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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES
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RESEARCH PROJECT
MASTERS OF DEFENCE STUDIES

**RECONSIDERING THE MINISTER'S DIRECTION THAT OFFICERS MUST HAVE
DEGREES PRIOR TO COMMISSIONING (MND 10)**

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La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale.

Abstract

In 1997, Minister Young announced a number of reforms that would prepare the CF for the challenges of the future and correct the errors of the past. One of these reforms was MND 10 which directed that all officers would have degrees prior to commissioning to instil a new ethos into the CF officer corps by improving its level of education. This reform was based on documents submitted to the minister for review and recommendations from experts within and outside of the CF. However, since 1997 the CF have continued to commission non-degreed officers under the Continuous Education Officer Training Plan (CEOTP) and the percentage of degreed officers has not improved significantly. Simply put, MND 10 has not been successful in its implementation nor has it been successful in achieving its intent. There are two main aims of this paper. First, it will show why it is possible to reconsider MND 10. This will be accomplished by conducting a comprehensive review of the documents available to the minister in 1997; presenting a contemporary debate regarding the merits of an educated officer corps; and reviewing how some of our allies deal with officer education and commissioning. These three studies will show that there is no concrete reason that would preclude the reconsideration of MND 10. The second main aim is to show why it is now essential to reconsider MND 10. Circumstances created by Generation Y and the Post Modern Military are contributing to the inability to recruit enough young officers through degreed commissioning programs such as DEO and ROTP. This has prompted the CMS and the CAS to request the permanent establishment of a non-degreed entry program to ensure a steady stream of new candidates. It is essential that MND 10 be reconsidered in order to allow for the development of a new CEOTP that meets the recruiting goals of the CF and the strategic intent articulated in *Officership 2020*.

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INTRODUCTION

“Leaders are born, not made. Just as BComms and MBA’s don’t make entrepreneurs, so Masters of war Studies or Masters of Strategic Studies don’t make war fighters. All the leadership training in the world is of no use in instilling leadership qualities in men and women who are not natural decision-makers and who do not also have personal charisma, the certainty of self, or the ability to evoke trust that are the essential ingredients for leadership of any sort. But once leaders have been identified and selected, then education is essential...”¹

Over the past twenty years the world within which the Canadian Department of National Defence operates has undergone significant transformation. Not since World War II or perhaps the Korean War have the Canadian Forces personnel, Army, Navy and Air Force, experienced such a high tempo of operations. Deployments included traditional peacekeeping operations such as those found in Cyprus and Israel and its neighbors, non-traditional and more volatile missions such as Bosnia and Somalia and warfighting missions in Afghanistan. The Canadian Forces has also been the subject of intense scrutiny particularly in the aftermath of the mission to Somalia and the subsequent Somalia Board of Inquiry. During this scrutiny it was determined that the Canadian Forces needed to undergo reforms to ensure that the mistakes that occurred in Somalia would not happen again. In short, it was believed that Canadians had lost confidence in its Armed Forces. In the following years several committees and advisory groups were established to ensure that the correct reforms were proposed and that they were implemented. Some of these committees include the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, The Minister’s Monitory Committee and the Minister’s Educational Advisory Board just to name a few. In 1996, the Minister of National Defence, The Honourable Doug Young, informed the Prime Minister of his intention to submit a report on the state of the Canadian

¹ Department of National Defence, *Educating Canada’s Military: Workshop Report* (Ottawa: Director of Recruiting, Education and Training, 7-8 December 1998), 27.

Forces by the end of March 1997.² This report would also include a number of reforms that would help address some of the challenges that the Canadian Forces were facing and restore the confidence of Canadians in their Armed Forces.

To assist him in this endeavour, the Minister made use of a number of reports and studies. They included a guidance document titled “Authority Responsibility and Accountability”, a paper entitled “Ethos and Values in the Canadian Forces”, a “Compendium of Changes in the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence,” a “Benchmark Study of the Armed Forces of Australia, Italy, The Netherlands, Sweden the United Kingdom and Canada”, a “Comparative Study of Authority and Accountability in Six Democracies”, the reports of four academic experts (Bercusen, Granetstein, Legault, and Morton), “The Future of the Canadian Forces: Opinions from the Defence Community” (by Dr. Dimoff), and the “1994 Defence White Paper.”³ These resources would form the basis³ of his justification to propose 65 reforms that would be essential in preparing the Canadian Forces to meet the challenges of the future and rectify the shortcomings of the past.⁴ Many of these initiatives have been fully implemented and the Minister’s Monitoring Committee on Change has submitted regular reports on the progress of those that still remain outstanding. One of these initiatives, however, even after eight years, continues to be the focus of a considerable amount of effort and debate.

The Minister’s Tenth reform (this reform will be described as MND 10 throughout the paper) directs to: “Change policies beginning in 1997 to make a university degree a prerequisite to commissioning as an officer, with the only exceptions to be made for those commissioned

² The Minister of National Defence, “The Future of the Canadian Forces: Opinions from the Defence Community,” <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Minister/eng/letterPM/mndle97.html>; accessed 26 February 2005.

³ The Minister of National Defence, “The Future of the Canadian Forces: Opinions from the Defence Community,” <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Minister/eng/letterPM/mndle97.html>; accessed 26 February 2005

⁴ The Minister of National Defence, “Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces,” <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Minister/eng/pm/mndintroduction.html>; accessed 26 February 2005.

from the ranks.”⁵ The stated intent of this reform was to “improve officer development and to inculcate an ethos appropriate to the Canadian Forces.”⁶ The implied intent of MND 10 was to improve the level of education within the Canadian officer corps. Of all the papers and reports, listed previously, that the Minister had available to him to assist him with developing this reform, the reports submitted by the five academics appear to have been the most influential. All five academics highlight the importance of a broad based liberal education that form the foundation for the special knowledge and expertise that is required of an officer in a Nations Armed Forces. This paper does in fact agree with this conclusion. However, MND 10 only focuses on the new applicant and ignores the many non-degreed officers currently serving the Canadian Armed Forces. Since 1997 only slow progress has been made towards a degreed officer corps and the closure of a non-degreed entry program has created significant manning shortages in specific officer classifications. This paper will show that MND 10 has failed in its implementation in that since 1997 the Canadian Forces has consistently continued to use a non-degreed officer entry scheme to meet its recruiting needs and it has failed in its intent in that the amount of degreed officers in specific MOCs has not significantly increased. MND 10 is not working and must be reviewed in order to permit the establishment of a new Continuous Education Officer Training Plan (CEOTP) that focuses on continuous learning, caters to all officers in the Canadian Forces that do not have degrees and permits a non-degree entry scheme that will provide the flexibility needed to meet recruiting goals. This is not to say that the Canadian Forces should abandon DEO and ROTP recruiting. It is also not to say that Minister

⁵ The Minister of National Defence, “Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces,” <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Minister/eng/pm/mndintroduction.html>; accessed 26 February 2005.

⁶ The Minister of National Defence, “Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces,” <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Minister/eng/pm/mndintroduction.html>; accessed 26 February 2005

Young made a terrible mistake. He made use of all the information and time that was available to him and realizing that decisive action was necessary to prepare for the future made his decision. However, with the benefit of additional time and information it becomes clear that it is now necessary to establish an approved non-degree commissioning program that complements current DEO and ROTP programs and provides the flexibility to meet recruiting goals and ensures that the intent of a better-educated officer corps is attained. The current ad-hoc nature of CEOTP enrolment does not provide the Canadian Forces with enough flexibility to meet the recruiting, training and education challenges of the future.

This paper is organized to provide two main points of view. The first is a look at why it is “possible” to reconsider MND 10. This is done in the first three parts of the paper through a study of those documents the minister had available to him in 1997, a contemporary debate regarding officer education and a detailed analysis of how some of our closest allies deal with officer education. The second point of view looks at why it is “essential” to reconsider MND 10. This fourth and final part provides the bulk of the substantiation for the thesis. Although the introduction of key arguments in the final part of the paper might catch some readers off guard, this was done deliberately in order to ensure a base of understanding and context for the reader.

As mentioned previously, the first part involves a re-evaluation of the supporting documents that Minister Young used to substantiate his reforms. Specifically the paper will review in detail the reports submitted by Rowley⁷, Granatstein, Morton, Bercusen, Legault and Dimoff. It will also review the benchmark study of some of our allies and how their Armed Forces operate. It must be understood that these papers dealt with a wide range of issues affecting the Armed Forces. The analysis provided here will focus only on the aspect of officer

⁷ Although the Rowley report was not part of the Minister’s submission in 1997, the 1969 report provides some excellent background to the discussion of officer development.

enrolment, education and development. This will allow a much more detailed study of the issue of officer education that was perhaps not possible in 1997 because of the vast number of issues that were discussed and the limited time that was available. It will attempt to answer why Minister Young established MND 10 in the first place and whether the supporting documents did indeed provide the required justification to implement this reform. What will be shown is that although a clear need to improve the level of education within the Canadian officer corps was identified, the method of how this was to be achieved, MND 10, was not substantiated.

The second part of the paper will then discuss the issue officer education in a more contemporary context. As previously stated, in 1997 Minister Young felt that in order to restore the confidence of the Canadian people in its armed forces a new ethos needed to be inculcated into the officer corps. This was to be done through higher education. However, the situation today is much different than it was in 1997. New technologies are being used on the battlefield and armies are facing more ambiguous missions that make swift and decisive military operations almost impossible to achieve. A high-tech, non-linear, non-contiguous battle space, with an unfamiliar and often unseen enemy, where actions are beamed instantaneously around the world by the media create a very complex operational environment that puts demands on our leaders that the military has never seen before. Some argue that today it is especially important that in order to prepare our leaders to operate in this ambiguous environment they must be exposed to higher education. However, there are also those that would challenge this intuitively appealing argument. This part of the paper will discuss contemporary arguments for and against a well educated officer corps. It will conclude that although the reasons for Minister Young's desire to improve the officer corps has been somewhat overcome by events, today's operational environment further highlights the need for a well educated officer corps. The emphasis is

however on continued education as one progresses in rank not the pursuit of a paper degree that might not be applicable.

One of the most common criticisms of the academics that provided reports to the minister was to say that our officer corps was extremely poorly educated when compared to our allies. Part III of this paper will provide a brief analysis of how officers are enrolled and educated in the United States, Great Britain and Australia to determine the validity of this claim. It will conclude that only the United States has a no degree, no commission policy and that the other two countries continue to maintain a non-degreed officer entry program. Therefore, to simply say that Canada needed to implement MND 10 to keep pace with its allies is somewhat misleading. Only the United States has a similar policy and the needs and demography of the United States are very different than Canada's. Aside from the United States, Canada's officers are on par or perhaps only slightly less educated than most of our allies. The situation is not as grave as that described by the academics.

The final and most important part of the paper will discuss four current issues that indicate why it is "essential" that MND 10 be reconsidered. First, the current CEOTP does not meet the strategic objectives of *Officership 2020*, but a new and improved CEOTP would not only support the Chief of Defence Staff's intent regarding continuous learning but create synergy with other programs that would improve the level of education within the officer corps. Second, progress towards a degreed officer corps has been slow and some supporters of officer education are disappointed in the "paper chase" that has resulted in efforts to receive a degree without gaining the critical thinking that comes with higher education. MND 10 focuses only on new applicants while there are still many serving officers that do not have degrees. A new initiative must be undertaken to increase the number of degreed officers in the Canadian Forces that

continues to embrace the intent of higher education and continuous learning. MND 10 and current policies are not enough. Third, neither the Chief of the Maritime Staff nor the Chief of the Air Staff are able to recruit enough officers through DEO and ROTP to meet the needs of specific MOCs. They are both requesting that CEOTP be re-activated in order to meet their requirements. Finally, the issue of the Post Modern Military and Generation Y are creating new personnel management and recruiting challenges that need to be addressed. A new centrally administered CEOTP needs to be created that meets the strategic intent of *Officership 2020*, includes all non-degreed officers in the Canadian Forces, directs when and what should be studied to avoid “paper degrees” and provides the flexibility needed to enroll Generation Y recruits in a Post Modern Military environment.

