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MASTER OF DEFENSE STUDIES THESIS

Re-taking the Hill: The Military's Role in Winning at Counterinsurgency

By /par

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ABSTRACT

Throughout the twentieth century, underestimated insurgency forces have achieved long-term strategic victory against some of the most modern and technologically advanced militaries in the world. As demonstrated by the French in Indochina and Algeria and the United States in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq, conventional military forces struggle to win the peace against an enemy that is both too mobile to be encircled and holds no territory. The focus of this paper will be on the military's role as a member of the counterinsurgency team and the military's implementation strategy for each element of national power (DIME: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic). Specifically, this paper will attempt to show that Western-nation militaries can conduct counterinsurgency operations successfully by first understanding their role as a member of the counterinsurgency team, by understanding the key players within a revolutionary environment, and then by leveraging all elements of national power to diffuse a conflict and then set the conditions for long-term stability.

Chapter 1 will describe the military's role within its national strategy and as a member of a counterinsurgency team. The idea that the military, like the other agencies involved in counterinsurgency operations, has an important responsibility across all lines of operation within the DIME model is a recurring theme throughout this paper (i.e. the military is more than a mechanism for the projection of military power).

Chapter 2 discusses how the operational environment of a revolutionary conflict is extremely complex and involves many interdependent actors that ultimately affect the threat level and the nature of a counterinsurgency campaign. This chapter will focus on the characteristics that broadly define the indigenous (local) population, the Western (homeland) population, the insurgency force, and the Western military organization. The intent of this chapter was not to describe the entire demographic system within a revolutionary environment, but rather to increase awareness as to the complexity of these environments prior to examining a strategy.

Chapter 3 details the specific functions the military can engage in during full-spectrum counterinsurgency operations, and offers a strategy for successful accomplishment of these functions. Western military roles will span not only the military line of operation, but across the information, diplomatic, and economic lines as well.

Ultimately, success for a counterinsurgency force rests largely on the elimination of the social, economic, and political factors that create public unrest and fuel the insurgent cause, not simply on annihilating an insurgent's military capability. Establishing a stable political environment, quickly solving economic flash points, setting the conditions for economic consistency, promoting education, fostering sound diplomatic initiatives, and securing the population in terms of both physicality and well-being are all critical to success. The difficulty lies in convincing military leaders that they must function within a counterinsurgency team construct, and focus their efforts along each line of the DIME model.

INTRODUCTION

Conducting counterinsurgency operations is a tough business that is described by many Western military operators and philosophers as similar to “chewing sand.”¹ Throughout the twentieth century, underestimated insurgency forces have achieved long-term strategic victory against some of the most modern and technologically advanced militaries in the world. As demonstrated by the French in Indochina and Algeria and the United States in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq, conventional military forces struggle to win the peace against an enemy that is both too mobile to be encircled and holds no territory.² Western conventional forces with the support of their respective populations often seek a clear victory by defeating opposing forces with decisive combat operations, an annihilation strategy. Annihilation strategies seek victory through decisive battle against an enemy fighting force.³ These strategies are appealing because they are easy to understand, and it is fairly simple to establish clear milestones that provide a sequential path to success.⁴ Insurgent forces, however, often lack the resources and manpower to engage in these types of battles, and instead, they choose to fight long, protracted wars of exhaustion that Western militaries are not trained to fight and that Western civilizations lack the willpower to support. Unlike an annihilation strategy, an exhaustion strategy

¹ “Chewing sand to find the beginning of a counterinsurgency process,” *Irregular Warfare Messages, Department of Military Instruction*, United States Military Academy. <http://www.usma.edu/DMI/IWmsgs/ChewingSand.pdf>, Internet; accessed 3 December 2006.

² David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 1964), 50-51.

³ See also Department of Military Instruction, *The Nature of Insurgencies*, Prepared for Counterinsurgency Seminar (West Point, NY: United States Military Academy, 13 October 2005); Department of Military Instruction, *Counterinsurgency Operations (Officer Professional Development)*, West Point, NY: United States Military Academy, 18 November 2005.

⁴ Department of Military Instruction, *The Nature of Insurgencies*.

“seeks the gradual erosion of an enemy nation’s will or means to resist,” and it often involves the protracted use of limited resources by the insurgency.⁵

In coming to terms with insurgent warfare, time is of the essence. Protracted wars of exhaustion will become the means by which future adversaries will attack Western civilizations until Western militaries and their interagency partners demonstrate that they are capable of defeating such a threat. As Dr. David J. Kilcullen pointed out during his remarks at the United States Government Counterinsurgency Conference in September 2006, the adaptation of Western democracies to meet the challenges of an insurgency, “is one of the most important efforts that our generation of national security professionals is likely to attempt...[T]he security of our nation and its allies and our long-term prospect of victory in the War on Terror may, in part, depend on it.”⁶ An integral part of this adaptation is developing an understanding of the elements of national power (DIME: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) and understanding how they can be integrated and competently leveraged by the military and other government departments and agencies. To accomplish this, it is important that military leaders understand their role within their respective national strategies and during multinational operations, within the international strategy. It takes a team effort to defeat an insurgency and to counter the social, economic, and political problems that create revolutionary environments in the first place. The counterinsurgency team includes not only military professionals, but diplomats, economists, public affairs

⁵ Department of Military Instruction, *Counterinsurgency Operations*.

⁶ David J. Kilcullen, “Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency,” U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Conference (Washington DC, 28 September 2006), 7.

officials, and other specialties from both intergovernmental and multinational agencies. Within the DIME construct, there will be situations when the military is the lead agency, and there will be situations when the military is a supporting agency.

The focus of this paper will be on the military's role as a member of the counterinsurgency team and its implementation strategy for each category of national power. While most Western militaries have long been dominated by a doctrine that supports annihilation theory and sequential campaigns, they are capable of contributing significantly to winning these protracted, unconventional wars because of their nearly unlimited resources in terms of personnel, technology, and money, and more importantly, because of the Western military's flexibility and perpetual will to win. Although no two insurgencies are identical, this paper will argue that military forces engaged in these types of unconventional conflicts can contribute greatly to achieving victory by respecting a universal strategy for winning at counterinsurgency. Specifically, this paper will attempt to show that Western-nation militaries can conduct counterinsurgency operations successfully by first understanding their role as a member of the counterinsurgency team, by understanding the key players within a revolutionary environment, and then by leveraging all elements of national power (military, informational, diplomatic, and economic) to diffuse the conflict and set the conditions for long-term stability in the embattled nation-state.

SCOPE

The scope of this paper is limited. David Galula, a renowned counterinsurgency writer and a former French officer that served in Algiers in the mid-1950s, defines two types of revolutionary wars or insurgencies: “cold revolutionary wars” where insurgent activities remain legal and are not violent and “hot revolutionary wars” where insurgent activities become openly illegal and violent.⁷ The scope of this paper will focus solely on a strategy to achieve success during a “hot revolutionary war.” Additionally, this paper will focus on the military’s role as a member of the counterinsurgency team and not the individual roles of the other members on the counterinsurgency team (i.e. specific military functions across the military, information, diplomatic, and economic lines of operations).

This paper will only address circumstances and outcomes that Western militaries can control within each category of the DIME model. For example, in Western democracies, the politicians and the people decide when and where to fight these unconventional wars because Western forces are subordinate to civilian control. Often in an effort to gain popular support, politicians determine the strategic end-state for military campaigns. The new American doctrine, *Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, clearly states that military strategists should not use a “cut-and-paste” template for resolving revolutionary wars because no two insurgencies are identical; therefore, there will be no attempt to create a “cut and paste” template.⁸ Instead this paper will emphasize a basic strategy to serve as a guide during military campaign planning.

⁷ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare* ..., 43.

Given the complexity of the topic, it is important to clearly define “insurgency” and “victory” in relation to these protracted revolutionary conflicts. For commonality purposes, an insurgency will be defined as a struggle for control over a contested area between a nation-state and one or more popularly-based, non-state actors.⁹ “Victory” will not be defined as the destruction of an insurgent group’s combat capability, but rather as the isolation of the insurgents from the population, the marginalization of the insurgency by the indigenous population, and the alleviation of the conditions that fueled the insurgent cause in the first place.¹⁰ Militaries contribute immensely to not only isolating the insurgents and providing security, but also as a force multiplier in the effort to remedy social, political, and economic problems.

⁸ "Chewing sand...", *Irregular Warfare Messages*.

⁹ Gordon McCormick, “Things Fall Apart: The Endgame Dynamics of Internal Wars,” *Third World Quarterly* Volume 28, No. 2.

¹⁰ See also United States. Department of the Army. *Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency* (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 15, 2006); Robert Taber, *War of the Flea*. New York (New York: Lyle Stuart, 1965); Peter W. Chiarelli and Patrick Michaelis, “Winning the Peace: The Requirements for Full-Spectrum Operations,” *Military Review* (July-August 2005): 4-17; David J. Kilcullen, “Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency,” *U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Conference*, Washington D.C. 28 September 2006.

CHAPTER 1 THE MILITARY AND THE COUNTERINSURGENCY TEAM

Prior to discussing the key players in the revolutionary battle space, it is important to provide some background regarding where Western militaries fit within their respective national strategies and as a member of the counterinsurgency team. Western nations have multiple resources at their disposal to gain influence and project power internationally. In the United States, the various means to project power (the elements of national power) are grouped into four categories: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME).¹¹ This paper will use the DIME model to logically organize military-specific actions within the counterinsurgency team. The strategy is applicable to other Western democratic nations, however, since Western countries use similar models to categorize the elements of national power. For example, Canada uses the terms diplomacy, defense, development, and commerce (3D+C) to describe their “whole of government” approach to power projection.¹² The idea that the military, like the other agencies involved in counterinsurgency operations, plays an important role across each category of national power will be a recurring theme throughout this paper (i.e. the military is more than a mechanism for the projection of military power). Nowhere is this more evident than during the conduct of counterinsurgency operations and during the current time period that is marked by a global conflict that is referred to by many Western nations as the “Global War on Terror.”

¹¹ United States, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-0: Operations* (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 14 June 2004), 1-4.

¹² Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World* (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 2005).

THE COIN TEAM AND NATIONAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Since the role of Western militaries has expanded over the last several years during the prosecution of the “Global War on Terror,” it is important to define the structure in which Western militaries must apply this strategy for “winning at counterinsurgency.” Since Western nations have finite resources that they can allocate toward achieving their operational and strategic objectives during a revolutionary conflict, it is essential that they effectively manage these resources when attempting to use their respective national power (DIME) to gain influence. The current trend in the management of these resources is best explained with a discussion of exactly how Western governments leverage resources to create the effect they desire. Presently, Western governments utilize joint, inter-agency, and multi-national assets to leverage their finite resources. “Joint” refers to a military force that consists of two or more services (i.e. United States: Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines or Canada: Air, Maritime, Land) that operate under a single joint force commander; “inter-agency” refers to both governmental and nongovernmental organizations; and “multi-national” refers to two or more nations acting together within the structure of a coalition or an alliance.¹³ Governments seek to create the best capability by managing and allocating resources across not only their own governmental agencies, but also international agencies in an effort to generate the most “fully integrated, adaptive, decision superior, networked, [and] decentralized” expeditionary force possible.¹⁴ Western military forces must work with

¹³ United States, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 1-02: Operational Terms and Graphics*, (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 21, 2004), 1-103, 1-106, 1-130.

¹⁴ “Joint, Inter-agency, and Multi-National Force 2020,” United States Army Vision 2020, <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/969284>; Internet; accessed 7 March 2007.

other governmental and multi-national organizations to leverage all elements of national power (in the most efficient and effective manner possible) in order to create the best possible conditions in the revolutionary environment.

