CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES
CSC 29 / CCEM 29

MDS RESEARCH PROJECT/ PROJET DE RECHERCHE DE LA MED

THE NEED TO BALANCE FORMAL ACADEMIC EDUCATION WITHIN THE OVERALL OFFICER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

By /par Maj Larry A. Paziuk

ABSTRACT

Canadian Forces officer education requirements were recently changed requiring that all newly commissioned officers have an university degree, and that by 2020, all existing officers have a university degree and colonels and above have a graduate degree. This change was purportedly done to improve the intellectual capacity and professionalism of the officer corps. This ch

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF FIGURES

THE NEED TO BALANCE FORMAL ACADEMIC EDUCATION WITHIN THE OVERALL OFFICER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

Introduction

Officer education is a subject that has been studied extensively throughout history, but it is also a subject that continues to evolve and is just as topical today as ever. The Canadian officer corps has transformed itself over the centuries from a gentleman's club, where social status and genealogical background were considered the most important aspects to membership, to a highly competent and well-educated group of professionals. But the officer corps can ill afford to rest on its laurels and must continually adapt its education and training programs to match changes occurring within society at large, and ensure that the next generation of officers are fully capable of conducting their duties in a competent and professional manner. Although there have been a number of developments in Canadian Officer education over the past century, one of the more significant occurred in response to events from the ill-fated Canadian peacekeeping mission to Somalia

The Somalia incident, in which a Somali youth was tortured to death, was perceived to be a failure in military discipline and Canadian officer leadership in particular. The result was that the officer corps was subjected to intense scrutiny and study by the Honourable Doug Young, then Minister of National Defence (MND), to determine how such lapses in judgement were allowed to occur and what measures could be taken to ensure such lapses wouldn't occur again. Although many aspects of the

Canadian Forces were examined, particular areas of concern included officer development and the overall professionalism of the officer corps.[1]

The MND compiled a report in which one of the specific recommendations was that all officers, with the exception of those commissioned from the ranks, must possess a university degree prior to commissioning.[2] This recommendation was made with the premise that officers with university degrees would function at a higher intellectual level, with a higher degree of professionalism, and an appropriate ethos that would prevent the re-occurrence of such disciplinary breakdowns. Policies have subsequently been issued formalizing the requirement that not only will newly commissioned officers all have a university education, but that by 2020, all officers must possess a minimum undergraduate degree and colonels and above must possess a graduate degree.[3]

These policy changes have had a profound effect on officer recruitment, professional development, and career advancement. This has touched off a heated debate on the issue of university education, particularly amongst the fifty percent of Canadian officers who do not possess an undergraduate degree and resent the implication that they are intellectually less competent than others despite an otherwise successful career.[4] There are also scholars such as Van Creveld who debate the effectiveness of academic education in relation to the military's ability to fight a war, since war fighting demands "a certain kind of hardheaded know-how, skill, and what the Germans call *Konnen*, or

---

[1] M. Douglas Young, *Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces*, Report to the Prime Minister (Ottawa: DND, 1997), p 15-18.

[2] Ibid, p 15.

[3] *Canadian officership in the 21st century: OPD 2020 statement of operational requirement* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2000), p 40.

[4] Ibid, p 13.

competence" that cannot "be acquired by sitting behind a university desk."[5] The other side of this debate is just as forceful in its arguments in favour of academic education based on historical trends, societal perceptions, and the complex environment that today's officer must operate in. As in the case of most debates of this nature, neither side is truly right or wrong. Rather, a balance needs to be struck between need to develop military competence and the need to develop an officer of sufficient intelligence and broad based knowledge to act appropriately in all situations.

The decision by the MND to restrict officer commissions to those with a university degree eliminated a long-standing Canadian Forces officer recruitment program entitled the Officer Candidate Training Plan (OCTP). The OCTP was open to all high school graduates wishing to enter the officer corps with the exception of those classifications for which a degree was required on the basis of technical competency, such as for the engineering classifications. The elimination of the OCTP scheme occurred without consideration for its impact on officer recruitment or its operational effect on those officer classifications reliant upon it for a significant portion of their intake. A case will be presented in this paper to retain some aspect of the OCTP in order to increase flexibility in the recruitment system to respond to short-term trends and recruitment shortfalls.

The stated goal in the Minister's report concerning the officer corps was that all officers should have a university degree prior to commissioning in order to "improve officer development and to inculcate an ethos appropriate to the Canadian Forces."[6] This

[5] Martin van Creveld, *The Training of Officers* (New York: The Free Press, 1990), p 77.

[6] Young, *Report on Leadership and Management*....,p 15.

decision was made on the basis of a number of reviews and reports from noted Canadian scholars Legault, Bercuson, Morton and Granatstein, who were unanimous in their recommendation that all officers should have a university degree prior to commissioning in order to increase their intellectual capacity.[7] However, little analysis was presented in any of these reports or the Minister's report to substantiate this decision or predict the effects of its impact. Although the Minister's report implied that advanced education would improve the ethical and moral standards of officers, this concept could qualify as a research paper in its own right, and, therefore, will not be a focus of this paper. Instead, the scope will be limited to examining the argument that officer development and intellectual capacity will be improved through the current policies and practises based on the Minister's report.

The view that officers should have a university degree is not a new concept and such recommendations had been asserted before, most notably in various committee reports from 1946 to 1948, and the Rowley Report of 1969.[8] The concept that officers, and senior officers in particular, should have strong intellectual capacity is not a difficult one to comprehend given the complex situations that officers must understand and the difficult decisions they need to make. But a distinction could be made between the intellectual capacity required of a platoon captain and that of a general. In his report,

---

[7] See *MND Report: Paper(s) prepared for the Minister of National Defence by Professor Albert Legault, Laval University, D.J. Bercuson, PhD, FRSC, University of Calgary, Desmond Morton, McGill Institute for the Study of Canada, and Dr. J.L. Granastein, Institute of International Affairs,* 25 March 1997.

[8] See Richard Arthur Preston, *Canada's RMC: A History of the Royal Military College*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), p 311-329, and *Report of the Officer Development Board, Vol 1,* Maj-Gen R. Rowley, chairman (Ottawa: Dept. of National Defence, 1969). Preston provides details on the Chesley, Lett and Stedman committees, which sat from 1946 to 1948 concerning officer entry programs and education. All three committees recommended that officers should have a university degree although the degree recommendation was strongest for technical officers and only desirable for non-technical officers.

Rowley acknowledged that certain skills of military knowledge, technical, and occupational ability are of prime importance below the rank of major, and that the need for intellectual capacity does not increase until after the rank of major.[9] Janowitz also comments in his writings on officer professionalism that "it has been repeatedly found that academic and scholastic achievement are unrelated to military leadership at the tactical and intermediate levels."[10] Not all officers will become career officers and many may serve as short as only four to nine years after enrolment.

Officer profession education, in general, is a continuous career program of development composed of a combination of formal courses leading sometimes to an academic degree(s) and several military or trade specific non-degree courses designed to enhance the technical and professional competence of the officer. The military officer can expect to spend over one-fifth of his career attending courses of a technical or professional nature.[11] It is therefore imperative that given the high cost of formal education and potentially short careers, some consideration be given to matching the educational requirements of officers with their needed professional development in order to fulfil the Service needs.

Academic education has an important role to play in the development of an officer, but it needs to be integrated within the overall officer professional development system if we are to develop officers capable of carrying out their duties in an effective manner. This paper will argue that the Minister's decision regarding officer education,

---

[9] *Report of the Officer Development Board, Vol 1,* Maj-Gen R. Rowley, chairman (Ottawa: Dept. of National Defence, 1969), p 39-41. Hereafter referred to as the Rowley Report.

[10] Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (USA: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), p 134.

[11] Sir John Hackett, *The Profession of Arms* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1984), p 197.

and the subsequent policy changes, have resulted in an over-emphasis on formal academic education. The effect has been to create a "ticket punching" approach to education at both the undergrad and graduate level that will not achieve the desired effect to intellectualize the officer corps and develop competent leaders. The officer professional development system should be a career-long, coordinated and balanced program of officer professional development training and formal academics with sufficient flexibility built in for unexpected trends or national emergencies.

This study will examine officer education requirements at both the entry-level and throughout the career development of an officer since both aspects are linked together in terms of overall professional development. Changes that occur at the entry-level of education will invariably affect changes to the higher level and visa-versa. The study will begin with an historical review of officer education; particularly the development of professionalism in the officer corps since that is the origin of education and intellectualization of the officer corps. Next will be an examination of the current educational requirements and professional development systems in place in the Canadian Forces. A review of education and recruiting practises in the militaries of some other nations will also be conducted to compare and contrast Canada's position. Finally, some thoughts will be provided on future direction that could be taken by Canada with respect to this issue followed by a conclusion and summary.

Historical Review of Officer Education

The origin of formal education within the officer corps can be linked to the development of professionalism within officer corps. According to Huntington, "The distinguishing characteristics of a profession as a special type of vocation are its expertise, responsibility, and corporateness."[12] It is primarily the need for expertise that results in the professional's need for education since the professional must first obtain the necessary skill and knowledge in order to practise his profession. This skill and knowledge is obtained "by prolonged education and training."[13] Huntington observed that there are two phases of education that a professional must undergo: a general phase and a technical phase:

> The liberal education of the professional man is normally handled by the general purpose educational institutions of the society devoted to this purpose. The second or technical phase of professional education, on the other hand, is given in special institutions operated by or affiliated with the profession itself.[14]

The specialized skill or expertise practised by the professional officer is the "management of violence."[15] Huntington also states, "Just as a general education has become the prerequisite for entry into the professions of law and medicine, it is also almost universally recognized as a desirable qualification for the professional officer."[16]

---

[12] Samual P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), p 8.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid, p 9.

[15] Ibid, p 11.

[16] Ibid, p 14.

