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Right-Wing Extremism, Radicalization, and the Canadian Armed Forces

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JCSP 47

Master of Defence Studies

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PCEMI 47

Maîtrise en études de la défense

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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES

JCSP 47 – PCEMI 47

2020 – 2021

MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES – MAÎTRISE EN ÉTUDES DE LA DÉFENSE

**RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM, RADICALIZATION,
AND THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES**

By Major M.S.W.G. Boire

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Abstract

Right-wing extremism (RWE) threatens the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) from a public security perspective, personnel perspective, and institutional perspective. This paper will argue that the CAF currently finds itself at a decisive point where the institution must guard against right-wing extremism in order to protect itself and its people. Specifically, it will be argued that the CAF could pursue establishing robust processes when screening individuals joining the institution, could develop counter-radicalization measures and deradicalization procedures, and, as part of the whole government, enable a change in culture in which RWE cannot proliferate.

This project examines Canadian culture and RWE, the processes of radicalization and deradicalization, efforts made by the CAF to combat hateful conduct, diversity as an RWE deterrent within the CAF, and analyzes a proposed operation framework provided by the MINDS program. Having analyzed these key elements, it is proposed that the CAF develop policies and programs along three lines of effort: enable counter-radicalization in Canada by engaging whole-of-government (WoG) agencies, establish counter-measures to protect the institution and its people, and enable culture change and eradicate hateful conduct.

Introduction

Canadian Armed Forces leaders are charged with the well-being and protection of their members, and to do so they must define the environment that they are operating in; identify and assess the likely threats; and understand key concepts that cause, motivate, and enable the proliferation of the threat. This is all completed to develop mitigating courses of action to combat them. Right-wing extremism (RWE) is one such threat. Right-wing extremism spreads hate and causes hateful conduct, incites radicalization, fosters disenfranchisement and dissent, and challenges core values within Canada and the Canadian Armed Forces.

Within Canada, RWE groups span the country from coast to coast and have recently been defined as prominent threats to Canadian public safety. The internet spreads hateful ideologies transnationally, and, in mere seconds, any individual with a smartphone or laptop can access a near infinite amount of hateful information. Enabled by the internet, RWE will seek to recruit CAF members. Military personnel and veterans are in great demand by RWE because as potential members they bring sought-after skills like weapons knowledge, experience in explosives, and organizational and leadership skills.

This purpose of this paper is to reinforce the ongoing discussion of RWE as it relates to the CAF, add to the general discussion of radicalization and extremism from a military perspective within academia, and provide a senior leader's perspective as the CAF seeks to enhance the protection of its members from radicalized individuals and, potentially, radicalization. Specifically, it will be argued that the CAF could pursue establishing robust processes when screening individuals joining the institution, could develop counter-radicalization measures and deradicalization procedures, and, as part of the whole government, enable a change in culture in which RWE cannot proliferate. The targeted audience for this work

is twofold: 1. professionals and academics developing counter-radicalization and deradicalization policies and programs within Canada; and 2. junior, senior, and institutional leaders of the CAF as they protect the Defence Team and the institution from the RWE threat.

The Threat

Dr. Barbara Perry, the Director of the Centre of Hate, Bias, and Extremism at the University of Ontario Institute of Technology, a subject-matter scholar in right-wing extremism in Canada, in collaboration with Dr. Ryan Scrivens, an Assistant Professor at the School of Criminal at Michigan State University define Canadian RWE as "...a loose movement, characterized by a racially, ethnically and sexually defined nationalism."¹ The loose movement includes, but is not limited to, organizations that promote "...anti-government/individual sovereignty; racism; fascism; white supremacy/white nationalism; anti-Semitism; nativism/anti-immigration; anti-globalization/anti-free trade; anti-abortion; homophobia; anti-taxation; and pro-militia/pro-gun rights stance" and may be religious or non-religious.² Furthermore, membership in one group does not preclude membership in another, as often the end states and actions are shared amongst groups but for different motivations.³ Right-wing extremist organizations are categorized as hate groups by the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC). Its definition describes "...hate groups as an organization or collection of individuals that – based on its official statements of principles, the statements of its leaders, or its activities – has beliefs or practices that attack or malign an entire class of people, typically for their immutable characteristics."⁴

¹ Perry, Barbara and Scrivens, Ryan. *Right-Wing Extremism in Canada*. Springer International Publishing, 2019.

² Parent, Richard B, James O. Ellis III, "The Future of Right-Wing Terrorism in Canada" *The Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security, and Society, TSAS*. (Waterloo, ON, 2016.) , 2.

³ *Ibid.*, 2-3.

⁴ Southern Poverty Law Center, What is a hate group? [Frequently asked questions about hate groups | Southern Poverty Law Center \(splcenter.org\)](https://www.splcenter.org/frequently-asked-questions-about-hate-groups), accessed 23/October/20

From a Government of Canada (GoC) perspective, ideologically motivated violent extremism (IMVE) is, defined by the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS), the resulting actions of an RWE worldview in which individuals and groups are willing to “...incite, enable, and or mobilize to violence.”⁵ CSIS further categorizes IMVE groups and individuals into xenophobic groups (white supremacy, neo-Nazis), anti-authority groups (militia or patriot groups), gender-driven groups (anti-lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgendered, queer – LGBTQ, Involuntary Celibate Movement or Incel), and groups that have no clear affiliation.⁶

Right-wing extremism threatens the CAF in several ways. From a public safety and security perspective, service members and veterans who have been associated with or who are members of right-wing extremist organization have conducted bombings, attacks, and have planned other attacks that can only be categorized by “...on a scale rarely seen before.”⁷ The bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma 1995, the planned biological and chemical attack in the U.S.A in 2019, and the bombing of an Oktoberfest celebration in Germany in 1980 are examples of attacks and planned attacks perpetrated by former and active service personnel associated with RWE groups and who have been radicalized.⁸ The military training that service personnel receive make them more deadly and more dangerous than a typical civilian joining these groups.⁹ Furthermore, radicalized individuals and RWE organizations operating in Canada may “...enter the armed forces for strategic or tactical purposes, to gain weapons training, access to ammunition and explosives or to recruit other soldiers for their cause...”, further enhancing a group or individual’s lethality.¹⁰

⁵ Canadian Security Intelligence Service. *CSIS Public Report 2019: A safe, secure and prosperous Canada through trusted intelligence and advice*. (Public Works Canada, April, 2020) 12-13.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁷ Koehler, D. “A Threat from Within? Exploring the Link Between the Extreme Right and the Military” *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism Policy Brief*. (The Hague, October 2019), 1-2.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 20.

From a personnel perspective, the threat that RWE ideologies and radicalized individuals pose to CAF personnel can be categorized into two sub-threats: those affected by radicalization, and those who become victims of the behaviours of those associated ideologies. Those service personnel who become radicalized and/or join RWE groups will become disenfranchised; in many cases will lose important relationships with families and loved ones¹¹; and may be manipulated and exploited by groups in carrying out acts that are in direct conflict with CAF values and ethics and breach the laws in Canada. Repercussions of these acts vary in degrees, from remedial measures and administrative actions, to removal from the CAF to imprisonment, to the possibility of being injured or killed. Secondly, RWE ideologies which continue to permeate within the CAF will directly contribute to hateful conduct, and those affected may become victims of abusive behaviour, harassment, and marginalization.¹²

From an institutional perspective, continued internal reports of racist acts and media coverage of CAF personnel who are connected to RWE groups like Proud Boys, The Base, and La Meute will increase the challenges of retention and recruiting that the CAF continues to grapple with.^{13,14} These challenges will directly reflect an inability of the CAF to be representative of the demographic make up of Canada, as well as affect the CAF's Diversity Strategy.

This paper will argue that the Canadian Armed Forces currently finds itself at a decisive point where the institution must guard against right-wing extremism in order to protect itself and its people. To do so, the CAF will require an understanding of the environment in which RWE

¹¹ Sikkens, Elga, Marion van San, Stijn Sieckelinck, and Micha de Winter. "Parents' Perspectives on Radicalization: A Qualitative Study." *Journal of Child and Family Studies* 27, no. 7 (2018), 2277-2278.

¹² Perry, Barbara and Scrivens, Ryan. *Right-Wing Extremism in Canada*. (Springer International Publishing, 2019), 12-13.

¹³ Akin, David. "Canada's Armed Forces, struggling to hit diversity goals, turns to new digital recruiting tools", Global News, September 14, 2018, <https://globalnews.ca/news/4450927/canada-armed-forces-diversity-goals-digital-recruiting/>.

¹⁴ Bresge, Adina. "2 navy members linked to Canada Day incident at Indigenous ceremony in Halifax" CBC News, July 3, 2017, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/canada-day-halifax-Indigenous-ceremony-proud-boys-1.4189020>.

permeates; recognize that CAF culture, as a product of Canadian history, needs to adapt to this environment; and understand how its people could be affected by RWE ideologies. It is recommended that CAF leadership pursue the establishment of countermeasures, seek out and develop tools and processes that will institutionalize a more comprehensive solution based on research by subject matter experts, and concurrently, seek to understand processes of radicalization in order to shield its members, and, when unsuccessful, support and enable the deradicalization process.

Methodology

This work seeks to answer key questions surrounding the CAF and RWE. These include:

- What does the threat environment look like in Canada and what has the CAF done?
- How do the RWE ideologies spread?
- Why are people attracted to RWE ideologies and groups that form around those causes?
- What changes or actions or events shape or enable individuals in become committed to RWE, and what can the CAF do about it?
- How does the current CAF strategy of fighting hateful conduct and championing diversity fit into the general situation, and what will the effect be?

The approach taken in answering the above questions was through initially canvassing literature on RWE, white supremacy, and, to a lesser extent, terrorism in Canada. Having established a baseline, research then focused on radicalization/deradicalization theories and experiences, researching the processes and factors which enable or mitigate these behaviors. Finally, research was focused on the CAF in relations to RWE, diversity, and the initial steps undertaken by the CAF.

The research method utilized in this work was a primarily analytical method throughout chapters 1 to 4; however, a deductive method was used when examining the operational framework in

chapter 5. This work broke down the research into five sections to be studied: RWE and the CAF, RWE and the internet, radicalization, deradicalization, and an analysis of potential framework for the CAF to counter RWE and radicalization.

Having found Dr. Barbara Perry and Ryan Scrivens' research and literature extremely useful in establishing the foundation of RWE in Canada, it was further used as a centerpiece when addressing questions specific to Canada and its history of racism and colonialism. Academic literature and Government of Canada policies were used when providing key elements to further define the threat of RWE and its associated violence and ideologies. Perry and Scrivens continued to be useful when describing the Trump Effect on Canada as they provide a Canadian perspective, which is one not readily found in academic literature. When researching radicalization and deradicalization, the works of Feddes et al. provided an excellent overview and a further psychological perspective; its supporting arguments lead to researching Schmid, Horgan, Moghaddam, all of which provided insight to radicalization.

When researching deradicalization - which was initially focused on Europe, as there is a large amount of research from that region - and finding overlapping studies and research on Canada, the works of Mattson, Johanson, and Koehler were invaluable. Furthermore, research resources in the form of the *Journal of Deradicalization* became especially useful. This journal includes various perspectives in the works it chooses to publish. However, it should be pointed that Koehler is both the editor and section editor for this work. All of Koehler's works were clear and to the point; his research and literature was not always specific to Europe, and did have crossover case studies in Canada and the U.S.A.

When examining the operational framework provided by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Robin O'Lunaigh, and David Jones, this paper utilized a deductive method, applying the

characteristics of training, time, intelligence, and costs to each key facet of the recommendations. Further substantiation was provided by government documents available without security concerns.

The research in preparation for the paper included a great deal of exploration of current events, websites (both private and governmental), and, when needed, those sources were used to reinforce, support, or highlight an argument in answering some or more of the research questions. The choice of methods used in this paper limited the spectrum of analysis as it focused on psychological, security, and government of Canada perspectives and discourse.

Chapter Description

To frame the argument and to put it into context, Chapter 1 will provide a review of the major discourse found in the literature to establish a contemporary perspective of the state of RWE and the CAF. This will include a history of RWE in Canadian society, the spreading of RWE in recent years throughout Canada, and the highlighting of key incidents that involve the CAF and RWE. The proliferation of RWE ideologies through the internet and the effects of a post-Trump ideological climate will be discussed in order to understand the recent energizing of RWE in Canada and North America, and the necessity of acting in a timely fashion to enfeeble the 'Trump Effect'.

Chapters 2 serves to further define the environment of RWE as it explores radicalization. Initially, the differentiation between a radical and activist is established, followed by the factors and stages of radicalization. This section will end with two vignettes with associated analysis with regards to the factors and stages discussed.

In Chapter 3, the RWE environment will be explored, but from a deradicalization and disengagement perspective. Both terms will be defined, as well as their associated stages. Push and pull factors that directly contribute to the deradicalization and disengagement process will be examined and a longer vignette, which spans both the radicalization and deradicalization of a CAF member, will be discussed. Finally, leveraging the works of Dan Kohler, key elements, and themes important in developing deradicalization programs will be explored.

Next, Chapter 4 will explore Canadian Armed Forces personnel involved and associated with occurrences attributable to RWE and hateful conduct. The Defence Administrative Order and Directive issued in reaction to the increase of hateful conduct and reported CAF involvement in RWE groups will also be analyzed. This chapter will end by highlighting the importance of diversity within the CAF as an essential contributor to countering RWE-CAF infiltrations, and easing some factors of radicalization and enabling deradicalization.

In Chapter 5 of this analysis, recommendations made by Gartenstein-Ross, O’Luanaigh, and Jones, developed in their work *“Like a Drop of Cyanide”*: *A Strategic Framework for Addressing Hateful Conduct and Radicalization in the Canadian Armed Forces* will be analyzed utilizing four criteria, and findings will be discussed to support or challenge the application of these recommendations in the CAF. Gartenstein et al., under the auspices of the Mobilizing Insights in Defence and Security (MINDS), developed several framework recommendations by stage at the individual level that span an individual’s career within the CAF: enlistment stage, training stage, active duty stage, promotion stage, retirement stage.¹⁵ The criteria of analysis

¹⁵ Gartenstein-Ross, D, Robin O’Luanaigh, and David Jones. *Like a drop of cyanide: A strategic framework for addressing hateful conduct and radicalization in the Canadian Armed Forces*. (Valens Global, 2020), 5-6.

which will be used to examine the framework will be: training resources required, time required, ability to provide intelligence to the institution on RWE, and any effects on costs.

This paper concludes with recommendations along three lines of effort that could be explored by the CAF as it moves beyond 2021. This will be followed by highlighting the current work in progress by Dr. Barbara Perry and the University of Ontario Institute of Technology and partners as they seek to enable the CAF's understanding of RWE and the military by establishing a national multidisciplinary network in order to combat RWE and its effect on the CAF.