In essence, Western militaries will compete with intergovernmental and multinational organizations for critical resources, and at the same time, they must also work effectively as a member of the joint, interagency, and multi-national team to maximize results. The resource management flow chart (Figure 1) depicts the manner in which national governments leverage their finite military, informational, diplomatic, and economic resources to create a desired effect within a revolutionary environment. As the illustration in Figure 1 depicts, military, intergovernmental, non-governmental, and multi-national organizations not only manage finite national resources, but at the same time they serve as action agents seeking to create favorable conditions within an embattled nation-state in terms of its infrastructure, economy, political system, military capability, and health and social service systems. The military, informational, diplomatic, and economic operational lines within the DIME model are not managed independently. In other words, the military does not focus exclusively on military operations; public affairs agencies do not focus solely on information operations; diplomats are not oriented exclusively toward diplomatic operations; and economists do not operate in a vacuum when contributing to the economic effort.¹⁵ Instead, each agency contributing to the effort to counter the insurgency has an impact along each line of operation.

¹⁵ See also *Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency*; Chiarelli and Michaelis. "Winning the Peace...;" Kilcullen, "Three Pillars ..."




Figure 1: National Resource Management Flow Chart
Source: Author's Representation

For example, when economists facilitate job creation, they contribute enormously to the military's efforts to secure the population because employment separates the local population from an alternative solution that local have to provide for their families - fighting for the insurgency. Similarly, when the military successfully isolates insurgents and secures economic centers, they create an environment where the population can work and purchase goods and services without fear of retribution at the hands of insurgent groups. This contributes directly to economic efforts. There are many other examples. For the sake of this paper, it is important to realize that Western military representatives are not just combatants. They are by default also public affairs officials, diplomats, and economists.

IMPROVING INTERAGENCY COOPERATION

Western militaries must continue to improve their ability to plan and conduct counterinsurgency operations in conjunction with joint, interagency, and multi-national organizations in order to best set the conditions for post-conflict long-term stability. How can the military improve? The military can improve inter-agency cooperation by first redefining the authority given to other governmental agencies within already established joint interagency coordination groups (JIACGs), and then by establishing programs that will encourage better interagency and multinational programs over the long-term. Most Western military organizations have already established JIACGs across regional commands, but these coordination cells are seen as only advisory groups with no real power to task and no authority to implement their plans.¹⁶ Optimally, these JIACGs are expected to “strengthen interagency operational planning, increase effectiveness through more integrated operational planning and tactical execution between civilian and military agencies, shorten military commitments and a foundation for stable transition activities, [and] create coordinated options involving all elements of national power to key decision makers.”¹⁷ To accomplish these goals, however, greater teamwork is necessary. To facilitate the establishment an interagency planning group that fosters better teamwork and cooperation, governmental agencies should play a larger role and bear greater influence in regards to the manner in which the military seeks to achieve operational and strategic objectives. Equality across agencies is critical. Once governmental agencies

¹⁶ Christopher M. Schnaubelt, “After the Fight: Interagency Operations,” *Parameters* (Winter 2005-2006): 57.

¹⁷ United States Joint Forces Command, “Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG),” http://www.jfcom.mil/about/fact_jiacg.htm; Internet; accessed 02 April 2007.

receive an appropriate level of authority and influence in the planning process, Western militaries should increase exchange programs between the military and other governmental agencies to enable greater operability and understanding between the multiple agencies that contribute to counterinsurgency efforts.¹⁸ In the United States, for example, personnel from organizations like the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Transportation, and the State Department could serve in key intelligence (J2), logistics (J4), and planning (J5) positions, respectively, within joint operational staffs. Shared and equal influence in the planning of operations and greater interoperability across all agencies would result in fewer and less discouraging lessons learned during the execution of counterinsurgency operations.

CAPACITY BUILDING – CABABILITY DEVELOPMENT – EFFECTS DELIVERY

In order to achieve success during counterinsurgency operations, Western militaries and their interagency and multinational partners must focus their efforts on not only “capacity building,” but also “capability development” and “effects delivery,” a mission focus currently in use by Canadian strategic advisory teams (SAT) in Afghanistan.¹⁹ According to Lieutenant Colonel Fred Aubin, the chief of staff of a SAT team currently in the Afghanistan theater of operations, “capacity building” is the act of providing the resources necessary to create a stable environment; “capability development” is the act of providing the professional training necessary to enable the local population to provide for themselves; and “effects delivery” is the generation of

¹⁸ Schnaubelt, “After the Fight...,” 58.

¹⁹ Aubin, Fred. *Strategic Advisory Team: Afghanistan*. Prepared for Joint Command and Staff Program Seminar (Toronto, Ontario: Canadian Forces College, 04 April 2005).

effective systems that allow for the harmonization of “capacity” and “capability” and the achievement of long-term results.²⁰ While the nature of revolutionary environments change from conflict to conflict, the current operational environments in Iraq and Afghanistan provide valuable case studies to identify specific examples of “capacity building,” “capability development,” and “effects delivery” (See Figure 2). In Iraq or Afghanistan, “capacity building” would include tasks like providing physical security, building schools and hospitals, generating electricity, developing a freshwater capability, and establishing a safe wastewater removal system. “Capability development” would include the training of national and local security forces, teachers, doctors, environmental engineers, and even blue-collar specialty tradesmen like electricians and plumbers. Finally, “effects delivery” would include the establishment of a self-sustaining political system, a justice system, an education system, a health care system, and even a tax system to facilitate the dispersal of essential services.




Figure 2: Canadian SAT Model with Iraq/Afghanistan Examples

Source: Author’s Representation

²⁰ Ibid.

With a focus on the “effect,” the military, along with the rest of the counterinsurgency team, can successfully set the conditions for long-term stability in a post-conflict nation-state. Given the complexity of these tasks, countering an insurgency must be a team effort.

CHAPTER 2

CRITICAL PLAYERS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ENVIRONMENT

The operational environment of a revolutionary conflict is extremely complex and involves many interdependent actors that ultimately affect the threat level and the nature of a counterinsurgency campaign. Coalition forces, national armies, ethnic militias, insurgent groups, tribal systems, terrorist cells, local and international media, national governments, non-governmental organizations, and both the Western (homeland) and indigenous populations all play a critical role in determining the course of any revolutionary conflict.²¹ It is essential, therefore, that military campaign planners have a solid understanding of each of these groups' motivations, strengths, weaknesses, and capabilities in order to engage these groups appropriately (i.e. use civic, humanitarian, diplomatic, economic, or military engagement). In an effort to simplify (but not oversimplify) the discussion of the actors within the conflict environment, this chapter will focus on the characteristics that broadly define the indigenous (local) population, the Western (homeland) population, the insurgency force, and the Western military organization. They are the most important state and non-state actors in the revolutionary environment and an understanding of the complex relationships between these groups are vital. Many of the other actors and their roles within the revolutionary environment will be specifically mentioned within the construct of this counterinsurgency strategy.

²¹ Kilcullen, "Three Pillars...", 3.

THE INDIGENOUS POPULATION

Indigenous popular support will always be an operational center of gravity for both the counterinsurgent and the insurgent during a revolutionary conflict.²² According to U.S. military doctrine, a center of gravity consists of “those characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight.”²³ When engaging the population, an insurgency force seeks to promote their ideology as a means to remedy social, economic, and political unrest. The insurgents will also attempt to incite violence, discredit the government, and attack any visible indicators of progress in order to convince the indigenous population to support the insurgent cause as a means to achieve both short and long-term prosperity (or in some cases short and long-term survival).²⁴ Why? Without the support of the indigenous population, the insurgents would not be able to operate using their unconventional tactics, nor fuel their cause which ultimately seeks to discredit the counterinsurgency force and the presiding national government.

The indigenous population is equally important to the counterinsurgents. Specifically, the counterinsurgency team must seek to isolate the indigenous population from the insurgents while simultaneously developing the social, political, economic, and legal infrastructure necessary to stabilize public unrest and improve the conditions that

²² See also Kalev I. Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” *Military Review* (May-June 2005) 9; *Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency*.

²³ *Field Manual 1-02: Operational Terms and Graphics*, 1-28.

²⁴ Kilcullen, “Three Pillars...,” 2-3.

caused unrest in the first place.²⁵ Regardless of the ethnic background or the varying cultures that exist within an embattled nation-state, the population can be categorized in three groups: those that faithfully support the insurgents, those that faithfully support the national government and the counterinsurgents, and those that remain passive and are still impressionable.²⁶ General Chiarelli, former commander of the 1st Cavalry Division in Iraq, characterized the passive population or “fence-sitters” as the true operational center of gravity because unlike the other two aforementioned groups, the counterinsurgency team can still influence the “fence-sitters.”²⁷ As opposed to the segment of the population that fervently support either the insurgents or the counterinsurgents, they are the fraction of the population that is waiting on clear signs of progress before determining whether they will support the national government and the counterinsurgents or support an insurgency group.²⁸ A Western-led counterinsurgency team, therefore, must focus its diplomatic, economic, and informational assets toward this passive group to ensure that they see both tangible and intangible progress in the social, economic, and political areas. Both Western-nation and host nation militaries should use the military element of national power to make the indigenous population feel more secure, but at the same time contributing toward the total team effort along the remaining three lines of operation (informational, diplomatic, and economic).

²⁵ See also Department of Military Instruction, *Counterinsurgency Operations*; Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare...; Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency*.

²⁶ See also Chiarelli and Michaelis, “Winning the Peace...; *Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency*.

²⁷ Chiarelli and Michaelis, “Winning the Peace...,” 4-17.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

While it may seem like a level playing field exists in the battle to win the support of the population, the high expectations of the indigenous population places the counterinsurgency force at a distinct disadvantage. As demonstrated during revolutionary conflicts that have occurred in the last century (Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq), when the West intercedes in a revolutionary conflict, the indigenous population expects quick results.

Right or wrong, [the population] believes that because America put a man on the moon, it can do anything—and do it quickly. When [the West] fail[s] to produce because of a lack of authority, a shortage of resources, or [due to] bureaucratic inefficiencies, they believe it is because we, as a coalition, do not want to fix it.²⁹

General Chiarelli's assessment exemplifies why a Western counterinsurgency team must plan and execute timely military, diplomatic, economic, and information operations in parallel with each other, not in sequence. If Western coalitions fail to show visible progress quickly, they risk losing the support of a critical and influential player in the revolutionary environment, the local population.

THE WESTERN (HOMELAND) POPULATION

Regardless of the cultural differences that exist between the citizens of an embattled state and the citizens of a Western democracy, these populations share many similarities in terms of the expectations they place on the counterinsurgency team and their central role in securing the peace during a revolutionary conflict. Like the indigenous population, the populations of Western nations maintain extremely high expectations for their militaries. In many Western democracies, citizens regard their military as one of the state's most valued resources and when their military is employed

²⁹ Chiarelli and Michaelis, "Winning the Peace..." 7.

to counter a threat, they expect swift, efficient, and decisive results. Unlike the populations of socialist nation-states, citizens within democratic countries not only have the right to know what their government does on their behalf, but they also have a fundamental investment in the use of their country's finite resources (like the military). Furthermore, they are obliged to debate the use of their militaries in terms of when, where, and why their governments employ them.³⁰ For this reason, it is essential that politicians, military professionals, diplomats, and other agency planners consider the effect that each operational objective will have on the homeland population just as it does with the indigenous population. Ultimately, insurgency forces do not have to defeat Western militaries in decisive offensive operations; rather, they need only convince the Western homeland population that the revolutionary conflict is no longer worth the sacrifice of its most precious finite resource - its people.³¹ So, while Western populations are not the focus of operations, they do have strategic importance.

The citizens of Western democracies are a strategic center of gravity for the both the insurgency and counterinsurgency forces. As demonstrated during recent successful insurgent campaigns in Algeria (France), Vietnam (France and U.S.), and Afghanistan (Russia), insurgents need only break the will of the counterinsurgents' homeland populations to secure their own strategic end-state and at the same time deliver demoralizing strategic defeats to the most powerful militaries of the modern military era.

³⁰ Mary Jane Mitchell-Musumarra, "The Role of Media Coverage in Meeting Operational Objectives" (Newport, Rhode Island: Joint Military Operations Department, Naval War College, May 16, 2003), 2.