The need for some level of officer education and training began as early as the 16th century and was driven by technological advances in the military aspects of artillery, fortification, engineering, and navigation. The period of Enlightenment in the 18th century also brought about changes in societal views on education and many specialty occupations and professions began to emerge requiring the practitioner to obtain some level of proficiency through formal education. The development of the professional education for military officers occurred much later than other civilian professions since it was considered more important that an officer be a person of character; a trait that was deemed to be determined by genetic decent and social position.[17]

According to Huntington, the shift to a professional officer corps occurred in "three phases: (1) the elimination of the aristocratic prerequisites for entry; (2) the requiring of a basic level of professional training and competence; and (3) the requiring of a minimum general education and the provision of this education in institutions not operated by the military."[18] One of the first countries to begin this transition to a professional officer corps was Prussia. In 1808, Prussia abolished class restrictions for entry to the officer corps and instituted a system of educational and entry exam requirements.[19] Throughout the 19th century, Prussia continued to be a leader in professionalization of the officer corps with the establishment of the Kriegsakademie, the Prussian War College, in 1810, and a further tightening of the educational requirements in 1865.[20] These changes occurred primarily for reasons of military efficiency and trends

[17] Van Creveld, *The Training of Officers*, p 14-19.

[18] Huntington *The Soldier and the State,* p 39.

[19] Ibid, p 39-40.

[20] Ibid, p 48.

within Prussian society. The rise of national armies under Napoleon had seen the formation of large fielded forces which, when combined with new modern long-range weapons, produced the need for commanders to be concerned with the strategy of war and the administration and logistics of those troops. The Prussians recognized that some kind of specialized military school was needed to provide formal education in these areas to elevate the efficiency of its military.[21] At the same time, the middle cla

reluctance to change.[24] The mood, particularly in the British army, was typified by the Duke of Cambridge who, in 1850, stated, "the British officer should be a gentleman first and an officer second."[25] Abolishment of purchase came about due to Liberal party reforms to restructure the army as a capable fighting force led by officers of ability, not wealth.[26] Despite abolishment of purchase, the establishment of the Royal Military College in 1802[27] and British Staff College in 1857,[28] the British army remained largely unreformed up to the start of WW I. Hackett describe British army officers as "men of good standing but ill-trained amateurs and not particularly intelligent."[29] It took the disastrous battles and slaughter of thousands of lives on the battlefield of Flanders and France in WW I before real reform began to occur in the British army.

The situation in Canada reflected that in Great Britain. When the British garrison withdrew from Canada in 1870, a small permanent Canadian militia was established, but most of the officers were ex-British officers.[30] The level of professionalism of the Canadian militia officers was as low as the British at the time, and most militia units were little more than social clubs.[31] Commissions in the militia were by political appointment,

---

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid, p 127.

[26] Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada* (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1990), p 91.

[27] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, p 44.

[28] Ibid, p 49.

[29] Hackett, *The Profession of Arms,* p 158.

[30] Richard Preston, "Military Influence on the Development of Canada," *The Canadian Military: A Profile*, ed by Hector J. Massey (Canada: Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1972), p 67

[31] Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, p 86.

which was a form of political patronage, and educational qualifications mattered little.[32] Although promotion was to be based on merit and qualifying exams, the situation up until the start of WW I was that most promotions and senior appointments were subject to political interference.[33]

Although some military training schools existed in Canada during the 19th century, it was really the opening of the Royal Military College (RMC) of Canada in Kingston, Ontario, on 1 June 1876, which signified the beginnings of officer education in Canada.[34] The college was modelled after West Point in terms of its curriculum and egalitarian rules, but its spirit, and thus character, was decidedly British.[35] When RMC opened, its curriculum was based on a four-year study program of academic and military subjects. Enrolment was not high primarily due to a difficult entrance exam and the requirement for cadets to pay fees of $200 for the first year and $150 for subsequent years.[36]

The college output of educated officers was hardly necessary for the practically non-existent Canadian army, but it was a step by the newfound dominion of Canada to take some responsibility for its own military affairs.[37] Since there were only a limited number of Canadian and British army commissions made available to cadets upon

---

[32] Preston, *Military Influence on…, p* 74.

[33] R.H. Roy, "The Canadian Military Tradition," *The Canadian Military: A Profile*, ed by Hector J. Massey, (Canada: Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1972), p 30-31.

[34] George Stanley, "Military Education in Canada, 1867-1970," *The Canadian Military: A Profile*, ed by Hector J. Massey (Canada: Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1972), p 170.

[35] Ibid, p 172.

[36] Ibid, p 171.

[37] Richard Arthur Preston, *Canada's RMC*, (Toronto: The University Press, 1969), p 18.

graduation, many of the cadets did not follow a military career but continued on in the civilian workforce.[38] After 1909, a limited number of positions were made available at the British army staff college for Canadian army officers as a Canadian staff college was still decades away from reality. Despite this modest development of a Canadian officer corps, British Officers would continue to hold senior Canadian positions up until WW I.[39]

Very little would change in Canadian officer education during the period between WW I and WW II, although an agreement was concluded in 1919 with several Ontario universities whereby RMC graduates could obtain a university degree with one more year of study at those institutions.[40] The interwar period was initially marked by drastic cuts in defence spending and reductions in all areas including manpower and equipment. Even the Royal Canadian Naval College, which had only opened in 1910,[41] was closed in 1922.[42] Although RMC would survive throughout this period, it would shut it doors in 1942 as a result of WW II. This action was undertaken by the Government of Canada in an effort to expand the army officer corps as rapidly as possible by commissioning all army officers from the ranks rather than waiting for RMC to produce an ideal officer.[43] Once WW II ended, the now very large Canadian military was partly disbanded, but Canada had become a middle power with worldwide interests and therefore a modest permanent professional military was retained. This military would grow in size in

---

[38] Stanley, *Military Education in Canada*, p 173-174.

[39] Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, p 120-122.

[40] Stanley, *Military Education in Canada*, p 177.

[41] Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, p 125.

[42] Ibid, p 170.

[43] Preston, *Canada's RMC*, p 294.

response to the threats of the Soviet Union and the start of the Cold War shortly after WW II.[44] Thoughts turned once again to the question of educating and commissioning the future officers of the permanent Canadian military. The Chesley and Lett Committees from 1945 to 1946 concluded that Canadian officers should have a university degree, and RMC reopened its doors in 1948 as a tri-service college with a four-year program leading to a degree.[45] There was considerable debate at the time as to whether or not RMC would re-open but according to Morton, it was Brooke Claxton, the then MND, whose "fondness for tri-service integration became the lever for re-opening the Royal Military College."[46] The RMC Ex-Cadet Club, a powerful lobby group, also put considerable pressure on Claxton to re-open RMC over the objection of senior military officers who wanted to use a civilian university instead.[47]

In addition to this increased emphasis on officer academic education, the end of WW II also saw increased emphasis being placed on officer professional development and education in military subjects, particularly the development of military competencies through education and training at military establishments. The RCAF Staff College was established in 1943[48] followed by the Canadian Army Staff College in 1946.[49] These colleges were meant to provide officer professional education in staff skills and command

---

[44] Ibid, p 308.

[45] Stanley, *Military Education in Canada*, p 179.

[46] Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, p 228.

[47] Ibid.

[48] William Shields,. *Canadian Forces Command and Staff College A History 1797 – 1946,* (Toronto: Canadian Forces College, 1987), p 4/10.

[49] "CLFCSC History," [http://lfdts.army.mil.ca/clfcsc-cceftc/About/hist_coll.asp?tree=about], 17 Sep 02.

problems, but also covered subjects such as organization, foreign affairs, and economics.[50] Education at the strategic level was offered at the National Defence College, which was established in 1948.[51] Each service also had various courses and staff schools set up to provide professional education to junior officers.

After unification in 1966, the tri-service Canadian Forces College was established in Toronto at the same site as the RCAF Staff School in order to provide a staff school for junior officer training and a Command and Staff Course for intermediate officer training.[52] The land forces also retained a junior staff college in Kingston so as to provide a greater level of training in army tactics to its junior officers.[53] In order to reconcile the differences in officer development among the various pre-unification services, the beginnings of an Officer Professional Development System (OPDS) was established in 1972 with release of the Canadian Forces Individual Training Policy for Officers.[54] This system remains very much in effect today although some changes have occurred periodically throughout the years in order to rationalize and improve officer development.

The concept that an officer should have a university education was fairly new since according to Van Creveld, most officers did not hold a degree at the end of WW II despite the establishment of some level of formal education and training of officers for

---

[50] Shields, *CFC History,* p 4/1- 4/15.

[51] Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, p 228.

[52] Stanley, *Military Education in Canada*, p 189.

[53] CLFCSC History Web site.

[54] Bernd A.Goetze, *Military Professionalism: The Canadian Officer Corps* (Kingston: Queen's University, 1976), p 49.

over one hundred years at that point.[55] Masland states that the need for formal advanced academic education for officers arose as a result of the increasing complexity of officer duties, and the need for officers to be knowledgeable in subject areas such as politics, economics, and new developments in technology.[56] This emphasis was most pronounced in the USA where the principle architects of military education "were motivated by a conviction that the professional officer corps required a high level of education."[57] This trend was somewhat less pronounced in Canada as only 35 percent of Canadian officers had a university degree in 1965 compared to 57 percent of American officers in 1960.[58]

Van Creveld offers a somewhat different view from Masland by looking at the general education trends within society at large. Van Creveld notes that the importance of higher education dramatically increased in civilian society after WW II. Having a degree suddenly became the ticket to achieving a good, high paying job. Society's respect for the largely degreeless officer corps began to diminish as respect and status for those professionals with degrees began to increase.[59] Officers had to accept the degree requirement for their profession if they were to maintain status in society and the ability to recruit top quality candidates.

Despite this increasing emphasis on education, the rapid build-up of the Canadian Forces at the start of the Cold War meant that the CF had to recruit large numbers of

---

[55] Creveld, *The Training of Officers*, p 69.

[56] John W. Masland, W. and Laurence I. Radway, *Soldiers and Scholars*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), p 20.

[57] Ibid, p 85.

[58] Goetze, *Military Professionalism*, p 35.

[59] Creveld, *The Training of Offices*, p 69-70.

officers without degrees as even in 1955, only 8% of young men in the age 18-24 age group attended university.[60] This meant that there were not enough military applicants with university degrees to meet all of the Canadian Forces' requirements.

By the time unification of the Canadian Armed Forces occurred in the mid 1960s, enrolment into the officer corps was being accomplished through five different commissioning plans:

a. Regular Officer Training Plan (ROTP);

b. University Training plan Men (UTPM);

c. Direct Entry Officers (DEO)

d. Officer Candidate Training Plan (OCTP); and

e. The Commissioning from the Ranks Plan (CFR).[61]

Of these plans, all required a potential officer candidate to graduate with a recognized baccalaureate degree before commissioning with the exception of the last two, OCTP and CFR. The OCTP scheme was open to selected high school graduates for acceptance in those officer classifications not requiring a technical or specialty degree. Its primary purpose was to fill the shortfall from the first three plans.[62] The CFR plan was open to suitable non-commissioned officers who showed superior qualities in technical, administrative, and leadership abilities. It was meant to provide a source of mature junior officers for employment within the specialist classifications.[63] These officer-

---

[60] Rowley Report, p 30.