Chapter 1 – The Contemporary Environment of Right-Wing Extremism in Canada

A History of Right-Wing Extremism in Canada

Understanding the past, through study, research and exploration, enables students of history, grand strategists, politicians, and leaders to understand why an event or issue came to be; what choices were made and why; and were the outcomes expected or unexpected, and how these outcomes influenced the group. Armed with this knowledge, these groups will navigate around similar problematic issues encountered in the past, resolve on-going challenges or frictions based on a increased depth of understanding, and potentially use the information and conclusions garnered to provide an appropriate course of action at the right time. Discovering the past also provides an understanding of perspective and culture. Understanding the cultural norms and how they influenced society, and equally what changes in society affected culture, could further enlighten groups and individuals as they seek to improve and move forward. Canada's history has influenced its present; past policies and laws have lead to the marginalization of groups, have inhibited diversity, and have the damaged cultures generationally. While Canada

and its leaders seek to resolve and reconcile past mistakes, sponsor and champion diversity, and support the re-establishment of cultures, the internet is used by RWE in direct conflict to that work. Right-wing extremists and those individuals who support them use message boards, private and public forums, and websites to recruit, propagate hateful dialogue, and coordinate activities. These RWE groups and individuals are further emboldened by the Trump Effect, as they see their views, perceived grievances, and purposes gain mainstream support and become normative in North American culture.

The history of right-wing extremism dates as far back as the early 1900s. The Ku Klux Klan (KKK) had representation in Canada by several groups: KKK of Canada, the Kanadian Ku Klux Klan, and Ku Klux Klan of the British Empire as early as the 1920s.^{16,17} While the KKK's presence is of note when discussing RWE of the time, it is more important, from a historical perspective, to understand that the KKK emerged in areas where the Orange Order, "...a protestant fraternal organization...", had been operating since 1830. The KKK's influence gained power, became mainstream, and even affected provincial political races of the time.¹⁸ RWE groups based on religion, language, and ethnicity continued to grow and achieve a certain amount of influence in the pre-World War II era of Canada.¹⁹ However, as a result of the human suffering, death, and anti-Semitism that would describe World War II, "...the 1940s-1960s were known as *the sanitary decades* for the RWE movement in Canada."²⁰ That being said, the post-World War II period was not without RWE. In fact, as the years went by, RWE movements began to gain momentum. By the time the 1970s and 1980s arrived, a time that saw changes in immigration laws and an increase in unemployment and inflation, the RWE environment

¹⁶ Perry, Barbara and Scrivens, Ryan. *Right-Wing Extremism in Canada*. (Springer International Publishing, 2019), 23.

¹⁷ Li, Peter S. "Racial Supremacism Under Social Democracy." *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 27, no. 1 (1995), 3.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 23.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 24.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 24.

exploded with new groups across Canada and the resurfacing of pre-existing groups.^{21,22} In the same time period, the KKK, remaining the perennial and patriarchal RWE, did not have the ability to recruit a new generation of radicalized Canadians; during this time neo-Nazism, Aryan brotherhoods, and white supremacist organizations like the Western Guard, Concerned Parents of German Descent, Aryans Nations, Heritage Front, the Nationalist Party, Campus Alternative recruited, grew, and became larger in both membership numbers and in terms of conducted activities in relationship to the KKK.²³ During the 1990s and the turn of the century, RWE continued to grow and become increasingly violent. Groups and individuals became increasingly linked due to the internet, and the level of nationalistic rhetoric in Canadian RWE groups increased.²⁴

Today, the aforementioned groups still exist, though many have splintered, amalgamated, regrown, and found new focus, but they still remain scattered across Canada. Perry and Scrivens posit that across Canada approximately 100 RWE groups are active, with groups ranging in size from 5 to 50 members in strength.²⁵ They further break down the information with the Maritimes being home to 6-8 groups, Quebec home to 20-25 groups, Ontario home to 18-20 groups, the Prairies home to between 26-33 groups, and British Columbia home to 12-15 groups; these groups target Black, Aboriginal, and other people of colour, LGBTQ, Jewish, Muslim, Asian, Aboriginal, and immigrant communities.²⁶ Canada currently has many RWE leaders, radicalized groups, violent extremists, and a myriad of potential and probable ‘lonewolf’ actors amongst its population.²⁷

²¹ *Ibid.*, 24-25.

²² Li, Peter S. "Racial Supremacism Under Social Democracy." *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 27, no. 1 (1995), 3.

²³ Perry, Barbara and Scrivens, Ryan. *Right-Wing Extremism in Canada*. (Springer International Publishing, 2019), 25-26.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 27.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 45.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 45.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 26-46.

Right-wing extremism and the spreading of hateful rhetoric continues to exist in Canada because of its history and culture. As Perry and Scrivens have named it, RWEs have “permission to hate in Canada” based on Canada’s history of racism, political rhetoric of intolerance, and law enforcement that is not committed to targeting RWEs and associated individuals and groups.²⁸ Canada is a former colony of the British Empire, whose initial colonization of the New World and then aggressive expansionism in the mid- and late-1800s included the persecution of minorities in Canada, whether they were Indigenous to the land mass of North America, or new persons arriving as immigrants.^{29,30} The result is Canada being a country whose baseline acceptance of racism allows RWEs to exist.³¹ Supporting this argument are the acts of the Canadian politicians and leaders since colonization: King Louis XIV authorized slavery in New France in 1689; the passing of the Common School Act segregating African-Canadian and white children in 1850; race-based voting restrictions in 1867-1885; the establishment of the residential school system in the 1870s; the Indian Act of 1876; the Immigration Act, which excludes immigrants that the GoC deemed unsuitable to Canada in 1910; the Dominion Elections Act, which reinforced provincial-level racial discrimination; the establishment of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to enable the movement of First Nations persons onto reservations in 1920; and Japanese-Canadians losing their property and being put into internment camps during World War II.^{32,33} After World War II, Canada saw a third wave of Black immigration, but these people continued to be marginalized with regards to employment and income, and underrepresented in

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 89-107.

²⁹ Taylor, Leanne, Carle E. James, and Roger Saul. “Who Belongs? Exploring Race and Racialization in Canada.” in *Race, Racialization and Antiracism in Canada and Beyond*, edited by Genevieve Fuji Johnson, Randy Enomoto. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 158-160.

³⁰ Perry, Barbara and Scrivens, Ryan. *Right-Wing Extremism in Canada*. (Springer International Publishing, 2019), 90-95.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 90-91, 95-96.

³² Taylor, Leanne, Carle E. James, and Roger Saul. “Who Belongs? Exploring Race and Racialization in Canada.” in *Race, Racialization and Antiracism in Canada and Beyond*, edited by Genevieve Fuji Johnson, Randy Enomoto. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 158-160.

³³ Parris Consulting. [There’s No Racism in Canada – A Timeline – Parris Consulting](#), accessed 27/04/24. Parris Consulting provides a much more detailed consolidation of historical and contemporary examples of institutional racism in Canada; thus supporting proof of systemic racism in Canada.

status occupation.³⁴ In the 1950s-60s, the Government of Canada forcibly removed Indigenous children in order integrate them society and these children “were often subjected to harsh discipline, malnutrition and starvation, poor healthcare, physical, emotional, and sexual abuse, neglect, and the deliberate suppression of their cultures and languages”; residential schools continued to operate into the late 1990s.³⁵ In the 2000s and 2010s, the province of Quebec continued to try to make wearing the hijab, turban, and other religious symbols illegal in governmental spaces, in essence targeting Muslims and Sikhs. Finally, in studies completed in the late 2000s and early 2010s, Perry and Scrivens explored the lack of law enforcement commitment to actively identifying, targeting, and affecting RWE groups’ ability conduct operations, and found that public security agencies have “...primarily focused on Islamist-inspired extremism.”³⁶ They further argued that failure to act upon or take seriously reports of crimes against minorities were seen by victims and minority community as condoning those behaviors.³⁷ Canada has a history of policies and laws based on race. These laws, which were enacted and enforced by a male-dominated government whose purpose was to protect a white-homogenous perspective of society, are evidence of a historical culture of racial intolerance. This intolerance, though dissipated over the years with advances in immigration reforms and contemporary liberal-enacted and -enforced policies and discussion, did influence society in that it has made permissible the existence of RWE groups, albeit as fringe groups. These groups, however, saw an increase in acceptability with the Trump Effect.

³⁴ Kihika, Maureen. "Ghosts and Shadows: A History of Racism in Canada." *Canadian Graduate Journal of Sociology and Criminology* 2, no. 1 (2013), 42.

³⁵ Parks Canada. "The Residential School System," accessed 05/05/21. <https://www.canada.ca/en/parks-canada/news/2020/09/the-residential-school-system.html>

³⁶ Perry, Barbara and Ryan Scrivens. *Right-Wing Extremism in Canada*. (Springer International Publishing, 2019), 107.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 103.

Right-wing Extremism in Canada and the Trump Effect

Canada and the U.S. have shared much of the same history and its relations have ebbed and flowed throughout time from being at war with one another to deploying to war with one another. Today, U.S.-Canada relations include exporting and importing massive amounts of trade, strong cultural ties due to the strength of American media, a similar demographic composition with the northern states, tourism, workforces, shared military exercise and exchanges, and energy.³⁸ It is therefore apparent that whatever happens in the U.S. will greatly affect Canada in terms of culture, economics, and politics; when the rhetoric in the U.S. changes it affects Canada.

Right-wing extremism continues to exist in Canada's political, cultural, and historical climate and has been further energized by the Trump Effect. The Trump Effect in the context of this work is the populist right-wing fervor that gripped the U.S. throughout President Trump's participation in federal level politics, from 2015 to 2021, a term which has been employed often by the media, scholars, and laymen alike.³⁹ This section argues that President Trump's platform of election and leadership effected RWE in Canada because of the proximity and the intimate relationship which has developed between Canada and the U.S., which thereby enabled the spreading of right-wing populist rhetoric. This, in turn, saw an increase in hateful conduct and crimes nationally.⁴⁰

Donald Trump's rhetoric, which got him elected president in 2016, was divisive, played on perceived threats and fears of the American people, and was focused on ensuring his

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 61-62.

³⁹ Perry, Barbara, Tanner Mirrlees, and Ryan Scrivens. "The Dangers of Porous Borders." *Journal of Hate Studies* 14, no. 1 (2019), 54-55.

⁴⁰ Villareal, Daniel. "Hate Crimes Under Trump Surged Nearly 20 Percent Says FBI Report", accessed 05/05/21.
<https://www.newsweek.com/hate-crimes-under-trump-surged-nearly-20-percent-says-fbi-report-1547870>.

white conservative base saw him as a leader who would protect them from socio-economic and minority groups.⁴¹ But it also "...emboldened and energized white supremacist ideologies, identities movements, and practices..." which would affect "...Canada as well."⁴² Specifically, this rhetoric, which played on Canadian media outlets, the internet, published articles, and throughout a protracted American presidential campaign and Trump's four years as president, focused on attacking an intellectual elite that was diverse in nature, and played on the themes of 'us versus others', with 'others' being minorities, and 'us' being depicted as good people under siege by the 'others'.⁴³

The U.S. felt the full brunt of the Trump Effect, with the Southern Poverty Law Center reporting more than 800 reports of hate incidents recorded up to 10 days after the 2016 election of President Trump; this increased to over 1000 within "...first 34 days after election..." with 37% directly referring to then President-elect Trump.⁴⁴ It should be noted, however, that hate crimes were reported to be increasing after President Obama's 2008 election win, with the SPLC, through Reuters, reporting that the increase was a reaction to the election of a Black president.⁴⁵ Perry, Scrivens, and Mirrlees, illustrate the Trump Effect in Canada with visceral examples of increasingly dangerous hateful incidents and crimes that can be linked in time and by the internet to President Trump's rhetoric: anti-Black graffiti in Saskatchewan, vandalization of places of worship with white supremacist symbols in Ottawa, racist posters and flyers in Toronto, physical assault in Hamilton, and the murder of 6 Muslim men in Quebec City.⁴⁶

⁴¹ Perry, Barbara, Tanner Mirrlees, and Ryan Scrivens. "The Dangers of Porous Borders." *Journal of Hate Studies* 14, no. 1 (2019), 53-54, 57.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 53-54, 57.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 55-56.

⁴⁴ Potok, Mark. "The Trump Effect" accessed 05/05/21. <https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2017/trump-effect>.

⁴⁵ Bigg, Matthew. "Election of Obama provokes rise in U.S. hate crimes" Accessed 05/05/21. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-obama-hatecrimes-idUSTRE4AN81U20081124>.

⁴⁶ Perry, Barbara, Tanner Mirrlees, and Ryan Scrivens. "The Dangers of Porous Borders." *Journal of Hate Studies* 14, no. 1 (2019), 59-61.

Leaders in the Canadian Armed Forces could increase their cognizance of the Trump Effect on both the populace it recruits from and the soldiers and officers that make up its work force as they are inundated with this rhetoric. Inevitably, as one of many federal departments who share with Government of Canada a racist and colonial past, the CAF exists in and employs individuals from a society with growing RWE sentiments and groups, and without processes and policies in which to protect itself, the CAF may find itself combating a larger and more insidious threat. In a country that sees almost every adult with access to the internet, the role in which the internet plays in radicalization and enabling RWE within Canada and around the world will need to be discussed. The proceeding portion will explore this topic.

The Internet and Right-wing Extremism

The internet is a tool, and in the right hands can enable positive activities and in the wrong hands it can enable negative activities. The internet affords people of all walks of life the ability to exchange ideas quickly and often, and it enables access to information like no other time in history. The internet has also enabled RWE ideologies, groups, and activities to spread. This chapter will discuss and analyze how the internet enables radicalization and radicalization to violence, enables RWE groups to recruit, and how the internet plays a key role in the proliferation of groups and ideas.