In summary, this paper will show that in 1997 it was clear that something needed to be done to improve the level of education within the Canadian officer Corps and the Minister made the best decision possible given the information and time available. However, none of the supporting documents fully substantiates the extreme nature of the MND 10 reform. It will also show that although the reasons for an educated officer corps have changed since 1997, the current operational environment continues to demand that officers possess the sound judgment and critical thinking that comes with formal education. Third, this paper will show that when compared to our allies, less the United States, our level of education is not as poor as has been suggested in the past. Both the UK and Australia continue to have a non-degreed officer entry program to meet their recruiting needs. Both clearly value education but neither will limit their flexibility to continue to enroll non-degreed officers if required. Finally, this paper identifies four issues that all indicate why it is essential that MND 10 be reconsidered in order to allow the creation of a new CEOTP that could have a dramatic impact on improving education within the

Canadian Forces while still providing the flexibility needed to meet recruiting goals. Education is critical. What needs to be done is to find a way to achieve this through a re-worked CEOTP that meets the intent of an educated officer Corps while still meeting the requirements of the service.

PART I: THE MINISTER'S DOCUMENTS

The confidence of Canadians in the Forces has been shaken. To make matters worse, our response to these events has been less than adequate.⁸

Introduction

The idea of a degreed officer corps for the Canadian Forces is not a new one nor is Canada alone in its efforts to achieve this. In fact the Prussian Army was the first military force that made a firm commitment to the idea of an educated officer corps when they made it mandatory for officers to attend a period of intensive study before being appointed to a senior military post.⁹ Huntington had long ago stressed the importance of higher education stating that “professional education consists of two phases: the first imparting a broad, liberal, cultural background, and the second imparting the special skills and knowledge of the profession.”¹⁰ The requirement for a degree prior to commissioning embraces this notion. This part of the essay will look at the various reports that may have influenced the Minister in his decision to implement MND 10 including a brief discussion of the Rowley Report of 1969 that represents an earlier attempt to address the issue of officer professional development. It will review the reports submitted by four academics in 1997 at the time popularly referred to as “the four wise men.”(Granatstein, Morton, Legault and Bercusen). It must be stressed, however, that the Rowley Report is fundamentally different than the academic reports of 1997. The Rowley Report focuses specifically on officer development where as the academic reports of 1997 discuss a wide range of issues affecting the Canadian Forces of which officer development was

⁸ The Minister of National Defence, “Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces,” <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Minister/eng/pm/mndintroduction.html>; accessed 26 February 2005.

⁹ Martin van Creveld, *The Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance* (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 100.

¹⁰ Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, (Cambridge, Mass. : Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1964), 9.

only a small portion. The paper will then review “Opinions From the Defence Community” by Dr. Dimoff and finally the “Benchmark Study of the Armed Forces of Australia, Italy, The Netherlands, Sweden, The United Kingdom and Canada.” It is the aim of this part of the paper to attempt to determine whether the supporting documents provided the required justification to implement this reform. What will be shown is that although a clear need to improve the level of education within the Canadian officer corps was identified, the method of how this was to be achieved, MND 10, was not substantiated.

Rowley Report

On 16 October 1967, the Canadian Chief of Defence, General Jean Allard, authorized the appointment of an Officer Development Board with Major General Roger Rowley as chairman.¹¹ The Canadian Forces, then as it is today, was facing tremendous transformational challenges with the unification of the Armed Services starting to appear on the horizon. The aim of the report, which became popularly known as the “Rowley Report” was to present the details of an officer development system that would prepare the Officer Corps to lead the Canadian Forces into the future.¹² Not surprisingly, one of the first recommendations of the Rowley Report stressed “a university degree as an essential requirement for a commission.”¹³ Rowley understood that higher education would provide the graduate with the ability to “acquire knowledge, to analyze and to understand.”¹⁴ Understanding that these skills are critical for a successful military career, this recommendation was widely accepted throughout the Canadian Forces, but ROTP and DEO enrolments in the late 1960s and early 1970s were not capable of

¹¹ George Stanley, “Military Education in Canada: 1867-1970,” in *The Canadian Military: A Profile*, ed. Hector J. Massey, 169-196 (Toronto: The Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1972), 193.

¹² Department of National Defence. *Report of the Officer Development Board (The Rowley Report)*. Ottawa: Chief of Defence Staff, 1969. 1.

¹³ George Stanley, “Military Education in Canada: 1867-1970,” in *The Canadian Military: A Profile*, ed. Hector J. Massey, 169-196 (Toronto: The Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1972), 194.

meeting this goal. As a result, in 1972 only 33% of commissioned officers held degrees.¹⁵ This report makes it clear that the idea of a degreed Canadian officer corps is not a new one. Rowley very clearly articulated the need for higher education and it must have been a great disappointment to him and to other supporters of his reforms to see the limited impact his report had on the number of degreed officers in 1972. Perhaps MND 10 was a way for Minister Young to ensure that his report would have a direct and immediate impact. Perhaps he wanted to be sure that the inability to institute reforms in 1969 would occur again in 1997.

The Legault Report

The Legault report identified that “The level of education in the Armed Forces is particularly lacking within the framework of a democracy that thinks of itself as a model or example within the Western world. In Canada, 53.3 per cent of our officers have a bachelor's degree, and 6.8 per cent a higher university degree (master's degree or doctorate).”¹⁶ Legault rightly identifies the lack of education within the Canadian Forces Officer Corps as a significant shortcoming. However, he does not specifically recommend that an MND 10 type policy be implemented. In fact, the only specific recommendation that he makes pertaining to officer education is his Recommendation 13 which states that: “Officer Cadet training time at the military colleges be reduced from 4 to 3 years, while the authorities should agree on provision of equivalent courses at civilian universities for up to 35 or 40 per cent of the content of their training.”¹⁷ The intention of this recommendation was to improve the level of education within the Officer Corps and to mitigate the “break between civilian society and military society” which

¹⁴ Major Reid McBride, “Do Officers Need Degrees” (Toronto: Canadian Forces College Command and Staff Course New Horizons Paper, 2003), 5.

¹⁵ George Stanley, “Military Education in Canada: 1867-1970,” in *The Canadian Military: A Profile*, ed. Hector J. Massey, 169-196 (Toronto: The Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1972), 193.

¹⁶ The Minister of National Defence, “The Legault Report,” http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Minister/eng/Legault/Legault_two_e.htm; accessed 23 February 2005.

he described as “deplorable.”¹⁸ In other words, Legault identified the need to improve the level of education within the officer corps but did not suggest the implementation of a no degree, no commission policy.

The Granatstein Report

Supporting Legault’s view of a lack of formal education among Canadian Officers, Dr. Granatstein stated that: “The CF has a remarkably ill-educated officer corps, surely one of the worst in the Western world... Almost a quarter of the officer corps has only high school education.”¹⁹ Specifically he suggested that: “The CF must move with vigour to ensure that ordinarily no one who has not been exposed--successfully--to higher education can become a regular force officer.”²⁰ What is also worth noting is that Dr. Granatstein identified another key problem that indirectly affects the Canadian Officer Corps. He stated that: “The single most serious problem faced by the CF is that the "politically correct" and safe way of doing things is not the best way to prepare a military that can fight and win wars.”²¹ In his conclusion he makes the following recommendations:

- stability of CF strength and budgets
- a clear statement of the role(s) of the CF
- the creation of a CFHQ and a DM headquarters in Ottawa
- the retention of the regimental system
- making operational effectiveness the key element in every decision

¹⁷ The Minister of National Defence, “The Legault Report,” http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Minister/eng/Legault/Legault_two_e.htm; accessed 23 February 2005.

¹⁸ The Minister of National Defence, “The Legault Report,” http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Minister/eng/Legault/Legault_two_e.htm; accessed 23 February 2005.

¹⁹ The Minister of national Defence, “Granatstein Report,” <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Minister/eng/Granatstein/gra2engsecf.html#TOP>; accessed 23 February 2005.

²⁰ The Minister of national Defence, “Granatstein Report,” <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Minister/eng/Granatstein/gra2engsecf.html#TOP>; accessed 23 February 2005.

²¹ The Minister of national Defence, “Granatstein Report,” <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Minister/eng/Granatstein/gra2engsecf.html#TOP>; accessed 23 February 2005.

- reform of the promotion system and of the rank structure
- investigation, reform, and rationalization of the CF educational system.²²

It is clear that Dr. Granatstein saw the need to have a better-educated Officer Corps within the Canadian Forces but he used words like “ordinarily” when making statements regarding the need for a degree prior to a regular commission. He also stressed the importance of “operational effectiveness” over “political correctness” as they keys to every decision. Therefore, one might conclude that Dr. Granatstein would support a non-degreed officer entry program that continued to embrace the need for follow-on formal education in order to meet operational requirements.

The Bercusen Report

As with Dr. Granatstein and Dr. Legault, Dr. Bercusen is also very critical of the level of education within the Canadian Forces Officer Corps stating that: “The Canadian Forces may well have the highest percentage of commissioned officers without formal post-secondary education of any of the western allies... All officers should hold a university degree or its equivalent... All officers over the rank of brigadier general should hold a masters degree.”²³ It is clear that Dr. Bercusen feels that the Officer Corps needs to be better educated but he does not specifically state that officers need a degree prior to commissioning. In fact he goes on to say that:

“A program of inducements to recruits, such as credits towards a post-secondary education, should be offered after a specified period of service. Recruiters should make a special effort to recruit in the final year of high school. They should emphasize the job training possibilities that the Forces offer (a major reason why young men and women join), but never at the sacrifice of what soldiering is really all about - service to the nation, difficult challenges to overcome, unlimited liability. Professional advice should be sought from outside the military in how to "reach" Canada's bright and active young men and women. Recruits in both the regular forces and the reserves should initially be offered

²² The Minister of national Defence, “Granatstein Report,” <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Minister/eng/Granatstein/gra2engsecf.html#TOP>; accessed 23 February 2005.

²³ The Minister of National Defence, “Bercusen Report,” <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Minister/eng/Bercuson/Berc1E.htm>; accessed 23 February 2005.

short-term service contracts; those who do not measure up can then be easily removed before longer terms of employment are entered into.²⁴

Although he stresses the need for higher education, this statement does not imply the need for a degree prior to commission. On the contrary it might lead one to think that a period of service prior to a sponsored degree would be useful in order to release those “who do not measure up.” Adding further weight to this later educational investment is Dr. Bercusen’s Recommendation 11, which states that in order to overcome “this intellectual deficit, a Canadian Forces War College should be established as a centre of strategic thinking, teaching, and development.”²⁵ Through this recommendation, Dr Bercusen identifies those of much higher rank as having an “intellectual deficit.”²⁶ Dr. Bercusen does not make a specific recommendation that a degree should be obtained prior to commissioning.

The Morton Report

In his report Dr. Morton stated that, “Operations on land, sea and air are not identical and one-size-fits-all training and personnel policies have been frustrating.”²⁷ Through this statement he clearly identified the need for flexible policies that are able to meet the needs of the service. Perhaps he would be critical of MND 10 as one of those “one-size-fits-all” policies. It certainly is a blanket policy that does not take into account the individual needs of the services and branches. As with the other academics Dr. Morton also emphasizes the importance of a well educated officer corps but only one of his 19 recommendations deals specifically with officer

²⁴ The Minister of National Defence, “Bercusen Report,” <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Minister/eng/Bercuson/Berc1E.htm>; accessed 23 February 2005.

²⁵ The Minister of National Defence, “Bercusen Report,” <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Minister/eng/Bercuson/Berc1E.htm>; accessed 23 February 2005.