³¹ See also Department of Military Instruction. *The Nature of Insurgencies*. Prepared for Counterinsurgency Seminar (West Point, NY: United States Military Academy, 13 October 2005); Eliot A. Cohen, *The American Counterinsurgency Tradition*, Report Prepared for the State Department/DOD COIN Conference (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 28 September 2006).

While military leaders do not ultimately decide foreign policy and are subordinate to civilian control, they are accountable to their own populations. In an effort to retain support at home and avoid demoralizing defeats, military leaders often focus public relations efforts on portraying their counterinsurgency coalition as a team that operates within the values-based framework the citizens of their respective countries demand. Despite tactical and operational successes that are commonplace for Western militaries, the strategic victory and ultimately peace cannot be achieved without the popular support of the homeland population.

THE INSURGENCY

From the outset of any revolutionary conflict, the insurgent has the initiative, and this allows him distinct advantages that often set the conditions for victory. T.E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia), a British officer that mentored a successful insurgency in the Middle East during World War I, expressed that the insurgent benefits from four distinct advantages at the outset of an insurgency: popular support, superior intelligence, operational mobility, and lines of communication.³² These advantages are not mutually exclusive. For example, without initial popular support, the insurgents would be nothing more than criminals, and they would not have freedom of movement amongst the population (operational mobility) or access to the crucial intelligence that originates from the indigenous population.

³² James J. Schneider, "T.E. Lawrence and the Mind of an Insurgent," *Army Magazine* (July 2005): 33-37.

This popular support, a prerequisite to any insurgency, must be fueled by an appealing and convincing cause. As stated before, the cause or causes that the insurgent seeks to exploit often offer a solution to remedy internal problems that exist within a nation-state that the national government appears unable to resolve.³³ If the cause is convincing enough, it can serve as an intangible asset to the insurgent, creating an almost unassailable base of operations that grants the insurgency force critical intelligence, freedom of maneuver within the localities, and logistical independence.³⁴

The insurgency groups that Western counterinsurgency teams currently face and will face in the future will be highly mobile and will have no lines of communications, making it difficult for Western militaries to interdict the insurgency force decisively. According to United States military doctrine, lines of communications are the routes that “connect an operating military force with [its] base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move.”³⁵ Since insurgent organizations tend to operate in a decentralized manner, they have no real base of operations for Western military organizations to disrupt or destroy.

Additionally, any viable insurgency realizes that it cannot effectively defend or deliberately attack a conventional Western military because of the conventional force’s enormous advantage in terms of manpower, firepower, and technology. For this reason, past, present, and future insurgency forces have fought and will continue fighting

³³ *Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency*, 1-4

³⁴ Schneider, “T.E. Lawrence...,” 35-36.

³⁵ *Field Manual 1-02: Operational Terms and Graphics*, 1-113.

protracted campaigns, seeking to frustrate the counterinsurgency force and the civilian-led, democratic governments that commit these counterinsurgency teams in the interests of national security.³⁶

Analogically, the guerrilla fights the war of the flea, and his military enemy suffers the dog's disadvantages: too much to defend; too small, ubiquitous, and agile an enemy to come to grips with. If the war continues long enough...the dog succumbs to exhaustion and anemia without ever having found anything on which to close his jaws or to rake with his claws.³⁷

Given the advantages of the insurgents, the counterinsurgency organization must be patient and consistent in its application of all categories of national power, regardless of the type of revolutionary movement it faces or the approach the insurgents take to advance their cause.³⁸

THE WESTERN MILITARY ORGANIZATION

Unlike the insurgent force and the indigenous population, Western-nation counterinsurgency teams are newcomers to the revolutionary theater and this places them at a tremendous disadvantage. Like the insurgent, the counterinsurgency force seeks to increase its influence and survive; however, unlike the insurgent, the counterinsurgents are looking to reduce the destructive, unbalanced nature of the conflict and to restore order.³⁹ The counterinsurgents will also have a cause; however, the primacy of their cause will evolve around the idea that the people can achieve security and social,

³⁶ Mao Tse Tung translated by Samuel B. Griffith, *On Guerilla Warfare* (Garden City, NY: Anchor Press 1978), 54.

³⁷ Robert Taber, *War of the Flea* (New York, New York: Lyle Stuart, 1965), 29.

³⁸ *FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency*, Chapter 1, discusses six different approaches insurgents can take when attempting to gain control in a revolutionary environment: Conspiratorial, Military-focused, Urban, Protracted popular war, Identity-focused, Composite and coalition.

³⁹ Kilcullen, "Three Pillars..." 3.

economic, and political stability by supporting the national government. There are many indicators that can reveal whether or not the counterinsurgency is effectively promoting its cause. A high level of support for the political process (this process does not necessarily have to be democratic) by the indigenous population, a low level of corruption, and an acceptable level of economic and social development are all excellent examples of these types of indicators.⁴⁰

The key to success for Western-nation counterinsurgents is balance. Can Western military organizations that for decades have focused almost exclusively on annihilation strategies achieve the right balance of both kinetic and non-kinetic operations to not only win the operational war, but win the strategic peace? The answer is “yes.”

Currently, Western militaries are working extremely hard to overcome their present affinity for kinetic solutions to “small war” problems.⁴¹ During the first few years of the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, American forces countered drops in morale, increased insurgency attacks, and even governmental and economic issues with the same solution, decisive offensive operations.⁴² Decisive offensive operations are what most Western ground forces know and it is what they are good at. As mentioned before, this mentality was encouraged until recently by U.S. doctrine, and until 2003,

⁴⁰ *Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency*, 1-11.

⁴¹ See also David H. Petraeus, “Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq,” *Military Review* (FEB-MAR 2006), 2-12; Chiarelli and Michaelis, “Winning the Peace...;” John R.S. Batiste and Paul R. Daniels, “The Fight for Samarra: Full-Spectrum Operations in Modern Warfare,” *Military Review* (May-June 2005) [Journal on-line]; http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume3/september_2005/9_05_3.html; Internet; accessed 3 December 2006.

⁴² Opinion of the author who was a tactical commander in Iraq in 2004.

“Cold War” training plans that focused almost exclusively on annihilation strategy and sequential operations at the operational level.⁴³ These were obvious weaknesses. The good news story is that Western alliance militaries are evolving and re-learning lessons about counterinsurgency warfare that have surfaced throughout the last two centuries. Combined with the assets provided by other governmental and non-governmental organizations, and the West’s vast resources in terms of manpower, money, and equipment, Western militaries are still viable during these resource intensive “small wars.”

Finally, only a disciplined, adaptive, and focused counterinsurgency force can achieve success on the revolutionary battlefield in the 21st century. At every level of command, counterinsurgency units must act with unquestionable ethics because there is zero tolerance for mistakes in a revolutionary environment. The indigenous and homeland populations, as well as the international community, will analyze every mistake and miscalculation made by a military representative through the lens of a microscope, regardless of whether it is made at the small unit tactical level or at the national command authority level. Counterinsurgents must also be adaptive; transitioning lessons learned to initiative-builders quickly and effectively. A reactive counterinsurgency organization will make little progress and risks appearing incapable amongst the indigenous population. Finally, a counterinsurgency force must be focused. A complacent counterinsurgent will orient exclusively along a single line of operation. Focused counterinsurgents will constantly seek to gain the initiative across diplomatic,

⁴³ See also Department of Military Instruction, *Counterinsurgency Operations*; Chiarelli and Michaelis, “Winning the Peace...,” 4.

economic, military, and informational lines. Each characteristic, discipline, adaptation, and focus, is imperative, and their cumulative effect greatly exceeds the sum their parts in achieving both operational and strategic victory during a revolutionary conflict. Like the elements of national power, these characteristics are interrelated.

CHAPTER CONCLUSION

Dr. David J. Kilcullen provides a detailed illustration of what he calls the “conflict ecosystem” in his article titled, “Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency” (See Figure 3).⁴⁴




Figure 3: Dr. Kilcullen’s Conflict Ecosystem
Source: Kilcullen, “Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency,” 3.

Kilcullen’s graphic depicts the many state and non-state actors that complicate a theater of operations in which Western military organizations may be asked to counter an insurgency. The intent of this chapter was not to describe the entire demographic system within a revolutionary environment, but rather to increase awareness as to the complexity

⁴⁴ Kilcullen, “Three Pillars...,” 3.

of these environments prior to examining a strategy. The intent of this chapter, however, was to make it clear to readers that while these wars are referred to as “small wars,” they are certainly not “small” for the warriors who fight them, or for the populations who have to suffer because of them.⁴⁵ Given the international repercussions of these conflicts, there is always much at stake.

⁴⁵ Bernard B. Fall, “The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” *Naval War College Review* vol. LI, No.1 (Winter 1998) [Journal on-line]; available from <http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/review/1998/winter/art5-w98.htm>; Internet; accessed 11 December 2006

CHAPTER 3 THE MILITARY ROLE IN DIME

Using the DIME model as a guide, this chapter will focus exclusively on the military's role on the counterinsurgency team. As mentioned before, the military will be the lead agency within some categories of the DIME model, and other times, the military will be the supporting agency. While it may seem straightforward to say that the militaries are always the lead agencies within the military line of operations, public affairs agencies are always the lead agencies within the informational line of operation, diplomatic agencies are always the lead agencies within the diplomatic line of operation, and economists are always the lead within the economic line of operation, it is not that simple. As discussed in the introduction, no two insurgencies are exactly the same; therefore, no two insurgencies should be countered in the same way. Lead and supporting agencies are determined on a case by case basis, and the relationships between agencies may change over time.

This chapter will not attempt to generalize with respect to a specific type of revolutionary conflict in which Western counterinsurgency organizations may in the future take on military, civic, diplomatic, and economic engagement missions. Instead, this chapter will discuss the specific functions the military can engage in during full-spectrum counterinsurgency operations, and offer a strategy for successful accomplishment of these functions. Within this strategy, these functions will span not only the military line of operation, but across the information, diplomatic, and economic lines as well.

MILITARY STRATEGY

Western military functions within the military line of operation are complex and diverse, and should be employed collaboratively with economic, diplomatic, and informational initiatives in theater. In this section, discussion will focus on the traditional application of military power along the military line of operation within the DIME model. Subsequently, stability and support operations will be examined as part of a review of the military's role within the economic, diplomatic, and information construct of this counterinsurgency strategy.

The primary purpose of military organizations conducting offensive or defensive operations during a revolutionary conflict is to secure (i.e. afford protection) non-combatants like the indigenous population, international civilians (contractors, NGO employees, media), and all the agencies that make up the counterinsurgency team. Security is a critical element within the entire strategy discussed in this paper and will be a central theme throughout. Security, better defined as living without fear, is a basic human right.⁴⁶ Like the freedom to worship, freedom of speech, and basic civil rights freedoms, security is a cause that is worth fighting for. Western militaries must guarantee this basic right to the citizens that are affected by revolutionary conflict; otherwise, it will be impossible for the counterinsurgents to pursue economic, social, and political initiatives that can ultimately assuage the problems that strengthened the insurgency in the first place. Assuming that the military force is entering a non-permissive environment (i.e. an environment in which the host country's military and law

⁴⁶ United Nations, "Universal Declaration of Human Rights," adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III), 10 December 1948.

enforcement agencies do not have control and lack the capability to assist in gaining control⁴⁷), the military force can contribute to the establishment a secure environment by *immediately (stage 1)* achieving a foothold in the embattled country, securing national borders, and creating a system designed to measure effectiveness. They can further contribute in the *near-term (stage 2)* by building on the successes of stage 1 as well as training host-nation national and local security forces, establishing a measure of control over the population, and isolating the insurgents. Over the *long-term (stage 3)*, western militaries can contribute to the establishment of a secure environment by empowering local and national security forces and conservatively engaging in large scale offensive operations once they achieve both immediate and near-term goals.⁴⁸ The diagram below (Figure 4) illustrates these ideas.




Figure 4: Military Strategy Model

Source: Author's Representation

⁴⁷ *Field Manual 1-02: Operational Terms and Graphics*, 1-145.