The world wide web, hardware, software, and social media platforms that are supported by the internet have played a key role in radicalization individuals and groups. It has become the norm, in the media, to report a hate crime perpetrator's internet history and internet presence in detail. The attacks in Norway in 2011, the attack on the Quebec City mosque in 2017, the mosque attacks in Christchurch in 2019, and the other attacks that have been front page news in

the last decade, have all reported on the perpetrator's activity on the internet (for example, which groups they belong to), and the internet was often the location in which they preparatorily published their manifestoes. The interest in a perpetrator's online presences is not unfounded. The internet provides and enables an individual's radicalization by offering an inexpensive means to communicate with others that have been radicalized, becoming part of a larger pan-regional, pan-national community, all the while remaining anonymous in a space where opinions and discourse have no limits.⁴⁷ Furthermore, the internet enables people who have recently become interested in RWE ideologies or who have been radicalized to acquire and further disseminate literature that is banned in the mainstream.⁴⁸ They will also be able to acquire music and clothes which are so vital to the RWE identity, while providing an individual the sense of a greater movement in which groups are at a tipping point and close to achieving their end states.⁴⁹ This sense of immediacy acts as a catalyst and may further radicalize individuals who want to be part of the change, enabling a transition from an online radical, one which has been "...indoctrinated and socialized..."⁵⁰, to getting involved with meetings and activities.⁵¹ As mentioned above, the aspect of the internet making an individual feel the belonging of a group should be discussed. Specifically, it allows interested individuals who may have recently begun the path towards radicalization, radicalization to violence, and even extremism, the opportunity to engage and question the authors of the banned literature, to interact with front leaders and perceived high-ranking propagandists in order to unpack and understand theories and views.⁵² This leads to a sense of a selected movement being much more tangible, and due to the flattened

⁴⁷ Koehler, D. 2014. "The Radical Online: Individual Radicalization Processes and the Role of the Internet." *Journal for Deradicalization* 1 (2014), 188-119.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 119-121.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 119-121.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 121.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 119-121.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 121-122.

hierarchy, a “...sense of participation and importance for every individual at a very early stage.”⁵³ Finally, from a retailer perspective, having discussed the customer perspective earlier in this paragraph, choosing to be a retailer in order to make a profit can also lead to radicalization, as producers of consumables must become more and more radical in order to win over a client base and remain proven to be committed to the movement of choice.⁵⁴ While the internet does not radicalize individuals, the freedom of movement an individual has at accessing RWE sites from across the globe and in staggering numbers cannot be underestimated. Those interested individuals can find a site within minutes which looks alluring, post anonymously into a forum, and moments later be in a private or public conversation with someone else with similar views and who may even be an active recruiter.

In this section, Ciani’s and Kroll’s (2015) research will be used as it provides quantitative data from 54 interviews with representatives from RWE organizations that span six European countries and the U.S.A., and an analysis of 336 RWE websites.⁵⁵ This will be coupled with Gaudette et al. who interviewed Canadian RWEs with questionnaires that had been developed with the aid of 30 police services and 10 community activists.⁵⁶ Recruiting for RWE groups and further perpetuating the radicalization to violence or extremism has been enabled by the internet because of key attributes of internet, such as anonymity and the ability “...immerse themselves in extremist content and networks...”⁵⁷, and it serves as a safe space for “...virtual communities...” who can gather and provide “...support for one another”.⁵⁸ As individuals steadily transition from the supporter to the devout, it’s inevitable that they answer a call for

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 121-122.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 122.

⁵⁵ Caiani, Manuela and Patricia Kröll. "The Transnationalization of the Extreme Right and the use of the Internet." *International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice* 39, no. 4 (2015), 331.

⁵⁶ Gaudette, T, Scrivens, R., and Venkatesh, V. "The Role of the Internet in Facilitating Violent Extremism: Insights from Former Right-Wing Extremists." *Terrorism and Political Violence* (ahead-of-print, no. ahead-of-print, 2020), 1.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 13.

volunteers for local activities or be asked if they would be interested in taking part in a festival or rally. A former member and recruiter for a violent Canadian RWE explained that he would gauge the interest of people responding online and interact with them at offline events, and those who showed promise would be recruited and interacted with in a more private setting; for example, by email or a messaging service.⁵⁹ Enabling that transition, from online presence to offline activities, would be "...the interactive and localized nature of these spaces; the like-minded could seek out, connect and interact with local adherents online who shared their views and who they could then meet in offline, in-person settings."⁶⁰ Such meetings, where individuals whose views are becoming or have become radicalized engage with people from their own town, region, or milieu, further legitimize their views and further aid in belonging. Supporting this argument of the internet supporting recruiting are the findings Ciaini and Kroll, who assessed the Web content of RWE websites, and found that "...Internet is relied upon heavily as an instrument for communication and information toward actual or potential members..." and while at the same time enabling these groups to plan and conduct operations.⁶¹ One third of the websites offered search engines, more than half discussed the ability to connect offline (to include street addresses, phone numbers, and email addresses), and little more than half included a section of up-to-date media coverage or news coverage specific to that site and multimedia materials aimed specifically at recruiting young people.⁶²

From an organizational and coordination standpoint, or "activities" as Gaudette et al. refer to it in their work⁶³, the internet is a tool which enables organization, coordination, and

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁶¹ Caiani, Manuela and Patricia Kröll. "The Transnationalization of the Extreme Right and the use of the Internet." *International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice* 39, no. 4 (2015), 335.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 335-336.

⁶³ Gaudette, T, Scrivens, R., and Venkatesh, V. "The Role of the Internet in Facilitating Violent Extremism: Insights from Former Right-Wing Extremists." *Terrorism and Political Violence* (ahead-of-print, no. ahead-of-print, 2020), 9-11.

ensures attendance. In fact, Gaudette et al., based on interviews with past RWE violent personnel found that the online medium, which includes "...forums, chatrooms, social media sites..."⁶⁴, and websites were pivotal in taking those who displayed interest in the online world in taking part in concerts, "...rallies, protests...", flyer campaigns, and included activities which would see violent extremist actions taken.⁶⁵ While Gaudette et al. focused on the national level, interviewing former violent RWEs in Canada⁶⁶, Ciaini and Kroll, analysed 336 RWE websites which span seven countries (Austria, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, U.S.A.)⁶⁷. Ciaini and Kroll found that RWE organizations had begun to mobilize via the internet, targeting issues transnationally yet conducting actions at the local level.⁶⁸ Additionally, as a transnational movement, a conglomerate of smaller groups were able to engage larger entities, thus "...allowing them to push above their weight".⁶⁹ The internet provides RWE a medium to conduct information operations in which they are able to challenge mainstream movements, often perceived as challengers or gatekeepers that need to be overcome in order to achieve a RWE group's or movement's end state.⁷⁰ The internet is a place where radicalization and radicalization to violence and extremism can be aided. It is also a place where RWE groups seek out and recruit those individuals ready to transition into offline activities, and it is also where many of those offline activities are posted and advertised.

The preceding chapter provided the context in which RWE was able to establish in Canada then grow and surge in the run-up and eventual election of Donald Trump. Enabled by the internet, and at times shrouded in anonymity and seemingly only a 'click' away, RWE

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 1-18.

⁶⁷ Caiani, Manuela and Patricia Kröll. "The Transnationalization of the Extreme Right and the use of the Internet." *International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice* 39, no. 4 (2015), 343.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 343.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 343.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 342-343.

continue to proliferate in Canada and North America. The proceeding chapter will investigate why individuals become interested in RWE and how they become radicalized.

Chapter 2 – Radicalization

Canadian Armed Forces joint doctrine speaks of an enemy's center of gravity; that is to say, the "characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a nation, alliance, a military force

or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight.”⁷¹ RWE ideologies and groups persist because individuals continue to adhere to those perspectives, and once radicalized, join groups or movements and take part in hateful conduct or crimes. This chapter will explore the initial stages of the extremist’s arc trajectory, which is of radicalization, engagement, and action ⁷² , and will argue that by understanding radicalization, its processes, factors, and essential elements, the CAF could develop its specific counter-measures and policies targeting radicalization, thus affecting RWE ideologies and RWE groups’ centers of gravity, which could be a cornerstone into developing a robust strategy in combat RWE and hateful conduct within the CAF.

This chapter will first differentiate between an activist and a radical and then focus on the definition of radicalization. This will be followed by identifying the reasons why individuals and groups become radicalized. Steps or processes that transform an individual or group into becoming radical will be discussed as well, and a template will be described which could enable leaders across the CAF to identify, early, a situation that could lead to radicalization. This section will also include two vignettes of individuals who became radicalized. The use of vignettes will enable retention of the subject matter, enable discussion outside of this work, and provides an emphasis on radicalization in a short storyline that can be identified with by readers of different backgrounds.⁷³

As a large institution operating in Canada, the CAF could be deliberate in defining and understanding the situations, catalysts, and behaviors that will transform an individual or groups into extremists who may or may not be prepared to use violence. A search of the Department of

⁷¹ Department of National Defence. *Canadian Forces Joint Publication: Canadian Military Doctrine*. (Ottawa: DND, 2009), GL-1.

⁷² Horgan, John, Mary Beth Altier, Neil Shortland, and Max Taylor. "Walking Away: The Disengagement and Deradicalization of a Violent Right-Wing Extremist." *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 9, no. 2 (2017), 74.

⁷³ Jeffries, Carolyn and Dale W. Maeder. "Using Instructional and Assessment Vignettes to Promote Recall, Recognition, and Transfer in Educational Psychology Courses." *Teaching Educational Psychology* 1, no. 2 (2006), 1-2.

National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces website, and a survey of CAF policies, a clear definition of “radicalization” cannot be found. Currently the only definition for radicalization available on TERMIUM, was provided to the Government of Canada’s by CISIS : “Essentially, radicalization is the process whereby individuals move from holding moderate, mainstream beliefs towards adopting extremist political or religious ideologies. Individuals who become radicalized may support or become involved in violent extremism.”⁷⁴ Defence terminology is important as it is essential to ensure “consistent interpretation of doctrine and procedures, uniformity of policy and instructional instruments; and interoperability in joint operations and other military activities.”⁷⁵ By defining radicalization, the CAF will establish a foundation in which programs, policies, and regulations will inhibit the spread of extremism within the CAF, and mitigate the radicalization of current and former members.

Activist or Radical?

At this juncture it is important to delineate the difference between the term *activists* and *radicals*. Simply put, those elements that choose to push a certain opinion or issue in a legal and peaceful manner are labelled *activists*, and those who choose to “...participate in actions that are illegal, including violent actions(.)” are *radicals*.⁷⁶ Examples of activism are “...political protests, circulating petitions, carrying political slogans...”, debate, political speeches, posting non-hateful opinions on social media, and supporting people who have legal dissenting opinions.⁷⁷ Radicals will illegally gather and

⁷⁴ Government of Canada. *Radicalization*, Accessed 05/05/21. https://www.btb.termiumplus.gc.ca/tpv2alpha/alpha-eng.html?lang=eng&i=1&srchtxt=radicalization&codom2nd_wet=1#resultrecs.

⁷⁵ Department of National Defence. *DOAD 6004-0, Defence Terminology*, accessed 05/05/21. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/defence-administrative-orders-directives/6000-series/6004/6004-0-defence-terminology.html>.

⁷⁶ Moskalenko, Sophia, Clark R. McCauley. *Radicalization to Terrorism: What Everyone Needs to Know*. (NY: Oxford University Press, 2020., 25-26.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 26

disturb, skirmish with local policing and security elements, and destroy property; when explosives are being set, individuals targeted with weapons and incendiary devices, it is then where a radical become even more extreme.⁷⁸ In further exploring the relationship between activists and radicals, Moskalenko and McNauley discuss that while participating in supporting or denouncing certain issues, again in a legal and non-violent manner, at times a “...transition from activism to radicalism is a matter of being in the wrong place at the wrong time”.⁷⁹ A simple turn of events like counter or fringe elements attacking a peaceful and legal demonstration, could see activists defending each other from radicals, “...reciprocating violence directed against those they care about.”⁸⁰ It is often the case that these immediate transitions to radicalism or extremism may be short lived, and once the threat has de-escalated, the once-activist returns to being just that. The scope of this analysis will focus on individuals and groups that are hateful, violent, and extreme in thought in order to focus on the individuals and groups who pose a threat to the CAF as a diverse employer whose leaders seek to have a workplace free of hateful conduct, bigotry, and harassment.

Radicalization

According to Feddes et al., radicalization is process by which individuals “...adopt an increasingly extreme set of ideas.”⁸¹ They further state that these ideas are linked, in many cases, to the targeting of other groups and individuals who pose a perceived threat to those radical ideas, and followers will apply violence or support the application of violence by others in order

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 27.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 25-26.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 26.

⁸¹ Feddes, Allard R., Lars Nickolson, Liesbeth Mann, and Bertjan Doosje. *Psychological Perspectives on Radicalization*. (New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2020), 51.

to achieve their goals, whether they be political change or changes in society.⁸² As a nonlinear process, radicalization can be immediate, can span short or long periods of time, and is often “..instigated by trigger events in a person’s life.⁸³ Feddes et al., as well as other scholars in the field of radicalization, utilize a comprehensive definition developed by Alex P. Schmid, which states that a radicalized person/group is:

an individual or collective (group) process whereby, usually in a situation of political polarisation, normal practices of dialogue, compromise and tolerance between political actors and groups with diverging interests are abandoned by one or both sides in a conflict dyad in favour of a growing commitment to engage in confrontational tactics of conflict-waging. These can include either (i) the use of (nonviolent) pressure and coercion, (ii) various forms of political violence other than terrorism or (iii) acts of violent extremism in the form of terrorism and war crimes. The process is, on the side of rebel factions, generally accompanied by an ideological socialization away from mainstream or status quo-oriented positions towards more radical or extremist positions involving a dichotomous world view and the acceptance of an alternative focal point of political mobilization outside the dominant political order as the existing system is no longer recognized as appropriate or legitimate.⁸⁴

While, the process of radicalization will be discussed in subsequent paragraphs, Moskalenko and McCauley argue that radicalization is defined as “...individuals, groups, or even large publics becom(ing) increasingly accepting of violence for a cause.”⁸⁵ They further discuss that while terrorism may be the application of that violence, radicalization is the path which those individuals and groups travelled down.⁸⁶ This is supported by Bérubé, Scrivens, Venkatesh, and Gaudette whose definition of radicalization is “...process by which an individual comes to use violence in the name of a radical

⁸² *Ibid.*, 51.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 52.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 51-52.

⁸⁵ Moskalenko, Sophia, Clark R. McCauley. *Radicalization to Terrorism: What Everyone Needs to Know*. (NY: Oxford University Press, 2020), 24.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 24.

ideology, religious or political cause.”⁸⁷ Taken together, these definitions provide a strong foundation as they provide and support the pathway theory of radicalization whose length is specific to an individual.

The Government of Canada, in its National Strategy on Countering Radicalization to Violence, breaks down the terms *radicalization*, *radicalization to violence*, and *violent extremism*. The strategy states that “radicalization is a process by which an individual or a group gradually adopts extreme positions or ideologies that are opposed to the status quo and challenge mainstream ideas.”⁸⁸ The GoC stipulates radicalization or having the above thoughts and opinions are by themselves not illegal, and are in fact protected under the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*.⁸⁹ It is actually the infringing on others’ rights, treatment of minorities (in the case of RWE), and spreading of the hateful rhetoric where illegality begins (i.e. a person’s actions and behaviour begins to be shaped by those radical views). It is when individuals and groups further radicalize to violence, now believing that being violent will further their cause and that the ends justify the means, that they have transitioned from the legal to the truly illegal.⁹⁰ Having become violent, these individuals or groups can now be described as *violent extremists*, because they “...support or use violence to achieve extreme ideological, religious or political goals”⁹¹

For the purpose of the paper, the term *radicalization* will be used in accordance with the definition proposed by the GoC. When necessary, the term *radicalized to violence* will be used to denote that individuals or groups have transitioned to the support,

⁸⁷ Bérubé, Maxime, Ryan Scrivens, Vivek Venkatesh, and Tiana Gaudette. "Converging Patterns in Pathways in and Out of Violent Extremism: Insights from Former Canadian Right-Wing Extremists." *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 13, no. 6 (2019): 73-74.