²⁶ The Minister of National Defence, “Bercusen Report,” <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Minister/eng/Bercuson/Berc1E.htm>; accessed 23 February 2005

²⁷ The Minister of national Defence, “The Morton Report,” <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Minister/eng/Morton/MORTON1e.htm#introduction>; accessed 26 February 2005.

education. Recommendation 12 states that: "Future CF officers should have a university degree or equivalent."²⁸ He does not specifically state "prior to commissioning" in his recommendation which leaves scope for a non-degreed entry scheme that would embrace continued education throughout one's career. Through his identification of the need to improve the level of education within the officer Corps he also implied the need to balance education and the needs of the services. He also allowed for a great deal of flexibility in the implementation of this reform by stating "university degree or equivalent." This statement emphasizes the importance of learning and education and de-emphasizes the need for a degree; which is the focus of MND 10.

The Dimoff Report

The "Opinions From the Defence Community" report by Dr. Dimoff indicated that the consensus was that there was no "quick and easy" solution to the Canadian Military's problems. Many cautioned against "overreaction."²⁹ Improvements needed to be made to the system of selection, education, training and promotion of officers where they could be trained for their specific military occupation and have an education that included knowledge of leadership management, finance, history and the social sciences. The system must also reinforce truth, duty, valour, loyalty, courage and integrity.³⁰ Based on these comments, one might consider that MND 10 was an effort to achieve a "quick and easy" solution and perhaps was even an

²⁸ The Minister of national Defence, "The Morton Report," <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Minister/eng/Morton/MORTON1e.htm#introduction>; accessed 26 February 2005.

²⁹ The Minister of National Defence, "Opinions of the Defence Community By Thomas Dimoff," http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Minister/eng/Dimoff/Dimoff_e.htm; accessed 27 February 2005.

“overreaction” that the report cautioned against. Dr. Dimoff, clearly identified the need to improve the level of education within the officer corps but also stressed the importance of developing carefully considered reforms and means of implementing them that meet the needs of the service. It is clear that these opinions from the defence community saw the danger that was lurking in the corners during this very sensitive period. It was essential that reforms be implemented. It was also essential that time and consideration be taken to ensure that the right reforms were developed. Minister Young had only a very short period of time in which to consider his reforms and perhaps MND 10 was a “quick and easy” way to address officer education and that today, in hind sight, one might even consider it an “over reaction.”

Benchmark Study

The countries examined in *The Benchmark Study of The Armed Forces of Australia, Italy, The Netherlands, Sweden, The United Kingdom and Canada* will now be discussed. Australia and the United Kingdom will not be discussed because they will be studied in detail later in Part III of the paper. The paper showed that in Italy, Military education begins at one of the three service military academies where over 80% of officers enter following high school where they are offered a two-year academic and military program. Graduates then go on to various classification schools for two more years of specialty training, which is followed by one year of special courses and on-the-job training. At that stage, five years have elapsed since they began their military careers. Since a large percentage (up to 75% in certain branches) continue with one more year of education at a civilian university towards a degree, many officers do not receive

³⁰ The Minister of National Defence, “Opinions of the Defence Community By Thomas Dimoff,” http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Minister/eng/Dimoff/Dimoff_e.htm; accessed 27 February 2005.

their first posting to a unit until more than six years after enrolment.³¹ In The Netherlands, officer training is accomplished through two programs, depending upon the educational background of the candidate. A four-year "A" program at either the Royal Military Academy (for army and air force members) or the naval academy which prepares its graduates for a full range of military duties, while the "B" program is aimed at the lower levels of command, preparing officers for positions as company commanders or military school instructors.³² In Sweden Military education is exactly that -- no civilian academic courses are offered. Officers who are engineers and medical doctors have university degrees; very few others have a formal university-level education.³³

So what can be learned from our allies regarding officer education. First, in Italy a great deal of time is spent at the various military academies but only "up to" 75% of the officers go on to get their degrees. Second, in the Netherlands there are two streams: those with degrees and those without. Third, Sweden places almost no emphasis on higher education for its officer corps and only specialists need degrees. Finally, neither Italy nor The Netherlands nor Sweden has a no-degree, no-commission policy. Therefore these allies all have non-degreed officers employed in their armed forces and continue to use a non-degreed officer entry program. This discussion of these three countries and their approach to officer education does not support the claim made buy the various academics that the Canadian officer corps is one of the most poorly

³¹ The Minister of National Defence, "Benchmark Study of the Armed Forces of Australia, Italy, The Netherlands, Sweden the United Kingdom and Canada", http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Minister/eng/benchmark/bench_e.htm; accessed 26 February 2005.

³² The Minister of National Defence, "Benchmark Study of the Armed Forces of Australia, Italy, The Netherlands, Sweden the United Kingdom and Canada", http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Minister/eng/benchmark/bench_e.htm; accessed 26 February 2005.

³³ The Minister of National Defence, "Benchmark Study of the Armed Forces of Australia, Italy, The Netherlands, Sweden the United Kingdom and Canada", http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Minister/eng/benchmark/bench_e.htm; accessed 26 February 2005.

educated in the world. Comparing Canada to these allies would not necessitate the implementation of MND 10 in order to keep up.

Conclusion

All the reports support the notion that the level of education within the Canadian Officer Corps needs to be improved but none offer a solution on how to achieve this. None of the papers stated specifically that a degree was required prior to commissioning in the way that MND 10 does but it could be understood how the minister implied this to be their intent. The benchmark study of the Armed Forces of some of our allies was also very enlightening. The Armed Forces of Italy and the Netherlands clearly make provisions for the higher education of its officer corps but Sweden, in contrast, pays education almost no attention. It should also be noted that none of these Armed Forces have an MND 10 policy in place and all continue to maintain a non-degreed officer enrolment plan to ensure the flexibility needed to attain recruiting goals.

The reports described in this part of the paper provide a summary of the information that Minister Young had available to him to assist him in making his reforms that would restore “the confidence of Canadians in the Forces.” It is clear that all of the reports identify the need to improve the level of education within the Officer Corps. It is also clear that neither the academic reports nor the country studies recommend a policy as restrictive as MND 10. In fact some of them caution “over reaction” and the implementation of just such a reform. Why did the Minister’s reforms include this policy without a firm understanding of the impacts that it would have on the future of the Canadian Forces? This remains unclear. Vice-Admiral (Retd) Mason a member of the Minister’s Educational Advisory Board suggests that: “The origin of the Degreed Officer Corps policy, in the post 1996 world, was the widespread deduction by external

observers that leadership problems experienced had mostly to do with the low educational standard of the Officer Corps.”³⁴ If true, is MND 10 really the best way to address this problem? Another factor was the relatively short period between the submission of these reports and the publication of the minister’s reforms. Hardly a few weeks went by giving experts within the Department of National Defence very little time to review the recommendations. It was clear that the Canadian public demanded quick results but perhaps the Minister did not realize the full impact of MND 10 nor did he want to see his report fall on deaf ears like the Rowley Report did before. However what can be deduced from this analysis is that the need to improve the level of education within the Canadian officer corps was clearly identified. What was not fully discussed or considered was the method of how this was to be achieved.

³⁴ Vadm (Ret) Mason, *Lack of Air Ops Recruits* (Email to VAdm Jarvis 1 November 2004).

PART II – DO OFFICERS NEED DEGREES?

Skills are not enough. The job calls for judgment, that odd distillate of education, the thing which is left when the memorized facts have either fled or been smoothed into a point of view, the thing that cannot be taught directly, but which must be learned.³⁵

The present system, under which very large numbers of officers are encouraged, even pressured, into taking advanced degrees in all kinds of probable and improbable fields is, militarily speaking, quite useless.³⁶

Introduction

In the previous section the paper attempted to determine what was the basis upon which the Minister made his decision to implement MND10. It became clear that the over-arching goal of all his reforms was to restore the confidence of Canadians in its armed forces.³⁷ In order to do this he felt that specific to the professional development of the Canadian officer corps it was necessary to “improve officer development and to inculcate an ethos appropriate to the Canadian Forces.”³⁸ This was to be done by MND 10 which states: “Change policies beginning in 1997 to make a university degree a prerequisite to commissioning as an officer, with the only exceptions to be made for those commissioned from the ranks.”³⁹ It is now worthwhile to revisit the issue of officer education from a more contemporary point of view. Even eight years after the Minister published his reforms, there continues to be a heated debate regarding the merit of a degreed officer corps. One side argues strongly that because of the increased use of new

³⁵Dr. John Scott Cowan, “RMC and the Profession of Arms: Looking Ahead at Canada’s Military University,” *Canadian Military Journal* 2, no 3 (Autumn 2001): 8.

³⁶Martin van Creveld, *The Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance* (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 105.

³⁷The Minister of National Defence, “Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces,” <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Minister/eng/pm/mndintroduction.html>; accessed 26 February 2005.

³⁸The Minister of National Defence, “Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces,” <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Minister/eng/pm/mndintroduction.html>; accessed 26 February 2005.

technologies and the increasing complexity of recent military operations, higher education is an essential element for the successful commander. Others are more critical and might even suggest that a degree could hinder a junior leader in the accomplishment of his missions. Specifically, Martin van Creveld has suggested that, “The effect of academic education on military effectiveness, by which I mean the ability to fight and win a war, has almost certainly been negligible.”⁴⁰ This part of the paper will discuss each of these points of view in turn. It will conclude that although the Minister’s original goal of “inculcating an ethos appropriate to the Canadian Forces” has been overcome by events, the need for continuous education through all rank levels is more important now than ever before in order to foster critical thinking and sound judgment.

Officers Need Degrees

In the past four years three papers were published that argued very strongly for an educated officer corps. They were *So What’s in a Degree*⁴¹ by Colonel Wakeman who is the director of professional development at the Canadian Defence Academy; *RMC and the Profession of Arms: Looking Ahead at Canada’s Military University*⁴² by Dr Scott Cowan who is the principal at the Royal Military College; and *Do Officers Need Degrees*⁴³ by Major Reid McBride who, in 2003, was a student at the Canadian Forces College. It is very worthwhile to look at these three articles in particular because they maintain a common theme even though they represent three distinct groups. Colonel Wakeman represents the higher military policy point of

³⁹ The Minister of National Defence, “Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces,” <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Minister/eng/pm/mndintroduction.html>; accessed 26 February 2005.

⁴⁰ Martin van Creveld, *The Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance* (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 102.

⁴¹ Colonel R.T. Wakeman, “So What’s in a Degree?” *Canadian Military Journal* 4, no 2 (Summer 2003).

⁴² Dr. John Scott Cowan, “RMC and the Profession of Arms: Looking Ahead at Canada’s Military University,” *Canadian Military Journal* 2, no 3 (Autumn 2001).

view, Dr. Cowan represents the civilian academic policy point of view and Major McBride represents the view from those that actually have to put policy into action. A common message from these three distinct groups further enhances the importance of their message.

In his article, Colonel Wakeman looked at the benefit of a degree from two different points of view. First, from a social science point of view he identified that having a degree improved one's "social credibility."⁴⁴ Specifically he stated that: "The Bachelor's degree serves as a recognized credential of the level of intellectual ability that society expects of its professionals. MND 10 formalizes that expectation for the CF."⁴⁵ Secondly, he argued that a degree enhanced the ability of leaders to make sound decisions. He suggested that it is best to have an understanding of a broad range of theories that can serve as a guide when faced with unfamiliar circumstances. This broad knowledge becomes necessary when the narrow focus of professional training is not enough; when sound judgment is particularly necessary. He went on to conclude that this broad knowledge was normally accomplished through a degree.⁴⁶ It is clear that Colonel Wakeman is an ardent supporter of MND 10. He recognized the continued debate over a degreed officer corps but firmly concluded that officers do need degrees and that "The time for debate is over."⁴⁷

Dr. Cowan is also an ardent supporter of a well educated officer corps and that sound judgment is built upon education.

The remarkable acceleration of technological change and the growth of knowledge have the potential to be a vast multiplier of the effectiveness of a numerically small force.

