The Canadian Armed Forces and Domestic Operations: Unbalanced and Overstretched?

Major James D.H. Rock
THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES AND DOMESTIC OPERATIONS: UNBALANCED AND OVERSTRETCHED?

By Major J.D.H. Rock

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ABSTRACT

The Department of National Defence’s vision in *Strong, Secured, Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy* is of fundamental importance to the Canadian Government’s contribution to the defence of Canada, North America, and its commitment to international engagements. However, in the past decade, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) have been affected by an increasing amount of additional tasks. More importantly, unexpected domestic operational deployments have had significant impacts on the routine business of defence personnel management. This study recognizes that the CAF’s primary mission is the defence of Canada and the support of Canadian values and interests. However, it distinguishes that the phenomenon of the Canadian military being the “first option” of government recourse and domestic crisis mitigation, is resulting in the CAF losing its overall operational effectiveness against the evolving pan-domain threats to both Canada and the international community.

Ultimately, the CAF needs to examine how to improve its efficiency in response to domestic and continental operations. This paper analyzes options on how this can be accomplished. They include the requirement for a dedicated domestic command and control structure; the further leveraging of both the North American Aerospace Defence Command modernization strategy and the “Tri-Command” structure; and a need for balancing between the emergency management responsibilities of Public Safety Canada, all levels of government, and the role the CAF plays in a response to a domestic crisis.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

On the CAF’s increasing climate disaster response – *If this becomes of a larger scale, more frequent basis, it will start to affect our readiness.*

- Lieutenant-General Wayne Eyre, Commander of the Canadian Army

The Government of Canada’s 2017 defence policy, *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy* (SSE), signaled a systematic change in defence planning and budgeting as it was specifically “built around people.”¹ Since people are the most critical resource to any organization or institution and are required for its future prosperity and development of operational efficiency, they must be well supported, treated fairly, and managed accordingly to develop a strong and collective team that can challenge any task or situation they encounter. SSE, therefore, has placed a high level of emphasis on the wellbeing of the defence community, including Department of National Defence (DND) employees and Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) members, but has also addressed the three traditional priorities of the CAF.²

The DND vision in SSE is of fundamental importance to the Canadian Government’s contribution to the defence of Canada, North America, and its commitment to international engagements. This vision relies heavily on its people for the successful implementation of the framework. However, in the past decade, the CAF has been affected by an increasing amount of routine tasks, and more importantly, the unexpected frequency of domestic operational deployments has had significant impacts

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on the business of defence personnel management. For example, in June 2019, the Chief
of Defence Staff (CDS), General Jonathan Vance, acknowledged in an interview with the
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) that the “force structure [of the CAF] is
probably too small to be able to deal with all the tasks it has anticipated.” The institution
“got it wrong” in terms of an organized and efficient force structure.³

Both the increase in domestic climate change-related events and more recently the
CAF’s direct involvement in supporting the fight against the Novel Coronavirus disease
2019 (COVID-19), has overstretched the force’s capabilities and left it understaffed at
various levels of command. To be sure, the CAF’s primary mission, as directed by the
federal government, is the defence of Canada and the support of Canadian values and
interests.⁴ However, the CAF, by being the “first option” of government recourse and
crisis mitigation for domestic assistance to civil authorities and non-governmental
partners, is losing its overall operational effectiveness against the evolving pan-domain
threats to both Canada and the international community. Accordingly, this paper will
argue that the stress of domestic operations on the CAF is cause for a revaluation of its
current command and control (C2) structure and an improvement of how it responds to
both routine and contingency domestic challenges.

Ultimately, the overuse of CAF members on domestic operations limits its ability
to plan, prepare, and execute tasks, conduct essential training exercises, and deploy on
sovereignty operations in Canada and international operations. Table 0.1 is an in-depth

analysis of the impacts of operational commitments on the CAF based on SSE “concurrent operations” policy. Notwithstanding that that the aforementioned limitations are not included in the analysis and that the totals are calculated based on a personnel availability “best-case scenario,” the CAF can be expected to deploy or contribute upwards of 39,093 personnel in a given year for named operations at home and abroad. Of note, the total is approximately 40% of the CAF’s deployable, effective strength. This detail is not elaborated in SSE and is an unsustainable policy for the CAF, as already demonstrated with its current struggle to balance operational commitments.

Table 0.1 – Analysis of CAF Effective Strength versus Concurrent Operations Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concurrent Operations (as per SSE)</th>
<th>Phases of the “Managed Readiness Plan” (MRP)</th>
<th>Road to High Readiness</th>
<th>High Readiness</th>
<th>Recomposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defend Canada, including responding concurrently to multiple domestic emergencies in support of civilian authorities.</td>
<td>RCN - Two Ready Duty Ships, ~60-500 (Source: Crew capacities of either a Maritime Coastal Defence Vessel (MCDV) (40 personnel) or Canadian Patrol Frigate (CPF) (250 personnel).)</td>
<td>~500-1,500</td>
<td>~500-1,500</td>
<td>~500-1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CA - Four Immediate Response Units (IRU) (Regular Forces), ~350 personnel each IRU (Source: CIOOC, Appendix 1, Annex A to SOOOD).</td>
<td>~500-1,500</td>
<td>~500-1,500</td>
<td>~500-1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Up to Ten Territorial Battalions Groups (TBG) (Reserve Forces), ~400-600 each TBG (Source: Annex A to Domestic Directive – 29th Canadian Division/Contingent Task Force East, 11 January 2014).</td>
<td>~100-500</td>
<td>~100-500</td>
<td>~100-500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Four Arctic Response Company Group (Reserve Forces), – Up to 200 personnel each (Source: Open source internet websites).</td>
<td>~345-455 (Source: CIOOC, Annex B to Contingency Plan Jingle).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meet NORAD obligations, with new capacity in some areas.</td>
<td>Net Applicable for analysis.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meet commitments to NATO Allies under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Two sustained deployments of ~500-1,500 personnel in two different theatres of operation, including one as a lead nation.</td>
<td>~500-1,500</td>
<td>~500-1,500</td>
<td>~500-1,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ One time-limited deployment of ~500-1,500 personnel (6-9 months duration).</td>
<td>~500-1,500</td>
<td>~500-1,500</td>
<td>~500-1,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Two sustained deployments of ~100-500 personnel.</td>
<td>~100-500</td>
<td>~100-500</td>
<td>~100-500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DART) deployment, with scalable additional support.</td>
<td>~345-455 (Source: CIOOC, Annex B to Contingency Plan Jingle).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ One Non-Combat Evacuation Operations, with scalable additional support.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total CAF personnel potentially employed or contributing to Concurrent Operations during each cycle of the MRP.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total CAF personnel potentially employed or contributing to Concurrent Operations throughout a calendar year.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the author based on SSE “Concurrent Operations,” 81, and multiple primary sources as indicated in the table.

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5 SSE indirectly indicates that the effective strength of the CAF in 2017 was 96,000 soldiers, sailors and aviators.
However, this impeding challenge is not an argument for institutional change to diminish the CAF’s overall commitment to supporting Canada and Canadians on domestic operations, but rather an appeal for an analysis of potential reorganization and new initiative implementation to better meet these challenges and mitigate the effects of the strain.

Elaborated into four chapters, this paper will demonstrate the need for a systematic evolution to how the CAF is structured to meet all requests while maintaining operational efficiency for other mandated commitments. Chapter 1 begins with an overview of the characteristics of domestic operations from Canada’s historical military experiences and the method the CAF responds to provincial Requests for Assistance (RFA) through the federal government. Chapter 2 will discuss the important significance of both General Rick Hillier’s and Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie’s institutional transformation strategies early in the 21st Century and provide some analysis to answer the question “is the CAF properly structured to meet the domestic threats facing Canada?” Chapter 3 will elaborate on the “Tri-Command” modernization initiative between the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC), the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), and the United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and the impacts of government inaction could have on domestic operations including the defence of Canada and North America. Finally, Chapter 4 will highlight the need for improvement and evolution of the civilian-military (CIMIC) relationship based around Public Safety Canada (PSC) and options of leveraging the Reserve Force in domestic operations. Restructuring and personnel management recommendations will conclude the research.
Literature Review

Arguments for and against the employment of military forces in domestic operations are not a new matter, nor are the ideas of reinventing an organizational structure that meets the demands of the government, the institution, and the expectations of society on military effectiveness. However, academic literature that specifically deals with the implications of domestic operations in Canada and the need for a modernization of the military organizational structure is mostly limited to news columns and opinion articles. That which is not academic is typically primary source material found on government websites. Albeit credible, primary sources rarely offer insight or analysis to the greater issue. Christian Leuprecht, a professor at both the Royal Military College of Canada and Queen’s University, as well as a columnist with the *Globe and Mail*, suggests that domestic operations are now a critical mission of the CAF that parallels expeditionary operations and that “CJOC needs a dedicated Joint Task Force (JTF) for domestic operations, composed of regular and reserve forces.”

Similar revelations were made public in 2005, when the newly appointed CDS, General Rick Hillier, had a new plan for “CF Transformation.” His vision analyzed in the book *Inside Canadian Forces Transformation: Institutional Leadership as a Catalyst for Change* by Lieutenant-General (retired) Michael K. Jeffery, was to transform the “industrial warfare” culture of the CAF and solve many institutional problems, most notably the “high, indeed unsustainable, operational tempo [which was] exacerbated by

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the reduction in personnel capacity.” This particular problem has resurfaced incrementally over the last decade and is now most prevalent in the balancing between the federal government’s requirement to contribute globally to expeditionary commitments and having a CAF that is prepared and healthy for an unexpected and rapid deployment on domestic operations.

SSE attempts to justify this balancing by putting significant emphasis on the CAF’s ability to conduct “concurrent operations” at home and abroad and ensures that the force is ready to participate in both simultaneously. However, SSE does not denote the vast array of potential contingency operations, additional unforeseen tasks, the challenges of the “Road to High Readiness” training, reconstitution obligations following operations and exercises, and specific personnel administration that have a direct impact on the effectiveness of the force.

The renowned Canadian author and historian, Desmond Morton, published an extensive historical analysis of the CAF throughout his career. His book, A Military History of Canada, describes the roots of the Canadian military, its contribution to modern international missions, and the war on terrorism. His writings briefly explain General Hillier’s “CF Transformation” strategy, but there is little emphasis on the employment of the CAF on current domestic operations except for some highlights of the “Oka Crisis” in 1990. In contrast, his article “Aid to the Civil Power: The Canadian Militia in Support of Social Order, 1867-1914,” briefly describes the early history of Aid

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of the Civil Power in Canada. Of note, Morton elaborated on two examples that are still relevant today. First, he indirectly explains how “Section 27” of the Militia Act of 1869 ultimately laid the foundations of the modern-day RFA, in that:

…when the senior local militia officer received a requisition in writing from the ‘Mayor, Warden, or other Head of the Municipality…he was obliged to call out as many men as he thought necessary to deal with the trouble.10

Second, the debate of cost repayment of the municipalities for a request for militiamen was equally a disputed issue at the turn of the 20th Century as it is today. Although callouts for the Militia were mostly due to a lack of a robust enough police force, Morton’s quote, “it was cheaper to obtain troops than to hire special constables,”11 still holds in the context of current CAF domestic deployments.

Morton’s publications are extensive and cover a vast array of historical background of the CAF. His chapter “‘No More Disagreeable or Onerous Duty’: Canadians and Military Aid of the Civil Power, Past, Present, Future,” in Canada’s International Security Policy accurately describe the history of the Canadian military’s use in domestic operations through acts and statutes and is one of the better literatures on the subject.12 However, due to its date of publication in 1995, it unfortunately does not detail the complexities of modern domestic operations in the 21st Century.

Another noteworthy academic author that describes the legal frameworks of CAF domestic deployments is Sean M. Maloney. His journal article, “Domestic Operations:

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11 Ibid, 245.
The Canadian Approach,” speaks to the parameters and application of the CAF in Canada through four major domestic operation case studies.\textsuperscript{13} Although important in understanding the employment of the CAF in domestic operations, it does not address the consequences of such operations on the effectiveness of the CAF as a whole.

Maloney’s other writings such as “A ‘Mere Rustle of Leaves’: Canadian Strategy and the 1970 [Front de la Liberation du Quebec] FLQ Crisis” was a succinct historical perspective of the FLQ Crisis that highlights some of the issues with deploying an armed force under the premise of \textit{Aid of the Civil Power} and \textit{Assistance to Law-Enforcement Agencies}. He notes the complexities and “legal distinctions” of having two simultaneous “named” domestic operations that were focused on one threat. Furthermore, he highlights the importance of military orders allowing for flexibility in the conduct of the operation.\textsuperscript{14} Both are common aspects in domestic operations.

The gap between increasing domestic deployments and effectiveness in modern literature is only now becoming relevant with the recent criticisms of top military commanders.\textsuperscript{15} These factors and the strain that domestic operations are putting on CAF personnel show that there are gaps in the literature regarding the most efficient and effective way Canada’s military should be structured to balance its domestic assistance role and its other responsibilities. This paper will address these gaps.


\textsuperscript{15} General (Retired) Johnathan Vance, Lieutenant-General Wayne Eyre, Major General Trevor Cadieu.
Conclusion

There is no debating the importance of domestic operations in Canada, as it is commensurate with the CAF’s primary role and mission. However, there is a growing trend for a government pendulum shift in attitude towards the over-use of the CAF in domestic emergencies. There are other recourses and options available to the government, including uniting Other Government Departments (OGD), Agencies (OGA), Crown corporations, and civilian businesses. Moreover, the CAF needs to revaluate, and perhaps modernize its current C2 structure with the intent of making it a more efficient institution in all that it does. As lessons learned are the basis and catalyst for institutional change of an armed force, a brief overview of domestic operations in Canada is required before the analysis and recommendations.
CHAPTER 2: OVERVIEW OF DOMESTIC OPERATIONS IN CANADA

The provinces and territories have the capacity to respond to such emergencies; however, when those capacities become overwhelmed, the province may turn to federal authorities, and potentially the CAF, for assistance.

- Contingency Plan Lentus, Standing Operations Order for Domestic Operations

Introduction

Domestic operations are an integral part of most modern militaries and are closely tied to the political agenda of the ruling government. Although how a government uses its military to act in a crisis will vary between nations, it is typically requested when other government departments, agencies, civilian contractors, or businesses cannot provide an adequate plan or service to deal with the particular emergency. Very often, the armed forces of other nations will assist the people they serve with natural disasters, such as fires and floods. A prime example was the Australian Defence Force’s intervention in the Australian bushfires of 2019-2020. Professor John Blaxland, from the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University, comments on the enormity of the fires in that he “had not seen a catastrophe on this scale, affecting so many people in so many different locations, since Australia became independent in 1901.”

Other examples include the deployment of the Italian Armed Forces (Forze Armate Italiane) to augment civilian agencies, hospitals, and government departments in the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak in spring 2020. Ultimately, the use of armed forces


in a national emergency is for the betterment of the people, society, country, and government they serve.

Domestic operations in Canada are similar to those mentioned above. However, in the last decade, the response of DND and deployment of the CAF has been synonymous with natural disasters, and more recently, support to the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) with the pandemic outbreak. These responses, albeit included in the generic list of potential tasks the CAF can complete in terms of a domestic crisis, are not commensurate with the principal role of the CAF in domestic operations, which is “the defence of Canada from a foreign military threat.” Moreover, the lack of a clear definition by DND, Parliament, or Cabinet exacerbates the confusion. For example, the National Defence Act (NDA), which ultimately creates the CAF, states that, “The Canadian Forces are the armed forces of Her Majesty raised by Canada and consist of one Service called the Canadian Armed Forces.” This very generic definition hardly gives a basis for interpreting priorities. Furthermore, SSE only skirts around the same topic by calling the CAF a “multi-purpose, combat-ready force” and that it has “8 core missions.” However, since the publication of the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) in 2008 and SSE in 2017, there has been greater emphasis by the federal government and DND about the CAF’s responsibility and expectations to Canadian society in response to natural disasters in Canada. This has led to doctrinal uncertainty as to what is the primary role of the CAF.

