

Canadian
Forces
College

Collège
des
Forces
Canadiennes



Correlation of Military Trade with Selection of General and Officer Candidates

Major Travis Kelley

JCSP 46

Master of Defence Studies

Disclaimer

Opinions expressed remain those of the author and do not represent Department of National Defence or Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used without written permission.

© 2020. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence. All rights reserved.

PCEMI 46

Maîtrise en études de la défense

Avertissement

Les opinions exprimées n'engagent que leurs auteurs et ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Ministère de la Défense nationale ou des Forces canadiennes. Ce papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite.

© 2020. Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale. Tous droits réservés.

(This Page Left Intentionally Blank)

CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE/COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES

JCSP 46 – PCEMI 46
2019 - 2020

MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES / MAÎTRISE EN ÉTUDES DE LA DÉFENSE

Correlation of Military Trade with Selection of Generals and Flag Officers

By Major T.J. Kelley
Par le Major T.J. Kelley

“This paper was written by a student attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions, which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied, except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.”

« La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale. »

Word Count: 23 109

Nombre de mots : 23 109

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table Of Contents	i
Abstract	ii
Chapter 1: Introduction	1
Hypothesis	2
Scope and Assumptions	3
Case Studies	4
Chapter 2: What has the CAF Done Before?	6
Current State of CAF Senior Leaders	6
CAF Philosophy for Training and Advancing Senior Leaders	10
Other Factors Affecting Advancement	13
Case Studies	16
Infantry	17
Combat Engineers	19
Logistics	20
Intelligence	23
Conclusion	27
Chapter 3: What Are Others Doing?	28
USA	28
Civilian Executives	33
Update of Case Studies	40
Infantry	40
Combat Engineers	41
Logistics	42
Intelligence	44
Conclusion	46
Chapter 4: What Should the CAF Do?	48
Arguments for Improving the Status Quo	48
Increase Cross Training for Selected Leaders Early	50
Design GOFO into Two Streams	53
Criteria Based Application Process	58
Recommendation	59
Chapter 5: Conclusion	61
The Magnitude of the Problem	61
The Impact of the Proposed Action	62
The Feasibility of the Proposed Action	63
Final Recommendation	64

ABSTRACT

This paper proves that, over the decade from 2010 to 2019, there is a statistically significant difference in the rate at which generals and flag officers are produced between the different military trades. Specifically, the so-called ‘operator’ trades like infantry, armoured, naval warfare and pilot are overrepresented while the ‘support’ trades like logistics and intelligence are underrepresented. This analysis takes into account the issue of proportionality, in that some trades are simply larger than others and would logically generate more senior officers for that reason alone. This study then shows that this is not an intended outcome of the Canadian Armed Forces’ professional development system, as designed and articulated during the Cold War by Major-General Rowley, and investigates some of the factors that might cause this bifurcation between intention and outcome.

Looking at the United States military as a well-documented example of how Canada’s allies approach this problem as well as how civilians in the public and private sector choose executives and how this relates to their professional experience shows several alternative approaches that might be taken to the selection of senior officers to reduce this. These options are investigated and compared to the experiences of several senior officers in the Canadian Armed Forces and found to be wanting.

As a result, the conclusion is that the status quo, with minor changes, is the best response to the problem of trade background disrupting individuals’ selection to senior ranks. These changes are twofold and mutually reinforcing. A change of culture to see the merits of an individual as a leader and commander rather than stereotyping based on trade would enable the support trades to appoint their best candidates to joint and institutional positions of leadership wherein they would demonstrate that supporters are capable of leading challenging operational problems, reinforcing the cultural change. The outcome of this positive feedback cycle would be

more supporters with the background necessary to assume the duties of the general and flag ranks and this would be advantageous to the Canadian Armed Forces because it would provide more options to choose from when a new general or admiral had to be chosen for a new task. The strength of Canada's generals and admirals is that they are hand-picked based on their talents and experiences for their jobs. Having more suitable candidates to choose from means a better fit more often and thus a better Canadian Armed Forces.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

When a Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) Construction Technician (formerly called Carpenters) reaches the rank of Warrant Officer, s/he ceases to hold the trade Construction Technician and becomes a Construction Engineering Superintendent. At this stage s/he puts down his/her tools and works to manage other tradespeople: construction technicians, plumbing and heating technicians, electrical distribution technicians and others. All of the other construction trades, when they reach the rank of Warrant Officer, also stream into the Construction Engineering Superintendent trade and become managers of all of the trades. This system works well for the management of the specialist trades within the Engineer Branch. The same logic is applied to the General and Flag Officers (GOFOs) of the CAF, but the challenges at that level are different.

The management tools for these two groups are the same: the Construction Technicians cease to be Military Occupation Structure Identification (MOSID) 00306 and become MOSID 00307 on their promotion. Likewise, an officer, on promotion to the rank of Commodore or Brigadier-General, loses his or her old MOSID and becomes 00172: General Officer. This management structure works well for administration of practicalities like the medical category requirements for senior managers.¹ However, any tradesperson who shows leadership and aptitude will have an equal chance to become a Superintendent, whereas one's military trade directly affects the ability of an officer to ascend to the GOFO ranks and the provenance of a general directly closes many jobs to him or her. It is common knowledge that the system works in this manner. No one thinks that a general officer drawn from a background in the infantry is the best choice to command the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF). Most officers acknowledge that a

¹ Department of National Defence. "Medical Standards for Military Occupations. Annex E – Minimum Medical Standards for Officers and Non-Commissioned Members." Accessed 31 March 2020, <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/medical-standards-military-occupations/minimum-medical-standards-for-officers-and-non-commissioned-members.html>

lieutenant's MOSID directly impacts his or her ability to become a GOFO. The question is: should it?

Major Brent Robart investigated this question in a 2019 Canadian Forces College paper with emphasis on two specific parts of the topic.² First, he looked at emerging domains, particularly emphasizing cyber. His observation was that in industry, specialists lead specialists. This led him to his larger point, which is that the CAF approach to training and selecting senior leaders, which emphasizes generalists over specialists, contributes to limiting its adaptability in complicated fields. Robart's approach to emerging domains shows the myopia of the broader system of selection for GOFOs. This approach leaves a void of specialists with the institutional connections necessary to successfully lead the specialized domains.

In the context of emerging domains, coupled with a shift in warfare from the counterinsurgency emphasis of the previous decades to hybrid warfare below the level of conflict, the moment is propitious to further investigate the questions which emerge from the Robart paper. While he questions how the CAF chooses leaders for emerging domains and finds the answer wanting, this paper looks at how trade influences selection as a GOFO and the merits of that system.

HYPOTHESIS

The anecdotal assumption within the CAF is that the combat operator trades are disproportionately represented among the GOFOs. Specifically, the combat arms from the army (Infantry and Armoured) and their counterparts in the Air Force and Navy (Pilots and Naval Warfare Officers (NWO)) respectively. The first step to understanding the selection of GOFO for the CAF is to determine the validity of this hypothesis.

² Brent Robart, "Leadership Requirements in Emerging Domains of Operations." (Joint Command and Staff Program Course Paper, Canadian Forces College 2019).

Once that is achieved, the next question is whether the current system continues to perform at a sufficient level, or if it can be improved. A realistic solution must be an adjustment of the current system, not a complete redesign. To determine this, the CAF system should be compared to others' systems and, to the extent possible, the effects of the CAF's system should be evaluated against its goals. These goals are assumed to be the effective and efficient management of the CAF as both a fighting force and a publicly funded institution.

SCOPE AND ASSUMPTIONS

The examination of this problem will be specific to the unique circumstances of the CAF, although the experiences of other organizations will inevitably inform this perspective. The emphasis will be on the one- to three-star levels, corresponding to the public service levels of Director General (DG) and Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM). The rank of Colonel, where officers initially move away from their trade of origin, is a crucial bridge between the specialized work of Lieutenant-Colonels and the leadership duties of the GOFOs. However, as a bridge, it is a transitional period and is therefore excluded as a category of analysis for this subject.

Similarly, the four-star position of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), with its fundamentally political considerations and its selection by the government rather than the military institution, incorporates unique considerations that drive its details outside of the scope of this paper. While the CDS is relevant to the study of the potential for different trades to become generals, the means and criteria by which that position is filled are not considered in this study.

This paper assumes, except as specified, that army and air force ranks and their naval equivalents are interchangeable. The considerations of Colonels in the preceding paragraph apply equally to Captains (Navy). Likewise, when a GOFO is referred to as a member of a military trade like infantry, it is understood to be his or her trade of origin, as he/she would, as a GOFO, be formally known as a 00172 General Officer.

This paper is oriented towards the contrasting of backgrounds between specialties, and emphasizes the division between the traditionally combat oriented arms like infantry, armoured, naval warfare, and pilot; and the supporting trades. This research will exclude trades classified as medical or chaplaincy because of their special status under international Law of Armed Conflict.³ Although there are a limited number of examples of members of these trades serving in generalist GOFO positions (such as Brigadier-General M.G.D. Savard, a Pharmacist, working as Director General of Military Personnel Management Capability Transformation) these specialists are excluded from the study due to the limitations in their employment under international law. The CAF identifies these officers differently, as well, classing them into MOSID 00175: General Officer Specialist.⁴ This category also includes Legal officers, but since some of Canada's allies sometimes employ legal officers in line roles, they have been included in this study, with the caveat that its findings have limited applicability to them in practical terms.

CASE STUDIES

Four case studies will be followed through this research. The case studies have an Army focus (although the support trades looked at, Logistics and Intelligence, are both jointly-oriented).

The first case study will be of the infantry trade. With the current CDS being an alumnus of the infantry (along with a full 17% of the other 2019 GOFOs), the infantry is the control group against which all others are measured. As representatives of the current paradigm, the infantry case study will show the advantages which a generalist perspective brings to senior leadership.

The second case study will be the combat engineer officer trade. The combat engineers are considered a combat arm and their officers have front line experience working with infantry

³ Department of National Defence. B-GJ-005-309/FP-001. *Targeting*. (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2014).

⁴ Department of National Defence. A-PD-055-0001/AG-001. *The Canadian Armed Forces Military Employment Structure*. (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2015).

and armoured officers. The combat engineer trade progression emphasizes a combination of technical and general experience for all officers.

The third case study will be officers of the logistics branch. As the largest branch of the CAF and a joint capability that is essential to the projection of combat power anywhere in Canada or the world, it is a reasonable assumption that the logistics branch would hold a significant proportion of the senior leadership billets of the CAF. As the managers of finance and business for the CAF, there is also a parallel to civilian business leadership which will be investigated.

Finally, the last case study will be the intelligence branch. As a smaller branch with less emphasis on direct combat capability and leadership of large groups, the intelligence branch contrasts with the other case studies and represents the more technical and smaller trades. However, the existence of Canadian Forces Intelligence Command (CFINTCOM) provides a clear look at what the intelligence branch might be responsible for.

The case studies are strongly influenced by the perspectives of a number of senior officers from those trades. Their thinking and comments reflect the Canadian and Western experiences as accumulated since the end of the Second World War. What is found from the case studies and, especially, from these senior officers is that the numbers do not tell the whole story. Although there is an imbalance in rate of GOFO production by trade, there are more problems than simple bias at play. Some of the solutions proposed by other organizations do not consider some of the fundamentals of military culture and the case studies and the perspectives of these trades' senior representatives clarify why.

CHAPTER 2: WHAT HAS THE CAF DONE BEFORE?

Assessing what the CAF ought to do is only possible in the context of what it is doing and what it has already done. Examination of a sampling of general officers will provide insight into the current state of the CAF's senior leaders. This provides a baseline for discussion of the impact of trade on selection of GOFO. With the facts established, the philosophy undergirding the training and advancement of these senior leaders can be reviewed in context. Then, finally, other factors which might influence selection in the CAF can be investigated. This will set a baseline for the CAF which can then be compared to other organizations for insight into the nature of selection and assignment of Canadian GOFOs.

CURRENT STATE OF CAF SENIOR LEADERS

The emphasis of this research has been to understand and quantify who the CAF's generals are. Annex A contains a list of GOFO with their positions and trades of origin. For comparison, Annex B is the published data from Director General Military Careers showing the Trained Effective Strength (TES) for all officer MOC in the CAF. Annex C contains the Annex A data refined to avoid duplications and other impurities in the original data. Annex D contains a detailed explanation of the methodology used to produce Annexes A through C as well as an assessment of the limitations of the method.