[61] Goetze, *Military Professionalism*, p 23.

[62] Ibid, p 25.

[63] Ibid.

commissioning plans have remained in place throughout the years largely unchanged, with the exception of the phase out of OCTP in 1997.

The general trend in academic and professional military education within the Canadian Forces since WW II was one of growing importance and emphasis on officer development and promotion. To some extent this trend can be related back to the professionalization of the Prussian officer corps in the 19th century. Canada had emerged from WW II as a middle power with strategic interests in many parts of the world, particularly Europe where it had permanent forces stationed, and needed an appropriate military to look after those interests. The establishment of academic standards for officers and education in the art of war reflected the growth of the Canadian Forces and the need to transition from a citizen soldier militia to a permanent, modest-sized, professional military, capable of acting in the interests of Canada. But this trend was also due to the increasing importance and desire of education within North American society; a trend that would accelerate to become an education revolution in the 60s and 70s.[64]

[64] Franklin C. Pinch and Charles A.Cotton, *Educational Change and Military Adaption in Canada*, (Willowdale, Ont: Canadian Forces Personnel Applied Research Unit, 1978), p 6.

A Review of Canadian Forces Educational Requirements

The examination of current education requirements in the Canadian Forces needs to begin with an understanding of the basis for these requirements. The current policy was not based solely on the events that occurred in Somalia, but were influenced by events and trends that began prior to it. Many studies and reports on education and training in the Canadian Forces have been written since WW II detailing these trends, but it is beyond the scope of this paper to review them all.[65] This paper will therefore address two specific reports, the "Rowley Report" and the "Morton Report," both of which had a significant impact on the formulation of the current policies regarding officer education and professional development. These reports primarily concentrated on officer entry-level requirements and professional military development.

The Report of the Officer Development Board, more commonly referred to as the Rowley Report, was a major study on officer education and training conducted shortly after unification of the Canadian Forces in the 1960s. It was conducted to review the links between education, training and development, and employment of officers in the newly unified officer corps. This study was conducted under the guidance of Major General R. Rowley and was published in 1969. This comprehensive report examined many aspects of the officer education and training system, and although the report's findings and recommendations made only a minor impact at the time it was published, it would receive much greater attention in later years and form the basis for many of the changes that would occur in the 1990s.

[65] In addition to the Rowley and Morton reports, other notable reports or studies include; Lett Committee report, June 1946; Chesley Committee report, Dec 1946; Stedman Committee report, Nov 1947; Kitchen 1985; Lightburn 1986; and Evraire 1988.

Early in the Rowley Report, a link is drawn between education and professionalism in the officer corps: "A general education on which to build a detailed expertise has become a necessary qualification for the modern professional officer."[66] In examining the educational requirements for newly commissioned officers, Rowley first looked at the caliber of officer recruits in Canadian society and educational trends in the general population. Rowley noted that in Canada, in 1955, of the young men in the 18-24 age group, 8% were enrolled in university, but by 1965 it was 14%, and was predicted to rise to 20% by 1975.[67] Rowley then theorized that there was a correlation between intellectual capacity and the ability to attend university, and concluded that if the Canadian Forces were to recruit from the top intellectual prospects of the Canadian male population it would have to target the "segment of that population that is destined to attend university."[68] This problem is depicted graphically at Figure 1.[69] There was, however, no analysis or logical rational provided by Rowley to substantiate his theory that the ability to attend university is a sign of intellectual capacity. Rowley then explains further that because young men perceive that a university education is the key to a professional career and success in life, the top candidates will not be interested in joining the Canadian Forces if a degree is not offered or required. Thus, although Rowley advocates a university education for all officers in order to install a higher level of professionalism and intellectual capacity, one of his principle reasons for supporting such a policy is that "the services must establish the degree requirement for officers just to

---

[66] Rowley Report, p 4.

[67] Ibid, p 30.

[68] Ibid, p 31.

[69] Ibid.

hold the line and get the same quality of officer material that we have demanded in the past."[70]



FIGURE 1 – INTELLECTUAL CAPACITY

The concern that Rowley had for the Canadian Forces being able to attract top quality candidates, due to the educational trend of Canadian youth, was also expressed in a 1978 report by Pinch and Cotton. Pinch and Cotton noted that the Canadian Forces relied on a large pool of unskilled labour for recruitment into the non-commissioned ranks.[71] However, an education shift occurred throughout the 60s and 70s and more youth were completing high school and the participation rates at post-secondary institutions had dramatically increased.[72] In essence, the pool of youth that had not graduated from high school or were not planning to attend post-secondary school was shrinking. Most of those

[70] Ibid, p 32.

[71] Pinch and Cotton, *Educational Change…,* p 4.

[72] Ibid, p 6-7.

that did not complete high school were considered marginal with regards to recruitment standards, and unlikely to make a successful soldier.[73] This education shift, and the growth of technology in most non-commissioned trades, meant that the non-commissioned ranks would have to raise their recruiting standards if they were to maintain the same level of quality.[74] Pinch and Cotton speculated that this shift upward in recruitment standards for the non-commissioned ranks would also force the officer ranks to raise their standards.[75] If the non-commissioned ranks were now recruiting primarily from the pool of quality high school candidates then the officer corps would have recruit above the high school level, at the post-secondary or university level.

One flaw in Rowley's logic is his assumption that all high school candidates with an ability to attend university will want to attend university. This line of reasoning makes no allowance for the bright, articulate, and intelligent youth who would rather experience life in the real world, perhaps piloting an aircraft, than spend another year behind a desk. Although there is no research showing what percentage of youths may fall into this category, it is unlikely to be zero, but not significantly high enough to change the overall trend judging by the increasing numbers of youth who are going past high school to some form of post-secondary education.

In discussing post-commissioning professional development, Rowley defines eight characteristics that must be addressed in the development system, listed as follows:

a. the soldierly virtues;
b. command ability;
c. branch and specialty skill;

---

[73] Ibid, p 16.

[74] Ibid.

[75] Ibid, p 26.

d. list competence;
e. military expertise;
f. intellectual ability;
g. executive ability; and
h. military-executive capability.[76]



FIGURE 2 – VARIATIONS IN IMPORTANCE OF QUALITIES WITH RANK

Rowley then plotted the relative importance of each characteristic for each officer rank level as shown in Figure 2.[77] Intellectual ability is of particular importance from the point of view of this paper since intellectual capacity is the most often stated requirement for substantiating the need that all officers must have a degree.[78] According to Rowley, the need for intellectual capacity is lowest at the junior officer ranks and does not begin to increase substantially until after the rank of major in obtained. Furthermore, the needs

[76] Rowley Report, p 39.

[77] Ibid, p 41.

[78] Ibid, p 90.

for branch and specialty skills are very high at the junior level. These skills are typically taught through military training, and experience at military establishments outside the civilian universities or even military academies. This observation by Rowley could be used to argue that greater development of intellectual capacity should be delayed until an officer is firmly established in his career path, and has fully developed his occupation's specific military skills. As suggested by Muclair, this implies that training and education needs to be balanced across the officer professional development spectrum to a greater degree than is being done currently.[79]

The Canadian Forces Officer Development Review Board (ODRB) chaired by Lieutenant-General Robert W. Morton (Retired), conducted one of the more recent major studies into officer education and professional development. This report, referred to as the Morton report, was published in 1995 with the stated aim to "review the education and professional development required by Canadian Forces officers during their careers and recommend a programme that meets requirements of the future."[80] With regards to pre-commissioning education standards, one of the key recommendations from the report was to:

> Raise entry-level education standards to assist officer candidates in meeting future demands and to avoid the burden imposed by the pursuit of academic upgrade in the busy early years of a career. The normal minimum standard on entry should be the completion of a relevant community college diploma. Exceptions to the minimum could be granted, when recommended by commanders, for specific purposes. A baccalaureate degree of higher academic achievement remains desirable.[81]

---

[79] D.D.G. Mulcair, *From Philosophy to Practise: The Missing Link in Canadian Forces Officer Education* (Toronto: Canadian Forces College, 2000), p 9.

[80] *Report of the Officer Development Review Board*, LGen Robert W. Morton (Retired), chairman (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1995), Vol 1 p 2. Hereafter referred to as the Morton report.

[81] Ibid, p 8.

Despite the Morton report's recommendation that minimum officer entry-level education should be established at the baccalaureate level, it also concludes that current officer entry programs, including the OCTP, have not restricted officer professional development. It recommends that the OCTP be retained as a low-cost option to recruitment but that entry quotas be established "based on the anticipated needs of the service, the response of the target population to recruiting solicitations, and the desired make-up of the officer corps."[82] This report further identified that the Officer Professional Development process in place at the time was essentially a flawed system, which did not coordinate the overall training, experience and educational requirements to ensure that future officers would be fully capable of meeting their professional and service obligations. In particular, Canadian Forces' educational programs were focused on technical and job requirements, but not on intellectual development.[83]

In the ORDB report, Morton proposes an officer professional development system consisting of four pillars of professional development: education, training, experience and self-development. The proposed system features a continuum of officer development through four distinct development periods:

a. Development Period 1 – Basic officer development (OCdt to 2Lt);

b. Development Period 2 – Intermediate officer development (Lt to Capt);

c. Development Period 3 – Advanced officer development (Maj to LCol); and

[82] Ibid, p 23-24.

[83] Ibid, p 37-38.

d. Development Period 4 – General and senior officer development (Col to Gen).[84]

This proposed model, which has been adopted as the Canadian Forces Officer Professional Development System (OPDS), highlights the fact that education only compromises one of the pillars of officer development, and that successful officer development must include education in coordination with the other developmental pillars.[85] As stated by Masland, "The educational systems of the armed forces constitute only one of many influences which contribute to the character and quality of military leadership."[86]

With the release of the Morton report and the focus of the Somalia Inquiry on the professionalism of the Canadian Forces officer corps, the stage was set for reform of the officer development process and the implementation of higher entry-level education requirements. In forming his directions on officer development requirements, the MND sought opinions from a number of academics as noted earlier. Of these, Granatstein was one of the most forceful in his argument that all officers must have a university education. Granatstein noted that at the time, only 53.29% of Canadian Forces officers had university degrees, only 6.79% had graduate degrees, and one quarter of the officer corps had only high school education.[87] Granatstein argued that the Canadian Forces officer needs a high level of education since today's operations involve complex

---

[84] Ibid, p 89-90.