⁴³ Major Reid McBride, "Do Officers Need Degrees" (Toronto: Canadian Forces College Command and Staff Course New Horizons Paper, 2003).

⁴⁴ Colonel R.T. Wakeman, "So What's in a Degree?" *Canadian Military Journal* 4, no 2 (Summer 2003): 2.

⁴⁵ Colonel R.T. Wakeman, "So What's in a Degree?" *Canadian Military Journal* 4, no 2 (Summer 2003): 4.

⁴⁶ Colonel R.T. Wakeman, "So What's in a Degree?" *Canadian Military Journal* 4, no 2 (Summer 2003): 2.

⁴⁷ Colonel R.T. Wakeman, "So What's in a Degree?" *Canadian Military Journal* 4, no 2 (Summer 2003): 4.

This is part of the RMA. But it also amplifies the need for complexity of thought and maturity of judgment to avert catastrophe, and drives that requirement further down the chain of command than ever before. Complexity of thought and maturity of judgment are the product of strong education, and its application to the interpretation of experience.⁴⁸

There are three key elements to Dr. Cowan argument. First, is that the technologically driven Revolution of Military Affairs amplifies the need for “complexity of thought and maturity of judgment.” Second, is that this is derived from “a strong education.” Finally, that failure to recognize this relationship will result in “catastrophe.” Dr. Cowan also made the important distinction between education and training: training focuses on improving skills; education focuses on improving judgment.

Today when a young officer may be called upon to be a skilled leader, a technical expert, a diplomat, a warrior, and even an interpreter and an aid expert, all at once, there is no question that good training is not enough. Skills are not enough. The job calls for judgment, that odd distillate of education, the thing which is left when the memorized facts have either fled or been smoothed into a point of view, the thing that cannot be taught directly, but which must be learned. Without the mature judgment which flows from education, we fall back on reflexes, which are damned fine things for handling known challenges, but which are manifestly unreliable when faced with new ones.⁴⁹

Major McBride mirrored Dr Cowan’s conclusion stating that “good training is no longer enough. Faced with situations that can often have strategic consequences, our officers need good judgment. This judgment comes from the mental flexibility and strength that a solid, broadly based university education can impart.”⁵⁰ The Educational Advisory Board to the Minister of National Defence synthesizes all three points of view by stating that “The RMA as well as higher societal expectations of the nation’s military leaders are the two key drivers behind the CF’s

⁴⁸ Dr. John Scott Cowan, “RMC and the Profession of Arms: Looking Ahead at Canada’s Military University,” *Canadian Military Journal* 2, no 3 (Autumn 2001): 6.

⁴⁹Dr. John Scott Cowan, “RMC and the Profession of Arms: Looking Ahead at Canada’s Military University,” *Canadian Military Journal* 2, no 3 (Autumn 2001): 8.

⁵⁰ Major Reid McBride, “Do Officers Need Degrees” (Toronto: Canadian Forces College Command and Staff Course New Horizons Paper, 2003), 12

investment in the cognitive development and improved critical thinking skills of its leadership.⁵¹ However, it must be recognized that higher education cannot be viewed as a panacea to creating superior leaders. As Colonel Wakeman himself suggested: “Having a university degree is not a guarantee that someone will be able to deal with complex situations effectively but post-secondary education does offer the opportunity to develop intellectual skills that can be of use on modern operations.⁵² It should also be noted that the higher in rank and position one goes the more complex circumstances become. As one climbs the ladder of responsibility within the organization, conceptual skills become more important and technical skills become less important.⁵³ Therefore, it can be concluded that as a result of demands being made by Canadian Society, increasing use of technology and complex and ambiguous missions, it is essential that higher education form a critical component of each level of officer professional development.

Officers Do Not Need Degrees

Although the majority of articles written on officer professional development support the idea of a highly educated officer corps there are those that provide some counter arguments. Martin van Creveld has suggested that some evidence has shown that “an early college education, with its heavy emphasis on theoretical work and written skill, can actually be harmful to junior commanders whose job, after all, is to lead men in combat.”⁵⁴ Although he does not go on to explain why this would be the case some research on the matter has been conducted. In 1992 the Canadian Forces Personnel Applied Research Unit reported that although initially it was believed that the more intelligent the leader, the more effective that leader would be, it was

⁵¹ Minister of National Defence Education Advisory Board Background Notes, *Briefing Note: Officer Professional Development in the CF*, 3 February 2004.

⁵² Colonel R.T. Wakeman, “So What’s in a Degree?” *Canadian Military Journal* 4, no 2 (Summer 2003): 1.

⁵³ John D. Kovacheff, Gregory Irving, Sharon E. Agar, and John P. Meyer, Ph.D., *Leadership Theory, Measurement and Implications for Officer Selection*, Technical Note prepared by Canadian Forces Personnel Applied Research Unit (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1992), 29

found that individuals that were extremely intelligent were less successful. To help explain why this occurred they concluded that some leaders who were much more intelligent than their subordinates had difficulties in communicating their intent to them.⁵⁵ It was stressed, however, that this occurred only when there were extreme differences in the levels of intelligence between the leader and the followers.

Touching on the social sciences aspect of the issue Martin van Creveld cynically explained the emphasis on higher education by stating that:

A long peace, often coupled with a surplus of medium-ranking officers, also led to a very great expansion of the staff college system, which now took in a much larger percentage of officers destined for much lower posts than formerly. The normal justification behind this growth was that war had become so much more complex. The real explanation is probably that peacetime armed forces in most countries no longer enjoy the same social prestige...⁵⁶

This provides a very different point of view than Colonel Wakeman, Dr. Cowan and Major McBride. However, there are two major flaws in his argument. First, is the fact that war has become much more complex. One must remember that van Creveld's book was published in 1990 and that many global changes have occurred in the past fifteen years. It is unlikely that van Creveld would have foresaw two major operations in Iraq and a global war on terror which began with terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and coalition operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. The world is much more complex and along with a more complex world came more complex conflicts. Second, in Canada, it is not a question of the military improving social prestige through higher education as suggested by van Creveld. It is Canadian

⁵⁴Martin van Creveld, *The Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance* (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 4.

⁵⁵ John D. Kovacheff, Gregory Irving, Sharon E. Agar, and John P. Meyer, Ph.D., *Leadership Theory, Measurement and Implications for Officer Selection*, Technical Note prepared by Canadian Forces Personnel Applied Research Unit (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1992), 27.

society that is demanding a better educated officer corps. This was shown clearly by Minister Young who represented our government, which represented our society when they demanded, through MND 10, that all officers shall have degrees.

Conclusion

Do officers need degrees? In 1997 the Minister felt that officers needed degrees in order to inculcate an ethos appropriate to the Canadian Forces. Today, Dr. Cowan, Colonel Wakeman, Major McBride and the Minister's Education Advisory Board feel that higher education is necessary because society expects it, technology requires it and the judgment necessary for today's complex conflicts is a product of it. The counter arguments provided by van Creveld are dated and are no longer applicable in today's world. Officers do need higher education. However, it must be stressed that in all the arguments it is higher education that brings forward critical thinking and sound judgment that is the key. It must also be stressed that the more senior the leadership position the more complex the circumstances and the more judgment required. It has been shown that all levels of command need to be exposed to education to improve critical thinking and sound judgment. It is clear that although the reasons for Minister Young's desire to improve the officer corps has been somewhat overcome by events, today's operational environment further highlights the need for a well educated officer corps. The emphasis is however on continued education as officers progress in rank not the pursuit of a paper degree that is not applicable. How much education is required? This has not been clearly identified. MND 10 has set the bar at second-lieutenant shall have a bachelors degree. Why? If more education is required the higher in rank one goes then would it not be appropriate to direct that

⁵⁶Martin van Creveld, *The Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance* (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 103

lieutenant-colonels shall have a post graduate degree? To take this line of thought down the chain of command should senior non-commissioned members have college diplomas? If not, why? The bottom line is that education is important at all levels of command for the reasons listed above. What is not clear is what levels of education are required for each level of command. This remains open for debate. This allows for scope to re-open a non-degreed officer entry program that embraces continued education that fosters critical thinking and sound judgment as its central theme.

PART III – ALLIED PERSPECTIVE ON OFFICER EDUCATION

Introduction

A common theme found throughout the academic reports upon which the Minister based his reforms was the idea that Canada was lagging far behind its allies in terms of officer education. Although a brief analysis of some of Canada's allies was conducted as part of the *Benchmark Study of the Armed Forces of Australia, Italy, The Netherlands, Sweden, The United Kingdom and Canada*, it is important to look at how Canada's allies educate their officers today in greater depth. This is necessary because eight years have passed since 1997 and a great deal has changed. Second there appears to have been an inconsistency between what the benchmark study stated and what was stated by the other reports when comparing the education of Canada's officer corps to that of its allies. It is the aim of this part of the paper to determine if it is true that "Compared to our allies, our officer corps is not as well educated. Compared to the US especially."⁵⁷ and "The CF has a remarkably ill-educated officer corps, surely one of the worst in the Western world."⁵⁸ What will in fact be shown is that Canada is not lagging far behind its allies when it comes to officer education and that only the United States and Canada currently have a no-degree, no-commission policy and one of the main reasons for the existence of this policy in the United States is a result circumstances that are not relevant in Canada. The United States, The United Kingdom and Australia have been chosen because under the ABCA agreements one could argue that they are our closest allies. Each nation is dealing with officer education and enrolment in different ways that perhaps Canada can learn from.

The United States

⁵⁷ Department of National Defence, *Educating Canada's Military: Workshop Report* (Ottawa: Director of Recruiting, Education and Training, 7-8 December 1998), iii.

The United States Navy⁵⁹, Army⁶⁰ and Air Force⁶¹ have almost identical enrolment plans. ROTC continues to provide the majority of entrants and is considered “one of the most cost effective methods of commissioning officers.”⁶² ROTC provides college students the ability to train to become officers by taking elective courses on leadership and military subjects that help prepare them to lead subordinates once they finish their training and attain their university degree.⁶³ Officer Candidate School (OCS) is a second officer entry plan where after completing an Officer Basic Course, candidates move on to classification specific training. In order to attend Officer Candidate School, applicants must be a college graduate with a four-year degree or higher.⁶⁴ The third officer enrolment program is attendance at one of the United States service academies where upon completion of a four year degree program officers are awarded their commissions.⁶⁵ The fourth and final officer entry plan is Direct Commission Officer. Each professional branch has its own officer training program that allows civilian degreed professionals to apply to receive a direct commission in their career field.⁶⁶ Currently in the United States it is not possible to be a commissioned officer without a degree.

It has been suggested that the United States has perhaps come the furthest in pursuing a degreed officer corps. The main reasons for this were “the spread of higher education after

⁵⁸The Minister of national Defence, “Granatstein Report,” <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Minister/eng/Granatstein/gra2engsecf.html#TOP>; accessed 23 February 2005.

⁵⁹ United States Navy, “Careers: Officer,” <http://www.navy.com/officer>; accessed 1 March 2005.

⁶⁰ Go Army, “About the Army: Officer,” <http://www.goarmy.com/about/officer.jsp>; accessed 1 March 2005.

⁶¹ United States Air Force, “Air Force Link: Careers,” <http://www.af.mil/careers/>; accessed 1 March 2005.

⁶² Hugh Smith, “Officer Education and the “Military After Next”: A Response to the Price Report” (Cambria: Australian Defense Studies Centre, December 1995), 11.

⁶³ Go Army, “About the Army: Officer,” <http://www.goarmy.com/about/officer.jsp>; accessed 1 March 2005.

⁶⁴ Go Army, “About the Army: Officer,” <http://www.goarmy.com/about/officer.jsp>; accessed 1 March 2005.

⁶⁵ Go Army, “About the Army: Officer,” <http://www.goarmy.com/about/officer.jsp>; accessed 1 March 2005.