The list of GOFO is provided for January and July of each year. This research used the January data for 2019, 2016, 2013 and 2010. Each GOFO reported in Annex C is unique within his/her year, but some positions are counted twice because of a replacement during the reporting period. The sensitivity analysis of this is discussed in Annex D. Annex E shows the number of GOFO for each trade for each of the four sample years.

Each year shows a count of unique GOFO, but the four-year total may contain some repetitions. For example, General Vance appeared in 2010 as BGen Vance, Commander Joint Task Force (Afghanistan); in 2013 as MGen Vance, Director of Staff; and in 2016 and 2019 as Gen Vance, CDS, so he is counted once in each year, but four times in the total. The count clearly shows that some trades generate more GOFO than others; the top five (most to fewest) are Infantry, Naval Warfare Officer (NWO), Pilot, Armoured and Logistics.

However, this does not account for the whole story as some of these trades represent a great many more officers than others. For example, in 2019 there were 475 Infantry subalterns and only 186 Armoured (more than 2.5 times as many infantry) but there were 25 Infantry GOFO compared to 14 Armoured (only 1.8 times as many infantry). In 2016, there were fewer than 1.5 Infantry generals for every Armoured. As a result, comparison between trades may be more logical as a proportion of GOFO to more junior officers. For example, 25 generals for 475 Infantry subalterns makes a proportion of 0.0526 to 1 or 5.26 generals per 100 subalterns, which will be expressed as 5.26%. By comparison, there were 6 Logistics GOFOs and 746 logistics subalterns in 2019, so 0.8 generals per 100 subalterns or 0.8%. The ratio of generals to subalterns is indicative of the rate of flow into the trade while the ratio of generals to colonels is indicative of the flow out of that trade. Figure 1 shows the proportions for GOFO to Subalterns, Figure 2 shows the proportions of GOFO to Colonels.




Figure 1: GOFO per 100 Subalterns




Figure 2 : GOFO per 100 Colonels

The proportion of GOFO to Colonels should be interpreted with caution as the sensitivity of the results to a change of one GOFO can be quite significant. For example, both the Military Police Officer (MPO) and Public Affairs Officer (PAO) trades are in the top five in 2019 with 66.67%; they have two generals and three colonels. Adding one colonel would drop either below NWO, and removing one general would move either trade from the top five to below average (the proportion of Colonels to GOFO across all trades, shown as total in the top row of Table 3 in Annex E). For the larger trades, the sensitivity is smaller: for Armoured, the addition of one colonel would move the result from 70% to 66%, and the removal of one GOFO would move the result to 65%. While not trivial, neither change removes the trade from the top five. It should further be noted that the small trades tend to feed GOFO into highly specialized positions linked to their trade, such as the Provost Marshall for the MPOs and the Chief of Staff for ADM(Public Affairs) for the PAOs. Consequently, the GOFO-to-Colonel proportions must be considered before being applied to analysis.

These tables mostly validate the original hypothesis: that the combat arms and their air and maritime counterparts are disproportionately represented among the GOFOs. The Armoured trade had the highest GOFO to subaltern ratio in all four sample years and the highest GOFO to Colonel ratio in two of them. The infantry, likewise, placed in the top five of both ratios in all four years. NWO was in the top five for all four years for subalterns, and two of four for Naval Captains. Pilot was the unexpected deviation with only three placements in the top five for Colonels and only one for Captains. The reason for these deviations can be readily seen in the data (2019 used): NWO have more Colonels than any other trade and Pilots have more subalterns than any trade but logistics and more Colonels than any other trade except logistics and NWO. The explanation for why that situation prevails, however, is much less clear.

Recognizing the limitations of absolute counts, NWO, Pilot and Infantry generate the top three trades for absolute number of GOFO in all four sample years, suggesting that the hypothesis remains mostly valid.

On the other hand, the other trades that produced GOFO for the CAF were not foreseen by this paper's hypothesis. The presence of Combat Engineers in the top five for all four years at the subaltern level was unexpected and will be reviewed further in the case study. Even more unexpected was the presence, in the subaltern data, of a different support trade appearing in the top five in three of the four years: Construction Engineer in 2019, Signals in 2016 and Air Combat Systems Officer in 2013. The proportions for these trades do not change much from year to year so the fluctuation means that once the main players are accounted for, there is a pool of other trades contributing GOFO from time to time as the circumstance and their personnel permit. The exact ratio among these trades changes in tune with the circumstances and fine details of these circumstances.

CAF PHILOSOPHY FOR TRAINING AND ADVANCING SENIOR LEADERS

The seminal work in the philosophy for training and advancing senior leaders of the CAF is the Report of the Officer Development Board, commonly known as the Rowley Report, written by MGen Roger Rowley in 1969. This report is known for emphasizing education over training for officers and for its foresight and its balanced approach which preserves its value today, remaining one of the key documents inspiring development design for senior leaders at the Canadian Forces College and across the senior developmental periods.⁵

Rowley starts his assessment of the development needs of officers by looking at the skills and expectations of officers and the requirements imposed upon them. He begins by discarding

⁵ Roger Rowley, *The Report of the Officer Development Board*, ed. Randall Wakelam and Howard Coombs. (Waterloo: LCMSDS Press, 2010).

the Second World War demand for “control of violence” in light of the “great variety of specialties” from his era.⁶ Arguing in favour of formal education for officers, he notes the need for a detailed expertise founded on general education. He continues this theme by demanding that a military officer apply technical knowledge in a human context, furthering the concept that a balance between technical specialty and generalist context is required for success.⁷ These ideas generated an egalitarian perspective that he traced to the Prussian Government of 1808: “the only title to an officer’s commission shall be, in times of peace, education and professional knowledge... all individuals who possess these qualities are eligible for the highest military posts.”⁸ Rowley believed that no aristocratic qualities should govern military selection or advancement, that professional armies are meritocracies and that the tools to judge, absent the selective pressure of war, were in the field of education and knowledge.

Forecasting his future, Rowley predicts the situation of today when describing the requirements for increased technical understanding of generalist officers in the fields of communication, combat support, logistics and acquisitions.⁹ He contrasts these technical demands against the general skills all officers will continue to need: knowledge of their own trade and environment, knowledge of the organization and administration of the CAF and knowledge of the interoperation of the environments, which we now call joint warfighting.¹⁰ Rowley’s analysis establishes the requirements for senior officers: generalist aptitude in the functioning of the organization and its elements with specialized knowledge of key emerging technologies and problems.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 18.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*, cited only to “Prussian Government, 1808.”

⁹ *Ibid.*, 32

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 33

In this context, Rowley claims that while an officer's specialty "tends to become decreasingly important as he [sic] rises in rank... the background it represents never becomes wholly unimportant."¹¹ This is a recognition of two realities seen in the data, and of a fundamental principle. First, it acknowledges that it is reasonable that the airforce will not be commanded by an army general; despite the jointness of the CAF and the nature of GOFs as generalist leaders and managers, the background of an airforce officer influences his/her perception of the culture, requirements and nature of the airforce in an essential way. Second, it concedes that certain highly specialized positions require technical background knowledge to be effective, such as the Judge Advocate General requiring a legal background. This is the concept that Robart focused on: the need to acknowledge this requirement for specialist in more positions.¹² Finally, Rowley's observation acknowledges that people are essentially shaped by their experience and that this must be acknowledged and, if possible, exploited rather than ignored in the selection and management of GOFs.

Division of power among senior officers was the same in Rowley's day as it is today. Rowley remarks "the traditional separation between those officers who could be classified as combat officers, combat-support officers and specialist officers. The numbers of senior positions open to these groups decreases in the order given."¹³ Rowley deplores this state of affairs: "we believe that no system of officer development is acceptable in Canada which does not afford equal opportunity for all officers to rise to the highest ranks in its volunteer force."¹⁴ Out of context, an injunction of this strength would seem like an appeal to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, but that document did not exist at the time of Rowley's report. Rowley

¹¹ Ibid., 126

¹² Brent Robart, "Leadership Requirements in Emerging Domains of Operations..."

¹³ Roger Rowley, *The Report of the Officer Development Board...*, 126.

¹⁴ Ibid., 48

specifically clarifies that the issue is “classification or designation at entry.”¹⁵ His Equal Opportunity consideration was a clarion call to the CAF of his day to ensure that regardless of military trade, any officer who has the aptitudes to lead the institution should be called to do so and prepared by that institution along the way.

OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING ADVANCEMENT

There are a great many factors affecting advancement of officers in the Canadian Forces. There are some specified criteria which are imposed from the outside and some decisions which are made among the existing cadre of GOFO about their successors. Further, there are factors imposed by the individual under consideration for promotion. In the first category are considerations such as bilingualism and age, in the second are considerations like command and operational experience, in the last category are challenges of family and employment choice.

Imposed criteria for advancement often emerge from practical or society wide considerations. The obligation for bilingualism among senior leaders is a Canadian imposition which is remarked upon regularly. While the impact on individuals can be very pronounced, the impact on the institution appears to be limited. For example, comparing the English and French infantry regiments shows no statistically significant difference in the number of generals they generated over the study period ($T=0.335$). This indicates that enough officers are sufficiently bilingual or can become so using the resources available that the English Regiments can keep up with the Royal 22e Regiment in the production of officers fit to be GOFO and bilingual. The fact that the ratio among the three regiments changes over the study period implies that the positions are not simply being awarded on the basis of one-third each to the three regular force regiments. Instead, the data supports the assessment that the best candidates are advancing and that language is not a barrier to the institution, despite its effect on individuals.

¹⁵ Ibid., 48

The factor of age was not assessed in the data but arises in the case studies. In order to be selected as a GOFO, an officer must have the potential, on promotion to BGen, to subsequently advance to MGen. In light of the CAF's mandatory retirement age, this means that the age of the officer as a colonel directly affects potential for promotion. Trade interacts with this in three ways: first, trades which experience rapid advancement enable more officers to reach the rank of colonel before they are too old to consider for promotion; second, trades who are primarily recruited from within the CAF, like the Intelligence Officers, are less likely to reach the rank of colonel in time to become a general; finally, trades which require additional academic background (beyond the bachelor degree for entry and professional development masters' degrees from staff college at development periods 3 and 4), such as the Training Development and Legal Officers, will be delayed by the additional training time. These age-related factors are often cited as causes for the differences between trades in GOFO production.

The inclinations of the existing cadre of GOFO also play a role in determining the advancement of officers in the CAF. Rowley discussed the abjuration of aristocratic quality determining advancement.¹⁶ An important question therefore arises: have the combat arms become a form of institutional aristocracy within the CAF? Hufnagle and Hassan, researchers from Queen Mary University in London, investigated the existence of an "Old Boys' Club" in International Policing and found that while the membership of women in leadership positions of Interpol has increased significantly since 1989, they tend to be women who conform to the masculine approach to policing.¹⁷ Although the composition of the "Old Boys' Network" changed to conform to social pressures to an "Old Boys' and Girls' Network" the approach to policing did not change and acceptance of women was hampered, despite the numbers, because

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 18

of these attitudes.¹⁸ The men and women selecting police leaders in the past chose individuals whose backgrounds and values were as close to theirs as possible within the pressures applied from outside. The same pressures could apply to the CAF, and they need not be perceived exclusively through a gendered lens. Successful combat arms officers like to attribute part of their success to the experiences they had in their past, and would see the lack of similar experiences as weaknesses when judging candidates for their replacement in the same way that male police officers judged the experiences and attitudes that served them well and sought them out in candidates, regardless of gender, for their succession. Although the research on this topic tends to focus on gender issues, other scholars hint at similar outcomes, where external pressures change the practical composition of professional groups, but perhaps not the attitudes as selection focuses on those with similar backgrounds.¹⁹

The final major category of factors affecting advancement is that of self-selection. Self-selection and trade interact with respect to two factors for the advancement of CAF officers to the GOFO ranks. First, there may be a bias towards certain trades for officers with the aptitudes for institutional leadership and attendant advancement to the rank of GOFO. For example, it might be argued that the operator trades generate disproportionate numbers of GOFO because those with military aptitude and the attitudes to succeed in the CAF are attracted to jobs of that nature. In fact, this should seem very plausible. No evidence either way was developed during the research and the investigation of this was beyond the scope of the historical research of this study.