⁴⁸ See also Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare...*; Kalev I. Sepp, "Best Practices..." *Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency*.

Stage 1: Immediate

The first step in creating a relatively stable and secure environment for the indigenous population is to establish secure footholds on key terrain within the embattled nation-state and then expand these areas as the situation permits. Counterinsurgency operations are extremely resource intensive in terms of manpower and equipment, so unless the revolutionary state is extremely small or the insurgency is still in its initial stages, no Western military has enough resources to conduct simultaneous operations throughout the depth and breadth of an embattled state.⁴⁹ Ultimately, Western militaries should seek to focus decisive operations in areas that the host nation's government still has a level of control and if possible, in areas that are culturally or economically significant.⁵⁰ Once secured, these high profile areas will have the highest payoff in terms of demonstrating significant signs of improvement to the indigenous and Western populations. While establishing a foothold in a nation-state it is extremely important that the militaries use an appropriate amount of force. To this end, intelligence is critical. In revolutionary conflict, as in life, first impressions are lasting impressions. While the counterinsurgency organization must appear formidable to the insurgents and their supporters, the majority of the population (fence-sitters) must understand that that the military organization is in theater to support the population, not conquer it. The insurgents will do everything in their power to convince the population otherwise.

In order to effectively secure populated areas and apply an appropriate amount of force, it is important for a military organization to consistently and accurately assess the

⁴⁹ *Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency*, 5-2-5-3.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 5-3.

conditions on the ground. To accomplish this, human relationships are critical. While terms like “strategic corporal” and “tactical general” tend to have negative connotations, they illustrate an important aspect about revolutionary conflicts. Counterinsurgency warfare is an extremely personal affair because the focus is on people and not terrain.⁵¹ In this type of conflict, tactical decisions can have operational effects. In order to gain an assessment of the situation at the operational level, therefore, military personnel on the ground must gain the confidence of the local population at the tactical level in order to achieve operational objectives. David Galula, a well-regarded counterinsurgency strategist, offers a recommendation to address this challenge. He suggests that operational objectives should be carefully separated into tactical objectives into which tactical units engage (militarily or civically) populated areas from “outside-in” and then sweep from “inside-out,” leveraging the military and informational aspects of national power.⁵² Appropriate leveraging of both military and civic engagement is critical during this initial occupation. If the “outside-in” movement is effective, the “inside-out” maneuver phase (movement from the center of the area of operation back to the perimeter) should focus heavily on civic engagement. The diagram on page 35 illustrates this maneuver technique (Figure 5). What does this technique accomplish? In essence, this technique places more of a human face on the counterinsurgents, and allows for the establishment of trust, the effective gathering of intelligence, and ultimately a reliable assessment of the actual situation on the ground.

⁵¹ See also Fall, “The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency;” Kilcullen, “Three Pillars...”

⁵² Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare...*, 75-77.




Figure 5: Galula’s “Outside-In” – “Inside-Out” Approach

Source: Author’s Representation of Galula’s Idea

While Galula’s suggestion is only one possible course of action, it addresses several critical intangible aspects of counterinsurgency warfare. By assigning tactical units their own population centers, Galula’s suggestion grants a sense of ownership to the counterinsurgent force and at the same time, ensures the entire population has gained some exposure to the military from which they can devise their own opinion.

During the initial security phase and prior to the expansion of each security zone, leveraging of the population is critical; therefore, it is essential that military organizations have a calculated and organized system to ensure that supportive populations are rewarded and less supportive populations are influenced appropriately through civic, economic, or military engagement. Once counterinsurgents achieve an operational

foothold and an accurate assessment of the situation on the ground, the counterinsurgent operational commanders are now in a position to retain the initiative by either continuing offensive operations or by rewarding the indigenous population for their support. This must be an organized effort. As an example, the British in Malaya designated areas as secure, contested, or enemy by using a rewards system.⁵³ Populations that assisted in purging insurgents and supported the host-nation government received quality of life incentives, and less compliant populations were influenced differently (i.e. less quality of life improvements and more restrictions).⁵⁴ This type of system benefits the counterinsurgency organization and the national government. As a primary effect, the supportive populations see both the tangible and intangible benefits of supporting the national government and the counterinsurgency team. With sustained effort, this prosperity should encourage less supportive populations to cooperate in order to “earn” a better quality of life.

A secondary effect of employing a rewards system focuses on the “spirit” of Western-nation militaries. Given the competitive nature of most military professionals, this systematic approach will not only inspire them to work extremely hard to improve the situation in their respective areas of responsibility, but also to seek lessons from other units that are having success in theater and encouraging cross-talk between tactical units. For the counterinsurgency team, it is not necessarily important what specific system they use, but rather that they use a system effectively as was the case in Malaya. The worst thing a counterinsurgency team could do during its effort to win the support of the

⁵³ Kalev I. Sepp, “Best Practices...,” 10.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

population would be to abandon supportive populations and neglect to reward them for their support.⁵⁵ Ideally, a static counterinsurgency element consisting of representatives from all key agencies should remain to secure cooperative localities and continue to provide recognizable indicators that supporting the national government is beneficial to the local population.

Western militaries must immediately defend the borders of the revolutionary state to deny or at the very least disrupt the insurgent's ability to receive outside support from other nation-states and non-state actors that are sympathetic to the insurgent cause. Border security is also important because it denies access to foreign fighters. Western militaries, with unconditional backing from the national government, must conduct this essential mission effectively, especially since terrorist groups often surge to failing states to advance their own international agendas (usually oriented toward discrediting the West).⁵⁶ In Algeria, the French were successful in denying access and sealing off National Liberation Front strongholds in Tunisia after they built a 320 kilometer barrier on the eastern Algerian border, the Morice Line.⁵⁷ After the French built the barrier, they were able to employ a smaller-sized, air-mobile quick reaction force and observers to prevent attempts by insurgents to enter Algeria and deny them the ability to have a

⁵⁵ See also L. Grant Bridgewater, "Philippine Information Operations During The Hukbalahap Counterinsurgency Campaign," *IO Sphere* (Spring) 2006: 37-41; Petraeus, "Learning Counterinsurgency..."; Chiarelli and Michaelis, "Winning the Peace..."; John R.S. Batiste and Paul R. Daniels, "The Fight for Samarra..."

⁵⁶ See also James A. III Baker, and Lee H. Hamilton, et al. *The Iraq Study Group Report* (New York: Vintage Books – A Division of Random House, Inc., December 2006), 34; William S. Lind, et al, "The Changing Face of War," *Marine Corps Gazette* (October 1989) [Journal on-line]; available from http://www.defense-and-society.org/fcs/4th_gen_war_gazette.htm; Internet; accessed 17 October 2006.

⁵⁷ Alistair Home, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962*. New York: Viking, 1977.

negative effect on the conflict environment. In the short term, this type of strategy allows for a greater level of control over insurgency groups and other non-state actors, and it also enables Western militaries to dedicate more resources to securing and controlling the local population. In the long term, it allows for greater national security and gives the entire counterinsurgency team the time and space it needs to win the peace through the balanced application of national power.

Stage 2: Near-Term

Once initial security is achieved in a populated area, a less robust, but capable security force must remain to not only protect the local population from another insurgent occupation, but to contribute to the advancement toward long-term stability. A Western-nation military can continue to advance toward long-term stability by training indigenous local and national security forces, continuing to isolate the population from the insurgents, expanding their level of control over the population, proactively limiting insurgent recruitment, and continuing to focus efforts to win the support of the passive (“fence-sitting”) population.

In the near-term, Western militaries must establish an effective program to train host-nation security forces at the national (military and police) and local (police) level. This training program should include an institutional and an operational curriculum. The institutional curriculum should focus on schooling and training for military professionals and policemen prior to their assignment to a unit. The operational program should concentrate on setting the standards and conditions for the training that is conducted by

the military or police units.⁵⁸ Western militaries share similar training models. Figure 6 illustrates the training and leader development model that is currently in use by the United States Army.



Figure 6: Training and Leader Development Model

Source: FM 7-0: Training the Force

Additionally, Western military leaders normally command a solid understanding of how to train a military force. Due to these factors, instead of focusing on “how to train,” the focus of the next two paragraphs will be on two critical considerations – the impact of culture on training and expectation management.

Western militaries that are involved in training foreign militaries must have a strong understanding of the cultural differences that exist between the West and the host-nation. This cultural understanding must evolve beyond a comprehension of basic language, customs, and courtesies. Cultural understanding must include a level of

⁵⁸ United States, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 7-0: Training the Force* (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 14 October 2002), 1-5.

acceptance and respect for differences. Otherwise, any training regime established by Western militaries will be largely ineffective. This type of fate was realized by American forces during their training of the South Vietnamese. In Vietnam during the 1960s and 1970s, American military trainers considered the South Vietnamese like “undereducated and underprivileged children,” expecting them to conform to American norms even though training was taking place in Vietnam.⁵⁹ On the other hand, the Vietnamese viewed Americans as “arrogant, blundering, clumsy, gullible, and wasteful,” and were insulted by the idea that they liked dogs, but showed little respect toward the elderly or tradition.⁶⁰ In this situation, the Americans failed to understand cultural differences and the impact their actions would have on the men they were there to support, and they failed to accept the differences between their cultures, generating a mutual lack of respect. The result was ineffective training.

When training indigenous military and police forces, it is critical that Western military organizations manage their expectations and adapt training plans to account for cultural differences. On-going military and police training in Iraq continues to provide valuable case studies that illustrate this concept. For example, most Iraqi military and police recruits tend to be quite fatalistic, meaning they surrender their future to the will of Allah.⁶¹ This fact should impact the expectations that American and British military trainers place on the Iraqis. Iraqi fatalism contributes positively to training because Iraqis

⁵⁹ Robert D. Ramsey, *Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 48.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ Carl D. Grunow, “Advising Iraqis: Building the Iraqi Army,” *Military Review* (July-August 2006), 12.

are extremely resilient to catastrophic and stressful events like suicide bombings and direct fire engagements; however, fatalism also detracts from training because Iraqis often lack a sense of urgency or a sense that they control their own destinies. If this cultural difference resulted in American and British trainers taking greater initiative and assuming more profound planning and leadership roles, then the training mission would be adversely affected. Below is an observation from a former military trainer in Iraq.

...American battle captains have a tendency to tell their Iraqi counterparts what to do, rather than allowing them to work through the planning and decision making progress.⁶²

This example exemplifies the wrong approach. The right approach is for Western military trainers to manage their expectations and allow for the Iraqis to take the extra time necessary to plan and then effectively and safely execute training. Unless Western-nation military trainers embrace cultural differences, manage their expectations, and allow indigenous police and military trainees to plan and execute missions independently, progress is difficult. Lack of progress in this area delays a transition of authority from Western-nation to host-nation security forces.

In order to isolate the insurgents from the population, the Western-nation and host-nation security forces should maintain a constant presence amongst the population. Government-supported (directed) twenty-four hour patrolling is critical. Patrolling not only denies insurgent access to the population, but if successful, over the short-term it secures the population and over the long-term improves the population's confidence in the national government's ability to provide security. The key to successful patrolling is that each military member on the ground understands that he must remain "inwardly on-

⁶² Ibid., 15.

guard,” but “outwardly friendly.”⁶³ Again, the intent of patrolling is not for the population to feel threatened, the purpose of patrolling is to make the population feel safe. It is *operationally* significant that each soldier at the *tactical* level understands this essential concept because as stated before, the operational center of gravity in a counterinsurgency scenario is the indigenous population. In the end, the population must make the decision to disassociate themselves from the insurgents and support the local and national governments and institutions. Continuous patrolling provides the level of security and the time necessary to permit these decisions. At the same time, patrolling provides the entire counterinsurgency team time to manage the entire spectrum of assets (military, informational, diplomatic, and economic resources) at their disposal to work toward the operational and strategic end-state.