⁸⁸ Department of Public Safety. "National Strategy on Countering Radicalization". (Canada: Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence, 2018), 7.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 7.

willingness to use, and the direct application of violence in order to further their goals. The following section will unpack radicalization in process and explore the factors that change people from a mainstream perspective to a radical perspective.

The Process of Radicalization

Literature of radicalization discusses a process; often this process is phased, involves steps, preconditions, is linear, is not-linear, and due to the events of 9/11 have been focused on terrorism.⁹² Feddes et al. give an excellent synopsis of the multiple models providing both criticism and praise. Initially, they discuss Moghaddam's Staircase to Terrorism for Islamism, which envisions radicalization, radicalization to violence, and finally terrorism, in six steps or floors (psychological interpretation of material conditions, perceived options to fight unfair treatment, displacement of aggression, more engagement, solidification of categorical thinking and the perceived legitimacy of the terrorist organization, terrorist act and sidestepping inhibitory mechanism).⁹³ Major criticism includes lack of emotional factors, sees the process of radicalization as "rational problem-solving strategy", does not analyse radicalization due to needs, and as previously mentioned, was designed as a framework for radicalization within an Islamic context.⁹⁴ Furthermore, they discuss three other models, each with religious connotations (Wictorowicz's model of radicalization, the New York City Police Department Model of Jihadization, and Precht's model for a "typical" radicalization

⁹² Feddes, Allard R., Lars Nickolson, Liesbeth Mann, and Bertjan Doosje. *Psychological Perspectives on Radicalization*. New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2020): 106-110.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 107-111.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 112-113.

pattern), and while less complicated than the Staircase to Terrorism, remain narrow and do not take emotion in to account.⁹⁵

McCauley and Moskalenko's model envisions a pyramid framework that couples certain aspects of the Staircase to Terrorism, yet the "layers" of the pyramid are not sequential and do not necessarily lead to violence.⁹⁶ From an emotional perspective process, and linking violent emotions to radicalization, albeit with social movements, van Stekelenburg suggests that combining the Staircase of Terrorism and the emotional transformation follows three phases: Outrage Based on Anger (groups and individuals are enraged by an obstruction in achieving their goals or a perceived injustice), Moral Superiority Based on Contempt (by analysing the conflict in the initial phase and deciding that it is not them, then it can only be attributable to perceived transgressors; the group defines the transgressors as inferior), and Elimination Based on Disgust (due to the emotion of disgust towards the inferior, the aggressed groups seeks to eliminate the inferior – this elimination can span a spectrum from distancing oneself to outright destruction).^{97,98}

Returning to Feddes et al., their model includes three phases: a vulnerability phase, group phase, and action phase.⁹⁹ This model combines the simplicity of having three successive phases, but with each phase covering the gambit of possibilities or courses for radicalization.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 111-116.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 117-121.

⁹⁷ van Stekelenburg, Jacqueliën. "Radicalization and Violent Emotions." *Political Science & Politics* 50, no. 4 (Washington: Cambridge University Press 2017): 937-938.

⁹⁸ Matsumoto, David, Hyi Sung Hwang, and Mark G. Frank. "The Role of Emotion in Predicting Violence." *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* 81, no. 1 (Washington: Department of Justice, 2012): 5-6.

⁹⁹ Feddes, Allard R., Lars Nickolson, Liesbeth Mann, and Bertjan Doosje. *Psychological Perspectives on Radicalization*. New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2020): 106-110.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 125-132.




Fig. 1.1 Feddes *et al*, 3 Phase Theoretical Model¹⁰¹

The vulnerable phase sees certain individuals that are vulnerable to radicalization due to a combination of “...socioeconomic position, identification with a group that is perceived to be disadvantaged or discriminated against, or frustration about world affairs...” but moreover the individual must have a motivational imbalance that further combines with a will to act as a catalyst for extreme behaviour.¹⁰² Motivational imbalances can be caused by traumatic events in an individual’s life that in turn develop into individuals who are identity seekers, justice seekers, significance seekers, and sensation seekers.¹⁰³ Each seeker template corresponds to one or more of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs: identity seekers look to groups for safety, attachment, and self-esteem; justice seekers seek out groups that will provide safety from injustices; significance seekers look for a sense of self-worth and self-esteem; and sensation seekers look for or are radicalized by the need for self-actualization.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 18.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 127.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 127.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 149-160.

The group phase is defined by the previously described seeker, having experienced a trigger factor and becoming radicalized, identifying with a group which will satisfy a need.¹⁰⁵ Trigger factors, as defined by Feddes et al., are “...any observable event outside an individual which can lead to (de)radicalization.”¹⁰⁶ These factors can be categorized as trigger factors in the personal realm (e.g. being confronted with death; negative events at home; losing perspective on work; problems at school; experiences with discrimination, racism, exclusion; confrontation with propaganda; meeting a radical person; marrying an extremist), trigger factors in the context of groups (joining a group with peers, breaking social bonds, receiving training), and trigger factors in society (call for action, perceived attack on the in-group, governmental action aimed at the in-group).¹⁰⁷ Of note, these trigger factors can act to move an individual forward or backward through the phases of radicalization.¹⁰⁸ These groups, which can vary in size and location (virtual or physical, provide radicalized individuals by “...categorizing people, making strong us-versus-them distinctions, perceiving the in-group as morally superior to out-groups.”¹⁰⁹

Finally, the action phase, which sees the individual prepared and willing to apply violence to out-groups or others in order to achieve a goal; motivation to do so varies greatly, but can depend on the group’s leadership, history of violence, and ability to be violent.¹¹⁰ In summary, the Feddes et al. model, argues that individuals will travel through a vulnerability stage, group phase, and action phase, where ascension is characterised by an individual seeking to satisfy a need being triggered into being radicalized into a group, and then, depending on a variety of factors, conducting actions. The following two vignettes will provide CAF examples of the ascension through these phases covering the initial arc trajectory of an RWE.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 128-129.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 183.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 192-204.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 191.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 169-180.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 129-132.

Vignette 1 – The Radicalization to Violence of John.¹¹¹

Vignette 1 provides an illustration of an individual who joins the CAF and becomes radicalized while serving. The radicalization period is progressive and compressed, does not include a traumatic event, but highlights the influence that leaders have on susceptible individuals. All three vignettes will have male characters illustrating the young male dominance of RWE groups and extremist groups.^{112,113}

During recruit training at Canadian Forces Leadership and Recruit School (CFLRS), John is assigned a training partner who is different in both race and gender. During training, John is continuously assigned extra duties in order to help the training partner in progressing through training. John becomes more and more vocal on the difficulties and lack of “drive” that the training partner is displaying. Finally, John becomes aggressive and is noticed “jacking-up” the training partner. A CFLRS instructor takes John aside and provides him with counselling and remedial measures. However, a subsequent CFLRS instructor mentions to John that what just happened was unfair and that there is a meeting this upcoming weekend in St-Jean-sur-Richelieu where a new group in Quebec will be discussing the need to keep the CAF a male-dominated workplace, only accessible to Canadians born in Canada. John, who initially went to the meeting based on a mild interest and the want to gain favour with his instructor, begins to become more involved and an up-and-coming leader in the group. Subsequently, he takes part in meetings that justify patrolling the streets and harassing visible minorities in order to “protect real Canadians”. Eventually, John and others are arrested after attacking two visible minorities. John is immediately released from the CAF and becomes more involved with similar groups, eventually returning to his hometown and establishing a satellite group.

This vignette was purposely adapted in a simple fashion and was meant to demonstrate an individual’s movement through the vulnerability phase, group phase, and action phase and the first portion of the arc trajectory of extremism. It also implies that in the case of John, the consequences of his actions were immediate and permanent. This

¹¹¹ This vignette is an adaptation from Scenario A – Radicalization of a High School Student. Department of Public Safety. “National Strategy on Countering Radicalization”. *Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence*, 2018.

¹¹² Perry, Barbara and Scrivens, Ryan. *Right-Wing Extremism in Canada*. (Springer International Publishing, 2019), 96.

¹¹³ Feddes, Allard R., Lars Nickolson, Liesbeth Mann, and Bertjan Doosje. *Psychological Perspectives on Radicalization*. New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2020): 137-138.

will be contrasted to Albert's consequences, in Vignette 3 at the end chapter 4. This vignette does not provide enough information on which to develop a recommendation, but it does raise the question of who is responsible for the radicalization of John. Should the CAF endeavor to deradicalize individuals who have been radicalized while in uniform?

Vignette 2 – The Radicalization of Trevor

As opposed to Vignette 1, Vignette 2 is a more protracted journey to radicalization, and, depending on the perspective, includes several traumatic events: loss of identity, feeling of treachery, attack on lifestyle.

Trevor joined the CAF in 1996. He completed his trade qualification and was posted to his unit. Shortly thereafter, he was deployed in support of operations in the Balkans, peace keeping operations in Africa, and completed two tours in Afghanistan, one in 2005 the other in 2010. Domestically, he has supported fighting floods, fires, and the Vancouver Olympics. An avid sportsman, he owns several firearms of varying size and caliber and was a prominent member of a local gun club. In 2018, while conducting a training exercise, Trevor injured himself. The injury led to almost constant pain in the affected region. Due to Trevor's injury and the subsequent medical employment limitations placed on him CAF Medical personnel, Trevor was unable to be employed within his unit as expected. His frustration grew as it is found that a CAF physician misdiagnosed his injury, his medical file was not updated correctly, and Trevor has had to be re-interviewed multiple times.

Coupled with this, his unit has not applied the Medical Employment Limitations (MELs) in tasking Trevor, and he has twice re-injured himself. Once a rising Senior NCO within his unit, Trevor now has difficulty motivating himself to go to work. However, he still is able to enjoy weekends hunting and his relationships within his gun club.

Finally, the CAF has decided that he no longer meets universality of service requirements and must be released. Trevor fights the finding and though he requests additional time in the Forces, it is denied by his chain of command (CoC). In the end, he is released. During his transition from the regular force to civilian life, he further becomes frustrated with release mechanisms, benefits, and Veterans Affairs Canada.

It is during this period that new regulations of weapons ownership are adopted throughout Canada. Trevor sees this as a final straw and that the “system” has gone too far attacking his way of life and that of others. Trevor, at his gun club, begins discussing ownership rights, freedom of an individual, and even begins visiting pro-gun rallies in the U.S.A and Canada and becomes involved with the Boogaloo Movement because of their stance on gun-control.¹¹⁴

Trevor enters the vulnerability phase due to his injured, subsequent perceived ill-treatment by his chain of command, medical service, and finally by the institution’s policies. Trevor is triggered into the group phase by new legislation against firearms in Canada, and due to the internet and multiple social platforms located therein, he finds a movement that will become violent in their search for what they envision are “normal” gun ownership rights. Trevor’s descent into RWE groups, in this case the Boogaloo Movement, was gradual and began while he was serving the CAF.

This chapter established the difference between activist and radical, and defined radicalization. Furthermore, the process of radicalization was explored with different models, but the three-phase model posited by Feddes et al. include key aspects of those previously discussed. The three phases include the vulnerability phase, group phase, and actions phase. Individuals transition from mainstream views towards radicalism while seeking to satisfy a perceived need and that, when triggered, begin to behave or commit hateful acts. The CAF, as it defines and identifies parts of the radicalization process it could affect, developing counter-radicalization policies for CAF members, could investigate those needs and triggers and see what and where they could influence the

¹¹⁴ According to the Anti-Defamation League “The boogaloo movement is an anti-government extremist movement that formed in 2019. In 2020, boogalooers increasingly engaged in real world activities as well as online activities, showing up at protests and rallies around gun rights, pandemic restrictions and police-related killings.” Anti-Defamation League. “The Boogaloo Movement,” accessed 5 April, 2021, [The Boogaloo Movement \(adl.org\)](https://www.adl.org/en-ca/news-events/newsroom/boogaloo-movement)

process the most. In the next chapter, the second half of the arc trajectory will be explored, including the process of deradicalization and what factors, contributors, and steps need to happen in order for an individual to return to the mainstream.

Chapter 3 – Deradicalization

Deradicalization

Radicalization may happen to an individual at any time and as such, deradicalization, too, could occur at any time. With CAF leaders having already been confronted with right-wing and radicalized individuals within its ranks, it is argued that developing a robust deradicalization policy will be a logical step as part of a larger counter-RWE policy. It is reasonable to assume that the CAF will be responsible for re-training or enabling the deradicalization of its members who have been found not to breach a certain line of behaviour and retaining that person where realistically possible.

Whereas the previous chapter discussed diverse views on the processes that lead to and produced radicalized individuals, the essential factors that fuel these processes, and the move towards extremism, this chapter will highlight and discuss the importance of deradicalization.

Identifying the concepts, stages, factors, and actions available to individuals, the chain of command, or by the institution as a whole in regards to deradicalization is crucial. In some cases, the identification and termination of an individual or group from the CAF will become necessary; however, it is likely this will be required only in extreme cases where violence has occurred or hateful action conducted; for those individuals or groups which have been identified prior to breaching the threshold of violence or hateful conduct measures, disengagement in conjunction with deradicalization courses of action could be identified and pursued. This chapter will initially define essential terms that are utilized across the spectrum of academic disciplines, the CAF, and the public sector. Further, this chapter will also explain the processes required to disengage from RWE groups and deradicalize worldviews, and the importance of the CAF and DND remaining up-to-date and well-versed in the concepts of disengagement and deradicalization as it seeks to protect its work force. Specifically, deradicalization will be defined and key discussion points will be expanded on, including: What is the concept of deradicalization? What are key factors that can support those concepts? This will be followed by an analysis of the work of Kohler (specifically, *Understanding Deradicalization: Methods, Tools and Programs for Countering Violent Extremism*) in exploring key elements required in effective and adaptable deradicalization programs which, if pursued, could meet future requirements of the CAF.¹¹⁵ This section will end with a vignette on disengagement and deradicalization, a scenario adjusted to fit the parameters of employment within the CAF in order to provide a realistic possibility that the CAF and its stakeholders could be challenged with. The importance of this vignette highlights the end of the arc trajectory and the complications and challenges that a chain

¹¹⁵ Koehler, Dan. *Understanding Deradicalization: Methods, Tools and Programs for Countering Violent Extremism*. (London: Routledge, 2017).

of command may be faced with, and could require support from, across the CAF and partnered agencies.