¹⁷ Sasika Hufnagel and Maria Hassan, “Women in International Policing: Replacing an “Old Boys Club”?” *Salus Journal* 6 no. 1 (2018), 75.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ For example, Abi Rimmer, ““Old boys club” culture at BMA undermined female members and staff, sexism report finds.” *British Medical Journal (Online)*: London 387 (October 2017) or Utz Schaffer, Alexander Schmidt and Erik Strauss, “An old boys’ club on the threshold to becoming a professional association: The emergence and

The second way in which self-selection and trade might interact to influence selection of GOFO did generate some comment in the case studies. Trades with significant employment potential outside of the military, and particularly those with strong employment opportunity in the public service like the logistics branch, might be more likely to leave military service before they are eligible to be considered for promotion to GOFO. Further, it is suggested that those with the greatest chance to be promoted to GOFO are also those with the greatest chance to be offered attractive civilian positions. Consequently, this logic flows, trades with skills relevant to civilian work have fewer GOFO candidates and particularly fewer *strong* GOFO candidates because those individuals leave for civilian jobs.

This “jumping ship” perspective arises in the case studies, but there are some weaknesses to the argument. Naval Warfare Officers can command civilian ships and are in demand for such jobs. The demand for pilots in the civilian economy is a well-known crisis. There is no shortage of jobs for engineers. However, all of these trades are among the best represented in the GOFO cadre. This line of argument is very reasonable to explain why infantry and armoured officers might outnumber logistics officers despite the proportions of those trades, but it falls short of explaining the overall situation in the CAF. However, it remains possible that this challenge interacts with the previous idea about those with the attitude and aptitude for military leadership preferring the operator trades in a way which significantly increases the potential of operator candidates who remain at the point when GOFO selected.

CASE STUDIES

Each of the trades in the case study was compared to the CAF population, all trades, for the proportion of GOFO per hundred subalterns. Using the Student T-Test, at 95% confidence, the

development of the association of German controllers from 1975 to 1989.” *Accounting History* 19 no. 1-2 (February 2014).

Combat Engineer Officer trade is not statistically significantly different from the CAF's officer population. The infantry, logistics and intelligence trades were statistically significantly different from the general population.

Infantry

As noted, the infantry trade is one of the leading generators of general officers in the CAF. It had the most generals in two of the four years studied and was second place in the other two, behind the frontrunner by one officer. The infantry trade is the largest of the army combat arms trades, and is the third largest of the CAF trades studied, after logistics and pilot. When adjusting for its larger numbers, the infantry trade is consistently behind the armoured trade, generally behind the Naval Warfare Officer trade and only marginally ahead of the combat engineer trade. It comfortably leads all others.

In many ways, the infantry trade is also the default assumption for military skills. Like the US Marine Corps' famous policy of "Every marine is a rifleman first," the CAF basic training model demands that every soldier learns certain infantry basics. There is no obligation to learn maritime warfare or aircrew skills unless one's trade requires them, but every soldier can handle a rifle and live in the field. To some degree, this genericizes the infantry trade, further privileging it as a control against which to compare the other trades.

Major-General Hercule Gosselin spoke to the author to represent the infantry trade and, consistent with expectations, his perspective was very balanced and seemed to start with the assessment that things were mostly working properly as regards GOFO selection. The initial conversation focused on the question of proportionality, as many conversations with infantry officers of all levels do on this topic. However, with that cleared, his insight rapidly delved deeper into the underlying challenges of choosing the CAF's senior leaders and he was able to

articulate clearly issues that arose for many of the senior officers who contributed to this research.

The key for General Gosselin was the idea of “best fit.”²⁰ Because the CAF is a small organization, with just over one hundred GOFO, it has the luxury of hand choosing each officer to his/her position. Conversely, the small size of the CAF also results in a smaller pool of candidates among the colonels and lieutenant-colonels. Further, the span of duty for even a brigadier is significantly larger than it would be in a larger organization and, consequently, the demand for versatility is very high for the CAF. Versatility is the key to advancement into the GOFO cadre, according to General Gosselin, and the infantry branch is invested in ensuring that its officers with aptitude for institutional leadership receive the breadth of experience that promotes that versatility. As a large branch with the weight of history behind it, the infantry branch is generally successful at finding positions for its officers which enable that diversification of experience. He compared the infantry to the Training Development Officer (TDO) trade, which has no GOFO in any of the samples under study. Although a TDO captain might possess the same aptitudes and proclivities for institutional leadership as an infantry captain, the TDO branch will not provide that officer the opportunities for diversification that the infanteer will receive. Consequently, when they are senior enough for consideration for promotion to GOFO, those two captains with equivalent potential will no longer be equivalent: the infanteer’s potential will have been nurtured and developed while the TDO’s will not.

The infantry trade is successfully nurturing the potential of many of its strong officers, enabling them to become GOFO leaders of the CAF. General Gosselin “think[s] that, as [an officer] move[s] forward in life and strive[s] to improve [him/herself] and understand better the institution, and develop [his/her] contribution to the organization, regardless of [their] trade, [he]

would suggest that everyone has a fair shot to develop themselves at a higher level, and [he] really believe[s] that.”²¹ This belief emerges from a host of factors looked at throughout this paper coupled with the experience of thriving within the infantry trade where those with his aptitude for leadership and vision are nurtured to their full potential.

Combat Engineers

MGen Gosselin’s perspective contrasts with that of Major-General Sylvain Sirois, the CAF Chief Military Engineer. The Combat Engineer trade is another one well represented in the GOFO cadre with five to seven GOFO in each of the study years and a proportional representation in the top five for all four years. General Sirois’ background is as a combat engineer, but his position includes representation of the air force Construction Engineer Officers as well. The construction engineers had one GOFO (General Whitecross) for three of the four studied years, but were in the top five trades as a proportion of subalterns in 2019, when they had three. This fluctuation is likely a function of the very small size of their trade, with approximately half the subalterns of the combat engineers.

The combat engineer trade is a front-line organization that views its officers as operators. This identity is threatened by the doctrinal disagreement between the combat engineers as one of four combat arms (infantry, armoured, artillery, combat engineers), the common parlance, and the official doctrine which defines combat arms as armoured and infantry, with the engineers and artillery in a combat support category, distinct from combat service support where logistics, signals and other such specialties are located.²² With regard to achieving GOFO ranks, General Sirois says that “Combat Arms fare well. Combat Support and Combat Service Support, for the

²⁰ Major-General Hercule Gosselin, telephone conversation with author, 9 March 2020.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Department of National Defence. B-GL-300-001/FP-001. *Land Operations*. (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2008): 1-4.

army, have a lot of difficulties.”²³ This leads the combat engineer trade to perceive an existential struggle to be recognized as an operational branch in order to sustain its credibility when generating GOFO candidates. When combat arms include all four trades, the operational experience of a combat engineer is perceived as equivalent to that of an infantry or armoured officer. When they are categorized separately as combat support, then a burden of proof forms to establish their equivalency.

Beyond this struggle to retain credibility and potential by reinforcing the perception of its officers as operators, the combat engineer branch works to ensure their versatility. General Sirois recalls an epoch when combat engineers in tactically oriented positions (like in the combat engineer regiments) were privileged almost exclusively over those streamed to supporting functions like infrastructure management. This has changed as the demands for versatility have increased. The engineer branch now strives to ensure that its officers have a mix of tactical and support experience to better enable them to manage the engineer function at senior levels, and finally to advance into the GOFO cadre with adequate versatility to handle both the operational and institutional roles of those positions.²⁴ General Sirois sees these decisions as positively influencing the potential of combat engineers to become GOFO and this echoes the versatility argument put forth by General Gosselin.

Logistics

In contrast to these trades, the Logistics Officer trade struggles to generate GOFOs. Despite being the largest officer trade in the CAF, representing about one in eight subalterns (including the excluded trades) the logistics trade never generated more than one in ten GOFO in the study years and by 2019 was down to about 1 in 25 (6/146). The logistics trade avoided being in the

²³ Major-General Sylvain Sirois, email conversation with author, 10 March 2020.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

bottom five by proportion of subalterns only thanks to the six trades that have no GOFO. In 2019 when the provost marshal position was raised from colonel to brigadier and there was a PAO GOFO, logistics joined the bottom five. Brigadier-General Carla Harding is one of the six Logistics Officer GOFO in the CAF. She believes that this is the case because of a combination of three factors: first, she sees evidence of residual bias against support trades; second, she believes that the logistics trade does not manage the development of its officers well; finally, she believes that there is a diversion towards civilian employment.

General Harding presents anecdotal evidence of the bias against the support trades. She cites a variety of reviews of her performance showing her consistently in the top few percent of all army trades in senior positions.²⁵ Across all trades, there are about 0.4 GOFO per Colonel and about 0.26 Brigadiers. If half of the BGen positions are entry level, which is probably an underestimate, then about the top eight of colonels should be promoted. General Harding's reviews should have put her in the top twentieth or better, but she was told "because [she] was Logistics, the only way that I would be promoted is if a Logistics job came open."²⁶ This speaks to General Gosselin's point about hand-choosing individuals for the needs of a position, but contradicts the idea that merit dominates over background.

Recognizing the highly anecdotal nature of that evidence, although it is consistent with the broader outcome figures, General Harding provides a counter-example. She remarked that Colonel Osmond, a logistician named for promotion to BGen in 2020, is not being tasked to a logistics position, but rather to one for which his personal talents and situation are a suitable fit.²⁷ This reinforces the evidence that GOFO are individually chosen for the positions they are intended to fill, but also raises another question. With one eighth of the subalterns and more than

²⁵ Brigadier-General Carla Harding, email conversation with author, 18 March 2020.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

one ninth of the colonels, why are logisticians not the right choice more often than roughly one twentieth of the time (based on 2019 numbers)?

One of the reasons is the career management strategy and professional development approach of the logistics branch. General Harding excoriates this process. In her perspective, the logistics branch “invest[s] heavily in specialists... but [they] do not invest, develop or nurture professional officers who talk logistics and strategy; instead, [they] develop technicians who miss the point of operational sustainment, global logistics and projection of forces.”²⁸ If the logistics branch trains and advances officers who can manage the execution of logistics, but not understand the goals and context, then it is very understandable why their colonels cannot be generalist GOFs. The impact of the trade’s decision to emphasize technical aptitude at the cost of generalization contradicts General Gosselin’s emphasis on versatility and contrasts directly with the previous trades. The infantry seek versatility. The engineers demand both specialist excellence and generalist diversity. If the logistics branch eschews this perspective for narrow trade excellence, then it is self-evident that their people, like the TDOs in General Gosselin’s example, cannot take on the institutional roles of GOFs.

Finally, the logistics trade suffers from the diversion of its personnel to civilian employment. General Gosselin suggests this explanation for why the logistics trade is woefully underrepresented in the GOF cadre.²⁹ He assesses that many of the best logisticians are enticed to civilian positions in both the public and private sectors, because of the degree of applicability of their skills to those jobs. General Harding does not emphasize this aspect; instead, she sees a particular point in time which generated a crisis whose impact is affecting the logistics branch of today. Specifically, she cites the Force Reduction Plan (FRP) of the mid-nineties as having

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*

tempted away the leaders of the era whose talents and training would enable them to get jobs. She says that “what was left in the CAF was a swath of leadership that didn’t have a hope of being hired by [any] civilian organization.”³⁰ This addresses two points: first, that the leadership of the CAF was decimated; second, that the best of those who remained through the FRP either had a deep passion for the military or else had skills that were less transferrable. Both of these categories would favour the combat arms and disadvantage the logistics trade and other support trades. The result, in General Harding’s opinion, is that the logistics branch was hit hard by FRP and the technically oriented specialists who remained focused on their core competencies of logistical management and sought and promoted that in the trade.

General Harding’s conclusion is that there is some bias against the logistics and other support trades, but that the inability of logisticians to compete for GOFO positions is mostly a self-inflicted wound. However, she offers the hope that this is changing and that in a decade the damage done by FRP to the logistics trade might be mostly healed.³¹ Overall, General Harding’s perspective tends to match that of the operational trades, infantry and engineer, emphasizing versatility and the role of the career management to ensure it. She believes that the next step is for logisticians and operators to see logistics as an operation, not a distinct supporting activity; this operationalization of perspective matches the struggle of the combat engineers to be seen as combat rather than support arms. That may be the next challenge for the logistics branch.

Intelligence

The Intelligence branch has faced similar challenges and is similarly overcoming them. However, as a small branch with a greater degree of specialization than logistics, there are important differences as well. The intelligence branch had one GOFO across all of the study

²⁹ Major-General Hercule Gosselin, telephone conversation with author, 9 March 2020.