In order to provide greater security and establish an unobtrusive level of control over the population, an effective identification system is essential. By creating a manageable system with which to control and account for the population, the counterinsurgency force can further isolate the insurgents and at the same time provide supporters (active and passive) with a sense of identity within the governmental system. For example, during the revolutionary conflict in Malaya (one of few examples of a successful counterinsurgency campaign waged by a Western power), the British required that each citizen carry an identification card with a thumbprint.⁶⁴ These identification cards allowed Malaysians freedom of movement through checkpoints and into developed areas, and they also provided the Malaysians with access to incentive programs that

⁶³ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare* ..., 84-85.

⁶⁴ Sepp, “Best Practices...,” 10.

improved their overall quality of life.⁶⁵ An identification system is effective when it allows cooperative citizens access to quality of life incentives, businesses, restricted roadways and neighborhoods, and at the same time allows the national government (with the support of Western militaries and host-nation security forces) to exercise a level of control over the population that is not overly transparent.

The United States military's identification card system is an example of a type of control system that could be employed immediately in currently active theaters like Afghanistan and Iraq (not the same system, but an identical non-U.S. military system). The U.S. military identification cards grant military personnel access to restricted areas and buildings, computer networks, and even governmental discounts at retail stores (to name a few). At the same time, they allow the U.S. government to exercise a measure of control over their military personnel. For example, the government can track each military member's personal data (date and place of birth, blood type, family information, etc.) as well as their deploy-ability status (medical, dental, weapons qualification, legal requirements, etc). Like the system used in Malaya, the U.S. military identification card gives each member a sense of identity and ownership, but at the same time allows the national government to exercise a non-transparent measure of control. While this method is not prescriptive for all revolutionary scenarios, it demonstrates an effective method that if employed properly can deny insurgents concealment within the indigenous population and allow the Western counterinsurgency team and the host-nation's government to exercise an unobtrusive measure of control in an often chaotic revolutionary environment.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

Stage 3: Long-Term

Once Western-nation militaries achieve immediate and near-term security objectives (foothold achieved, borders secured, effectiveness system in place, security force training program established, population unobtrusively controlled, insurgents isolated), military units fighting an insurgency should engage in decisive offensive operations only if absolutely warranted as these types of operations may be controversial. For the sake of discussion, controversial operations will be defined as operations that may cause unacceptable collateral damage or incite cultural, ethnic, political, or religious unrest when the local or Western populations receive information of the operation through some media outlet.⁶⁶ For example, the secondary effects of conducting a raid on a mosque could be ethnic, religious, and political unrest within the local population and international unrest amongst the populations of Western allies, leading to a drop in local and global support for the counterinsurgents. In analyzing the costs and benefits of any operation, the decision-makers must consider whether, “this operation will take more bad guys off the street than it creates.”⁶⁷ If offensive action is necessary, the leadership must also carefully consider the manner in which units will conduct the operation. Precision and speed are normally essential to ensure that combat operations do not leave a significant footprint (“the amount of personnel, spares, resources, and capabilities present and occupying space”⁶⁸) and do not cause unnecessary collateral damage. The indigenous population can easily misinterpret poorly planned and careless combat operations, and these careless operations can significantly influence their sense of

⁶⁶ Mitchell-Musumarra, “The Role of Media Coverage...,” 2.

⁶⁷ Petraeus, “Learning Counterinsurgency...,” 5-6.

⁶⁸ *Field Manual 1-02: Operational Terms and Graphics*, 1-82.

security and their overall opinion of a Western counterinsurgency team. Eventually, all lines of operation are adversely affected by disorganized or chaotic offensive operations.

Some operations are more beneficial to the counterinsurgents than others; therefore, they are more creditable in terms of assuming and taking risks. For example, organizing a raid to kill or capture members of an insurgency group's leadership is a good example of the type of offensive operation that could be a credible target of counterinsurgency efforts. As T.E. Lawrence describes, "leadership is the insurgent's greatest vulnerability; take away the leader and you have rendered the insurgency impotent and ineffective."⁶⁹ If conducted correctly, the benefit of a decisive operation aimed at the insurgent leadership would in many cases greatly outweigh the cost.

As national governments stabilize and host-nation security forces become more proficient, Western military organizations should use offensive combat operations as a last resort whenever possible. In most cases, foreign militaries should afford the host-nation leadership the opportunity to peacefully resolve situations and also work with the local and national governments to reach consensus on what conditions must be met in order to avoid a kinetic solution. If force is required, Western militaries should allow local and national security forces (military and police) to take action. This may involve joint and combined operations with both Western and host-nation forces. The 1st Infantry Division's actions in Samarra, Iraq in 2004 serve as an excellent example of this concept.

⁶⁹ Schneider, "T.E. Lawrence...", 31-37.

In Samarra, the 1st Infantry conducted offensive operations only after Iraqi local and national government leaders determined that they could not effectively manage the situation and meet the conditions agreed upon by both the local government and the counterinsurgency team.⁷⁰ Even though the situation required a kinetic solution, 1 ID's attempt to reach a non-violent solution (i.e. they allowed the local and national governments to attempt to meet agreed upon conditions through negotiation and local enforcement measures) gave the coalition and the Iraqi security forces legitimacy for future operations and enabled the local leadership (sheiks, muqtars, and city council representatives) the leverage they needed to convince Samarrans not to support the insurgency.⁷¹ While this sort of process is slow and does not appear decisive (the way most Western militaries like it), it is an effective means to achieve operational success even when military forces ultimately use decisive offensive action. National leaders and national agencies must be involved in the planning of the entire spectrum of the counterinsurgency effort. Why? "The secret to enlisting commitment lies in one word involvement, [and] involvement creates ownership."⁷² This method is one means by which Western militaries can encourage this type of ownership.

Section Conclusion

Again, this military strategy is not meant to be prescriptive, but instead a tool or a "gut check" for Western military organizations deploying to a revolutionary environment. During counterinsurgency operations, there is no "step-action" drill because no two

⁷⁰ Batiste and Daniels, "The Fight for Samarra..."

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² United States Military Academy Center of Enhanced Performance, "Systematic Approach to Building a Team," <http://www.dean.usma.edu/centers/cep/Military%20Outreach/ArmyOutreach.htm>; Internet; accessed 07 January 2007.

conflicts are identical. To that end, it is more likely that the circumstances will change from region to region and even town to town within a single revolutionary conflict. What will remain a constant? The idea that all elements of national power must be leveraged in parallel to resolve these conflicts is constant, leading to the next aspect of this strategy – information operations.

INFORMATION STRATEGY

An integral part of gaining popular support amongst the indigenous and homeland populations is to wage an effective information campaign. Information operations (IO) are essential to a Western military's attempt at convincing the host nation's population that there is a possibility for a better life if they support the national government and the counterinsurgency team. They are also a critical element in the endeavor to reassure the homeland population that their vital resource (the military) is dedicated toward a cause that is worth fighting for and to confirm that their sacrifices are appreciated and showing measurable progress. This section will focus on how Western militaries can leverage information operations effectively and why it is important that this critical element of national power projection is not ignored when countering an insurgency in a revolutionary environment.

Information strategies focus on the shaping of perceptions. According to Western military doctrine, in addition to shaping perception through psychological, deception, and media operations, information operations also include the employment of electronic

warfare, computer network operations, physical security, and even physical destruction.⁷³ While the latter are important in the conduct of full spectrum operations, they will not be a topic of discussion within this strategy because they are unlikely to constitute a decisive operation during a revolutionary conflict. Indeed, the critical elements within counterinsurgency a campaign do not focus on the destruction or protection of capabilities, but on the projection of influence both locally and internationally. To effectively contribute to the efforts of the entire counterinsurgency team and to gain influence in a revolutionary environment, Western militaries must understand the manner in which information flows within an embattled state prior to entering the theater. Once in theater, Western militaries should adapt information operations to fit the information environment, plan and execute an effective media operations campaign that focuses on education, engagement, and a measure of control over the media, and finally, utilize information operations to achieve deception which enables operations along all operational lines of the DIME model. The model on page 49 (Figure 6) depicts the critical elements of information operations (middle) that will be discussed in this section and the population groups that these operations are oriented towards (left side).

⁷³ United States, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-13: Information Operations*, (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 28, 2003), 288 (Glossary-12).




Figure 7: Information Operations Model

Source: Author's Representation

Pre-Deployment: Understand the Information Environment

To begin, Western-nation military organizations must understand the manner in which information flows locally and internationally and employ information actions in both a shaping and decisive nature when countering an insurgency. Just as a cultural understanding of both the homeland and indigenous populations are essential, it is important to understand how the flow of information occurs both at home and within the revolutionary environment. The transmission of information about any conflict, whether oriented toward the homeland or the indigenous population, is critical for both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent. Information can establish legitimacy, manage expectations, calm fears, and generate support, or it can de-legitimize, create pessimism, frighten, and degrade support.⁷⁴ For this reason, it is essential that Western militaries understand and effectively engage the different sources of information that exist within a revolutionary environment, understand and leverage where and how information is

⁷⁴ "Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept (09 September 2004)," Center of Army Lessons Learned, <https://call2.army.mil/search/search.asp>; Internet; accessed 7 January 2007, 15.

delivered, and, finally, comprehend the speed with which information travels both locally and internationally.

The counterinsurgency force must adapt its information operations campaign to the environment in which it is fighting. Since, most revolutionary wars in the last century have been fought in third-tier nation-states, Western militaries cannot expect to use the same tactics and techniques they use to project information within the first-tier international community. As mentioned before, the indigenous population is a center of gravity for both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent; therefore, it is important to deliver information in the most effective manner possible to achieve desired effects in theater. Specifically, the message to the local population is always stronger when it appears to originate from locals. Unfortunately for Western militaries, insurgent fighters have demonstrated a high level of proficiency in effectively interacting with the indigenous population throughout the history of revolutionary conflict. For example, during the Huk rebellion in the Philippines from 1946 to 1952, insurgents labeled U.S. military advisors as “occupiers” and “evil capitalists.”⁷⁵ This insurgent information campaign not only caused local criticism of the United States’ role in the Philippines, but it also undermined and de-legitimized the national government. After many setbacks, the Filipino government learned from its adversary and employed a powerful information campaign of its own, removing the Huk’s ability to incite violence and rallying the local population to its own cause.⁷⁶ Filipino pro-government information operations

⁷⁵ Bridgewater, “Philippine Information Operations...,” 41.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

originating from local sources within the indigenous population were well received.⁷⁷ Even though the message the Filipino locals transmitted to the population was the same, the local sources were able to achieve an effect that U.S. advisors and Filipino government officials were unable to achieve. Like the Filipino government which learned from its enemy during the Huk Rebellion, Western militaries should learn from this example and apply its lesson. Information Operations that are oriented toward the local population are best conducted by people that are representative of the local population, not military personnel who do not look like, talk like, act like, or share a common identity with the indigenous population.

Western militaries should encourage interagency information planning with the local military and other host-nation governmental agencies in order to achieve the greatest effect. Currently in Afghanistan and Iraq, coalition forces are using the host-nation military to conduct an array of security missions in an effort to place a “local face” on traditional offensive operations like raid, cordon and search, and search and attack missions. Information operations, however, are largely planned, organized, and executed by Western militaries instead of the local military and other host-nation agencies. Since information operations are so critical, the counterinsurgent leadership should encourage host-nation organizations to participate in the planning of these operations and then serve as the main effort during the execution of the majority of the information operations that are oriented toward the local population. Unlike the counterinsurgents, local military and police forces and local leaders are more culturally aware and maintain much more

⁷⁷ Ibid., 37-41.

cultural credibility within local population centers.⁷⁸ With the exception of the voluntary information support flowing from within the population, utilizing the indigenous military and police force or host-nation local and national governmental agencies are the most effective means to communicate vital information to the local public.