[85] DAOD 5038-1, *Officer Professional Development (OPD) System,* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1997).

[86] Masland, *Soldiers and* Scholars, p 49.

[87] J.L. Granatstein, *A Paper prepared for the Minister of National Defence by Dr. J.L. Granatstein Canadian Institute of International Affairs*, Report to the Prime Minister (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1997), p 19.

situations requiring a high degree of judgment and intelligence, which, according to Granatstein, are characteristics that can be shaped by education.[88] Granatstein is also a strong proponent of senior officers having graduate degrees in order to increase their intellectual capacity, and allow them to function at the same intellectual level as well-educated civil servants and politicians.[89] The other academic advisors, Desmond Morton, Bercuson, and Legault, also echoed Granatstein's thinking, particularly Morton who surmised that all officers must have a degree since "no self-professed profession would except less."[90]

Thus, in 1997, the MND issued his report on leadership and management of the Canadian Forces, which contained a number of sweeping changes and recommendations including the change in officer recruitment policy to make a university degree a prerequisite to commissioning as an officer. The only exception to this rule would be for those commissioned from the ranks under the CFR program.[91] In this program selected members from the non-commissioned ranks (usually of at least Sergeant rank) are invited to enter the officer corps at the junior level for those classifications for which they can provide effective service on the basis of leadership, officer-like qualities, and their military skills in the non-commissioned ranks. Implied in the decision to retain the CFR program is that one may develop the appropriate skills, intellectual capacity and ethos to become a junior officer through a means other than through formal academic education.

---

[88] Ibid.

[89] Ibid, p 19-20.

[90] Desmond Morton, *A Paper prepared for the Minister of National Defence by Desmond Morton McGill Institute for the Study of Canada*, Report to the Prime Minister (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1997), p 23.

[91] Young, *Leadership and Management,* p 15.

There were, of course, opponents to the MND's decision to restrict officer enrolment who argued that Canada has had many successful generals in the past who were not university graduates as proof that academics are not needed to develop military leaders. Previous generals and outstanding military leaders, such as Maj-Gen George Pearkes,V.C., Gen Guy Simonds, and former CDS General Jacques Dextraze, did not hold any formal academic qualifications although they certainly had completed numerous military training courses and had undergone professional military development (Whig-Standard Cox). However, Bland effectively refutes this line of argument in responding that today's officer must operate in a much more complex environment compared to previous years:

> It is true that more than 50 years ago, during the Second World War, and in the post-war period, many accomplished officers of high rank were not university graduates, although many were ex-cadets from Royal Military College. Generally, at that time only very few people were university graduates. How far back in history would [one] go to reject the present and the future? There was a time when few officers could read or write. Officers today of all ranks live in a world far removed from the world of those who commanded the forces in the 1940s, or even 10 years ago.[92]

As stated previously, in 1995 almost half of the personnel in the officer corps did not have a university degree so some concern was expressed as to what effect this change in policy would have on officer recruitment, particularly for those classifications that had previously relied on the OCTP scheme for much of their intake. The university degree policy could be expected to have little effect on those technical and engineering officer classifications, such as Aerospace Engineering, which already required most entrants to have an engineering or technical degree, while it could be anticipated that there would be

[92] Letter of the Day, *Whig-Standard*, May 1, 1997.

a significant effect on the operational officer classifications. An Operational Research Division Report conducted in 1997, based on personnel data from April 1997, showed that significant problems could be experienced in the Pilot, Infantry, and Maritime Surface officer classifications since many of the officers in these classifications did not have a degree.[93] These officer classifications had typically relied on the OCTP entrant for much of their intake since there was no technical degree requirement as compared to many of the support classifications. This research paper posed a number of good questions that had not been given adequate consideration in adopting the university degree policy. What will be the cost of the university degree policy? How will the service deal with the significant numbers of officers who currently do not hold a degree? How would recruitment be affected? Will operational effectiveness be affected by delaying young persons from taking part in the activities of physically demanding classifications in favour of academic qualifications? The report did not provide answers to any of these questions, but highlighted the fact that the degree policy would have far reaching consequences for the officer corps.

In order to determine the affects of the university degree policy on specific officer classifications, a follow on Operational Research study was conducted in 1998.[94] This study documented the modeling work carried out to determine the impact of eliminating the OCTP program on the trained and effective strength of seven operational classifications. There were three different scenarios modeled for each classification:

---

[93] Jesion and Kerzner, *An Assessment of the University Degree Policy for Canadian Forces Officers* (Ottawa: DND Canada, Operational Research Division, 1997, Op Research 9707), p 23-25.

[94] Jesion and Kerzner, *Models of Canadian Forces Officer Occupations Most Affected by University Degree Requirements* (Ottawa: DND Canada, Operational Research Division, 1998, Op Research 9806).

a. Scenario 1 - baseline case, no change to current input (includes OCTP);
b. Scenario 2 - OCTP eliminated, no increase in intake of other recruitment plans but production probabilities of other plans scaled up; and
c. Scenario 3 - OCTP intake zero, but other plans allowed to ramp up in 5 years to replace lost OCTP input.

The results showed that under scenario 2, the infantry, pilot, air navigator, aerospace controllers, and maritime surface operators would experience critical production problems leading to severe manpower shortages. Even under scenario 3, infantry, pilot, and maritime surface would continue to experience problems well beyond the 5 year time frame. This result highlights the inherent flexibility of the OCTP program in being able to account for periodic shortfalls in officer recruiting since an OCTP officer can become operationally effective in a much shorter time than the ROTP officer who must undergo four years of university studies before he can be qualified and operational. Since there are no university costs, the OCTP scheme also provides a less costly source of candidates as compared to the ROTP scheme, an important aspect during periods of high recruitment but fixed budgets.

Although many have argued for a highly educated officer corps on the basis of intellectual capacity, the educational revolution that was occurring in Canada was also creating pressure to alter Canada Forces recruitment policies with regards to educational standards. Both of these aspects of officer education were discussed in the Rowley report with Rowley concluding that future officer recruitment should be primarily from the segment of Canadian youth intent on pursuing a university education. The Morton report came to a similar conclusion as Rowley but acknowledged the importance of a limited

OCTP in order to provide a greater degree of flexibility in human resource management with respect to recruitment. Both Rowley and Morton also recognized that formal academic education is only one aspect of officer development. Just as important are aspects such as experience, military competence, and leadership, and that a balanced program is needed to support career-long development.

Based on the statistical trend of Canadian youth's desire for post-secondary education, it was inevitable that the officer corps would have to recruit primarily from those high school graduates destined for post-secondary education. But the recommendation by the Minister that all commissioned officers must have a degree for reasons of intellectual capacity is overstated given the evidence, allows no flexibility in recruiting, and should have been coordinated with the officer professional development system in order to achieve the desired affect. The preliminary results from the Op Research reports provides some indication that hastily conceived policies can have serious operational consequences.

Officer Education in other Militaries

In order to better understand the implications and trends of officer education in Canada, it is useful to contrast and compare the Canadian system of officer educational development and professionalism with that of other nations. Such a comparison will serve to highlight the benefits and drawbacks of educational policies in situations or under conditions that might not have occurred in Canada. In order to limit the scope, this paper will focus on the educational system of the US military officer corps since the US experienced much the same societal trends in education as Canada and it is most often contrasted with the Canadian Forces as an officer corps that has fully embraced the concept of advanced academic education. The German and the Israeli officer education systems will also be considered but only where they differ significantly from that of Canada.

The historical development of officer education in the United States began with the establishment of West Point, the United States Military Academy, in 1802, followed by the US Navy Academy in 1845.[95] The USAF would eventually set up its own academy in shortly after its creation in 1947. Following WW II, the role of the officer became increasing complex with a requirement for knowledge in many areas that were not exclusively military in nature.[96] This growing knowledge requirement for officers caused concern for their intellectual development and influential people such as General Eisenhower remarked that "[officers] should have a background of general knowledge

[95] Huntington, *The Soldier and The State, p* 198-200.

[96] Masland, *Soldiers and Scholars*, p 25.

similar to that possessed by the graduates of our leading universities."[97] Thus, the principle architects of US military education after WW II placed strong emphasis on the need for all officers to obtain a university degree upon commissioning.[98] Although the US military has recruited officers without degrees during periods of rapid expansion or national emergency, the emphasis of the US Professional Military Education (PME) System since WW II has been that all officers should have a degree.[99] By 1997, Legault reported that 90% of all American military officers had achieved at least undergraduate degree status compared to the Canadian statistic of only 50%.[100] In addition, the US has a strong system of staff, command and war colleges, and a post-graduate degree is considered mandatory for senior ranks.[101]

There are currently three officer entry paths into the US military: the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), the service academies, and the Officer Candidate School (OCS).[102] The ROTC scheme accounts for the largest pool of officer candidates. The ROTC candidate is provided with a subsidized education while attending a civilian university in a reserve capacity. The service academies, such as West Point, provide the next largest group of officer candidates and offer a four-year program of education

---

[97] Ibid, p 28.

[98] Ibid, p 85.

[99] Efflandt and Reed, "Developing the Warrior-Scholar." *Military Review*. Vol. 81 Issue 4 (July/August, 2001), pp 85.

[100] Albert Legault, *A Paper prepared for the Minister of National Defence by Professor Albert Legault Laval University*. Report to the Prime Minister (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1997), p 41.

[101] *Morton Report*, Vol 3 (Report on Foreign Field Research), p 10.

