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**The Court Martial of Lieutenant-Commander Dean Marsaw:
Lessons on Culture, Leadership, and Accountability for the CF**

By /par

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ACKOWLEDGEMENT

Marsaw's court martial; and to my academic advisor, who was patient enough to read the draft and offer his advice.

ABSTRACT

Between 1995 and1996 Lieutenant-Commander Dean Marsaw underwent court martial proceedings over the alleged abuse of his crew on board Her Majesty's Canadian Submarine OJIBWA. Allegations ranged from verbal to physical abuse and included an alleged incident of sexual abuse of a subordinate on board the boat he commanded. While the media focused on weaknesses in the Canadian Forces (CF) military justice system throughout Marsaw's court martial, this paper examines the 'lost story' concerning the court martial – how key lessons can be identified for the Canadian Forces in the areas of organizational culture, leadership and accountability. Marsaw's court martial represents three key factors in the interrelationship between culture, leadership, and accountability: the critical role of the leader as the primary agent who embeds culture in an organization; the historical and leadership style influences in Canadian submarine culture that impacted Marsaw's leadership ability; and at the institution level, the requirement for external accountability mechanisms due to failures in the CF's ability to self-regulate as a profession. The Somalia Commission identified the need for renewal in the areas of culture, leadership, and accountability during the era of Somalia and Marsaw, and fundamental changes have taken place in both CF culture and leadership; however, negligible change has occurred in the realm of accountability. While the Department of National Defence (DND) and the CF hold to the principles of and reporting requirements for accountability to the federal government, the CF has failed to introduce effective changes in the area of accountability for leader behaviour both at the individual and unit level, proving that the CF has lost its privilege for self-regulation as a profession of arms until it makes significant changes in this area.

CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

Ask a uniformed service member to define the term, 'organizational culture' as it applies to his/her profession and like most people, he or she might better describe the term than define it. And in typical soldier-like candour he/she may add that the term better fits in the corporate world than the military environment. The term 'culture' denotes the 'soft side' of the organization, which is difficult for soldiers to comprehend because they are called to a vocation that requires them to confront if called upon, the harsh reality of armed conflict. However, if the same service member were asked to describe his service's values, beliefs and attitudes, the member would clearly articulate the very essence of the term, 'organizational culture.'

A report published in 2000 by The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) entitled, *American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century: A Report of the CSIS International Security Program*, furnishes a rather straightforward definition of military culture as ". . . how things are done in a military organization."[1] Simply taken, this definition infers the idea of action and actors as agents of action. Military culture, therefore, involves a group who are identified as such because of shared beliefs and values that shape their attitudes, which are ultimately expressed in behaviour. Yet there is no guarantee that the group behaviour will reflect its values; in fact, past experience confirms that from time to time a schism has existed between the two. In the CF, this

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[1] Walter F. Ulmer Jr., Joseph J. Collins, and T.O. Jacobs. *American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century: A Report of the CSIS International Security Program*. Washington: Center for International and Security Studies, 2000, xviii.

divide has been evident in the events like Somalia and the Marsaw case where as much as the CF espoused traditional warrior values such as duty, honour, and integrity, the individual or group behaviour differed drastically from those values long upheld within the Canadian military.[2]

A series of scandals in the Canadian Forces (CF) during the 1990s brought to the forefront the CF's need to define a desired institutional culture because of the disconnection between its espoused and actual values. Consequently, the documents *Duty With Honour*, and *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*, (hereafter referred to as *Conceptual Foundations*) define for the first time in the history of the CF what it means to be a leader in the CF.[3] Up to that point no common CF culture had been clearly articulated to servicepersons. *Duty With Honour* defines the organizational (military) culture desired in the CF - its values, or in other words, its ethos. *Conceptual Foundations* takes the tenets of *Duty With Honour* and builds the CF leadership model, expressing leadership functions that are founded on a values-based framework.[4] The principles of both doctrinal manuals have been integrated into courses at every level in the CF, from basic training to leadership courses for officers and Non-

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[2] Major C.R. Shelley, "A Crisis of Character? Ethical Development in the Canadian Officer Corps." *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, 25, no. 4 (June 1996): 27. Prior to the recent articulation of the CF military ethos in *Duty With Honour*, the best formulation of a CF military ethos was based on the commissioning scroll of Canadian officers – loyalty, courage and integrity.

[3] Allan. D. English, "The Masks of Command: Leadership Differences in the Canadian Army, Navy and Air Force." In *The Operational Art: Canadian* Perspectives, ed. Allan English, 1-30. (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy, 2006), 1.

[4] Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000AP-004 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2005), i.

Commissioned Members (NCM).[5] From all accounts the Chief of Defence Staff's (CDS)

direction to incorporate these documents into the professional development system for all

CF members is being carried out.[6] But, has the CF embraced its new culture? More

importantly, to what extent has the organizational culture of the CF transpired into the

newly defined institutional culture described in *Duty With Honour*? Further, since

organizational culture may be defined in its simplest form as, ". . . how things are done

around here . . ."[7] what role does the leader play in shaping the organization's culture?

Finally, does an effective accountability framework currently exist within the CF that

encourages a holistic approach towards the transformation of its culture? While the

transformation of the CF culture is in its early implementation stage and analysis has not

yet been conducted on the success of this initiative, an examination of previous events in

the history of the CF regarding culture and leadership furnishes insight into influential

factors that prompted fundamental change in these areas.

The 1995-96 court martial of Lieutenant-Commander Dean Marsaw provides a

unique insight into the role of culture and its interrelationship with leadership and

command style within the submarine branch of the Canadian navy. Marsaw was the CO

of Her Majesty's Canadian Submarine (HMCS/M) OJIBWA from 1991 to 1993. During

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[5] Chief of the Defence Staff, *Leadership Manuals* CANFORGEN 069/05, CDS 027 DTG 081511Z APR 05, on-line; available from http://barker/Admin/Canforgen/2005/cfg05069_e.html; Internet; accessed 23 March 2007.

[6] Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-001 *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada* (Ottawa: DND Canada 2003), 1 and Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000AP-004 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations . . .*, i.

[7] Colonel M.D. Capstick, "Defining the Culture: The Canadian Army in the 21st Century." *Canadian Military Journal* 4, no.1 (Spring 2003): 47.

this period he was accused of mentally and physically abusing his crew, in addition to being accused of having committed the famous 'cigar tube' incident in which he allegedly sexually abused a subordinate during a mess dinner on board the submarine he commanded.[8] A member or members of Marsaw's crew leaked the stories to a local Halifax newspaper, describing Marsaw's command as a 'reign of fear' and his boat – 'the death boat' - because few had prospered under Marsaw's rule as CO: in fact several of his officers' requests to return to the surface fleet were directly related to the abuse they suffered under Marsaw as their CO. Seven charges were laid, of which five he was found guilty; however, the Court Martial Appeal Court later overturned the findings based on the inadequate technical merits of the Crown's arguments during the court martial proceedings.[9] A review of news articles during Marsaw's court martial reveals the focus of the press on the perceived injustice served to Marsaw due to a broken military justice system; few articles dealt with Marsaw's failure in command and what led to that failure. After the results of his court martial appeal however, the navy was forced to deal with this issue because the appeal court advised a new trial could be ordered if military authorities decided to proceed with the particular charges once again.[10] The navy's decision was not to re-convene a court martial but instead to deal directly with the systemic leadership and cultural issues in the submarine service that had produced a leader like Marsaw, whose leadership style not only failed to reflect the Canadian naval

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[8] Malcolm Dunlop, "Sub's captain under scrutiny: probe launched into alleged reign of fear on Ojibwa." *The Chronicle-Herald*, 16 December 1993, 1.

[9] Department of National Defence. *Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada Decision rendered September 10, 1997 in Lieutenant-Commander D.C. Marsaw v. Her Majesty the Queen (CMAC-395)*. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1997, 5.

[10] *Ibid.*, 27.

officer leadership style, it had nearly torpedoed his crew. Hence, the navy stepped in and delivered two swift blows: it administered a Career Review Board (CRB) on Marsaw, which ended his career; and it stood down the First Canadian Submarine Squadron under the auspices of the 'Waterfront Reorganization' of the Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Halifax Dockyard. In effect, the navy disbanded the First Canadian Submarine Squadron much like the Minister of National Defence (MND) had disbanded the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR) over the events in Somalia.[11] But the disbandment of the First Canadian Submarine Squadron was a 'quiet' one, falling on the heels of the CAR disbandment.[12]

LITERATURE SURVEY

In the aftermath of Somalia, a Commission of Inquiry identified serious fractures in the leadership, ethics and accountability within the CF in its work, *Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry*.[13] The Commission urged senior leadership to ". . . live by the military ethos and personify its core values . . ." if the CF desired that it retain its

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[11] Department of National Defence, "Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry: Post Deployment," [report on-line]; available from http://www.dnd.ca/somalia/vol1/v1c14e.htm; Internet; accessed 24 March 2007.

[12] Donna Winslow, *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia: A Socio-cultural Inquiry*. Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997, 83. The MND disbanded the Canadian Airborne Regiment on 04 March 1995. The First Canadian Submarine Squadron was stood down 09 February 1996.

[13] Department of National Defence, "Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry: The Military in Canadian Society," [report on-line]; available from http://www.forces.gc.ca/somalia/vol5/v5c43e.htm; Internet; accessed 22 February 2007.

credibility as a national institution in which the public places its trust.[14] It also

highlighted the critical role of the public and the media in their perception of the military

and identified the need for the CF to be continuously in tune with changing attitudes in

Canadian society to which it belongs.[15] This seminal work on the impact an eroded ethos

had on a CF subculture served as the starting point from which changes in CF culture and

leadership have since evolved. Another foundational work used by the CF in formulating

its current leadership manuals is Edgar Schein's book *Organizational Culture and*

Leadership in which he articulates the importance of leaders as drivers of organizational

culture. Schein contends that an individual can be a powerful instrument in creating,

transmitting and shaping organizational culture by imposing his values, attitudes, or

beliefs among the group through various means.[16] The CF has incorporated Schein's

theory of values-based leadership and its impact on embedding CF culture in a

forthcoming publication entitled, *Institutional Issues in the Canadian Forces:*

Contemporary Issues.

An addition to the literature on CF military culture and its historical roots is Allan

English's book, *Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective*. While he

covers the evolution of the profession of arms in Canada from an historical perspective,

the focus of his book concentrates on armed forces as a reflection of their society. In

particular, despite varying differences between the Canadian and American cultures,

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[14] *Ibid*.

[15] *Ibid*.

[16] Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*. 3rd ed. San Francisco: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2004, 225, 245.

English opines that increased interoperability between Canadian Forces and the US (United States) forces has resulted in the 'Americanization' of the CF. He further attests that American research on military culture may not apply to the CF because of inherent differences between the two nations' policies concerning their armed forces. An example would be Canadians' unwillingness to accept civil rights limitations on an individual in uniform, whereas Americans impose such limitations.[17]

While research has been conducted in the area of CF military culture recently, most publications and essays predominate on the corporate culture (CF culture) and army culture. Two decisive works that defined the unique attributes of a CF subculture and its impact on leadership and culture were Donna Winslow's paper, *Misplayed Loyalties: Military Culture and the Breakdown of Discipline in Two Peace Operations* and her book *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia: A Socio-cultural Inquiry*. These works identify how cultural influences within a subculture impinged upon on leader behaviour.

Richard Mayne's recently published book *Betrayed: Scandal, Politics, and Canadian Naval Leadership* covers the firing of Admiral Percy Nelles, the head of the Royal Canadian Navy, (RCN) in 1944. This historical account describes the RCN working at cross-purposes between two elite groups - the Regular navy and the volunteer Reserves - and the impact of Nelles' firing on civil-military relations, military professionalism, and leadership during WWII. *The Admirals: Canada's Senior Naval*

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[17] A.C. Okros, "The Gaps Between Military and Civilian Societies: A Canadian View on Military Professions in a Global Society." (Unpublished paper in possession of author): n.p., quoted in Allan D. English, *Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective*. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), 183.

Leadership in the Twentieth Century by Whitby, Haydon, and Gimblett provides relevant analyses of the Canadian navy's admirals and their leadership styles. The chapter on Admiral Landymore, "The Silent Service Speaks Out", contributes insight into the historical struggles of the Canadian submarine service.

Allan English's work, *The Masks of Command: Leadership Differences in the Canadian Army, Navy and Air Force* offers a particularly useful study on environmental subcultures in a unified armed forces.[18] While English acknowledges that each environment identifies itself as a subculture and is influential in developing leadership styles appropriate to the particular environment, there remains much room to conduct further analyses of the leadership characteristics which prevail among each subculture in the CF like the Canadian submarine service.

Since the Canadian navy and its submarine service share similar rich traditions with the Royal Navy (RN), Richard Gimblett's essay *Canadian Naval Command Styles* furnishes an appropriate source to understanding the Canadian submarine service leadership style. His work specifies the foundational requirement for technical competency in naval officers and focuses on the attributes that characterize the Canadian navy leadership style he refers to as the 'Anglo-American' naval command style. His list, summarizing seven characteristics of this command style, provides a useful basis

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[18] English defines the three services of the CF: navy, army, and air force, as subcultures. The three services are referred to as 'environments' as a result of the unification of the navy, army and air forces into the composite organization referred to as 'The Canadian Armed Forces' in 1968.

from which to understand similarities in leadership styles between the Canadian navy and its submarine service.

Writings in the field of submarine culture and leadership are sparse. Still, a few works, such as Jonathan Crane's book *Submarine*, provide exceptional insight into the shaping of submarine captains (CO) through the submarine officer command training known as 'Perisher'. Although written from a RN perspective, due to the historical link between the RN and the Canadian submarine service, it affords a basis from which to compare the Canadian submarine command style to Gimblett's piece on Canadian naval command style. Two other significant primary sources are germane in analyzing the role of culture and its interrelationship with leadership and command style in the Canadian submarine service: the Marsaw court martial transcripts and interviews conducted for this paper.[19] Even though the Court Martial Appeal Board overturned the findings of the court martial and recommended a retrial, the Board based its decision on the technical merits of the procedures of the trial itself and not on whether or not the alleged incidents did indeed happen.[20] The court martial transcripts, therefore, provide a primary source for analyzing the culture and leadership topics applicable to this paper. Forty-three Crown witnesses provided testimony relating to the leadership behaviour of Marsaw, which revealed a consistent picture of leader behaviour and command style that was influenced by cultural distinctions particular to the Canadian submarine service. As well,

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[19] Dr. Danielle Charbonneau, Research Ethics Chair, The Royal Military College of Canada, email correspondence, 23 November 2006. The author was granted permission from the Research Ethics Board of the Royal Military College of Canada to conduct interviews for this paper.

[20] Department of National Defence. *Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada Decision rendered September 10, 1997 . . .*, 5-27.

interviews were conducted with officers who served with Marsaw in the submarine service or who are current surface fleet officers with experience in dealing with the submarine service. Their first-hand knowledge of ". . . how things are done around here . . ."[21] was perceptive of the operations and organizational culture of the Canadian submarine service. Marsaw's case puts into sharp relief the command style of Canadian submariners in that he was atypical; he took to extreme measure what many others chose not to emulate. The court martial transcripts and interviews provide a greater understanding in how the autonomous workings of the First Canadian Submarine Squadron led to deficiencies in accountability in the areas of culture and leadership.

In light of the Marsaw events, three key lessons can be identified from his court martial: the critical role of the leader as the primary agent who embeds culture in an organization; the historical and leadership style influences in Canadian submarine culture that impacted Marsaw's leadership ability; and at the institution level, the requirement for external accountability mechanisms due to failures in the CF's ability to self-regulate as a profession. The aim of this paper is to examine the influences of a subculture in predicting a leadership/command style that can pose a threat to strengthening a desired common culture for the CF. The paper further identifies the CF's need to re-examine and overhaul its internal accountability measures with respect to CF leadership behaviour to ensure it aligns leader behaviour with the desired CF culture, thus not permitting subculture leadership styles to erode the values-based CF leadership style and the common CF culture.

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[21] Capstick, "Defining the Culture: The Canadian Army in the 21st Century." . . ., 47.

A theoretical approach to the study of organizational culture assists to formulate a robust definition of military culture. Having defined military culture, an appreciation of its aspects helps in understanding the development of the concept of autonomy as a fundamental assumption within Canadian submarine culture that further embedded the organizational culture of that service. Concurrent with the emerging autonomy that characterized the submarine service, the changing CF culture between 1960 and 1990 played a prominent role in forging stronger subculture identity particularly within the army (Canadian Airborne Regiment) and the navy (submarine service) as a result of the increasing bureaucratization of the corporate CF. The leader's role as the principal embedding mechanism in shaping organizational culture amidst an already strong autonomous culture in the submarine service, coupled with broad changes to the CF, formulated the embedding and transferring of submarine culture within successive generations of the submarine service. Both CF culture and submarine culture influences, therefore, deeply impacted Marsaw whose leadership was an aberration of the Anglo-American naval command style because his behaviour expressed allegiance to the elite of the Canadian submarine service rather than the Canadian Forces as a whole.

While Marsaw's leadership style advocated the elitism of the submariner culture, his behaviour remained unchecked by peers and superiors within his immediate chain of command. As a result, Marsaw received the tacit approval of his superiors to continue fostering his bully-like behaviour that demoralized his crew and further eroded CF cultural values of duty, loyalty, and integrity.[22] Insufficient internal accountability

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[22] Shelley, "A Crisis of Character? Ethical Development in the Canadian Officer Corps." . . ., 27.

measures within the First Canadian Submarine Squadron exacerbated Marsaw's behaviour, which culminated in the navy stepping in to resolve the leadership and ethics issues that pervaded the submarine service. The Marsaw events proved to be the pinnacle of a subculture gone awry within the Canadian navy, much like the Canadian Airborne Regiment within the army, serving to underscore the need for a CF-wide overhaul of its culture and leadership.