Media: Bridging the Gap

Successful media operations, a component of information operations, are essential because they enable the accomplishment of objectives across the entire spectrum of the DIME model. Why? In terms of the homeland population, it takes time and consistent effort to create an information culture that supports the counterinsurgency team's long-term stabilization effort. A well-orchestrated media operations strategy is essential to achieving this outcome. In regards to the Western (homeland) population, the media is important because it shapes homeland public perception and plays an essential role in bridging the gap between the public and the military organization that is waging a counterinsurgency campaign abroad.⁷⁹

“Bridging this gap is important to the operational commander; public perception of the costs of waging war and the success of operations can directly and quickly translate into the loss of political will both within the [Western nation] and internationally. As political will wanes, national-strategic objectives are both challenged and changed. The consequence of this reaction is significantly alteration of operational objectives and the planned course of a campaign.”⁸⁰

The media is vital. Media outlets, whether international or domestic, not only serve as a source of rapid information for political decision-makers within Western democracies,

⁷⁸ Dennis Murphy, “Information Operations and Winning the Peace: Wielding the Information Element of Power in the Global War on Terrorism,” *Center of Strategic Leadership Publication*, Volume 14-05 (December 2005), 3-4.

⁷⁹ Mitchell-Musumarra, “The Role of Media Coverage...,” 1-4.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 1.

they also serve as a weapon of choice for insurgents, terrorists, and other hostile non-governmental organizations.⁸¹ For these reasons, it is essential that military professionals deliberately plan for media operations and implement an effective strategy that accounts for each revolutionary conflict's unique media environment.

Planning for Media

The military must address media actions during every aspect of the planning process because in the age of global media, news travels fast. The information provided to the homeland and indigenous populations by the media is integral in shaping each groups' perceptions. Even though the manner in which news is transmitted varies from country to country, it is nonetheless important that a Western military organization plan and act decisively to achieve information dominance globally and across the local population. Unfortunately for the counterinsurgent, global dominance is difficult considering Western media outlets largely emphasize negative events, especially when these events occur during an election year.⁸² In response to the global media bias, military public affairs teams must work tirelessly to counter media "spin" by providing timely and accurate reports to international media outlets and by leveraging news crews so they are more inclined to verify and report positive events. Essentially, military staffs must find a way to "beat" the media to the story-line. Specifically, media planners should carefully consider each military action in regard to its impact on the local and

⁸¹ Patrick O'Heffernan, "Mass Media Roles in Foreign Policy," *Media Power in Politics*, ed. Doris A. Graber (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1994), 325-326.

⁸² Batiste and Daniels, "The Fight for Samarra..."

homeland population, coalition partners, and regional powers and then counter all negative effects of these actions with well-defined and timely “talking points.”⁸³

Talking points are written guidelines for military personnel that allow military members to speak effectively and clearly to the media and the local population in a manner that is in line with the commander’s intent.⁸⁴ Like operations orders, talking points should be refined and oriented for each level of command: coalition to company. The international media insists on access to the “front-line soldier.” In order for a soldier to understand and effectively communicate the commander’s talking points, he must understand how they are applicable to *his or her role* in the unit. This may seem like a tactical, and not an operational strategy, but when the media is involved, tactical actions often have operational and even strategic consequences. Media outlets are a valuable tool that is essential to the counterinsurgents’ efforts to maintain the support of the homeland and indigenous populations. This is why it is important that Western militaries plan for them, especially in regard to the approach they take to control the media.

Engage the Media

The counterinsurgency team must maintain positive control of media operating across the depth and breadth of the revolutionary battle-space. Western militaries are important contributors to this effort. Western militaries can achieve control of the media and its outlets by using different approaches: engagement, education, and physical control. By consistently engaging media outlets with forthright and current information

⁸³ “Stability Operations...,” Center of Army Lessons Learned, 15.

⁸⁴ Author’s definition.

regarding key aspects of operations occurring within the confines of the revolutionary environment, military leaders can minimize media skepticism and improve its chances that the media will tell the counterinsurgent's story versus their own narrative of events. The 1st Infantry Division successfully used the technique of engagement in Iraq. During their tour in 2004 and 2005, they used daily "drumbeats" (one page newsletters in Arabic and English), and a mobile broadcast station (playing both popular music and news) to communicate the division's good news stories to media outlets and to the Iraqis living inside their area of operations.⁸⁵ With this adaptive methodology, the 1st Infantry Division maintained constant communication with the media and access to the local population. This proactive strategy, which utilized both printed press and radio, denied the enemy the ability to vilify the U.S. military's message. In essence, the division's message was communicated directly from Major General Batiste, the division commander, to the media and the local masses.

A lack of media engagement on the part of Western militaries can be extremely detrimental to the entire counterinsurgency team's cause. This lack of interaction can cause the military to lose credibility because it creates the possibility that the media will report events out of context, and it can cause significant delays in the presentation of the military's perspective regarding critical operations or events.⁸⁶ The media's impact in Somalia during Operation Restore Hope not only demonstrates why engagement is important, but also the tremendous power of global media. Prior to U.S. action,

⁸⁵ Batiste and Daniels. "The Fight for Samarra..."

⁸⁶ David Stockwell, "Press Coverage in Somalia: A Case for Media Relations to be a Principle of Military Operations Other Than War" (Master's thesis, Army Command and Staff College, 1995).

international global media coverage of the human suffering in Somalia and the public outcry that followed coerced the Clinton administration and other U.S. policy-makers to intervene.⁸⁷ Initially, the media was extremely supportive and reported positively about the Clinton administration and U.S. operations in Somalia, resulting in overall domestic public support for the operation.⁸⁸ Once the media endorsement shifted toward a more critical view and showed shocking images of dead U.S. soldiers, however, public perception quickly shifted.⁸⁹ This shift in media exposure led to a foreign affairs nightmare and an embarrassing withdrawal for the United States military. Why was there such a quick shift in the manner in which the media covered Operation Restore Hope? One possible reason is the military's lack of engagement with the media. Coalition forces operating in the Somali revolutionary environment might have pacified this media turn by engaging the media in an effort to communicate the military perspective of conditions on the ground. Another possibility for military organizations that find themselves in environments similar to Somalia is to educate the media regarding the benefits and potential risks of conflict and attempt to familiarize the media with the military viewpoint.

⁸⁷ Mitchell-Musumarra, "The Role of Media Coverage...", 6.

⁸⁸ Piers Robinson, "The News Media and Intervention: Critical Media Coverage, Policy Uncertainty and Air Power Intervention During Humanitarian Crisis," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 37, No. 5 (Sep., 2000), 10-13.

⁸⁹ Mitchell-Musumarra, "The Role of Media Coverage...", 6.

Educate the Media

By educating the media on certain aspects of the military culture, Western militaries can better engage the media in an effort to maintain their support and improve the likelihood that the military perspective is understood and addressed during media reports. Most media reporters have never served in the armed forces and have little first-hand knowledge of military regulations, tactics, customs, or the vastness of its role in projecting national power across all lines of the DIME model.⁹⁰ In order to better and more effectively communicate to the media (and in turn to the public), military organizations must dedicate time and resources to educate the media on concepts like the law of armed conflict, operational planning, the military justice system, and the enormous amount of effort the military places on safety and the minimization of collateral damage during operations. By dedicating time and resources to educating the media, the militaries can minimize rumors and misinformation and more effectively communicate to the press. Education promotes common language and understanding. Media agencies are extremely powerful “players” in a revolutionary environment; therefore, it is essential that counterinsurgents reach out to these organizations in an effort to gain relative control.

Control the Media

In addition to educating the media, it is essential that military organizations exercise relative control over the media in order to leverage its power and sustain the support of both the local and Western populations. Militaries will not exercise authoritative control over the media, but rather they will have the informal power to

⁹⁰ Ibid.

“orient” the media in order to support the counterinsurgency effort. This is extremely difficult given the sheer number of media representatives that flock to a conflict. For example, during Operation Iraqi Freedom in March of 2003, over seven thousand journalists and media crews operated within the region, making it extremely difficult for the commanders of the coalition force to track them within their respective areas of operation.⁹¹ Control was limited which resulted in reporting that was inconsistent and at times inaccurate.⁹² Conversely, during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, General Norman Schwarzkopf controlled the media’s access to the battle space by providing press escorts and by conducting security reviews of all reports originating from his theater of operations.⁹³ While Schwarzkopf was criticized for this technique, he effectively controlled rumors and misinformation, preventing the media from adversely affecting the perception of the American and global populations.

Embedding reporters is another not so obvious, but equally effective means of control. By maintaining direct contact with operational units, embedded reporters can see first hand the patriotism and dedication of the counterinsurgents while at the same time being exposed to the same living conditions, and climate as the counterinsurgents.⁹⁴ This technique for control allows reporters to identify with the struggles and efforts of the military and creates unity of purpose and effort (i.e. a sense of comradeship) between the military and the media. Ultimately, this fosters improved relations. Regardless of the

⁹¹ Mitchell-Musumarra, “The Role of Media Coverage...,” 8-9.

⁹² Fact-based opinion of author who was a tactical commander in Iraq in 2004.

⁹³ Richard Sims, “War Without Witnesses,” *Media Studies Journal* (Summer, 2001): 46-51.

⁹⁴ Mitchell-Musumarra, “The Role of Media Coverage...,” 8.

strategy for control, it is imperative that the media, like all other operational enablers, are accounted for and utilized to achieve both operational and strategic objectives. In the end, militaries must conduct media operations at the local and global level effectively in order to win over the local population, maintain the support of its own population, and successfully defeat the insurgency force. Control is critical.

Shaping the Perception of the Insurgent: Deception Operations

In addition to shaping the perception of populations, information operations are also effective in shaping the perception of insurgents as a means to achieve an operational advantage. Deception operations, an element of information operations, focus on presenting information to insurgency forces that causes them to behave in a way that the counterinsurgents desire.⁹⁵ Deception operations, in essence, assist in shaping the revolutionary environment in a way that allows western militaries to optimize their chances for success during an operation. For example, during the Huk rebellion in the Phillipines, the Filipino military (along with U.S. advisors) lured and confused the Huk insurgency force by intentionally leaking information that their forces were leaving certain villages that were known insurgent safe-havens.⁹⁶ When the Huk's returned, they were easily captured or killed by Filipino national forces that successfully used information operations to seize the initiative and surprise their enemy. History has shown that information initiatives like the Filipino military used during the Huk Rebellion are effective. For example, the Vietcong used deception operations against the French and Americans in Vietnam, the allies used deception operations on D-Day, and more recently,

⁹⁵ *Field Manual 1-02: Operational Terms and Graphics*, 1-52.

⁹⁶ Bridgewater, "Philippine Information Operations...", 39.

the allied coalition used deception operations during the ground offensives into Iraq during Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom. In each instance, deception operations were an essential shaping effort that contributed immensely to the success of the military force.

Section Conclusion

Understanding information operations and their role in a revolutionary conflict is important, but unless a successful information campaign is reinforced by individual and collective actions that support the information campaign, the counterinsurgent will not be successful. Western militaries can successfully contribute to “winning at counterinsurgency” if information operations and the other aspects of national power are managed effectively and are applied concurrently. Each element of national power, however, requires that each military member on the ground, regardless of rank, understand that they are not only counterinsurgency “warriors,” but diplomats of their countries and of the national government that is struggling for survival. This leads to the next section of this strategy - diplomatic operations.

DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY

Members of the counterinsurgency team (to include military personnel) must be effective diplomats. Diplomacy is defined as the “skillful handling of a situation [or] skillfully dealing with sensitive matters or people.”⁹⁷ To this point, this paper has focused on the military and information operations portion of the DIME operational

⁹⁷ Princeton Wordnet On-line Encyclopedia, “Diplomacy,” <http://wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=diplomacy>; Internet; accessed 3 December 2006.

spectrum. During counterinsurgency operations, these two elements are largely shaping operations for diplomatic operations and economic operations. While decisive military operations and well planned information operations can create a “physically” secure environment, economic programs and sound diplomacy enable once embattled nation-states to prosper financially and govern effectively because *these* initiatives create the level of security required to achieve long-term stability. Ultimately, diplomatic and economic operations will more directly solve the social, economic, and political problems that caused popular unrest and fueled the insurgency in the first place. This section will focus on diplomatic operations that Western militaries can engage in to contribute to the counterinsurgency team effort. Specifically, this section will discuss the concept of “diplomatic offensive,” the role of the counterinsurgents as teachers and mentors, the importance and relevance of cultural anthropology to the diplomatic warrior, and finally the concept of establishing political control through effective diplomacy.