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19 Department of National Defence, Canadian Forces Joint Publication: CFJP 3-2 Domestic Operations (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2011), 1-1.
Regardless, the CAF will deploy in support of OGDs, the provinces and territories, and Canadian society writ large so long as the provision of service for the CAF is lawfully directed by the appropriate authority (depending on the threat), and is consistent with section 273.6 (Public Service) of the NDA. However, this modern conceptualization of employment of the CAF for natural disasters in domestic operations, vice its primary role, has increased in percentage over the last two decades to the point where over almost 50% of current operational deployments of the CAF are now domestic. Therefore, this chapter will provide a brief history of the evolution of the CAF in domestic operations, an understanding of their characteristics, and Canadian government policy initiatives regarding the use of the CAF domestically.

**Background and Statistics**

Canada is the second-largest country in the world, making domestic operations an enduring challenge for the CAF. This includes a total landmass of 9,984,670 km², a coastline of 243,042 km along three oceans, a sharing of the longest international border with the United States totaling 8,890 km, and over 27% of Canada’s total area covered with trees. The country is massive and much of it remains undeveloped and inhabited, thus exacerbating the difficulty of domestic military operations. Moreover, the spectrum

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22 National Defence Act, R.S.C., c. N-5, s.273.6 (1) (1985). Subject to subsection (2) [Law enforcement assistance], the Governor in Council or the Minister may authorize the Canadian Forces to perform any duty involving public service. However, “Public Service” is not specifically defined in the NDA. It can be modified to accommodate various circumstances, including Rapid Response Operations (RRO) such as Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR).


of natural disasters and conflict and technology incidents in Canada are at times unique to its geography and demographics. Figure 1.1 illustrates examples of the variety of disasters that have occurred in Canada since 2000. Although the provincial RFA for the CAF in an emergency event has been unanimously in response to natural disasters, the CAF must be prepared for any circumstance where “valuable support in the event of public security emergencies, public welfare emergencies, and in assistance to other federal, provincial, or territorial government departments and agencies” could occur.25

![Figure 1.1 – Disasters and Incidents in Canada 2000-2020](https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrs/cndn-dsstr-dtbs/index-en.aspx)

The deployment of CAF personnel on domestic operations in Canada has been occurring in varying degrees and magnitude since Confederation in 1867. Whether it was

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by way of the founding legal statutes of the *Militia Act*, or the *War Measures Act*,\(^\text{26}\) or their respective replacements, the NDA, or the *Emergencies Act*,\(^\text{27}\) soldiers have always answered the call of the government to assist when required.\(^\text{28}\)

Up until the end of the Second World War, the majority of requests for military intervention were founded upon the legal parameters of *Aid of the Civil Power*.\(^\text{29}\) In most cases, the callouts were in response to labour strikes; however, they were typically limited in violence.\(^\text{30}\) After a short hiatus, requests under the *Aid of the Civil Power* framework reappeared in the 1960s and were almost exclusively for armed interventions, except for rare examples such as the famous “October Crisis”\(^\text{31}\) in 1970 and the “Oka Crisis”\(^\text{32}\) in 1990. Since then, callouts are extremely rare as there has been a gradual transition away from addressing violent aggression as noted in a response to *Aid of the Civil Power*.

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\(^{26}\) Denis Smith, “War Measures Act,” in *The Canadian Encyclopedia*, last modified July 25, 2013, [https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/war-measures-act](https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/war-measures-act). The federal government passed the *War Measures Act* on August 22, 1914 following the declaration of the First World War. It gave the Cabinet extended powers over the House of Commons and the Senate during “war, invasion or insurrection.” The only domestic use of the *War Measures Act* was during the October Crisis in 1970. However, the military was called out under the authorities of the National Defence Act and a Memorandum of Understanding between the DND and Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

\(^{27}\) The NDA ultimately replaced the *Militia Act* on April 18, 1950, and the *Emergencies Act* replaced the *War Measures Act* on July 21, 1988.


Civil Power, towards the more pacific Disaster Response. This point alone exemplifies the developing complexity of modern emergencies, and that the municipal and provincial governments are not necessarily addressing the public response adequately, but rather defaulting to federal resources to deal with local community problems.

Although some argue that globalization is intensifying and is cause for greater military interventions in domestic preparation and response, climate change and the resulting natural disasters have also certainly had significant impacts on recent CAF deployments. Table 1.1 represents a condensed list of CAF domestic operations from 1960 to 2000. Except for the natural disasters of the Manitoba Red River Flood of 1997 and the Eastern Canada Ice Storm of 1998, the other requests were either for a known event or in response to Aid to the Civil Power requirement and were more consistent with the CAF’s primary role in domestic operations. Table 1.2 illustrates the changing dynamic in the use of the CAF in response to natural disasters and climate change. This is in addition to the regular requests for routine circumstances and scheduled events the CAF receives, such as support to the Vancouver Winter Olympics in 2010 or the G7 Summit in 2018.

33 Disaster Response falls under the NDA 237.6(1) (Public Service). Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy), “Requests for CAF Assistance Domestic Playbook for OGD Partners” (Ottawa: ADM (Policy), May 2014), 16.
34 Bernd Horn, No, but Yes. Military Intervention in the New Era: Implications for the Canadian Armed Forces (Calgary, AB: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2015), 1.
Although the effective strength of CAF members deployed on domestic operations has typically declined over the last twenty years, the increase of actual deployments, particularly in response to natural disasters, has risen dramatically. Since

the year 2000, the CAF has deployed on more than 55 domestic operations.\textsuperscript{37} This response is typically associated with ongoing physical changes in the environment. The effects of climate change, and more specifically, the average mean temperature “is projected to increase everywhere” in Canada in the future.\textsuperscript{38} Therefore, it is assumed that a “greater demand for…military activity” in response to operations related to natural disasters and climate change will also increase.\textsuperscript{39} This trend is unlikely to disappear.

**Expectations and Characteristics of Domestic Operations**

Domestic operations in Canada are regarded differently than expeditionary operations to include intricacies between the “perceived dichotomy some claim exists between ‘warriors’ and ‘peacekeepers’.”\textsuperscript{40} Albeit an important aspect in the support of the government’s national security and policy objectives, domestic operations are not as glamorous, prestigious, or important to Canadian military culture and identity. This is in part because “Canadian governments continue to use the CF as part of [their] foreign policy…as a way to maintain a place at the table…”\textsuperscript{41} If greater government importance was placed on domestic operations, there would be more DND and CAF emphasis on individual and collective training, exercises in a Joint, Interagency, Multinational, and

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{38} D. S. Lemmen, E Bush, and (editors), \textit{Canada’s Climate Change Report} (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2019), 116.
\item \textsuperscript{39} Canada. Department of National Defence, \textit{Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy} (Ottawa: DND, 2017), 52.
\item \textsuperscript{40} Allan D. English, \textit{Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective} (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004), 144.
\item \textsuperscript{41} \textit{Ibid.}
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Public (JIMP) environment, department spending on equipment and technology, and possibly a dedicated higher-level C2 force structure in place.  

However, public expectations of the CAF in domestic operations are high and are unlikely to change. In two recent surveys respectively commissioned by the Canadian Defence and Security Network and the Conference of Defence Associations, 89% of Canadians say “protecting the safety of Canadian citizens is very important” and 88% of Canadians “support role for armed forces to fight COVID-19.” Currently, general support by the public for the CAF response in domestic operations “has never been higher.” Therefore, regardless of the current military state of affairs and beliefs on expeditionary operations, an armed force’s readiness to respond to a public RFA in a domestic emergency should be considered one of its “raisons d’être” and priorities. As for the federal government, to ignore a public outcry by not responding is not a viable option and could lead to political liability.

Apart from public expectations, other important characteristics include the types of domestic operations, the need for a “comprehensive approach,” and legal responsibilities.

42 The structure should be larger than the already established “Immediate Response Unit” (IRU). The IRU is a high-readiness, tactical-level organization that is activated when a RFA is accepted by the federal government. Its mandatory effective strength is 350 soldiers divided into three “Notice to Move” sub-organizational groups. In many recent CAF domestic operations, the number of dedicated IRU soldiers to an operation is significantly augmented. This is on a case-by-case basis. Canadian Joint Operations Command, Appendix 1, Annex A to Standing Operations Order for Domestic Operations (n.p., CJOC, July 17, 2014).


44 Nanos, Canadian Knowledge and Attitudes about Defence and Security Issues, Canadian Defence and Security Network (Nanos Research, September 2020).


46 Canadian Forces Joint Publication CFJP 3.0 – “Operations” defines the comprehensive approach as “the application of commonly understood principles and collaborative processes that enhance the likelihood of
The types of domestic operations the CAF can execute are commensurate with the emergency, and are governed by specific parameters and authorized according to “legal framework[s] defined by statutes and regulations.”

They are the *Provision of Service, Humanitarian Assistance, Assistance to Law-Enforcement Agencies, Aid of the Civil Power,* and the general defence of Canada including sovereignty and standing national-level tasks such as Search and Rescue (SAR). All types are further subdivided into specific categories; however, in all circumstances the CAF and DND will work within a comprehensive approach to operations, encompassing varying degrees of a “Whole-of-Government” method to ensure mission success. Legal aspects of domestic operations, including the cost recovery process for CAF *Provisions of Service,* are important to note and vary depending on the type. Table 1.3 provides a synopsis of which legal instrument is required to authorize a particular request.

Although each character is interrelated and asserts significant importance in its own right, the comprehensive approach is unique, as it is naturally inherent in the planning and conduct of domestic operations. Neil Chuka and Heather Hrychuk argue that the comprehensive approach is “equally applicable in domestic contexts” as in expeditionary operations and that developing cohesion between organizations is essential favourable and enduring outcomes within a particular situation. [It] brings together all the elements of power and other agencies needed to create enduring solutions to a campaign. These may include: military (joint and multinational forces), Canadian government departments and agencies (whole of government), foreign governments and international organizations (e.g. NATO and UN), and publicly funded organizations (e.g. NGOs).”

Canada and Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-300/FP-001, *Canadian Forces Joint Publication: CFJP 3.0 Operations.* (Ottawa: DND, 2010), GL-3.


in achieving a strategic end state.\textsuperscript{49} In addition, the illusion and functionality of cohesion help build public trust and societal expectations when interagency organizations must work together in domestic emergencies. Without it, governments lose their credibility.

Table 1.3 – Legal Instruments and Authorities for Domestic Operations in Canada\textsuperscript{50}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Domestic Operation</th>
<th>Type of Assistance</th>
<th>Legal Instrument</th>
<th>Approving Authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provision of Service (PoS)</td>
<td>Not Applicable (NA)</td>
<td>DND PoS policy.</td>
<td>Delegated by the Minister of National Defence (MND) to the approving authorities identified in the PoS policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance</td>
<td>Domestic Disaster Response</td>
<td>Small-scale requests supported through the PoS policy. Large-scale requests may be considered a &quot;public service&quot; and made under the National Defence Act (NDA) section 273.6(1).</td>
<td>Small-scale delegated by MND to the approving authorities. Large-scale requests, the MND has the authority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance to Law Enforcement Agencies (ALEA) - Federal</td>
<td>Corrections Service Canada</td>
<td>NDA s. 223.6(2); Order-in-Council (OIC) 1975-131 (Penitentiary Assistance Order).</td>
<td>The Governor in Council, or MND.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO)</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between DND and DFO or NDA s. 273.6(2) if for enforcement activities against a resisting vessel.</td>
<td>MND.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Counter-Drug</td>
<td>Pursuant to s. 273.6(2) of the NDA, MOU between the CAF and RCMP.</td>
<td>MND.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RCMP CBRNE</td>
<td>Pursuant to s. 273.6(2) of the NDA, MOU between the CAF and RCMP.</td>
<td>MND.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance to Law Enforcement Agencies (ALEA) - Provincial</td>
<td>Class 1 (Situation affecting national interest)</td>
<td>OIC P.C. 1996-833, Canadian Forces Armed Assistance Directions (CFADD). May also be authorized under the NDA, s. 273.6(2).</td>
<td>MND.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provincial Class 2&amp;3 (Potential disturbance of the peace)</td>
<td>OIC P.C. 1990-833, CFADD, DND PoS policy.</td>
<td>Considered PoS. Delegated to the operational level commander.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid of the Civil Power</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Part VI, NDA s. 274 to 285.</td>
<td>CDS after receiving direction from MND.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the author based on Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy), “Requests for CAF Assistance Domestic Playbook for OGD Partners.”


\textsuperscript{50} Canadian Joint Operations Command, Standing Operations Order for Domestic Operations (July 17, 2014), AA1-7/9 to AA1-8/9. The Canadian Forces Armed Assistance Directions defines a protocol for the RCMP to request support from the CAFs’ Joint Task Force 2 in dealing with disruptions of the peace involving terrorists, hostage taking, or abuse against internationally protected persons. It was developed to streamline the request for the resolution of a disruption of the peace concerning national security that is occurring or may occur.
Policy Initiatives and Doctrine

To compliment public expectations and the general characteristics of domestic operations, government policy and CAF-specific doctrine are instrumental contributors that help gauge the importance of disaster and emergency response in Canada. Although the publishing of the Conservative Government’s CFDS in 2008 was generally accepted with mixed reviews due to its “brevity and the broad-brushed approach to articulating government intent and ambition,” the development of the “Six Core Missions in Canada, in North America and Abroad” was an important step towards modernizing the national security plan of the country. Of the six core missions, four of them were focused on Canada and strengthening the CAF’s role within it. They were “conduct daily domestic and continental operations including in the Arctic and through NORAD,” “support a major international event in Canada,” “respond to a major terrorist attack,” and “support civilian authorities during a crisis in Canada such as natural disasters.”

Ironically, following the publishing of the CFDS, the number of domestic operations the CAF responded to increased. Although it is difficult to proclaim that the number of requests for CAF support augmented as a result of the CFDS, it does mark a paradigm shift in attitude and the expectations of the CAF to the Canadian public.

The publishing of SSE in 2017 built upon the original six core missions of CFDP. The new “Eight Core Missions” did not necessarily create any revolutionary ideas in terms of a DND response to domestic operations, but rather offered new guidelines of

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51 Maj H. Allan Thomas, “Change and Effect: The Evolution of Canadian Defence Policy from 1964 to 2017 and Its Impact on Army Capabilities” (Canadian Forces College, 2018), 68.
how Canada was to project its defence objectives at home, abroad, and internationally.\textsuperscript{54}

Of particular significance was the CAF’s mandate to “respond concurrently to multiple domestic emergencies” as part of the “detect, deter and defend against threats to or attacks on Canada” core mission and the “increasing need for Canadian Armed Forces support” to “provide assistance to civil authorities and non-governmental partners in responding to…domestic disasters or major emergencies.”\textsuperscript{55} In both these two newly refined core missions, the CAF needs to be prepared to respond to multiple, increasing emergencies concurrently. It is debatable that the CAF may not be able to consistently achieve these mission sets over prolonged periods given the current human and climate threat environments, which now include the constraints of COVID-19.

\textbf{Conclusion}

A government’s response to domestic emergencies is an integral part of its political agenda. More specifically, it cannot fail the public that ultimately elected them into office. Therefore, quick response to an emergency and within lawful authority is always in a government’s best interest. Although the use of the military in a crisis will vary by country, it is normally required when all other civilian capabilities are overwhelmed and unable to provide an adequate response. This trend is increasing as natural disasters and the effects of climate change are reshaping the modern threat environment.

In Canada, this tendency is no different. Over the last three decades, the CAF’s involvement in domestic emergencies has increased in terms of frequency and duration as

\textsuperscript{54} Canada. Department of National Defence, Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy (Ottawa: DND, 2017), 82.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid, 82-86.
both the provincial and municipal governments are quickly defaulting to federal capabilities for assistance. While it is unlikely that the federal government will ever deny a provincial RFA, it is acknowledged that natural disaster response, including pandemic intervention, is not the primary role of the CAF in domestic operations.

The history of the CAF’s response to emergencies, its characteristics, and the expansion of government policy have since guided the modernization of the use of the armed forces in domestic operations. Therefore, to ensure that the CAF’s domestic response improves and is commensurate with its capabilities, an evaluation of the past, current, and future C2 structure is required.
CHAPTER 3: A “NEW RESTRUCTURING”

The CF command and control structure must be optimized to provide the most effective and responsive decision and operational support to designated strategic, operational and tactical commanders.