The importance of the Marsaw experience cannot be underestimated. While the CF instituted fundamental changes to re-defining its culture and leadership doctrine since that time, it has failed to address the issue of accountability for leadership behaviour as outlined by the Somalia Commission of Inquiry:

> Accountability is a principal mechanism for ensuring conformity to standards of action . . . . In a properly functioning system or organization, there should be accountability for one's actions, regardless of whether those actions are properly executed and lead to a successful result, or are improperly carried out and produce injurious consequences. An accountable official cannot shelter behind the actions of a subordinate, and an accountable official is always answerable to superiors.[23]

Despite the fact that the institution has made nominal efforts towards increased accountability, deficiencies in holding to account the individual member, the unit, and the institution exist, threatening long-term change to CF culture. The CF will remain impotent to produce sustainable change to its culture and leadership until it holds

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[23] Department of National Defence, "Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry: Accountability," [report on-line]; available from http://www.dnd.ca/somalia/vol0/v0s10e.htm; Internet; accessed 24 March 2007.

individual leaders at every level accountable for how each embeds and fosters CF culture and values-based leadership.

CHAPTER 2 – ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE THEORY AND APPLICATION TO THE CANADIAN SUBMARINE SERVICE

TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF MILITARY CULTURE

The circumstances surrounding the court martial of Lieutenant-Commander Dean Marsaw highlight the influence of military culture and especially subculture on leader behaviour and overall military effectiveness. Culture impacts leader behaviour, which affects the public's perception concerning the legitimacy of the CF as a national institution. Where leaders demonstrate inappropriate behaviour, it taints the popular image of the CF in Canadians' eyes. The very value of the CF is called into question and rightly so. Canadians view their military as the 'voice' of Canada internationally, and thus they expect the CF to act with the highest code of honour and decorum. To further understand how culture influences leadership behaviour, further study of the concepts of organizational culture and its application to CF culture assist in understanding the role of the leader as pivotal in transmitting that culture internally within the organization and externally to society. Application of the theoretical framework regarding organizational culture to the Marsaw court martial case demonstrates how particular attributes within the Canadian submarine service played a pivotal role in cultivating his incompetent leadership style.

Culture at large, including organizational culture, contains certain aspects held or shared in common by groups. Some of these may include: observed behavioural

regularities such as the language of the group; group norms like standards and values that evolve; espoused values – the articulated principles that are goals to achieve within the group; formal philosophy formed in policies; rules of the game; embedded skills; shared meanings primarily through group interaction; and 'root metaphors' or 'integrating symbols' – those ideas, feelings, and images that help characterize themselves such as artefacts.[24] These elements are important for they help to influence culture, but they do not provide an adequate definition of the term. According to sociologist Edgar Schein, although organizational culture is often referred to by norms, values, behaviour patterns, and traditions, culture offers two other critical elements to the concept of sharing. The first is that of structural stability within the group. The culture of an organization is ". . . not only shared, but deep and stable."[25] In this context 'deep' means ". . . less conscious and therefore less tangible and less visible."[26] The other element is the integration of the elements into a coherent whole. It is this patterning or integration that is the essence of what Schein defines as culture. Therefore, culture is about the accumulated sharing of a group over time, often characterized by problem solving, which promotes learning as a result of shared experiences.[27] Repeated socialization provides stability to group membership, which in turn forms culture.[28]

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[24]Edgar H. Schein, "Defining Organizational Culture," In *Classics of Organizational Theory*, 6th ed., edited by Jay M. Shafritz, J. Steven Ott, and Yong Suk Jang, 360-367. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2005, 363.

[25] *Ibid.*, 363.

[26] *Ibid.*, 363.

[27] *Ibid.*, 364.

[28] *Ibid.*, 364.

 With these aspects explained, Schein concludes with a well-rounded definition of

organizational culture:

> A pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it
> solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that
> has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be
> taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in
> relation to those problems.[29]

The Layers of Organizational Culture

 Beyond the importance of agreeing upon an acceptable definition of

organizational culture rests the significance of understanding the layers of organizational

culture, because changes that occur among these various levels can deeply impact an

organization's effectiveness. Schein's comprehensive analysis of organizational culture

provides a solid foundation to understanding this concept. Based on the premise that

cultures and subcultures form from within societies, he describes three layers of culture

that can translate to organizations as well. The first level is artefacts. Artefacts are

tangible aspects of culture that give shape, structure, and meaning to those unfamiliar to

the organization or are in the process of being socialized into it.[30] Within the military,

awards, uniforms, rewards, and certificates are typical artefacts. The next level is

espoused beliefs and values. These are formed through repeated experiences of problem-

solving within a group that, over time, influence how one ought to think and behave as a

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[29] Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership . . .*, 17.

[30] *Ibid.*, 25.

result of leader influence to resolving problems.[31] If a particular problem is resolved, the

leader's beliefs and assumptions are acknowledged by the group as an acceptable

response to resolving an issue. If however beliefs and values are not based on prior

learning, the organization fails to act upon their 'espoused beliefs'; while members know

what is expected of them in certain situations, their conduct differs from what they

actually *value* when challenged in those circumstances, thus leaving behaviour

unexplained and a culture that is dysfunctional.[32] The third layer is the assumptions

level. If the organization's beliefs and values coincide with the basic underlying

assumptions held by the organization, then assumptions assist in amalgamating the group

and serve as a ". . . source of identity and core mission."[33] Schein describes assumptions

as those fundamental beliefs when, after repeated problem-solving, have produced

successful results for the group that goes beyond a hypothesis and ". . . gradually

becomes treated as reality."[34] As assumptions are less visible and are, therefore, more

difficult to change, they become potent within cultures so that the group believes that

acting in contravention to them is inconceivable.[35]

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[31] *Ibid.*, 28.

[32] *Ibid.*, 30.

[33] *Ibid.*, 30.

[34] *Ibid.*, 30.

[35] *Ibid.*, 31.

Assumptions guide behaviour, teaching the group how to think or perceive or feel about certain things. Schein asserts that since assumptions tend to be

> . . . nonconfrontable and nondebatable . . . they are very difficult to change because it changes the fundamental core of an organization, often causing great anxiety. Once the basic assumptions of a group are formed, it provides a 'mental map' that provides comfort when working with those who share the same assumptions, while on the other hand provides a level of discomfort where different assumptions exist.[36]

Any organization can be studied on all three levels, but misinterpretation will occur if one attempts to study the artefacts and the espoused beliefs and values apart from understanding the pattern of basic assumption held by that group.[37] By understanding the deeper invisible basic assumptions of an organization, one can more accurately interpret the other levels of the organization's culture and deal appropriately with them.[38]

In order for cultural change to take effect in the CF, senior leadership had to reveal the levels of its existing organizational culture to discover what lay at its very core – the assumptions level - if it hoped to ensure lasting change for the health and viability of the organization. The impetus for change lay in the series of incidents like the murder of a Somali teenager, allegations of sexual harassment, hazing rituals, and assault that, if studied independent of each other, appear as though an example of nothing more than isolated incidents.[39] In reality, systemic flaws existed at every leadership level including

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[36] *Ibid.*, 32.

[37] *Ibid.*, 36.

[38] *Ibid.*, 36.

the CDS, who, during the Somalia Inquiry testified his subordinates had betrayed him by claiming they falsified documents bearing his signature and subsequently released them to the press. The Minister was not amused; within six weeks after his testimony, General Boyle resigned as CDS.[40]

Application to CF Organizational Culture

Taking Schein's theoretical framework and applying it to the CF, common themes emerge. In particular, the two themes proposed by Schein that are foundational to the definition of organizational culture – that of structural stability, and the element of integration into a holistic functioning of the organization - are fundamental to the concept of military culture. The CF is built upon a hierarchical structure typified by a rank structure and other structural echelons of authority, accountability, and responsibility that provide stability, which institutionalizes the culture. Furthermore, when these aspects are patterned over successive generations, they give meaning and coherency to the functioning of the organization. In the case of the CF, that sense of purpose is not just applicable to the members of that culture but also to the public at large; the CF exists to serve its citizens as an institution entrusted to enforce national security policy on behalf of the government of Canada through the lawful application of military force. A

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[39] Donna Winslow, "Misplayed Loyalties: Military Culture and the Breakdown of Discipline in Two Peace Operations," in *The Human in Command: exploring the modern military experience* (New York: Kluwer Academic Plenum Publishers, 2000), 294.

[40] Scott Taylor, "Taking the Middle Ground: A Unique Vantage Point," In *From the Outside Looking In: Media and Defence Analyst Perspectives on Canadian Military Leadership*, ed. Colonel Bernd Horn, 128-141 (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy), 2005, 137.

hierarchical structure, authority, accountability, and responsibility are essential elements within the CF to help it function properly. Since the government of Canada grants legal authority to its armed forces to apply force up to and including lethal force when necessary, a legal and ethical obligation rests on the CF to fulfil this obligation judiciously.[41] Hierarchical structures, rules of engagement and the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), therefore, provide structure so that when force is applied, it is carried out legally - in accordance with Canadian law and government policy - and ethically, legitimizing the CF as a national institution before the government and the Canadian public.

Tension between espoused military values and actual values ('values-in-use' in sociological terms) in the CF has always existed but the scandals during the 1990s revealed a deep schism between the two, alerting the Canadian public that something had gone terribly wrong within a trusted national institution. While the visible signs of military culture such as artefacts may change to some degree over decades and centuries, the government who invests the public's tax dollars in their armed forces expect congruency between what their military aspires to uphold and its actual conduct. Underlying the organizational culture of the CF then is its ethos made up of its basic assumptions, beliefs and values of military service, which is designed as a centre of gravity and the impetus for effective leader behaviour during peacetime and war.[42] An

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[41] Department of National Defence. *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution*. Ottawa: DND Canada, in progress, vii, 4.

[42] Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-001 *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada . . .*, 10, 25.

ethos erodes when assumptions, beliefs, and values abrogate the core military values of duty, integrity, loyalty, and courage, or fail to integrate with Canadian society's values of democracy; the concept of peace, order, and good government; and the rule of law.[43] The court martial events of Dean Marsaw are most interesting as they provide an example of when a subculture's actual values conflict with the espoused values of the larger culture, malevolent leader behaviour can result in some leaders, which can significantly impact organizational effectiveness.

ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE: APPLICATION TO THE CANADIAN SUBMARINE SERVICE

Historical Development of Canadian Submarine Culture

As discussed, artefacts and values create basic assumptions over time in any culture, especially for the Canadian submarine service.[44] Since assumptions are the deepest level of culture and the most difficult to change, a brief history of the Canada's submarine service highlights a key assumption that permeates the submarine service and serves to appreciate an understanding of this subculture from an organizational culture perspective.

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[43] *Ibid.*, 29-31.

[44] Henceforth in this paper the 'Canadian submarine service' will be referred to as 'submarine service' or 'First Canadian Submarine Squadron' or 'submarine squadron'. The phrases are interchangeable and refer to the submarines (boats) and the squadron headquarters that make up the submarine squadron organization of Canada's navy.

The autonomous nature of submarine operations and the organizational structure of the Canadian submarine service contribute to an underlying assumption that it is a separate service of the Canadian navy and therefore, a subculture. The Canadian submarine service is a recognized subculture of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), as it shares some similar artefacts, values, and behaviour common with its 'host society'.[45] But as will be seen, the RCN's distinct break from RN cultural influences post-WWII signalled the beginning of a truly Canadian naval culture in the RCN. The submarine service, on the other hand, remained largely dominated by the RN due to close ties established as a result of capital acquisition, doctrine, and training.[46] The RN submarine service was recognized early in its history as a 'service within a service' due in large part to different artefacts, beliefs, and values that became embedded over time into the basic assumptions of the subculture. These features include relaxed 'pirate rig' at sea and living ashore in foreign ports due to inhospitable working conditions on the boats; a duty watch system alongside that was more relaxed in its structure than the surface fleet; and a general lethargy towards the navy's fastidious preoccupation with ceremonial protocol.[47]

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[45] Karen D. Davis and Brian McKee, Chap. 2 in *Institutional Issues in the Canadian Forces: Contemporary Issues*, ed. Robert Walker, n.p. (Kingston: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, in press). When a relationship exists between a subculture and a parent culture, sociologists refer to the parent culture as the 'host society'. Similarities are evident between the two; however the subculture will have distinguishing features that differentiate it from the host society.

[46] Lieutenant-Commander John Tremblay, "The Court Martial of Lieutenant-Commander Dean Marsaw," *Interviewed by* Commander Mary-Ellen Clark, oral citation, Toronto: 29 October 2006. Except for a short time in the 1990s when Canada assumed training of the submarine command qualification within Maritime Forces Atlantic, all training for 'dolphins' qualification for both officers and Non-Commissioned Members, (NCMs) and submarine command qualification (for officers) was conducted at H.M.S. Dolphin in the United Kingdom. Since the RN has discontinued running the submarine command qualification course for diesel boats (SSK), Canadian submarine officers take this course in Australia, the Netherlands or Norway.

[47] Nicholas Lambert. *The Submarine Service, 1900-1918*. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2001, xxii.

Since the Canadian submarine service has its roots in the RN, it is no surprise that the same features mentioned above also applied to the Canadian submarine service for decades.[48] The RN has actually contributed more to the institutionalization of the submarine culture in Canada than the RCN ever did.

The Canadian submarine service was founded in August 1914 when the premier of British Columbia purchased two Chilean submarines from the US with the purpose of defending the west coast of Canada during WWI.[49] Between WWI and the commencement of WWII, the 'service within a service' suffered from the lack of government commitment towards expanding its fledgling fleet of submarines. During WWII, the RCN's absence of submarines seriously impeded its ability to effect lethal scores against U-boats. Hence, Canadian submariners saw the majority of wartime service in RN submarines.[50] While Canadian submariners served with the RN, the RCN's participation in the Battle of Atlantic (BOA) became its 'Vimy Ridge'[51]. The six-year BOA in which the RCN participated and in which many young Canadian lives were

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[48] Commander Michael Craven, "The Court Martial of Lieutenant-Commander Dean Marsaw," *Interviewed by* Commander Mary-Ellen Clark, telephone interview, Toronto: 12 March 2007. The matter of 'Pirate Rig' in the Canadian submarine service was finally addressed in Canadian Submarine Standing Orders (CANSSOs) promulgated during the tenure of Commander Bill Sloan, as Commander First Canadian Submarine Squadron, in the mid-1980s. Use of 'Pirate Rig' was formally prohibited with the adoption of prescribed patterns of at-sea submarine service dress, including lightweight USN-pattern coveralls.

[49] Julie H. Ferguson, *Through a Canadian Periscope: The Story of the Canadian Submarine Service* (Toronto: Dundurn Press Limited), 1995, 3, 14.

[50] *Ibid.*, 113, 165.

[51] Michael L. Hadley, "The Popular Image of the Canadian Navy," In *A Nation's Navy*, ed. Michael L. Hadley, Robert N. Huebert, and Fred W. Crickard, 35-56 (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1996), 54.

lost proved the RCN had come of age.[52] According to Michael Hadley, this experience

defined the organizational culture of the navy. The function of a fleet – what it can do, is

greatly determined by the traditions, values, and behaviour of its officers - ". . . the

strategic culture of the officer corps."[53] Naval officers trained by the RN had been

schooled under the traditions of Mahan, Corbett, and Richmond, which Hadley states

cultivated the 'operational ethic' of the naval officer, characterized by "'. . . the fighting

spirit,' initiative, and offensive action . . . ." that predominates among naval officers to

this day.[54]

Notwithstanding the strong RN cultural influence that acculturated RCN officers,

the Mainguy report published in 1949 highlighted dissatisfaction among Canadian sailors

concerning a breakdown in the relationship between officers and petty officers, a failure

to provide workable Welfare committees, and an overall desire to decrease RN cultural

influence – to be less colonial and more Canadian.[55] Eventually, despite some senior

naval officers' reluctance to 'Canadianize' the RCN, changes did evolve.[56] These

changes occurred in the visible artefacts dimension of organizational culture: Canadian

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[52] English, *Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective . . .*, 88-89.

[53] Hadley, "The Popular Image of the Canadian Navy," In *A Nation's Navy . . .*, 58.

[54] *Ibid.*, 59.

[55] Dr. Richard H. Gimblett, "What the Mainguy Report Never Told Us: The Tradition of 'Mutiny' in the Royal Canadian Navy before 1949," *Canadian Military Journal* 4, no. 1 (Spring 2003) [journal on-line]; available from http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/engraph/Vol1/no2/pdf/85-92_e.pdf; Internet; accessed 04 February 2007.

[56] James Goldrick, "Strangers in their own Seas? A Comparison of the Australian and Canadian Naval Experience, 1910-1982," in *A Nation's Navy*, ed. Michael L. Hadley, Robert N. Huebert, and Fred W. Crickard, 325-338 (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1996), 333.

sailors were permitted to wear 'Canada' flashes on their uniforms; the CF Ensign

replaced the Naval Jack; and the Battle of Atlantic Sunday celebrations replaced the age-

old RN tradition of the Battle of Trafalgar in HMC Canadian wardrooms.[57] As well,

Canadian warships were designed for the first time as distinctly 'Canadian' with the

creation of the St. Laurent class destroyers and the navy's operational focus shifted to US

Navy (USN) doctrine during the Cold War era.[58] While these physical changes to the

navy's organizational culture took shape, the submarine service remained predominantly

influenced by the RN, especially as a result of the acquisition of the Oberon-class

(referred to as 'O-boats') submarines in the 1960s. During the time in which the Liberal

government swayed between the purchase of SSNs from the US and SSKs from the RN,

Canada's submarine service began to shift its doctrine and tactics towards a USN focus.