[102] *Professional military education : an asset for peace and progress / a report of the CSIS Study Group on Professional Military Education*, Dick Cheney, chairman (Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997), p 21.

leading to a baccalaureate degree in science. The third entry scheme, OCS, is based on a 13-14 week course and is used to recruit superior enlisted personnel and non-commissioned officers into the officer corps.[103] This scheme can be used to recruit Army and Marine candidates that do not have a degree, but it is preferred that the candidate has a degree or at least partial credits towards attaining a degree. Despite the importance the US military has placed on obtaining a university education, the US has maintained the OCS program with its ability to recruit officers without a degree as a "critical safety valve for rapidly regulating the flow of officers, especially in times of national emergency."[104]

In addition to undergraduate education, the US military also places high value on graduate education for senior officers. In 1996, 38% of all US officers had a graduate degree compared to just 6.8% in Canada.[105] The importance of a graduate degree at senior officer levels is even more pronounced as attainment of a graduate degree has become critical for promotion.[106] In 1996, 90% of all USAF lieutenant-colonels and 98% of all colonels had a graduate degree.[107] Granatstein and Legault both use these statistics to emphasis how poorly educated, and therefore less intellectual in their view, are senior Canadian officers compared to their US counterparts. Despite this viewpoint from

---

[103] Daniel Kaufman, "Military Undergraduate Security Education for the New Millennium" *Educating International Security Practitioners: Preparing To Face the Demands of the 21st Century International Environment* (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2001), p 7.

[104] *Professional military education : an asset for…,* p 34.

[105] Legault, *A Paper Prepared for the MND*…, p 40-41.

[106] Edwin Arnold, *Professional Military Education: Its Historical Development and Future Challenges* (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 1993), p 25.

[107] *Professional military education : an asset for…,* p 15.

Granatstein and Legault, there appears to be no evidence to suggest that Canadian officers are any less capable or looked down upon by their American compatriots because of their lack of degrees. Canadians officers have performed extremely well in many senior US exchange positions and appointments such as deputy chief NORAD.

Van Creveld offers a somewhat different perspective by asserting that the promotion of graduate studies in the US had more to do with maintaining the prestige of the officer corps and enhancing second career options than intellectual development. Van Creveld provides the opinion that:

> Officers under pressure to get their tickets punched took easy courses at less competitive school. Easy courses at less competitive schools often produced mediocre results. Whatever the quality of education provided, the net impact on the ability to fight and win wars was minimal.[108]

Although Van Creveld offered no evidence to support his views on advanced degrees, his concerns regarding the "ticket punching" mentality that has developed would seem to be justified judging by a recent policy announcement in the USAF. USAF Chief of Staff, General Jumper, recently issued guidance to alter academic education at the post-graduate level such that it will become more complementary to career development of USAF officers. The USAF has a mandatory graduate degree requirement for promotion to lieutenant-colonel, which fostered the "ticket punching" mentality described by Van Creveld. General Jumper stated that the mandatory graduate degree policy will be cancelled but efforts will be expanded to allow Air Force officers to pursue academic interests complementary to their careers. General Jumper articulated his vision in a recent address at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey:

---

[108] Van Creveld, *The Training of Officers,* p 78.

> If we think you need a master's degree to do [a job], then we give you the opportunity to do that and we don't require people to spend all weekend or three nights a week like I did in night school to go get a master's degree just to be competitive for promotion. We want a master's degree, an advanced academic degree, to have meaning. We want it to blend with professional military education and we want PME to be relevant and useful to the Air Force we live in today.[109]

Formal academic education and professional military education will be tailored to the needs of the individual and to the benefit of the USAF. Advanced degrees will still be offered to most officers, but depending on the degree, they may receive credits towards compulsory activities in their military education program. No longer will an engineer and a pilot be expected to complete an identical academic and military education program. The needs of these occupations are different and this will be reflected in their professional development.[110]

Van Creveld takes his view regarding the effectiveness of advanced degrees, with respect to military efficiency, one step further when he comments that the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) experienced a coincident drop in combat effectiveness at the same time there was increased emphasis on academic education for officers.[111] Until recently, academic education in the IDF was not given much emphasis and may have been actively discouraged. Studies conducted in Israel showed that academic graduates assigned to combat units as platoon leaders failed to translate their intellectual abilities into effective leadership. The conclusion was that "the ability to lead combat units effectively required

---

[109] "Jumper emphasizes total force development during visit," [http://www.af.mil.newa.Nov2002/1129022.shtml], 29 Nov 02.

[110] "Chief's Sight Picture," [http://www.af.mil/lib/sight/Total_Force_Development.pdf], 6 Nov 02.

[111] Van Creveld, *The Training of Officers*, p 75.

something more than, or perhaps different from, academic prowess and hence demanded a selection and training process independent of civilian schooling."[112]

Despite this report, one reason for the lack of emphasis in academic education was likely due to the fact that Israel was constantly at war for survival and it was prowess in combat situations that was critical to the state and therefore the most important aspect in promotion. There was also an anti-intellectual trend in Israeli society as most state leaders did not have a degree, and the Israeli officer held high status in Israeli society even without being highly educated.[113] Recently, however, the IDF officer corps has come under criticism for its lack of critical thinking and the intellectual level of its senior officers. This criticism was particularly harsh as a result of the IDF failures in Lebanon, a result similar to the Somalia reaction in Canada.[114] Policies have therefore been put in place to encourage attainment of academic qualifications for officers, and a university degree is now required for promotion to Colonel.[115] The new policies with regards to academic qualifications have received acceptance in the Israeli military largely as a result of trends in Israeli society regarding the growing importance of advanced education. Retiring senior officers have now found it difficult to start a second career in a suitable job without advanced education.[116]

---

[112] Reuven Gal, *A portrait of the Israeli soldier* (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1986), p 35.

[113] Van Creveld, *The Training of Officers*, p 75.

[114] Gal, *A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier*, p 182.

[115] Ibid, p 167.

[116] Yael Enoch and AbrahamYogev, "Military-University Encounters and the Educational Plans of Israeli Officers," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 15 No. 3 (Spring 1989), p 450.

Less critical than Van Creveld was a major congressional report published in 1989 on the state of education and professional development in the US military commomly referred to as the Skelton Report.[117] That report confirmed the need for US officers to be well educated in order to develop leaders who can think at the strategic level and be skilled in the application of that strategy. However, the report noted that aside from education, talent and experience were also major components in the development of a strategist. The report concluded that formal academic education was important in officer development, but that it should not be pursued at the expense of service and joint educational programs. One of the key recommendations of the report was that "[e]ducation outside the PME system, although necessary, should not be viewed as a substitute for professional military education."[118]

The method of officer selection and enrolment in Canada and the USA are similar in that the candidate is designated as an officer at the time they enroll. Van Creveld criticizes that this system of officer selection doesn't depend on actual performance in the military, but is determined by examiners and interviewers.[119] Germany, one of the first countries to introduce academic education and a system of professional development into its military, has, however, developed an officer enrolment system quite different from the North American method, which addresses the concern expressed by Van Creveld.

In the German officer-candidate system, the pre-commissioned officer undergoes a series of basic training courses and initial leadership roles for a period of two years

---

[117] *Report of the Panel on Military Education*, Ike Skelton, chairman (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1989). Hereafter referred to as the Skelton report.

[118] Skelton report, p 31.

[119] Van Creveld, *The Training of Officers*, p 2.

before he is finally commissioned as a 2nd lieutenant. Once commissioned, the new officer completes a five-month tour as platoon leader and proceeds to a civilian university to complete an undergraduate degree. He is promoted to 1st lieutenant about halfway through his university education. Professional development continues throughout the remaining career of the German officer through attendance at various officer qualification and command and staff officer schools.[120]

The officer development model used by Germany helps to reinforce the notion that one of the primary roles of the officer, particularly those of the operational classifications, is to be militarily competent at leading troops into battle. By the time the potential officer candidate is commissioned he is already trained in the skills of warfighting and has developed a degree of dedication and identification to the military. He is not simply a naïve youth looking for a subsidized education, a charge that has been leveled at the Canadian system by Goetze, who stated that those who enroll in the Canadian ROTP program "see it as a cheap means of getting an expensive education."[121] Another advantage of the German system is that the new 1st lieutenant is fully capable of actively contributing to the operational success of his unit, whereas in the Canadian system, a new 1st lieutenant may have had little practical military or leadership experience other than a classification qualifying course. Although the German 2nd Lieutenant is commissioned before he has completed his university education, the rank of 2nd Lieutenant can be considered a training rank with only limited professional responsibilities and therefore limited intellectual requirements. This position can be

---

[120] Luke G. Grossman, *Command and General Staff Officer Education for the 21st Century: Examining the German Model* (Ft Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, 2002), p 13-15.

[121] Goetze, *Officer Professionalism*, p 41.

likened to a doctor working as an intern in a hospital where he has only limited discretion and authority to act independently of the local resident. Most would see the intern as a doctor in training rather than a fully-fledged professional.

The general theme amongst the nations studied in this section is that academic education, to at least the undergraduate level, is encouraged, or in the case of the USA, insisted upon, for all officers. However, even the USA maintains an entry program that would allow for rapid expansion of the officer corps through the induction of candidates without a degree in the event of a national emergency. The German method of officer entry provides an interesting alternative to consider as academic education is still emphasized, but only after the development of essential military skills. Such a method could be used as basis for a renewed OCTP program.

The American success at implementing a degreed officer corps is often held up as an example for Canada to emulate despite the lack of evidence that Canadian officers are any less inferior to their southern counterparts. The US system has its critics too, as Van Creveld argued that the advanced degree program in the US is an ineffective program that will not achieve its aim; however, efforts by the USAF appear to be underway to address these criticisms as they back away from a mandatory graduate degree policy that was similar to the one initiated by the MND. The criticisms made by Van Creveld may be somewhat over stated, but the direction shown by the USAF and Israeli experiences justifies the assertion that formal academic education must be coordinated in a program of career-long officer development, and that over-emphasis of academic education through mandatory requirements may not achieve the desired results.

Current Practices and Possible Reforms in Military Education

The previous chapters in this paper have established the basic trends in the education and training of the officer corps, both within Canada and other western democracies, particularly the USA. The MND justified his decision to restrict officer commissioning to those with degrees on the need to increase intellectual capacity in the officer corps. However, Van Creveld, and even Rowley, point out that the general trend in society in favour of higher education, its resultant bias and its effect on recruitment, may be the prime reason for the increasing emphasis on academic qualifications within the military. This chapter will examine the current situation within the Canadian Forces with respect to officer academic qualifications, whether or not current policies support the development higher intellectual standards, and the nature and type of education needed to develop greater intellectual capacity. Society's current attitude with regards to education will also be reviewed as it pertains to officer education and recruitment programs. Finally, some suggestions will be provided to improve the balance between officer education, professional development, and fiscal realities including the implementation of a modified OCTP program.