- General Rick Hillier, Chief of Defence Staff Transformation Principles

Introduction

In 2005, General (Gen) Rick Hillier, as the incoming CDS, saw an immediate need for institutional transformation and a restructuring of the CF. In his view, such measures were required due to a myriad of developing national and international changes that included the realignment of government strategies and policies, evolving global threats, modern technological developments, globalization, and departmental reductions in budgets and capabilities. According to Gen Hillier, the CF was an institution that was suffering from decreasing morale and was unable to project an operationally effective armed force in a high-tempo environment. Although there was the logic behind Gen Hillier’s vision, not all his subordinates agreed with the concept. The reaction of his environmental Chiefs of Staff and other senior officers gave a “strong indication that the transformation road would not be a smooth one.” However, it provided a common goal and focus to the disoriented CF of the time.

Notable transformation changes included the creation of four new operational commands independent of the National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) and the

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formation of the Strategic Joint Staff (SJS) headquarters to complement not only the new commands but also assist the CDS as the senior military advisor to the Canadian government. Gen Hillier’s change vision was an important step to revitalizing the CF and repositioning it to be able to contend with and perform in a modern and evolving threat environment.

This chapter will discuss the important history of the two major CAF institutional structure transformations since the turn of the 21st Century. The first was Gen Hillier’s “CF Transformation” which occurred immediately following his appointment as CDS in 2005 as a means to reinvent and align the CAF organizational structure. The second was Lieutenant-General (LGen) Andrew Leslie’s recommendations that led to “Transformation 2011,” which was a cost-savings restructuring initiative to eliminate bureaucratic overhead. The chapter will then discuss the current significance of not having a specific Land Component Command (LCC) embedded into the organization of the CAF and the impacts that have on domestic operations. The final analysis will examine the possible benefits of “resurrecting” a dedicated organization that specializes in domestic operations to help counter the increasing frequency of CAF domestic deployments and its overall operational effectiveness.

Pre-CF Transformation

Before “CF Transformation,” all non-routine and contingency operations fell under the responsibility of the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (DCDS), which included

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59 "The [Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff] DCDS provides operational direction to Canadian Forces in the field in non-routine and contingency operations and is the focus for integrated military planning and operations at NDHQ. The DCDS is responsible for developing plans and taskings for CF non-routine and contingency operations, and recommending the allocation of military resources required to effect such operations. The DCDS is responsible in particular for: exercising command and control of non-routine and contingency operations on behalf of the CDS; ensuring the effective production and dissemination of defence and scientific intelligence; overseeing Emergency Preparedness Canada on behalf of the DM; and
both international and domestic operations. The specific task, depending on the requirement, would be given to one of the environment commanders (then known as Chiefs of Staff) of Maritime Command (now the Royal Canadian Navy [RCN]), Air Command (now the Royal Canadian Air Force [RCAF]), Mobile Command (now the Canadian Army [CA]) or NORAD for the force generation and force employment of soldiers on operations. As the environmental commanders were working independently of each other and far outside the geographical region of NDHQ, their situational awareness of national military strategic coordination was lacking, “particularly with respect to domestic operations.”

High-level military representatives knew the intricacies between the force generation and force employment concept. The claim was that it was “workable,” but general officers such as Vice-Admiral (VAdm) R.D. Buck and LGen G.E. Macdonald admitted that the concept “placed an increasing burden on the DCDS with the operational tempo experienced since the end of the Cold War.” This trend would continue over the years and was one of the catalysts that fueled the CDS’s vision of CF Transformation.

overseeing joint responsibilities such as out-of-Canada activities, joint programs and common doctrine.” Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, WOUNDED: Canada’s Military and the Legacy of Neglect, September 2005, 204.


61 At the strategic level, Force Employment (FE) is defined as “the application of military means in support of strategic objectives” whereas at the operational level it is defined as the command, control and sustainment of allocated forces.” TERMIUM Plus, https://www.btb.termiumplus.gc.ca/tpv2alpha/alpha-eng.html?lang=eng&i=1&srchtxt=force+employment&codom2nd_wet=1#resultrecs.


64 Lieutenant-General (retired) Michael K Jeffery, Inside Canadian Forces Transformation: Institutional Leadership as a Catalyst for Change (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2009), 36-37. Gen Hillier developed a graphic known as the “missile” metaphor that described how institutional change
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate the DND positional and CF environmental organization charts respectively before “CF Transformation.”

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Figure 2.1 – DND Organization Chart before “CF Transformation”

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needed to begin with a balancing of the force employment of domestic and expeditionary forces. It then progressed through stages of force generation and force development as a way of supporting the entire concept.
However, these particular organizations, specifically the force employment aspects of them, were not commensurate with the threats the CF was facing at the time. The pre-transformation CF was structurally built on an “industrial age warfare” organization where each of the environments was focused on simply force generating personnel to fight a linear, conventional war with very little interoperability with other service and rarely in a joint operations context.\(^{65}\)

The Cold War legacy was still a key factor in the organization and culture of the CF around the turn of the 21\(^{st}\) Century. However, the reality was that the CF was more accustomed to participating in United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping missions and responding to routine and contingency domestic operations, such as the 1998 Ice Storm,

than preparing and training for conventional war against a “near-peer” adversary.
Moreover, by 2005, the CF was firmly committed to an asymmetrical Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{66} This C2 structure lacked a domestic, continental, and international vision and purpose to mitigate the new global threat environment. CF Transformation provided a solution to this command and control gap.

**“CF Transformation” 2005**

The creation of the four separate unified commands beginning in 2005 was an “essential element of the Transformation strategy.”\textsuperscript{67} The four new commands were Canada Command (Canada COM), the Canadian Expeditionary Command (CEFCOM), the Canadian Special Operations Command (CANSOFCOM), and the Canadian Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM). Table 2.1 provides an overview of the specific roles of each command.

**Table 2.1 – The Four Commands Following General Hillier’s CF Transformation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command Name</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Official Stand-up Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada Command (Canada COM)</td>
<td>“Responsible for the conduct of all domestic operations – routine and contingency. National operational authority for the defence of Canada and North America.”</td>
<td>June 28, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Expeditionary Command (CEFCOM)</td>
<td>“Responsible for the planning, and conduct of all CF international operations, with the exception of operations conducted solely by CANSOFCOM.”</td>
<td>February 1, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM)</td>
<td>“Responsible to provide the CDS and operational commanders with agile, high-readiness Special Operations Forces capable of conducting special operations across the spectrum of conflict at home and abroad.”</td>
<td>February 1, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM)</td>
<td>“Responsible for planning and executing the delivery of national-level operational support for theatre activation, sustainment and termination of all CF domestic, continental and international operations.”</td>
<td>February 1, 2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Of particular significance was the creation of Canada COM. Domestic and continental responsiveness of the CF was fast becoming a societal necessity, especially after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York, and thus required a robust headquarters to be able to meet the demands of both the government and public expectations. Under the previous structure, domestic contingency operations often forced the DCDS to “augment his small ‘continental’ staff for the duration of the crisis.” However, following CF Transformation, the DCDS position converted to become the first Commander of Canada COM and streamlined the efficiency of domestic decision-making. The benefits of the new structure helped provide a “very clear command and control chain” from the CDS to the newly appointed Commander of Canada COM and the subordinate Regional Joint Task Forces (RJTF) for domestic and continental operations. Moreover, the establishment of Canada COM also provided the CF a new delineated continental relationship with both USNORTHCOM, which was founded almost a year following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Figure 2.3

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68 Rick Hillier, *A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats and the Politics of War* (Toronto, Canada: HarperCollins, 2010), 200, 202-203. The societal necessity and public expectations of the CF were growing since the time Gen Hillier was Commander of 2 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group in Petawawa, Ontario, but were certainly exacerbated by the 9/11 terrorist attacks. For example, in 1998, the Ontario and Quebec Ice Storm affected both provinces significantly. Gen Hillier worked very closely with the Ottawa Region Emergency Management authorities, but received little in terms of support from Emergency Measures Ontario. They were “simply not a player, because they tried to do everything from Toronto, and as a result were out of touch with what was happening in eastern Ontario.” Regardless, public reaction to the CF response was “phenomenal” and “became another step in the rejuvenation of the Canadian Forces.” These kinds of domestic emergencies probably fueled the reasoning behind the creation of Canada COM.


illustrates the organization of the CF following the implementation of CF Transformation in 2005.

Subordinate to Canada COM was the six RJTFs. This new structure made official the C2 relationships between the strategic and operational levels of military command. As part of this command relationship, the Commander Canada COM delegated to the RJTF Commanders the “appropriate level of autonomy” for regional routine domestic operations and ultimately the authority to conduct operations during complex
contingency operations. The six RJTFs included: Joint Task Force (North) (JTFN), Joint Task Force (Pacific) (JTFP), Joint Task Force (West) (JTFW), Joint Task Force (Central) (JTFC), Joint Task Force (East) (JTFE), and Joint Task Force (Atlantic) (JTFA).

The RJTF structure continued throughout both transformations and is remains the principle structure at the operational level of CAF domestic operations. Of particular significance was that each RJTF Commander had the additional responsibility of Commander of their environment-specific forces within their geographic area of responsibility. Therefore, the Commanders of JTFP and JTFA were also Commanders of the Maritime Forces in the Pacific and Atlantic Areas respectively, whereas the Commanders of JTFW, JTFC, and JTFE were also the Commanders of Land Forces Western, Central, and Eastern Areas respectively. Of note and perhaps the most interesting RJTF command was that of JTFN. Not only did it have the only commander that was not “double-hatted” in terms of geographical responsibility, but also it was the only truly “joint” command that does not force generate “traditional” soldiers such as combat arms to fulfill its mandate. Although no obvious conflicts of interest or major failures have transpired or been officially documented, the lines of communication between assigned military forces, and the relationships between OGDs and OGAs, and civilian Public Safety representatives differ significantly within each of the double-hatted

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72 Canada and Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-300/FP-001, Canadian Forces Joint Publication: CFJP 3.0 Operations (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2010), 7-4.
organizations. The creation of the RJTF construct as part of the CF Transformation was an important realignment of joint capabilities within a comprehensive approach that provided the RJTF commanders with significant military power to exercise their command efficiently during routine and contingency domestic operations.

In addition to the creation of the RJTFs, the influence of the 9/11 attacks helped solidify the continental defence relationship between the United States and Canada. The attacks had a history-changing impact on the United States Department of Defense and further proved the need to strengthen the multi-domain continental security protocols. As a result, Gen Hillier’s Canada COM structure was logical in design as it provided an equivalent Canadian military command-level that paralleled both USNORTHCOM and NORAD, effectively creating the “Tri-Command” structure. One such binational output that developed between both nations was the Civil Assistance Plan (CAP) published in February 2008 and later amended in January 2012. This particular plan ultimately provided “a framework for military forces of one nation to support military forces of the other nation that are providing military support of civil authorities.” It sought to strengthen a continental military domestic response to crises ranging from natural disasters such as floods, fires, hurricanes, or earthquakes to terrorist attacks. Of particular significance was the almost immediate first-time use of the CAP only six months following its signature. CF members deployed to the United States Gulf Coast to assist

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77 Canada Command and United States Northern Command, Canada - U.S. Civil Assistance Plan (2012).
with disaster response in the aftermath of Hurricane Gustav in August 2008. The relationship between the CAF and USNORTHCOM, and in particular as it relates to the “Tri-Command” structure, will be explored in further detail in Chapter 3. Unfortunately, Gen Hillier’s transformation efforts would be short-lived; and although it did achieve the “consolidation phase” in 2008-09, it never had a chance to evolve into the CF organization he had hoped to achieve.

The Leslie Transformation, 2011

In 2010, the Minister of National Defence (MND) Peter MacKay announced that the CF needed yet another major transformation and that LGen Andrew Leslie would lead as the Chief of Transformation (CoT). The premise of the 2011 transformation strategy was to “reduce overhead and improve efficiency and effectiveness, to allow reinvestment from within for future operational capability despite constrained resources.” Specifically, LGen Leslie sought to “blend like organizations,” save billions of dollars in yearly administrative costs, and reduce the size of headquarters staff by “rerolling and reinvesting” 11,000 military and civilian employees. Of note, this initiative followed the Canadian government’s change of mandate in Afghanistan from a combat mission-focus in the Kandahar Province to a training mission of Afghan National Security Forces in Kabul.

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79 Lieutenant-General (retired) Michael K Jeffery, Inside Canadian Forces Transformation: Institutional Leadership as a Catalyst for Change (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2009), 118.
The CDS at the time, Gen Walter Natynczyk, and the newly appointed CoT saw this as an opportunity to rebuild the CF while in a period of a reduced operational tempo from combat intensity. While the premise of the proposed changes reflected a commonsense approach to improving efficiency, some argued that the timing and structure by which the transformation occurred were flawed.82 Even senators throughout the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence:

…voiced concerns with respect to the fate of the surplus full-time reservists, the call for reductions, without full analysis, in the civilian workforce, and the report’s perceived criticism of the Hillier-era transformation.83

Moreover, one of the “Terms of Reference” the CoT received from the CDS was to ensure that recommendations were guided by Strategic Review results and other planning activities. However, “Transformation 2011” was occurring simultaneously as the government’s Strategic Review, and therefore, recommendations based on alignment were impossible.84

The CoT’s findings and recommendations were subsequently published in July 2011 as part of the Report on Transformation. Although in the report the CoT argued that the CF had a cumulative increase of 19% in terms of senior leadership and staff in headquarters,85 other government departments outside the CF and DND were doing the same thing at the time, and continue to do so. As of January 2019, Deputy Ministers and

84 Major J. L. Hopkins, “The Leslie Transformation: Another Failed Attempt to Change the Canadian Armed Forces” (Canadian Forces College, 2016), 3.
Associate Deputy Ministers have grown to 83 within the government. In the last decade alone, it has increased by 11, with the majority created since the election of the Trudeau government in 2015.86 Ironically, despite significant personnel inflation in government over the last decade, the bureaucratic “red tape” in the federal government and the Public has improved.87

Having a robust civil-military leadership in DND is not to intentionally create delays in decision-making, but rather to ensure the defence of Canada is managed properly and that its “efficiency and effectiveness” is meticulously thought-out in a coherent approach.88 The DND has the largest budget in all government departments accounting for 7.3% of the total Main Estimates for Canada, and therefore, expectations are that overhead exists. Unlike Gen Hillier’s transformation vision of 2005 that sought to realign the C2 of the CF, LGen Leslie’s strategy targeted to significantly reduce the personnel structure, organization, and leadership responsibilities at the institutional level, giving little regard for second and third order effects such as giving additional responsibilities to commanders and staff who were already overworked. Gen Hillier even argued that “headquarters reductions of that magnitude would seriously damage, perhaps even ‘destroy,’ Canada’s armed forces.”89

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Notwithstanding the 43 recommendations of the report, one of the most important aspects of Transformation 2011 was the call to create a “Joint Force Employment” organization that:

…would enable concurrent and well-coordinated delivery of operational effects, enhance Force Generation and Force Development process integration, and preserve clearly identifiable and distinct Command and Control chains for expeditionary and domestic operations.90

The approach to the Joint Force Employment model was to amalgamate the three “Level 1” Commands, including Canada COM, CEFCOM, and CANOSCOM into one overarching headquarters. The result was the creation of the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC). The massive restructuring of the commands occurred in 2012.91 Figure 2.4 illustrates the new organization.

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The establishment of CJOC had a significant impact on the C2 of CF domestic operations. The RJTFs, which were previously subordinate to the Commander of Canada COM when required, were now subordinate to Commander CJOC. In addition to having the command of all domestic forces during national or provincial emergencies, the Commander CJOC had command of all expeditionary forces overseas as well as the newly named Canadian Forces Joint Operational Support Group (CFJOSG), previously CANOSCOM.  

was Operational Command.\textsuperscript{93} Moreover, with the establishment of CJOC, there were now three separate force employers in the CAF, which included NORAD, CANSOFCOM, and CJOC.