Language and procedures, a part of culture, changed to fit USN submarine doctrine as a

result of the acquisition of HMCS/M Grilse, a USN submarine in 1961, and in

anticipation of the acquisition of SSNs.[59] Eventually the language, doctrine and tactical

operations reverted back to RN practices when the government decided to purchase the

RN Oberon-class boats.[60] The progressive move on the part of the RCN to adopt its

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[57] Hadley, "The Popular Image of the Canadian Navy," In *A Nation's Navy . . .*, 54.

[58] Peter T. Haydon, "Sailors, Admirals, and Politicians: The Search for Identity After the War," In *A Nation's Navy*, ed. Michael L. Hadley, Robert N. Huebert, and Fred W. Crickard, 221-235 (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1996), 230.

[59] *Ibid.*, 255. Language also characterizes culture, according to Schein and nowhere would this be more evident than in the submarine service as they changed to adopt USN doctrine. For instance, Canadian submariners were accustomed to the order, 'Hard-a-port!' whereas the USN submarine service used, 'Full left rudder.' Not only did the change in language cause confusion, but the changes in procedures did as well.

[60] Ferguson, Through a Canadian Periscope: The Story of the Canadian Submarine Service . . ., 253.

national culture, while the submarine service reverted to RN culture, highlights the disconnection between the wider RCN and its submarine branch.

Autonomy: A Cultural Distinction of the Canadian Submarine Service

While history bears out how the submarine service was distinct from the RCN in its physical artefacts, the deeper aspects of culture – the attitudes, values, and behaviours that are developed over time - reinforce the underlying cultural assumption of autonomy. This autonomy has had a profound effect in the manner in which operations were conducted and in the leadership style particular to the submarine service. Understanding the role of the submarine in maritime warfare and the role of the Commanding Officer (or captain) of a submarine helps to clarify this concept.

Submarines differ from surface warships in fundamental aspects. Referred to as the 'Silent Service', a submarine's key asset is its cloak of invisibility. It is a weapon of stealth and best employed covertly.[61] Submarines carry out a series of tailored naval tasks largely unsuited for a blue water navy such as inshore operations and laying of mines, photo reconnaissance, clandestine operations and assisting in special operations forces (SOF) operations.[62] The SSK in particular brings significant strength to the

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[61] Captain(N) Laurence Hickey, "Perisher: The Submarine Driver's License." (Halifax: in progress, 2006), 38.

[62] *Ibid.*, 38.

maritime battlespace due to its sustained ability to operate virtually unseen and unheard for extended periods of time.[63]

Submarines are more vulnerable to the effects of nature and the risk of collision than surface warships, due to their inherently reduced reserve of buoyancy. To make this point, one submariner commander, who has frigate command experience, suggests that in a surface warship several personnel could fall asleep on watch and the ship would continue to float. The same scenario aboard a submarine would risk certain peril.[64]

The demand for safety is increased in submarine operations. A submarine's crew complement is smaller than that of a warship and unlike surface sailors, every submariner must have an intimate knowledge of the hydraulics, low and high pressure air, electrical, and damage control systems in order to live up to the motto: 'float – move – fight'; the vessel's very survival depends on it.[65] Therefore, a higher demand for safety is required, and all training is centred on a high achievement of this criterion.[66]

The command qualification invested in only one officer aboard a submarine gives great autonomy in commanding this platform. There is also only one command-qualified

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[63] Ferguson, Through a Canadian Periscope: The Story of the Canadian Submarine Service . . ., 253-262.

[64] Captain(N) Laurence Hickey, "The Court Martial of Lieutenant-Commander Dean Marsaw," *Interviewed by* Commander Mary-Ellen Clark, cassette recording, Halifax: 27 December 2006.

[65] The motto of the Canadian navy and its submarine service.

[66] Commander D.R. Charlton, "Stress and the Submarine Command Course," *RNE* 45, no. 2 (circa 1990), 26. Photocopy held by author.

officer serving in a submarine whereas the CO, the Executive Officer (XO) and perhaps the Combat Officer in a surface warship will be command-qualified.[67] While the entire navy has supported the 'mission command' leadership style for countless years, a submarine commander enjoys greater flexibility to operate under this philosophy as he/she usually operates covertly and alone, unlike surface warships, and is removed from regular communications with higher headquarters staff.[68]

Finally, a key factor in submarine operations is the effective teamwork fostered by the captain that is grounded in the crew's implicit trust and confidence in his ability to lead. As the only command-qualified officer on board, the crew look directly to him for the final say and for reassurance during stressful events.[69] History bears this oreientation out; in the initial years of the Canadian submarine service a young Canadian officer under training for command encountered some difficulties with the longitudinal stability of the boat. The instructor ordered 'full ahead' when the officer, ordered, 'Full astern and blow everything!' The crew ignored the instructor and instantly obeyed their CO, who had given the correct order as it turned out.[70] This implicit trust must be earned and is highly regarded as a sacred trust among the crew as it is critical to operating the vessel safely during peacetime and war.[71]

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[67] Hickey, "The Court Martial of Lieutenant-Commander Dean Marsaw,". . ., 27 December 2006.

[68] *Ibid*.

[69] The term 'him' is not gender specific in this context, acknowledging the integration of women into command appointments in the Canadian navy and submarine service.

[70] Ferguson, Through a Canadian Periscope: The Story of the Canadian Submarine Service . . ., 29.

ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND CF EFFECTIVENESS: THE MARSAW CASE

The Role of the Leader

The theoretical framework of organizational culture and the concept of autonomy in the Canadian submarine service serve as the background to appreciate the link between culture and effectiveness. The critical link between the two is the leader. Although this relationship involves leaders at every level within a military unit, the key leader in any unit is the CO. Of course, he does not act in isolation but the CO is the one primarily responsible for creating, embedding, and transmitting culture through a variety of means.[72] When the CO demonstrates leader behaviour consistent with an espoused military ethos, followers will imitate the attitudes, beliefs, and values of the leader that will result in overall effectiveness – mission success.[73] This relationship is accentuated in a submarine, where the small crew is tightly knit in a cohesive team and the captain's

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[71] Canada, Court Martial Transcripts, *Her Majesty the Queen v. Lieutenant-Commander Dean C. Marsaw, Standing Court Martial Canada, Nova Scotia, Canadian Forces Base Halifax* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence), 1994-1995, 1423-1449.

[72] Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership. . .*, 246-261. The key leadership team on board a surface warship or a submarine in the Canadian navy is known as the 'Command team (or formerly 'The Command triad'), otherwise jokingly referred to as 'The Father, Son and Holy Ghost' made up of the CO, XO and the Coxswain. This structure is often transferred to ashore establishments within the Formations on each coast. Each leader in the triad has a distinct role in embedding and transmitting culture within the unit. To supplement the CO in creating culture, the XO is responsible for the administration and discipline of all officers, while the Coxswain is responsible for the discipline, welfare, and morale of all NCMs on board.

[73] Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000AP-004 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations . . .*, 15-32.

constant presence in the control room makes him the key agent for transmitting culture to his subordinates.[74] Based on the interviews conducted for this paper and the court martial transcripts, Marsaw's underlying assumption that he could command in a completely autonomous manner was perpetuated by the submarine service that fostered that same assumption over many years. However, Marsaw took this to extreme levels of independence as evidenced by his bizarre behaviour which violated core military values and values upheld in Canadian society and ultimately undermined the credibility of the submarine service, the navy, and the CF.

The Leader as Principal Agent of Embedding Culture

The means by which leaders transmit and embed culture contributes to organizational effectiveness. For more mature organizations like the CF, the primary means of embedding culture is through the socialization process.[75] This socialization takes place throughout the member's career from recruiting, through all forms of training, through education, and through working relationships, which acculturate members into the military culture. The importance of the socialization process has been recently

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[74] Unlike a warship where the captain reports to the Operations Room (Ops Room) during the second and first degree of readiness, a higher state of alert in a warship, the submarine captain often works in the control room in all degrees of readiness, with his officers and crew who are on watch. As well, the captain will always assume charge of the vessel when conducting attack drills, unlike a surface warship, making his command presence more prevalent on board a submarine.

[75] Schein, *Organizational Culture and* Leadership . . ., 245.

underscored by a values-based CF ethos and CF leadership doctrine.[76] When the leader demonstrates values-based leadership behaviour that is aligned with the CF ethos it contributes to organizational effectiveness because conduct values are the centre of gravity through which CF effectiveness is achieved.[77] The leader is, therefore, the agent through which these outcomes are accomplished or not accomplished.[78]

Leaders model their organization's culture based on a combination of individual beliefs, values, and attitudes and those of the organization to which they belong. During the leadership crises of the 1990s, the lack of a clearly defined CF ethos left individual leaders to rely on various means of expressing an ethos, which included the traditional ideal of the 'heroic warrior' typified by a male dominant aggressive leadership style, and distinctive regimental and squadron attitudes and values cultivated within subcultures.[79] This weakly articulated ethos often pitted subcultures against society's expectations of a military that must be adaptive with and responsive to the larger Canadian society in which the military operates. When the military lacks a well-defined ethos, the individual leader becomes the critical mass through which culture is transmitted to others. The assumptions, beliefs, and values held by a leader will therefore determine the unit's effectiveness. Again, Schein offers the most comprehensive analysis on how leaders embed and transmit culture that contributes to organizational effectiveness.

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[76] Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000AP-004 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations . . .*, 15-32.

[77] *Ibid.*, 18.

[78] *Ibid.*, 45-54.

[79] Winslow, *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia: A Socio-cultural Inquiry . . .*, 68-82.

The most powerful means through which Marsaw transmitted and embedded culture, according to Schein's model, concerned those aspects to which Marsaw devoted his entire focus.   Leaders embed culture through what they pay attention to, measure, and control on a regular basis.[80] This tool is powerful for transmitting culture. Even questions or comments directed to a specific area of concentration denote what matters to that leader.[81] Through the process of socialization, followers will pick up on these clues, however invisible they are to the naked eye, and respond appropriately to the leader's goals or desired outcomes.[82] Another means of discovering what a leader measures and controls is derived through the leader's emotional outbursts, especially when one of his assumptions or important values is being challenged.[83] This emotional means to resolving crises or problems creates anxiety in followers and followers typically try to modify their behaviour to accommodate the leader and to avoid this uncomfortable display of leadership.[84] Another critical trigger through which to discover what the leader pays attention to and tries to control is the way in which he handles inconsistency and conflict. For instance, a leader may espouse decentralized control and yet retain that control and work around others in the organization.[85] Subordinates will, therefore, find compensatory mechanisms to accommodate for the leader's idiosyncrasies and will try to

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[80] Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership . . .*, 246-247.

[81] *Ibid.*, 247.

[82] *Ibid.*, 247.

[83] *Ibid.*, 249.

[84] *Ibid.*, 249.

[85] *Ibid.*, 249.

protect the organization from that dysfunctional leader.[86] In some cases the organization will create further subcultures or a counterculture to deal with this dysfunction.[87]

The Marsaw Impact on Culture: 'Reign of Fear'

Morale is a force multiplier of military effectiveness and directly relates to culture – troops who exude confidence and discipline in performing their tasks increase the likelihood of achieving mission success. Many witnesses during the court martial testified that they believe it was the CO's responsibility to set and maintain high morale on board a submarine.[88] What the CO paid attention to or measured, therefore, impacted morale and unit effectiveness.

Marsaw's obsession over perfectionism deeply impacted OJIBWA's morale and ability to operate effectively. Testimonies from one of HMCS/M OJIBWA's officers stated Marsaw would regularly change the operational status of the control room by turning off switches and lowering the radio volume in order to test his officers' situational awareness abilities.[89] While this situation might appear to be a reasonable training scenario, it terrified the crew. His actions often directly affected the safety of the

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[86] *Ibid.*, 249.

[87] *Ibid.*, 254.

[88] Canada, Court Martial Transcripts, *Her Majesty the Queen v. Lieutenant-Commander Dean C. Marsaw, Standing Court Martial Canada . . .*, 716.

[89] *Ibid.*, 844. Testimony revealed that it is standard operating procedure that only the captain or the Officer of the Watch (OOW) has authority to alter the state of the control room in this manner.

submarine.[90] Crew members testified that they personally witnessed their captain alter the submarine's state; they also re-counted Marsaw's vilification whenever they failed to notice these changes immediately.[91] Several crew commented that the entire crew was becoming increasingly fearful for the submarine and crew safety because of Marsaw's behaviour; his actions reflected deliberate hazarding the ship, an offence subject to court martial.[92] Marsaw's demand for high performance from his team was cloaked in the assumption that as CO, he was infallible, and when he perceived this assumption was threatened, he resorted to emotional outbursts, creating stress so that the crew tried to accommodate for the CO by concentrating more carefully on their tasks, yet without success.[93] He habitually remarked publicly that his crew let him down, yet insisted it was through no fault of his own.[94] When the crew's performance fell short of his expectations, Marsaw lost his temper; witnesses testified that he delivered derogatory and harassing remarks directly at individuals whenever they made even a minor mistake.[95] These profane remarks were degrading comments in direct contravention of the protection against discrimination afforded individuals under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.[96] Many witnesses commented that despite their concerted efforts

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[90] *Ibid*., 844.

[91] *Ibid*., 1423-1449.

[92] *Ibid*., 1423-1449.

[93] Canada, Court Martial Transcripts, *Her Majesty the Queen v. Lieutenant-Commander Dean C. Marsaw, Standing Court Martial Canada . . .*, 1335.

[94] *Ibid*., 844.

[95] *Ibid*., 583-584.

to improve their performance and thereby please their captain – a natural reaction to try to alleviate the tension in this situation according to Schein - their performance declined further because of increased stress levels, further underscoring Schein's principle that how a leader chooses to respond emotionally to events determines what that leader considers important or controls. Marsaw's perfectionism evidenced through his emotional outbursts of anger and abuse affected his crew detrimentally, directly reducing their chances of success and effectiveness as a team.

While Marsaw espoused decentralization (ensuring everyone contributed their part to team effectiveness), he practiced centralized control of everything within the boat, which adversely affected crew morale. Watch team leaders, who are given the responsibility to run the watch in a submarine, are the captain's representative for the safety and operations of the boat.[97] Their responsibilities include decision-making on the captain's behalf and directing the watch in accordance with captain's standing orders. Yet under Marsaw's command, his rule of control did not allow his officers room to make decisions even though they had proven themselves under previous captains and the Submarine Squadron Commander (SM1) during training serials on board. OJIBWA's

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[96] Canada, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, "Equality Rights," http://lois.justice.gc.ca/en/Charter/index.html#libertes; Internet; accessed 10 March 2007. Under article 15 (1) of the Charter every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.

[97] Tremblay, "The Court Martial of Lieutenant-Commander Dean Marsaw." *Interviewed by* Commander Mary-Ellen Clark, oral citation, Toronto: 29 October 2006.

Chief Engine Room Artificer (CERA), a seasoned submariner, asserted:

> EXAMINED BY PROSECUTOR Q. Can you comment on how watch leaders led or made decisions when you would discuss engineering matters with them? A. Watch leaders never actually made decisions. Every simple little thing the Captain was informed of. Q. Before any action was taken? A. Before any action was taken.[98]

The CERA further testified Marsaw's command style offended him because Marsaw belittled his officers and senior NCMs. Unlike nineteen other CO s under whom the CERA had served, Marsaw was the only one who insisted the CERA was never permitted to brief him on the engineering state of the submarine unless the boat conducted a dive. The CERA explained this action was unusual and placed an unnecessary echelon in the briefing sequence during an emergency. Recognizing that OJIBWA's engineering officer (EO) had proven his technical expertise but lacked experience as a head of department in running a boat, the CERA testified that the normal routine would be that he report directly to the CO if the EO was off-watch or if an emergency happened.[99] Yet, Marsaw insisted that the CERA brief the EO and the EO then brief the CO. While defence counsel challenged the CERA that this procedure could have been a result of Marsaw's intention to train the EO, the CERA refuted this contention by stating it was Marsaw's manipulative control, which constrained his crew from operating effectively as a team. In completing his testimony, the CERA stated he would not go to war with Marsaw because he was a 'one-man show', a CO that did not trust his officers, and as a result, the

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[98] Canada, Court Martial Transcripts, *Her Majesty the Queen v. Lieutenant-Commander Dean C. Marsaw, Standing Court Martial Canada . . .*, 1029.

[99] *Ibid.*, 1029.

CERA did not trust his judgment, especially given the stressful conditions of operating a submarine.[100]

The hallmark of the navy is its divisional system, and for years the CF boasted of a functioning grievance system, both which are designed for the maintenance of high morale and discipline. Although unknown publicly to this day who approached *The Chronicle-Herald* reporter and leaked the stories of abuse on board OJIBWA, it is commonly believed that a crew member or members did so because of a fragmented divisional system and a CF grievance system that failed to function as intended within OJIBWA and within the squadron headquarters.[101] When sailors perceived that the divisional system was broken and knew that the CF grievance system operated within the construct of the chain of command, they believed that any attempt to resolve their issues in accordance with standard protocol would only produce further grief for them. Had any of the submariners submitted a grievance, the CO would be required to review it; this action signalled the end of the grievance or the perceived end of the submariner's career; hence, no one dared confront this CO for fear of repercussion.[102] Yet, Marsaw's abuse of authority had to cease. Thus, a counterculture emerged whereby his crew devised a means to resolve the crisis before something more serious happened. Like the mutinies

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[100] *Ibid.*, 1030.