³⁰ Brigadier-General Carla Harding, email conversation with author, 18 March 2020.

years, Brigadier-General Robert Williams in 2013; he assessed that fair and reasonable consideration of the best person for the job was applied to choose generals at that time, but could not comment on more recent development regarding the intelligence branch.³² In 2013 intelligence was still in the bottom five trades for proportion of GOFOs to subalterns despite General Williams' promotion, and it was sixth in proportion of GOFO to colonels. With 207 subaltern positions, it is larger than the engineer trade at that level, but it is only two thirds the engineer trade at the colonel level (eleven to seventeen). The growth of the intelligence trade is quite recent; the ramifications of that growth are not yet fully understood. The trade has two key challenges with the production of GOFO, the first is whether it is a specialty or not; the second is how to avoid the specialization trap which the logistics branch is trying to extract itself from.

Rear-Admiral Scott Bishop is a Naval Warfare Officer who is the current Chief of Defence Intelligence (CDI) and Commander of Canadian Forces Intelligence Command (CFINTCOM). He remarks upon the comparison made between his role as CDI and the other specialist advisors of the CAF like the Surgeon General, Judge Advocate General or Chaplain General. With the recent advancement of the Provost Marshall to the rank of Brigadier, and the creation of a GOFO PAO position, he finds this comparison particularly topical.³³ For him, the question is whether the specialist knowledge is of the essence for the trade in question.³⁴ For him, the specialist knowledge would be useful for an intelligence leader, but unlike the other specialists, it is not critical; instead, the leadership and understanding of operational roles are

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Brigadier-General (Retired) Robert Williams, email conversation with author, 8 March 2020.

³³ Rear-Admiral Scott Bishop, email conversation with author, 10 March 2020.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

more important.³⁵ Having the intelligence specialty background would enhance those, rather than vice versa.

Accepting the argument that intelligence is distinct from the specialty trades with GOFOs because of its operational rather than specialist orientation, it follows that intelligence officers should be able to compete for non-specialist GOFO positions. Colonel Hugh Ferguson, the Intelligence Branch Advisor, identified five reasons why it failed in competing for those positions. First, he observed that historically intelligence officers were chosen from transfers out of other trades. Because all intelligence officers spent five to eight years at the tactical level of another trade, before restarting the tactical level intelligence trade, they did not have enough time to be young enough for GOFO selection.³⁶ Second, the design of the intelligence trade did not earmark any positions as command billets; senior intelligence officers managed small staff cells, rather than commanding intelligence organizations. Third was the size of the intelligence trade, as noted above. The fourth factor was the most important in his assessment. With no environmental affiliation, and no joint GOFO to act as the champion of the intelligence officers, career management and diversification was managed by an intelligence colonel and the intelligence branch, with less ability to gain access to the positions that would provide competitive diversification opportunities.³⁷ Finally, he observes a degree of institutional bias against the intelligence branch from a structural rather than personal perspective. There are few (15³⁸) positions allocated to intelligence officers outside of intelligence related work. Without this option for diversification, he assesses that it will be almost impossible for intelligence officers to compete against operators whose career management is designed to enable these

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Colonel Hugh Ferguson, email conversation with author, 13 March 2020.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ Rear-Admiral Scott Bishop, email conversation with author, 10 March 2020.

experiences.³⁹ While things are changing, the experience of the logistics branch suggests that such changes take time. The smaller size of the intelligence branch and the existence of a GOFO specifically oriented towards intelligence branch problems, despite not being an alumnus the branch, may help to accelerate the process compared to the thirty years that General Harding ascribes to the logistics human resource challenges.

Colonel Orest Babij, Commander of the Canadian Forces Intelligence Group, a formation inside CFINTCOM, amplified these points of view. He catalogued the progress of the intelligence branch from the 1980s to the present at growing the number and seniority of command billets culminating in his receipt of the first formation command for an intelligence officer. This is an important milestone which should pave the way for future intelligence officers to command a formation, which is a critical gateway to consideration as a GOFO.⁴⁰

The intelligence branch perspective reinforces General Gosselin's perspective about the need for diversity and clarifies the distinction between small operational trades and specialists. It appears that a specialist group of sufficient size might need a GOFO chosen from that specialty, but likely members of that trade will not be suitable for any other GOFO position. Conversely, a non-specialist trade can generate the generalists needed of CAF's generals, but it does not guarantee that the commanders of that trade will come from that trade. Still, the intelligence branch may see a day when it has a sufficiently consistent pathway to GOFO promotion that it can anticipate staffing a position like CDI with the Chief of the Intelligence Branch, like COS ADM(IE) is the Chief Military Engineer, not because it is reserved for them, but because their specialist knowledge amplifies the diverse and command oriented experience that their best officers receive.

³⁹ Colonel Hugh Ferguson, email conversation with author, 13 March 2020.

⁴⁰ Colonel Orest Babij, email conversation with author, 17 March 2020.

CONCLUSION

An officer's military trade has a profound effect on GOFO selection in Canada. Being a member of certain trades, especially those associated with operations, increases the likelihood of advancing to the GOFO ranks. Likewise, certain trades largely or wholly inhibit advancement to that level, as demonstrated by the current and recent data for the CAF's senior leadership. This reality is contradictory to the ideals of military professional development, particularly those articulated by Rowley which govern the CAF's officer professional development philosophy. There are many explanations and valid exceptions that are strongly echoed in the army-oriented case studies, but they do not remedy the impression of a systemic problem within the institution.

If this is the case in the CAF, is it a natural extension of fundamental principles? To establish this requires comparison against other organizations. This paper will next look at the effect of military trade in the US Army, with some context from the US military and then investigate if employment background affects selection for senior leadership in the private sector. This will provide context for the discussion of solutions.

CHAPTER 3: WHAT ARE OTHERS DOING?

The Canadian military context is the essential data for understanding how the CAF's generals are selected and employed in light of their military trade. However, understanding what other organizations are doing will provide additional perspective on the problem. If the situation is the same everywhere, then there is almost certainly an underlying cause. If there is a diversity of approaches, then the drivers and outcomes of each solution can be contemplated to understand which are relevant to the CAF problem.

USA

The United States (US) military is a logical starting point because of its broad combat exposure and its well documented history and activity. Its perspective is a starting point though, and not an answer, as the enormous disparity in scale and culture limit the comparability with the CAF. Nevertheless, this perspective is important as the Western approach to military activity since the Second World War has to a great extent reflected the US approach and especially the US Army approach. The size of these institutions and their key role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) make their perspective and approach the foundation from which other approaches are developed. The understanding of the US history on this topic underlies many of the comments made by the CAF GOFO in the case studies. The question of military trade's influence on senior promotion is not extensively written about, even for the US, but there are allusions to the issue in other studies of leadership.

Investigative journalist Thomas Ricks studies the management of general officers in the US Army in combat from the Second World War to Afghanistan and Iraq in his comprehensive work "The Generals."⁴¹ His main argument focuses on the need to relieve unsuccessful generals but a second theme shadows this thought which is much more relevant to the question for the

CAF: the requirement for combat experience when commanding combat operations. Ricks also provides a synopsis of certain aspects of the US Army's philosophy of generals that shows that it is similar to the CAF's. In particular, like in the CAF, a US Army colonel removes the insignia of his/her branch of origin, such as infantry or engineer, and instead puts on a star when promoted to Brigadier. This is meant to represent a generalist approach.⁴² In this context, trade of origin should not matter; Ricks shows that it does.

Across his history of the modern US Army, Ricks shows that experience commanding smaller units is not a guarantor of success in a general, but its absence is a strong predictor of failure. A good example of this is General William Simpson, the commander of US forces during the Battle of the Bulge, who was praised by Eisenhower as well as his subordinates after the war. He had combat experience in Mexico, the Philippines and both World Wars prior to the Battle of the Bulge.⁴³ A counterexample is General James Chaney, Eisenhower's predecessor in Britain. Having risen through the US Army Air Corps as a pilot, Chaney was found to lack an ability to grasp the essentials of the war in Britain, despite the Battle of Britain raging at the time. His technical orientation as a pilot, a specialist in the army of the day (and unlike the operators of the modern air forces that emerged from the Second World War); his contemporaries viewed this as preventing him grasping the breadth of military necessity in that environment.⁴⁴ Lacking the combat experience, he was unable to succeed when placed in an operational context.

This concept is reinforced by the autobiography of General William Pagonis, the US Army Logistician responsible for the support of operations for the 1991 Gulf War, especially Desert Shield and Desert Strike. Pagonis' logistical career began with a secondment to an

⁴¹ Thomas E. Ricks, *The Generals*. (New York: The Penguin Press, 2012).

⁴² *Ibid.*, 9.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 107.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 37.

infantry unit where he commanded a platoon of infantry soldiers and his company command involved support of indirect fire assets which were mounted on the barges he commanded in Vietnam.⁴⁵ His operational experience combined with his logistical experience throughout the rest of his career to generate an understanding of the requirements of combat and logistics, enabling him to support, in highly effective fashion, the largest military logistics undertaking in history.⁴⁶

Ricks further describes the rise of General David Petraeus, ascribing his successes as Corps Commander in Iraq to his experience commanding smaller units, particularly the 101st Airborne Division in combat.⁴⁷ In Ricks' analysis, this is one of two factors which give Petraeus the insight to make a significant turnaround in the fighting in Iraq. The other is a strategic rather than tactical view of the situation, which Ricks contrasts to Petraeus' predecessors Sanchez and Franks. When Petraeus was tasked to select Colonels for promotion to Brigadier-General he chose those with combat command experience and preferred Infantry and Special Operations commanders.⁴⁸ This shows a tendency to select individuals similar to himself, as well as a preference for specific trades.

These anecdotal examples from US Army history provide three key insights to the problem for the CAF. First, they show that experience in combat is valuable, even essential, for Generals commanding combat operations. The case studies take a different view, that it is not combat but operational experience that matters, but this perspective is argued by the CAF GOFs as a contrast to the assumption that combat experience is the key to military leadership.

⁴⁵ William G. Pagonis, *Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War*. (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1992).

⁴⁶ Google.ca. "Book Review – Moving Mountains; Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War." Accessed on 31 March 2020, https://books.google.ca/books/about/Moving_Mountains.html?id=H2pnPwAACAAJ&source=kp_book_description&redir_esc=y

⁴⁷ Ricks, *The Generals...*, 438.

This is a key perspective that the extensive combat record of the United States highlights and which must be borne in mind when selecting CAF GOFO who will command combat operations. It implies a corollary, though, which is that experience at difficult tasks helps to perform them better. This corollary is the fundamental argument of the Robart paper regarding employment of Information Security specialists in Information Security commands.⁴⁹ The second insight from the anecdotes is that in the US, generals often choose those with similar backgrounds to succeed them. The final insight derives from General Pagonis' experience, which is that support trades given combat leadership roles can synthesize that with their specialty to become institutional leaders.

Moving beyond anecdotes, Ricks indicates that 59% of US Generals in the Second World War emerged from the infantry branch, rather than “the other combat arms – artillery, cavalry, armor [sic] and engineering.”⁵⁰ Ricks indicates that this is out of proportion and caused problems due to the homogeneous mindset of these generals. For context, the US Army in 1945 had 71 Infantry divisions and 17 armoured divisions, but the infantry, artillery and armoured personnel represented only 30% of the force, while services, excluding medical, were also 30%.⁵¹ If only the combat arms Ricks lists could be Generals, then 59% would be about proportional; if Generals could be drawn from the support services, then it ought to be closer to 40%. Interestingly, the assumption that Generals ought to be drawn only from the combat arms is never called into question or even acknowledged. Ricks further indicates that, in contrast to the topic of his work, the Army, the US Navy and Marines apply “seafaring custom in handling

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ Brent Robart. “Leadership Requirements in Emerging Domains of Operations...”

⁵⁰ Ricks, *The Generals...*, 111.

⁵¹ Department of Defence. *The United States Army in World War II*. (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, n.d.), combines data from 2-1 page 203 Table 3: “Growth of the Army by Branch” and 2-1 page 161 Table “Ground Forces in the Army, December 1941 – April 1945”.

commanders”⁵² and the US Air Force chooses pilots, with their background community having changed over the years from bomber to fighter.⁵³ Overall, Ricks summarizes the US system of selecting GOFO as being very similar to the hypothesis: that combat arms and their maritime and air equivalents are favoured. If anything, he shows an underlying assumption that anything else is not even worth considering.