The product of the structure was logical and achieved some of the aims of LGen Leslie’s recommendations. However, although there was a reduction of overhead and a “blending of like organizations,” the efficiency that the CJOC model promised has not necessarily come to fruition since the transformation. As a result, the CJOC HQ staff has grown exponentially to support all CAF expeditionary, domestic, mission support, and SAR operations.\textsuperscript{94} This ongoing challenge of balancing both command and staff responsibilities and the intricacies of headquarters functionality has hampered the CAF for years. Major Paul Johnston argued in 2008 that the CAF had “chronic problems with over-bureaucratic ‘staff centric’ headquarters” and that subdividing any such system is inherently more bureaucratic.\textsuperscript{95} Finding an equilibrium between expeditionary, domestic, and continental operations as demonstrated by the current CJOC structure only exacerbates these difficulties. Furthermore, until summer 2020, there was a dedicated “Continental” staff branch embedded in the CJOC HQ structure that performed both the “operations” and “plans” functions. However, since that time, CJOC has gone through a headquarters “Optimization 1.2” process and reverted to its original domestic design. Not

\textsuperscript{93} TERMIUM Plus, \url{https://www.btb.termiumplus.gc.ca/tpv2alpha/alpha-eng.html?lang=eng}, “The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as the commander deems necessary.”; Canadian Joint Operations Command, “Joint Doctrine Note: JDN 02-2014: Command & Control of Joint Operations” (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, September 2, 2014), 4.
\textsuperscript{94} This challenge is not unique only to CJOC, but also to other CAF levels of command such as 1st Canadian Air Division in Winnipeg, Manitoba.
only is the “Director Continental” now the “J3 Continental,” but the “plans and readiness” functions have returned to their respective “Director Generals” under other CJOC HQ branches.\textsuperscript{96} This is a significant change as the domestic C2 in CJOC gives the impression of missing the depth of a fully robust headquarters branch designed for domestic operations that aims at improving the functions of force generation, employment, development, sustainment, and management of an organization. Figure 2.5 represents the previous continental branch structure of CJOC. Of note, not only was the Director-General Operations (DG Ops), responsible for continental operations but also had the responsibility of “Small Missions,” “J3 Expeditionary Operations,” and the “Canadian Forces Integrated Command Centre” within the CJOC HQ C2 structure. These four portfolios are extensive and become increasingly complex during unexpected contingency operations. Furthermore, as of June 6, 2019, the continental structure was missing six positions. Although the intricacies of an HQ battle rhythm vary between organizations and the leadership that are responsible for them, the continental branch (and now the J3 Continental) structure of CJOC appears limited in capability. This statement remains extant with the latest CJOC Optimization 1.2 that occurred in the summer of 2020. An official organization chart for the “J3 Continental” structure has yet to be published.\textsuperscript{97}

\textsuperscript{96} Email from J33 Continental, Canadian Joint Operations Command, dated April 23, 2021.
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid.
The Missing Land Component Command

Of the particular significance of the new structure was the relationship between the component commands and CJOC. The components, which include the Maritime Component Command (MCC), 1st Canadian Division Headquarters (1st Can Div), the Joint Force Air Component Command (JFACC), and the Special Operations Coordination Element, do not fall under the direct responsibility of the Commander CJOC, but rather an “Operational Control” relationship is established when needed.98

However, this relationship has varying degrees of complexity. For example, LGen Leslie’s initial recommendation suggested that the 1st Can Div act as the RJTF for Central Canada, based in Ontario,\footnote{Canada and Department of National Defence, *Report on Transformation 2011*, July 6, 2011, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/report-on-transformation-2011.html#a1, 49.} however, this would never materialize. Rather, it would remain as a:

…high-readiness headquarters, able to move on short notice to command sea, land, and air missions and work with mission partners to meet national objectives anywhere in the world.\footnote{Department of National Defence, “1st Canadian Division Headquarters,” last modified April 28, 2015, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/conduct/1-canadian-division.html.}

Although considered a joint high-readiness headquarters capable of deploying on both expeditionary operations such as for Contingency Plan *Jupiter* or in domestic emergency response such as for Operation *Lentus*, 1st Can Div typically has focused most of its attention and training on the latter. Furthermore, the 1st Can Div HQ, unlike both the MCC and JFACC, is not officially a component command. The assumption that it was the Land Component Command (LCC) for the CAF is not necessarily valid and therefore it remains nebulous as to which command headquarters assumes this responsibility during a domestic response. An example of this complexity was the 1st Can Div’s domestic employment and designation as “Joint Task Force Laser” (JTF-LR) in response to the COVID-19 pandemic in Ontario and Quebec in spring 2020. Of particular importance was that this was the first time the 1st Can Div HQ structure was responsible as a national regulating headquarters of multiple RJTFs for specific disaster relief and the coordination of emergency management and the CAF response.

Subordinate to JTF-LR was JTFE and JTFC. Before the pandemic outbreak, neither JTFE
nor JTFC had any previous experience working with a “Joint Land Component Command” in a domestic operation of this scale. Although the chain of command network was easy to comprehend in theory, creating a national ad hoc C2 structure during a crisis that culturally was only accustomed to specific geographic domestic relief was not an ideal decision. The result was that command responsibility was subsequently transferred to CJOC after only a few months due to the duplication of bureaucratic effort and vague hierarchal command responsibilities. For example, in the Operation Laser “Post Operation Report,” JTFE specifically refers to the C2 complication of orders, tasks, and levels of responsibility between CJOC, SJS, JTF-LR, and JTFE. However, under different circumstances and with properly delineated responsibilities, the structure could well have worked.

The fact that there is not an established LCC structure is significant, as a noteworthy percentage of large-scale named emergency domestic operations in Canada are ground-focused and supported by other environmental domains. This is not to argue that the CA’s investment in domestic operations response is more important or superior than the other environments. Rather, it is quite the opposite. The RCAF

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102 Department of National Defence, “Operation LENTUS,” last modified December 11, 2018, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-lentus.html. Although statistical data is difficult to find on open-source internet websites, a few DND sources prove this argument. For example, the CAF deployed 51 RCAF members and 220 CA members to the BC wildfires in 2018; during the BC floods in 2018, the “majority of [the 350] troops were from 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade in Edmonton”; for Operation Lentus 17-03 (Ontario & Quebec floods), there were 72 CA units, four RCAF squadrons, three Naval Reserve units, and one Frigate (HMCS Montreal); See Table 0.1 for additional troop numbers by environment as per the SOODO.

regularly plans and executes domestic operations unlike the CA, but the deployment of CA soldiers (both Regular and Reserve Forces) during an Operation *Lentus*-type response to combat floods, wildfires, and winter storms is increasing in frequency and duration thus demonstrating the need for an improved land-centric C2 structure to support these specific deployments.\(^{104}\) Additionally, there is usually an unbalanced and higher percentage of soldiers from the CA that provide direct support to domestic operations in Canada. For example, the Canadian Rangers as part of the CA, although not recognized for large-scale domestic operational deployments, are significantly involved with the CA-specific response to Operation *Laser* in northern communities across Canada.\(^{105}\)

Although the lack of a dedicated LCC structure is not a new conundrum to institutional leadership of the CAF, it has led to the question of which organization should be designated the LCC. Options are constrained to headquarters organization and capability, including the appropriate rank structure in the headquarters and staff liaison functions. On one hand, there is the option of the Commander of the Canadian Army (CCA). One of the CA’s principal roles is to support the training and subsequent force employment of soldiers on expeditionary and domestic operations.\(^{106}\) The CA is currently in the process of evolving towards an:

\(^{104}\) See Appendix 1 – “Operation *Lentus* 2019 CJOC Summary,” and Appendix 2 – “CJOC Historical Data Operation *Lentus* 2009-2020” for a CJOC-based statistical analysis of Operation *Lentus* trends and the impacts to the CAF.


\(^{106}\) Canada and Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-500/FP-000, *Canadian Forces Joint Publication: CFJP 5.0 The Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process (OPP)* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2008), 1-1.
improved coordination with Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) and Canadian Special Operations Forces Command, as appropriate, to better align force generation with force employment.¹⁰⁷

Within a domestic construct, the CCA would become the LCC and streamline the force generation responsibility with force employment. This structure is important as it would ameliorate some administrative requirements similar to Gen Hillier’s vision and intent with CF Transformation, but an overall improved operational efficiency would most likely be limited. Moreover, the CCA is a “three-leaf” general officer whereas the commanders of the MCC, JFACC, and Special Operations Command are all “two-leaf” generals reporting to the Commander CJOC when required.¹⁰⁸ A conflict of interest concerning C2 could potentially limit the successful application of this structure, not to mention the proprietary control the CCA would have over a large number of soldiers both from the domestic joint reaction force derived from the RJTFs and the simultaneous command of the CA.

The other option is to designate the Commander of the 1st Can Div HQ the responsibilities of LCC. This structure makes logical sense from a rank perspective as the Commander of the 1st Can Div HQ is a “two-leaf” general officer. However, the inherent “joint” coordination capabilities of the HQ could make the control and liaison functions with the other environmental component commands complicated, but not impossible. Therefore, similar to the dual command responsibilities of the six RJTFs, the Commander of the 1st Can Div can be double-hatted as both the “Joint Land Component Command” (JLCC) during a specific land force employment in a joint environment and the

Commander “Joint Task Force Canada” (JTF-Can) in a domestic land-based emergency response. Moreover, if such an emergency was to occur on either coast of Canada or in remote locations across the country, the nomination of the MCC or JFACC as the JTF-Can is possible and perhaps desirable.

The concept of restructuring aspects of the CAF into a JTF-Can to meet the increasing need for a domestic force has gained limited commentary among some academics such as Christian Leuprecht and Dr. Peter Kasurak. They argue that Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations in Canada are having a “significant and growing demand on CAF resources” and offer alternatives for the federal government to counter this trend. Moreover, academic students such as Nicholas Thompson from the University of Toronto’s Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy advocate for a specific Operation Lentus recruiting initiative to grow the effective strength of the CAF in direct response to natural disaster emergencies.

Although the JTF-Can structure has yet to be properly developed and has only been tested once inadequately as an ad hoc joint task force as the JTF-LR, a JTF-Can may be the “next logical step” for the CAF due to the regular increasing requests for assistance by the provinces in response to a domestic crisis. Most notably, the recent

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110 Ibid.
deployment of the CAF on Operation Laser and Vector are examples of how “the [COVID-19] pandemic is a harbinger of future CAF domestic operations” and that a dedicated structure to respond to these new and exacerbated threats is fundamental to the defence of Canada.\footnote{Christian Leuprecht, “Military Efforts at Home Are Increasingly the Norm. A Joint Task Force Canada Is the Next Logical Step,” \textit{The Globe and Mail}, January 10, 2021, \url{https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-military-efforts-at-home-are-increasingly-the-norm-a-joint-task-force/}.
}

Thus, the creation of this particular structure would see an amalgamation of the beneficial aspects of both Gen Hillier’s and LGen Leslie’s transformation visions. First, similar to Gen Hillier’s Canada COM structure, a separate domestic JTF response organization would provide a dedicated joint HQ to concentrate on current and future threats at home and in North America. Furthermore, the defence of Canada and its people is the “overarching priority” for the DND and CAF,\footnote{Canada. Department of National Defence, \textit{Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy} (Ottawa: DND, 2017), 60.} and therefore, it is only logical that a specific, domestic-focused force be tasked with these national-level responsibilities. Second, the JTF-Can structure would remain subordinate to Commander CJOC under the premise of not expanding the size of either headquarters staff or the doubling of like responsibilities as was predicated by the recommendations of LGen Leslie in his \textit{Report on Transformation}. Third, the RJTFs would remain as a part of the CJOC organization only when required, but subordinate to the JTF-Can HQ. Fourth, the regular and dedicated staff liaison functions between the JTF-Can, USNORTHCOM, and NORAD would help strengthen relationships and build upon the Tri-Command structure evolution. Furthermore, the consistent interaction between each headquarters of the Tri-Command would further assist in providing a buffer between the staff and commanders.
Ultimately, the return to a greater focus on domestic and continental defence would again bring a semblance of purpose to the Tri-Command structure similar to Gen Hillier’s Canada COM vision vice the CJOC model that splits its priorities between a myriad of force generation coordination between environments, force employment situational awareness, domestic operations expectations, and politically driven expeditionary responsibilities. Finally, SAR responsibilities would remain subordinate to the CJOC construct to ensure no loss of effective C2 of this essential service and to maintain a structured relationship with the 1st Canadian Air Division. Ultimately, the CDS would retain command authority to stand up the JTF-Can on the recommendation by Commander CJOC. Figure 2.6 illustrates the potential C2 relationship between CJOC HQ and its subordinate units and formations.

Figure 2.6 – Proposed CJOC Organization Chart
Source: Author.

Conclusion

The long-standing debate over an appropriate C2 structure in the CAF that balances the relationship between governments, the military, and Canada’s allies in both
domestic and expeditionary operational contexts is related to the CAF’s military culture and identity.\textsuperscript{115} Whether it was the single environment-based decision-making process of the 1980s and early 1990s or the DCDS group that exercised C2 on behalf of the CDS,\textsuperscript{116} globalization and the ever-changing threat environment have left the CAF somewhat lost in how it should be structured. Gen Hillier’s \textit{CF Transformation} of 2005 attempted to realign the CF and move away from the post-Cold War mentality to a well-defined unified structure. However, his vision was short-lived and never had the chance to materialize before LGen’s Leslie \textit{Report on Transformation} in 2011 took its place. Now, only ten years later and fraught with increasing domestic responsibilities such as the ongoing COVID-19 response and reoccurring Operation \textit{Lentus} deployments, the CAF may have to look at another major structure change, or minimum, the recreation of a “JTF-Can” organization that focuses specifically on these responsibilities.

As the modernization of the CAF continues to evolve, the options of defining a dedicated national JTF to coordinate continental defence as part of the Tri-Command structure and assume C2 responsibility to a domestic emergency may be the next logical step for the CAF. Perhaps the statement from LGen Leslie’s \textit{Report on Transformation}; “the triumphs of today do not, however, guarantee the successes of tomorrow,”\textsuperscript{117} in describing the amalgamation of Canada COM, CEFCOM, and CANOSCOM, will persistently beg the question “is the CAF properly structured to meet the domestic threats

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facing Canada?” The answer may lie with Canada’s position with the Tri-Command structure and its role in sharing the burden of continental defence with the United States.
CHAPTER 4: LEVERAGING MODERNIZATION

Military commentators, observers, and policymakers in both nations can perhaps learn from one another how democratic and culturally similar nations prepare for and respond to domestic situations requiring military force.

- Sean M. Maloney, Domestic Operations: The Canadian Approach

Introduction

The global security environment, as Western society has known it, has changed significantly over the last three decades. As annotated in Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy, “the evolving balance of power,” “the changing nature of conflict,” and “the rapid evolution of technology”\textsuperscript{118} have significantly shaped government policies, foreign relations, and impacted security trends in Canada and with many of its allies. It is now very common and almost expected, that defence policy papers or international security publications rank globalization and the reemergence of conventional threats to national security high as state concerns. However, the particular level of anxiety and the interpretations of these threats differ between various government departments of Canada and the United States.

Within the context of the defence of North America, the conventional or “near-peer” threat has matured exponentially and been exacerbated by the neglect of an operational imbalance between an offensive and defensive domestic military strategy. For example, as one of NORAD’s previous Commanders, General (Gen) Terrence O’Shaughnessy, USAF (ret), and NORAD’s current Deputy Director of Operations, Brigadier-General (BGen) Peter Fesler have remarked, the United States has given little thought to “defending the Homeland because the basic assumption in the American

strategy is that “[they] will fight the enemy over there so that [they] don’t have to fight them here.”\(^{119}\) Moreover, the current NORAD Commander, Gen Glen D. VanHerck, USAF, is similarly advocating that the United States “can’t afford any longer to build stovepiped systems with capabilities for only one threat.”\(^{120}\) However, the United States’ neglect over the years to modernize its continental defence strategy in partnership with Canada has certainly left the DND and Canadian government not knowing which continental strategic path to take. Ultimately, Canada’s large geography coupled with its very limited defence capabilities and strong devotion to maintaining national sovereignty leaves little room for any continental defence influence. Perhaps Canada’s “strategy is best characterized as ‘hoping’ for help – an assumption that the United States will defend Canada if push comes to shove regardless of the latter’s level of effort.”\(^{121}\) However, there is a fine line between “defence against help”\(^{122}\) and the United States militarily strong-arming Canada into an awkward political quagmire. In contrast to some Canadian academics,\(^{123}\) P. Whitney Lackenbauer argues that Canada should “contribute meaningfully to bilateral defence in order to ‘stay in the game’ and secure ‘a piece of the action’.” He continues to state that to do otherwise would be contrary to the threats and “future realities facing Canada in a North American context.”\(^{124}\)

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\(^{123}\) Andrea Charron and James Fergusson.