[101] *Ibid.*, 1283. LS Bourrassa's testimony attests to the breakdown of the divisional system within OJIBWA and the submarine squadron headquarters, namely, the SM1. When he had formally grieved comments on his annual Performance Evaluation Report (PER), Marsaw told him to forget about it until the following year. Unsatisfied with his CO's reponse, Bourassa asked to see the SM1. Bourassa testified that the SM1 delivered the same comment to him. This lack of support from the divisional system in following up on an individual's grievance and disinterest in a submariner's welfare would reinforce the general feeling of malaise among the crew in their hesitation to approach Marsaw of the SM1 regarding Marsaw's behaviour ; they perceived the chain of command was corrupt.

[102] *Ibid.*, 1283.

on board HMC ships in 1949, submariners conducted a protest of a modern sort in view of a crippled divisional system: they went to the media. After all, the media broke the story of the Somalia events that same year (1993), erupting in public scandal for the CF and focussing on ineffective leadership and abuse within the Airborne Regiment.[103] There was no reason to believe a media leak concerning the abuse on board OJIBWA would not elicit a similar response and focus.[104]

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[103] Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, "Cover Up? – The Somali Affair – Conflict and War," CBC archives, [news clip on-line]; available from http://archives.cbc.ca/IDCC-1-71-723-4338/conflict_war/somalia/; Internet; accessed 15 March 2007.

[104] Malcolm Dunlop, "Sub's captain under scrutiny . . .", 1. Although never confirmed publicly, the assumption has been made based on the breaking story in the Chronicle-Herald that one or more of OJIBWA's crew leaked the story to the reporter at The Chronicle-Herald.

CHAPTER 3 – DOMINANT INFLUENCES ON CANADIAN SUBMARINE CULTURE AND COMMAND STYLE

> I have seen the enemy and he is us.
> Pogo

HISTORICAL INFLUENCES ON SUBMARINE CULTURE – 1960-1990

External Influences – A Cultural Revolution within the CF

> Perhaps because we are just too busy administering one another I fear we are forgetting that the Parliament of Canada has decreed that the Canadian Armed Forces shall be commanded.[105]
> Brigadier General Leslie, 1972

Given the role of organizational culture in contributing to CF effectiveness and how the leader impacts the organization's overall effectiveness through embedding culture, external and internal influences also shaped the organizational culture of the CF which ran counter to espoused values of the military, those values of loyalty, courage, and integrity, directly impacting the submarine service and CF.[106] This clash of cultures caused a failure in leadership at many levels, culminating in an overhaul of leadership and a redefinition of culture as a result of events like Marsaw.

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[105] Douglas Bland, "Military Leadership and Change in the 1990's." Speech to the XXII Annual CDA Institute for Security and Defence Studies Seminar [speech on-line]; available from http://www.cda-cdai.ca/library/bland.htm; Internet; accessed 08 March 2007.

[106] Prior to the recent articulation of the CF military ethos in *Duty With Honour*, the best formulation of a CF military ethos was based on the commissioning scroll of Canadian officers – loyalty, courage, and integrity.

Throughout Canada's history, civil-military relations can be best described as conventional. Government backing of the CF fluctuates between all-out support during times of war to minimum investment of essential resources during times of peace. This was particularly evident when the end of the Cold War brought about the 'peace dividend', resulting in a host of defence budget cuts during the 1990s. Many people reasoned that the absence of a large-scale threat reduced the need for continued investment in the CF; to many Canadians, the CF suddenly lacked relevance in light of this new era of peace.[107] The problem, however, was that the government increasingly tasked the CF in Operations-Other-Than-War (OOTW) while it simultaneously reduced the 'PO&M' – personnel, overhead, and maintenance, spiralling the CF into a declining resource base.[108] In response, the officer corps adopted a risk-averse approach, encouraging its leadership to conform to government direction.[109] Horn and MacIntyre commented on the inflexibility of the Canadian officer corps to adjust to changed circumstances:

> The new security environment marked by confusion, ambiguity, ever present media, and nefarious enemies and threats embedded in the context of failed and failing states overloaded a traditional, conservative and intellectually inflexible officer corps that saw the world in terms of absolutes.[110]

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[107] Brigadier General (ret'd) (Joe) G.E. Sharpe, and Allan D. English, *Principles for Change in the Post-Cold War Command and Control of the Canadian Forces* (Winnipeg: Canadian Forces Training Materiel Production Centre, 2002), 53-55.

[108] *Ibid.*, 58.

[109] Bercuson, "Canadian Military Leadership in an Era of Military Transformation," In *From the Outside Looking In . . .*, 42.

[110] Colonel Bernd Horn and Lieutenant-Colonel Allister MacIntyre, "Emerging from a Decade of Darkness: The Creation of the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute," in *In Pursuit of Excellence: international perspectives of military leadership*. (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy, 2006), 54.

It is difficult to create confidence in leadership when leaders refuse to be honest with their superiors. The very nature of the military to make things happen promotes a persistent 'can-do' attitude while ignoring the reality of the situation. The frequency in which CF senior leaders continued to agree to participate in high tempo operational missions during the 1990's while the DND insisted on budget cuts is illustrative of this pervasive mindset. As a result, by 1995 only seventeen percent of CF personnel expressed their confidence in the senior leadership of the Department to lead them through the tough times.[111] Additional to the challenges mentioned above, evolving leader challenges included the move towards a third-party service delivery framework; the increase in frequency and complexity of missions assigned to units; a public who became more engaged and reactive to military affairs; and changes in Canadian society and the social make-up of the CF.[112] Added to these pressures were poor Canada-US relations, force restructuring, and emerging technology.[113] The CF could no longer keep pace with the constant change. Apart from the military's lack of foresight to anticipate this shift and the transformation that would be required to continue to meet its operational mandate, by the time society had dealt with the numerous 'single incidents' of corruption, abuse, murder, and hazing in the CF, they had had enough. As Horn and MacIntyre contend, ". . . the CF completely missed the dramatic and profound societal shift. As a

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[111] Sharpe, and Allan D. English, *Principles for Change in the Post-Cold War . . .*, 59.

[112] Department of National Defence, *The Professional Development Framework: Generating Effectiveness in Canadian Forces Leadership*. (Kingston: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute Canadian Defence Academy, September 2006), 9.

[113] Scott Robertson and Michael Hennessy, "The Canadian Forces of Tomorrow: Maintaining Strategic Effectiveness and Relevance in the 21st Century," *Canadian Military Journal* 4, no. 1 (Spring 2003) [journal on-line]; available from http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/engraph/Vol4/no1/reports_e.asp; Internet; accessed 11 March 2007.

result, they lost the confidence and trust of the very people for which they existed to serve – Canadian society."[114]

Civilian control over the military in a parliamentary democracy is enshrined in Canadian statute. Nonetheless, undue influence and control exercised by the civilian bureaucracy within the DND contributed to the erosion of the military ethos within the CF officer corps. Although few authors agree on which defining moment altered the organizational culture of the CF, many do agree that either the act of unification in 1968 or the reorganization of National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) in 1972, or a combination of both actions contributed towards this shift in culture.[115] Both events and resultant outcomes of these political decisions greatly influenced civil-military relations, impacting members of the CF at every level in the organization over the next thirty years.

The integration of the CF Headquarters and the NDHQ in 1972 profoundly affected the CF's organizational culture by merging two distinct cultures into one; the predominant culture shifted from the military 'heroic warrior' to the civilian domain of 'civilianization and bureaucratization', which pervaded the officer corps and deeply impacted troops' confidence in their senior leadership. Brigadier-General Sharpe and Allan English contend that the merger resulted from two competing cultures: the

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[114] Horn and Lieutenant-Colonel Allister MacIntyre, "Emerging from a Decade of Darkness: The Creation of the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute," . . ., 55.

[115] Douglas Bland, "The Government of Canada and the Armed Forces: a troubled relationship," in *The Soldier and the Canadian State: a crisis of civil-military relations?* ed. by David A. Charters and J. Brent Wilson, 27-45. (Fredericton, NB: University of New Brunswick Centre for Conflict Studies, 1996), 28.

traditional model of the 'heroic warrior' that competed in the arena of the 'bureaucrat'.[116]
While the military was obligated to an ethos described at that time as 'honesty, integrity
and obedience unto death', the public servant was not compelled to uphold the same
code.[117] A single ethos thus emerged among the 'Defence Team' where, if a requirement
disrupted the greater good of the 'Defence Team', ". . . any differences in military and
public service ethics . . . had to be set aside."[118] These competing values clashed,
resulting in a decision-by-consensus process, which undermined the role of the military
leader in decision-making that ultimately affected the CF from the strategic to the tactical
level. Senior military leadership as decision-makers became subsumed within the
'Defence Team'; advice to government was henceforth largely influenced by senior
bureaucrats as opposed to a balanced perspective between civilian and military
leadership.[119]

Not surprisingly, soldiers lost confidence in the officer corps. A considerable
blow to troops' confidence in the senior officer corps happened in 1987 when senior
bureaucrats directed senior officers encourage the CF's open enthusiasm for the
Conservative government's initiative of renewal for the CF, which included nuclear
submarines and an expanding role for the forces. However, as the promises of the White
Paper crumbled before their eyes, soldiers witnessed senior officers swallow the

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[116] Sharpe, and Allan D. English, *Principles for Change in the Post-Cold War . . .*, 59.

[117] Douglas Bland, "The Government of Canada and the Armed Forces: a troubled relationship," . . ., 36.

[118] *Ibid.*, 37.

[119] *Ibid.*, 32-36.

government's decision without objection.[120] This defining moment for the rank and file during the 'decade of darkness' in the 1990s showed when senior leadership failed to speak up on behalf of those whom they were called to support – their troops. Soldiers expect loyalty downwards; after all, it is soldiers whom officers are charged with the responsibility of placing in harm's way when called upon by the government. Soldiers, enraged with an officer corps who had betrayed them, began to speak out; the chasm between the officer corps and NCMs widened as a result of a risk-averse officer corps who were only interested in pursuing their own careers.[121]

As the events of Somalia unfolded, senior officers insisted it was a case of merely 'one bad apple'. But the injustice served to the troops over the fact that only NCMs were prosecuted and officers were spared over the scandal served to further undermine soldiers' trust in their officer corps. By the time the story of the alleged abuses by Marsaw reached the press shortly after Somalia, soldiers and sailors alike felt vindicated because an officer, in fact a commanding officer, was being charged and held to account.[122] The Minister reacted by placing a moratorium on all promotions and set about an aggressive agenda to figure out what had happed to this national institution and

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[120] *Ibid*., 32. The sole exception was the Vice Chief of Defence Staff, Admiral Chuck Thomas, who resigned in protest because he felt neither the government nor the CDS at the time could make rational choices for the CF.

[121] Winslow, *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia: A Socio-cultural Inquiry . . .*, 36-38.

[122] Editorial, "Navy, Marsaw Start Round Two." *The Daily News*. 30 November 1996: 17; [on-line]; available from http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=256130761&sid=1&Fmt=3&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD; Internet; accessed 25 November 2006.

what could be done to fix it.[123] But by now most had figured out the enemy: it was the

officer corps and it desperately needed reform. The outcome was the formation of the

Minister's Monitoring Committee (MMC), which made over 300 recommendations for

reform of the CF, which included its culture and leadership. The CF needed to develop

". . . as soon as possible a clear vision of the desired institutional culture and of the

qualities and characteristics of the officers who will serve in it."[124]

An Internal Cultural Revolt: The Reaction of CF Subcultures

Significant changes occurred from within the CF and outside the military that

impacted its culture to the peril of the senior leadership who refused to address the need

for change. While the organizational culture in NDHQ pervaded bureaucracy and

careerism among senior military officers, the three services retained tight control over

their distinct subcultures in opposition to unification and a growing realization that the

national headquarters was steadily becoming more civilianized.[125] Subcultures continued

to perpetuate the 'heroic warrior' model of military culture – the aggressive male

dominant leader – and held fast to traditions and customs of regiments, ships, and

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[123] Desmond Morton, "Military Leadership and Change in the 1990's," Speech to the XIII Annual CDA Institute for Security and Defence Studies Seminar (n.d. 1997) [speech on-line]; available from http://www.cda-cdai.ca/library/morton.htm; Internet; accessed 08 March 2007.

[124] Canada. *Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces. Final Report – 1999.* (Ottawa: The Committee, 1999), 14.

[125] Winslow, *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia: A Socio-cultural Inquiry . . .,* 28.

squadrons in an attempt to retain a sense of relevancy while changes at NDHQ and in Canadian society spiralled at an unprecedented pace.

In addition, the shift from the 'vocational' model of the CF to that of 'occupationalism' during the 1970s shaped the future officer corps for the next thirty years, creating a further disconnect between traditionally held values concerning military service and new recruits from a changing Canadian society. Where historically many in the CF had dedicated themselves to a lifetime of service, this trend declined sharply as a result of emerging cultural and social changes in the Canadian milieu.[126] Occupationalism threatened to erode the warrior's professional code of honour that espoused loyalty and duty before self in the face of a new generation in Canadian society that was more self-focussed; the shift therefore in many servicepersons' attitudes from life-long service in the military to the CF as just another 'job' began to escalate. Recruitment from the Canadian population in subsequent decades reflected this predominant generational attitude. Recruits were ". . . more concerned with individual career opportunities rather than commitment to the military institution. Loyalty in this case depend[ed] more on the conditions of employment than commitment to service."[127] Even Human Resources (HR) policies changed to reflect this paradigm shift: Thus, CF members exchanged traditional 'trades' for 'occupations' in keeping with the changing pace of Canadian society.

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[126] C.A.Cotton, *Military Attitudes and Values in the Army in Canada*. (Willowdale, ON: Canadian Forces Personnel Applied Research Unit, 1979), 6.

[127] Winslow, *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia: A Socio-cultural Inquiry . . .*, 261.

Canadian culture had also changed, impacting a conservative institution like the CF. The ability of the average Canadian to tolerate traditional norms or to accept blindly a given version of the truth decreased in direct proportion to the increase in education levels.[128] Other changes in Canadian society unnerved the traditional culture of the CF such as the enactment of The Canadian Human Rights Act and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the 1980s. These statutes brought about revolutionary changes in HR policies that disconcerted those who held on to the 'heroic warrior' typology that characterized subcultures like the submarine service. However, the CF changed its policies: it instituted the active recruitment of visible minorities; it lifted the ban on sexual orientation; it ended discrimination against marital status, family status and sex; and it opened all military occupations, with the exclusion of submarine service to women.[129] Despite these monumental changes, a state of cultural inertia persisted within the CF; an all-familiar phrase among service people that, 'single white Anglo-Saxon men need not apply' in response to recruitment drives for visible minorities during this era illustrates this pervasive attitude.

Additionally, in response to these statutes, the CF implemented a zero tolerance policy on harassment. Although perceived by many that the subject dealt primarily with sexual harassment, the most common complaint laid against supervisors and superiors

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[128] *Ibid.*, 48.

[129] Franklin C. Pinch, "Managing Change and Shrinking Resources," In *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*, ed. Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams and David R. Segal, 156-181 (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2000), 165.

was abuse of authority.[130] Gradually the institution began to comply with Parliament's

direction even though the cultural paradigm shift in society had occurred almost

overnight. Emerging cultural trends in the national culture changed the face of the CF as

it slowly it transformed socially, becoming ". . . more democratized, liberalized,

civilianized, and individualized, with significantly greater emphasis on human and

equality rights."[131] In contrast, subcultures like the submarine service maintained its

sense of separateness and distinctiveness from the navy and Canadian society. While the

navy steamed ahead with new HR policies such as the introduction of mixed-gender

ships, the submarine service insisted that, as a 'unique' service, it should retain its single-

gendered unit status. A study on the feasibility of introducing women in submarine

service concluded that the only restriction to women serving on board concerned a lack of

privacy, driven by the construct of the Oberon-class boats.[132] This satisfied many

submariners who continued to see their culture as male-dominant and fitting the

traditional culture of the 'heroic warrior'.[133] The Canadian submarine service had become

the last refuge of traditional values whereas all other environments moved forward on the

integration of women in non-traditional roles.[134]

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[130] *Ibid*., 168.

[131] *Ibid*., 156.

[132] Major Lynn Bradley, "Mixed Gender Crewing of VICTORIA Class Submarines: Maritime Staff Research Report 99-1." (Ottawa: Chief of the Maritime Staff Research Paper, September 1999), 14.

[133] Scott Taylor, "Sharks of Steel?" *Esprit de Corps*, March 1993, 13.

[134] Department of National Defence. "Backgrounder Fact Sheet: Womens' Progress in the Canadian Military." [on-line]; available from http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1581; Internet; accessed 14 March 2007. Women were only exempt from serving in submarines; in 2001 the policy changed, however, opening all occupations to women in the CF.

CANADIAN NAVAL COMMAND STYLE AND SUBMARINE CULTURE

Leadership Competency Defined

Since the MMC's recommendation to articulate the desired military culture and leadership qualities required of its officers for the CF, the bulk of written work in the field of military culture and leadership has centered on the army; however, English and Gimblett's essays provide the groundwork to analyze how organizational culture can influence leadership styles within subcultures like the Canadian navy.[135] Although nothing has been devoted to the area of the Canadian submarine service in this respect, generalizations can be drawn from their works based on the premise that the submarine service is a subculture of the navy because it shares some commonality in organizational culture with its sister service, especially with respect to leadership style and training. However, some distinguishing features in both submarine command training and organizational culture make it truly a subculture of the Canadian navy.