In order to begin the discussion, some essential terms will be defined with an explanation of how they will be utilized in this work. Standardized terminology is important as it enables uniformity, consistency, and interoperability.¹¹⁶ Deradicalization, while is often defined as policies that seek to prevent radicalization, "...the demobilization and reintegration of insurgent groups, and [to] programmes aimed at counter-radicalization practices curtailing radical thoughts and utterances in those who have not engaged in violence", must be further broken down, as the aforementioned concept encompasses too many courses of action.¹¹⁷ By breaking down this concept into three or for key parts, a practitioner, like the CAF, can more easily visualize the separate parts that could be affected in order to negate the effect of radicalization and RWE within in its ranks. First and foremost, this work will view *deradicalization* as "... a formal or informal approach aimed at reducing commitment to an extremist viewpoint that has led or could lead to violent action."¹¹⁸ A supporting argument in utilizing this definition is one developed by John Horgan, a leading scholar in extremism, radicalization, and deradicalization; he states the deradicalization is "...the social and psychological process whereby an individual's commitment to, and involvement in, violent radicalization is reduced to the extent that they are no longer at risk of involvement and engagement in violent activity."¹¹⁹ He further argues, which this work readily agrees with, that deradicalization, due to its ongoing psychological process, can

¹¹⁶ Department of National Defence. *DOAD 6004-0, Defence Terminology*, accessed 05/05/21. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/defence-administrative-orders-directives/6000-series/6004/6004-0-defence-terminology.html>.

¹¹⁷ Pettinger, Tom. "Deradicalization and Counter-Radicalization: Valuable Tools Combating Violent Extremism, Or Harmful Methods of Subjugation?" *Journal for Deradicalization* Fall, no. 12 (2017), 3.

¹¹⁸ Ahmad, Hafal (Haval). "Youth Deradicalization: A Canadian Framework." *Journal for Deradicalization* Fall, no. 12 (2017), 124.

¹¹⁹ Horgan, John. , *Walking Away From Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist Movements* (London: Routledge, 2009), 153.

happen over a long period of time, and can begin at different phases of an individual's return to mainstream society.¹²⁰

While deradicalization seeks to understand an individual's or group's return to views and opinions that are within that culture's accepted norms, disengagement is the concept by which an individual, for his or her own reasons, based on a myriad of factors which will be explored in subsequent paragraphs, seeks to leave a group. Specifically, *disengagement* is the "...physical cessation of some observable behaviour"¹²¹, more often violent or extreme, as well as the departure from groups who tolerate, enable, support, participate, and actively conduct hateful and violent acts. Understanding disengagement includes understanding that the physical process of breaking clean or exit processes can be "...complex and multifaceted and feature a high degree of ambivalence."¹²² Individuals and those supporting them will need to deliberately plan for separating from the group. Furthermore, while leaving a group that holds extremist views and values as central may have an inherent level of risk, and having dedicated much of one's own periods of time, passion, and identifying oneself with a certain group or a role in that group, it is important that to improve the chances of complete disengagement, and to ensure that re-engagement doesn't occur at a future date, that exit strategies include a new role where the emotions, self-identity, and an individual's *raison d'être* is fulfilled.¹²³ As Mattson and Johanson so succinctly phrase it: "Leaving a role means disengaging from values, social networks, friendships, norms and certain ways of thinking about central issues in life."¹²⁴ The void created

¹²⁰ Horgan, John, Mary Beth Altier, Neil Shortland, and Max Taylor. "Walking Away: The Disengagement and Deradicalization of a Violent Right-Wing Extremist." *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 9, no. 2 (2017), 64.

¹²¹ Pettinger, Tom. "Deradicalization and Counter-Radicalization: Valuable Tools Combating Violent Extremism, Or Harmful Methods of Subjugation?" *Journal for Deradicalization* Fall, no. 12 (2017), 3.

¹²² Mattsson, Christer and Thomas Johansson. "Talk is Silver and Silence is Gold? Assessing the Impact of Public Disengagement from the Extreme Right on Deradicalization." *Journal for Deradicalization* Fall, no. 24 (2020), 82.

¹²³ Mattson, Christer and Thomas Johansson. "Becoming, Belonging and Leaving – Exit Processes among Young Neo-Nazis in Sweden." *Journal for Deradicalization* Fall, no. 16 (2018), 345.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 45.

by disengagement will play a vital role in the deradicalization process, as it there where an individual create a new identity or “ex-role”, which will be discussed in the next section.

The Process of Deradicalization

In the same work, Mattson and Johanson, quoting Helen R.F. Ebaugh’s work, describe a stage theory which can be employed to visualize the location of an individual as he or she contemplates leaving or exiting a group. These stages include the doubting stage, searching for alternatives, the turning points, and creating an ex-role. In the doubting stage, an individual considers inwardly who they are as a person, what they represent, and how this potentially contrasts with the role they are filling in a group and the groups’ end state. The key factors which shape this stage are “... degree of awareness, social context, degree of control over the process, and the institutionalization of doubts.”¹²⁵ The second stage sees the individual searching for alternatives in how to think, act, and live.¹²⁶ Essential in this stage is the support of trusted and significant people in an individual’s life; the individual will seek out other groups and other positions that they may find equally rewarding.¹²⁷ The turning points stage can be further broken down into five major types of turning points: specific events (death in the family or other emotionally charged moment in life), time-related factors (an individuals age and the implied changes that happen to an individual’s outlook and attitudes over time), finding an excuse that can be utilized to remove oneself from a group, either/or alternatives (either get out of a RWE group or suffer the consequences of death or imprisonment), and a final stoke event, which is major or minor enough to push a member to exit.¹²⁸ Finally, in the creating an ex-role stage, the

¹²⁵ Mattson, Christer and Thomas Johansson. "Becoming, Belonging and Leaving – Exit Processes among Young Neo-Nazis in Sweden." *Journal for Deradicalization* Fall, no. 16 (2018): 345.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 45.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 45.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 45-46.

individual conducts a break-clean from their previous roles and groups and tries to establish themselves in a new group in order to meet the needs and wants required of their personality and inherent behaviour.¹²⁹ One key moment in this stage is when loved ones and the person's immediate social circle begin thinking of them in their new role and not the role the individual previously held or the values he or she defined themselves by.¹³⁰

The stages make it clear that one supports the next, and to rush the stages is to invite catastrophe. Furthermore, while it is possible for an individual to accomplish this task alone, it is observed that being enabled by his or her core family or friendship group would greatly enable the individual wishing to remove him or herself from an RWE group. Furthermore, it is likely that an individual may require additional resources like money, alternative housing, childcare, and additional time to deliberately complete all stages.

From a CAF perspective, applicable processes, reporting systems, and leadership culture could greatly enable the above steps both directly, if the member reaches out, or indirectly, by mentorship or a culturally diverse work environment. Starting anew requires a journey of self-discovery. Individuals must challenge the norms that has defined them and their perspectives. It will reframe those grievances which played an important role at beginning of their path to radicalization. However, events and issues must spark those internal questions. In the next section, push and pull factors will be discussed as an individual begins the process of disengagement and deradicalization.

Push and Pull Factors

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 46.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 46.

Factors that cause the skepticism, doubt, or reluctance to continue membership or roles in a certain group are referred to as *push factors* and are defined, by Kohler, as “...negative social incidents and circumstances that make it uncomfortable and unappealing to remain in the group and are typically comprised of the group’s inner workings, as well as internal psychological processes and reactions to certain conflicts related to the involvement in the group.”¹³¹ Supported by studies and academic articles, these factors include: negative social sanctions and stigma, government or military repression, general exhaustion due to the extremist or terrorist lifestyle, doubt in the group’s ideology, frustration with the group’s hypocrisy and behaviour, loss of social support, role mitigation or loss of status, mistreatment and physical abuse, disappointment about results of armed struggle and effects of violence, tactical differences, disapproval of the group’s strategy, unmet expectations, and cognitive dissonance.¹³²

Conversely, *pull factors* are “positive factors attracting the person to a more rewarding alternative”, and are mostly external and positive influences creating new opportunities or alternatives to engagement and involvement with an extremist or terrorist organization. The strongest of pull factors is the desire to live a ‘normal’ life or experience life-changing events resulting in changed priorities, age, starting a family, intervention or pressure by existing family members, new positive relationships with movement or group outsiders, career prospects, and socio-political change.¹³³ Vignette 3 addresses and highlights the complete arc trajectory, encompassing processes, factors, and all stages of deradicalization.

Vignette 3 – The Deradicalization of Albert

¹³¹ Kohler, Dan. *Understanding Deradicalization: Methods, Tools and Programs for Countering Violent Extremism*. (London: Routledge, 2017), 16.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 16-18.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 18-20.

Horgan et al., studied “one person’s trajectory into, through and out of right-wing violent extremism in the U.S.A. It is based primarily on a face-to-face interview with the subject.”¹³⁴

This work was leveraged and adapted to present a potential situation in which the CAF finds itself in. This vignette seeks to encompass both a radicalization and deradicalization journey of an individual who joins the CAF.

Albert Tremblay was born and grew-up in a lower income household in Montreal’s east end in the mid- to late-1980s. Raised Roman Catholic, Albert’s childhood and early adolescence was marred by his parents’ volatile relationship which, exacerbated by the use of drugs and alcohol, often became emotionally abusive and physically violent. On more than one occasion, Albert would become the target of his parents’ abuse. Doing well in school, when he chose to, Albert’s behaviour towards his classmates and school staff steadily worsened until he was forced to go to a different school, having been expelled for fighting. At this new school, he interacted with and gradually became involved with several teenagers who held racist and right-wing ideas and were often engaged in petty illegal activity. Albert’s role within this group was as a ‘look-out’ when the groups was committing crime, and he saw himself as a conduit in which the group could recruit younger members. However, Albert never took part in the active destruction of property or any physical violence; again, he was used as a ‘look-out’. Having graduate high school Albert, who had always envisioned himself a soldier, joined the CAF.

Albert joined the CAF and reported to CFLRS to complete his recruit training. Throughout his time in St-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Albert continued his relationships with right-wing friends in Montreal, who were becoming more and more radicalized, becoming active in the drug trade in order to meet the requirements of entry for a larger RWE group in Quebec. Albert met other recruits who, though not radicalized, held certain sympathies that would not allow them to inform on Albert to the chain of command when they would meet Albert’s friends while on leave in Montreal.

Having graduated recruit training, Albert completed training as an armour soldier and was posted to an armour regiment near Quebec City. The proximity to Montreal, the internet, and social media would enable Albert to remain close with his friends in the east end, as well as meet up with like-minded individuals and groups in the vicinity of Quebec City. For years, Albert would live a double life as a CAF member and as a recruiter and online activist for an RWE group in the region. However, the CAF’s ethos, the supervisors, peers, and subordinates he worked with in Quebec, as well as the people he met while serving would begin to challenge those engrained ideas. Furthermore, Albert entered into a relationship with a member of the CAF, whose up-bringing was different from his and who came from a more demographically diverse region of Canada.

¹³⁴ Horgan, John, Mary Beth Altier, Neil Shortland, and Max Taylor. "Walking Away: The Disengagement and Deradicalization of a Violent Right-Wing Extremist." *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 9, no. 2 (2017), 64.

Albert was promoted and quickly found himself undergoing advance training in leadership, interacting more and more with CAF personnel outside of his trade and region; as such, he inevitably sought to break ties with RWE groups and those individuals from his youth, as his worldview became more mainstream and conflicted with RWE. Alas, he was informed by another member of the CAF, a close friend of his who had also radicalized and was an active participant in several of the groups that Albert belongs to, that he would inform the chain of command of Albert's past ideologies and activities if Albert were to leave the RWE group.

Albert remains loyal to his friends and remains active within the RWE group, albeit no longer heavily recruiting for it, and it is only when Albert is promoted to a higher rank and position which requires an enhanced security clearance do his activities become known to the CAF. His chain of command investigates him, charges him, conducts a court martial, and he is found guilty. He is ostracized from many of his CAF relationships, becomes separated from his wife, but having been interviewed by his chain of command, he is placed on remedial measures, as they see him to be a person and soldier worth investing in. He finally disengages from his previous RWE groups and ceases communications over all mediums. Aided by the CAF Chaplaincy, his CoC, and his wife, Albert is able to begin the process of deradicalization and develop ideologies that are within mainstream Canadian culture.

Specifically, the CAF Chaplaincy explored and took advantage of the doubts that Albert had on RWE ideologies, enabled a revisitation of his own self-definition, and supported Albert as he developed a path forward. His chain of command, having been affirmed that Albert was returning to mainstream ideologies, provided him with time and space to become deradicalized and then leveraged Albert's experience to support and refine the development of prevention and deradicalization programs within the CAF and its stakeholders. All the while, his wife and close friends provided him with support as he acclimatized to his new life.

First and foremost, this vignette demonstrates an individual's journey through an arc trajectory of radicalization, engagement, action, disillusionment, disengagement, and deradicalization typical of the former extremist's experience.¹³⁵ Like the original study, this short vignette also highlights some pull factors such as change in priorities, age, starting a family, new positive relationships with a movement, career prospects, and socio-political change, which seem to be the aggravating factors to pull Albert out. Similar to the radicalization process,

¹³⁵ Horgan, John, Mary Beth Altier, Neil Shortland, and Max Taylor. "Walking Away: The Disengagement and Deradicalization of a Violent Right-Wing Extremist." *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 9, no. 2 (2017), 74.

deradicalization is often not achieved by one single extraordinary event, but a myriad of events, experiences, and factors galvanized by an important event or experience. Furthermore, Albert's ability to psychologically disengage from his former groups was a pivotal point, and only once he was found out and no longer risked being exposed by his friend was he able to affect a break-clean and begin an inward journey of self-reflection and redefinition.¹³⁶ While his disengagement was short in time, the deradicalization process enabled by other CAF personnel, Albert's CoC, and key relationships was lengthy a period of time.¹³⁷ Finally, Albert, having regained the trust of his CoC, and supported by his wife and other programs, re-defined his place in the world and began to support the CAF in the prevention and deradicalization of its personnel with regards to RWE.¹³⁸ Ebaugh's work of the stage theory of deradicalization can also be observed throughout the vignette. The doubting stage is evident as Albert gains experience, gains a wider breadth of knowledge, and becomes involved with someone from another part of Canada. His search for alternatives begins with him looking to move away from the group, but this is eventually forced upon him by the chain of command, which also acts as the turning point. Finally, with the help of his wife, chain of command and the chaplaincy, he is able to create a new role for himself.