\(^{124}\) Whitney Lackenbauer, “Defence Against Help” Revisiting a Primary Justification for Canadian Participation in Continental Defence with the United States,” in *Shielding North America: Canada’s Role*
Fortunately, there have been ongoing efforts to ameliorate the political commonality of the defence of North America by modernizing the C2 structure of NORAD and its aging capabilities and further develop the Tri-Command relationship between NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and CJOC. Ultimately, this modernization strategy will have a significant impact on the future roles and responsibilities of the DND and CAF writ large. But more specifically, as the North American security environment becomes further contested by a multitude of threats ranging from: ballistic and cruise missiles, hypersonic weapons, and cyber-attacks from near-peer adversaries; irregular asymmetric terrorist attacks; increasing impacts of climate change on environmental security; and the growing occurrence of natural disasters, the DND and CAF will be forced to reevaluate how it could leverage military commands such as USNORTHCOM, NORAD, and other civilian agencies and government departments. Otherwise, the CAF will not be able to respond adequately and ultimately quickly enough, to both routine and contingency challenges to Canada and greater North America. Moreover, the mismanagement of CAF members on domestic operations will continue to have an impact on the effectiveness of the institution as a whole at home and abroad.

Why “Tri”?

To appreciate what the Tri-Command is and how it can potentially influence the improvement of the effectiveness of domestic operations in Canada, it must be briefly examined from a historical perspective. The roots of the Tri-Command derive from the beginning of the Cold War in 1947 when the United States acknowledged that there was
a need for a “defensive air shield” command to counter potential attacks from Soviet bombers. For about a decade, the command matured to include elements of the Navy, Air Force, Army, and early warning radar site capabilities. It changed names four times from the “Air Defense Command” to the “Continental Air Command,” back to “Air Defence Command,” and then finally “Continental Air Defense Command.” The growing requirement of a joint air defence command that involved all three services continued to plague United States military leaders as each service was working unilaterally and had varying differences of opinion.

All the while, the USAF had been cooperating and coordinating with the Royal Canadian Air Force’s Air Defence Command (RCAF ADC) on the continental air defence mission. This collaboration culminated in September 1957 with the standing up of an integrated Canada-US ‘North American Air Defence Command.” This binational structure is important to Canada as it represents the first time that the United States air defense C2 system was “twinned” with an American Combatant Command in addition to the RCAF ADC, effectively creating the first Tri-Command structure.

In May 1958, the first formalization of the “NORAD Agreement” occurred between both the governments of Canada and the United States, which ultimately solidified the important binational relationship between both nations for the defence of

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North America. Renewals of the NORAD Agreement continued over the decades along with various amendments and changes to mirror the evolving global threat environment, including the “warning and assessment of possible air, missile, or space attacks on North America.” As a result of this expansion of responsibility, NORAD’s name changed yet again to the North American “Aerospace” Defense Command to represent the need for a larger defence umbrella against the new threats. The current NORAD Agreement signed in 2006 remains a critical treaty that binds both nations and is:

…vital to their mutual security, and is compatible with their national interests as the architecture of North American defense and national defense in their respective countries...  

Perhaps the most significant structural and organizational changes to NORAD occurred following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The then United States Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, wished to create a “North American Defense Command” where the Commander of NORAD would be “a subordinate unified command under a homeland defense command.” However, this would have had a significant impact on both the political and military C2 relationship between Canada and the United States. Had this restructuring occurred, the important decisions on the defence of Canada, including the command relationship of Canadian military forces, would have been subordinate to the United States Homeland Security. This would have resulted in a loss of Canada’s national sovereign identity, as continental defence is “the defence of one’s

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sovereign territory *in partnership* with another nation” vice a distinctive authority of one nation over another.\(^{131}\) This proposal was rejected by the then MND Art Eggleton as it went against the terms of the NORAD binational agreement. In 2002, the subsequent decision by the United States was to create the domestic operations-focused USNORTHCOM for which the Commander of NORAD was also double-hatted as the Commander of USNORTHCOM. Although this new structure did abide by the agreement, it gave the illusion of an imbalance of military power to the United States government over the defence of North America. However, relationships between both nations have remained consistent since its inception.\(^{132}\)

The establishment of Canada COM in February 2006 following Gen Hillier’s CF Transformation was not only a critical step for the restructuring of the CAF in Canada, but it provided a single Canadian military point of contact in terms of Canadian domestic operations for both NORAD and USNORTHCOM. The official agreement between all three military commands was solidified in September 2009 following the publication of the “Framework for Enhanced Military Cooperation among North American Defense Command, United States Northern Command, and Canada Command.” The purpose of the Framework “describes how the three Commands operate and interact, highlights fundamental relationships, and underscores command responsibilities concerning mutual

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support and cooperation” and ultimately marked the beginning of the Tri-Command relationship.

**Threats and Problems to the Tri-Command at a Glance**

Both the governments of Canada and the United States interpret the threats to North America as a whole very similarly. Gen O’Shaughnessy and BGen Fesler, have admitted recently in a *Wilson Center* and *Canada Institute* security and defence publication that the defence policies of both nations provide “similar guidance,” recognizing the primary threat to North America is a near-peer adversary. However, the interpretation of the role of organizations such as NORAD against such a threat has come into question. Simply put, the United States’ perspective to continental defence favours the offensive nature, whereas Canada leans more to the defensive. Moreover, the recognition that the security environment has changed over the past two decades does not necessarily provide enough justification for a fundamental change in national defence policy, especially for the Government of Canada (GC). Generals O’Shaughnessy and Fesler contest that the United States and Canada are not prepared to counter a near-peer threat and that modernization of old and new technology is necessary to be able to intercept the threats long before they can initiate an attack.

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This criticism of a lack of continental preparedness and the mitigation strategy provided can be construed as a very offensive, NORAD solution for a command organization that has been almost uniquely defensive since its foundation. Dr. Andrea Charron of the University of Manitoba “cautioned against assuming that Canada and the U.S. would be on the same page in the event NORAD’s core mission were to change.”\textsuperscript{137} Regardless, notwithstanding the near-peer threat, Canada’s uncertain participation in a potential change to NORAD’s role and mission, radical and violent extremism, natural disasters, and now pandemic outbreaks are skulking not far behind in terms of additional continental threat realities and could very quickly divert the attention of both governments and the Tri-Command almost instantaneously.

The rebalancing of domestic operations responsiveness with Canada’s pro-expeditionary operations culture is a difficult affair and is often not given the due regard it deserves. Although some research is emerging to help understand how the CAF can, and should, rebalance the differences between both types of operations, the source of the problem can stem from a variety of factors. As Paxton Mayer points out in a recent Canadian Global Affairs Institute article, there is a direct link to recruitment and the CAF’s branding strategy. Thus, by improving such as areas and educating politicians and the public that the CAF is “responsible for more than fighting conventional wars,”\textsuperscript{138} a cultural change could occur and boost the needed attention emphasis, albeit not instantaneously, towards important structures such as the Tri-Command and the role of each nation in the defence of North America. As the threat environment in North

\textsuperscript{138} Paxton Mayer, \textit{What’s in a Soldier?} (Calgary, AB: Canadian Global Affairs Institute, 2020), 6.
America continues to grow and evolve, the likelihood that a combined Canada-United States domestic military and civilian agency response will be more possible.

The desired improvement of the CAF’s domestic operational effectiveness is constantly pulled in multiple directions by a lack of bilateral government policy agreements. These include Canada’s stance against the continental Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) program;\(^{139}\) pan-domain and multifaceted threats from near-peer and asymmetrical adversaries; emerging environmental climate change concerns specifically in the Arctic;\(^{140}\) and aging equipment to include both the near end-of-life and technologically outdated capability of the North Warning System (NWS)\(^{141}\) and the replacement CF-18 fighter jet interceptor.\(^{142}\) Although some initiative and thought have been given to how to mitigate these concerns such as Generals O’Shaughnessy’s and Fesler’s SHIELD concept,\(^{143}\) the impact on the future role of the CAF in domestic continental defence is unknown. The United States’ perception of the threat is different than Canada’s; however, given the magnitude and growing importance of these problems,

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\(^{140}\) Adam Lajunesse, *The Canadian Armed Forces in the Arctic: Purpose, Capabilities, and Requirements* (Calgary, AB: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2015), 2.


\(^{143}\) “Northern Command and NORAD have collectively developed a modernization strategy for defense referred to as the Strategic Homeland Integrated Ecosystem for Layered Defense, or SHIELD…. [It] takes advantage of the data provided by traditional and non-traditional sources to provide a layered ability to detect any threat approaching the continent, from the sea floor to on orbit, in what NORAD and Northern Command refer to as “all domain awareness.” General Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy and Brigadier General Peter M. Fesler, *Hardening the Shield: A Credible Deterrent & Capable Defense for North America* (Washington, DC: The Wilson Center, September 2020), 9.
the CAF must develop capabilities and prioritize its assistance and support mechanisms to the modernization of NORAD. This initiative has the goal of further developing an appropriate continental C2 structure to help minimize any gaps in the Combined Defence Plan (CDP). However, it is still uncertain how the CAF plans to contribute to NORAD modernization. Furthermore, it is unknown to what extent the Canadian government will support or even agree with the United States’ portion of the NORAD modernization initiatives.

Although there are many references to the modernization of NORAD in SSE, there is little in terms of the details of how this will unfold. Often refuted as the “unwritten and unfunded chapter of Canada’s defence policy,” NORAD’s modernization is grossly based on academic speculation and current media coverage. How government funds are to be used for supporting the NORAD modernization initiative is still unclear. Regardless, serious ramifications could exist if a decision is not made soon. Moreover, the GC may boast that funds will be made available for “future military deployments as well as decisions related to continental defence and NORAD modernization,” but these allocations are only going to be further complicated and delayed significantly due to the unsought of the COVID-19 pandemic and the

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government’s priority of providing financial support to businesses and individual Canadians. Immediate, funding-conscious options for an improved NORAD bilateral support agreement and USNORTHCOM binational coordination framework are needed to ensure the Tri-Command’s short to medium-term goals are achieved.

**Alternative Approach to Continental Domestic Defence**

There is little doubt that the future of NORAD and the Tri-Command structure is important to both governments. However, due to a variety of reasons, including the innate security classification of the status of the NORAD modernization plan, any official changes that have been recommended and decided upon by each nation are still unknown. Furthermore, both governments have been significantly preoccupied with internal dealings with the COVID-19 pandemic and specifically in the case of the United States, the added complexity of the change of Administration. NORAD modernization, albeit imperative, may suffer from political inertia in the coming months. However, given the CAF’s need to maintain operational efficiency, alternative options are needed to support both a national and continental response action plan. Therefore, three areas that could be leveraged are bilateral agreement updates; increased training and exercise opportunities between both nations; and the development of a new C2 structure.

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Bilateral Agreement Updates

The easiest method of modernizing a bilateral or binational relationship is to conduct a review of standing contingency plans and agreements and synchronize their re-publication. First, the Civil Assistance Plan (CAP) was originally published in February 2008 and updated in January 2012 between USNORTHCOM and Canada COM. The purpose of the CAP is for “the military of one nation to provide support to the military of the other nation while in the performance of civil support operations.”151 In essence, the CAF or the United States Armed Forces can provide aid to the civil authorities while subordinate to the other nation’s military forces such as in response to fires, floods, hurricanes, and earthquakes. Table 3.1 illustrates the plans agreed upon by the armed forces of Canada and the United States where the CAP could be implemented. Of particular significance, given the current COVID-19 environment, are the two pandemic national-level contingency plans. Although both nations have their respective military responding to the pandemic in some capacity, only the GC has been proactive via the media sources and government websites stating that it implemented its military’s contingency plan.152 This is attributed to the National Guard principally being employed by the state government rather than the federal government.

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151 Canada Command and United States Northern Command, Canada - U.S. Civil Assistance Plan (n.p., 2012), 1.
152 Research based on an open source search of both the CAF and the United States Armed Forces pandemic contingency plan names and results specifically pertaining to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Table 3.1 – Bilateral, Binational, and National Contingency Plans

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan Relationship</th>
<th>Plan Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Bilateral</td>
<td>Basic Defense Document (BDD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 Bilateral</td>
<td>Combined Defense Plan (CDP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 Bilateral</td>
<td>Combined Counter Terrorstion Defense Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Bilateral</td>
<td>CONPLAN UNIFY (CJOJC support to USNORTHCOM hurricane relief effort)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Binational</td>
<td>NORAD CONPLAN 3310 (Aerospace Warning, Aerospace Control and Maritime Warning for North America)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 National - CJOJC</td>
<td>Standing Operations Order for Domestic Operations (SOODO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 National - CJOJC</td>
<td>CONPLAN LASER (Pandemic Influenza)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 National - CJOJC</td>
<td>Major Air Disaster Plan (MAAID)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 National - CJOJC</td>
<td>CONPLAN PANORAMA (CAF response to a catastrophic earthquake off the west coast of Canada)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 National - USNORTHCOM</td>
<td>CONPLAN 3500 (CBRN Response)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 National - USNORTHCOM</td>
<td>CONPLAN 3405 (DOD Nuclear Weapon Incident Response)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 National - USNORTHCOM</td>
<td>CONPLAN 3501 (BSCA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 National - USNORTHCOM</td>
<td>CONPLAN 3501 (BSCA)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Canada Command and United States Northern Command Civil Assistance Plan, 25 January 2012.

Simple updates to organizational names such as Canada COM to CJOJC and the Department of Foreign Affairs to Global Affairs Canada could assist with understanding the roles and responsibilities of Canadian departments to those not familiar with the Canadian structure. The same would be applicable for the United States military organizations and departments. Furthermore, with the scientific acceptance of climate change having greater impacts on the environment each year, the CAP could be better aligned and focused in terms of expanding potential military tasks and identifying geographical areas that are typically impacted by natural disasters. This could also include updating the environmental threat and consequences posed by the melting Arctic.

Second, the Combined Defense Plan (CDP) was published at the same time as the 2012 edition of the CAP and ultimately is the standing defence contingency plan between Canada and the United States in response to an adversary attack upon North America. It involves the full spectrum of operations and is further defined in the CJOJC “Contingency Plan Citadel,” the NORAD 3310 Aerospace Warning, Aerospace Control and Maritime Warning for North America, and USNORTHCOM 3400 Homeland Defense.

Unfortunately, specific details to these plans are limited due to their classification; however, both the NORAD 3310 and USNORTHCOM 3400 contingency plans were to undergo “substantial revision in FY 2019-2020.”\(^{155}\) Ultimately, each command has its version of the defence of North America with national caveats and subtleties. Although the specific details are unknown, it would be in the best binational interest that all stakeholders continue to synchronize the updating of each plan concurrently and not in unilateral silos as is often the case.

Third, the *Tri-Command Training and Exercise Statement of Intent* was published in December 2012 with the purpose of “enhance[ing] joint and combined readiness in support of safety, security and defense missions through effective combined training and exercises.”\(^{156}\) Although very short in length, the document does identify realistic exercise objectives that reflect what the Tri-Command ought to conduct and accomplish either on an annual or as required basis. It should, however, identify all capstone exercises including their purpose. Furthermore, the majority of all training and exercises that occur within the Tri-Command structure are heavily focused on air power and to a lesser extent naval surveillance, due to NORAD’s acquisition of its maritime warning mission in 2006. Such exercises include *Vigilant Shield* and operations *Noble Defender*, and *Noble Eagle*.\(^{157}\) Although it is still extremely important to maintain these training opportunities, other domains such as the land domain should be further integrated into the mandate as


both USNORTHCOM and CJOC are joint commands and will maintain national operational command of their respective land forces in the event of a domestic emergency. Ultimately, there should be a deliberate, planned Tri-Command exercise that should be more than just focused on aerospace defence, but rather expand on the greater joint, pan-domain, and interagency concept.

**Increased Training and Exercise Opportunities**

To ensure that the effectiveness of the CAF is maintained in the case of a domestic or continental emergency, its organization must be tested and pushed to the limits in a realistic training scenario. However, as the CDS proclaimed, the current CAF force structure is not necessarily suited or able to respond to concurrent domestic and expeditionary operations and unforeseen tasks due to the size of its effective strength. This statement contradicts SSE, which states, “at any given time the Government of Canada can…call upon the Canadian Armed Forces to deploy on multiple operations at the same time.” How can the CAF accomplish this without overstretching the effective strength of the organization when it is struggling with balancing its current mandate to respond to simultaneous operations, routine tasks, and personnel administration shortfalls? A redistribution of CAF soldiers to better support domestic and continental defence may be difficult to achieve in the short term as the CAF structure is greatly fixated on expeditionary missions rather than domestic operations. Ultimately, there

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needs to be a balance between offensive operations (expeditionary) and defensive operations (continental and domestic). Therefore, a solution is to leverage the Tri-Command relationship and test different organizational structures through combined training and exercises. This is not to suggest that American soldiers are used for the defence of Canada, but rather a means to force the Canadian government to leverage some of the emergency management assistance mechanisms already in place between Canada and the United States and test them in a controlled exercise environment.