With this observation in mind, three elements play an appreciable role in acculturating naval officers in becoming leaders and rising to command: the technical requirements of their occupation; the historical development of naval command styles;

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[135] Richard H. Gimblett, "Canadian Naval Command Styles," in *The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives* 31-53 (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy, 2006) and English, "The Masks of Command: Leadership Differences in the Canadian Army, Navy and Air Force," in *The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives* . . ., 1-30. In English's essay he defines subcultures as the three services of the CF: navy, army and air force. For the purposes of this essay, the term 'culture' and 'subculture' will be used interchangeably between the three services and the submarine service for ease of use.

and the cultural traditions of the navy. Leadership competency in the CF is largely determined by the influence that subcultures play in the formative years of an officer's career. Despite single-service basic training for officers, all three environments of the CF spend their formative years up to the rank of the Lieutenant-Commander primarily with their own environment. Spending this time ". . . in a single service culture shapes their attitudes, values and beliefs about what is an appropriate leadership style."[136] While personality can predispose a distinct leadership style, training and organizational culture remain influential in shaping what each environment considers to be an appropriate leadership style.[137] English's theoretical construct proposes two predominant leadership styles founded in the history of the three environments in the CF. The army for instance, has cultivated a 'heroic warrior' leader, where effective leadership is characterized by the leader sharing risks with his followers. The trademark of the navy and air force on the other hand is 'technical leadership': leadership is proven through the specialized knowledge or skill of the leader, which in the navy includes competencies in seamanship, ship handling, and warfighting.[138]

The Canadian navy and its submarine service typify the 'technical leadership' style. The leader's legitimacy is based on whether or not the officer can drive the ship and fight it competently. Historically, the RN's requirement for its officers to pass rigorous exams prior to commissioning and again prior to assuming command

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[136] English, "The Masks of Command: Leadership Differences in the Canadian Army, Navy and Air Force," in *The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives . . .*, 1.

[137] *Ibid*., 2-3.

[138] *Ibid*., 26

underscores the emphasis on technical competency as the overriding determinant of effective leadership.[139] This requirement is no less true in Canada's navy and the submarine service, noting that both share an impressive historical connection with the RN. The training process in the CF for naval and submariner officers is earmarked by a series of 'reqs' (requirements) at every stage from initial qualifications of Officer of the Day (OOD), Bridge Watchkeeper, OOW, to head of department, and culminating in command qualification. As part of this qualification, officers must successfully pass a series of written exams and sit a command board who evaluates the candidate's technical and leadership competencies.

The submarine service follows these same requirements to achieve command with the exception of the qualification known as 'Perisher', of which there is no course equal to it in the surface fleet.[140] There are no set of exams, just a highly intense five-month course traditionally run by the RN in the United Kingdom (UK): "The only standard is that set by the two Teachers; it is their judgment that controls the future of the men around the table. It could be that all will pass – or none."[141] The title given to the course is significant: one either passes or perishes - never again to be given opportunity to qualify for submarine command - unlike the opportunity afforded to those officers within the surface fleet who fail their first attempt to challenge the command board. Successful Perisher candidates proceed as captains of their own boat; whereas, those who fail usually

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[139] *Ibid.*, 17.

[140] Jonathan Crane, *Submarine* (London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1984), 49.

[141] *Ibid.*, 54.

transfer to 'general service' to command in the surface fleet. This stigma of failure is real

for the submariner officer. On the one hand, he wears his dolphins badge with pride

having obtained early in his career the rigorous qualifications required to serve in

submarines. Conversely, the badge serves to remind him that he failed command

qualification in what submariners consider the prestigious arm of the navy.[142] Perisher

runs in three assessment phases: submarine safety, tactics, and leadership, known as

'command presence'.[143] The sources of stress under which a submarine captain is subject

necessitates injecting significant stressors into the course to establish an individual's

limits and capabilities so that he is well aware of his personal limitations once he is a

CO. The safety of the submarine and its crew is the criterion upon which successful

command is determined and hence, this is Perisher's primary focus.[144] As well, a

candidate is subjected to sleep deprivation to simulate realistic conditions under which he

would find himself as a CO. With these rigorous demands to achieve command of a

submarine, it is clear that the training forms the foundation of what some have considered

an elite service.[145]

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[142] Hickey, *Perisher: The Submarine Driver's License . . .*, 2.

[143] *Ibid.*, 2.

[144] Charlton, "Stress and the Submarine Command Course.". . ., 25. Photocopy held by author.

[145] Commander (ret'd) Peter Kavanaugh, "The Court Martial of Lieutenant-Commander Dean Marsaw," *Interviewed by* Commander Mary-Ellen Clark, telephone interview, Toronto: 15 March 2007.

Command Style in the Canadian Navy and Submarine Service – Rooted in

Tradition

Although the technical competency requirements for leadership established a

cultural norm in the Canadian navy and submarine service, tradition has worked to its

detriment or betterment depending on how leaders handled cultural change when the need

arose. Leaders are called upon to work with culture and when necessary, to destroy it or

significantly change it when the organization becomes dysfunctional.[146] The Canadian

navy's organizational culture is deeply rooted in its traditions and emphasis on maritime

strategy, which provides purpose and direction.[147] Traditions have also been the Achilles

heel of the navy, creating aversion towards cultural change. RCN senior Admirals

bitterly opposed the Mainguy report recommendations despite sailors' requests to change

from a RN-dominant organizational culture to one that reflected their national culture.

One author concluded that senior officers' stubbornness to shift from an RN culture to

Canadian culture ". . . suggests that too many in the RCN's officer corps had adapted a

type of life and style of leadership alien to Canada."[148] On the more positive side of

tradition, history indicates the Canadian navy's employment of a distributed leadership

style has been effective as part of its culture and an element of the RN culture that has

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[146] Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership . . .*, 11.

[147] English, "The Masks of Command: Leadership Differences in the Canadian Army, Navy and Air Force," in *The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives . . .*, 6-7. The publication *Securing Canada's Ocean Frontiers: Charting the Course from Leadmark* is the most current Canadian naval maritime strategy and doctrine.

[148] Goldrick, "Strangers in their own Seas? A Comparison of the Australian and Canadian Naval Experience, 1910-1982," in *A Nation's Navy . . .*, 333.

been beneficial for the Canadian navy. Nelson himself exemplified a type of distributed leadership style where he placed emphasis on implicit rather than explicit intent.[149] His directions during the Battle of Trafalgar such as, 'Engage the enemy more closely' and 'England expects every man to do his duty' typify this leadership style. The Canadian navy has successfully implemented this leadership style based on RN influence in doctrine and training.

Nevertheless, the navy's break with RN traditional culture to embrace Canadian values marked an emergence of a distinct Canadian cultural flavour within the navy. Richard Gimblett contends that the RCN mutinies in 1949, the introduction of francophone ships and mixed-gender integration over the years contributed towards the harmony between Canadian society and the navy.[150] Notwithstanding these initiatives, the Canadian submarine service experienced a clash of cultures as the navy pressed forward throughout the 1990s with these implementations fleet-wide. The submarine service's resistance to cultural change within the navy evidenced itself in the leadership style of some officers, like Marsaw, who perpetuated autonomy from the larger context of the Canadian navy's culture. As one submariner officer stated: "Part of the very attraction of the submarine service was the perception that the 'normal rules' were administered with a flexibility not normally seen in 'skimmers' (surface ships) and a

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[149] Richard H. Gimblett, "Canadian Naval Command Styles," in *The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives . . .*, 39-40.

[150] *Ibid.*, 46.

considerable degree of small-ship 'informality' was not only tolerated but actively

encouraged."[151]

The Canadian submarine service does, however, share a common distributed type

leadership or command style with its navy; yet, Marsaw's command style was atypical of

this model in that he demonstrated excessive tendencies of some of the characteristics

listed below. Before the analysis however, Figure 3.1 below outlines the characteristics

and their features of the Canadian naval command style that predominates the navy and

submarine service.

Naval Command style Characteristic	Definition
The Professional Standard of the Mariner	• One of the requirements of the naval commander is to meet or exceed this professional standard. Those trained for command often possess a ruthless determination to ensure that the ship is ready to move quickly at all times; the naval officer characterizes himself as one who is able to make tough decisions without hesitation.
Competence, Confidence and Arrogance	• The command characteristic that is created by the rigorous command qualification process used by the navies that share the Anglo-American tradition is one of competence, confidence and even a touch of arrogance.
Independence	• This characteristic is based on the historical tradition of the independent operational environment in which commanders operated and thus, had to be prepared to make decisions that might have serious and wide-ranging consequences. Therefore, naval commanders operate in a culture that encourages and prizes independence. While naval commanders appreciate the detailed instructions provided them as CF Contingent Commanders regarding responsibilities and authority, naval commanders without these instructions are still expected to act when they believe that it is necessary to do so.

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[151] Craven, "The Court Martial of Lieutenant-Commander Dean Marsaw," . . .,12 March 2007.

Unique Officer Leadership Competencies	• Junior officers undergo a long process of training and evaluation that is overseen by experienced officers. Unlike the army, naval officers receive little training from NCMs; therefore even junior command-qualified naval officers have skills that senior NCMs do not have.
Status and Aura of Command	• In addition to the power held by the CO of a warship, the organization and the training system of the navy cause the naval commander to possess a significant status and aura of command.
Aggressive Leadership	• Naval commanders know operations inside and out (how to fight and lead it effectively); • Naval commanders will appear aggressive and quick to make decisions during operations.
The Primacy of Training	• The naval officer aspiring to command will do anything in his power to conduct all training necessary to bring the ship's company to the highest level of readiness and keep it there. Officers who don't do so, find their command appointments shortened and their prospects limited.

Figure 3.1 – Naval Command Style: the Canadian Navy

Source: *The Operational Art: Leadership Perspectives – Leadership and Command*, 49-50.

Application to Marsaw

While Marsaw's leadership behaviour is atypical of most Canadian submariner

officers, some have remarked that other submariner officers exhibited similar traits. One

submarine commanding officer in particular was described as

> having established a reputation possibly as infamous as Marsaw's: this
> fellow was an acknowledged loose cannon when he commanded his
> first submarine and prone to behaviour when serving in staff positions
> ashore that certainly attracted the attention of his seniors![152]

 Personality and upbringing does impact on an individual's leadership style; however,

with respect to the Marsaw case that area will be left for others to research. This section

examines how the organizational culture of the submarine squadron and submarine

command training that was previously explored, influenced Marsaw's command style,

which defied Canadian naval culture. Evidence of Marsaw's abuse revealed in the court

martial transcripts is astounding. Although the case was subsequently overturned by the

decision of the Court Martial Appeal Court, a careful review of over 2,000 pages of court

martial transcripts and more than 40 Crown witnesses' testimonies provide compelling

evidence that these events actually happened. Crown witnesses' testimony from senior

officer to NCMs was consistent in its presentation of evidence as they recalled with

exacting detail the abuse of authority and harassment suffered under Marsaw's command.

The organizational culture and the independent nature of submarine squadron

operations contributed to Marsaw's command style. This independent nature reflected in

the organizational structure and tradition of the submarine service is deeply rooted in its

history. During the ninety years of its existence the Canadian government has neglected

the submarine service, marked by debates over the viability of its continued existence,

capital acquisition issues, and the deployments of the boats for training versus

operations.[153] Until introduction of the Oberon-class submarines in 1966, the Canadian

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[152] Craven, "The Court Martial of Lieutenant-Commander Dean Marsaw," . . .,12 March 2007.

[153] Ferguson, *Through a Canadian Periscope: The Story of the Canadian Submarine Service* . . ., 233, 236, 275. O-boats were employed as 'target boats' for training missions; they were not tasked on an operational patrol until 1981.

submarine headquarters was under RN command in Halifax.[154] An incident in the early

days of HMCS/M OJIBWA demonstrates the powerful influence of culture in creating

this attitude of independence from the navy. In 1966, the first commander of the First

Canadian Submarine Squadron (SM1 HQ), Commander Edmund Gigg, embarked on a

course to make the squadron the best in the world and to bring the operations of the

squadron into line with the rest of the navy.[155] Duty watches and training packages were

changed to reflect the USN submarine service, creating consternation among the crew,

which resulted in a personal visit on board OJIBWA by Flag Officer Atlantic Coast Rear

Admiral Landymore. Upset with the shift from RN to US doctrine and operations

procedures, Landymore immediately reversed the submarine squadron to the RN-

dominant culture.[156] This influence in the organizational culture of the squadron

continued until Waterfront Reorganization in 1997.[157] Until the introduction of the

Upholder class, submariners continued with RN practices of living ashore in foreign ports

and distinct duty watch rotations that differed from the surface fleet. It is recognized that

practical reasons existed for some of these traditions being maintained but it underscores

the tacit approval that Landymore gave to the submarine squadron to operate

independently from the navy despite Gigg's best intentions to adopt USN doctrine in

order to increase interoperability with the USN like the surface fleet had done. Some say

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[154] *Ibid.*, 237, 266.

[155] *Ibid.*, 265, 266.

[156] *Ibid.*, 237, 266.

[157] The dockyard 'Waterfront Reorganization' occurred in 1997 changed the organization and command structure of the First Canadian Submarine Squadron, which became subsumed under the Fifth Maritime Operations Group, (MOG 5).

that even today that the same autonomous culture continues to pervade the submarine service; certainly, it views itself as the elite service within the navy, believing its unique operational requirements exclude it from following the norms and traditions that apply within the larger context of the navy, under whom it belongs.

Additionally, a lack of oversight over squadron governance from the squadron HQ staff contributed to Marsaw's failure in command. While some SM1s devoted their efforts to mentoring boats' COs, others remained distant from their boats, focussing their efforts on the administration of the submarine squadron. [158] Under Marsaw's reign as CO of OJIBWA, one officer commented that ". . . senior officers were reluctant to investigate rumours of irregularities aboard OJIBWA as a result of Marsaw's high level of credibility as a CO, based on their unquestioned acceptance of his outstanding technical competency."[159] Court martial transcripts attest to this fact: SM1 commanders did not provide direct oversight in leadership matters concerning Marsaw despite the fact they had personally interviewed nine officers who requested a return to general service while serving under Marsaw's command.[160] These officers consisted of those in their initial training phase and seasoned officers including department heads and an Executive Officer.[161] It is alarming that nothing alerted the SM1s to investigate deeper into the reasons behind the unusual high number of requests to leave submarine service during

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[158] Kavanaugh, "The Court Martial of Lieutenant-Commander Dean Marsaw," . . .,15 March 2007.

[159] Craven, "The Court Martial of Lieutenant-Commander Dean Marsaw," . . .,12 March 2007.

[160] Canada, Court Martial Transcripts, *Her Majesty the Queen v. Lieutenant-Commander Dean C. Marsaw, Standing Court Martial Canada* . . ., 1749-1750.

[161] *Ibid.*, 1750.

Marsaw's appointment as CO.[162] Complicating matters was a subjective emphasis the

SM1 placed on annual evaluations of the boats' COs. A SM1 testified that the accepted

process to assess submarine COs was based on a combination of a number of inputs,

mostly subjective in nature: the SM1's minimal observation of the captain at sea; the

quarterly Report of Proceedings generated by the CO, which could be construed as self-

inflationary; and word-of-mouth from the CO's peers such as Sea Training staff and

Submarine Trainer staff within Maritime Forces Atlantic (MARLANT).[163] Thus,

Marsaw's PERs were based primarily on subjective input from his immediate supervisor

and on the opinions of peers who were asked to provide input on Marsaw. If other

officers had issue with Marsaw's leadership, they chose not to reveal them to the SM1

due to the hesitation to whistle-blow on one of their peers.

The other predominant driver that influenced Marsaw's leadership behaviour was

his extreme interpretation of the Canadian naval command style. Marsaw's technical

competence was unequalled in the Canadian submarine service according to many who

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[162] *Ibid.*, 1708-1710. The SM1 had stated in his testimony that he had resolved a few of the requests by rotating some of the officers off the boat for a brief period or by convincing some of them to remain in the submarine service, perhaps leaving him with the impression there was no leadership issue with Marsaw but with the officers themselves. The requests had been carefully worded by the officers who feared retaliation from Marsaw had they stated the underlying reason of their request, which was Marsaw's abuse. This came out during the course of the trial. The officers believed they could not submit a redress of grievance against their CO without fear of repercussion for themselves and the remainder of the wardroom; they also expressed little faith in the submarine squadron HQ itself to act accordingly to correct the situation.

[163] *Ibid.*, 1695-1710. The nature of covert operations in a submarine and limited ability to board and exit the vessel while on operations restricts the frequency of visits available at-sea for the SM1 to monitor a submarine Captain in command. Marsaw was monitored three times by SM1 over the period of three years as CO of OJIBWA.

served with him.[164] Yet one contemporary of Marsaw attested to Marsaw's excessive

emphasis on professional competency. During training, submariner officers must qualify

to serve as OOD and in preparation for their board they complete a number of 'reqs'

(requirements). One such 'req' pertains to procedures for 'Submarine Open to Visitors'.

Candidates must know the evolution, verbally demonstrate their knowledge to the

satisfaction of a qualified submarine officer, and be able to answer unexpected 'what if'

types of questions dealing with the subject, designed to further explore their leadership,

logic, and decision-making skills. Marsaw, at the time a newly qualified submarine

officer, was assigned the duty of signing off selected 'reqs' for junior officers. After a

while, junior officers under training avoided approaching Marsaw for 'reqs' because of

his tendency to go to illogical extremes.[165] In the previous example, Marsaw evolved the

scenario to the point where the visitors transformed into a riotous mob on the jetty: "Dean

made it clear that, rather than engage the local police he expected me to control the mob

by drawing small arms and ordering sailors to shoot. It was well beyond what the 'req'

reasonably expected or required."[166] By the time Marsaw rose to command, these

extremes in leadership style became a source of frustration for his officers. He held on-

the-spot closed-book exams for officers to test their tactical competency, but selected

such obscure questions that it was virtually impossible for officers to pass the test. Yet

Marsaw's huge ego over his emphasis on technical competency created a social ineptness

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[164] Canada, Court Martial Transcripts, *Her Majesty the Queen v. Lieutenant-Commander Dean C. Marsaw, Standing Court Martial Canada . . .*, 771.