The history of the US Army is informative and provides published context for many of the cultural considerations that influence the role of trade on GOFO selection. However, it also seeks to improve its situation and in 2013 the Centre for New American Security, a defence-policy think tank, published a report by Lieutenant-General (Retired) David Barno, Dr. Nora Bensahel, Katherine Kidder and Kelley Saylor entitled “Building Better Generals.” Although focused more on what should be than what is, the report suggests some options for the CAF as well. The degree of uptake of their recommendations by the US military is not known at this time, but the topics they discuss were of direct interest to the GOFOs in the case studies. Most of their suggestions, like better selection and evaluation practices, are important but evolutionary. However, their recommendation to formally stream GOFOs into two tracks is a more revolutionary adjustment, and one that nearly every senior officer interviewed discussed. Their recommendation is to orient GOFO towards either warfighting, called operational, billets or towards institutional, called enterprise, jobs. The idea would be to stream officers towards one or the other in order to gain two economies. The first advantage would be in education: by specializing education from the rank of colonel (what Rowley would call Development Period Four) towards one or the other, a better theoretical basis could be established while also spending less resources on professional development. The second advantage would be in experience:

⁵² *Ibid.*, 12.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 13.

GOFOs could serve for five years in a position, since they would not need both operational and institutional experience at each level before advancing.⁵⁴ A further advantage of this approach might be to generate a stream that is oriented towards the backgrounds and aptitudes cultivated in the support trades, ensuring a stream for them to gain access to the GOFO ranks.

The US military experience is well documented and its combat experience sufficient that it allows for some meaningful assessments of the value of background in combat and in garrison duties. Unlike Canada's other allies, the US military's selection and management policies are at least somewhat documented, allowing a standard of comparison in this question which has seen less academic literature than many. Although comparison with the US is perilous because of the enormous difference in scale and the significant difference in culture, it provides at least a touchstone for comparison when reviewing what is the case in Canada, and what should be. This touchstone provides context and a foundation for many of the comments made by the senior officers interviewed for the case studies.

CIVILIAN EXECUTIVES

As the changing nature of military engagement moves it away from the combat oriented experience of the US Army in the Second World War and increasingly towards a paradigm of corporate governance, it is relevant to review civilian practices for executive selection to understand the scope of the question of how one's background should and does influence advancement in large organizations. Because of the military's managerial similarities with the public service, this field of civilian employment will be investigated separately from the question in the private sector.

The Canadian public service and its practices for executive management are not broadly researched. As with military research, the United States is one of the best documented in the

⁵⁴ David Barno, et al. *Building Better Generals*. (Washington: Centre for New American Security, 2013).

world, but the focus tends to be on gender. Interestingly, the public management of East Asia has been extensively researched in recent years and provides useful perspective on the question of military selection.

Berman, Wang, Chen, Wang, Lovrich, Jan, Jing, Liu, Gomes, Sonco, Melendez and Hsieh, a group of management scholars from around the Pacific Rim including China, the United States and New Zealand, showed the difference between East Asian and Western public service management. Their research showed that senior public management leadership is internally recognized almost equally in the West and the East. However, it finds that the external perception of public service effectiveness is much weaker in Western countries (in the USA 22% of the survey found the public service effective) than in Asian ones (41% assessed it as effective in the Asia-Pacific region).⁵⁵ One of the key findings within their study was that human resource management of public service executives was a key contributor to their outcomes. In particular, they found that many assumptions taken for granted in private practice could be linked to positive outcomes in public service as well, particularly the importance of appraisals and the linking of rewards to performance. The relevance of this study is, if the linkage between the public service and the military is granted, to show the importance of human resource decisions in outcomes of corporate governance, and to establish the potential relevance of private sector research to the military question.

Bearing in mind the cultural differences established by Berman et al., Indonesian scholar Nada Sakinah introduces a critical datum regarding executive selection in the public service. Sakinah compares the Indonesian public service with the South Korean in the context of a pilot project in Indonesia introducing South Korean ideas. In the Indonesian public service,

⁵⁵ Evan Berman, et al., “Public Executive Leadership in East and West: An Examination of HRM Factors in Eight Countries.” *Review of Public Personnel Administration* 33 no 2 (2013).

progression is hierarchical with vacancies typically filled from the subordinates of the vacant position. In South Korea, as in the Indonesian pilot project, positions are defined by “competency requirements” and then filled by competitive processes among applicants.⁵⁶ Sakinah cites previous research indicating that this model enhances employee mobility in the bureaucracy. Remarking that the Indonesian hierarchy bears a significant resemblance to the CAF promotion structure while the South Korean approach resembles, to some degree, the method of the Canadian Public Service for selecting executives (and others), these findings might apply to the selection of CAF GOFs.

While the research concerning the impact of background on the selection of public executives is very limited, there is some research on the question of the impact of background on the selection of corporate executives. The degree of applicability of these results to the selection of GOFs is not clear as there are some significant differences between the two. First, most of the research focuses on the selection of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) rather than the selection of subordinate executives; this selection, handled by the board of directors, may be more akin to the selection of the CDS by the cabinet than the selection of new GOFs by the current cadre. Second, it may be the case that the fundamental nature of private enterprise demands a different approach. However, the practices and successes of the corporate world are being applied to militaries; Nancy Youssef, writing for the Wall Street Journal, explains how the US Army is “drawing on the hiring practices of private-sector organizations and corporations such as the Boston Symphony Orchestra and Google.”⁵⁷ Her writing is on the topic of battalion commanders, the group from which 90% of all US Army GOFs ultimately emerge, but shows

⁵⁶ Nada Sakinah, “Employees’ Attitude toward the Implementation of Open Selection System for Senior Executive Service Positions.” *Bisnis & Birokrasi* 24 no 1 (Jan 2017).

⁵⁷ Nancy Youssef, “In Generational Shift, Army Uses a New System to Promote Hundreds of Officers.” *The Wall Street Journal*, 4 March 2020.

that corporate human resource policies can have a place in military human resource management.⁵⁸

On the question of the impact of trade on selection of CEOs the research is limited. In the research, this is phrased as functional background, instead of trade, and one of the primary researchers is University of Windsor scholar Eahab Elsaid. Elsaid led a research collaboration with a structure significantly resembling that of this study, but focused on CEO selection rather than GOFO selection. Elsaid's background research, method and results are all relevant to the GOFO selection question.

The background to Elsaid's question reveals fundamental assumptions about the interaction of background and performance which recall but differ from Rowley's. Elsaid synthesizes the important of functional background by summarizing research from the 1980s which showed that career experiences affect how CEOs "process information about how they make strategic choices."⁵⁹ These, in turn, directly influence the organizational outcomes and tend to shape, in a fashion correlated to functional background, the strategic choices that dictate a firm's direction.⁶⁰ If this applies to the military, it is equivalent to saying that infantry generals will approach problems differently than logistics generals and that will change both how well the organization performs and how it evolves. Elsaid further remarks that previous research has indicated that female managers often "do not get any line experience in operations, manufacturing and/or marketing [and] this line experience is an essential component in the

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ Eahab Elsaid, "The Effect of Change in CEO Gender, Functional and Educational Background On Firm Performance and Risk." *Journal of Applied Business Research* 30 no 6 (2014).

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

ascent of any manager to the CEO position.”⁶¹ Replace ‘female managers’ with ‘intelligence officers’ and CEO with GOFO and this statement is relevant to the CAF experience.

Moving from Elsaid’s background to his research method, Elsaid notes the dearth of research focused on CEO background, remarking that the majority of inquiries on the question of CEO replacement focus on the debate of internal versus external recruitment.⁶² This question is not germane to the military question, but Elsaid’s research is. He divides CEO functional backgrounds into four groups: founder, output, throughput and peripheral.⁶³ Output backgrounds relate to engagement with customers, like marketing and sales; throughput backgrounds focus on the inner workings of the company, like operations or engineering; and peripheral backgrounds focus on specialist functions like law and accounting. The peripheral group closely matches the specialist group defined in the data for this paper. The throughput group resembles the operators in that they work closely with the core functions of the business but there is no military equivalent to the output group. However, the support trades could be seen in a similar light, being vital to but not part of the main work of the organization. Elsaid’s output group does not correspond to any military trade; rather these functions are tasks to which officers can be posted for a period instead of persistent vocations. For example, recruiting bears many similarities with the output group as does the engagement of the Government of Canada by ADM(Policy) but there are no trades for these roles, only members of other trades assigned to the tasks. Similarly, the founder category, while somewhat unique to civilian practice, bears some similarities to the GOFOs who create new capabilities for the CAF; however, like output, this is not tied to trade but to task and so has less bearing on the question of how trade affects GOFO selection. Elsaid’s

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² Eahab Elsaid, Bradley Benson and Dan L. Worrell, “Successor CEO Functional and Educational Backgrounds: Influence of Predecessor Characteristics and Performance Antecedents.” *The Journal of Applied Business Research* 32 no 4 (July/August 2016).

research method establishes two things relevant to the question of trade's influence on GOFO selection: first, that there are likely to be relevant groupings among the different military trades; second, that it is reasonable to divide jobs into categories as was done for leader, manager and specialist positions. While Elsaid has the data to complete a much more rigorous analysis of his question, his fundamental approach validates that taken with the CAF GOFO data in this paper.

Finally, regarding Elsaid's conclusions, two key results emerge. The first is that companies tend to hire CEOs with a similar functional background to previous CEOs, especially when things are going well.⁶⁴ This contributes to the question of whether operators lead the CAF because they have done since the second world war (or before) and have simply selected similar replacements, in general. Elsaid's conclusion certainly reinforces the possibility that this would transpire based only on human factors as would be present across the large businesses he studied. The corollary to this observation is that when things are going poorly, companies will often choose a CEO with a different background. This harkens to some of Ricks' research about Marshall's revamp of the US Army's GOFO cadre at the start of the second world war.⁶⁵ Elsaid notes that "firms with low prior profitability are more likely to hire a successor CEO with a finance/accounting background."⁶⁶ This suggests that the CAF might promote more logistical generals if it began to experience problems in financial or logistical matters. However, with much of the strategic financial and logistical work performed by civilians in the Department of National Defence (DND) but not in the CAF, it is more likely that problems in those domains would see changes on the Deputy Minister's side of DND. This is likely a critical factor for the

⁶³ *Ibid.* Table 1.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ Ricks, *The Generals...*, 24.

⁶⁶ Eahab Elsaid, Bradley Benson and Dan L. Worrell, "Successor CEO..."

disparity of operator to support trades among the GOFO cadre: many of the support functions in DND have been civilianized, even though there remains a CAF element to them.

The second key conclusion that Elsaid develops ties directly to this. His research shows that the functional background of CEOs reflects the type of organization that they are chosen to lead. In particular, his research demonstrated that:

companies that engage in significant [research and development] tend to hire CEOs that have come from operations, research and development and engineering. The implications of these findings are that firms that are research driven tend to want CEOs that are familiar with and have the knowledge base to understand the company's research.⁶⁷

While Elsaid has focused on research and development, it is reasonable to hypothesize that companies with other foci might also choose CEOs from functional backgrounds relevant to that focus. Consequently, when the selection of GOFO for the CAF is considered, if the CAF is seen as the operations arm of DND, rather than as the broad management of all of Canada's military capability, then it becomes much clearer why operators might be chosen for most of the GOFO positions.

Review of the practices of the civilian world reveals three key ideas that lend credence to the conclusions developed regarding the CAF's selection of GOFOs. First, looking at the selection of public sector civilian executives shows strong advantages in choosing by criteria based competition, rather than hierarchical promotion. Second, that the CAF must be seen in the context of DND, which handles much of its strategic support with civilians, and not just as an independent entity. Finally, the questions and structure proposed by this paper are germane, or at least consistent with the research being done for civilian executives.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

UPDATE OF CASE STUDIES

In the context of the US military's development since the Second World War, the CAF has developed many similarities but also several key differences. One of the key differences is the division of labour between military and civilian executives in DND. This leads to increased interest in the strategies for the selection of civilian executives and their applicability to the military.

Infantry

General Gosselin observed that “the core business of the CAF is not to put GOFO everywhere in the department.”⁶⁸ In so saying, he was addressing a number of points regarding the employment of GOFO. First, he was referring to the fact that in a military the size of the CAF, leadership, even institutional leadership, is not unique to GOFO. Many key institutional drivers exist at the Colonel level. For example, there are two trades in the study who have one colonel each, TDO and Personnel Selection. These colonels are senior advisors about the capability of their specialty, like the Provost Marshall advises on theirs; although they are not GOFOs, they are leaders for the CAF. Further, they affect the CAF in the way that they manage the specialties, of which they themselves are the pinnacles. The TDO colonel will have a significant influence in determining whether skilled TDOs in the future can get the breadth of experience to lend those skills to the CAF as GOFO, or if they will not be developed to have the diversity of experience needed to grow those aptitudes to the degree needed at the GOFO level. Beyond this, though, General Gosselin was saying that there are leaders of the CAF at the senior, executive level, who are not GOFO. The importance of the civilian executive cadre in answering the question about the impact of trade on GOFO selection is subtle but crucial.