Notwithstanding the CAF’s contribution to exercises such as *Vigilant Shield*, other military domains and the participation of civilian agencies on both sides of the border should be exercised to stress the command, control, and coordination structure of both the CAF and the United States Armed Forces. Currently, apart from small reciprocal unit exchanges between Canada and the United States and exercise *Maple Resolve* in Wainwright, Alberta,\(^\text{161}\) there are few other pan-domain, combined exercises or training opportunities for both nations to improve their interoperability and effectiveness while on domestic operations. Furthermore, given the growing concerns of near-peer state conflict, terrorist attacks, health uncertainties, and environmental climate threats, it essential that the Tri-Command exercise their agreed continental defence plans such as the CAP and CDP.

A legitimate and very realistic training and exercise opportunity to implement such plans and have the involvement of OGDs and OGAs from both nations would be a catastrophic earthquake scenario in western Canada and the United States. This idea is

not new and has been often referred to as the “Big One.”162 In a worst-case scenario, the earthquake would register a 9.0 on the Richter magnitude scale and be accompanied by a massive tsunami with waves reaching up to 20 metres impacting the states of Oregon, Washington State, Idaho, and the province of British Columbia. The likelihood of this occurring in the next 50 years is debatable; however, some experts believe that there is a one in three chance.163 Therefore, the purpose of this exercise is significantly important to both nations.

Fortunately, Canada and the United States have contingency plans drafted and have already exercised this scenario at varying levels. At the Canadian strategic level, the CAF has included its response to the earthquake as an Appendix to the contingency plan Lentus in the “Standing Operations Order for Domestic Operations.” Whereas at the regional operational level, Joint Task Force Pacific published their contingency plan Panorama in 2014. As expected, both contingency plans are in support of civil authorities and are coordinated with British Columbia Public Safety and Emergency Services.164 However, there is little in terms of coordination with the United States Armed Forces apart from the recognition that the CAP is available for implementation if required. Nevertheless, “opportunities for mutual aid between both countries…may be

limited”165 due to the similar impacts the earthquake would have on the United States. This statement, unfortunately, assumes that a combined bilateral response would not occur and that Canada would be left to fend for itself. However, it is unacceptable to disregard national mutual assistance in such a circumstance without properly testing the feasibility and viability of the plan in a controlled exercise capacity.

In June 2016, emergency managers of Oregon, Washington State, Idaho conducted exercise Cascadia Rising 2016, a four-day major domestic emergency exercise in response to the “Big One.” Roughly, 20,000 members from the states, federal partners, military, private sector, and Non-Governmental Organizations participated.166 However, the involvement of British Columbia provincial emergency management officials and the CAF was very limited in scope. The integration and coordination between nations was primarily focused on the response of provincial and state civilian authorities and not necessarily a “Whole of Government” approach. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Association of Canada claimed that exercise Cascadia Rising highlighted that “there has been a lack of a coherent strategy for the development of such capabilities [earthquake response] in the Canadian Army”167 and although a CAF deployment would be a joint effort and not uniquely a CA-centric approach, little has been done to improve the effectiveness of a national and combined continental military response.

Enter the requirement for the integration of the Tri-Command structure with civilian emergency management authorities. Planning is ongoing for the next iteration of

the exercise *Cascadia Rising* that is set for June 2022. It would be very beneficial if the Tri-Command could participate with the intent of providing federal-level support to both the individual states and the province of British Columbia. Moreover, one goal of this JIMP partnership exercise would be to test the complex and dynamic C2 structure in a controlled realm against a real potential catastrophic natural disaster scenario that would significantly affect both countries. Such a significant strategic military involvement could also confirm if elements of the Tri-Command or NORAD’s modernization strategy could potentially confirm or deny the feasibility of a unified “North American Defence Command” as originally envisioned by the Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld back in 2001.

**A “North American Defence Command”?**

Any significant change or adaptation to an institution will always be shadowed by resentment and objection within the organization and by its stakeholders. The NORAD modernization strategy is viewed no differently especially when the idea of a change to the C2 structure is envisioned. Political disagreements and a misunderstanding of the actual threat to North America are creating delays in the modernization of NORAD and limiting the strength of the Tri-Command.

The NORAD modernization process was born out of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) “Evolution of North American Defense” (EvoNAD) study. It

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168 The participation of both UNNORTHCOM and CJOC should be significant due to the inherent joint constructs of both command organizations and their ability to coordinate with civilian OGDs and OGAs. NORADs participation would most likely be limited; however, their situational awareness and information sharing with the other two commands would be an essential aspect of the exercise.


proposed tasking NORAD to be the principal conduit of determining ideas for adaptation, evolution, and development of the defence of North America based on current and future threats. The EvoNAD study had three areas of concentration: modernization of the North Warning System; the creation of a NORAD Combined Forces Air Component Commander; and other issues related to the Tri-Command structure. However, subsequent academic research has given the impression that a change to the C2 structure of NORAD may also be necessary. The change influences include the increasing threat environment and the subsequent blending of multiple domains such as the air and space domains, the increasing importance of the cyber domain, and the maritime warning aspect added to the NORAD responsibility in 2006. Ultimately, some believe that “NORAD is no longer simply an aerospace command” that focuses solely on air threats and that “its foundational mission, preparing to fight an air defence battle, is long gone.” Therefore, the future structure of NORAD must be viewed holistically as part of the modernization strategy to further ameliorate coordination with the other two joint commands and be able to respond as part of the Tri-Command to all pan-domain and environmental threats to the continent.

The complexities between the three individual commands of the Tri-Command structure, to include their subordinate commands, create the illusion of dysfunction. There are multiple commanders and staff alike from both nations who are double-hatted

that fulfill similarly, but different roles depending on their position. Moreover, rank and position influence relationships and authorities. For example, the commander NORAD is a peer to the CDS in terms of rank, yet reports to the GC (through the CDS); however, the same individual as Commander USNORTHCOM is also a peer to the commander of CJOC as a major operational commander, who in turn is subordinate to the CDS.

Regardless of the complexities between command and staff functions, it is contested that the Tri-Command structure in its current continental operational role is threatened as the binational, bilateral, and national processes “are not equipped to deter, detect and defend against a multi-domain environment.”\textsuperscript{175} However, the mitigating solution is far from simple and is further exacerbated by the conflicting political and military opinions on both sides of the border about the actual risk. For example, Canada “sees no immediate threat in the Arctic and the North,”\textsuperscript{176} yet it will continue to “deter and defend against threats to the continent, including from…Northern approaches.”\textsuperscript{177} The CAF interprets the Arctic environment as “relatively benign from the standpoint of conventional (i.e., state-based) military threats” and that its “responsibilities are thus seen as primarily constabulary in nature.”\textsuperscript{178}

The idea of Generals O’Shaughnessy and Fesler’s “Hardening the SHIELD” by indirectly proclaiming that a more offensive solution to continental defence is the answer


\textsuperscript{177} \textit{Ibid.}, 66.

\textsuperscript{178} Peter Gizewski, “Northern Approaches: Strengthening the Army’s Role in the Arctic,” in \textit{Canadian Army Today} (Ottawa, ON: March 2019) 69.
has not been well received in Canada. Nor has the idea of NORAD evolving into a bilateral “North American Defence Command” that can have a greater influence on the pan-domain threat environment. Although this particular option gives perhaps the illusion of a logical transformational step for Canada towards an improved continental strategic defence strategy, it is unlikely to occur due to continuing political disagreements over the current threat analysis, legal ramifications of changing the structure, the C2 structure and the subsequent role of NORAD should this change occur. Ultimately, a drastic modification of the C2 structure is not likely to occur in the immediate term. If it were, a significant update to the 2006 NORAD Agreement would be required, which again is unlikely given the current state of political affairs between both nations on NORAD modernization.

**Analysis**

Canada needs to decide where it stands in terms of meeting its NORAD modernization commitments. By doing so, military planners at the strategic level would be in a better position to determine how resources could be reallocated to strengthen the Tri-Command relationship. After all, a realistic continental defence is only attainable through the Tri-Command structure as it allows “the two countries to integrate or

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coordinate their continental defence efforts while safeguarding national sovereignty and autonomy.”\footnote{Joseph T. Jockel, “Five Lessons from the History of North American Aerospace Defence,” in *International Journal*, 65, no. 4 (n.p., 2010): 1022.} However, if the GC “balks for political reasons related to sovereignty and independence, then NORAD will also likely be marginalized,” resulting in the United States acting unilaterally in terms of continental defence.\footnote{Andrea Charron and James Fergusson, *NORAD: Beyond Modernization*, (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba, January 31, 2019), 55.} Although important, the Canadian government should ease the debate about sovereignty concerns (especially in the Arctic), and demonstrate how it could help fortify relations with the United States. A favourable Canadian government change in attitude towards continental defence “burden-sharing” with the United States (to include varying comprises concerning the NORAD modernization strategy) could ultimately lead to a better bilateral partnership between both militaries during domestic emergencies. As such, in the event of a threat to North America, the Canadian government’s proclamation of a “robust domestic defence”\footnote{Canada. Department of National Defence, *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy* (Ottawa: DND, 2017), 59.} that ultimately promotes one-third of Canada’s strategic vision, would fail and leave a significant gap in Canada’s control over its sovereign territory.

Unfortunately, this change is unlikely in the near term. In many instances, it takes a significant event to act as a catalyst for a change of this magnitude. For Canada, it would have to be a missile launched over its sovereign territory or physical strike in North America to invoke a reevaluation of its standing national security structure with the United States. If this were to occur, it is already too late. After all, “the extant U.S. policy is not to defend Canada”\footnote{House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence (2017). Answer by Lieutenant-General St. Amand to a question posed by Committee Member Ms. Leona Alleslev.} nor is USNORTHCOM legally bound to assist if Canada
requires it.\textsuperscript{186} Therefore, the GC must make the right decisions for continental defence while NORAD modernization initiatives and discussions are still current.

\textbf{Conclusion}

The NORAD modernization strategy is of vital importance to the United States and Canada; however, there remains much debate on the future role of NORAD and the Tri-Command framework. The United States’ stance has developed into a more offensive idea, as proclaimed by Generals O’Shaughnessy and Felser in the SHIELD concept; whereas Canada’s view is fixed on the original notion that NORAD should remain a defensive organization.

Rumsfeld's idea in 2001 of creating a “North American Defence Command” is an interesting concept that was too avant-garde for Canada. It was an ad hoc arrangement that gave too much power and authority to the United States over the continental defence. That said there could be some worth in developing certain aspects of the idea. The balancing of offensive and defensive operations to include both expeditionary and domestic operations is crucial for Canada if it wants to contribute greater to NORAD and ensure its sovereignty is not contested.

Such realizations may be possible by updating agreements, improving binational training and exercises, and developing a new C2 structure that suits the needs of both nations. This structure may have to branch outside the military realm and include a larger civilian component. Going forward, organizations such as Public Safety Canada may need to fill this role to improve the Civil-Military relationship in response to domestic and continental threats to both nations.

CHAPTER 5: DOMESTIC OPERATIONS AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

The requests for assistance between levels of government generally follow a structure from the “bottom-up”: from community, to provincial, to federal levels of government. All levels of this hierarchy work on different types of tasks and activities, with many jurisdictions and organizations working together in partnership through emergency management structures.

- Ontario Provincial Emergency Response Plan 2019

Introduction

The portfolio of Public Safety Canada (PSC) is extremely diverse and focuses on a wide variety of national security, safety, and emergency management characteristics. It has the mandate of keeping “Canadians safe from a range of risks such as natural disasters, crime and terrorism” and regularly collaborates with many other government departments and agencies such as DND, Canada Border Services Agency, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Department of Environment and Climate Change, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, and Transport Canada. This interagency collaboration is indicative of the complexities of PSC’s responsibilities to both the federal government and civilian society writ large. As a result, PSC has adopted the “whole-of society” approach which:

…seeks to leverage existing knowledge, experience and capabilities with [Emergency Management] partners in order to strengthen the resilience of all [Canadians].

The whole-of-society approach is similar to the military’s understanding of the “comprehensive approach” but puts more focus on Canadian society rather than the partnerships and cooperation between civilian-military interaction in a specific context.

Since its creation in 2003, PSC has grown significantly as a department and has become increasingly more involved in domestic emergency management and crisis prevention at the federal, provincial, and territorial levels of government. Furthermore, its perceived societal importance has expanded as the concerns of natural and pan-domain threats to Canada such as terrorism, natural disasters, and now health security uncertainties such as COVID-19 increase over time. However, a key trend that has emerged over the last decade is that the provinces and territories are defaulting more regularly to PSC and the federal government for emergency management assistance rather than leveraging their integral capabilities.\(^{189}\) Although the CAF should always remain a domestic force of last resort, frequently it is requested and in greater numbers by the provinces.\(^{190}\)

For the federal government, there will always remain the significant difficulty of not approving a RFA from the provinces or territories as it creates a negative societal perception that political leadership is unable to effectively manage emergencies under demanding circumstances. Moreover, it is a reputational risk for the federal government to sit idly and do nothing even if the ultimate responsibility for emergency management (up to a national emergency) lies with the provinces and territories. Therefore, a better balance is needed between the emergency management action plans of all levels of government and the use of federal capabilities such as the CAF in a domestic crisis. By doing so, greater responsibility will be put on provincial, territories, and municipal


governments to plan, coordinate and ultimately “do something” when required with the capabilities available to them. This solution would improve the local economy by employing civilian contractors and companies instead of the CAF. Furthermore, by limiting the CAF response as the “first option” of government recourse in emergencies it would also assist in the rebalancing of the operational effectiveness of the CAF at home and abroad.

This chapter will outline the four “Emergency Management Components” of PSC that guide how each level of government should approach emergency management in their respective jurisdictions. It will subsequently look at the two main components that the CAF is frequently associated with and how changes to the civil-military relationships can ultimately improve all levels of government preparedness and response to a domestic emergency. Such improvements will focus on the comprehensive approach to contingency planning and implementing interagency training and exercises regularly.

The Four “Emergency Management Components” and the CAF

In May 2017, PSC unveiled their capstone publication entitled “An Emergency Management Framework for Canada.” Its stated purpose is to:

…guide and strengthen the way governments and partners assess risks and work together to prevent/mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk to Canadians.192

To accomplish this, PSC divided the concepts of emergency management into four components to understand the specific areas of needed emergency management

192 Ibid, 6.
improvement. They are “Prevention and Mitigation,” “Preparedness,” “Response,” and “Recovery.”

Although PSC has the responsibility to assist all levels of government with the understanding and coordination of each of the emergency management components, the CAF only intervenes when specifically mandated by the federal government and most often only during the “Response” component of a crisis. However, as natural disasters are becoming more frequent, severe, and continue to present “one of the most evident threats to humanity,” the CAF will undoubtedly be required to increase their contribution and participation in the other three emergency management components as well. Although this is counter-productive to ameliorating the CAF’s operational effectiveness due to force structure limitations, the improved interagency contribution, specifically in the “Preparation” component, will not only assist all levels of government with identifying gaps and shortfalls of emergency management procedures, but it will help temper public expectations of the responsibilities of the CAF in response to emergency domestic operations.

Although the range of threats to Canada varies immensely and influences both PSC and the CAF, natural disasters, severe weather events, and the effects of climate change are reoccurring threats that are continuously affecting Canadian’s physical, social,

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193 Public Safety Canada, *Emergency for Canada: Toward a Resilient 2030*, (Ottawa, ON: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2019), 3. Emergency Management has traditionally emphasized on “Preparedness” and “Response” operations, but with the increase and frequency of disasters in Canada, PSC has changed their focus to “Prevention and Mitigation” efforts, as well as pre-emptive “Recovery” efforts.

and economic livelihood\textsuperscript{195} and ultimately have a significant impact on CAF operational effectiveness. For this reason, in addition to space limitations, terrorist and modern geopolitical conventional threats to Canada will not be analyzed.