This vignette provided the targeted audience a realistic situation that CAF personnel could face. From a CAF perspective, it highlighted several key shortcomings that will be further discussed in Chapter 5: enhanced security clearance measures, and clear situation-dependent policy and support programs targeting the CoC, radicalized individuals, and their families. These policies and programs must help individuals who are having doubts, personnel who have identified friends and family member who are 'at risk' by providing them access to a robust

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 74.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 74.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 75.

system of help. As these programs are developed, from either the top down or from a grassroots perspective, what roles, if any, former radicalized individuals have to play in the CAF and the development of these polices should be discussed.

Key Criteria of Deradicalization Programs

In his book *Understanding Deradicalization: Methods, Tools and Programs for Countering Violent Extremism*, Daniel Kohler, a theorist, practitioner, and expert in counter-radicalization and deradicalization^{139,140}, seeks to “...bridge the gap for the first time between academic and practical perspectives on ‘deradicalization.’”¹⁴¹ His book is supported by empirical case studies, open source press, practical field experience, a survey of established deradicalization programs worldwide, peer-reviewed articles in the subject of “...deradicalization, disengagement, rehabilitation, disaffiliation...”¹⁴², and reports from various stakeholders.^{143,144} This work provides an excellent synopsis of the state in which the discussion and debates over disengagement and deradicalization, and presents them in an easily understood manner, with each section building upon the previous one.¹⁴⁵

Kohler provides key insights into developing, establishing, and maturing deradicalization and disengagement programs which will be effective within a country.¹⁴⁶ First and foremost, individuals will be disengaged and deradicalize just as differently from each other as they

¹³⁹ Daniel Kohler <http://girds.org/staff>, accessed 08/04/21.

¹⁴⁰ Daniel Kohler <https://icct.nl/people/daniel-koehler/>, accessed 08/04/21.

¹⁴¹ Daniel Koehler. *Understanding Deradicalization : Methods, Tools and Programs for Countering Violent Extremism*. (New York: Routledge, 2017), 5.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 12.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 5,11-13.

¹⁴⁴ Schuurman, Bart. Book review “Understanding Deradicalization: Methods, Tools and Programs for Countering Violent Extremism”. *Perspectives on Terrorism* Vol. 11, Issue 3. (2017): 77-78.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 77-78.

¹⁴⁶ Daniel Koehler. *Understanding Deradicalization : Methods, Tools and Programs for Countering Violent Extremism*. (New York: Routledge, 2017), 290-291.

became radicalized, and therefore no single program will effective for all people.¹⁴⁷ Each individual plan must be personalized, and, as such, each person must be assessed and treated differently from the others; their individual backgrounds and socio-economic environments will be analyzed, the reasons for being accepted into a program considered, family dynamics examined so that program facilitators can develop plan which has rigour and adaptability.¹⁴⁸ In order to ensure that various programs can cover a wider spectrum of deradicalizing and disengagement plans, a whole-of-government partnered approach is needed.¹⁴⁹ However, a difficulty will lie in ensuring “...commonly accepted standards...” due to the programs being managed at multiple over several governmental departments and agencies, pan-agency, and by community partners.¹⁵⁰ Kohler recommends reinforcing the commonly accepted standards by having the capacity to “...sanction misconduct...” by reducing funding while rewarding excellence by ensuring “(...additional funding or awards of excellence) and international recognition.¹⁵¹ This in turn would ensure standard by which to conduct evaluation and further enable the sharing of best practices for staff and staffing, training, research, statistics, and to establish a program’s successfulness in deradicalization.¹⁵² In short, deradicalization programs must be flexible, staffed by well-trained personnel who are engaged and committed to delivering individualized plans to a variety of ideological and radical groups across a country.¹⁵³

This chapter provided the realities in which the CAF will operate in as it seeks to protect its personnel and institution from the effects of RWE; specifically, the realities of disengagement and deradicalization and the potential of its ability to retain its personnel who are willing return

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 232-233.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 232.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 135.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 195.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 195.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 179, 183, 194-195.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 295.

to mainstream values and opinions. It further provides an overview of key criteria in developing a disengagement and deradicalization program. While it is not foreseen that the CAF will become lead in domain, the CAF may need to develop its own policies and procedures leveraging in place programs or supporting them. Finally, the final vignette was used to bring key elements in radicalization and deradicalization together to highlight concepts and stages which the CAF may need to examine. In the next chapter, policies and strategies that the CAF has developed in order to minimize and stop both hateful conduct the spreading of RWE within the CAF will be examined.

Chapter 4 – CAF and Right-wing Extremism, Hateful Conduct Policy, Diversity

This chapter will explore past and current links between the Canadian Armed Forces and incidents and events directly and indirectly attributable to RWE and hateful conduct.

Furthermore, the CAF response to the recent upsurge in reported events will be discussed and analyzed. Concluding this chapter will be a discussion on the importance of diversity within the CAF as a key factor which may counter RWE from entering the CAF, mitigate factors of radicalization and enable deradicalization, and promote culture change. This chapter will argue that when faced with overt instances of RWE within its ranks the CAF did, in fact, react.

However, it will also argue that the reaction only countered hateful conduct that had or may be happening.

This section is complimented by an earlier section, in chapter 1, on the history of RWE in Canada, which provided a contemporary snapshot of RWE in the CAF. These events eventually led to the publishing of military conduct policies focused on hateful conduct. The years 2019 and 2020 saw several accounts of Canadian Armed Forces personnel involved in or linked to

RWE groups. In early 2020, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested Patrick Mathews, a Canadian primary reservist allegedly recruiting for The Base and recently released from the CAF who had been in the process of planning and preparing violent attacks “...similar to what was seen at a rally in Charlottesville, Va., in 2017, in which one person was killed and dozens others injured.”^{154,155} In 2019, Boris Mihajlovic, a neo-Nazi and forum administrator, was encouraging other RWE individuals to join the CAF in order to make use of their military positions and military abilities in order to initiate a race war.¹⁵⁶ Further supporting this argument, is a media report “...claim(ing) to have found evidence in online communication between right-wing extremists discussing the strategic value of infiltrating the armed forces to acquire weapons training and tactical skills.”¹⁵⁷ In fact, a 2018 internal report that covered the years 2013 to 2018 reported that “16 regular force and reserve members were associated with hate groups; and 35 regular force and reserve members were alleged to have engaged in racist or hate-motivated conduct.”¹⁵⁸ The report further states that of those 51, 15 received remedial measures and disciplinary actions, three members were directly released, 18 voluntary or medically released, and seven members were found to have done nothing wrong.¹⁵⁹ Finally, the 1990s saw members of the Airborne Regiment linked to RWE groups provide training to neo-Nazis, and torture and kill a Somali national.¹⁶⁰ The CAF and Department of Defence have begun to address the threat

¹⁵⁴Pauls, Karen and Angela Johnston. “Ex-Reservist Patrik Mathews and others planned violent revolution, U.S. prosecutors say”. Accessed 4/29/21. <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/patrick-mathews-base-violent-revolution-1.5435323>.

¹⁵⁵ Gartenstein-Ross, D, Robin O’Luanaigh, and David Jones. *Like a drop of cyanide: A strategic framework for addressing hateful conduct and radicalization in the Canadian Armed Forces*. (Valens Global, 2020), 13.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 13.

¹⁵⁷ Koehler, D. “A Threat from Within? Exploring the Link Between the Extreme Right and the Military” *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism Policy Brief*. (The Hague, October 2019), 5.

¹⁵⁸ Department of National Defence. “Hateful Conduct in the Canadian Armed Forces” accessed 29/04/21. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/proactive-disclosure/cow-estimates-a-2019-20/personnel.html#toc4>.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, accessed 29/04/21.

¹⁶⁰ Gartenstein-Ross, D, Robin O’Luanaigh, and David Jones. *Like a drop of cyanide: A strategic framework for addressing hateful conduct and radicalization in the Canadian Armed Forces*. (Valens Global, 2020), 11.

of RWE ideologies and hateful conduct by releasing operational and tactical guidance for leaders who encounter these challenges.

Hateful Conduct Policy

The CAF has responded to the increase in publicised events of RWE incidents and events linked to CAF members by releasing policy that defines and addresses hateful conduct.¹⁶¹ The framework policy clearly articulates that racism and associated behaviors are negative to the operational effectiveness of the CAF and harmful at the individual level.¹⁶² This new policy, centered on a Defence Administrative Order and Directive (DOAD), numbered 5019-0, states that those CAF personnel who are observed performing or conducting themselves in a manner that constitutes hateful conduct will be, based on the severity of the performance or conduct, subject to the following possible consequences: be ordered to complete appropriate learning, training or professional development; have the incidents recorded in the member's quarterly or annual evaluation; be reported to appropriate civilian police agencies to be investigated and disciplined according to applicable laws.¹⁶³ This, coupled with additional training, an awareness campaign, a reporting mechanism, and the capability to access experts in radicalism and RWE in Canada and around the world will ensure the elimination of hateful conduct and enable culture change within the CAF.¹⁶⁴ While the policy speaks to the elimination of racism and hateful

¹⁶¹ The CAF define hateful conduct as: An act or conduct, including the display or communication of words, symbols or images, by a CAF member, that they knew or ought reasonably to have known would constitute, encourage, justify or promote violence or hatred against a person or persons of an identifiable group, based on their national or ethnic origin, race, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, marital status, family status, genetic characteristics or disability. Department of National Defence. "DOAD 5019-0, Conduct and Performance Deficiencies" accessed 29/04/21. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/defence-administrative-orders-directives/5000-series/5019/5019-0-conduct-and-performance-deficiencies.html>.

¹⁶² Department of National Defence. "Canadian Armed Forces releases policy that defines and addresses hateful conduct" accessed 29/04/21. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/maple-leaf/defence/2020/07/caf-releases-policy-defines-addresses-hateful-conduct.html>.

¹⁶³ Department of National Defence. "DOAD 5019-0, Conduct and Performance Deficiencies" accessed 29/04/21. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/defence-administrative-orders-directives/5000-series/5019/5019-0-conduct-and-performance-deficiencies.html>.

¹⁶⁴ Department of National Defence. "Canadian Armed Forces releases policy that defines and addresses hateful conduct" accessed 29/04/21. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/maple-leaf/defence/2020/07/caf-releases-policy-defines-addresses-hateful-conduct.html>.

conduct in the CAF, it is silent on the steps to be taken to counter RWE individuals and groups from entering the CAF, and of the roles the CAF would played in counter-radicalization within the CAF, or deradicalization of individuals who have become radicalized directly or indirectly owing to military service. In the proceeding section, diversity and how it can be a countermeasure to radicalization and enables deradicalization will be discussed.

Diversity

The Canadian Armed Forces' vision of its own Diversity Strategy states that it seeks to have an institution that reflects the "...diversity of Canada..." and whose members "...are recognized and encouraged to maintain and contribute through their unique experiences, abilities, and perspectives within a respectful and inclusive environment."¹⁶⁵ The Diversity Strategy encompasses four goals: understanding diversity culture, inculcating a culture of diversity, modernizing policies to support diversity, and generating a CAF that reflects Canada's diversity.¹⁶⁶ These goals are intended to ensure that the CAF remains contemporary in diversity of culture in order to better align its policies and processes, enables a workplace at the institution level that is inclusive and respectful, and ensures that the CAF is seen as an employer of choice in order to both recruit and retain a diverse workforce, which in turn will ensure that CAF does, in fact, reflect Canada's diversity and that it has fully incorporated diversity as a core value.¹⁶⁷

Diversity will also directly affect the ability of RWE individuals and groups to operate within the CAF. Firstly, as the CAF becomes a more diverse workplace, reflecting Canada, members of the CAF will become racially cognizant and that will increase awareness of racial

¹⁶⁵ Canadian Armed Forces. "Canadian Armed Forces Diversity Strategy". (Public Works Canada, January, 2017), 2.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 6.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 7-12.

disadvantages.¹⁶⁸ Three crucial experiences can enable the development of racial awareness: cross racial-interactions, multicultural education, and minority experiences.¹⁶⁹ Cross racial-interactions and the establishment of friendships can enable white people in becoming more “...aware of the realities of people of color...” and broaden the scope of their understanding of race.¹⁷⁰ Increasing multicultural education and race-conscious education can offer new insights, alternative narratives to ongoing issues, and can lead to a “...self-interrogation...” and “...becoming increasingly cognizant that fundamentally race matters”.¹⁷¹ Minority experiences cannot be related to by all people, as they are experiences gained by experiencing a “...marginalized social identity...” whether it be gender, religion, or sexuality and can allow a person to understand and relate to others who have been marginalized and provide great empathy and arguably insight to societal structures and processes.¹⁷²

Secondly, and from an individual tactical level, by recruiting and retaining those diverse perspectives and backgrounds, individuals who have begun to read and visit sites or interact with groups who promote right-wing ideologies or who come from a background which has enabled right-wing ideologies, will be faced with the behaviours and conduct of a diverse group of section commanders, subordinates, fireteam partners, and commanding officers. These men and women of diverse backgrounds will directly challenge those preconceived notions on race, gender, and age; if needed, enabling a deradicalization process or hindering and stopping the potential radicalization of an individual. Take for example the life lessons acquired by Sarah, a right-wing extremist who, through interacting with people of colour, became deradicalized.¹⁷³

¹⁶⁸ Cabrera, Nolan L. "Working through Whiteness: White, Male College Students Challenging Racism." *Review of Higher Education* 35, no. 3 (2012), 385.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 385.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 385.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 385-386.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 387-389.

¹⁷³ Horgan, John, Mary Beth Altier, Neil Shortland, and Max Taylor. "Walking Away: The Disengagement and Deradicalization of a Violent Right-Wing Extremist." *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 9, no. 2 (2017).

Having been separated in space from her previous RWE group and immersed in a diverse environment, she began to interact with people who were different from her, discussing her views, which led to her initially questioning those views and then to her consciously challenging them, and in the end she chose to enable others to also break free of those preconceptions.¹⁷⁴

Supporting and championing diversity in the workplace and exploring the culture of diversity by having open discussions and educating its members, the CAF may change the norms, identify blind spots, and focus the lens inwardly. Increasing education on racism, discrimination, and diversity may ensure that signs of radicalization are identified early and discussed. Diversity may enable intervention with borderline personnel, and can severely inhibit already radicalized individuals in their freedom of movement in possible meetings, groups activities, and even recruiting.¹⁷⁵

This chapter explored past and current links between the Canadian Armed Forces personnel and RWE groups and ideologies to provide a context in which to understand the importance and immediacy of the CAF's initial response and ongoing deliberate approach in combatting RWE. The CAF response to this threat was discussed and analyzed, highlighting how current policies focus on actions taken upon identification of hateful conduct perpetrated by CAF personnel but fall silent on the next step. How will the CAF protect itself? What steps are to be taken when a member is identified as at risk? Finally, diversity was discussed; specifically, how it will also act as a deterrent, cultural compass, and its ability as a core value to counter RWE groups as they seek to recruit personnel in the CAF and positively affect CAF personnel who have been or may becoming radicalized. As part of the deliberate approach to combating RWE,

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 70-73.