Since 1997, commissioning in the Canadian Forces has been restricted to those with a baccalaureate level university degree, with the exception of the CFR intake. Despite the direction that all newly commissioned officers will have an undergraduate degree by 2020, over half, as noted in the Officership 2020 Statement of Requirements (SOR) document, are still without a degree.[122] A program has been put in place in order to encourage those officers without a degree to obtain one by providing financial

[122] Canadian Officership 2020 SOR, p 13.

assistance, and in some cases, paid leave of absence to attend formal classes.[123] Additional emphasis has also been placed on graduate degree status for senior officers in order to meet future command and staff challenges. This goal is also to be realized by 2020 for DP 4 (Col rank) officers.[124]

There have also been some changes arising from the Morton Report to the OPDS that seek to strengthen and instill the growth of professionalism in the officer corps. The Junior Officer level development period (DP 2) incorporates "training [that] emphasizes education and job experience towards occupational, environmental and functional command requirements."[125] This training consists of a combination of on-the-job training, self-development, and formal courses. The focus of this training is at the tactical level of warfare. This training has been modified only slightly in the past few years although increased emphasis is now placed on completion of all DP2 activities before officers can qualify for promotion to the next level.

The primary activity at the advanced officer level (DP 3) is still attendance at Command and Staff College (CSC), a one-year formal course. The focus at CSC is on enabling the aspiring career officer to function at the operational level of war but academic rigour, aimed at development of intellectual capacity, has been progressively increased. Starting in 2002, qualified CSC students were able to obtain a professional master's degree in defence studies from RMC based on credit given for CSC course work plus an additional graduate level research paper.

---

[123] DAOD 5031-7, *Initial Baccalaureate Degree Programme* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2000).

[124] Canadian Officership 2020 SOR, p 14.

[125] DAOD 5038-1, p 3.

The senior officer level (DP 4) has been modified quite extensively in order to rectify the gap in professional development left by the loss of the National Defence College in the early 1990s. The Canadian Forces College has introduced two new courses, the Advanced Military Studies Course (AMSC) and the National Security Studies Course (NSSC), intended to provide this essential training at the advanced operational level and the strategic level. The four-month AMSC usually occurs at the LCol – Col rank and the six-month NSSC usually occurs at the Col - BGen rank.

Despite the improvements to the OPDS and attempts to introduce academic rigour, there remains the perception that career development and academic achievement are not complementary goals. This perception was noted by Morton when he concluded that, "[t]oo often the wrong people were educated to do the wrong things, often at high cost."[126] Failure to utilize gained academic knowledge in job related activities could lead to feelings of frustration and apathy regarding academic achievement. Such an opinion was voiced in a survey from the Morton report when officers complained that they never used the knowledge gained as a result of their academic degree and that "having a degree has nothing to do with being a good officer."[127] Such feelings of apathy could also partially explain why less than half of the students attending the current CSC course are attempting to qualify for the Masters in Defence Studies degree.

Policies and incentives should be in place to encourage officers to pursue academic qualifications; however, policies that enforce degrees as mandatory for promotion will reinforce the "ticket punching" perception, particularly if the type of

[126] Morton Report, Vol 1 p 5.

[127] Morton Report, Vol 2 (Report on the Gathering and Analysis of Opinion), p B-4/11.

degree or its applicability to the military and the member's job function is irrelevant. Van Creveld scathingly states, "The present system, under which very large numbers of officers are encouraged, even pressured, into taking advanced degrees in all kinds of probable and improbable fields is, militarily speaking, quite useless."[128] Van Creveld argues that officers should focus their studies on the profession of war and not try to match government officials and academics in academic qualifications.

There are also complaints that post-graduate education in the Canadian Forces is focused on achieving degrees that will not increase officer intellectual capacity. Morton comments that "postgraduate education, was, and still is to some extent, focused primarily on the technical occupations, while intellectual development or broadening have not been addressed."[129] This bias towards technical degrees was also noted in the Fraser Report, which complained that there is little Canadian Forces sponsorship for non-technical graduate degrees and many officers have the assumption that a non-technical degree is not appropriate for a true military education.[130] Although there have been some changes to address this imbalance, such as the addition of a number of military defence and war studies degrees available from RMC, there is still little sponsorship or incentive to induce officers to specifically undertake these degrees.

The lack of a coordinated military education policy that fully supports advanced education amongst Canadian Forces officers is another factor that contributes towards

---

[128] Van Creveld, *The Training of Officers*, p 105.

[129] Morton Report, Vol 1 p 37-38.

[130] *Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces*, John A. Fraser, chairman (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1999), p 12.

apathy and perpetuates the "ticket punching" perception of education.[131] Career-minded officers are told they must obtain an advanced degree but current policies only provide minimal financial support and little career management coordination.[132] Current career management policies have, in fact, created a situation where many junior officers perceive that taking time from active operational tours to undertake a graduate degree increases the time to promotion, particularly from captain to major.[133] Although some promotion incentive points are provided to obtain a degree, they cannot compete with the high performance point total that one can earn on an operational tour. This attitude amongst Canadian officers is quite different to that of US officers where policies and funding are in place so that anyone can get a get an advanced degree and it is generally viewed as a positive career move.[134] The situation for senior Canadian officers is not much better as academic sabbaticals to achieve advanced degrees are rarely given due to the current ops tempo.[135] Retired BGen Hague, former RMC Commandant, stated that Canada needs a unified and balanced education policy for CF officers that fully supports

---

[131] David Jay Bercuson, *Educating Canada's Military: Workshop report on new university programmes for the Canadian Armed Forces* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1998), p 14, and *Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change…,* p 11.

[132] Bercuson, *Educating Canada's Military*, p 12.

[133] Ibid, p11.

[134] Richard Schmidt, "Advancement Potential Through Graduate Education," *Adult Learning*, Vol 8 Issue 2 (Nov/Dec, 1996), p 2.

[135] BGen (Ret'd) W. Don Mcnamara, "Intellectualism in the General Officer Corps." *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral*, ed by Bernd Horn and Stephen J. Harris (St.Catharines, Ont: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2001), p 503.

advanced education along with long-term career management policies if we are to successfully achieve the goal to further intellectualize our senior officers.[136]

Others have also raised concerns as to whether or not we are providing our newly commissioned officers with an appropriate education for the development of intellectual capacity. The concern expressed is that undergraduate degrees heavily biased towards technology and engineering may not provide a sufficient basis for the development of intellectual capacity. Bedley states that the development of a strategic leader starts with an undergraduate education and that that education should be a liberal education.[137] Goetze argued some years ago that entry officer education is too technical and should be based on a program of liberal arts in order to develop greater professionalism in the officer corps.[138] More recently, Last echoed these concerns that education concentrated in technology and engineering may not be preparing our newly commissioned officers for the types of problems they will encounter. Last argues that officer entry education should concentrate on the sciences and humanities since this would provide better skills development in cognitive abilities, sensitivity and leadership.[139]

Although many insist that an officer education should be based on a broad-based liberal arts program, Rowley asserts that any degree imparts the "ability to acquire

---

[136] BGen Ken C. Hague, "Strategic Thinking General/Flag Officers: The Role of Education," *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral*, ed by Bernd Horn and Stephen J. Harris (St.Catharines, Ont: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2001), p 517.

[137] David F.Bedey, *An Undergraduate Foundation for Strategic Leaders* (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2001), p 10.

[138] Goetze, *Officer Professionalism*, p 33.

[139] David Last, "Educating Officers: Post-Modern Professionals to Control and Prevent Violence," *Contemporary Issues in Officership: A Canadian Perspective*, ed by Bernd Horn (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2000), p 30.

knowledge, to analyze and to understand," which are the important characteristics that must be developed for intellectual growth.[140] This criticism against the technical degree is partially compensated for by RMC since it does offer a much broader liberal based program for engineering students as compared to many civilian universities[141] (although RMC only accounts for about 25% of the CF officer intake).[142] BGen Macnamara also cautions against eliminating technical degrees arguing that the CF needs officers with both technical and liberal arts backgrounds.[143] Some officers with strong technical backgrounds are needed if we are to keep pace with battlefield technology and the ongoing revolution in military affairs.

It is interesting to note that although most academics and scholars universally support the requirement that all commissioned officers need a university degree, a survey conducted in 1993 of Canadian Forces officers showed that less than half felt a university degree was necessary to be an officer.[144] Of course supporters of the university policy will point out that this survey merely reflected the anti-educational bias and the "no-think-necessary culture" of the Canadian Forces officer corps, since at the time of the survey only about half of the Canadian Forces officers had a university degree.[145] The same survey, however, did report that even amongst those with a university degree, only

---

[140] Rowley Report, p 35.

[141] *Report of the Ministerial Committee on the Canadian Military Colleges*, Pierre Martin, chairman (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1993), p 7.

[142] *Report of the RMC Board of Governor's Study Group: Review of the Undergrad Program at RMC,* Gen Ramsey Withers (ret'd), president (Kingston: RMC, 1998), p 15.

[143] Macnamara, Intellectualism in the General Officer Corps, p 499.

[144] Morton Report, Vol 2 (Report on the Officer General Specification), p14.

[145] Robert Shepperd, "Degree of Command," *Maclean's Magazine*, May 1, 1997, p 70.

75% felt that their degree had proven useful.[146] But once again, this attitude may stem from a lack of a coordinated education policy in the Canadian Forces and its failure to promote the benefits of education and ensure a culture of educational awareness and intellectual excellence.

The need for a balanced education and officer development policy is even recognized by those strong supporters of a degreed officer corps, such as Bercuson, who admit that formal education alone is not enough to create good leaders.[147] The Skelton Report recognized the importance of formal education, but stated that academic education alone is not good enough for the development of our future military leaders; it must be supplemented by professional military development to ensure the development of military competencies and talent through experience and military studies.[148] Leaders with critical thinking abilities will not occur unless the seeds of those abilities, planted at the time of obtaining a degree, are nurtured throughout the officer's career.

Is the requirement for a newly commissioned officer to have a university degree based on the intellectual needs of an officer to perform his duties at the start of his career, or based on other factors such as recruiting trends and societal bias in favour of university education? Although the numerous scholars and academics already mentioned in this paper universally support the policy that a commissioned officer must have a degree, surprisingly little analysis or evidence is provided to support this position. Even BGen Macnamera, a strong supporter of academic education, concedes, "The general

---

[146] Morton Report, Vol 2 (Report on the Officer General Specification), p 15.