**How to “Prepare”?**

PSC has consistently annotated in their most current publications that “Preparedness” continues to be a fundamental component of emergency management in Canada.\textsuperscript{196} It is defined as being “ready to respond to a disaster and manage its consequences through measures taken prior to an event” and includes preparatory measures such as comprehensive response plans, mutual agreements, training and education, communication with the general public, equipment resource availability, and emergency management exercises.\textsuperscript{197} All these measures are critical to the responsiveness of the whole-of-society approach during an emergency. With the recent publications, PSC has sufficiently acknowledged the “what” it needs to do in terms of emergency preparedness recognition in Canada. However, there remains a gap in “how” it will be accomplished.

The linkages between the “what” and the “how” in emergency management have been an ongoing conundrum that has plagued the federal government (regardless of the political party in power) and PSC for over a decade. For example, in 2009, the then Auditor-General, Sheila Fraser criticized that the government did not have a “planned


and coordinated approach in place so that federal, provincial and municipal agencies
know what part they will play in managing a crisis.” These criticisms followed the
federal government’s handling of the Novel Influenza H1N1 pandemic in which Fraser
argued the government’s reaction was commensurate with the “case-by-case” response
rather than a deliberately planned methodology. Ironically, the current government is
receiving similar accusations concerning their handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, but
criticisms are more focused on personal protective equipment shortages, insufficient
vaccine manufacturing capacity in Canada, federal authority over the provinces,
national lockdowns, rapid testing, and vaccine rollout execution. In addition to recent
government pandemic responses, in 2016, an audit by the Commissioner of Environment
and Sustainable Development, Julie Gelfand found that the “federal government had not
done enough to help mitigate the anticipated impacts of severe weather events.”
Although both the H1N1 pandemic and reoccurring severe weather examples can relate to
the “Prevention and Mitigation” component, they also apply to “Preparedness.” as little
was organized in terms of a comprehensive response plan, tools for decision-makers, and
a detailed communication strategy for the general public.

Since that time, there has been an improvement, as noted in the PSC “Departmental Results Report 2019-20.” However, there has been an increased focus on

the “Prevention” and “Response” components rather than “Preparedness.” Figure 4.1 details the actual expenditures of Emergency Management in 2019-20 of PSC. Of particular note, only 3% of the total $555M allotted to the Emergency Management responsibility was dedicated to “Emergency Preparedness.” Furthermore, there is no indication of a financial breakdown of actual spending on CAF assistance during domestic emergencies. Although it may be less pertinent during the “Preparedness” phase, a greater CAF contribution throughout this component could potentially lower both main estimates and actual spending throughout the “Response” phase.

![Figure 4.1 – Public Safety Canada Emergency Management Expenditures 2019-20](https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrscs/pblctns/dprtmntl-rslts-rprt-2019-20/index-en.aspx#s2)

Therefore, the “Preparedness” component is where the CAF should focus its attention to improve domestic operations interoperability with PSC and other governmental departments and agencies. The benefits of amalgamating both departments during this particular phase outweigh the force structure risks as described by the previous CDS, General Vance, and the impacts of disaster relief on the readiness of the

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CAF as announced by the CCA, LGen Eyre.\textsuperscript{203} Moreover, to mitigate the interagency gaps between PSC and CAF, both organizations must work intimately together, regularly, and recognize that their partnership will increase as with the changing threat environment unless there is a paradigm shift in attitude by provincial and territorial governments with requesting capabilities such as the CAF as a force of “first response” in domestic emergency management.\textsuperscript{204} Thus, two identified key improvements during the “Preparedness” phase that are already harmonized with the current federal government emergency management concepts are: targeted interagency working groups to develop a combined whole-of-society and comprehensive approach contingency planning for PSC, the CAF, and other key partners;\textsuperscript{205} and mandated interagency training and realistic scenario exercises involving all stakeholders. These improvements could subsequently be integrated into the provincial and territorial response plans.

Civil-Military Contingency Planning

At the political and strategic levels of government, there is an understanding that both PSC and the DND are mandated to keep Canada and Canadians safe from a variety of risks.\textsuperscript{206} Both departments publish key strategic-level policy documents that further explain the risks and their impacts on society. However, as the modern threat

\begin{footnotes}
\item[204] Of note, there is no mention of the “Department of National Defence” or the “Canadian Armed Forces” in any of the capstone PCS publications (Federal Emergency Response Plan; Emergency Management Planning Guide 2010-2011; An Emergency Management Framework for Canada; Emergency Management Strategy for Canada: Toward a Resilient 2030; Departmental Plan 2021-22).
\end{footnotes}
environment continues to evolve, a greater requirement for synchronized contingency planning between civilian and military leadership becomes extremely important at all levels. Furthermore, there must be an acknowledgment that the challenges of information sharing, cooperation, coordination, and integration within an interagency contingency plan can impede operational effectiveness. Seldom are major preparatory concepts and coordinating measures identified before a disaster. Such inaction often leads to an ad hoc civilian and military emergency management system that is only compelled to work together because of shared responsibility to disaster response. As a result, this inconsistent interagency cooperation contributes to a lack of will and resources to improve teamwork, shared preparation, training, equipment standardization, and the implementation of best practices for civil-military cooperation.

At the provincial and territorial levels of government, there is evidence that better synchronization and cooperation between emergency management authorities and the CAF does exist. For example, British Columbia’s Public Safety and Emergency Services has a comprehensive “All Hazard” contingency plan which includes deployment direction and hazard-specific annexes detailing emergency management actions following disasters such as earthquakes, floods, tsunamis, pandemics, and fires. More specifically, in the “British Columbia Earthquake Immediate Response Plan,” a clear delineation of responsibility between provincial authorities and the CAF is annotated to

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include specific reference to Conplan Panorama, JTFP’s 219-page contingency plan response to a catastrophic earthquake in British Columbia.209

The Province of Ontario has similar documentation in their “Provincial Emergency Plan 2019” in that there is a “close relationship” between Emergency Management Ontario and JTFC.210 However, there is little more in terms of the specifics or contingency planning between both organizations. Of particular significance is the escalation of the Province of Ontario’s emergency response levels and when contingency planning is required. Figure 4.2 depicts contingency planning occurring during the “Enhanced Monitoring” phase. Although direct lineages are debatable, this is in contradiction to the timeline of PSC’s “Preparedness” component phase. Ultimately, contingency planning should occur during the “non-emergency operations” to ensure maximum coordination and input of all stakeholders in a controlled, no-stress environment.

Without the proper implementation of a comprehensive (or whole-of-society) approach to contingency planning at all levels of government, gaps will be missed. However, if applied correctly and regularly, this method of collaborative interagency planning will leverage “the strengths and capabilities of diverse mission players…[and] result in both immediate and more enduring success in complex missions.”

**Figure 4.2 – Ontario Provincial Response Levels**
Source: Ontario Provincial Emergency response Plan 2019, 60.

**Regular Interagency Training and Exercises**

PSC policy notes that emergency management training and exercises are fundamental to organizational development and “contribute to the testing of all-hazards

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plans, and validate their effectiveness."\textsuperscript{212} Furthermore, when applied in a civil-military or interagency context, they can “significantly help in bridging the culture gap and in fostering mutual respect.”\textsuperscript{213} There is little argument that training and the subsequent exercises that build on an organization’s experience are essential to achieving success, particularly during unpredictable and stressful situations such as an emergency management disaster response. The federal government’s understanding of the importance of training is no different. It is frequently communicated throughout federal publications and on PSC government websites.\textsuperscript{214} However, since the closure of the Canadian Emergency Management College in 2012,\textsuperscript{215} PSC has both diverted federal emergency management training to online courses through the Canada School of Public Service and delegated much of its extracurricular and in-person training to the provinces, territories, and municipal governments. This practice is detrimental to the experience and knowledge of federal emergency management leadership as there is less social engagement, sharing of best practices, evaluation assessment, networking, and lessons learned. Although limited academic analysis has been conducted in regards to training efficiency to prove training methods of delivery, some published results indicate that organizations need to move “towards a more sophisticated and evidence-based approach

\textsuperscript{212} Public Safety Canada, \textit{Emergency for Canada: Toward a Resilient 2030} (Ottawa, ON: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2019), 20.


\textsuperscript{215} Andrew Paul Burtch, \textit{Give Me Shelter: The Failure of Canada’s Cold War Civil Defence} (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012), 40, 82, 86, 126; Public Safety Canada, “ARCHIVE - Canadian Emergency Management College History,” last modified December 21, 2018, https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/mrgnc-mngmnt/mrgnc-prprdnss/archive-cndn-mrgnc-mngmnt-cllg-hstry-en.aspx. The Canadian Emergency Management College was created in 1951 under the original name “Federal Civil Defence Staff College.” Following the Second World War and the subsequent Cold War uncertainties, the focus of the college was primarily towards civil defence. Throughout the decades the name would change five times and evolved to include education and training on all types of emergencies that posed a threat to Canada.
to training needs analysis, design, and evaluation…” rather than an ad hoc approach.²¹⁶ Ultimately, given the changing environment that includes both pan-domain and environmental threats, it is recommended that the Canadian Emergency Management College be reinstated and subordinate to PSC to ensure that training consistency is maintained between all levels of government. Moreover, the integration of CAF leadership from strategic, operational, and even tactical-level headquarters such as a Brigade or an RJTF’s “Immediate Response Unit” would assist tremendously in building civil-military relationships and enhance interoperability between organizations.

In addition to a required modernization of individual and collective training delivery methods for emergency management, the federal government needs to be more pragmatic in terms of exercise design, planning, and execution. Although the “National Exercise Program” (NEP) is a PSC proclaimed “key activity” in the improvement of emergency management in Canada,²¹⁷ little is known about the program or any of the outcomes. Unlike government department results, CAF post-exercise, or operation reports, nothing is readily available for analysis in the unclassified or open-source realm.

In stark contrast to the Canadian NEP, informality is the United States equivalent national program under the same name and administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). FEMA’s NEP is a two-year cycle of exercises conducted around the United States to assess and validate skills in all areas of emergency management preparedness. The “Principals' Strategic Priorities,” identified by the National Security Council's Principals Committee direct each NEP cycle and ultimately

approve the emergency topic of focus. A culminating National Level Exercise (NLE) in which all levels of government are assessed then follows the two-year cycle on their abilities to respond to a national-level catastrophic disaster event. For example, the focus of FEMA’s NLE 2020 (before the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak) was on cybersecurity threats and measures to counter them. The NLE 2022, as described in a previous chapter, is focused on an earthquake along the Cascadia Subduction Zone fault in the Pacific Northwest. Again, the benefits for Canadian federal, provincial, territorial, and municipal governments and the CAF to leverage this exercise are immeasurable in terms of experience and cooperation (national and binational).

Although the reputation of FEMA was tarnished by the wake of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the organization has rebounded significantly, albeit with some claims of bureaucratic inefficiency. It has a robust training and exercise cadre, aptly called the Emergency Management Institute as part of the National Emergency Training Center, which provides both in-person and online courses at the state and national level. Furthermore, FEMA consistently works closely with the United States National Guard as demonstrated recently with the President’s decision to deploy both organizations to assist with the COVID-19 vaccination rollout plan. Ultimately, the integration and oversight of FEMA in disaster response and the education program it has developed are

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commensurate with what PSC ought to envision in terms of emergency management. If the recreation of an independent federal emergency management training institution that supervises exercise planning and execution is not viable, an alternative solution would be the integration of a small CAF planning cell into a civilian emergency management organization and adopt a military-style of exercise design and planning. As “interagency education and training activities are extremely complex to plan and execute and are expensive undertakings,” a military planning approach under the direct supervision of civilian emergency management leadership could assist in achieving specific training goals for all stakeholders. Understanding that PSC is not as robust as FEMA and that the current CAF structure is not capable of taking on additional domestic tasks such as emergency management training and exercise development, there still must be an improvement upon the “Preparedness” component of emergency management.

A Reactive Response

The response of a government to an emergency is crucial to not only the health and safety of the society it represents but also to its credibility as a responsible organization acting accordingly under demanding and difficult circumstances. The PSC definition of “Response” as it relates to the other four components is:

…to act during, immediately before or after a disaster to manage its consequences through, for example, emergency public communication, search and rescue, emergency medical assistance and evacuation to minimize suffering and losses associated with disasters.223

This particular component is probably the most important in terms of public perceptions and expectations of governments. It is also the principal phase of an emergency management operation that the CAF is typically requested and employed. Ultimately, regardless of the level of authority and the amount of time, money, and effort a government invests in the “Prevention and Mitigation” and “Preparedness” components, political leadership must be seen as “doing something” when an emergency occurs for the benefit of the society they have been elected to protect.\(^{224}\) As for the “Recovery” component, there will always be a requirement of governments to provide relief to affected individuals and communities in a reasonable amount of time, but the added pressure of potential loss of life or critical infrastructure due to a lack of government “Response” has usually subsided by this stage.

Unfortunately, despite the efforts of PSC in institutionalizing the four components and communicating their importance, there is still a significant inadequate government “reactive approach” in response to the complexities of pan-domain and environmental threats.\(^{225}\) As a result, the deployment of militaries in democratic states on domestic operations is frequently requested too late by their governments. For example, the governments of New Brunswick, Quebec, and Ontario were criticized by residents and communities for not requesting CAF support earlier in response to the 2019 floods. The same criticism was expressed in the 2017 flooding of the Ottawa and Gatineau rivers when it was reported that the CAF “arrived too late and didn’t offer help in trying to save

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individual homes.”

Although neither the federal government nor the CAF was ultimately to blame for the untimely response, public perception of inaction can very easily damage the credibility of an organization. Therefore, early interagency cooperation and public communication strategies are crucial leading up to, and, during the “Response” component phase of emergency management. These strategic communications with the public are essential, yet intergovernmental message coordination “may create tension, and may force decisions that could risk that positive reputation.”

Moreover, it is during the “Response” phase that senior military officials are concerned about the domestic employment impacts on CAF structure and its operational effectiveness. As a result, decisions by PSC in consultation with the CAF as to how the employment of the military as the force of “first option” should adjust to mitigate CAF leadership concerns. For example, the further leveraging of municipal equipment and personnel resources not only improves the local economy, but it lowers the requirement for the deployment of military assets. This solution has two overarching fundamentals that should guide the participation of the CAF in domestic emergency operations. First, it maintains the idea that to “use the CAF to displace civilian capacity and labour” is inappropriate; and second, it abides by the principle that the CAF is a “force of last resort” and may only be requested when the “primary response municipal, provincial, and

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federal capabilities are exhausted.”²²⁹ Leveraging options could include the loan of heavy equipment such as bulldozers, backend loaders, and trucks or the purchase of specific tools, material, and expertise. Again, although this would likely occur during the “Response” component phase, ideally, these options should be identified and contracts put into place during the “Preparedness” component phase in the attempt to save time. Furthermore, municipalities could coordinate their emergency management preparedness activities by ensuring contracts could overlap between jurisdictions. This would mean if one particular municipality were in a state of emergency, an adjacent municipality could intervene and assist with their established contracts. Financial compensation during the “Recovery” phase would be a significant aspect to de-conflict, but the greater good of the “shared” municipal response should prevail.

A second example is the reimagining of the CAF domestic force structure to include a greater responsibility on the employment of Reserve Force members in place of the Regular Force. This concept is not revolutionary as denoted in the DND and CAF’s Reserve Force – Report on Plans and Priorities 2015-16 when specific capabilities such as:

…the Territorial Battalion Groups (TBG), Domestic Response Companies, and Arctic Response Company Groups (ARCG)…represent the force employment framework through which the Army Reserve will leverage existing unit structures and capacities and eventually take the land forces lead in domestic operations, with support from the Regular Force as required.²³⁰

Although the creation of a new CAF structure based on the Reserve Force that is responsible for the conduct of emergency domestic operations was not one of the new initiatives as indicated in SSE,\(^\text{231}\) some believe that the Reserve Force “should become a more functional capability charged with these duties exclusively.”\(^\text{232}\) Unfortunately, this is not necessarily a favourable option and “would likely elicit an extremely negative reaction from reservists.”\(^\text{233}\)

However, the creation of a specific branch of the Reserve Force that has specialized trades and training in emergency management and domestic emergencies support could be envisioned and developed.\(^\text{234}\) This concept is not unlike the Regular Force’s expeditionary-focused “Disaster Assistance Response Team;”\(^\text{235}\) the only difference would be that it is rather domestically-oriented and founded on the Reserve Force. For example, the CA has implemented in the past five years the “Strengthening the Army Reserve” (StAR) initiative that ultimately focuses on the growth of the force, its capabilities, and funding. Although unique only to the CA, the logical next step would be to grow the StAR program around domestic response capabilities as it has already with

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\(^{231}\) There are nine new initiatives “to enhance the role and capabilities of the Reserve Force” indicated in SSE. These include: increasing the size of the Primary Reserve Force, assigning new roles, enhancing existing roles, assigning primary roles in expeditionary missions, create models that supports full and part time serve, alignment of remuneration and benefits, annuitant employment regulations, full-time summer employment, and align federal acts governing job protection.


the Light Urban Search and Rescue (LUSAR) task.\textsuperscript{236} This progression could easily be integrated with both the RCAF Reserve and the Naval Reserve.