⁶⁸ Major-General Hercule Gosselin, telephone conversation with author, 9 March 2020.

The impact of the civilian side of DND on the infantry is moderated by the nature of that trade. While any infantry officers who have a hope of becoming GOFO will have leadership and management skills that are valuable in senior executive positions in the civilian world, public or private, their technical skills have limited crossover. This reduces their competitiveness in some cases and closes off many specialist-management paths to them. Further, it is implied in General Gosselin's observations that there is a greater chance that the infantry officers will prefer to seek opportunities as uniformed executives (GOFOs) rather than adopt civilian positions.⁶⁹ The CAF has about 6.3 colonels for every hundred subalterns; the infantry and logistics branches are both close to this (Infantry 7.3, Log 5.8). However, while the CAF overall has about 40 GOFO per hundred colonels, the infantry has 71 (2019) and the logistics branch has 14. The role of the DND civilian executive in managing some of the strategic logistical aspects is an important explanation why this might be so, as General Gosselin points out. There are few civilian positions for handling problems tied to operator skills and knowledge, like that possessed by the infantry, but there are many for handling support problems.

Combat Engineers

This perspective is reinforced from a different perspective by General Sirois, the combat engineer general whose position directly supports one of the civilian executives:

ADM(Infrastructure and Environment) (ADM(IE)). For him, DND is composed of "two institutions:"⁷⁰ the military institution of units, schools and deployments; and the non-military enablers found within the ADMs. For him, there is a distinct difference between the skills needed in these institutions, although, given the tactical background of any officer, he assesses that the skills from the enabling institution, often called the corporate side of DND, transfer back to the

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ Major-General Sylvain Sirois, email conversation with author, 10 March 2020.

operational institution more easily than the reverse. This philosophy positively reinforces the engineer approach to career development which demands a combination of operational and corporate experience to advance.

General Sirois' experience also communicates an important perspective on functional background as it relates to the military and its selection of executives. His position, Chief of Staff for ADM(IE), was first staffed in 2009 and has been filled since then by a military engineer (either combat or construction). This is an example of the falsehood of the statement that a general's previous trade is ignored. However, General Sirois put it in another light which serves to much better explain the effect of trade on GOFO assignment. For him,

any [GOFO] could fill this billet. But, because it is also double hatted as the Chief Military Engineer, the position has been filled by a military engineer, [combat or construction]. Having a military engineer who has also served in a Construction Engineer detachment... helps to bring some credibility to the organization and support to the ADM who normally is not an engineer and probably new to DND.⁷¹

This concept ties to General Gosselin's perspective regarding the hand-picking of GOFO for their positions to maximize the efficacy of the small GOFO cadre in the CAF. It also relates to Elsaid's observations about the impact of functional background. Viewed in this light, instead of seeing every GOFO as a generic generalist, it might be more appropriate to view every GOFO as a unique capability which must be fitted into the jigsaw puzzle of positions with as little forcing as possible given the candidates and jobs.

Logistics

For the logistics branch, General Harding focuses on another part of the question. When asked about cross training with the infantry early in a logistical career, a model inspired by the US

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

Army and particularly by the experience of General Pagonis, she was unconvinced. Her assessment is that adopting such a policy in the CAF, “while it would be a tremendous experience, it isn’t the experience that truly makes a great [GOFO].”⁷² For her, the core quality of a GOFO is “a deeper understanding of the system around us.”⁷³ This perspective ties back to Elsaid’s view on functional background; while the logistics branch focuses its training and thinking on the execution of supply, rather than the understanding of support, it will not develop the functional background necessary to reliably generate the systems understanding that General Harding demands.

Alongside this is the question of combat experience. General Petraeus sought combat experience for generals in the US Army. General Harding reframes this to operational experience. For her, combat experience is cyclical in general, a perspective echoed by General Sirois.⁷⁴ However, for Harding, it is also a matter of chance: “whether someone happened to be at the right place at the right time.”⁷⁵ Conversely, operations includes a broader group of activities still fundamental to the military perspective. Looked at one way, while combat experience enhances an infantry officer’s credibility in some ways, a logistician with combat experience has, in some senses, failed. Even General Gosselin supports the perspective that it is not combat but operational experience that is relevant in the Canadian context. For him, his operational tours and his Masters of Business Administration stand equivalent as enablers for his duties as a GOFO. Although it is not clear if this is a Canadian perspective, a smaller military perspective or if General Petraeus is the exception, the voice of Canada’s GOFOs is clear that it is not combat but operations that refine an officer’s ability to serve as a CAF GOFO.

⁷² Brigadier-General Carla Harding, email conversation with author, 18 March 2020.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ Major-General Sylvain Sirois, email conversation with author, 10 March 2020.

⁷⁵ Brigadier-General Carla Harding, email conversation with author, 18 March 2020.

The final issue that General Harding raises is the alternate perspective on culture which underlies Ricks' discussion of GOFO selection for the US Army. Ricks questions why 59% of GOFO are Infantry, rather than armoured, artillery or combat engineers but never questions why they are not logisticians. General Harding attributes this to culture, the one explanation for the dearth of CAF logistics generals she attributes outside of the logistics branch. She grants as an example her being told by an operator that she "cannot lead an operation because [she is] a supporter, even though the operation in question is the preservation of the Defence Supply Chain [sic]."⁷⁶ She generalizes this example by saying that "our culture has no problem putting an operator in charge of supporters, but will not accept supporters in charge of operators."⁷⁷ She assesses the solution to this cultural issue to be the generation of a critical mass of GOFO from the various support trades who can demonstrate that it is a question of individual knowledge and talent, not military background, that determines a GOFO's fit for a given job or task.⁷⁸ This cultural blindness is similar to the US Army's, and anecdotally exists in all of Canada's allies' militaries.

Intelligence

The view among Canada's allies of who should lead the defence intelligence apparatus is not consistent. Admiral Bishop identifies the trades of the commanders of the defence intelligence agencies for several of Canada's allies; for only three (United Kingdom, Australia, Germany) is that background in intelligence. For New Zealand, Netherlands, and Israel neither the incumbent nor his/her predecessor was an intelligence specialist. For France the incumbent is a pilot, and Admiral Bishop provided no data on his predecessor. For the three nations currently employing

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

an intelligence specialist in command of their defence intelligence agencies, none of the predecessors were also intelligence specialists.⁷⁹

Admiral Bishop further asserts that the majority of Chiefs of Defence Intelligence in NATO are operators and all but one of the non-intelligence Chiefs or predecessors were from operator trades (Infantry, Pilot, SOF Operator⁸⁰, Armoured and his own Naval Warfare). The one exception is an Air Navigator, which is the next most operator-like trade in the RCAF after pilot.⁸¹ It bears remarking that Admiral Bishop's predecessor, General Wynnyk, was a combat engineer, another borderline-operator trade. It is unclear if the militaries of NATO, like the CAF, are moving in a post-9/11 world towards having more intelligence GOFOs and more intelligence alumni leading their defence intelligence organizations. Admiral Bishop confirms that there is a desire to have an intelligence specialist in his role in the future, but also that it is expected that the intelligence branch will not be able to generate enough officers capable of becoming GOFOs to constantly fill that position.

Admiral Bishop also emphasizes the point raised by General Sirois that the key is to get the right leader in the job, with specialist knowledge being an asset when 'rightness' is assessed, more than a requirement for most GOFO jobs.⁸² Colonel Ferguson adopts an even less ambitious goal: for him, an intelligence officer should limit his/her aspirations to leadership of the intelligence function. This is, for him, a "realistic (and fair) objective for [intelligence] officers" with employment outside of the intelligence function being an "exception rather than a goal."⁸³

⁷⁹ Rear-Admiral Scott Bishop, email conversation with author, 10 March 2020.

⁸⁰ Remark that SOF Operator is not a distinct officer trade in the CAF but would be on the list of Operator trades if it existed.

⁸¹ Rear-Admiral Scott Bishop, email conversation with author, 10 March 2020.

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ Colonel Hugh Ferguson, email conversation with author, 13 March 2020.

This echoes Elsaid's findings that peripheral, or specialist, functional backgrounds are disadvantaged for selection as CEOs except in specific circumstances.

CONCLUSION

While Canada will not and should not march in lock-step with its allies on its approach for selecting GOFOs, they provide an important benchmark for any approach it might contemplate as well as a critical context for the discussion of any issue of military leadership, including that related to the impact of trade on GOFO selection. Likewise, the selection of civilian executives can provide guidance or insight, but is not determinative of the best course of action for the CAF. Looking at allies and the civilian world provides several key insights on the question of how trade affects GOFO selection and what the CAF should do about it.

First, it provides a key insight into the role of the civilian part of DND in skewing the proportions in favour of operator trades as GOFOs because many strategic support functions are handled by civilians who might be retired military from support trades. This insight leads to the revelation that it might be best to adopt the approach that every GOFO is unique rather than seeing them all as being the same, generalists under MOSID 00172. Instead of MOSID 00172 representing several dozen functionally interchangeable specialists, like 00306 does, it might be best to see 00172 as collecting several dozen unique trades of one or two people each into a single management catchment.

Second, it leads to three approaches which might be applied to address the question of how trades and GOFO selection could be potentially revised. The first, suggested by General Pagonis, is to ameliorate cross-training. The second, proposed by Barno, involves the streaming of GOFO into operational and institutional streams. The third, based on the selection of civilian executives, would be a criteria based application process. These approaches will be explored in

the next chapter in the context of the insights gained about the current state of the CAF and the nature of management of GOFs.

CHAPTER 4: WHAT SHOULD THE CAF DO?

The fundamental purpose of this research was to determine what the actual situation in the CAF was regarding the impact of trade on selection of GOFO. However, what should be done about it? In looking at the impact of trade, or functional background, on executive selection in other organizations, three alternatives arise. The first, suggested by the experience of General Pagonis, is to ensure greater cross training for selected officers to ensure that they have the background experience to achieve the versatility necessary to take on most of the CAF's GOFO roles. The second, suggested by Barno et al. for the US military, is to institute GOFO streams for operational and institutional billets. The third, suggested by emerging best practice in civilian public sector executive management, would be a criteria based application process. All of these options are alternatives to the current situation, a status quo that seems to be working.

ARGUMENTS FOR IMPROVING THE STATUS QUO

The status quo is working. The CAF is successfully conducting operations. It is counter-factual reasoning to guess if the situation would be better if more members of the support trades had a path to GOFO ranks. However, in light of the insight that the civilian side of DND provides much of the strategic support management which might otherwise have needed support backgrounds at the GOFO level, General Gosselin's perspective that quality leaders emerge from the current practice of choosing GOFO based on an officer's experience and fit for the duty stands the scrutiny of practice.⁸⁴ However, if the best results are defined as having the most qualified candidates possible in each position, then the CAF should endeavour to have more qualified candidates to choose from, and it should ensure that a potential candidate, by talent and aptitude, is not forestalled from consideration by limitations of their experience as managed by their trade. To achieve this within the current model requires two changes: first, an evolution of

the culture to see each GOFO as a unique specialist rather than as a coherent trade like we see subalterns; second, an evolution of the supporting trades to better enable them to gain the diversity of experience required to become GOFO.

Cultural biases are tricky and more so when there is a basis of fact that underlies them, as in the case of the effect of trade on potential to become a GOFO. While General Harding observes the cultural bias in the CAF against supporters leading operators, she also advances that many logisticians are not fit to lead operations because of the nature of their training and experience. Fixing the experience is the second topic, but fixing the cultural expectations will be difficult until it is accomplished. The first step will be to acknowledge that stereotypes have a basis in fact, but then to move beyond the stereotype when a particular individual or circumstance comes into question. While acknowledging that today's supporters often do lack the experiences necessary to succeed as senior leaders, when considering a specific individual, their personal experience is the relevant data, not the general experience of their trade. This ties back to the idea that, unlike other MOSIDs, the GOFOs' must be seen as a management tool only, and every member of that MOSID managed as a unique specialist.