World War II, the impact of Nuclear Weapons, the need to broaden minds, integrate the military into society, prevent militarism, and keep up with technological change.”⁶⁷ All of these factors are equally important when placed in a Canadian context. However, another contributing factor is that a degree will help the officer find a second career as a result of the “up or out” system that exists in the United States.⁶⁸ In the United States it is critical that officers who are released from their Armed Services are able to continue to contribute in the work force. Having a degree is a key element in being able to accomplish this. In Canada this is not as essential because military terms of service are very different. Most Canadian officers who choose to remain in the Canadian Forces and continue to contribute to the needs of the service, regardless of how many years they remain in rank, can do so and are not required to re-enter the work force. Many officers in the United States Armed Services are not able to do the same and once promotions are no longer forthcoming must retire.

Very recently two new developments have occurred in the United States regarding officer education. On 6 November 2002 the United States Air Force Chief of Staff, General John P. Jumper, expressed dissatisfaction with the current “square filling” education programs and policies found within the United States Air Force.⁶⁹ By “square filling” he means that in order to be promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel officers needed to pursue post-graduate degrees regardless of the applicability or quality of the degree. A post-graduate degree had become a “tick-in-the-box” for promotion and had lost the spirit of what higher education has to offer: complex thought and improved judgment. Under a new system of professional development

⁶⁶ United States Army, “About the Army: Officer,” <http://www.goarmy.com/about/officer.jsp>; accessed 1 March 2005.

⁶⁷ Martin van Creveld, *The Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance* (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 102

⁶⁸ Martin van Creveld, *The Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance* (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 102.

General Jumper stated that if the Air Force needed certain officers to obtain specific Advanced Degrees then the Air Force would send them.⁷⁰ This would prevent officers from working towards irrelevant advanced degrees that do not support Air Force objectives and then getting credit for them at command or promotion boards. Specifically General Jumper went on to say that:

Scientists and engineers will be competitive for promotion based on their skills, their advanced technical degrees, and their proven capability to publish and mentor. Pilots will not require an advanced degree in order to be competitive for promotion to lieutenant-colonel. Their promotion will depend on their ability to sustain the highest levels of qualification such as mission lead or instructor pilot.⁷¹

He makes it very clear that “it is time for a new way of thinking.”⁷² In a second letter dated 2 February 2005 he put this new way of thinking into practice when he directed that beginning in January 2005 all academic education information would be removed from all promotion boards up to the rank of Colonel.⁷³ What does this mean? Some suggest that this will prevent officers from getting credit for pursuing irrelevant degrees while rewarding those officers that perform well because they have pursued a degree that actually assists them in the performance of their duties.⁷⁴ There is concern, among advocates of higher education, that this will add to the argument that advanced degrees are no longer required. What this policy change does do is emphasize the importance of avoiding “square filling” policies and not losing sight of what higher education really has to offer. Perhaps MND 10 is one of these “square filling” policies that needs to be reconsidered?

⁶⁹ General John P. Jumper, “Total Force Development,” *Chief’s Sight Picture*, 6 November 2002.

⁷⁰ General John P. Jumper, “Total Force Development,” *Chief’s Sight Picture*, 6 November 2002

⁷¹ General John P. Jumper, “Total Force Development,” *Chief’s Sight Picture*, 6 November 2002

⁷² General John P. Jumper, “Total Force Development,” *Chief’s Sight Picture*, 6 November 2002

⁷³ General John P. Jumper, “Force Development: Changing the Education Mindset,” *Chief’s Sight Picture*, 2 February 2005.

⁷⁴ Foot, Dr. Peter, “Military Education Sought To Be Cut In Stress Period,” Email to LCol Frank 7 March 2005.

The second development was reported in the *Washington Times* on 23 February 2005 by Pamela Hess. In her article she reported that “the United States Secretary of Defence has asked the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide options for cutting back military officer education during ‘stress periods’ such as during the war in Iraq to allow greater numbers to be available for deployment.”⁷⁵ She also reported that 29 officers currently attending the Command and General Staff College Course would be withdrawn from their course in order to be available for deployment to Iraq with the 4th Infantry Division.⁷⁶ On 17 February 2005 Major General (retired) Robert Scales, who was a former commander of the Army War College, provided words of caution to those who would cut back on education within the armed services. He considers that “War is a thinking man’s game and only those who take time to study war are likely to fight it competently. Soldiers and Marines need time for reflection, time to learn, teach and write. In this new age of warfare we must do more to prepare soldiers to think as well as act.”⁷⁷

It is clear that the United States is entering a period where their operational tempo is so high that education programs are being reviewed to try and free up more officers for service overseas. Robert Scales’ concerns are abundantly clear but when education gets in the way of the ability to conduct operations something has to change: operations are reduced, education is reduced or the size of the force is increased. This could be seen as being very troubling from a Canadian point of view. Almost unanimously each of the academic reports discussed in Part I of this paper pointed to the United States as the leader in officer education whose example Canada should follow. Now the leader in officer education that Canada was seeking to emulate might

⁷⁵Pamela Hess, “Military Education Sought To Be Cut In ‘Stress Periods,’” *Washington Times*, 23 February 2005, 6.

⁷⁶ Pamela Hess, “Military Education Sought To Be Cut In ‘Stress Periods,’” *Washington Times*, 23 February 2005, 6.

⁷⁷ Robert Scales, “Studying The Art of War: Soldiers Need Time to Learn About Combat,” *Washington Times*, 17 February 2005, 19.

soon change its policies. What this means to Canada is that it should pursue military education policies that make sense to its own specific circumstances and not simply because our neighbor to the South is doing it.

The United Kingdom

Just as Canada wrestled with the issue of officer development in the 1960s with the Rowley report, so did the United Kingdom. The Howard-English Report in Great Britain, submitted in July 1966, suggested that the intellectual broadening of non-technical officers should occur through the establishment of a “Royal Defence Academy” in Shrivenham where recruits would spend two years in prior service and then be enrolled in a 1-3 year program. It proposed to separate academic study from purely military study by providing a 3 year break from military service to be devoted to education.⁷⁸ Similar to the Rowley report, the goal was to achieve a commissioned officer corps within the United Kingdom Military Services. Today we find that the three British service colleges for the most part do not grant degrees to its students. The granting of degrees is largely left to civilian universities that candidates attend prior to arriving at the service colleges. The Army’s military academy in Sandhurst is where most army officers attend a 44-week Commissioning Course, which provides a foundation of military knowledge and skills with the emphasis on leadership development.⁷⁹ In the Royal Air Force, candidates spend 24 weeks at the RAF Academy in Cranwell, developing leadership and

⁷⁸ P.H. Partridge, *Educating for the Profession of Arms*, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence no. 5 (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1969), 8-9.

⁷⁹ United Kingdom Army, “Army Jobs Officer,” http://www.army.mod.uk/careers/officer/td_sandhurst.html; accessed 1 March 2005.

management skills.⁸⁰ In the Royal Navy initial training takes place at Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth over a period of 28 to 49 weeks.⁸¹

This almost complete lack of a Canadian Type ROTP degree granting program is possible because currently almost 90% of candidates entering the three academies already have degrees. However, it should be stressed that even though such a high percentage of applicants have a university degree, the United Kingdom Navy, Army, and Air Force still maintain a non-degree entry program where each candidate is looked at on a case by case basis to determine the skills and experience they can offer.⁸² For the RAF, of the twenty officer classifications available for enrolment, only 9 required a degree (catering officer, dental officer, chaplain, engineer officer, legal officer, medical officer, nursing officer, physical education officer and training officer).⁸³ It is difficult to determine exactly how many officers in the United Kingdom armed services have degrees but as a result of a query submitted to the British Army Web Page a response of 85% was received.⁸⁴ What this shows is that the United Kingdom, like Canada, places a great deal of emphasis on officer education. The difference lies in the fact that the United Kingdom continues to maintain a non-degree commissioning program while MND-10 precludes it.

Australia

Australia exhibits many common themes found in Canadian history, society and defence. As a result of this similarity, Australia is an ideal allied country against which one can compare

⁸⁰ Royal Air Force, "The Big Picture," <http://www.rafcareers.com/yourmove/trainforlifeofficers.cfm>; accessed 1 March 2005.

⁸¹ Royal Navy, "Initial Officer Training at BRNC," <http://www.royal-navy.mod.uk/static/pages/2196.html>; accessed 1 March 2005.

⁸² United Kingdom Army, "Army Jobs Officer," http://www.army.mod.uk/careers/officer/entry_requirements.html#edreq; accessed 1 March 2005.

⁸³ Royal Air Force, "Job Selector," <http://www.rafcareers.com/jobselector/index.cfm?qualifications=&category=&rank=Officers&ranks=Go&start=11>; accessed 1 March 2005

military education. Similar to the reports submitted to Minister Young in 1997, in the early 1990s the Australian Department of Defence published the Price Report which was intended to stimulate debate in the Australian Community about the nature and purpose of future officer training.⁸⁵ Part of the reason why this review was required was because it was felt that not enough emphasis was being placed on officer education. For example, as of 1986 approximately only 30% of the officers in the Royal Australian Air Force had degrees.⁸⁶ The publication of this report highlights the importance that Australia places on officer education and that this interest is not just limited to undergraduate education. Australia also recognizes that for the further development of senior officers higher education remains a requirement.⁸⁷ Even with this emphasis on the need for an educated officer corps, many of the Officer specializations in the Navy, Army and Air Force are available to people with or without a degree. However, a significant number of applicants are degree qualified.⁸⁸ Generally speaking, to be eligible for Direct Entry, applicants must have completed Grade 12 with passes in English and three other registered subjects.⁸⁹

Although it is very difficult to obtain current data concerning the number of serving officers with post secondary education within the Australian Defence Forces and a clear policy on officer education is still being developed,⁹⁰ some useful information can be extracted from the

⁸⁴ Metafaq.com. The Online Careers Office. Email to LCol Frank, 25 February 2005

⁸⁵ Hugh Smith, "Officer Education and the "Military After Next": A Response to the Price Report" (Cambria: Australian Defense Studies Centre, December 1995), 1.

⁸⁶ Harry G. Gelber, *A Programme For the Development of Senior Officers of the Australian Defence Force*, Working Paper 119 (Canberra: The Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian national University, 1986), 4.

⁸⁷ Harry G. Gelber, *A Programme For the Development of Senior Officers of the Australian Defence Force*, Working Paper 119 (Canberra: The Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian national University, 1986), 6.

⁸⁸ Australia Defence, "Officers and Management: Direct Entry Officers," <http://www.defencejobs.gov.au/default.asp?p=126>; accessed 1 March 2005.

⁸⁹ Australia Defence, "Officers and Management: Entry Requirements," <http://www.defencejobs.gov.au/default.asp?p=133>; accessed 1 March 2005.

⁹⁰ Mathew McNeill, "Research," Email to LCol Frank, 6 March 2005.

Australian Defence Personnel Environment Scan 2020. What is of particular interest is the fact that the number of personnel in the Australian Defence Force with post-secondary education actually decreased between 1995 and 1999.⁹¹ Although this Personnel Environment Scan does not provide a specific table regarding officer education,⁹² it can be calculated that in 1999, 63% of Male officers and 74% of female officers had degrees.⁹³ As will be shown in Part IV of this paper, this is not a significant difference from what is found in Canada.

Conclusion

In summary, it is true that in 1997 Canada lagged far behind the United States with regard to the education of its officers. However, this could likely be said about most other countries in the world. Only the United States has a no-degree, no-commission policy and this is partly due to the fact that they must prepare their officers for service out of uniform because of their up or out system. It is also interesting to note that the United States is currently reviewing its officer education programs and policies as a result of their high operational tempo and the feeling that the intent of higher education is being lost through “box filling.” These trends would indicate that it would be unwise for Canada to adopt policies simply because they exist in the United States. This paper has shown that Canada, The United Kingdom, Italy, The Netherlands and Australia all place similar emphasis on officer education and far exceed those standards found in Sweden. Is it true that compared to our allies, our officer corps is not as well educated? Is it true that the Canadian Forces has a remarkably ill-educated officer corps, surely one of the

⁹¹ Thomas Schindlmayr, “Defence Personnel Environment Scan 2020.” (Canberra: Directorate of Strategic Personnel Planning and Research, August 2001). 54.