[165] Craven, "The Court Martial of Lieutenant-Commander Dean Marsaw," . . .,12 March 2007.

[166] *Ibid*.

and authoritarian style of leadership where he denied permission for open-book exams while at the same time he expected his officers to succeed.[167]

Marsaw also took to extreme the characteristics of the 'arrogance' and 'status and aura of command' of the naval command style. He regularly bragged to his officers over being rated as the squadron's top submarine commander (subsequently verified on the witness stand by a SM1) and who would be the first 'Teacher' of the Canadian Submarine Command Officer Training course – the Canadian version of the RN Perisher.[168] While submariner senior officers recognized Marsaw's technical leadership ability, Marsaw's intimidating comments to his officers created fear so that had they approached the SM1 in the squadron openly about Marsaw's inappropriate leadership style, they believed such action would jeopardize their careers.[169]

Finally, Marsaw's extreme demonstration of the 'aggressiveness' command style characteristic resulted in his abusive behaviour towards his crew. While Perisher training encourages submariner captains to exhibit an aggressive leadership style, especially during attack drills, abusive behaviour is never acceptable.[170] Countless officers and

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[167] Canada, Court Martial Transcripts, *Her Majesty the Queen v. Lieutenant-Commander Dean C. Marsaw, Standing Court Martial Canada . . .*, 1447.

[168] *Ibid.*, 1423-1449.

[169] *Ibid.*, 844.

[170] Department of National Defence, *Defence Administrative Orders and Directives 5012-0 Haraassment Prevention and Resolution*; [on-line]; available from http://www.admfincs.forces.gc.ca/admfincs/subjects/daod/5012/0_e.asp; Internet; accessed 25 March 2007. Harassment is defined as: any improper conduct by an individual that is directed at and offensive to another person or persons in the workplace, and that the individual knew or ought reasonably to have known would cause offence or harm. It comprises any objectionable act, comment or display that demeans, belittles or

NCMs testified that Marsaw's derogatory insults were not general in scope; they were specifically directed at the individual and always peppered with defamatory remarks against the person.[171] His performance evaluations of his officers reflected inaccurate comments about their performance, with the aim of pressuring them to display aggressive behaviour similar to his, such as yelling and screaming, while they had charge of the watch.[172] In one example, Marsaw's XO had been previously evaluated by two SM1s as being ready to challenge the Perisher course; however, over the two years that followed under Marsaw's command a different picture emerged of the officer. During the court martial that officer was asked to read Marsaw's evaluation and then the reviewing officer's remarks, which were markedly different from the SM1's last comments on this officer's performance:

> Q. Would you read the bottom paragraph of the SM1 Commander's comments? A. 'I am somewhat at a loss to explain Lt(N) [name] performance because he actually had a good SOCT [XO's course]. He readily took charge of the control room team during his evolutions and demonstrated a good command appreciation and presence. I intend to provide another opportunity for Lt[N] [name] to take advantage of the talents that he has by requesting a further one year sea going appointment as executive officer. He should be ready to attend SMCC in 1994.' [173]

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causes personal humiliation or embarrassment, and any act of intimidation or threat. It includes harassment within the meaning of the *Canadian Human Rights Act* (CHRA).

[171] Canada, Court Martial Transcripts, *Her Majesty the Queen v. Lieutenant-Commander Dean C. Marsaw, Standing Court Martial Canada* . . ., n.p. See testimonies of Higginson, Elford, Dussault, Harris, Bourassa et al. All forty-three Crown witnesses attested to the personal abuse they suffered by Marsaw.

[172] *Ibid.*, 1430.

[173] *Ibid.*, 1429.

The testimonies during the court martial proceedings reveal how the submarine squadron's organizational culture and training influenced Marsaw's extreme application of the Canadian naval command style. The culture that pervaded within the submarine squadron and the CF during those years discouraged officers and NCMs from submitting their grievances through the CF grievance system because of the fear of possible retaliation from a CO whom they perceived could shut down their career.[174] Further, their unwillingness to circumvent the chain of command was based on previous unsuccessful attempts by junior officers to confront Marsaw personally about his abusive behaviour.[175] Thus, subordinates felt as though they were stymied; the divisional system and grievance system within the squadron had severely ruptured.[176]

The change in CF organizational culture that has since emerged from the Marsaw events arrived as a result of an eroding ethos among the officer corps that started thirty years previously yet continued to perpetuate itself through subculture influences in a submarine service that prided itself as an elite group distinct within the Canadian navy. Whether or not the CF can mitigate future events like Marsaw's failure in command remains dependent on what extent the CF enforces individual leaders to be accountable for reinforcing the institutionalized CF culture (ethos) and whether sufficient means exist

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[174] Canada, Court Martial Transcripts, *Her Majesty the Queen v. Lieutenant-Commander Dean C. Marsaw, Standing Court Martial Canada . . .*, 771-775.

[175] *Ibid.*, 1425.

[176] *Ibid.*, 1423-1449. This is one citing; there are several others of officers in OJIBWA who had confronted Marsaw and testified his response ranged from indifference to callousness or insulting remarks.

to implement an adequate means to ensure accountability for leader behaviour at all

levels within the organization.

CHAPTER 4 – ACCOUNTABILITY AND CF EFFECTIVENESS: IS THE CF ON-

MARK OR ASTERN OF STATION?

> Perhaps nothing in our society is more needed for those in
> positions of authority than accountability. Too often those with
> authority are able (and willing) to surround themselves with people
> who support their decisions without question.[177]

An organization's effectiveness can be determined from how the leader embeds

and transmits culture primarily through the process of socialization. When an

organization's culture, especially in western democratic nation-states, reflects a strong

military ethos based on a combination of traditional warrior values and its society's

values, it increases the probability for mission success, reinforcing the notion that a

nation's armed forces is regarded by its government and populace as a national

institution. Conversely, when a weak military ethos exists or a disconnection exists

between what the military aspires to and how it conducts itself, inappropriate leader

behaviour emerges, eroding both unit morale and decreasing a unit's probability to

achieve mission success, resulting in the government and public's lack of confidence in

its armed forces. Further, command or leadership styles are highly influenced by

environmental distinctiveness because officers spend most of the formative years of their

career within their particular environment. Hence, officers learn 'how business is

conducted around here' based on various factors such as training; the socialization

process, which reinforces the environment's perspective of 'appropriate leadership

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[177] ThinkExist.com, "Quotes on Accountability."
http://thinkexist.com/quotation/perhaps_nothing_in_our_society_is_more_needed_for/14011.html;
Internet; accessed 16 March 2007.

behaviour'; and traditions. Using this theoretical framework, the historical traditions of the Canadian submarine service based principally on a strong RN cultural influence, and the principle of autonomy that characterizes the Canadian submarine service, demonstrate how the organizational culture of the submarine service contributed to Marsaw's idiosyncratic leader behaviour that was left unchecked by superiors.

That Marsaw's superiors failed to deal with his conduct begs the question of accountability for individual leader behaviour. In light of the aftermath of the Marsaw events, the issue of accountability plays a significant role in determining to what extent an articulated new CF culture can transform individual leader behaviour today and in the future. More importantly, are existing internal accountability mechanisms, which are designed to measure leadership competence and organizational effectiveness, functioning effectively? All the changes to and reform of an organization's culture will be for naught if the CF fails to establish effective accountability measures to monitor and evaluate its organizational culture based on its ethos and leadership doctrinal frameworks. This culture must recognize the distinctiveness of each CF subculture whilst it promotes an overarching CF-wide culture that unifies the three environments.[178] A review of current accountability mechanisms will reveal that the CF has not yet achieved a holistic approach regarding assessing overall CF effectiveness.

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[178] Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000AP-004 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations . . .*, 16-27.

TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF ACCOUNTABILITY

The leader is the link in integrating culture and organizational effectiveness and hence, leaders must be held accountable for not only embedding culture, but shaping it to become institutional culture, or 'CF culture'. While some strength in the internal realm of accountability exists, current weaknesses are still evident at each level of leadership in the CF: individual; unit; and corporate; hence, a requirement for external accountability mechanisms remains. To form the basis for this analysis, the term 'accountability' must be further explored. Oxford defines 'accountability' as, "Liable to be called to account, or to answer for responsibilities and conduct; answerable, responsible. Chiefly of persons."[179]   The *Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry* concluded:

> Accountability is a principal mechanism for ensuring conformity to standards of action. In a free and democratic society, those exercising substantial power and discretionary authority must be answerable for all activities assigned or entrusted to them – in essence, for all activities for which they are responsible.[180]

Both definitions provide the concept of answering for one's actions. Evolution of the term over time derived the connotation of assigning blame for failure to act in compliance with regulatory requirements – particularly applicable within the Canadian military, which is afforded the privilege to administer justice within its own judicial system.

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[179] Oxford University Press, *Oxford English Dictionary* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50001361?single=1&query_type=word&queryword=accountable&first=1&max_to_show=10; Internet; accessed 16 March 2007.

[180] Department of National Defence, "Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry: The Military in Canadian Society,". . ., 22 February 2007.

Despite this traditionally held perspective on accountability, the Office of the Auditor

General (OAG) made a deliberate shift from an emphasis on the assignment of blame to a

process that involves a collaborative approach between those held accountable for their

performance and senior management, in the 2002 OAG report on modernizing

accountability in the public sector.[181] This modernized process of accountability involves

a proactive approach that includes tangible measures such as: agreement on performance

expectations; a demonstration of results achieved and the means by which they were

achieved; timely corrective action for progress; and a review of one's performance

through ". . . supportive assessment and feedback aimed at creating a continuous learning

environment."[182] Hence, the federal government's focus on the accountability process

has moved towards a proactive approach - one that encourages openness internally within

the respective governmental department and externally with other government

departments. Notwithstanding this move, the CF has not yet adopted this modernized

approach with respect to leadership accountability. Effective accountability occurs in an

environment where senior commanders cultivate openness, sharing, and a mentoring

approach towards leadership development of their subordinate leaders. Unfortunately,

CF leaders fear repercussions over perceived leadership weaknesses, making them risk-

averse in sharing personal leadership challenges with their senior commanders.[183] This

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[181] Office of the Auditor General of Canada, *The December 2002 Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons, Chapter 9 – Modernizing Accountability in the Public Sector*, (Ottawa: Minister of Pubic Works and Government Services Canada, 2002) [report on-line]; available from http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/20021209ce.html; Internet; accessed 18 March 2007.

[182] *Ibid*.

[183] Major Lisa Noonan,."The Court Martial of Lieutenant-Commander Dean Marsaw." *Interviewed by* Commander Mary-Ellen Clark, telephone interview, Toronto: 05 April 2007.

situation can only be overcome through a paradigm shift in fostering a mentoring leadership model in the CF, no easy task because this leadership approach opposes the traditional aggressive and individualistic leader-type bred in militaries. However, accountability must start at the individual leader level so that it can impact the unit and corporate level, thus transforming the organization's culture. Three levels of accountability will be explored: the individual level (Marsaw), the unit level (CO) and the corporate level (CF) to determine if sufficient accountability measures exist with respect to ensuring the alignment between leader behaviour and the newly endorsed CF ethos.

THE FAILURE OF INTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS

Deficiencies at the Individual Level

The weakest area in accountability to ensure leader behaviour aligns itself with the CF culture rests with the chain of command's lack of supervision over individual performance and conduct. The requirement for effective monitoring of CF officers is paramount, as their appointment as commissioned officers in the CF is based on a special trust bestowed upon them by the Crown.[184] Officers are distinguished from NCMs with regards to their general responsibilities in Queen's Regulations and Orders as those who are responsible to ". . . promote the welfare, efficiency and good discipline of *all* subordinates . . ." which make them ultimately accountable for their leadership behaviour

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[184] Shelley, "A Crisis of Character? Ethical Development in the Canadian Officer Corps." . . ., 23.

and for the leadership behaviour of those under their command.[185] When the

assumptions, beliefs, and values of an organization are assumed by an individual leader

who takes them to extreme, leadership can become corrupt which in turn impacts the

organization's culture and its effectiveness. If left unchecked, it increases the risk of

becoming a group or institutional norm, which also increases the risk that these nefarious

attitudes and behaviour will transfer to future generations of the organization and thereby

create a disconnection between what the organization espouses and how it actually

conducts itself. Since the events of the 1990s, the CF made great strides to define a

corporate culture or rather – an institutional culture - that is based on a robustly defined

CF military ethos. Although rogue leaders exist in the organization who will choose to

abrogate the principles of the CF military ethos, the structure of military command and

control with its emphasis on obedience and loyalty to the chain of command must be

careful to monitor its leaders with respect for their due regard to embrace the CF ethos in

a practical way; otherwise, the institution risks a resurgence of systemic leadership issues

like those of the 1990s.

The breakdown in accountability at the individual level in the Marsaw events

rested within the navy and within the submarine squadron chain of command. A lack of

oversight of Marsaw's conduct, inadequacies in the individual performance evaluation

reporting system (PER), and the navy's decision to proceed solely with a disciplinary

investigation contributed to ineffective accountability measures in addressing the

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[185] Department of National Defence, "General Responsibilities of Officers," *Queen's Regulations and Orders, Article 4.02 Volume I* – Administration, [publication on-line]; available from http://www.admfincs.forces.gc.ca/qr_o/vol1/ch004_e.asp#4.01; Internet; accessed 16 March 2007.

Marsaw's events. On the other hand, the navy's administrative reorganization of the First

Canadian Submarine Squadron proved to be a positive means to deal with the

institutional cultural issues that plagued the submarine squadron.

The failure on the part of Marsaw's peers and superiors to act upon his

inappropriate leader behaviour throughout his career reveals the prevalent assumption

within the submarine squadron that it could operate completely independent of the navy

and the CF. Marsaw exhibited a corrupt leadership style for many years in a permissive

environment that reinforced the acceptance of his behaviour until those subjected to his

abuse could no longer tolerate it. However, his self-absorption over his greatness rather

than the collective needs of the team was antithetic to the navy's expectations of effective

leadership. His consuming focus on achieving professional competency as a submarine

CO, his arrogance, and his explosive outbursts were evident long before he assumed

command of OJIBWA. One of Marsaw's colleagues stated: "We knew he was

dangerous but we didn't anticipate just *how* dangerous he was."[186] In an interview with

the *Trident*, the Canadian navy's newspaper, Marsaw admitted having to give up his

hobby of photography because it was too all-consuming, "'I don't have time to do it

(photography) properly,' he says . . . . 'If I can't do it properly, I'd rather not do it.'"[187]

His penchant for his hobby also transferred to his career. "I found that knowing how to

channel all my energy in one direction (photography) contributed to the success of my

[186] Kavanaugh, "The Court Martial of Lieutenant-Commander Dean Marsaw," . . .,15 March 2007.

[187] Kim Patterson, "Striving for Excellence: Commander of HMCS Ojibwa gives 100 per cent to the Navy." *The Trident*, n.d. circa 1991-1992. Photocopy held by author.

Naval training."[188] Marsaw's colleagues attest to his engrossed pursuit to become the

best driver in the Canadian submarine service. When required to re-take his Director's

level course (to become a navigating officer), he pined over his inability to complete his

first attempt of the course (for medical reasons) would be perceived as failure. One of his

colleagues tried to convince him that others would not perceive his re-coursing as a

weakness, but Marsaw saw much greater significance behind what he deemed to be

failure.[189] This same colleague related Marsaw's startling reaction to a comment related

to the incident in question at a downtown Halifax bar several months later:

> There were several of us from two submarines present at (name of bar)
> and we had all had a few beers. Dean was giving those of us who were
> 'Part Threes' (and there were at least half a dozen present) a hard time
> because he didn't feel that we were working hard enough to achieve our
> 'Dolphin' (submarine) qualification in a timely manner. I turned to him
> in considerable irritation and told him, perhaps too candidly, to 'Lay
> off. Your own career hasn't been without its moments. How about the
> navigation course, for instance?' Dean just exploded and, forgetting his
> coat, stormed out of the bar in a rage.[190]

In an interview with another of Marsaw's colleagues for this paper who had witnessed

this same event, he recited the accounts above with similar clarity but added: "After this

incident, Dean went out and got a baseball bat and threatened him with it."[191] When

another peer achieved a higher mark than Marsaw on a surface command exam, one

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[188] *Ibid*.

[189] Craven, "The Court Martial of Lieutenant-Commander Dean Marsaw," . . .,12 March 2007.

[190] *Ibid*.