Diplomatic Offensive

Western militaries should engage in a “diplomatic offensive” as soon as they commit resources to a revolutionary conflict. Within this diplomatic offensive strategy, the military force on the ground would commit resources in terms of manpower, money, and equipment in an effort to reach compromises that reinforce the national government’s reconciliation efforts.⁹⁸ This focus of effort would contribute immensely toward eventually legitimizing the political process and toward setting the conditions for a long-term peace.⁹⁹ Instead of only contributing forces to provide security to counter insurgent

⁹⁸ Baker and Hamilton, et al, *The Iraq Study Group Report*, 44-45.

kinetic aggression (which can only deter or disrupt insurgent action in the short-term), militaries must dedicate themselves to the development of programs directed at ending the animosity and hatred that fuels national division. Regardless of whether national division is fed by hatred originating from religious intolerance, cultural differences, or tribal competition, the counterinsurgency force must aggressively seek to suppress or at least control these potential boiling points. Similar to programs aimed at solving other global problems (famine, poverty, disease, etc.), education should be a critical element of the counterinsurgent's diplomatic offensive in order to empower the citizens of an embattled nation-state to contribute to reconciliation efforts.

Teach and Mentor

In order to enable the achievement of objectives at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, the counterinsurgents must be good teachers, mentors, and role models. While providing security from insurgent aggression and delivering an effective message to the local population is critical in the short-term; the counterinsurgency team must also “deliver the goods” in terms of teaching the indigenous population and their leadership about *how* to actually achieve long-term stability.¹⁰⁰ Depending on the degraded nature of the nation-state at the time the military engages in the conflict, the counterinsurgents may have a large role in teaching the indigenous population. For example, in a conflict environment like Afghanistan, military forces continue to be heavily engaged in mentoring Afghans on how to not only run governments, employ police and national security forces, and create basic economic institutions, but also how to provide basic

⁹⁹ Ibid., 45.

¹⁰⁰ Murphy, “Information Operations and Winning the Peace...,” 3.

services like water treatment and health care to their own people.¹⁰¹ Regardless of the level of instruction and mentorship the local population requires, when training is complete, evaluations are essential. While David Galula offers a more sequential plan instead of the concurrent strategy offered in this paper, he does address the importance of testing the local leadership while at the same time not appearing overly paternalistic.¹⁰² Validating the performance of local leaders is critical because eventually the counterinsurgents must place a local “face” on reconstruction efforts in an attempt to legitimize local and national governmental systems and set the conditions for a long-term peace.¹⁰³ It benefits the counterinsurgents and the local and national governments to have the local leaders that are representing them operate in a manner that is efficient and effective in the eyes of the general population regardless of their position.

Encourage Ownership in the Political Process

Once the immediate problems (lack of basic services, violence, etc.) are assuaged, the counterinsurgent should encourage involvement of the entire indigenous population in the political process (which is not always a democratic process) and enable local leaders to begin fostering a sense of national identity. This step in the diplomatic process is largely dependent on the success of “diplomatic offensive” efforts, the success of teaching and mentoring initiatives (especially in the area of local and national

¹⁰¹ Howard G. Coombs and General Rick Hillier, “Planning for Success: The Challenge of Applying Operational Art in Post-Conflict Afghanistan,” *Canadian Military Journal* (Autumn 2005): 5-14.

¹⁰² Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare...*, 90-92.

¹⁰³ See also Jeb Nadener, “Future U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Capabilities,” *U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Conference* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 28 September 2006); Schneider, “T.E. Lawrence...,” Petraeus, “Learning Counterinsurgency...,” *Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency*.

governance), and the success of security and information operations. The focus of this diplomatic engagement should not only be on the “fence-sitting” population, but on the insurgent forces as well. Western militaries should focus resources on not only encouraging all factions of the population to take part in the political process (i.e. by voting or competing for office in a democratic construct), but also on convincing insurgents that their best opportunity to achieve their objectives and avoid imprisonment or death is to reintegrate themselves with the rest of the population.¹⁰⁴ Amnesty or rehabilitation programs are effective means of encouraging this type of insurgent reintegration.¹⁰⁵ While the democratic process tends to be the political weapon of choice for Western militaries, the focus of the governmental system should be on stability. The system of government that is best for a nation-state will differ based on its demographics. Regardless of the governmental system, however, participation in the political process should create a sense of ownership and a level of consensus amongst the indigenous population. Why? Ownership and consensus across the population leads to a sense national identity.

A counterinsurgency strategy must focus its diplomatic efforts on creating a feeling of ownership amongst the indigenous population. The Western military experience in the 21st century has confirmed the general rule that revolutionary wars are not won by destroying the insurgent. They are won by isolating the insurgent with the support of the population and by eliminating the grievances that energize the cause of the

¹⁰⁴ Sepp, “Best Practices...,” 10.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

insurgent.¹⁰⁶ Similar to non-military foreign affairs, a diplomatic approach to counterinsurgency should encourage the general population to have a stake in their own future. As T.E. Lawrence noted in 1917:

Better the [indigenous population] do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not win it for them...It may take them longer and it may not be as good as you think, but if it is theirs, it will be better.¹⁰⁷

Regardless of the enormity of resources and manpower a Western military can contribute to the counterinsurgent effort, success will ultimately depend on whether or not the indigenous population works together efficiently, honestly, and effectively to not only isolate the insurgency, but to also provide a means for a lasting peace in their country. Greater emphasis on a “national perspective” in all stability activities, whether by the Western counterinsurgency team or the national government, enables greater moderation of divisions caused by race, religion, or culture.¹⁰⁸ Ownership across the entire demographic of a nation-state is critical. To effectively contribute to this lofty goal, however, Western militaries must first understand the culture they are attempting to help.

Understand the Culture

The study of cultural anthropology by Western militaries is essential to optimize the military’s ability to effectively contribute to diplomatic operations. Cultural

¹⁰⁶ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare...*, 54.

¹⁰⁷ T.E. Lawrence, “Twenty-Seven Articles,” *Arab Bulletin*, August 20, 1917.

¹⁰⁸ *Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency*, 5-16.

anthropology is a “sub-discipline of anthropology concerned with the non-biological, behavioral aspects of society.”¹⁰⁹

Truly understanding another culture requires more than speaking a language or knowing certain social customs so that we do not offend our hosts. Certainly those things are important, but to truly have an impact, and to do more good than harm, we must understand the social power structures that informally govern societies as well as the internal motivations of the enemy and the people. In short, we need to develop an anthropological approach to understanding our enemies. What motivates them at the individual and social level? To what extent is the conflict about religion, or economics, or ideology, versus other grievances?¹¹⁰

Dr. Jeb Nadaner, a recent speaker at the United States Government Counterinsurgency Conference in Washington DC, describes this detailed understanding of international cultures as “global ethnic and cultural terrain mapping.”¹¹¹ This is an art our enemies have mastered. As demonstrated by non-state actors in Iraq today, the future “enemy” will not only have a strong understanding of these cultural factors in regard to the indigenous population, but also Western coalition military partners and their respective populations. As allied nations continue to disassociate themselves from the revolutionary conflict in Iraq and even Afghanistan, few can question our enemy’s results. Western militaries must learn from their adversaries because as mentioned in the introduction, the populations that are affected by revolutionary conflict are the key terrain. Why? Wars, regardless of the magnitude of the conflict, are fought by human beings.

¹⁰⁹ China Through a Lens, “Cultural Anthropology,” www.china.org.cn/english/features/Archaeology/98851.htm; Internet; accessed 7 February 2007.

¹¹⁰ Eric Edelman “Transcript,” *U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Conference* (Washington DC: 28 September 2006).

¹¹¹ Nadaner, “Future U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Capabilities.”

Wars, whether dominated by annihilation, attrition, or exhaustion strategy, are waged by humans and ultimately affect humans; therefore, it is essential to understand “what?” these humans are fighting for and more importantly “why?” they are fighting for it. Most military operational planning models are based on data collected from proving grounds and Cold War models. These models often neglect “human factors,” and if they do address human factors, then it is usually in the form of an intangible and subjective “morale” assessment. The complex quality about intangibles and subjective variables, however, is the fact that they are difficult, if not impossible, to measure effectively. Despite this difficulty, it is imperative that counterinsurgent leaders understand these human factors. For example, looking at recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the coalition partners fight for similar causes: “[a nation-state] that is peaceful, united, stable, and secure...”¹¹² So, *why* are they fighting for it? The answers vary: to improve global standing and their standing within the alliance, to defeat terrorism and eliminate terrorist sanctuaries on their ground, to gain economic benefits, etc. On the other hand, *what* are our enemies fighting for? Most counterinsurgency strategists agree that the answer is power, control, and influence.¹¹³ Again, the real question is “*why* are they fighting for it.” Are the insurgents fighting for power, control, and influence because they desire personal gain, or are they fighting for something much more vital like their very existence or the existence of their families? The “why factor” is what often places the counterinsurgent at a serious disadvantage when engaged in a revolutionary conflict. To reduce this disadvantage, counterinsurgent leaders must understand the “why factor” that

¹¹² United States, Executive Office of the President of the United States, *Strategy for Victory in Iraq* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 30 November 2005), 1.

¹¹³ See also Sepp, “Best Practices...;” Kilcullen, “Three Pillars...;” *Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency*.

inspires their enemies, and understand how the “why factor” can limit their own forces. The study of cultural anthropology is critical in order for Western military personnel and their interagency and multinational teammates to achieve this level of understanding. The diagram below (Figure 8) illustrates the thought process behind these ideas.




Figure 8: Why They Fight
Source: Author’s Representation

The “why factor” that drives both the counterinsurgency team and insurgency groups is an intangible aspect of counterinsurgency warfare that must be understood.

Since counterinsurgency is less about winning the war than it is about achieving a peace, it is essential that every soldier have a firm understanding of the fact that the indigenous population is judging their every move against the alternative, the cause of the insurgency. As discussed, it is imperative that Western militaries have a firm understanding of the culture in which they are fighting since the support of the population is critical to achieving both short-term and long-term success. Why is this so important on the revolutionary battlefield? Standards of etiquette and ethics vary from region to region and even culture to culture. As an example, in Middle Eastern countries, an

inappropriate glance or even a misinterpreted gesture can mean the difference between the population seeing the counterinsurgent force as legitimate or as a nuisance.¹¹⁴ When counterinsurgents act improperly, they allow the insurgents the opportunity to execute “non-lethal counter-fire.” Non-lethal counter-fire is a tactic used by insurgents that capitalizes on counterinsurgent mistakes in an effort to increase support for the insurgent’s cause.¹¹⁵ MG John R.S. Batiste, former commander of the 1st Infantry Division in Iraq, notes that it is essential that Western militaries minimize the insurgents’ opportunities to conduct “non-lethal counter-fire,” because they have a profound effect on the effectiveness of operations across every line of operation (military, informational, diplomatic, and economic).¹¹⁶ In order to reduce opportunities for the insurgents and avoid the effects of “non-lethal counter-fire,” Western militaries must be culturally aware.

Section Conclusion

The counterinsurgency team must establish “political control” through effective diplomacy. Unlike the traditional military concept of “control,” achieving a functional level of collaboration and consensus towards a series of agreed upon national objectives is the purpose of diplomatic efforts.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴ Author’s observation during deployment to Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2004.

¹¹⁵ Batiste and Daniels, “The Fight for Samarra...”

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Kilcullen, “Three Pillars...,” 3.

Politically, the more force you have to use, the worse the campaign is going. Marginalizing and out-competing a range of challengers, to achieve control over the overall socio-political space in which the conflict occurs, is the true aim.¹¹⁸

If the counterinsurgents understand the culture of the revolutionary environment, effectively teach and mentor the indigenous population, and enable an atmosphere where national unity can develop, political control is achievable. Again, success in revolutionary warfare rests predominantly on the elimination of the social, economic, and political factors that caused the conflict in the first place, and the counterinsurgents can only accomplish this if they establish a measure of control by conducting nested operations across all lines of operations within the DIME model. In addition to the primacy of diplomatic operations, the next section will discuss the other decisive effort in counterinsurgency warfare – economic operations.