⁹² Thomas Schindlmayr, “Defence Personnel Environment Scan 2020.” (Canberra: Directorate of Strategic Personnel Planning and Research, August 2001). 50.

⁹³ In 1999, there were 45,134 males and 7,418 females in the Australian Defence Force for a total strength of 52,552. Of this total, 15% of the males and 19% of the females had post secondary degrees. This meant that 6,770 males and 1,409 females had degrees. In 1999, officers made up 24 % of the total strength of the ADF or 10,721 males and 1,892 females. This means that if all the degrees were found within the officer corps, which

worst in the Western world? On both counts; no it is not true. Minister Young did not need to implement MND 10 in order to bring Canada up to the same level of its allies. Aside from the United States, Canada's officers are just as well educated as the officers of its allies. In fact in his lecture delivered to the faculty and cadets of the Royal Military College in Kingston on 4 February 2004, His Excellency John Ralston Saul stated that, "Our Officer Corps has gradually become one of the best educated in the world, involving more and more officers with MAs and PhDs."⁹⁴

would result in the highest possible percentage for degreed officers in the ADF, then in 1999, 63% of Male officers and 74% of female officers had degrees.

⁹⁴ John Ralston Saul, "A New Era of Irregular Warfare?," *Canadian Military Journal* 5, no 4 (Winter 2004-2005): 9.

Part IV: MND 10 RECONSIDERED

Introduction

The intent of the first three parts of this paper was to show that it is “possible” to reconsider MND 10. Part IV will now focus on why it is “essential” to reconsider MND 10. Reconsidering MND 10 will allow for the creation of a renewed CEOTP that meets the strategic intent of *Officership 2020*, includes all non-degreed officers in the Canadian Forces, directs when and what should be studied to avoid “paper degrees” and provides the flexibility needed to enroll Generation Y recruits in a Post Modern Military environment. To accomplish this it is first necessary to look at the policies put in place since 1997 that attempted to implement MND 10 and improve officer education from the creation of the Continuous Education Officer Training Plan to the publication of *Officership 2020*. This will show that the original CEOTP, that replaced OCTP, was an inadequate program that did not meet the intent of MND 10 nor would it be in line with the current strategic direction offered by *Officership 2020*. It will also show that the ad hoc decentralized nature of programs designed for in service officers to gain degrees is inadequate. However, if a new and improved CEOTP was implemented, it would not only be in line with *Officership 2020* but also support the attainment of its objectives through the inclusion of all in-service officers without degrees.

Secondly this part of the paper will attempt to evaluate the progress made to date. This will include a statistical analysis of exactly how many officers hold degrees today when compared to 1997 and comments provided by some of the academics who provided the minister with his initial reports. It will show that MND 10 has not been as successful as expected and identify some of the reasons why progress towards a degreed officer corps has been so slow. What this analysis suggests is that MND 10 only focuses on those applicants trying to enter the

forces and not on those already in. A new CEOTP that directs who, when, where and what degree will be pursued that includes those officers already enrolled would have a dramatic impact on increasing the number of degreed officers in the Canadian Forces. It would also help mitigate the “paper degree” problem where people seek the degree simply to get another “tick-in-the-box” on the road to promotion.

Third, Part IV will introduce the concept of the Post Modern Military and Generation Y and how these factors might influence the establishment of a degreed officer corps. It will show that the changing needs of society require that more flexible entry programs are necessary to attract the best people across a large spectrum of the demographic available.

Lastly, this part of the paper will provide the points of view of the Chief of Air Staff, Chief of Maritime Staff and the Royal Military College. This analysis will show that current enrolment plans are not providing enough recruits and that a new non-degree entry plan is required that does not contradict the key tenants necessary for continued education to be successful.

Policies and Strategies

The Continuous Education Officer Training Plan (CEOTP) was created following direction from Armed Forces Council in April 1998 to achieve an all-degreed officer corps. Its purpose was to meet projected shortfalls in officer production requirements until existing officer training and commissioning plans were aligned with the new policy.⁹⁵ CEOTP was to be zero loaded by 2002-2003. Under this plan, CEOTP candidates were required to earn a degree, on their own time, within the first nine years of service. Current programs to support the attainment of a degree include ADM (HR-Mil) subsidized part-time university studies and full-time

⁹⁵ LCol L.J. Grandmaison, *Continuous Education Officer Training Plan* (Briefing Note for ADM (HR-MIL), January 2003), 1.

university studies under the Initial Baccalaureate Degree Program. Each of the Environmental Chiefs of Staff had also created their own initial Bachelor Degree Programs. The current system places the complete responsibility upon the individual to gain a degree. Sponsorship programs are not centrally controlled and offer an ad hoc solution that does not ensure that the right officers are getting the right degree. A new program that centrally controls sponsorship programs and includes all non-degreed officers in the Canadian Forces would form a partnership with the individual and the Canadian Forces and improve the level of education within the officer corps. In his article “A Ministry of Education For Defence: The Canadian Defence Academy (CDA) at Two Years of Age,” Dr. A.J. Barret stated that the CDA was created “with the mandate to *centralize* officer education and then to *supervise* it.”⁹⁶ The responsibility to centrally coordinate a new CEOTP would seem to fall within this mandate.

As a result of an inability to attract the required number of applicants, limited CEOTP quotas were authorized after 2003 by ADM (HR-Mil) to meet the requirements in stressed officer MOCs.⁹⁷ In a letter to the Minister of National Defence the Chief of the Defence Staff stated that “CEOTP is currently used as an entry plan of last resort to achieve recruiting targets when DEO and ROTP numbers fall short.”⁹⁸ Simply put, the Canadian Forces have consistently relied upon CEOTP to meet shortfalls in recruiting (1998/99 – 41, 1999/00 – 48, 2000/01 – 39, 2001/02 – 75, 2002/03 – 20)⁹⁹ and should come to realize that this requirement is likely to continue into the future. The current CEOTP has filled the recruiting gap when required but as

⁹⁶ Dr. A.J. Barrett, “A Ministry of Education For Defence: The Canadian Defence Academy at Two Years of Age,” *Canadian Military Journal* 5, no. 4 (Winter 2004-2005): 90.

⁹⁷ LCol L.J. Grandmaison, *Continuous Education Officer Training Plan* (Briefing Note for ADM (HR-MIL), January 2003), 1.

⁹⁸ General R.R.J. Henault, *Progress Towards a Degreed Officer Corps* (Chief of Defence Staff: file 4500-17-2 (DTEP 2-6), December 2002), 2.

⁹⁹ General R.R.J. Henault, *Progress Towards a Degreed Officer Corps* (Chief of Defence Staff: file 4500-17-2 (DTEP 2-6), December 2002), 2.

previously discussed does not form a partnership between the individual and the Canadian Forces to improve the level of education within the Canadian Officer Corps. However, little can be done to improve this situation because improving CEOTP would legitimize a non-degreed officer entry program which is contrary to MND 10. Before CEOTP can be improved, MND 10 needs to be reconsidered. The Chief of the Defence Staff reported that by 2007 all members of the officer corps will possess at least a baccalaureate degree¹⁰⁰ and that by 2020 all Colonels and above will have a graduate degree.¹⁰¹ It remains to be seen if these goals can be achieved.

In February 2001 the Chief of Defence Staff published his strategic policy, regarding officership in the Canadian Forces. This was done in line with the overarching Strategy document titled *Strategy 2020* which would provide guidance to the Canadian Forces. *Officership 2020* stresses balancing education and experience to develop critical thinking and continuous learning.¹⁰² It is important to review some of the key aspects of these guidance documents. Of the eight strategic objectives outlined in *Strategy 2020* three relate directly to officer professional development.

Objective 1: Innovative Path – Create an objective, innovative and relevant path to the future.

Objective 2: Decisive Leaders – Develop and sustain a leadership climate that encourages initiative, decisiveness and trust while improving our leader's abilities to lead and manage effectively.

Objective 6: Career of Choice – Position Defence as a rewarding, flexible and progressive workplace that builds professional teams of innovative and highly skilled men and women dedicated to accomplishing the mission.¹⁰³

¹⁰⁰ Minister of National Defence Education Advisory Board Background Notes, *Briefing Note: Officer Professional Development in the CF*, 3 February 2004.

¹⁰¹ General R.R.J. Henault, *Progress Towards a Degreed Officer Corps* (Chief of Defence Staff: file 4500-17-2 (DTEP 2-6), December 2002), 1.

¹⁰² Department of National Defence, *Canadian Officership in the 21st Century (Officership 2020)*, (Ottawa: Chief of Defence Staff, February 2001), 11.

¹⁰³ Department of National Defence, *Canadian Officership in the 21st Century (Officership 2020)*, (Ottawa: Chief of Defence Staff, February 2001), 2.

There are eight strategic objectives that will achieve the vision for *Officership 2020*:

- Objective 1: The Ordered Application of Military Force.
- Objective 2: The Application of Sound Leadership.
- Objective 3: Highest Standards of Professionalism.
- Objective 4: An Officer Who Thinks Critically.
- Objective 5: Embrace and Manage Change.
- Objective 6: The CF as a Learning Organization (foster continuous learning).
- Objective 7: Career of Choice.
- Objective 8: Governance. (Flexible OPD system)¹⁰⁴

Officership 2020 Strategic Objectives are to be accomplished by 8 Key Initiatives:

1. Ensure Intellectual Development.
2. Improve the Common Body of Knowledge.
3. Develop Policy, Concepts and Doctrine.
4. Strengthen the Military Ethos.
5. Cultivate External Relationships and Links.
6. Provide OPD Flexibility.
7. Provide Organizational Capacity and Resourcing.
8. Establish Accountabilities, Incentives and Performance Measurement.¹⁰⁵

CEOTP in its current form does not meet all the objectives or support all the initiatives in either *Strategy 2020* or *Officership 2020*. By placing the full responsibility on the individual to find the time to gain a degree within the first nine years of service, the current CEOTP does not meet Objective 2 from *Strategy 2020* or Objective 8 and Initiative 8 from *Officership 2020*. At this time no formal program is in place to monitor and ensure that CEOTP applicants gain their degree within their first nine years of commissioned service. In order to meet these challenges a new CEOTP must embrace accountability at the highest level to ensure that candidates are provided with solid sponsorship programs and a forecasted timeframe within which to attend an academic institution. As previously mentioned the CDA as the Ministry of Education For Defence would be ideally suited to provide this accountability. The current

¹⁰⁴ Department of National Defence, *Canadian Officership in the 21st Century (Officership 2020)*, (Ottawa: Chief of Defence Staff, February 2001), 6-7.

¹⁰⁵ Department of National Defence, *Canadian Officership in the 21st Century (Officership 2020)*, (Ottawa: Chief of Defence Staff, February 2001), 7-8.

system of placing the full responsibility on the individual to find the time to study while providing only ad hoc university sponsorship programs is not adequate. If CEOTP is to follow the strategic guidance published in *Strategy 2020* and *Officership 2020* it needs to be reviewed.

A revitalized CEOTP type program is not contrary to any of the objectives or initiatives of *Officership 2020*. In fact, CEOTP “2020” would enhance the Canadian Forces ability to realize the vision articulated by the Chief of the Defence Staff. It would achieve Objective 1 and Initiative 7 by providing an entry scheme that would be flexible enough to recruit the required numbers of officers to meet operational commitments. It would also assist in the attainment of Objective 6 and Initiative 1 because, by its nature, CEOTP fosters continuous learning and intellectual development. It would also assist in the attainment of Objective 7 and Initiative 5 because CEOTP allows the Canadian Forces to recruit from a different demographic than ROTP and DEO entry plans. A new CEOTP would be an asset in achieving strategic objectives. However a comprehensive review and implementation of a new CEOTP cannot be accomplished until MND 10 is reconsidered.