In addition, to complement the StAR program and further develop Canada’s growing domestic constabulary responsibilities in the Arctic, the CAF could devote more attention to the Arctic Training Centre at Resolute and enhance the four Reserve Force ARCGs. As highlighted by Peter Gizewski in the Defence Research and Development Canada document, forces “assigned to Arctic tasks (e.g., Immediate Response Unit Company, ARCG) have significant and enduring challenges” and therefore must continue to improve their capabilities and effectiveness in harsh climates.\textsuperscript{237} Again, these amelioration considerations should not only be limited to CA Reserve Force units, but rather a shared responsibility between all environments.

Regardless, these particular recommendations are significant and would require extensive analysis as a major restructuring of personnel would be required. In addition, other issues such as Reserve Force retention and recruitment, specific training, legal ramifications relating to civilian job assurance, associated risks and benefits, and possible reallocation of defence budget funds to support the change would need further analytical review. Ultimately, the Reserve Force should be leveraged largely for the planning, execution, and C2 of domestic operations in Canada. By providing individual augmentation to the Regular Force by reservists with specific qualifications and skillsets and further developing C2 headquarters such as the TBG and individual units, a greater domestic responsibility is bestowed on the Reserve Force.

\textsuperscript{237} Peter Gizewski, “Northern Approaches: Strengthening the Army’s Role in the Arctic,” in \textit{Canadian Army Today} (Ottawa, ON, March 2019) 69.
Conclusion

Over the last decade, provincial, territorial, and municipal governments have increasingly developed a dependency on PSC and the federal government for emergency response assistance rather than using their capabilities. While the specific reasons for such a trend are debatable, the impacts it has on the CAF operational effectiveness can be measured in terms of decreases in individual and collective training outputs. This problem is only further exacerbated due to the impacts of COVID-19 on recruiting and the subsequent training.238

Ultimately, the CAF is a domestic force of last resort and should not be used as a means to gain public support for the government or a particular political party. A greater emphasis on PSC’s “Preparedness” component and how the CAF could assist with contingency planning, training, and exercises within an interagency civil-military team could potentially contribute to a more robust and better equipped public “Response” to emergency management vice a military “Response.” Although the defence of Canada and its citizens will remain the CAF’s primary mandate,239 its overuse for domestic operations when additional provincial, territorial or municipal capabilities are available has consequences on the state of readiness of the CAF.

CHAPTER 6: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Recommendations

The CAF is again at a pivotal point in terms of its structural *raison-d’être*. This sentiment has been exacerbated by the onslaught of the COVID-19 pandemic and the increasing demands on the institution due to climate change and natural disasters. Although expeditionary operations continue to be an essential part of the CAF culture, greater public attention is now focused on the defence and protection of Canada and its citizens. Perhaps another significant “CAF Transformation” is to better align the purpose of the military in these unprecedented, threatening times. The following recommendations are not inclusive of all that was discussed in this paper; however, highlighted are some key areas that the leadership of the CAF, DND and other federal government departments could examine to improve the efficiency of the institution in response to domestic operations.

First, there is a growing requirement for a dedicated domestic operations C2 structure to counter all current and future pan-domain threats that affect Canada and its citizens. Gen Hillier’s Canada COM organization was amalgamated into the CJOC structure too early and not allowed to adjust and evolve. Reduction of bureaucratic redundancy and saving federal funds are important as noted in LGen Leslie’s *Report on Transformation*, but not to the detriment of the defence and security of a nation. The solution in the near term is therefore a structure that can be established relatively quickly and not have a significant impact on the institution, such as a “Joint Task Force Canada.” This structure would be similar to what was exercised during Operation *Laser* in that subordinate formations would remain the RJTFs; however, the main difference would be that 1st Can Div would not necessarily be the designated headquarters. The headquarters
would be a “joint” construct that is mandated to uniquely focus on domestic operations and response alone. The responsibility of a command organization splitting its priorities between both domestic and expeditionary operations has to stop. Only then could a greater understanding of the problem be properly addressed.

Furthermore, in the long term, the idea of a “Canada Domestic Command” could be envisioned. Although this option was not analyzed in this study, its benefits should be examined to include an option of having a civilian as the “commander” or “chief director-general.” By doing so, there is the argument that DND and the CAF remain subordinate to civil government and respond only when mandated. Moreover, a better intergovernmental relationship with OGDs and OGAs such as with PSC could be strengthened. A current example of this potential civilian-military relationship is that between Major-General (MGen) Dany Fortin and PHAC concerning the Canadian COVID-19 vaccine distribution. Named “Vice President Logistics and Operations” and seconded to PHAC, MGen Fortin is responsible to oversee logistical planning and distribution of the COVID-19 vaccines across Canada.²⁴⁰ However, he ultimately receives direction and guidance from the minister of PHAC, a civilian government employee, the Honourable Patty Hajdu. Although time will tell if this unique operational “C2” relationship succeeds, it demonstrates that the CAF and DND are prepared to indirectly evaluate and assess, albeit under demanding circumstances, the value of having a civilian directly decree strategic direction to the military in an operational context.

Second, the uncertainty and differing ideas behind the NORAD modernization initiative and the Tri-Command strategy cannot be a scapegoat for the Canadian federal government to delay the commitment to continental defence. Understanding that issues that impact the ideology of Canadian sovereignty and its current stance in terms of the defence of North America are culturally important to Canada, a government decision needs to be made on Canada’s level of contribution to the NOARD modernization strategy before a catalyst instigates a reactive change in unfavourable circumstances.

Additionally, a CAF response to natural disasters within a binational agreement in the short term will help shape Canada’s contribution to the Tri-Command structure and how it plans on dealing with the more complex developing conventional and asymmetrical threats to Canada and the United States in the medium to long term. A notable example to strengthen the binational relationship is the CAP that remains a fundamental plan that needs to be further expanded upon and tested within a realistic scenario. Training opportunities and exercises such as exercise Cascadia Rising 2022 are a primordial opportunity to ensure that a binational JIMP response to a continent disaster will be coordinated efficiently within a comprehensive approach to operations.

Ultimately, citizens of both nations who are in dire need care not about the nation’s military force that saves them, but rather that “someone” is there to support, protect, and defend them as needed, regardless of country or federal agency. Canada may not be ready for a “North American Defence Command” as initially envisioned by Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld, but it should be prepared to commit more to NORAD modernization and the Tri-Command strategy.
Finally, there is a need for balancing between the emergency management responsibilities of PSC, the provincial, territorial, and municipal governments, and the role the CAF plays in a response to a domestic crisis. Ultimately, regular targeted working groups, mandated interagency exercises and training opportunities, and the reinstallation of educational institutions such as the Canadian Emergency Management College are all fundamental recommendations to improving the coordination and cooperation of emergency management between organizations, agencies, and all levels of government.

Moreover, the greater integration and bestowed responsibility upon the Reserve Force in domestic response should be further analyzed. Additional specialized training to complement typical domestic disaster tasks such as LUSAR, greater C2 accountabilities, and the creation of a specific “Reserve Force” branch or organization similar to the DART, but in a domestic capacity are all options to grow the spectrum of response options the CAF could provide when a provincial RFA is authorized by the federal government. Furthermore, all these possibilities compliment the Regular Force capabilities as both a domestic and expeditionary force and assist to improve the operational effectiveness of the force writ large.

**Conclusion**

The impacts on the CAF by a growing number of new institutional tasks, the balancing of domestic and expeditionary operations, and an increase in unforeseen natural disaster emergency management deployments in Canada have led to a significant decline in the effectiveness of the institution over the last decade. The CAF’s response to domestic climate change-related activities such as fires, floods, winter storms, as well as
its participation in the battle against COVID-19, have overstretched the force's capability and left it inadequately staffed to accomplish all the assigned and implied tasks. As a result, the CAF, as the "first option" of government recourse to domestic response, is losing its overall organizational efficacy against the emerging pan-domain challenges to both Canada and the international community.

A fundamental change is required. The options must be bold, similar to Gen Hillier’s CF Transformation, and cannot be constrained by the possibilities of bureaucratic duplication of positions or federal budgets. This argument is not a means to lessen the CAF’s overall contribution to assisting Canada and Canadians; rather, it is a call for a review of the organization, its culture, and its priorities to help alleviate the pressure of an overburdened C2 structure.

The CAF is at an institutional crossroads, just beyond an incoming pan-domain storm. There is still time, but it must decide soon to either continue down the same “reactionary” path and piecemeal solutions to increasingly complex problems or reevaluate its current position and create a path that balances operational necessity with domestic obligations in support of the Government of Canada and the Canadians it is sworn to protect. After the storm is too late.
### APPENDIX 2 – CJOC HISTORICAL DATA OPERATION LENTUS 2009-2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Op Name</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>Duration (days)</th>
<th>Deployed Pers</th>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20-01</td>
<td>January 18, 2020</td>
<td>January 28, 2020</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>2 X CH-130, 1 X CH-146, 1 X CH-148, 1 X CH-149</td>
<td>Snowstorm - NL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-05</td>
<td>November 13, 2019</td>
<td>November 19, 2019</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Evac (Flood) - ON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAF sp to NSL</td>
<td>November 4, 2019</td>
<td>November 18, 2019</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Social Crisis - ON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-04</td>
<td>September 7, 2019</td>
<td>September 15, 2019</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>3 X CH-146</td>
<td>Hurricane - NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-03</td>
<td>May 31, 2019</td>
<td>June 12, 2019</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>2 X CH-146</td>
<td>Wildfire - AB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-02</td>
<td>May 30, 2019</td>
<td>July 22, 2019</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>5 X CC-130, 2 X CH-147</td>
<td>Evac (Wildfire) - ON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-01</td>
<td>April 20, 2019</td>
<td>June 5, 2019</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>2,534</td>
<td>4 X CH-146</td>
<td>Flood - NB, QC, ON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-06</td>
<td>November 29, 2018</td>
<td>December 2, 2018</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2 X CC-130</td>
<td>Winter Storm - QC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-05</td>
<td>August 13, 2018</td>
<td>September 13, 2018</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>1 X CC-130, 1 X CH-124, 1 X CH-146</td>
<td>Wildfire - BC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-04</td>
<td>May 23, 2018</td>
<td>May 25, 2018</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 X CH-147, 2 X CC-130</td>
<td>Evac (Wildfire) - MB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-03</td>
<td>May 16, 2018</td>
<td>May 26, 2018</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Flood - BC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-02</td>
<td>May 11, 2018</td>
<td>May 15, 2018</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Flood - NB, QC, ON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-01</td>
<td>April 26, 2018</td>
<td>May 7, 2018</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 X CC-130, 1 X CH-146</td>
<td>Evac (Flood) - ON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-04</td>
<td>July 9, 2017</td>
<td>September 23, 2017</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2 X CH-147, 3 X CH-146, 1 X CC-124, 3 X CC-130, 1 X CC-177</td>
<td>Wildfire - BC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-03</td>
<td>May 6, 2017</td>
<td>June 5, 2017</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2,600</td>
<td>7 X CH-146, 1 X CH-147, 1 X CH-149, 1 X Frigate (Montreal)</td>
<td>Flood - QC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-02</td>
<td>April 16, 2017</td>
<td>May 1, 2017</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>CR - unknown</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Evac (Flood) - ON</td>
</tr>
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<td>17-01</td>
<td>January 27, 2017</td>
<td>February 8, 2017</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>1 X CH-146, 1 X CP-140</td>
<td>Ice Storm - NB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-01</td>
<td>May 4, 2016</td>
<td>May 13, 2016</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>4 X CH-146, 1 X CH-147, 1 X CC-130</td>
<td>Wildfire - AB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-02</td>
<td>July 8, 2015</td>
<td>July 21, 2015</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>2 X CH-146</td>
<td>Wildfire - SK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-01</td>
<td>April 27, 2015</td>
<td>May 7, 2015</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Nil (aircraft on standby - not deployed)</td>
<td>Evac (Flood) - ON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-05</td>
<td>July 4, 2014</td>
<td>July 15, 2014</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>4 X CH-146, 1 X CP-140</td>
<td>Flood - MB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-03</td>
<td>May 17, 2014</td>
<td>May 20, 2014</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>CR - unknown</td>
<td>2 X CC-130</td>
<td>Evac (Flood) - ON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-02</td>
<td>May 10, 2014</td>
<td>May 20, 2014</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>CR - unknown</td>
<td>3 X CC-130, 3 X CC-146</td>
<td>Evac (Flood) - ON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-01</td>
<td>May 7, 2014</td>
<td>May 8, 2014</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CR - unknown</td>
<td>2 X CC-130, 5 X CC-146</td>
<td>Evac (Flood) - ON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-01</td>
<td>June 21, 2013</td>
<td>June 26, 2013</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2300</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Flood - AB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forge</td>
<td>July 6, 2011</td>
<td>July 22, 2011</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>CR - unknown</td>
<td>6 X CC-130</td>
<td>Evac (Wildfire) - ON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyre</td>
<td>July 2, 2011</td>
<td>July 5, 2011</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Flood - MB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lustre</td>
<td>May 8, 2011</td>
<td>May 27, 2011</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1,866</td>
<td>1 X CP-140, 1 X CH-146</td>
<td>Flood - MB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lotus</td>
<td>May 5, 2011</td>
<td>June 7, 2011</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>834</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Flood - QC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton</td>
<td>December 13, 2010</td>
<td>December 27, 2010</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1 X CC-130 (SAR), 1 X CP-140, 3 X CH-146</td>
<td>Snow Storm - ON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lama</td>
<td>September 25, 2010</td>
<td>October 9, 2010</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Hurricane - NL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: Operation Lentus only became a "named" operation in 2012, prior to that each emergent domestic operation had independent names.

Note 2: During several deployments, Canadian Rangers (CR) were the deployed force; however, their numbers were not reported.
**APPENDIX 3 – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Can Div</td>
<td>1st Canadian Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALEA</td>
<td>Assistance to Law-Enforcement Agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARCG</td>
<td>Arctic Response Company Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGen</td>
<td>Brigadier-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMD</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada COM</td>
<td>Canada Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Canadian Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCA</td>
<td>Commander Canadian Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAF</td>
<td>Canadian Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANOSCOM</td>
<td>Canadian Operations Support Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANSOFCOM</td>
<td>Canadian Special Operations Force Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Civil Assistance Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBC</td>
<td>Canadian Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDP</td>
<td>Combined Defense Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>Chief of the Defence Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEFCOM</td>
<td>Canadian Expeditionary Force Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF</td>
<td>Canadian Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFDS</td>
<td>Canada First Defence Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFJOSG</td>
<td>Canadian Forces Joint Operational Support Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJOC</td>
<td>Canadian Joint Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conplan</td>
<td>Contingency Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoT</td>
<td>Chief of Transition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COVID-19</td>
<td>Novel Coronavirus Disease 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DND</td>
<td>Department of National Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EvoNAD</td>
<td>Evolution of North American Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC</td>
<td>Government of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen</td>
<td>General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HADR</td>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRU</td>
<td>Immediate Response Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFACC</td>
<td>Joint Force Air Component Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIMP</td>
<td>Joint, Interagency, Multinational, and Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JLCC</td>
<td>Joint Land Component Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTFA</td>
<td>Joint Task Force (Atlantic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF-C</td>
<td>Joint Task Force (Central)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF-Can</td>
<td>Joint Task Force Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF-E</td>
<td>Joint Task Force (East)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF-LR</td>
<td>Joint Task Force Laser</td>
</tr>
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<td>JTF-N</td>
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