ECONOMIC STRATEGY

Western militaries can effectively contribute to the counterinsurgency team's economic game-plan. Like diplomatic operations, economic operations are not a traditional military function. They are extremely important (arguably more important than military and information operations) because they contribute directly toward solving the social, economic, and political problems that create public unrest and fuel the causes of insurgents and other non-state actors. Western militaries must contribute toward the counterinsurgency team effort to create an economic environment where unemployment is at a manageable level, where private businesses can thrive, and where there exists a popular culture that encourages the idea that “peace pays” in terms of both financial gain

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

and overall well-being.¹¹⁹ To accomplish these effects, Western militaries must first understand the economic environment, quickly address short-term economic problems, and then set the conditions to enable long-term economic prosperity.

Understand the Economic Environment

A counterinsurgency force must have a solid understanding of the economic environment that exists within the nation-state so that it may orient its economic operations efforts correctly. Why? Economic disparities, often more than any other factor, contribute to political instability.¹²⁰ Given the importance of understanding the economic environment, it is critical that the counterinsurgents quickly determine whether or not the revolutionary state has a functioning economy, whether its people have fair access to land, property, and services, and then immediately begin to formulate solutions to minimize any economic grievances by which the indigenous population may feel suppressed.¹²¹ Visible progress is important. Looking at the revolutionary conflicts that have occurred in the last century, it is safe to assume that Western militaries will enter a conflict environment that is marred by economic instability. For this reason, it is imperative that counterinsurgents quickly remedy more pressing economic problems like unemployment in the short-term.

¹¹⁹ *Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency*, 5-17.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 3-11.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 3-12.

Contribute to Solving Short-Term Economic Problems

Upon entering the revolutionary environment, it is important that Western militaries conduct an “economic offensive” to improve social and economic conditions on the ground, lend credibility to the national government and the counterinsurgency team, and quell support for insurgents and other non-state actors. The failures of coalition economics efforts in Iraq serve as a valuable case study. A member of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad who anonymously wrote an article titled, “Mismanaging Iraq,” described the concept of “economic offensive” as the deliberate efforts of a counterinsurgency team to rapidly deploy host-nation labor and supplies in an attempt to lessen the impact of economic problems across the local population.¹²² Specifically, the author recommends that in Iraq in 2003, counterinsurgents should have dedicated significant resources to establishing essential services, as well as to housing projects.¹²³ Figure 9 provides a real-world example of essential service categories and objectives that are important in a revolutionary environment.




Figure 9: Example of Essential Services Categories and Objectives

Source: Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency, Figure 5-4.

¹²² “Mismanaging Iraq,” *National Interest*, Issue 78 (Winter 2004-2005): 109.

¹²³ Ibid.

By nesting security, information, and diplomacy operations within this type of economic offensive, western militaries and their counterinsurgency partners would create the immediate effect of providing basic life support, housing, and employment for the local population. It would also create a secondary effect, greater security.

Why should solving immediate economic problems be a main effort for a military force, and how will militaries accomplish this effect? In addressing the “why?” it is important to note that when the indigenous population is employed and their families concerns are remedied, they are more likely to feel a greater sense of self worth and less likely to seek fraternity with insurgent groups. In Iraq stabilizing the economy was not the main effort during the initial reconstruction phase and this resulted in 70% of the male population being affected by unemployment by the fall of 2003.¹²⁴ This high level of unemployment not only caused a problem politically for the provisional government, but it also created a military problem. More adult males were forming allegiances with insurgent groups which appeared more prepared and unfortunately more willing to remedy their social, political, and economic problems.¹²⁵ Economic problems will not remedy themselves. After over three years of operations in Iraq, a multi-national panel of political, military, and economic leaders are still recommending in their publication, “The Iraq Study Group Report,” that the counterinsurgency coalition in Iraq direct resources toward private sector job creation as a potential remedy to diffuse the economic unrest

¹²⁴ “Mismanaging Iraq,” 109.

¹²⁵ See also Petraeus, “Learning Counterinsurgency...,” *Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency*; Kilcullen, “Three Pillars...,” Batiste and Daniels. “The Fight for Samarra...,” “Mismanaging Iraq.”

that continues to plague the country.¹²⁶ Specifically, they recommend expanding the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) to provide additional resources to ignite blue-collar labor positions that provide essential services like trash removal, plumbing service, electrical service, and water and sewage treatment.¹²⁷ Militaries can assist in the accomplishing these initiatives in two ways. First, since military commanders control CERP funding, they can orient the allocation of these funds toward private sector contracts. Military commanders should prioritize these contracts based on public need (i.e. essential services for the local population first). Second, since Western militaries possess a wealth of resources in terms of manpower and equipment, they can fill private sector manpower and equipment voids until the local population receives appropriate training or they receive necessary equipment.

While Western militaries should use the all instruments of national power (DIME) concurrently to create a stabilized conflict environment, the manner in which each is employed along their respective operational lines is at times sequential. The economic line of operation is one such case. Remediating potential economic flash-points like unemployment is a pre-requisite to setting the conditions for long-term economic prosperity. In addition to remediating economic flashpoints, encouraging host-nation ownership in the economic system is another prerequisite to long-term stability.

¹²⁶ Baker and Hamilton, et al, *The Iraq Study Group Report*, 86.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

Encouraging Ownership in the Economic System

Western militaries and their partners should make every effort to ensure that the majority of the population has a stake in their local and national economies. Every time the counterinsurgency team contemplates an economic initiative, it should consider whether the initiative will increase the population's involvement in the economic process. For example, in Iraq, the 1st Infantry Division's leadership determined that economic programs were another way to drive a wedge between the people of Samarra, a volatile region of Iraq, and insurgent groups.¹²⁸ By employing the Samarrans, the 1st Infantry Division not only improved the population's quality of life, but after certain conditions were met, it allowed 1 ID to showcase Samarra as an example to the rest of the region (assisting in the expansion of their zone of control).¹²⁹ In other words, the success in Samarra exposed the "fence-sitting" population to the benefits of the economic programs that were endorsed by the national government and the coalition, dissuading them from the insurgent cause. Finally, ensuring that the indigenous population has a stake in the economic success of their local and national economies can produce tangible and intangible gains across all lines of operations. For example, if the majority of the population is employed and working hard to support their families, then they are less likely to take part in supporting the insurgency, thus increasing the level of security.

¹²⁸ Batiste and Daniels, "The Fight for Samarra..."

¹²⁹ Ibid.

Set the Conditions for Long-Term Economic Stability

Western militaries can assist in setting the conditions for success, but they cannot guarantee long-term economic stability in a post-revolutionary environment. Despite the tremendous amount of resources at its disposal, the counterinsurgency force ultimately cannot control the amount of international aid or the degree of foreign investment that will flow into the nation in which it is conducting operations. What can a Western military force control? Militaries can contribute to creating an environment where the international community believes its capital resources will be well spent and where business can foresee profit potential. Western militaries are essential role players in this pursuit, and they can fulfill their role by providing security for the population in terms of physicality and well-being, by being great ambassadors and leading by example, and by sustaining short-term economic progress until long-term economic institutions can gain a foothold in the region. Additionally, Western militaries will have to work closely with agencies like non-governmental organizations, international businesses, and agencies within the coalition governments to create systems to determine land and property ownership, transfer property, resolve disputes, protect asset rights, standardize wage rates, create open access to trade of goods and services, and revitalize monetary and banking systems.¹³⁰ None of these goals are single agency initiatives. All of these requirements involve a consistent and dedicated effort by western militaries and all of its inter-agency partners to motivate economic development and the establishment of sound economic institutions.

¹³⁰ See also *Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency*, 8-16; Petraeus, "Learning Counterinsurgency...;" "Mismanaging Iraq," 108.

In order to guarantee economic prosperity and inevitably long-term peace in a country that has been demoralized by an insurgency, the focus of the entire counterinsurgency team must be on developing reliable economic institutions. While it is not a traditional role, the military is part of this interagency and many times multi-national effort. This team effort should not involve throwing money at the problem (economic injection). Building banking and ministry facilities, providing small business loans, and guaranteeing unlimited resources to the indigenous population will accomplish little in terms of long-term economic growth.¹³¹ Allocating small business loans and negotiating contracts with the indigenous population without first establishing the foundation for a fledgling economy is as reckless for a military organization as conducting a deliberate breaching operation prior to firing obscuration smoke. The results can be disastrous. The solution to economic long-term stability is similar in nature to the solution to providing a stable, long-term security force. In addition to providing resources, it is essential that the entire counterinsurgency team assist the indigenous population in developing professional education systems, developing administrative policies and procedures, and ultimately, creating an environment that attracts foreign investment (highly dependent on the economic, political, and security environment).¹³² In the “Iraq Study Group Report,” military, political, and economic leaders go further and suggest that in order to effectively build economic institutions, it is imperative that efforts are taken by the counterinsurgent to better educate business leaders on skills like delegation of authority, instituting better internal business controls,

¹³¹ See also Chiarelli and Michaelis, “Winning the Peace...,” 13-14; Petraeus, “Learning Counterinsurgency...,” 6-7, 9.

¹³² Department of Military Instruction, *Counterinsurgency Operations*.

procedural improvements, and even providing technical training.¹³³ While some of these responsibilities may seem like tasks for other governmental organizations, only certain Western military organizations boast the adaptability, flexibility, and manpower to build the foundation to enable these long-term initiatives to take place in a conflict environment.

Section Conclusion

Again, Western militaries cannot achieve economic stability alone – it is a team effort. Western militaries can, however, contribute immensely to an economic strategy by understanding the economic environment before conducting operations, assisting in immediately solving short-term economic flash-points, encouraging local participation in the political process, and by being a cooperative teammate while long-term economic institutions gain a foothold in an embattled state. Cooperation is critical within this economic strategy because not only is the economic line of operation usually the most important in achieving long-term stability, but it also takes the longest for its objective to become a reality. For Western powers that are accustomed to quick results, sustained cooperation is always a challenge.

¹³³ Baker and Hamilton, et al, *The Iraq Study Group Report*, 86-87.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

Western-nation militaries can conduct counterinsurgency operations successfully by first understanding their role as a member of the counterinsurgency team, by understanding the key players within a revolutionary environment, and then by leveraging all elements of national power (military, informational, diplomatic, and economic) to diffuse public unrest and set the conditions for long-term stability in an embattled nation-state. As proven throughout history, exclusively kinetic operations are not the answer to the problems that exist within a revolutionary conflict scenario. Ultimately, success for a counterinsurgency force rests largely on the elimination of the social, economic, and political factors that create public unrest and in the process fuel the insurgent cause, not on annihilating an insurgent's military capability. Establishing a stable political environment, quickly solving economic flash points, setting the conditions for economic consistency, promoting education, fostering sound diplomatic initiatives, and securing the population in terms of both physicality and well-being are all critical to ensuring success. Military and information operations largely enable diplomatic and economic operations which are the most vital operations that eventually bring stability to a region. For Western militaries, the difficulty lies in convincing leaders and soldiers at all levels that they must function as a team with interagency and multinational partners and simultaneously focus their efforts along each line of operation (military, diplomatic, informational, and economic), not in sequence.

In the end, the adaptability and “will to win” of today’s Western military soldier make these politically charged revolutionary wars winnable. As Lieutenant General James N. Mattis notes, “it is not our technology that shocks and awes our enemies. It is our capacity to produce highly motivated, innovative, and agile expeditionary warriors.”¹³⁴ In this author’s opinion, it is this motivation, innovation, and agility that will allow Western militaries to adjust our azimuth and “win at counterinsurgency” during the prosecution of both current and future conflicts.

¹³⁴ James N. Mattis and Frank G. Hoffman, “Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars,” Proceedings (November 2005), 19.

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