Progress Assessment

Now that we have an understanding of what measures have been taken since 1997 it is worthwhile to consider the impact that these measures have had on achieving a degreed officer corps. To assist us in this endeavor it is worthwhile to review a paper published in 1997 that attempted to forecast which officer classifications might have the most difficulties in fulfilling the minister’s reform. This paper was written by Dr. A Jesion and L.F Kerzner on behalf of the Canadian Forces Operational Research Division. The report identified nine MOCs that might face problems in the implementation of MND 10. In fact the report highlighted that the Pilot

Classification would face the most serious of challenges. The MOCs that were identified are listed in Table 1. Also included in Table 1 are the percentages of officers who had degrees at the time the report was published and the percentages of officers who hold degrees today.

Table 1: MOCs Which May Face Problems with The Officer/Degree Universality Policy as Forecasted in 1997.¹⁰⁶

MOC	% of Officer's with a degree 1997	% of Officer's with a degree 2005 ¹⁰⁷
39 – Aerospace Control	38	55
32 – Pilot	44	58
57 – Nurse	45	57
23 – Infantry	50	65
71 – MARS	53	66
22 – Artillery	55	60
21 – Armour	56	67
31 – Air Navigator	57	69
82 – Intelligence	69	85
Average	52	64

It is clear that some progress has been made over the past eight years but still falls short of what the minister might have hoped for. As stated earlier, in 2004 the CDS forecasted that all officers would have at least an undergraduate degree by 2007. It seems unlikely that this will be achieved given the progress made over the past eight years. What can certainly be deduced from this table is that MND 10 was not the key in achieving a degreed officer corps and new initiatives are required to improve the situation. MND 10 has not only failed in its implementation, through the continued commissioning of non-degreed officers through CEOTP, it has also failed in its intent which was to significantly improve the level of education within the Canadian officer corps. It is quite likely that a new CEOTP that included all non-degreed officers and directed who, when, where and what would be studied, would help rather than

¹⁰⁶ Dr A Jesion and L.F Kerzner, *An Assessment of the University Degree Policy For Canadian Forces Officers*, Research Note 9707 prepared by Canadian Forces Operational Research Division (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, September 1997), 25.

hinder increasing the number of officers with degrees. Even Vice-Admiral (Ret) Mason, who is a senior advisor to the Minister of National Defence and the Chief of Defence Staff suggested that CEOTP would be in keeping with the spirit of the “Degreed Officer Corps Policy”, if a sponsored program was in place to ensure a degree prior to the nine year point.¹⁰⁸ MND 10 focuses on officers entering the military. A new CEOTP needs to focus on those officers that are already in the military.

Some have suggested that the main reason why little progress has been made is two fold. First is the lack of funds to either subsidize additional serving non-degreed officer’s efforts to attend university; and second is the inability to attract additional Direct Entry Officers.¹⁰⁹ The first issue could be resolved by a CDA funded and coordinated CEOTP that included all officers without degrees. At present sponsorship programs are offered by ADM HR (Mil), each of the environmental chiefs of staff and a number of other sources. If a centrally controlled Continuous Education program was in place, it would add focus and efficiency towards officer education. However, the recruiting issue becomes more complex and could be attributed to the Post Modern Military and Generation Y. These two aspects will be discussed in greater detail later in the paper.

The Ministers Monitoring Committee on Change has watched the progress of a degreed officer corps very closely. In 2003 it noted positively that a "culture change in respect of the promotion of education within the CF appears to be taking place."¹¹⁰ However, the board

¹⁰⁷ These numbers were provided by ADM (HR-Mil) as a result of a request for information.

¹⁰⁸ LCol L.J. Grandmaison, *Continuous Education Officer Training Plan* (Briefing Note for ADM (HR-MIL), January 2003), 2.

¹⁰⁹ Major Reid McBride, “Do Officers Need Degrees” (Toronto: Canadian Forces College Command and Staff Course New Horizons Paper, 2003), 3.

¹¹⁰ Minister’s Monitoring Committee on Change, “Final Report 2003,” http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/reports/mmcc/reports_e.asp; accessed 22 February 2005.

remained concerned that the Canadian Forces were not meeting the intent of what MND 10 was trying to achieve. Specifically Dr. Morton commented that:

As one of those who recommended to Mr. Young that Canada should have a "degreed officer corps," I have been struck by the ingenuity of Canadian universities in devising equivalencies in order to profit from the pressure on many good and ambitious officers to secure paper qualifications. What was intended in seeking a university graduation diploma was greater capacity for critical professional thinking and greater clarity in communicating ideas. You may wonder, as I do now, whether current post-secondary education actually contributes to either of these goals in and of itself.¹¹¹

At the Ottawa Military History Colloquium on 27 Jan 1999, Dr Granatstein stated that:

“if he and his colleagues had anticipated the way their call for university degrees would be mocked, they would not have made it.”¹¹² It is not the degree, it is the education. In other words there is a concern that arrangements made with specific universities to cater to officers attempting to get their degrees are not providing candidates with the required theoretical body of knowledge or honing analytical skills and are merely getting their tickets punched in order to proceed with their careers.¹¹³ This is the same “box filling” exercise that was described in earlier discussions concerning the United States Air Force.

What does this analysis tell us? First is the fact that MND 10 has not had the desired effect and if Canada wishes to increase the number of degreed officers then a new initiative is required. This new initiative must address the issue of getting serving officers degrees and the inability to recruit enough degreed officers and must also stress the importance of education to avoid “box-filling.” This new initiative could be a revitalized, centrally funded and controlled CEOTP that includes all serving officers without a degree and directs when and where degrees

¹¹¹ Minister’s Monitoring Committee on Change, “Final Report 2003,” http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/reports/mmcc/reports_e.asp; accessed 22 February 2005.

¹¹² Major Reid McBride, “Do Officers Need Degrees” (Toronto: Canadian Forces College Command and Staff Course New Horizons Paper, 2003), 8.

¹¹³ Major Reid McBride, “Do Officers Need Degrees” (Toronto: Canadian Forces College Command and Staff Course New Horizons Paper, 2003), 8.

will be pursued and what degree would be obtained. In order to proceed with this initiative it must be recognized that MND 10 has failed in its implementation (the continued reliance on CEOTP) and it has failed in its intent (limited improvements in the number of degreed officers) and it is essential that it be reconsidered.

The Post Modern Military and Generation Y

As mentioned previously, The Post Modern Military and Generation Y are having an impact on the environment in which the Canadian Forces must operate. In his book *The Post Modern Military*, Charles Moskos identifies three types of militaries: The Modern from 1648-mid-twentieth century, the late modern from mid-twentieth century to the early 1990s and the post modern from early 1990s to present.¹¹⁴ He indicates that the postmodern military is characterized by five major organizational changes:

1. Increased interpenetrability of civilian and military spheres;
2. Reduction of differences within the military based on branch, rank and role;
3. Change from warfighting to OOTW;
4. Move towards coalition action; and
5. Internationalization of military forces such as the Eurocorps.

in Post Modern society.¹¹⁶ This was made evident when a researcher interviewing Italian soldiers who served in Somalia and Albania, detected a new type of motivation for military service. “A “postmodern motivation” characterizes soldiers who enter the military more for the desire to have a meaningful personal experience than out of either national patriotism or an occupational incentive.”¹¹⁷

Aside from the new form of post modern motivation for military service, the other major development is the integration of both military and civilian roles that need to be fulfilled by officers. This DIME¹¹⁸ approach means that “The dominant military professional must possess not only the skills associated with military operational leadership but also those of civilian management and diplomacy – that is, the ability to operate effectively in military and civilian oriented roles nationally and internationally.”¹¹⁹ It has been identified that many of these skills can be gained only through extensive education and experience outside the CF.¹²⁰ Therefore, officer professional development must include a broad range of experience through secondments to other government departments and attendance at a wide range of institutions. This emphasizes the necessity of a continuous education process.

Jeff Tasserson provides an excellent overview on the impact of Generation Y on the military. He states that “although Generation “X” has often been described as “driven,” Generation “Y” seems to be embracing a more internally self-aware, less future focused

¹¹⁶Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams and David R. Segal, “Armed Forces After the Cold War,” in *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces After the Cold War*, ed. Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams and David R. Segal, 1-13 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 4.

¹¹⁷Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams and David R. Segal, “Armed Forces After the Cold War,” in *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces After the Cold War*, ed. Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams and David R. Segal, 1-13 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 6.

¹¹⁸ Diplomacy, Intelligence, Military, Economic (DIME).

¹¹⁹ Franklin C. Pinch, “Canada: Managing Change with Shrinking Resources,” in *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces After the Cold War*, ed. Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams and David R. Segal, 156-181 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 157.

demeanor... Generation Y expects continual change and is used to a fragmented, peace-meal focus.”¹²¹ What this means is that the old mindset of the military as a career is becoming an obsolete idea and that the new generation is expecting something different.¹²² From the perspective of Generation Y, the prospect of a military career with its authoritarian and apparently unchanging environment is increasingly being rejected as a possible career choice.¹²³ Therefore, the quantity and the social characteristics of the recruiting base is changing.¹²⁴ Increasingly applicants will be less and less interested in the stability and security offered by an ROTP type entry program. Generation Y applicants will be looking for instant personal gratification in the way of demanding training and deployments coupled with the diversity offered by continuous and relevant education. Two of the reasons why the Canadian Forces are unable to attract additional DEO and ROTP candidates are as a result of the Post Modern Military and Generation Y. If the Canadian Forces hopes to attract the best that Generation Y has to offer, it must cater to its desires.

What this means is that the Canadian Forces must recognize that people are joining the Canadian Forces for different reasons than they were twenty years ago or perhaps even ten years ago and that the type of education and experience obtained by its officers will have a dramatic impact on the way it is able to fulfill its missions. A revitalized CEOTP will be able to attract generation Y applicants by quickly providing them with operational employment opportunities

¹²⁰ Franklin C. Pinch, “Canada: Managing Change with Shrinking Resources,” in *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces After the Cold War*, ed. Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams and David R. Segal, 156-181 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 162.

¹²¹ Jeff Tasseron, “Military Manning and the Revolution in Social Affairs,” *Canadian Military Journal* 2, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): 57.

¹²² Jeff Tasseron, “Military Manning and the Revolution in Social Affairs,” *Canadian Military Journal* 2, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): 59.

¹²³ Jeff Tasseron, “Military Manning and the Revolution in Social Affairs,” *Canadian Military Journal* 2, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): 59.

¹²⁴ Jeff Tasseron, “Military Manning and the Revolution in Social Affairs,” *Canadian Military Journal* 2, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): 53.

while still enhancing a continuous learning environment that will maintain their interest. Further, a new CEOTP that directs what type of education is pursued will ensure that the Canadian Forces is prepared for the Post Modern Military challenges that lie ahead. Minister Young did not have the benefit of understanding the impacts that the Post Modern Military and Generation Y would have on a reform such as MND 10. However the situation of today is much different and further emphasizes the need to reconsider MND 10.

Environmental Perspectives

Both the Chief of Air Staff and the Chief of Maritime Staff have identified difficulties in recruiting enough candidates for specific MOCs. LGen Jeffery, a past Chief of Land Staff, described the current situation as attempting to “motivate the educated” whereas the ideal situation would be to “educate the motivated.” In the words of the Chief of the Air Staff, “To overcome recruiting challenges a new strategy is urgently required.”¹²⁵

As of 28 October 2004 Operational Air Force occupations were staffed below authorized manning levels. For 2003-2004 only 79 of the required 184 Direct Entry Officers were recruited. The shortfall was made up by 40 CEOTP and 50 re-enrollees. For 2004-2005 156 Direct Entry Officers need to be recruited but the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group is forecasting similar recruiting difficulties.¹²⁶ This identifies a clear problem that is being faced by the Air Force. This has been a historic trend and the impact of the post modern military and generation Y will only continue to make the situation worse. To further compound this problem is the current system of contracted flight training where the CF pays for slots regardless if the recruiting

¹²⁵ Lieutenant-General K.R. Pennie, *Air Officer Production Challenges* (Chief of Air Staff: file 4840-1 (D Air PPD), 28 October 2004), 2.