[191] Kavanaugh, "The Court Martial of Lieutenant-Commander Dean Marsaw," . . ., 15 March 2007. This incident was brought up by the interviewee during the interview with no prompting from the author with regards to this particular event.

colleague stated Marsaw ". . . went up in front of the entire class of officers and accused [name withheld] of cheating because according to Dean, there was no way in the world *anyone* could beat him on an exam."[192] Though he prided himself in believing he had consummate knowledge of submarine operations, one officer stated that Marsaw would conveniently forget that he did not know everything yet expected perfection from his officers.[193] Yet, his arrogance carried him through, despite clearly evident character flaws such as his unwillingness to take criticism and his refusal to accept any form of personal failure. He was caught up in that aura of command that had been fostered within the history of the RN, the RCN, and in the submarine squadron itself. He believed in his invincibility as a CO. No one achieved success in confronting Marsaw about his inappropriate and gross distortion of 'naval command style' until Marsaw's operations officer (Ops O) requested a transfer to general service.[194] One colleague commended the former operations officer for his action: "He was the first one to stand up to Dean and quit on him."[195]

Opponents of those who claim Marsaw's behaviour was inappropriate would argue if his behaviour was so unbefitting a naval officer, why would his peers and

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[192] *Ibid.*

[193] *Ibid.*

[194] Canada, Court Martial Transcripts, *Her Majesty the Queen v. Lieutenant-Commander Dean C. Marsaw, Standing Court Martial Canada . . .*, 1524-1525.

[195] Kavanaugh, "The Court Martial of Lieutenant-Commander Dean Marsaw," . . ., 15 March 2007; and Canada, Court Martial Transcripts, *Her Majesty the Queen v. Lieutenant-Commander Dean C. Marsaw, Standing Court Martial Canada . . .*, 1524-1525. The Ops O submitted a request to return to the surface fleet but had couched his real reason for his request. At the court martial he admitted the motivation behind his request centred on Marsaw's inept leadership and his abuse towards him and officers on board OJIBWA.

superiors fail to confront him from the earliest display of these tendencies? Could not

these attitudes and behaviour have been stopped? Peers believed the singular incidents

were 'isolated' events. Certainly none of them noticed the dangerous trend that began to

emerge, which eventually culminated in his abusive behaviour towards his crew. An

assumption permeated among submariners that the SM1 was protecting Marsaw's career,

and therefore subordinates felt their complaints could not be heard without bias on the

part of the SM1.[196] The SM1personally selected Marsaw to spearhead the prestigious

Canadian Perisher course; hence, submariners believed he was untouchable.[197] Because

the submarine squadron operated autonomously from the larger context of the navy,

submariners believed any complaints would halt at the SM1 level; they feared

repercussion from him and from Marsaw.

Inadequacies of the PER system, which failed to capture accurately Marsaw's

performance and potential especially in the area of ethical behaviour, contributed to

inadequate oversight of Marsaw's conduct. As earlier stated, Marsaw's PER assessments

reflected only praise from superiors; they were compiled largely based on subjective

opinion, lending credence to the belief that his behaviour received the tacit approval of

senior officers. Since the incidents of the 1990s, the PER form now includes an

assessment factor entitled, 'ethics'. But even this part is prone to subjective

interpretation of the assessor despite the guidelines and standards provided in the

Canadian Force Personnel Appraisal System (CFPAS) handbook. A recent incident on a

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[196] Canada, Court Martial Transcripts, *Her Majesty the Queen v. Lieutenant-Commander Dean C. Marsaw, Standing Court Martial Canada . . .*, 777-778.

[197] *Ibid*, 866.

DCDS (Deputy Chief of Defence Staff) operation illustrates this point. When a senior commander directed that all personnel would receive a high score for the ethics assessment factor on individual PERs (with the exception of the few who deviated from this score), he based his decision on the premise that an increase in operational tempo presupposed honourable and ethical conduct on the part of those who deployed.[198] This action indicates a broken evaluation system that is subject to commanders superimposing their subjective opinion over an already objective standard set within the CFPAS. Furthermore, the fact that the ship's company had accepted this faulty logic was alarming due to the subtle attitude conveyed to the crew concerning the assumption between one's participation in deployed operations and high ethical performance. In actual fact, it could be presumed that not every serviceperson faces ethical challenges of the same magnitude during a deployment; it is dependent on the nature and complexity of the operation, and the environment in which one operates.[199] Moreover, the fact that a senior commander stated that most persons would receive a high score rating on ethical conduct as the *standard* assumes that an *average* score in this assessment factor carries the connotation of a certain degree of failure to achieve the presupposed high standardized score established by command.

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[198] This was the author's experience during a DCDS deployment in 2003.

[199] It could be stated that land-centric, asymmetric operations such as those faced by the Canadian army in Afghanistan derive more head-on ethical challenges for a large number of Brigade personnel because of their geographical location and the challenges of conducting counter-insurgency operations; whereas, only a select portion of a ship's company operating in the Persian Gulf would face similar challenges as the naval boarding party, a small portion of the ship's company, are those who experience heightened ethical challenges based on direct contact with potential insurgents. A smaller portion of a ship's company therefore would be involved in complex operations similar to those of the Brigade group in Afghanistan.

Since the PER proves to be a questionable means by which accountability for ethical conduct can be measured, disciplinary proceedings should provide the effective means by which individual leaders are held to account when leadership behaviour goes awry. In many cases this is true; however, disciplinary proceedings limit their scope to the individual when in some cases the leader's conduct may be indicative of a wide-range of issues in the unit. The question arises then of the utility of conducting an administrative investigation such as a Summary Investigation (SI) or a Board of Inquiry (BOI) as opposed to a disciplinary investigation in a case like Marsaw.[200] While this paper will not discuss the disciplinary investigation regarding Marsaw, suffice to say that an administrative investigation offers a number of benefits from an institutional perspective. First, administrative investigations offer more latitude with regards to investigation scope. Thus, not necessarily limited to Marsaw's leadership behaviour, an administrative investigation could have broadened the scope to investigating personnel issues on board OJIBWA, thus enabling the board to investigate underlying or systemic issues related to leadership on the boat. For instance, the average pass rate for submarine squadron junior submariner officers was eighty percent, but in OJIBWA, the average was thirty percent.[201] A BOI might have revealed underlying issues related to potential leadership problems that rested solely with Marsaw or a combination of his behaviour

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[200] Department of National Defence, *Defence Administrative Orders and Directives 7002-1Boards of Inquiry*, (Ottawa: Department of National Defence 02 August 2002) [on-line]; available from http://www.admfincs.forces.gc.ca/admfincs/subjects/DAOD/7002/1_e.asp; Internet; accessed 17 March 2007. A BOI vice a SI would be more appropriate in the Marsaw case. DAOD 7002-1 affords a provision to convene a BOI "to investigate and report on matters of unusual significance or complexity." A BOI affords the procedure of testimony to be taken under oath as well, which would have been advisable in this particular case due to the serious nature of the allegations.

[201] Canada, Court Martial Transcripts, *Her Majesty the Queen v. Lieutenant-Commander Dean C. Marsaw, Standing Court Martial Canada . . .*, 1666.

and other issues that would come out in the course of an administrative investigation.

The administrative investigation route also offers opportunity to provide

recommendations on rectifying the evident problem (in this case – Marsaw), and

underlying issues, such as leadership and the operational exhaustion experienced by

OJIBWA's crew.[202] Furthermore, the final report of an administrative investigation,

which includes the board's findings and recommendations, is forwarded for higher level

review. In the Marsaw case, the findings and recommendations of a BOI may have

precipitated organizational changes to the submarine squadron that would have

encouraged a change in organizational culture and may have resolved leadership and

operational issues with the O-boats before having to resort to outside intervention.

The navy's reaction in dealing with Marsaw and organizational culture issues in

the submarine squadron proved to be an effective means to resolve systemic issues within

the submarine service. Notwithstanding this, the navy's lack of oversight in submarine

squadron matters for years had contributed to the very challenges the navy sought to

resolve. While it had always acknowledged the unique operational and administrative

construct of the submarine squadron, the navy's reticence to provide direct oversight in

the governance of the squadron led to several investigations in the 1980s that included

repeated canteen shortages, a submarine captain who hazarded his submarine frequently

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[202]*Ibid.*, 1693-1694. OJIBWA sailed over 200 days in 1992, taking on the bulk of operations in the submarine squadron – ONONDAGA experienced a crankshaft problem which demanded an extended docking period - and OKANAGAN was in refit. Further, according to the SM1's testimony, between 1990 and 1993 submarines began to conduct extensive patrols in support of other government departments, demanding extensive training in preparation for this new role. In fact, OJIBWA was the first submarine of Canada's fleet to be deployed on counter-drug operations. According to the crew who testified at Marsaw's court martial, the extensive operational schedule between 1990 and 1993 influenced Marsaw's leadership behaviour because of exhaustion and stress the crew experienced as the only operational boat for extended periods.

by repeatedly damaging the sonar dome of his submarine, and incidents of electrocution of submariners on board ONONDAGA.[203] The navy dealt with these events singularly, but it was becoming increasingly evident to senior naval leadership that the individual events were indicative of serious problems within the submarine service that required immediate attention.

Notwithstanding these events, Marsaw became the navy's impetus for dealing with a culture that operated autonomously and risked spinning out of control. As one submariner concluded, "It was clear something had to be done in the submarine community that had produced a Marsaw."[204] After charges were laid against Marsaw, the Commander MARLANT initiated the 'Waterfront Reorganization' group in 1994 to ". . . study to investigate and make recommendations on a revised Waterfront Organization which would incorporate the Submarine Squadron."[205] By subsuming the submarine squadron into another organization (Maritime Operations Group, or MOG), the navy anticipated it would crush the autonomous streak that pervaded the submarine service for decades. The report offered two recommendations to Commander MARLANT: option one would retain the commander submarine squadron (SM1) appointment and amalgamate the squadron under MOG 5 commander; option two would encompass the entire submarine squadron under MOG 5, with no SM1. Commander

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[203] Kavanaugh, "The Court Martial of Lieutenant-Commander Dean Marsaw," . . ., 15 March 2007.

[204] *Ibid*.

[205] Commander Maritime Forces Atlantic, *Report of the Phase Two Waterfront Support Reorganization Working Group*, Commander Maritime Forces Atlantic: file nil file number, 23 June 1995, 1.

MARLANT chose the latter option despite the report's recommendation to select the first option for ease of transition with the impending introduction of the Victoria class submarines in the fleet.[206] The Commander MARLANT disbanded the submarine squadron, much like the disbandment of the Airborne Regiment.[207] This action may be disputed; however, one officer who served during this time stated that the MARLANT Command Chief Petty Officer told him that the Commander MARLANT wanted the elitism of the submarine squadron dealt with because of the numerous events that culminated in Marsaw's court martial.[208] Despite the navy's lack of oversight of the submarine service for decades, it at least took responsibility to break the mold of the submarine culture by amalgamating it with the surface fleet into one operational group - one that would be commanded by surface officers – at least for the short term.

Deficiencies at the Unit Level

Notwithstanding the shortfalls of accountability at the individual level, some initiatives to increase accountability at the unit level indicate a move towards a holistic approach to accountability for leader behaviour and toward leader accountability for shaping organizational culture. The CDS' guidance to commanding officers is one example of strengthening the accountability requirement at the Commanding Officer

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[206] *Ibid.*, 16.

[207] The First Canadian Submarine Squadron was stood down on 09 February 1996.

[208] Kavanaugh, "The Court Martial of Lieutenant-Commander Dean Marsaw," . . ., 15 March 2007.

level.[209] A unit's organizational effectiveness with respect to ethos and leadership is

dependent on the personality of the particular CO commanding the unit. However, the

CDS' guidance to COs clearly articulates command and leadership expectations of COs.

The document establishes a consistent standard for unit performance, and directly links

unit effectiveness to the role of the CO in shaping the culture of the unit.

An initiative within the submarine service that indicates strong accountability

measures for command selection is Commander MOG 5's recent re-instatement of the

'Submarine Command Assessments' for officers. This re-instatement was necessary

because in previous years, selection was primarily based on the submarine squadron

commander's recommendation – admittedly, a biased selection process.[210] The new

assessment, separate from an officer's annual PER, assesses key factors of not only

submarine safety and tactics, but also includes assessments on the candidate's ability to

handle stress while in leadership appointments at sea and his overall capability to foster

team leadership.[211] Further requirements include a specific statement about the readiness

of the candidate to command a submarine, recognizing that he may possess the requisite

technical and tactical skills, but may not be ready for command at the time of the

assessment.[212] The Submarine Command Assessment promises to be an effective

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[209] Chief of the Defence Staff. *Chief of the Defence Staff Guidance to Commanding Officers – 2007*. [on-line] available from http://barker.cfcacad.net/Admin/Canforgen/2007/CDSguideCO_e.pdf; Internet; accessed 20 March 2007.

[210] Captain(N) Laurence Hickey, *Submarine Command Assessments*. Fifth Maritime Operations Group: file 4500-1 (Comd), 15 September 2005, 1.

[211] *Ibid*., Annex A 3/5.

[212] *Ibid*., Annex A 5/5.

measure that will introduce numerous checks and balances before granting a candidate a recommendation for command appointment.

Two other leadership and ethical climate assessment tools available for unit COs show further promise of closing the gap between leadership, organizational culture, and accountability; the challenge exists however, with respect to instituting a mandatory requirement for implementation of these tools across the CF. The Unit Morale Profile (UMP) – for in-garrison use - and the Human Dimensions of Operations (HDO) – for deployed units - are surveys designed to assess the leadership and ethos of a unit; both surveys provide almost 360º feedback that measure strengths and potential systemic issues depending to what extent COs implement the tools. Both surveys employ the tenets of CF leadership doctrine: the HDO refers to these tenets as 'Principles of Leadership for an Operational Environment' tied directly to CF leadership doctrine; whereas, the UMP refers to 'Leadership Styles' in their survey, derived from a combination of the CF leadership doctrine and the 'Bass and Avolio Mulit-Factor Leadership Questionnaire' to assess leadership effectiveness within a unit.[213] The army and air force employ the UMP (Wing Morale Profile, recently introduced in the air force); and all three environments have employed the HDO to some degree when members deploy on operations.[214] An interview with a researcher in the Directorate of

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[213] Major Lisa Noonan, email correspondence, 05 April 2007. The Bass and Avolio Multi-Factor Leadership Questionnaire is comprised of transformational, transactional, and laissez-faire leadership styles. Added to this questionnaire is the CF Principles of Leadership based on chapter 2 of A-PA-005-000AP-004 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*.

[214] The 'Unit Climate Profile" was the former version of the current HDO; the HDO is comprised of three surveys taken throughout a deployment: a pre-deployed version of the survey, an in-theatre

Personnel Applied Research (DPAR) at NDHQ confirms the challenges experienced by

DPAR regarding the voluntary basis for its use by commanders.   Many COs are reluctant

to implement the survey based on various personal reasons; others who have

implemented the surveys fail to make effective use of the results through follow-up.

Conversely, the COs who generally demonstrate effective leadership and find success

with the surveys are those who embrace an open-sharing environment, are willing to be

vulnerable as the subject of assessment, and have incorporated follow-on

recommendations designed to improve leadership and ethical behaviour at all levels in

the unit.[215] A number of commonly-held misconceptions on the part of COs and

participants complicate instituting this tool as a mandatory requirement: first, a common

belief among officers prevails that they know everything about their unit and people and

therefore do not require a survey; second, COs fear repercussion should adverse results

be divulged higher in the chain of command thereby decreasing their promotion

opportunities; and a common misunderstanding among officers that, in sharing openly

among their superiors about leadership and ethical challenges, they risk being fired.[216]

Overcoming these misconceptions is no easy task, but the tools offer benefits for

COs to address unit strengths and opportunities for enhancing leadership capabilities

within their unit. However, the attitude change required to execute these tools

successfully based on a mandatory requirement for implementation demands leadership

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assessment, and a post-deployed survey. The pre and post-deployed versions of the survey include a
section on personnel retention issues at the request of the army.

[215] Major Lisa Noonan,."The Court Martial of Lieutenant-Commander Dean Marsaw."
Interviewed by Commander Mary-Ellen Clark, telephone interview, Toronto: 05 April 2007.

[216] *Ibid.*

from the top. A shift from the individualistic, competitive leader-type model towards the executive coaching, or mentoring type of leadership style, between senior commanders and their subordinate officers would alleviate the fear of failure experienced by subordinates while it would offer several benefits that promote sustainable change to an organization's culture.[217]

First, the survey tools disclose unknown issues related to leadership and ethical climate within a unit, both of which are important in transforming an organization towards the CF culture. The misconception that a CO believes he knows all that happens within his unit is counter-argued by scholar Donna Winslow's works on socio-cultural issues within the Airborne Regiment where she documents that systemic issues pervading within the regiment could go virtually unknown at the command level due to the fierce loyalties among the sub-groups within the regiment.[218] Yet another example more relevant to the systemic issues resident in the submarine squadron concerns a former submariner officer's attestation that although he knew his junior ratings well, having risen from the ranks himself, sailors would keep secret any issue regardless of the strong bond created amongst them. As a junior officer serving in ONONDAGA, he learned electricians were electrocuting submariners completely by surprise, despite the restricted physical confines of the submarine. Even the CO was totally blindsided by the events.[219]

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[217] *Ibid.*

[218] Winslow, "Misplayed Loyalties: Military Culture and the Breakdown of Discipline in Two Peace Operations," In *The Human in Command: Exploring the Modern Military Experience . . .*, 305.

[219] Kavanaugh, "The Court Martial of Lieutenant-Commander Dean Marsaw," . . ., 15 March 2007. and Editorial, "Submarine captains are Trusted for Decisiveness not Politeness" *The Ottawa Citizen*, n.d. circa 1996. 'Getting meggered' is a submarine service tradition as explained by the interviewee where

Hence it is possible that a CO may not be aware of incidents within his unit, regardless of the magnitude of the events.

Another benefit offered by implementing the survey tools relates to its rigorous research design that reduces the potential to gather opinionated comments as opposed to quantifiable data. The HDO and UMP follow a theoretical model rather than measure opinions of respondents; hence the tools assess ". . . the *building blocks underlying* [sic] unit climate rather than single issues."[220] An important part of these surveys, therefore, is the leadership evaluation component which assesses underlying organizational values and confidence in command.[221] A CO's willingness to implement the survey over an extended period of time will reveal trends in leadership issues, which in turn can facilitate change to align leader behaviour with the CF ethos.