[147] Bercuson, *Educating Canada's Military,* p 27.

[148] Skelton Report, p 31.

assumption that an undergraduate degree develops a 'critical intellect,' is certainly subject to scrutiny, especially in the generalization of the success of the aim."[149] BGen Macnamera asserts that an undergraduate degree should be considered as an indicator of critical analysis capability, but the academic content of the degree and the level of achievement of the student may also have a bearing on the development of critical intellect.[150] However, despite these concerns, the general further remarks, "without an officer corps with a minimum of a first degree, any aspirations for an intellectual general officer corps would be seriously self-limiting."[151]

If intellectual capacity and creative thinking skills of the senior officer is the primary purpose of the university degree, could these skills not be also obtained by targeting those officers who show the promise of career advancement through a tailored program of academics and military education? The analysis provided by Rowley on officer qualities would seem to suggest that greater intellectual development need not occur until later in an officer's career, although a certain degree of intellect is needed at the beginning. Retired General Baril, former CDS, however, argues that junior officers must have an academic education in order to increase their intellectual competence since even at the junior level, they must be prepared to deal with situations that are complex and full of moral and ethical dilemmas.[152] Reoyo provides a valid example of the skills needed by a junior officer when he describes the situation where a platoon captain in

---

[149] Macnamara, Intellectualism in the General Officer Corps, p 498.

[150] Ibid.

[151] Ibid, p 499.

[152] Gen Maurice Baril, "Officership: A personal Reflection," *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral*, ed by Bernd Horn and Stephen J. Harris (St.Catharines, Ont: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2001), p 142.

Bosnia, operating at the tactical level, is asked to hold a bridge that has strategic importance. Now imagine that this captain and his platoon are besieged by an angry mob of Serb peasants, mostly women and older men, but threatening violence with sticks and clubs.[153] The captain's failure or success in this low level task will therefore have strategic consequences. He will undoubtedly need a keen intellect to select the appropriate course of action, but just as important, he will have to be a competent leader with strong communication and interpersonal skills, and thoroughly knowledgeable on the rules and regulations pertaining to the theatre of operation. These skills would not be provided by a university education alone.

It is highly desirable that every officer have a university degree in order to enhance their intellectual capacity and expand their knowledge of the world, but the fiscal realities of providing for such an outcome and the possibility that not enough candidates possessing degrees will be found to fill all entry level requirements, create a possibility that such a policy may be unsustainable as noted by the Op Research reports. BGen Hague takes a more pragmatic approach and proposes that such a recruiting deficiency could be rectified by recruiting candidates without a degree but possessing the ability to obtain a degree over a specified period of time. Each candidate would be assessed and offered a tailored education plan at the time of entry so as to elevate his level of intellect throughout his career.[154]

---

[153] Paul J. Reoyo, *Professional Education: Key to Transformation* (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2002), p 1-2.

[154] Bercuson, Educating Canada's Military, p 23.

At the time of the Morton report, the approximate cost of educating an undergraduate student at RMC was $76,000 per year.[155] Although the per-student costs of education at a civilian university would perhaps be cheaper, it would still not be an insignificant cost. One may argue that such an investment is worth the cost in order to develop career officers that have the necessary intellectual capacity and critical thinking skills to function as a military officer in today's complex environment, but many of these officers will not become career officers or achieve senior ranks. Many will only serve whatever time is necessary to payback the "free" education. Paulson argues that the Canadian Forces would gain better investment by educating motivated OCTP officers rather than investing in the unknown ROTP candidate prior to commissioning.[156] Since the OCTP entrant is only signed to a short service engagement, a substantial educational investment need only be made if the OCTP officer shows the intellectual capacity and motivation to successfully achieve higher academic potential. If such potential is not shown then the officer can be released at the end of his short service engagement.

One of the difficulties of this concept is that:

> Unless officers are educated by the time they are commissioned, the demands of technology and professional specialization will make it harder for them to educate themselves before they reach a post which will demand critical, imaginative, and comprehensive intelligence.[157]

---

[155] Morton Report, Vol 1 p 44.

[156] G.A. Paulson, *University Education for the Officer Cadet Training Plan (OCTP) Entry Officer* (Toronto: Canadian Forces College, 1990), p 17.

[157] Theodore Ropp, "The Military Officer and his Education in the Next Quarter of a Century," *Centennial Symposium on Military Education: Military Academies: Problems and Prospects* (Kingston: Royal Military College of Canada, 1976), p 12.

This concern could be mitigated with a program, such as that envisioned by BGen Hague, where academic and military training are managed on a coordinated, individual basis. This program would not be that dissimilar from the current Initial Baccalaureate Degree Programme with the savings made in entry-level education costs used to fund the program. It should also be remembered that such a program would be limited in size and that the majority of Canadian Forces officers would still entry through one of the other degreed programs. In addition, not all of the modified OCTP candidates would qualify for advanced education; only those deemed suitable. Such a program would, however, require implementation of supportive career management polices to ensure that sufficient academic leave is available for those selected to pursue a degree.

This is not to say that Canada should eliminate the ROTP program and institute a system of officer training and development similar to Germany. As noted by Rowley previously, Canadian youths anticipate a university education as the key to success and status. The Officership 2020 SOR noted that in 1996, over 36% of the Canadian workforce had completed some form of academic education beyond high school.[158] The Canadian Forces will have to continue to offer the prospect of a university education if it is to recruit from the top intellectual prospects of today's youth. Rather, as suggested by Morton, the OCTP program could be retained as a low-cost option to account for production shortfalls in the ROTP, UTPM, and DEO programs. The OCTP program should, however, be modified from the format previously used. As suggested by Hague, the number of candidates should be limited with the quality of the applicants closely

[158] *Canadian Officership 2020 SOR*, p 25.

monitored to ensure that the candidates meet a high standard and be fully capable of obtaining a university education by some specific point in the future.

A further benefit of reinstating a limited OCTP program is that it would shorten the time until the officer-candidate became a fully trained and effective officer since education would not be pre-loaded at the front of the officer's career. This would aid in human resource management during times of high attrition, as recently occurred in the pilot classification, since the OCTP officer will become available in a much shorter time to alleviate operational manning difficulties.

The overwhelming balance of scholarly writings and professional opinions would support the premise that increased intellectualization and professionalism of the CF officer corps is essential to the future of the CF. This point is best summed up by the often quoted passage by Gen Allard in the Rowley report:

> It matters little whether the Forces have their present manpower strength and financial budget, or half or them, or double them; without a properly educated, effectively trained, professional officer corps the Forces would, in the future, be doomed to, at the best, mediocrity; at the worst, disaster.[159]

But just as the importance of academic education is clear in the literature and studies regarding this subject, it is also clear that without a balanced system of officer professional development, coordinating attainment of academic qualifications and military competencies, even the provision of a degree for all commissioned officers will not guarantee the achievement of the goal as envisioned by General Allard. Incentive and supportive policies are critical in fostering an atmosphere of intellectual development, but academic degrees obtained solely for the purposes of promotion will lead to the

[159] Rowley Report, p IV.

development of a “ticket punching” mentality. A balanced approach is needed that will match the achievement of academic qualifications, be they liberal arts or technical degrees, to the professional and job related requirements of the individual. Although the suggestion to reinstate a modified OCTP scheme would seem to be incompatible with the call for increased academic qualifications, the program as envisioned, could improve the overall human resource management of the officer corps without sacrificing intellectual development. A better-managed officer corps could then assist efforts to allow personnel time for academic upgrading since manpower shortages would be reduced through achievement of recruitment quotas and shorter classification qualification times.

Conclusion

The events surrounding the marred Somalia peacekeeping mission in 1993, triggered an analysis the Canadian Forces officer corps that highlighted many areas of concern, but one area that received considerable attention was the role that education plays in the development of officer professionalism. As a result of this analysis, the MND issued a report concluding that officer professionalism must start with an appropriate education and that formal academic education was needed by the Canadian Forces officer if he were to develop the intellectual capacity and critical thinking skills needed to function in today's complex environment. Officer education policy was then changed such that with exception of the CFR program, commissioning in the officer corps would be restricted to those with a university education, and that senior officers would, in the future, be required to obtain a graduate degree.

Although the decision that all officers must have a university degree was precipitated by the Somalia crisis, such a requirement had been debated in Canada and other countries for numerous years, particularly since the end of WW II. The debate centred on the educational requirements needed to establish the basis for the officer profession and how best to achieve the required degree of intellectualization. The issue regarding the professionalism and intellectualization of the officer corps is very complex, and not one that can be solved by simply ensuring all commissioned officers have a baccalaureate degree. The aim of this paper was to show that the desired goal could only be achieved through a balanced program of academics, military training and continued professional development, all conducted in a supportive environment.

The beginnings of the requirement for officer education can be linked to the growth of professionalism within the officer corps starting with the changes that occurred in the Prussian army in the 19th century. It was the Prussians who first established minimum educational standards for officers, abolished aristocratic privilege, and removed the ability to purchase an officer commission regardless of qualifications. The Prussians were also the first to recognize the need for continuous education and training of officers and established a command and staff college to further expand an officer's abilities in the art of war.

The growth of a professional officer corps occurred more slowly in most other countries but by the early 20th century, aided by the growing influence and power of the liberal middle class, this trend had taken hold in other western democracies. In Canada, this trend was seen in the establishment of RMC and growth of an independent Canadian military. However, the permanent Canadian officer corps remained small, poorly funded, and heavily reliant upon the British for top leadership and strategic direction. Even the large military mobilizations of WW I and II were accomplished by a largely militia based, citizen soldier army. The situation changed quite drastically after WW II. Canada had become a country with strategic interests in other parts of the world and maintained a modest permanent force to address those interests. The role of the officer had become more complex requiring a resultant increase in his critical thinking skills and ability to comprehend issues outside the sphere of tactical warfare. This new role required the officer to acquire a much higher level of academic knowledge than previously needed in order to understand the complex issues he faced; hence the increased emphasis on university education.