¹²⁶ Lieutenant-General K.R. Pennie, *Air Officer Production Challenges* (Chief of Air Staff: file 4840-1 (D Air PPD), 28 October 2004), 1.

system can fill them.¹²⁷ This is very wasteful and the current ROTP/DEO system makes it very difficult to catch up. The bottom line is that LGen Pennie has recommended the permanent establishment of CEOTP to ensure the system receives a steady stream of recruits.¹²⁸ The Chief of Maritime Staff is encountering similar recruiting difficulties. As of 7 Jan 2005 the Navy was approximately 70 trained MARS officers below authorized manning levels out of an establishment of 889 or 8%. This has resulted in maritime staffs being critically short with a number of positions left unoccupied for extended periods of time. In a letter to ADM HR (Mil), CMS described the problem he is facing in great detail.

Forecasting indicates that the MARS occupation will lose 56 officers per year out to 2012. Therefore to keep up with attrition the Navy needs to qualify 56 officers per year and to overcome the deficit over the next eight years should qualify 65. Overall attrition from enrolment to qualification is 48%. Therefore the Navy must over the next eight years recruit 125 officers per year to overcome attrition and the deficit.¹²⁹ MARS DEO enrolments are forecasted at 50 per year. As a result of limited interest by candidates the maximum number of ROTP enrolments is forecasted at 40 per year. In-service enrolments and occupation re-assignments are forecasted as ten per year. This means that the MARS trade will continue to be short 25 candidates per year.¹³⁰

As a result, CMS has also requested that CEOTP be re-opened to allow him to recruit the required number of applicants. However, he does stress the importance of an educated officer corps and proposes a very clear commitment that will allow CEOTP officers to obtain a degree within nine years.¹³¹

¹²⁷ LGen Pennie, *Lack of Air Ops Recruits* (Email to Vadm Jarvis 28 October 2004).

¹²⁸ LGen Pennie, *Lack of Air Ops Recruits* (Email to Vadm Jarvis 28 October 2004).

¹²⁹ Vice Admiral M.B. MacLean, *MARS Recruiting Challenges* (Chief of Maritime Staff: file 3371-5760-1(DMTE 2-2-2 #35368), 7 January 2005), 1.

¹³⁰ Vice Admiral M.B. MacLean, *MARS Recruiting Challenges* (Chief of Maritime Staff: file 3371-5760-1(DMTE 2-2-2 #35368), 7 January 2005), 2.

¹³¹ Vice Admiral M.B. MacLean, *MARS Recruiting Challenges* (Chief of Maritime Staff: file 3371-5760-1(DMTE 2-2-2 #35368), 7 January 2005), 3.

There are still many who are hesitant to reopen CEOTP but the topic continues to be the focus of discussions amongst ADM HR (Mil) staffs.¹³² Some suggest that it would be difficult to find room to complete a degree after commissioning because it would compete with OPME, CFC, SLT. However, it is unlikely that this would be the case because most of these “conflicting” priorities actually support the equivalencies currently given by academic institutions.¹³³ In fact, the Chief of Maritime Staff points out that “As a result of equivalencies with several universities the Navy can produce a degreed officer in the same period for less money. In addition CEOTP/OCTP officers do well in University because of their increased maturity and motivation.”¹³⁴

The requirement to re-open a non-degree officer entry program has been identified by two of the three environmental chiefs of staff. Both understand the importance of officer education and the pursuit of a degreed officer corps. It is worthwhile then to try and gain a perspective from the educational environment as well to determine if there are any reasons why a non-degreed officer entry program could not support a well educated officer corps. At RMC a distinction is drawn between junior credits (first and second year courses) and senior credits (third and subsequent year courses). The junior courses provide the foundation of knowledge upon which student’s base subsequent years of study. Senior courses allow students to apply knowledge and seek answers for themselves.¹³⁵ A military core curriculum is required at RMC and is viewed as essential for officership in the CF. To address the lack of some of these core

¹³²LCol L.J. Grandmaison, *Continuous Education Officer Training Plan* (Briefing Note for ADM (HR-MIL), January 2003), 2.

¹³³ Capt (N) Romanow, *MMC – Progress Report II – June 03* (Email to Col Matte dated 26 June 2003).

¹³⁴ Vice Admiral M.B. MacLean, *MARS Recruiting Challenges* (Chief of Maritime Staff: file 3371-5760-1(DMTE 2-2-2 #35368), 7 January 2005), 3.

¹³⁵ LCol David Last, PhD, “Military Degrees: How High is the Bar and Where’s the Beef,” *Canadian Military Journal* 5, no 2 (Summer 2004): 32.

curriculum for officers that did not attend RMC the Professional Military Education program is used to make up the difference. This program is run by RMC and is given university credit.¹³⁶

As LCol Last, who is the Registrar at RMC puts it: “Students know that they are learning, because they have more questions at the end than at the beginning of a course, but they have a good idea about where to look for answers to these questions. This is education... Pedagogy (the art of teaching) without epistemology (the philosophy of knowledge) degenerates quickly into pedantry (insistence on forms and details).”¹³⁷

As stated previously many of the other training activities that a non-degreed officer must undertake (second language training and OPME) are given university credit. These activities when coupled with classification training and experience can form the basis for the junior credits described by LCol Last. This would then prepare the candidate for attendance at an educational institution where he would receive senior credit instruction. As LCol Last stressed, it is during the senior years of study where higher education is really achieved. As long as a CEOTP program recognizes the difference between junior credits that can be partially achieved through equivalencies, and senior credits that form the centre of gravity for higher learning, a non-degreed entry program could support the pursuit of a better educated officer corps.

Conclusion

As stated in the introduction the aim of this part of the paper was to explain why it is essential that MND 10 be reconsidered. A number of conclusions can be drawn from the discussion. First, a new program that centrally controls sponsorship programs and includes all non-degreed officers in the Canadian Forces would form a partnership with the individual, would

¹³⁶ Dr. John Scott Cowan, “RMC and the Profession of Arms: Looking Ahead at Canada’s Military University,” *Canadian Military Journal* 2, no 3 (Autumn 2001): 7.

avoid box filling and improve the level of education within the Canadian officer corps. Second, the Canadian Forces have consistently relied upon CEOTP to meet shortfalls in recruiting and should come to realize that this requirement is likely to continue into the future. CEOTP in its current form is inadequate but staff officers are prevented from improving this program because it would be seen to contradict MND 10. Third, a revitalized CEOTP type program is not contrary to any of the objectives or initiatives of *Officership 2020*. In fact it would enhance the Canadian Forces ability to realize the vision articulated by the Chief of the Defence Staff. Fourth, as a result of the post modern military, officer professional development must include a broad range of experience through secondments to other government departments and attendance at a wide range of institutions. This emphasizes the necessity of a continuous education process. This post modern effect is further compounded by the need to attract generation Y applicants by quickly providing them with operational employment opportunities while still enhancing a continuous learning environment that will maintain their interest. Lastly and perhaps most urgently, VAdm McLean and LGen Pennie state that to overcome recruiting challenges a new strategy is urgently required. They recommend the re-opening of CEOTP to ensure the system receives a steady state of recruits. As long as a CEOTP program recognizes the difference between junior credits that can be partially achieved through equivalencies, and senior credits that form the centre of gravity for higher learning, a non-degreed entry program could support the pursuit of a better educated officer corps. These conclusions clearly indicate why it is now essential that MND 10 be reconsidered.

¹³⁷ LCol David Last, PhD, "Military Degrees: How High is the Bar and Where's the Beef," *Canadian Military Journal* 5, no 2 (Summer 2004): 31.

CONCLUSION

The intent of this paper was to argue that MND 10 needed to be reconsidered in order to permit the establishment of a new Continuous Education Officer Training Plan (CEOTP) that focuses on continuous learning, caters to all officers in the Canadian Forces that do not have degrees and permits a non-degree entry scheme that will provide the flexibility needed to meet recruiting goals. In order to do this the paper first of all had to show that it was “possible” to reconsider MND 10. It reviewed the reports that the minister had available to him in 1997 in an effort to show that although a clear need to improve the level of education within the Canadian officer corps was identified, the method of how this was to be achieved, MND 10, was not substantiated. Second, it went on to show that although the initial reasons for Minister Young’s desire to improve the officer corps has been somewhat overcome by events, today’s high tech and often ambiguous operational environment further highlights the need for a well educated officer corps. Thirdly, as a result of criticism that Canada did not measure up to its allies when it came to officer education, a study of three allies was presented. The conclusion was that aside from the United States, Canada’s officers are on generally on par with most of its allies. These three points indicate that there is no substantiated reason why MND 10 should not be reconsidered. The Fourth part of the paper focused on why it is “essential” that MND 10 be reconsidered. It provided conclusions that were drawn from a number of sources that support the idea that MND 10 needs to be reconsidered so that a new CEOTP can be created that meets the strategic intent of *Officership 2020*, includes all non-degreed officers in the Canadian Forces, directs when and what should be studied to avoid “paper degrees” and provides the flexibility needed to enroll Generation Y recruits in a Post Modern Military environment.

In 1997 it is clear that Minister Young made the best decision based on his interpretation of the information presented to him in the time he had available. With the benefit of hind sight and a better understanding of the current circumstances the evidence shows that MND 10 has fallen short of its original intent. The impacts of the post modern military and generation Y are just now starting to be understood and initial thoughts would indicate that MND 10 may not be the best way to improve officer education while still continuing to meet recruiting goals.

What is the way ahead? The first thing that needs to be done is ensure that people think critically about this topic and do not fall into the trap presented by LCol Last where “Pedagogy (the art of teaching) without epistemology (the philosophy of knowledge) degenerates quickly into pedantry (insistence on forms and details).”¹³⁸ It is important not be pedantic about this issue. Progress towards a degreed officer corps has been slow and recruiting challenges have been clearly identified. The CDS has articulated the need to embrace “continuous learning.” It would be difficult to find a more appropriate program than a Continuous Education Officer Training Plan to achieve his intent. The current CEOTP is inadequate and needs to be reviewed, but in order to do this MND 10 needs to be reconsidered. As pointed out by VAdm Mason, in order to proceed ADM HR (Mil) will: “Require the Minister’s concurrence to an amplification of the policy. This concurrence will not be likely without the endorsement of the Education Advisory Board. The EAB would likely not give support unless the “educational guarantees” are spelled out very clearly.”¹³⁹ In addition, “the full support of the CDS as a champion of the program is seen as essential.”¹⁴⁰

¹³⁸ LCol David Last, PhD, “Military Degrees: How High is the Bar and Where’s the Beef,” *Canadian Military Journal* 5, no 2 (Summer 2004): 31.

¹³⁹ Vadm (Ret) Mason, *Lack of Air Ops Recruits* (Email to VAdm Jarvis 1 November 2004).

¹⁴⁰ Department of National Defence, *Educating Canada’s Military: Workshop Report* (Ottawa: Director of Recruiting, Education and Training, 7-8 December 1998), vi.

Much work is still needed but something has to be done in the very near term in order to overcome the recruiting difficulties identified by the environmental chiefs of staff. All of our allies, less the United States, have a non-degree entry program and Canada continued to use CEOTP to meet its recruiting demands. It is time to realize that the Canadian Forces needs a non-degree entry program and to get serious about creating a program that embraces continuous education for all non-degreed officers while still helping to meet recruiting quotas. It must be stressed that CEOTP will not hamper ROTP or DEO entry plans. CEOTP will be another method of entry that will be used to achieve strategic objectives. It is both possible and essential that MND 10 be reconsidered.

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