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an electrician would electrocute NCMs and junior officers with hundreds, even thousands of volts while they were undergoing training concerning the electrical systems of the boat. If the trainee gave the incorrect answer to a question, he would 'get meggered.' It is interesting to note that the pervasive cultural attitude among submariners that it was all 'good fun'. The interviewee and an editorial that appeared in The Ottawa Citizen confirm this. The 'tradition' seemed to have got out of hand when the Petty Officer accused of abuse tied the hands of junior submariners so that the action was deemed to be against the individual's will. The only reason these incidents came to light was because the Ordinary Seaman (OS) reported the abuse he suffered directly to the submarine squadron commander. Although a copy of the Board of Inquiry (BOI) was not made available to the author for this paper, the author can also attest to the veracity of the interviewee's statement having been posted to the Submarine Squadron HQ during the time that the BOI was conducted. Two submariners were charged and found guilty.

[220] Major Anne Goyne, "Measuring Unit Effectiveness: What do Commanders Want to Know and Why?" [paper on-line]; available from http://www.internationalmta.org/Documents/2006/2006011P.pdf; Internet; accessed 17 March 2007.

[221] *Ibid*.

Deficiencies at the Corporate Level

As a profession, the CF prides itself in its ability to self-regulate but this privilege and practice experiences weaknesses as well. To its credit, however, senior CF leadership focussed on fundamental changes to its organizational culture by first of all expressing a culture that was founded upon an ethos, embraced as the new corporate 'CF culture'.

As has been previously stated, military ethos acts as a centre of gravity to guide leader behaviour. In order to address systemic leadership and accountability problems, the CDS reviewed these topics in light of the tension between the requirements for military service, which shapes a conservative type of organizational culture, and liberal changes to Canadian society since the 1980s. The former CF leadership doctrine in 1971 had advanced from the 'transactional leadership' model to the 'transformational leadership' model, popularized by James Burns in the late 1970s.[222] The shift to adopting a new leadership doctrine after the Somalia and Marsaw events transformed into a values-based leadership model, deliberately designed as such, based on the newly articulated CF ethos.[223] By commencing with the definition of the CF ethos, the CF articulated its fundamental leadership doctrine consistent with its values-based ethos.

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[222] Commander (ret'd) Terry Pinnell, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, email correspondence, 23 February 2007.

[223] Lieutenant-Colonel Bill Bentley, "The Court Martial of Lieutenant-Commander Dean Marsaw," *Interviewed by* Commander Mary-Ellen Clark, telephone interview, Toronto: 22 March 2007.

The resulting leadership doctrine manual, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces:*

Conceptual Foundations, explains the connection:

> No mention has been made [to this point] of how good or effective
> leadership is to be identified among the many kinds of purposeful
> influence that are a common part of human social activity. Nor has any
> attempt been made to prescribe CF leader behaviour – to specify what
> CF leaders *ought* to do. This is because effective leadership can only be
> defined in relation to how we conceptualize organizational
> effectiveness. Leadership is, after all, at the service of collective
> effectiveness. Hence defining effect leadership, and, more specifically,
> effective CF leadership, requires a discussion of what we mean by the
> effectiveness of the CF as a professional institution. In other words,
> defining effective CF leadership call for a discussion of institutional
> *values* [sic], those abstract qualities that tell CF members and their
> leaders what organizational outcomes they should strive to achieve and
> what *professional standards* [sic] they should use to guide and regulate
> their conduct.[224]

Further developments in practical leadership manuals such as *Leadership in the*

Canadian Forces: Leading People; Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the

Institution; Institutional Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Contemporary Issues; and a

revised professional development framework offer practical measures to guide leaders in

their professional development in the art of military leadership.[225] Yet, instituting

doctrine alone fails to provide adequately the link to leader behaviour if tangible

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[224] Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000AP-004 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations . . .*, 16.

[225] Karen Davis, email correspondence, 13 March 2007. *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading People; Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution;* and *Institutional Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Contemporary Issues* are currently in process of final editing and will be published in 2007 by the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute under the auspices of the Canadian Defence Academy. *Institutional Leadership in the Canadian Forces* contains a chapter (Chapter 2) specific to organizational culture, entitled, "Culture in the Canadian Forces: Issues and Challenges for Institutional Leaders".

measures of accountability are not incorporated to hold CF members responsible for leadership and culture.

While changes emerged toward defining a corporate ethos and leadership expectations for the CF, internal measures remain insufficient to address accountability when mechanisms have either not been implemented or have not been mandated within the DND/CF.   As a servant of the state, the CF is accountable to Parliament for its governance and operations. Accountability ensures the CF's credibility as an institution as it provides a feedback mechanism on whether or not it is meeting its mandate on behalf of the government and people of Canada. Various internal reporting mechanisms provide public record as to the CF's performance; however, many of these reports concern procurement and current deployments, matters on which DND is obligated to report. The Minister of National Defence (MND) reports to Parliament annually and senior officers report to the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence; however, the Department tends to stress positive performance, reinforcing the notion that self-regulation breeds an insular approach towards accountability. The last time the MND reported to the Treasury Board Secretariat on ethics and accountability reforms in DND was 1999.[226] And although the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) serves as the government watchdog for accountability across all departments, topic selection for audits are based on a wide selection of parameters. Strengthening the internal accountability chain with respect to CF leadership and culture requires an OAG

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[226] Treasury Board Secretariat, *National Defence Performance Report for the period ending March 31, 2003*, [report on-line]; available from http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rma/dpr/02-03/ND-DN/ND-DN03D01_e.asp; Internet; accessed 17 March 2007.

audit of the CF's progress date on these matters. Self-regulation and regulation from other government departments does not ensure robust accountability. The CF cannot afford to wait for another debacle like that of Marsaw to reach the public domain without having a body external to the CF to monitor and report on CF ethics and leadership. This initiative will help sustain the CF as a profession of arms.

THE REQUIREMENT FOR EXTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS

The Public Matters

The public's expectations and perception of the CF are a viable source for measuring accountability. Public opinion should not be underestimated for when disaster strikes within Canada like the Manitoba floods, or environmental disasters such as Hurricane Juan, citizens immediately look to the military to provide direction, support, and a sense of control in the midst of surrounding chaos. Retired General Ramsey Withers states the following tenets of the public's expectations of their military: a belief in their profession; a loyalty to the organization; integrity; ethical conduct; a willingness to be accountable for their actions; an integral part of the community; acceptance of Canadian values; and adaptability towards change that typifies today's world.[227] Inappropriate conduct on the part of CF leaders can quickly destroy the implicit trust between citizens and the military. The CF exists to protect Canadian citizens, and

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[227] General (retired) Ramsey Withers, "Public Expectations of the General Officer Corps," In *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral*, ed. Colonel Bernd Horn and Stephen J. Harris, 423-434 (St Catharines: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2001), 430.

Canadian values at home and abroad; therefore, public opinion can be a significant driver to ensure that the CF lives up to Canadians' expectations of its role in Canadian society.

The Media Matters

The media also acts as an effective tool to force the CF to be accountable for its actions. The Marsaw case was the highlight in a string of military tribunals that had gone sour for the CF, which eventually initiated change in the CF military justice system.[228] Debates rage about the way in which the press interprets the news, but in a society that is accustomed to open transparency and has ease of access to events in the media *while* they occur, it underscores the importance of the media as a means to require accountability within the CF. But it is not only access to on-line media that plays a role in today's society of people thirsting for up-to-the-second news-breaking stories. The pace at which people are switching from one news-type website to another is astounding. A recent report on the power of the media in military operations by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation revealed that on average, a person surfing the internet switches from one news website to another searching for breaking news every forty seconds, proving two maxims : 'information is power' and 'perception is reality'.[229]

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[228] Government of Canada Depository Services Program, "National Defence Act: Reform of the Military Justice System," [report on-line]; available from http://dsp-psd.communication.gc.ca/Pilot/LoPBdP/CIR/961-e.htm; Internet; accessed 18 March 2007. Other cases that ended up in debacle the same year of Marsaw's court martial included the court martial of an officer accused in the accidental death of a soldier while on exercise, and courts martial of soldiers at CFB Valcartier as a result of the falsification of invoices.

Developing an ethical framework, articulating leadership doctrine, and publishing

leadership manuals will not prevent another 'Somalia' or a 'Dean Marsaw'; these

incidents will always occur, but the response of the institution to take measures to

investigate, report and deal with these incidents in an appropriate manner to the

government and the public is important. Journalist Adam Day contends that the

possibility for another crisis in command is plausible because leaders currently do not

hold subordinate leaders to account for inappropriate conduct even ten years after the

Somalia events.[230] He cites two events in which an 'alternate ethos' as he describes it,

was permitted to emerge as a result of unethical conduct displayed by leaders during

military operations. In one incident, a young lieutenant had no referent power over the

Warrant Officer (WO) given his youthfulness and inexperience and though the lieutenant

confronted the WO the following day after the incident, cultural values had already been

transferred to young, impressionable minds through the informal socialization process

between the WO and the troops.[231] In essence, the WO espoused an 'alternate' ethos, one

that ". . . values cruelty, abuse of power, and disrespect for the law."[232] The alternate

message cloaked in humour, was more persuasive to the listeners ". . . because the

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[229] Canadian Broadcasting Cooperation, "Spinning into the Twenty-first Century." Episode 6 of *Spin Cycles*. CBC radio Sunday Edition, Toronto: aired 25 February 2007; http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/spincycles/audio/spincycleep6.mp3; Internet; accessed 25 February 2007.

[230] Adam Day, "Somalia Redux? The Yahoo Defence, Terminal Bullshit Syndrome and the Myth of the Isolated Incident," In *From the Outside Looking In: Media and Defence Analyst Perspectives on Canadian Military Leadership*, ed. Colonel Bernd Horn, 142-154 (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy), 2005, 143.

[231] *Ibid*., 146.

[232] *Ibid*., 146.

reconfiguration of values is subtler. What was formerly wrong is now funny, and what is funny is often accepted."[233] And by telling the story in front of a superior officer, he gained tacit consent for that ethos.[234] Although the second incident occurred on a different deployment, the beliefs and values transferred to junior leaders through their Sergeant that they could challenge authority by discretely disobeying a direct order, reinforced the 'alternate ethos' syndrome. Some may argue that soldiers today are less intimidated to whistle-blow on their superiors but history does not bear this out, especially in tightly-knit subcultures where group loyalty forms a basic assumption – almost impossible to change, according to Schein's theory.[235] The CF faces a long journey ahead to filter out these resurging values that remain unchecked by the chain of command. Can an external means of accountability like the media mitigate the resurgence of a crisis in command or a re-emergence of an 'alternate ethos' other than the espoused CF ethos? Opponents to this argument may doubt so, but the media plays a significant role in reporting their personal observations much like Day did, so that when senior officers read accounts like Day's, it should alert them to the possibility of a dangerous return of the decade of the 1990s. The media and the public, therefore, play a significant role in identifying potential leadership and ethical issues because of access to events in the public domain as they happen.

The government must propose a way ahead for effective monitoring of individual and collective performance in the areas of ethics and leadership in the CF. Since current

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[233] *Ibid*., 146.

[234] *Ibid*., 146.

[235] Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership . . .*, 31.

internal accountability measures are replete with significant shortfalls, Table 4.1 below

serves to illustrate the integration of a holistic approach towards accountability for CF

ethics and individual leadership behaviour that reflects the tenets of the CF ethos and the

CF leadership doctrine.[236] It visualizes the argument in this paper that ethos and

leadership shape organizational culture and have a direct bearing on the CF's legitimacy

as a national institution. Effective internal accountability measures coupled with external

accountability measures provide a robust accountability framework that ultimately

determines the legitimacy of the CF as a national institution and thus, value for Canada

and Canadians.

EXTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS (VALUE FOR CANADIANS)

INTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY (SELF-REGULATION – PROFESSION OF ARMS)

ESPOUSED VALUES   **VALUES-IN-USE**

CF ETHOS

BELIEFS AND EXPECTATIONS ABOUT MILITARY SERVICE	CANADIAN VALUES	CANADIAN MILITARY VALUES
UNLIMITED LIABILITY	PEACE, ORDER, GOOD GOV'T	DUTY
FIGHTING SPIRIT		LOYALTY
DISCIPLINE	DEMOCRACY	INTEGRITY
TEAMWORK	RULE OF LAW	COURAGE

CONDUCT

CF EFFECTIVENESS

LEGAL (CIVIL & LOAC)

ETHICAL

Shapes institutional culture of the CF (organizational culture)

LEGITIMACY AS A NATIONAL INSTITUTION

Table 4.1 – Accountability and CF Effectiveness – a robust definition

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[236] These components are the author's graphical interpretation of essential components of the CF ethics doctrine and CF leadership doctrine derived from *Duty With Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*, and *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*.

CONCLUSION

The events surrounding the court martial of Lieutenant-Commander Dean Marsaw demonstrate the strong connection between leadership style and culture in military subcultures and how these elements impact overall unit and CF effectiveness. Notwithstanding, personality does play a part in the leadership style of the individual; however, Marsaw's abusive leadership was the result of a number of factors which contributed to his ultimate failure in command.

First, the autonomous nature of submarine warfare and command provides more liberty and independence to the CO in every area of operations, unlike affairs in surface fleet. Yet, Marsaw exploited this privilege of autonomy and betrayed the trust of his subordinates by means of his abhorrent command behaviour. Second, the Marsaw case underscores the truth that the leader is the primary instrument through which culture is transmitted and embedded deep within the core of the unit. Marsaw's incessant perfectionism caused anxiety among his crew, creating an atmosphere of fear and repeated failures despite their efforts to work diligently to appease their captain. Their anxiety and their ineffective performance stemmed from fear over Marsaw's unpredictable and bully-like behaviour: the crew exhibited typical coping mechanisms according to Schein's theory, in order to cope with Marsaw's outbursts and demoralizing comments. After repeated similar actions from Marsaw over a three-year period, a counterculture emerged to halt his reign of terror.

The third contributor to Marsaw's failure was the increasing bureaucratization of the CF over three decades and a resultant increase in subculture identification as a means by which subcultures, like the submarine service, dealt with the perceived threat over their survival. Like the Airborne Regiment, the submarine service considered itself elite and somehow special, not subject to the same standards as the larger CF. It therefore isolated itself from the navy and further polarized itself from Canadian society, creating a clash of cultures between itself and the CF, and with Canadians at-large. This clash of cultures was further aggravated by a strong alliance with the RN in everything from its organizational structure to training and doctrine, which continued to influence the way in which the submarine squadron conducted its business.

Finally, insufficient oversight of Marsaw's behaviour in effect condoned his leadership style even though it was an extreme of the Anglo-American naval command style. The lack of a well-articulated CF ethos during these years created a moral vacuum whereby his peers, who were aware of his eccentric behaviour from early on in his career, were discouraged from confronting Marsaw because of the perception that senior leadership within the squadron protected Marsaw's career and, therefore, would not take any action – disciplinary or administrative - to resolve issues until the navy stepped in and did so. A weak divisional system within the squadron and an ineffective CF grievance system further compounded submariners' efforts to resolve issues with Marsaw's leadership, causing further frustration among the crew. An unhappy boat under a mean captain set all the conditions for a mutiny. Instead, the crew member or members pursued an alternate route by airing their complaints through the media, proving

that the media can be an effective means of ensuring or at least provoking accountability on behalf of the CF to Canadian society at-large, whom the CF serves. Eventually, the navy took the strongest administrative actions possible to root out the systemic issues within the squadron: it disbanded the submarine squadron and it convened a career review board, which resulted in Marsaw's release.

While the CF regulates its leader behaviour through internal mechanisms such as its own ability to administer military tribunals, which can be effective especially in light of the changes to the military justice system as a result of the Marsaw court martial fiasco, the CF still struggles to self-regulate due to inadequacies at every leadership level within the CF. At the individual leader level, the CF fails to apply a consistent non-biased administration of its personnel evaluation reporting system, which leads to over-inflation of annual evaluation reports on CF members. The ability of senior officers to protect a subordinate officer's career remains a habit hard to break but must be done in order to allow full unfettered accountability for leader behaviour. At the unit level, the implementation of the HDO and UMP survey tools show particular promise; however, until the culture of fear of repercussion is removed by senior CF leadership, COs will continue to be reluctant to implement the tools for assessing leadership and ethics at the unit level. Furthermore, despite external government oversight from Treasury Board Secretariat and the Office of the Auditor General, the large percentage of oversight of DND/CF activities pertains to financial accountability and issues related to operational deployments. OAG audits are selective; an audit of leadership and ethics initiatives in the Department is needed at this critical point of implementation where the OAG could

produce recommendations to address potential long-term concerns, if any, on the implementation of the new CF culture and leadership doctrine before implementation continues further down the road. Finally, the public's perception and media's first-hand observations of the CF prove a worthwhile barometer to measure accountability for leadership and organizational culture in the CF. Until the CF can prove it has the requisite means to self-regulate, it must strengthen its internal accountability measures by employing external measures before the institution is considered mature enough to enjoy the privilege of self-regulation as the profession of arms in Canada. Choosing to rely on self-regulation alone will only perpetuate the myth within CF leadership that the CF continues to provide value for Canadians while ignoring their very concerns. The CF can no longer afford to remain nepotistic towards accountability in the areas of culture and leadership. The Canadian public simply deserves the very best from a national institution that represents their national interests, and the heart and soul of Canada at home and abroad.

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