The preliminary step of actively disregarding cultural biases will both enhance and be enhanced by an effort to ensure appropriate diversity for talented leaders from all trades. At a preliminary level, this involves ensuring that command and staff-leadership positions are available to the support trades. Giving the support trades opportunities to work and, especially, command outside of their specialties will allow those trades to advance the prospects of their most promising officers. The basic version of this is to allocate some more positions in joint and institutional organizations explicitly to support trades. For example, the limited non-intelligence positions available to the intelligence branch can be rectified simply by allotting to them more

⁸⁴ Major-General Hercule Gosselin, telephone conversation with author, 9 March 2020.

positions. This will have an impact on career management, but it is an evolutionary change. An organization the size of the CAF may not be able to manage every position and every individual to get the best fits but it might be able to arbitrarily assign fewer positions to the infantry, for example, which do not need an infanteer's background, and allot the gains to the support trades for the nurturing of their most promising candidates.

However, to do so requires some of the cultural change already described. Those positions do not require any specialist background, but they do require leaders: they are not unimportant or they wouldn't serve to forge future GOFO. We need to trust the support trades to do these jobs at the same time we offer them the chance. The corresponding obligation to the support trades is that they send their most promising leader into these positions. If the best logisticians are hoarded by the logistics branch for the hardest logistics jobs, then they will not get the diversity necessary to become GOFO and the non-logistics positions proposed to be offered to them will get weak officers who will ultimately fail and thereby reinforce the stereotype that supporters cannot be trusted to lead operations. This is evident logic, but the CAF has frequently failed to avoid talent-hoarding to its detriment. What is described here is a tweak to the status quo. The positions which could be opened to the support trades are those already identified as suitable for any officer which have simply been allocated to the operator trades, historically, for convenience. The more revolutionary extension of this, as suggested by General Pagonis, is to explicitly cross train.

INCREASE CROSS TRAINING FOR SELECTED LEADERS EARLY

Letting supporters command joint and institutional organizations and take on staff-leadership roles is an adjustment of what we do, but not of the existing management principles and structures of the CAF. Pagonis' experience shows a more extreme approach with correspondingly more extreme potential advantages and disadvantages. The formative effect of

Pagonis' experiences in operator and combat roles are clear from his biography.⁸⁵ They are not tested against the possibility that they prepared him for operational leadership as the experiences he describes as a GOFO are all within the logistics specialty domain. His leadership of logistics, particularly in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, shows the highest level of leadership and operational aptitude, contradicting General Harding's colleague who did not accept logistical leadership even of a logistics mission. However, in light of General Gosselin's emphasis not on trade but on background diversity, it is reasonable to deduce that, within the CAF context, these sorts of experiences would greatly advance both the cultural assumption of supporter incapability, and the practical question of diverse background needed to be selected as a GOFO.

How would this look in the CAF? Could one platoon of infantry in each battalion be set aside for a supporter to command, as Pagonis commanded a platoon? This is possible, but there would be some consequences. First, this would take away command positions for infantry officers, which would generate a career management challenge for generating future company and battalion commanders. However, if some joint and institutional command and staff positions were moving from the operators to the support trades anyway, this might be manageable. More importantly, while a logistics officer, for example, could hold the billet, s/he might not be able to do the job without the training of an infantry officer. If that platoon was set aside for different, easier jobs, then the effect would be lost as that logistics officer would neither have proven his/her aptitude in an operational job, nor gained the experience from such a job. This consideration is amplified in the other combat arms; the technical knowledge of an engineer officer, armoured officer or artillery lieutenant is even more divorced from that of a logistics lieutenant than is that of an infantry officer. Furthermore, the difference in the army is minor compared to the difference in technical skills between a logistics officer and a Naval Warfare

⁸⁵ William G. Pagonis, *Moving Mountains...*

Officer or a Pilot. Despite this challenge, it might be possible for the support trades to adjust their training slightly to take on some less specialized but still legitimate and operational entry-level positions in the operators' units.

If the entry level positions that would allow the CAF to copy Pagonis' experience are not feasible to exchange in order to promote cross training, would mid-level positions be? In a combat arms battalion in the Canadian Army, there is a logistics officer who commands the logistics platoon and who is under the command of the administration company commander, an officer of the trade to which that battalion is associated (an infanteer in an infantry battalion, for example). Could that company command, which integrates a logistical and operational perspective, be granted to a member of the support trades? If the support trades placed their most promising officers into that position, that company commander, integrating support and operations, might be drawn from the support trades. Meanwhile, the operator officers who no longer have command positions could perhaps take command of a support company. Rawley would be of two minds over such a proposal; while he would admire the diversification of those officers' understanding of their element's operations, a key competency he expects majors to learn, he would assert that major is the last rank at which an officer's branch and specialty skills remain really vital.⁸⁶ He might be convinced, though, if the officers in question were among the best and brightest and being groomed for potential future generalship. The problem is that while aptitude is often evident at that stage, other criteria for promotion to the GOFO cadre are not visible even ten years in advance,⁸⁷ let alone the fifteen to twenty that separate company commanders from brigadiers.

⁸⁶ Roger Rowley, *The Report of the Officer Development Board...*, 45.

⁸⁷ Major-General Hercule Gosselin, telephone conversation with author, 9 March 2020.

Despite the challenges, some successes of a similar nature but lesser scale exist to reinforce the potential of this approach. In particular, the combat engineer trade has most of its officers specialize into a stream within the engineering function, such as infrastructure, geomatics, counter-IED, or others. Officers then move between operator jobs working as part of combat arms teams at all levels from combat team to army headquarters and specialist jobs, working with institutional elements like ADM(IE), CFINTCOM and others. General Sirois describes the deliberate cultivation and expansion of this program as one of the efforts to sustain the competitiveness of engineer officers for GOFO positions.⁸⁸ Ultimately, this approach is one of the extremes of the status quo approach, blending in to the basic implementation of the Pagonis model.

Despite this example, the problem of identifying future generals is deleterious to the deep cross-training concept inspired by Pagonis. The cross training would have to be sufficiently extensive that alumni of the program remained after all of the other factors restricting advancement to the threshold of GOFO selection were considered. There are considerable administrative and practical hurdles and the return on investment would likely be modest at best. Although a careful and detailed look at this might be taken, it seems unlikely on balance to be a strong candidate, although it might be considered from time to time for individual officers who need challenging.

DESIGN GOFO INTO TWO STREAMS

If the problem of identifying future generals in time to give them useful cross-training is deleterious to that concept, it is fatal to the idea of GOFO streams. It is not the only fatal flaw to this idea, though, at least for a military at the scale of the CAF. After explaining briefly what two streams might look like, these flaws will be detailed.

⁸⁸ Major-General Sylvain Sirois, email conversation with author, 10 March 2020.

Barno and his team envision a system where each position for an officer two-stars and above is assigned to either the operational or the enterprise stream. At the apex, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be an operational billet while the Vice Chairman would be enterprise. As examples from the three-star rank, the N3 or the commander of XVIII Corps would be operational while the N4 or the G1 would be in the enterprise stream. The idea is that the “skills that flag officers actually require may poorly align with the strong tendency to promote successful warfighters or ‘operators’ to flag rank.”⁸⁹ This perspective builds off of Ricks’ research, explicitly, but attempts to qualify his conclusions with an appeal to the complexity of the modern battlefield. He cites the increasing proportion of army generals as their rank increases who emerge from operational backgrounds.⁹⁰ The advantages to his proposed system are twofold. First, by streaming officers and positions, the professional development assigned to officers headed to those streams can be tailored for increased efficiency. Second, by knowing what sort of position an officer will hold at the next rank, the military is not required to provide experience at the present rank in both streams and can therefore hold an officer in a position longer, developing mastery of both the current job and of the stream and thereby increasing efficiency dramatically.

This system could be translated easily to the Canadian context. Likely it would not start at the two-star level but apply to all GOFs or even to all Colonels. Setting aside this difference, which is fundamentally predicated on scale, the CAF could see the same system applied and anticipate similar advantages. Instead of 00172 General Officer List and 00175 General Officer Specialist, there would be three categories: General Officer Operational, General Officer Enterprise and General Officer Specialist. This corresponds closely to the model found in

⁸⁹ David Barno, et al., *Building Better Generals...*, 11.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

Elsaid's analysis of corporate executive backgrounds. Knowing that they will be streamed away from operational commands, more support trade members could then enter the enterprise stream where their background and aptitude is better suited. This idea is intuitive and matches the practice for most officers of streaming specialties. The promised gains are attractive and plausible. However, the idea is fundamentally flawed.

Barno argues that "too often the US military treats [its] flag officers as interchangeable parts, a practice that both produces suboptimal results and departs from military tradition."⁹¹ However, that is exactly what his proposed scheme is doing. If the current situation is that each GOFO is looked at as a unique member of the GOFO cadre, but not looked at closely, then by explicitly categorizing them it is almost inevitable that the category will be checked and nothing else. Instead of having a bin of 'fasteners' that you would dig through to find one that sort of worked, you would have a bin of 'nails' and a bin of 'screws' and assume that everything in each was essentially good enough for that job.

If the CAF is succeeding at treating each GOFO as a unique asset to be managed based on capability and requirement, then this proposed adaptation risks much to gain little. By forcing into place a structure of this sort, there is the chance of losing the careful individualized management described by General Gosselin without solving the challenges General Harding described of bringing the expertise of the support trades to the strategic level needed of a GOFO. For Colonel Ferguson, the management and development of depth of knowledge alongside leadership is key, and the institution of multiple GOFO streams would degenerate into a "class system, where one tier would likely be seen as superior to the other."⁹² If this were the case, then it might win the battle while losing the war for the support trades, granting them the rank while

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 12

⁹² Colonel Hugh Ferguson, email conversation with author, 13 March 2020.

depriving them of the authority to apply their unique talents to the betterment of the CAF.

General Harding perceives an even bleaker outcome: the selection of bureaucrats and managers over leaders to the institutional positions with the result of amplifying the difficulties that the logistics branch already experiences of overvaluing technical skills over strategic perspective.⁹³ She summarizes vehemently the general perspective of the senior officers approached on this topic: “[the CAF] absolutely must not have streams – we need the GOFO selection, first and foremost, to be about right fit.”⁹⁴

General Sirois also fears that the stream concept would produce “second class citizens.”⁹⁵ As can be seen from Barno’s proposed division of positions, every commander is operational, all of the deputies are enterprise stream. For General Sirois, choosing GOFO who can manage the complexities of the institution, since they have already passed the operational challenges to reach the rank of Colonel, will provide officers who can handle all of the challenges faced by a GOFO.⁹⁶ Not one of the senior officers approached on this topic believed that Barno’s approach was fit for the CAF.

General Gosselin provided particular insight on this point as well. For him, the problem was as much practical as cultural. Because of the many factors, internal and external to the CAF, which affect an officer’s ability to join the ranks of the CAF’s GOFO cadre, it is not consistently feasible to identify future GOFOs ten years in advance.⁹⁷ Given this, how much harder would it be to both identify and stream them? If the streams were to be assigned strictly based on trade, then it would only exacerbate the current problem of losing the opportunity to avail the CAF of the unique experiences and perspectives of some of its officers at the strategic level. Instead of

⁹³ Brigadier-General Carla Harding, email conversation with author, 18 March 2020.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵ Major-General Sylvain Sirois, email conversation with author, 10 March 2020.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

trade-related selection effects cutting the CAF off from the insights of members of its support trades, streaming by trade would cut the operational stream off from the same while also cutting the enterprise stream off from the governance aptitudes of its operators. Streaming on an individual basis is what is already being done: choosing the right person for the job. There is no evidence to suggest that formalizing this in streams would help and it could be deleterious.

Notwithstanding the clear condemnation of the proposed solution of streaming GOFOs, there are two points which remain for consideration. The first is that, within the individually managed single stream presently employed, nothing precludes preparing selected officers educationally and experientially for emphasis on specific roles. For example, as Colonel Ferguson observes, there are fields which are becoming increasingly technical, like the advent of artificial intelligence and big data in the intelligence world.⁹⁸ By choosing potential future GOFO for specialized professional development either alongside or instead of traditional professional military education, this specialized knowledge can definitely be brought to bear immediately and might be positioned for strategic use later, depending on the success of predicting General Gosselin's ten year horizon. This might be a solution to address the semi-specialized GOFO positions, such as Colonel Ferguson's intelligence example or Robart's cyber concern.

The second consideration is the example of successful leadership teams from the civilian world. The famous Jobs-Wozniak duo from Apple inspires thoughts about the Visionary-Implementer team. However, the military advancement process, like that of the public service, is fundamentally predicated on individual advancement based on individual merit. It would require a complete reconstruction of the public service paradigm to approach leadership in a team dynamic like theirs. This is not impossible, but it is beyond the scope of this paper.