¹⁷⁵ Scrivens, Ryan, Vivek Venkatesh, Maxime Bérubé, and Tiana Gaudette. "Combating Violent Extremism: Voices of Former Right-Wing Extremists." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* (2019), 6, 8-10, 17.

the proceeding chapter will analyze and discuss operational framework recommended in a reported provided by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Robin O’Luanaigh & David Jones as they sought to satisfy a Mobilizing Insights in Defence and Security (MINDS) program Policy Challenges for Fiscal Year 2019-20, specifically “Addressing and Preventing Hateful Conduct and Radicalization”.¹⁷⁶

Chapter 5 - Like a Drop of Cyanide: Operational Framework Analysis

The CAF continues to assess and react to numerous threats that pose a risk to its members: hateful conduct, inappropriate sexual behaviour, toxic leadership, and harassment. All of these affect the safety of its personnel, their mental well-being, esprit de corps, trust in leadership, and the CAF’s ability to recruit and retain. The CAF, cognizant of the opportunities, insights, perspectives, and the subject matter experts that work within the academic and professional realm have outlined a national policy and developed the Mobilizing Insights in Defence and Security (MINDS) program. This program seeks to “...strengthen(s) the foundation of the Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces’ (DND/CAF) evidenced-based policy-making.”¹⁷⁷ It is within the auspices of the MINDS program that Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Robin O’Luanaigh & David Jones provided a report on a recommended framework and strategy that would enable the CAF to counter radicalization within the CAF and establish counter-measures towards radicalized individuals entering the CAF that in turn could reduce hateful conduct and further minimize the risks to the CAF and its personnel.

¹⁷⁶ Department of National Defence. “MINDS Policy Challenges 2021-22”, accessed 02/05/21. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/programs/minds/defence-policy-challenges.html>.

¹⁷⁷ Department of National Defence. “Mobilizing Insights in Defence and Security (MINDS)”, accessed 23/03/21. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/programs/minds.html>.

Like a Drop of Cyanide

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Robin O’Luanaigh & David Jones in their report “*Like a Drop of Cyanide*”: *A Strategic Framework for Addressing Hateful Conduct and Radicalization in the Canadian Armed Forces* provide the CAF with two sets of recommendations in developing further or enhanced policy in countering RWE.¹⁷⁸ Firstly, they recommended that the CAF engage in the whole-of-government and partnered agency approach recommended by Kohler and discussed in Chapter 2.¹⁷⁹ They further recommend that the CAF adopt an “...anonymous reporting system that allows for CAF personnel to discreetly report instances of hateful conduct.”¹⁸⁰ This reporting mechanism would be similar to those found in France, Spain, and Germany.¹⁸¹ The recommended CAF version of the anonymous reporting system would be focused on gathering information on those who may be at risk in order to engage early in counter-radicalization and deradicalization.¹⁸² They also recommend that an impartial internal oversight body be established.¹⁸³ The impartiality of the oversight body would foster a system which would be transparent and accountable, and provide reports on the successfulness of programs and policy in order to improve them.¹⁸⁴ This body would be responsible for “...for measuring the effectiveness of training programs, reporting systems, and resources to prevent and counter radicalization and hateful conduct in the ranks”, the anonymous reporting system, and the conduct of a survey that would collect “...information from CAF personnel regarding their experiences related to hateful conduct.”¹⁸⁵ While some similarities can be observed between

¹⁷⁸ Gartenstein-Ross, D, Robin O’Luanaigh, and David Jones. *Like a drop of cyanide: A strategic framework for addressing hateful conduct and radicalization in the Canadian Armed Forces*. Valens Global, 2020.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 5, 28-30.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 5, 30.

¹⁸¹ Kohler, Dan. *Understanding Deradicalization: Methods, Tools and Programs for Countering Violent Extremism*. (London: Routledge, 2017), 151, 130, 153.

¹⁸² Gartenstein-Ross, D, Robin O’Luanaigh, and David Jones. *Like a drop of cyanide: A strategic framework for addressing hateful conduct and radicalization in the Canadian Armed Forces*. (Valens Global, 2020), 29.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, 30-31.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 30.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 29-31.

the proposed oversight body and the Office of the CAF Ombudsman, more similarities can be drawn between the proposed body and the office of an inspector general, who, while impartial, still reports to the highest authorities, similar the offices of inspector general of the U.S. Armed Forces. For example, the mission of the U.S. Army Inspector General Agency is to “[p]rovide impartial, objective, and unbiased advice and oversight to the Army through relevant, timely, and thorough inspections, assistance, investigations, and training to promote and enable stewardship, accountability, integrity, efficiency, good order & discipline and enhance total Army readiness.”¹⁸⁶ The analysis of implementing an office of inspector general is not within the scope of the work, but is worthy of further study and discussion.

The most beneficial section of their report, from an operational perspective, and one which deserves further analysis and discussion in this Chapter is the “Military Life Cycle Counter-Radicalization Recommendations”. Gartenstein-Ross et al. posit, coupled with the strategic framework discussed above, counter-measures at the “...individual level...” which would span the life cycle of a CAF member, and would enable “...recognizing, preventing, and mitigating radicalization and hateful conduct.”¹⁸⁷ While Gartenstein-Ross et al. use the term “individual level” recommendations, taken as a whole, these recommendations look, from a military perspective, as lines of operation with associated tasks conducted throughout the tactical level. They define the life cycle of CAF members into five stages: enlistment, training, active duty, promotion, and retirement.¹⁸⁸ They support a career approach to counter-radicalization based on three assumption: hateful conduct and problems of radicalization is present throughout the CAF rank structure, those persons radicalized and who look to conduct hateful acts will seek

¹⁸⁶ United States Army. “Office of the Inspector General”, accessed 11/04/21. <https://www.army.mil/ig/#org-about>

¹⁸⁷ Gartenstein-Ross, D, Robin O’Luanaigh, and David Jones. *Like a drop of cyanide: A strategic framework for addressing hateful conduct and radicalization in the Canadian Armed Forces*. (Valens Global, 2020), 31.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 31.

to remain concealed from the chain of command and regulatory authorities, and radicalization can occur at any time “...and is an individual process.”¹⁸⁹ Based on the arguments and discussion highlighted in the section of radicalization and deradicalization of this work, the author concurs with these assumptions. Furthermore, when developing this framework, a rehabilitative approach was taken, and Gartenstein-Ross et al. emphasize that while a clear line must be defined with regards to hateful conduct in regards to punitive measures, “(f)orgiveness should be built into the system, to allow CAF members to positively grow from their mistakes.”¹⁹⁰ From a chain of command and military perspective, without clear delineation of levels of hateful conduct, standards of punitive courses of action and remedial measures prescribed to individuals will differ great within the CAF and could lead disproportionate punishments and remedial measures or perceived inaction by the chain of command.

Framework Analysis

Each element of the individual framework will be broken down into its key points and analyzed and explored using four criteria: staffing, time, intelligence, and cost. Staffing analysis will discuss the availability of trained personnel, the leveraging of already-in-place personnel, and what steps may be required to mitigate any shortcomings. The time analysis will discuss the likely time requirement that would be associated with the framework, any phasing or concurrent activity requirements and where frictions exist, and possible courses of action required to mitigate these frictions. These recommendations may be leveraged to provide intelligence that could be gathered and utilized by the chain of command, security services, and/or our partnered agencies across the whole of government for not only advancing programs but also in countering

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 31.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 31.

RWE groups who have targeted the CAF or Veteran community. While a detailed cost estimate of implementing the recommendations is not within the scope of the work, the analysis will highlight applicable costs associated with the proposed recommendations.

Gartenstein-Ross et al. have proposed the following framework:¹⁹¹

1. Enlistment stage:
 - a. enhanced background checks to determine if an individual is joining the CAF due to being inspired by an extremist cause or the intention to advance it,
 - b. informed tattoo screenings to determine if an individual has possible connections to WSE groups or ideologies, and
 - c. particular emphasis on reserve forces to prevent White Supremacist Extremist (WSE) infiltration.
2. Training stage:
 - a. counter-radicalization training to inoculate incoming personnel against the effects of WSE ideologies and propaganda,
 - b. leveraging the multi-stakeholder community to inform personnel of appropriate support channels to discuss grievances commonly exploited by WSEs, and
 - c. leadership-specific training that equips leaders with the skills and resources they need to embody and enforce hateful conduct policies.
3. Active duty stage:

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 31-36.

- a. measures to be implemented before and during deployment, particularly a continuity of hateful conduct prevention efforts,
 - b. measures to be implemented post-deployment, including post-deployment screenings to determine changes in behaviors and beliefs of returning CAF members, and
 - c. increased resources and support to deployed personnel.
4. Promotion stage:
- a. a scrupulous review of past conduct prior to a promotion being granted, and
 - b. pre-promotion informational interviews of both the individual being considered for promotion and past subordinates to determine if the individual engaged in hateful conduct or oversaw instances of hateful conduct.
5. Retirement stage:
- a. screenings of short-career personnel as they depart the CAF, and
 - b. updating current military-to-civilian transition materials to address the risk of WSE recruitment among CAF veterans and increase relevant resources and support to prevent radicalization and hateful conduct after service.

The enlistment stage recommendations include enhanced background checks and informed tattoo screenings with particular emphasis on reserve forces to prevent WSE infiltration. As the entry conduit for all personnel joining the CAF, this is the first line of defense, and as such, the report recommends deliberate heightened screening measures and enhanced training specific to RWE recognition.

Currently, background checks on individuals considering joining the CAF are completed by the Canadian Forces Recruiting Center. These background checks involve submitting an applicant's information in order to complete a criminal record check through the Canadian Police Information Center (CPIC), a reference check conducted by a third-party contractor or military career counselor (MCC), and the interview process conducted by the MCC who has the applicant's file within their portfolio.¹⁹² With respect to criminal record checks, if an individual has not broken the law or acted in any manner that would necessitate him or her being entered into CPIC, a negative return would be received.¹⁹³ Also, the telephone reference check does not specifically ask participants if the applicant has engaged in or is affiliated with RWE organization or ideologies, but rather whether a reference assessed if the applicant is "...capable of working in a diverse environment...", "...any concerns related to a potential employment within the Canadian Armed Forces...", and finally, if references have "...any additional information you would like to provide that you believe relates to his/her issues of trust and reliability?"¹⁹⁴ Simply put, directed questions of past hateful conduct, ideologies, and experiences are not asked to the reference. From an interview perspective, while the interview and the questions asked are protected, the purpose of the interview is not. There is a portion within the interview where an applicant's suitability is assessed that includes the assessment of tattoos and the search for any red flags with regards to discrimination and harassment.¹⁹⁵ It should be noted that this is after the applicant has signed a statement of understanding on the CAF policy of discrimination, harassment, and professional conduct.¹⁹⁶ However, MCCs and

¹⁹² Canadian Forces Training Development Center (CFDTC). "Enabling Objective 001.02 Review Applicants File." *Training Plan: Military Career Counsellor*, (CFDTC, October 2015), Slides 7-17.

¹⁹³ Reliability Screening. "CPIC Check" accessed 23/03/24. [CPIC Check & Services | Reliability Screening Solutions](#).

¹⁹⁴ Canadian Forces Recruiting Group "Form WI 3.3.4.15 - Telephone Reference Check Interview Protocol" (CFRG: Borden, Ontario 2017), 3-5.

¹⁹⁵ Canadian Forces Recruiting Group "CFRG Quality Manual – Suitability Assessment and Selection Interview Process" (CFRG: Borden, Ontario 2017), 10.

¹⁹⁶ Canadian Forces Recruiting Group "Form WI 3.3.3.14 – CAF Policy on Discrimination, Harassment, and Professional Conduct" (CFRG: Borden, Ontario, May 2018).

recruiters, those most in contact with potential applicant and applicants, do not undergo any training specific to radicalization and extremism.^{197,198} It should also be noted that at no point are the social media accounts of an applicant requested and therefore are not scrutinized for RWE or another extremism indicators.¹⁹⁹ From an enlistment phase perspective, having reservists undergo the same enhanced background checks that would be developed for regular force applicants would ensure a standard start state for counter-radicalization, and reserve-force-specific counter-radicalization would need to be looked at in the training and career phase where regular force personnel and reserves differ the most.

Looking at the enlistment process as a whole, the following increase time requirements would be needed: adopting a new enhanced reference and background check that included directed questions of hateful conduct, ideologies, potential bibliographies, as well as scrutinizing an individual's online presence, while adhering the Canadian laws and regulations, are assessed as marginal. From a training perspective, MCC and recruiters would need to have further time on course to become qualified and have within the recruiting toolbox the following tools: an intelligence overview of RWE threats in Canada and the CAF, an overview of RWE culture and key indicators in an individual's speaking patterns, and an indoctrination to "...terms, figures, and iconography..." used by RWE.²⁰⁰ This additional training will increase the duration of the MCC and Recruiter course by potentially several days, depending on the training package established, but an efficiency could be met by synchronizing each course to undergo the same training concurrently. Currently, the MCC course has a time requirement of five days of

¹⁹⁷ Canadian Forces Training Development Center (CFDTC). *Training Plan: Military Career Counsellor*. (CFDTC, October 2015), v-vi.

¹⁹⁸ Canadian Forces Training Development Center (CFDTC). *Training Plan: Recruiter*. (CFDTC, March 2016), iv-v.

¹⁹⁹ Canadian Forces Training Development Center (CFDTC). "Enabling Objective 001.02 Review Applicants File." *Training Plan: Military Career Counsellor*, (CFDTC, October 2015), Slides 7-17.

²⁰⁰ Gartenstein-Ross, D, Robin O'Luanaigh, David Jones, and Samuel Hogson. *Risk Indicia Glossary: White Supremacist Extremist Terms, Figures, and Iconography*. (Valens Global, 2020), 3.

distributed learning, 10 days in location training, and on-the-job training that lasts “...not less than three months and no more than six months.”²⁰¹ The recruiter’s course has a time requirement of three days of distributed learning, 10 days in location training, and an on-the-job period that should not last “...more than 6 months.”²⁰² From a cost perspective, with more training and contracting, a more detailed background check will increase the overall cost to recruit an individual into the CAF. Finally, from an intelligence perspective, identifying and then barring an individual from entrance into the CAF serves little in terms of intelligence gathering. However, having identified an individual trying to enter the CAF on behalf of an RWE and having him or her questioned by a policing agency would further increase the threat analysis. In conclusion, the above analysis fully supports the recommendation of enhanced background checks and informed tattoo screenings. However, emphasis on reserve forces to prevent WSE infiltration at this stage is assessed as unnecessary if all personnel applying to the CAF undergo identical screening and assessment. Further investigation of reserves and WSE infiltration will be necessary.