The increasing importance of academic qualifications for officers was also partially due to a general shift in society concerning the value of higher education. The now powerful middle class perceived a university education as the ticket to prosperity, and an academic qualification became a status symbol of achievement. The trend, which saw Canadian youth attend post secondary schooling in ever increasing numbers throughout the 60s and 70s, began to affect officer recruitment. The Government was compelled to offer the opportunity to join the military and receive a subsidized university education in order to attract top quality high school prospects into the officer corps.

One of the first comprehensive reports on Canadian Forces officer education and development was the Rowley report. This report, produced in 1969, analyzed many aspects of officer education and recommended that all officers receive a university education prior to commissioning. Rowley stated that such action would ensure the development of necessary intellectual skills, but also conceded that it was needed in order to attract quality candidates to the officer corps. A follow-on report by Morton some twenty-six years later would draw much the same conclusions as Rowley. Following the Morton report, a series of reports from several Canadian scholars to the MND would not only recommend that all officers have a university degree, but that all senior officers above the Lieutenant-Colonel rank should have a graduate degree in order to develop an even higher level of intellectual capacity.

This trend in officer education was also seen in other countries but none so strongly as in the USA where almost all commissioned officers have a university education and many senior officers have a graduate degree. Some Canadian scholars, such as Granatstein, point to the USA's achievements in the level of officer education as

a goal that the Canadian Officer corps should try to emulate. Others, such as Van Creveld, question the utility of this advanced education on the essential war fighting ability of the military and argue that the policies in place have created a "ticket punching" approach to higher education that will not foster the desired growth of intellect.

Although the Canadian OPDS has been modified to increase the development of intellectual and critical thinking skills, there remains a disconnect between the achievement of academic qualifications and the development of those essential skills and competencies needed by an officer to carry out his duties. As has been seen in the USA, the need for academic qualification is perceived as more of a need to fill in a "check box" on the way to promotion rather than an essential element of professionalism and military capability. Policies in place are not supportive in helping officers to complete advanced degrees and the intellectual content and military utility provided at both the undergrad and graduate level can be suspect, depending on the degree taken and the institution attended.

If policies were implemented that were more supportive of attaining advanced education, in conjunction with a coordinated professional development system, then it might be possible to reinstate a modified version of the OCTP entry scheme, whereby a limited number of suitable candidates are allowed into certain officer classifications. These candidates would have to meet minimum education standards and would only be commissioned on a short service engagement plan. The primary purpose of such a plan would be to provide a cheaper source of junior officers, particularly during times of high recruitment or national emergencies. Those candidates that show potential for career

officer status through outstanding performance could then be targeted for advanced education at that time.

Given the complex operational environment that the Canadian Forces must perform its duties and society's emphasis on higher education, Canada should have a policy supporting the attainment of a university degree by all officers. Such a policy would help to ensure that all officers attain a suitable level of intellectual development and professionalism. A similar policy is also needed to encourage career officers to achieve higher levels of intellectual development through appropriate graduate work in military relevant fields of study. Although a university degree may establish the pattern for learning and development of analytical skills, the creation of a competent military officer and a strategic leader will only occur through a balanced, career long program of academics and officer professional development. There are many factors that will determine to what extent an officer will develop the appropriate intellectual capacity and competency skills needed to become an effective military leader; a formal academic education is only one of those factors. By placing too much emphasis on academic qualifications with mandatory and inflexible requirements, the Canadian Forces runs the risk of creating a officer development system that will not achieve the desired result of a highly professional and militarily competent officer corps.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Arnold, Edwin J. *Professional Military Education: Its Historical Development and Future Challenges*. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 1993.

Baril, Maurice, Gen. "Officership: A personal Reflection." *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral*. Edited by Bernd Horn and Stephen J. Harris. St.Catharines, Ont: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2001.

Bedey, David F. *An Undergraduate Foundation for Strategic Leaders*. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2001.

Bercuson, David Jay. *Educating Canada's Military: Workshop report on new university programmes for the Canadian Armed Forces*. Ottawa: DND Canda, 1998.

Bercuson, D.J. *A Paper prepared for the Minister of National Defence by D.J. Bercuson, PhD, FRSC University of Calgary*. Report to the Prime Minister. Ottawa: DND Canada, 1997.

Canada, Department of National Defence. DAOD 5031-7 *Initial Baccalaureate Degree Programme* . Ottawa: DND Canada, 2000.

Canada, Department of National Defence. DAOD 5038-1 *Officer Professional Development (OPD) System*. Ottawa: DND Canada, 1997.

Canadian Officership in the 21st century : OPD 2020 statement of operational requirement. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2000.

"Chief's Sight Picture." [http://www.af.mil/lib/sight/Total_Force_Development.pdf]. 6 November 2002.

"CLFCSC History." [http://lfdts.army.mil.ca/clfcsc-cceftc/About/hist_coll.asp?tree=about]. 17 September 2002.

Efflandt, Scott, and Reed, Brian. "Developing the Warrior-Scholar." *Military Review*. Vol. 81 Issue 4 (July/August, 2001), pp 82-90.

Enoch, Yael, and Yogev, Abraham. "Military-University Encounters and the Educational Plans of Israeli Officers." *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 15 No. 3 (Spring 1989), pp 449-461.

Gal, Reuven. *A portrait of the Israeli Soldier*. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1986.

Goetze, Bernd A. *Military Professionalism: The Canadian Officer Corps*. Kingston: Queen's University, 1976.

Granatstein, J.L. *A Paper prepared for the Minister of National Defence by Dr. J.L. Granatstein Canadian Institute of International Affairs*. Report to the Prime Minister. Ottawa: DND Canada, 1997.

Grossman, Luke G. *Command and General Staff Officer Education for the 21st Century: Examining the German Model*. Ft Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, 2002.

Hackett, John W., Sir. *The Profession of Arms.* London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1983.

Hague, Ken C., BGen. "Strategic Thinking General/Flag Officers: The Role of Education." *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral*. Edited by Bernd Horn and Stephen J. Harris. St.Catharines, Ont: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2001.

Huntington, Samual P. *The Soldier and the State*. New York: Vintage Books, 1957.

Janowitz, Morris. *The Professional Soldier*. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960.

Jesion, A. and Kerzner, L.F. *An Assessment of the University Degree Policy for Canadian Forces Officers*. Ottawa: DND Canada, Operational Research Division, 1997.

Jesion, A. and Kerzner, L.F. *Models of Canadian Forces Officer Occupations Most Affected by University Degree Requirements*. Ottawa: DND Canada, Operational Research Division, 1998.

"Jumper emphasizes total force development during visit." [http://www.af.mil.newa.Nov2002/1129022.shtml]. 29 November 2002.

Kaufman, Daniel J. "Military Undergraduate Security Education for the New Millennium" *Educating International Security Practitioners: Preparing To Face the Demands of the 21st Century International Environment*. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2001.

Kingston Whig – Standard. Letter of the Day, May 1, 1997.

Last, David. "Educating Officers: Post-Modern Professionals to Control and Prevent Violence." *Contemporary Issues in Officership: A Canadian Perspective*. Edited by Bernd Horn. Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2000.

Legault, Albert. *A Paper prepared for the Minister of National Defence by Professor Albert Legault Laval University*. Report to the Prime Minister. Ottawa: DND Canada, 1997.

Masland, John W., and Radway, Laurence I. *Soldiers and Scholars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957.

Mcnamara, W. Don, BGen (Ret.). "Intellectualism in the General Officer Corps." *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral*. Edited by Bernd Horn and Stephen J. Harris. St.Catharines, Ont: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2001.

Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces. John A. Fraser, chairman. Ottawa: DND Canada, 1999.

Morton, Desmond. *A Military History of Canada.* Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1990

Morton, Desmond. *A Paper prepared for the Minister of National Defence by Desmond Morton McGill Institute for the Study of Canada*. Report to the Prime Minister. Ottawa: DND Canada, 1997.

Mulcair, D.D.G. *From Philosophy to Practise: The Missing Link in Canadian Forces Officer Education*. Toronto: Canadian Forces College, 2000.

Paulson, G.A. *University Education for the Officer Cadet Training Plan (OCTP) Entry Officer.* Toronto: Canadian Forces College, 1990.

Pinch, Franklin C., and Cotton, Charles A. *Educational Change and Military Adaption in Canada*. Willowdale, Ont: Canadian Forces Personnel Applied Research Unit, 1978

Preston, Richard Arthur. *Canada's RMC*. Toronto: The University Press, 1969.

Preston, Richard. "Military Influence on the Development of Canada." *The Canadian Military: A Profile*. Edited by Hector J. Massey. Canada: Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1972.

Professional military education : an asset for peace and progress / a report of the CSIS Study Group on Professional Military Education. Dick Cheney, chairman. Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997.

Reoyo, Paul J. *Professional Education: Key to Transformation*. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2002.

Report of the Ministerial Committee on the Canadian Military Colleges. Pierre Martin, chairman. Ottawa: DND Canada, 1993.

Report of the Officer Development Review Board. LGen Robert W. Morton (Retired), chairman. Ottawa: DND Canada, 1995.

Report of the Officer Development Board, Vol 1. MGen R. Rowley, chairman. Ottawa: DND Canada, 1969.

Report of the Panel on Military Education. Ike Skelton, chairman. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1989.

Report of the RMC Board of Governor's Study Group: Review of the Undergrad Program at RMC. Gen Ramsey Withers (ret'd), president. Kingston: RMC, 1998.

Ropp, Theodore. "The Military Officer and his Education in the Next Quarter of a Century." *Centennial Symposium on Military Education: Military Academies: Problems and Prospects*. Kingston: Royal Military College of Canada, 1976.

Roy, R.H. "The Canadian Military Tradition." *The Canadian Miltary: A Profile*. Edited by Hector J. Massey. Canada: Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1972.

Schmidt, Richard J. "Advancement Potential Through Graduate Education." *Adult Learning*. Vol 8 Issue 2 (Nov/Dec, 1996), pp 29-30.

Sheppard, Robert. "Degree of Command." *Maclean's Magazine*. August, 1999, p 70.

Shields, William. *Canadian Forces Command and Staff College A History 1797 – 1946.* Toronto: The Canadian Forces College, 1987.

Stanley, George. "Military Education in Canada, 1867-1970." *The Canadian Miltary: A Profile*. Edited by Hector J. Massey. Canada: Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1972.

Young, M. Douglas, MND. *Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces*. Report to the Prime Minister. Ottawa: DND Canada, 1997.

Van Creveld, Martin. *The Training of Officers*. New York: The Free Press, 1990.