During the training stage, Gartenstein-Ross et al. recommend that training include counter-radicalization, bringing in multi-stakeholder community to inform personnel of appropriate support channels and leadership-specific training.²⁰³ Gartenstein-Ross et al. further discuss the necessity in bringing in subject matter experts (SMEs) and consulting with them in developing both the tools necessary to teach the personnel undergoing training as well as train-the-trainer opportunities. For the purpose of this section, this work will break down the training stage into two categories: 1. Basic training, which will include all training undergone by either

²⁰¹ Canadian Forces Training Development Center (CFDTC). *Training Plan: Military Career Counsellor*. (CFDTC, October 2015), 2-1/4.

²⁰² Canadian Forces Training Development Center (CFDTC). *Training Plan: Recruiter*. (CFDTC, March 2016), 2-1/5.

²⁰³ Gartenstein-Ross, D, Robin O’Luanaigh, David Jones, and Samuel Hogson. Risk Indicia Glossary: White Supremacist Extremist Terms, Figures, and Iconography. Valens Global, 2020.34

officer candidates or non-commissioned members from entrance into the CAF to being fully qualified in their trade or profession; 2. Career training courses which are required for advancement and promotion and include, but are not limited to, command courses within a trade or element, the Joint Command and Staff Program, and National Security Program.

From a basic training perspective, the time associated with including additional training into a basic training course is marginal, depending on the breadth and depth which the CAF will elect to include training based on SME advice. Currently, the Basic Military Qualification (BMQ), the CAF official term for recruit training, is allocated 10 weeks in which to complete 50 training days.²⁰⁴ While increasing training days may seem to be inherently simple, the BMQ recently underwent a training rationalization in which a 60-day, 12-week course was cut down to where it stands now, a 50-day, 10 week course, and while no content was removed lectures were translated into reading assignment and an additional 2 open book tests were added.²⁰⁵ However, recruit courses and the follow-on trade courses are synchronized in order to ensure steady throughput and may require a national realignment in training. From a training criteria perspective, there are no issues to be discussed if SME are brought into execute the training. However, military instructors within training cadres, which are tasked to deliver the training, will require a train-the-trainer module in the instructor indoctrination courses that occur at many school training institutions. Currently, the General Military Training Instructor course, executed over 2 weeks, does not include any similar training.²⁰⁶ From an intelligence gathering criteria perspective, information from this stage would enable instructors to identify and route potential RWE individuals, as well as potentially identify and counsel those recruits who may be

²⁰⁴ Canadian Forces Leadership and Recruit School (CFLRS). Training Plan: Basic Military Qualification. (CFLRS: May 2020), 2-1/195.

²⁰⁵ Canadian Forces Leadership and Recruit School (CFLRS). Training Plan: Basic Military Qualification. (CFLRS: May 2020), iii.

²⁰⁶ Canadian Forces Leadership and Recruit School (CFLRS). Training Plan: General Military Training Instructor. (CFLRS: Dec 2016), v-vi.

influenced by RWE ideologies or who may have backgrounds that may suggest susceptibility. From a cost-criteria perspective, increased time at a training institution means increased cost to developing trained CAF members. However, due to the size of many of the courses, some efficiencies are saved by providing the training to such a large number, and possibly synchronizing multiple courses to attend concurrently. However, some training does have certain trainer-to-trainee ratio requirements and could negate any large group training.²⁰⁷ From a career training perspective, the same effects on cost and training exist; however, from a time perspective, these courses are often not followed up by a secondary course and could be extended to include the leadership-training discussed in the report. In both categories, the ability to gather intelligence would increase as more and more personnel would become aware of the signs, stages of radicalization, and other identifiers of RWE with individuals or groups within the CAF, and we would have superiors equally versed in the language. The recommendations suggested by Gartenstein-Ross et al. for the training stage of the framework is supported as no unrealistic demands exist on the potential implementation within the CAF.

The active-duty stage recommendation of both pre- and post-deployment enhanced screening from a time perspective requires minimal additional time. Additional questions can be added to the interviews; however, additional training will be required for those conducting interviews to gauge reactions, answers, and body language. Conversely, if SMEs outside of the CAF are required to conduct post-initial interviews, time to complete interviews from a deployment perspective will increase, as will cost. These recommendations will result in minimal ability to gather intelligence, but as highlighted in the report, ensuring that the anonymous reporting system is available to deployed personnel would be helpful. Of note, the career training

²⁰⁷ Canadian Forces Leadership and Recruit School (CFLRS). Training Plan: Basic Military Qualification. (CFLRS: May 2020), 2-1/195.

recommendations discussed in the previous section, will aid in changing the culture discussion and could be used by those junior and senior leaders assessing their subordinates in preparations for deployment, while deployed, and having returned from deployment.

The promotion stage recommendations include examining an individual's record and conducting anonymous interviews of past and current subordinates. No training would be required for this recommendation as it would have built upon RWE training as part of a supervisor or leader's career training requirements. Officers and senior NCOs alike would be able to thoroughly review an individual's file when the member is potentially being promoted. A requirement could be added, at the career management level, to ensure that that verification or assessment had been complete. Training would be required for interviewers in order to make the interview fully indisputable, as it would inevitably be scrutinized. The second course of action would be to outsource the interview, similar to the 360-Degree Feedback Self-Development Process utilized by the Canadian Forces College.²⁰⁸ As promotions are forecasted well in advance, meeting the criteria, in so much as time is concerned, would not be a factor in these recommendations. Costs associated with having a third party conduct the assessment would increase the overall cost to develop junior, senior, and institutional leaders; however, an efficiency would be achieved by training CAF personnel posted to the impartial body described at the beginning of this chapter. From an intelligence perspective, little would be gained by these two measures. These recommendations are also supported and could be deliberately implemented within the CAF.

The retirement stage of a CAF member's career can also be an opportunity to for RWE groups to recruit CAF personnel as they transition to civilian life. Gartenstein-Ross et al. suggest

²⁰⁸ Canadian Forces College. 360-Degree Feedback. Accessed 02/05/21. [360-Degree Feedback \(forces.gc.ca\)](https://www.forces.gc.ca/360-degree-feedback).

screenings of short-career personnel as they depart the CAF, updating current military-to-civilian transition materials to address the risk of WSE recruitment among CAF veterans, increasing relevant resources and supports to prevent radicalization and hateful conduct after service. From a training perspective, these recommendations would see the greatest challenge, due primarily to the amount of personnel that enable a retiring CAF member's transition. Training, to different degrees, would need to be implemented to the member's chain of command, which, like the promotion stage, would have already been instructed during advanced leadership training; training would need to be provided to staff of the CAF Transitions Group, and to case managers and staff at Veterans Affairs Canada field offices, as well as the members who are retiring themselves. Leveraging the analysis of the promotion stage, the timeline and processes in retiring from the CAF is deliberate, and those involved in the transition process have specific training that could be leveraged or could include RWE specific training.²⁰⁹ Increasing training for personnel involved with transitioning an individual to civilian life would increase the cost for qualified personnel with several groups and agencies. The programs and screening involved during this period would seek to enable a person transitioning and would garner extremely limited intelligence.. While the training demands of this recommendation could span multiple formations and groups within the CAF and other government agencies, the recommendation is still supported, as it would support members and their families as they begin a life outside the forces.

In order to provide and present the above analysis in a focused fashion, this work will provide a hypothetical concept of implementation. Based on the analysis above, a phased

²⁰⁹ Department of National Defence. "About The Canadian Armed Forces Transition Group". Accessed 01/05/21. [About The Canadian Armed Forces Transition Group - Canada.ca](#).

approached in implementing this framework could be proposed. This phased approach would see the enlistment and retirement stage recommendations implemented first (to include those recommendations which affect basic training), followed by the training (specific to career and leadership courses) and active duty stages recommendations, and finally the promotion stage.

The first phase of recommendations would take priority, as they could affect the highest number of CAF members at crucial times in their careers. This phase would require the most additional training based on the amount of personnel required to fully train and fully release a member of the CAF. By implementing these initial recommendations in priority, the CAF would establish a deliberate screening procedure around the institution, and, on the other end, would release members who are not at risk. This phase could also see a grassroots culture change in the CAF. Implementation of the active duty and training stage recommendations would require less training and time, could leverage lessons learned from the application of phase 1 implementation, and positively affect culture change in the CAF as the junior and senior leaders, both officers and non-commission officers, would be enabled to observe and target potential friction areas with regards to RWE. Finally, the promotion stage recommendations could be implemented. However, based on the successes of the first and second phase, screening procedures from the first phase would be in place and training that the member would have had to receive before entering the promotion stage may enable some efficiencies.

Like a drop of cyanide: A strategic framework for addressing hateful conduct and radicalization in the Canadian Armed Forces provides recommendation in five stages of the member's career in the CAF: enlistment stage, training stage, active duty stage, promotion stage, and retirement stage. By analyzing these stages using demands on training, demands on time, cost, and potential intelligence gained from these recommendations, this work fully supports the

implementation of similar, if not the specific, recommendations provided by Gartenstein-Ross et al.

Conclusion

Right-wing extremism propagates hate and hateful conduct, motivates vulnerable individuals to radicalize, fosters disenfranchisement and anti-authoritarian behavior, and challenges core values within Canada and the Canadian Armed Forces. Right-wing ideologies threaten the CAF and pose a risk to CAF personnel. From a public safety and security perspective, RWE groups seek to recruit trained CAF members and/or infiltrate the CAF to gain skills that would make RWE groups more lethal and dangerous. From a personnel perspective, RWE ideologies may cause a CAF member to become radicalized and follow an extremist arc trajectory whose outcomes can be quite severe, while CAF personnel could become victims of RWE ideological behavior and suffer abuse, harassment, marginalization, and an unsafe

workplace. From an institutional perspective, continued reports both internally and externally of CAF members behaving in a hateful manner and with direct or indirect affiliations with RWE groups may negatively impact the CAF's diversity aims in retention and recruiting.

This paper argued that the Canadian Armed Forces is at a decisive point where the institution must protect itself and its people from right-wing extremism. To do so, CAF leadership could pursue the development of a robust counter-RWE strategy, developing tools and processes that could be implemented from the tactical level to the institutional level.

By researching Canada's history of RWE ideologies, it was concluded that Canada has institutionalized racism which has led to a tendency to allow RWE rhetoric to continue in Canada. This, coupled with the Trump Effect and the ease in which RWE ideologies and hate groups can proliferate with the use of the internet, has made Canada home to many active RWE groups.

By investigating radicalization and deradicalization, and analyzing key elements of those processes, it was found that the CAF may be able to develop policies and programs that will counter radicalization and enable deradicalization. It was further concluded that the CAF may not be in a position to complete its own deradicalization domain, but that a whole-of-government approach would be more successful.

The Canadian Armed Forces, having been faced with reports, both internally and externally, of CAF members affiliated with RWE groups and hateful conduct, published an order that, while enabling commanders at all levels to navigating the challenges with hateful conduct, does not provided a robust counter-RWE, counter-radicalization, and deradicalization framework.

However, through the CAF emphasis on diversity, some secondary effects will include counter-RWE, counter-radicalization, and enable a change of culture. Finally, this work fully supports

the implementation of recommendations provided by Gartenstein-Ross et al. in addressing hateful conduct and radicalization in the CAF. This framework provided recommendations in the five stages of the member's career in the CAF: enlistment stage, training stage, active duty stage, promotion stage, and retirement stage.

The purpose of this paper was to add to the academic discussion in Canada with regards to right-wing extremism from a Canadian Armed Forces perspective by providing future and current institutional leaders an analysis of the threat and how it spreads, key aspects of radicalization and deradicalization, and the importance of diversity in countering RWE ideologies within the CAF. Furthermore, the paper provided analysis of recommended counter-measures at an operational and tactical level, which, if pursued, could protect the CAF in many facets of its processes, and shield CAF members throughout their careers.

Recommendations

This paper recommends 3 lines of effort that the CAF could pursue in its effort to protect itself and its members from RWE, radicalization, and hateful conduct:

Line of Effort 1 – Counter Radicalization in Canada. The CAF should engage at the federal, provincial, and local level, utilizing the enablers that are inherent in a whole-of-government approach in counter-radicalization efforts. As a key stake holder in matters of security and employer of young persons, the CAF could enable the WoG strategy in countering radicalization and enable deradicalization when possible.

Line of Effort 2 – Establish Counter Measures. The CAF should pursue an exhaustive and deliberate system of screening for all personnel in order to ensure that potential CAF members entering the institution are suitable for employment and will strictly adhere to the CAF values and ethics. This would include a robust training package in diversity and RWE for officer and non-commissioned members as they attend respective basic training.

Line of Effort 3 – Enable Culture Change. Enhanced RWE orientation and training should be included in key leadership courses offered to officers and non-commissioned members alike. This would ensure a passage of information and lessons learned throughout the chain of command and at all rank levels. By having leaders return to their parent units and formations, they could enable discussions that in turn would change the culture of the CAF.

Horizon Projects

A current project which could greatly enable the above lines of effort and further validate the recommendations provided by Gartenstein-Ross et al., will be the research, examination, and development of a multilingual and multidisciplinary national network to support the CAF “...critically assess its policies in terms of their relevance and capacity to manage and respond to hateful conduct and extremism.”²¹⁰ The national network will seek to answer several core questions, but of interest to this scope of this work will be: What is the extent of the links between members of the CAF and established RWE groups active in Canada? Are CAF members more at risk of embracing RWE views when compared to the general population? If so,

²¹⁰University of Ontario Institute of Technology. “Ontario Tech researcher helping Canada’s military battle right-wing extremism”. accessed 03/03/21 and 02/05/21 New and Announcements. <https://news.ontariotechu.ca/archives/2020/06/ontario-tech-researcher-helping-canadas-military-battle-right-wing-extremism.php>.

why?”²¹¹ The answers to those questions will inevitably lead to bold changes within the CAF, and the results of these network will provide courses of actions which will shape “... training, culture, approaches to strategic communications, and anticipating future challenges(.)”

²¹¹ University of Ontario Institute of Technology. “RWE-CAF Research Network Blog” Accessed 03/05/21. <https://sites.ontariotechu.ca/rwe-caf/blog/index.php>. The five core question to be answered will be: Who among CAF members may be at increased risk of embracing RWE views? How are RWE views disseminated through members of the CAF? What is the extent of the links between members of the CAF and established RWE groups active in Canada? Are CAF members more at risk of embracing RWE views when compared to the general population? If so, why? What kind of empirically-grounded initiatives, resources, training, or information can the CAF use to prevent, identify, and combat the adoption of RWE views among its members?

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