⁹⁷ Major-General Hercule Gosselin, telephone conversation with author, 9 March 2020.

⁹⁸ Colonel Hugh Ferguson, email conversation with author, 13 March 2020.

Ultimately, then, the concept of streamed leadership is not fit for the CAF. Instead, the emphasis returns again to the idea that each GOFO is a unique capability managed as an individual in the hopes of finding the best fit for the jobs required from among the human resources available. Streamed leadership returns to us the idea of better managing the available resources in various ways, but one of those ways is not to artificially constrain the management of that pool.

CRITERIA BASED APPLICATION PROCESS

The last option for reducing the impact of trade on GOFO selection with the goal of enabling the best candidates to eventually become GOFOs is to adopt a model more akin to that of the civil service. Instead of having the existing cadre choose future GOFOs, an additional step of applications would be added to improve transparency of that process.

The envisioned model would be to have each GOFO position's requirements articulated. For a given position, is combat experience required? Is support experience required? Is operational experience required? Is business education required? Is advanced technical education? By carefully and relevantly articulating these requirements, the actual and verifiable prerequisites for holding a GOFO position could be established and agreed upon. Once done, anyone could apply to an open GOFO position, possibly including public servants or corporate leaders, especially those with reserve experience. Further, so long as the requirements remained relatively stable over time, although they would certainly have to evolve, it would allow any CAF officer, or even recruiting centre applicant, possessed of the ambition to become a GOFO to chart a path towards their desired outcome. They could then manage their careers in such a way as to enhance their suitability for future positions at higher ranks.

At the very least, developing this data for the GOFO positions would establish the degree to which operational experience and operator experience play in to the requirements of the

positions. It would open the door to public discourse, within or beyond the profession of arms, about whether those assessments were valid. As it stands, the opacity of the system leads to concerns like General Harding's that selection of GOFO is "defaulting to culture"⁹⁹ rather than to genuine demands of positions.

The existence of successful experiments like Sakinah's in transitioning hierarchical advancement to criteria based competition approaches, coupled with the structure of the Canadian public service executive selection process suggests that this might be a viable approach for the CAF. However, it leaves behind the question of the impact of trade on the selection of GOFOs and enters a new realm about the process for their selection, placing further discussion beyond the scope of this paper but distinctly in the realm of useful further research.

RECOMMENDATION

At this time, then, it appears that the status quo is the best option going forward. While research into the merits of a criterion based application system might be worthwhile, the current system of the existing GOFO cadre selecting its successors as individually managed human resources to be assigned to the tasks available and foreseen is working. It is likely that even criteria based applications would have at most a marginal effect on the ultimate outcomes, as all of the senior officers approached held varying degrees of faith in the current system.

While potentially useful to challenge the best and brightest, the CAF is not structured to adopt the Pagonis-inspired model. Moving towards it to the extent that the system is structured to handle it would likely be a desirable refinement of the status quo. Like the combat engineers endeavor to mix the operator and specialist work of their officers, the CAF should seek more opportunities to give support trade officers operational and command experiences in the same way that operators have institutional and managerial opportunities in their existing career

⁹⁹ Brigadier-General Carla Harding, email conversation with author, 18 March 2020.

streams.¹⁰⁰ What must be avoided is artificially constraining the individualized management of the small cadre of GOFOs, such as by assigning official streams to them. This ties the hands of the decision makers without adding any value if each officer is already being selected and managed for the best outcome to the CAF.

The first step and the final result of the tweaks to the status quo which are the preferred immediate actions for improvement is a change of culture. Instead of seeing support trades and operator trades, we should see individuals. This culture change includes both the way the support trades see themselves, and also the way that, consciously or unconsciously, the operator trades see them. Culture changes are hard, but this one is started, as shown by the successes of the intelligence branch. The experience of the combat engineers in bringing their internal specialties to par with their pure-operations streamed officers offers further evidence of the viability of this change.

¹⁰⁰ Major-General Hercule Gosselin, telephone conversation with author, 9 March 2020.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

The goal of the CAF is and should be to get the best GOFOS that it can for the jobs that it has. It does this by choosing the best candidates from those available. An officer's military trade has a distinct and significant effect on their prospects to be chosen and it should not. Nevertheless, no proposed plan for radically altering this seems more likely to succeed than slightly adjusting the status quo. How serious is the problem? How much can the proposed adjustments affect it? Can the CAF successfully make these changes?

THE MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM

Things are currently working. There is no evidence to suggest that the CAF's system of selecting GOFOS has fallen so entirely out of order that it must be reinvented. This is in large part because the civilian apparatus of DND provides much of the strategic support and so the dearth of support trade backgrounds among the GOFOS has less impact than if all strategic support was being managed by a similarly constituted cadre. If nothing happened to change the status quo, the CAF would proceed and succeed. Therefore, this question is about doing more with the resources at hand, not about ensuring that the CAF can meet the minimum standard.

The heart of the problem is that young men and women are joining the CAF with the natural talents and aptitudes to be great GOFOS but their choice of trade restricts their ability to nurture those aptitudes to the level where they will successfully compete against equal or lesser peers from trades which did nurture their potential. It is beyond the scope of this paper to address the amount of potential lost this way. It may be that there is very little loss: perhaps those with the aptitude to become GOFOS are naturally drawn to the operator trades which tend to produce them; perhaps the difference between the seventh best logistician and the twenty-fifth best infanteer as candidates for becoming GOFOS is so small as to be beyond notice; perhaps since,

as Barno says, the “military’s most essential task is to fight and win the nation’s wars,”¹⁰¹ there is no need for support experience at the strategic level.

All of these arguments might be true, but probably they are not. While there might be some attraction of those with the talent to be GOFO towards the operator trades, General Harding would argue that among the 746 Logistics Branch subalterns in 2019, some of them have talent competitive with the operator trades’ best people. Although some of the best logisticians will move on to civilian work, as General Gosselin describes, it seems unlikely that those with the best mix of talent to be GOFOs will do so, at least to the extent necessary to generate the disparity seen between the two trades. Finally, if the task is to fight and win wars, General Sirois’ observation that “as one moves closer to the operational and strategic levels, Logistics (log, engineering, support, communications, health services and transport) is what will win or lose a war, a campaign, or a deployment.”¹⁰²

The magnitude of the problem, then, is a question of how much talent is lost when certain trades’ culture and career management prohibit their best candidates from becoming GOFOs, and how much their expertise would be useful to fight and win the war, campaign, or deployment, compared to the mixture of leaders that the current system produces.

THE IMPACT OF THE PROPOSED ACTION

The proposed action, to refine the status quo by working to change culture and to give development opportunities to support trades, will have a limited impact. It is not a revolutionary change; it is a small change to the system. This implies that the potential benefit is limited but, correspondingly, that the risk is small. The change to culture is no risk at all: seeing each individual for their own strengths and limitations is already a CAF goal. While this is already

¹⁰¹ David Barno, et al., *Building Better Generals...*, 11.

¹⁰² Major-General Sylvain Sirois, email conversation with author, 10 March 2020.

being achieved, partly or fully, in the management of the GOFO cadre, this perspective needs to promulgate more widely as part of the general policy of seeing people for their individual qualities and not the qualities associated with their groups (rightly or wrongly). The impact of this change of culture will be a reduction in the bias which presently seems to favour operators and disadvantage supporters.

More difficult is the active step of offering more and better positions to the support trades. The intelligence branch has fifteen positions at all officer ranks that are not specifically intelligence focused. The infantry branch has about 2.25 times as many officers; if it had proportionally as many non-infantry specific positions, it would have 34. This ludicrously small number proves the imbalance of the current situation. By turning some of the non-trade-specific jobs in the CAF, especially those seen as being developmental of the strategic mindset sought in GOFOs, to the support trades the CAF accepts some potential risk for some potential reward. The risk is that the support trades cannot or do not fill them with suitable officers, resulting, at best, in a failure to improve the GOFO selection outcomes and at worst in failures of the key tasks of these essential positions. The potential reward is a broadening of perspective in both these key roles and in the support community for the operational demands of the CAF with an ultimate result of having more GOFO to choose from to get the right person for the job. Further, if this succeeds, it will positively feed back into the culture change by providing more widespread examples of competent operational leadership from the support community.

THE FEASIBILITY OF THE PROPOSED ACTION

Changing culture is hard, but this change can be driven top down by mandating a rebalancing of the key positions to favour the support trades. The positive feedback into culture will then reinforce the changes thereto and normalize the implementation of this proposed program. What is proposed can be implemented gradually, to avoid massive career management disruption; it

can be done within the existing rules and frameworks that govern the CAF. Trying this is a stroke of the pen away.

The challenge of implementation will be found in the career management of the support trades. Given the opportunity to advance their best people in joint and institutional positions, the trades career managers can fail and ruin the proposed program in either of two ways. First, they can fail to provide the necessary generalist training to their personnel. Without the general understanding of the CAF and operations, rather than the narrow understanding of their specialty, no officer can succeed in positions of this sort. The operator trades cultivate this understanding but the support trades are not seen to do so, even by their own members like General Harding. It can be done, but for this to work it must be done. Second, if they keep their best people for the hardest jobs within their specialty, there is a distinct risk that the runners up sent to these prestigious jobs will fail and that will prove to those watching that the culture of supporter inadequacy for command is valid. Neither of these constraints to implementation are insuperable. Neither is even difficult, but both are routinely observed in other contexts of the CAF. This solution is feasible to implement, but there are hazards to avoid.

FINAL RECOMMENDATION

In final conclusion, it is proven that an individual's trade affects his/her potential to be promoted to the General Officer and Flag Officer ranks. It is strongly indicated that it should not, based on the perspectives of senior officers from diverse backgrounds in the CAF. This problem is not unique to the CAF, being found in the militaries of Canada's allies and in the civilian executive world. The revolutionary strategies proposed to reform the problem are too extreme to be effective; the way forward is to adjust the current system.

This adjustment requires changing the culture of the military to hold less bias regarding the potential of certain trade backgrounds to be better or worse candidates for leadership duties.

This change would both precede and then follow from an adjustment of the opportunities for the best individuals of the support trades to be appointed to the challenging command and staff positions which nurture in their incumbents the aptitudes ultimately sought in our generals and admirals. The goal is not to force the system to accommodate more support-background officers, but to enable those officers to nurture their talents through their careers so that they are legitimately competitive with their operator-background peers. This solution preserves the vital nature of the current system, which is the management of each general or flag officer as a unique individual asset assigned to the tasks at hand based on the best fit of talents and experiences. The advantage to the CAF from this changes is to have more candidates to choose from who are suited to those tasks and, as a result, have a better chance of a better fit for all of the jobs that are set before it.

ANNEX A: SAMPLE OF GOFOS, 2010 TO 2019

Serial	Year	Organizati	Rank	Last Name	Initials	Position	Trade	Source	Position Ty	Notes
1	2019	MND	Bgen	Janzen	J	DG - Public Affairs	PAO	AK	Specialist	
2	2019	CDL	Vadm	Maddison	P	High Commissioner - Austri	NW	WA	Leader	
3	2019	MND	Bgen	Martin	DE	Comd - CFPSA	PLT	https://evc	Leader	
4	2019	MND	Mgen	Ormsby	P	DCOS - Material	ACSO	https://wy	Manager	
5	2019	MND	Bgen	Goodyear	RW	DCFO - Finance	LOG	OB	Specialist	
6	2019	MND	Mgen	Sirois	JS	COS - Infrastructure	ENGR	AK	Specialist	
7	2019	MND	Mgen	Chagnon	FJ	COS - Info Management	SIGS	OB	Specialist	
8	2019	MND	Bgen	Theriault	MM	Seconded - Public Affairs	PAO	https://ott	Specialist	
9	2019	CDS	Gen	Vance	JH	CDS	RCR	AK	Leader	
10	2019	CDS	Lgen	Wynnyk	PF	VCDS	ENGR	AK	Manager	
11	2019	CDS	Mgen	Allen	FJ	DVCDs	CELE	AK	Manager	
12	2019	CDS	Bgen	Mialkowski	CJJ	COS - CDS	RCR	https://wy	Manager	
13	2019	CDS	Bgen	Horgan	KG	COS - VCDS	CONST ENC	AK	Manager	
14	2019	CDS	Radm	Zwick	JB	CFD	NW	http://www	Manager	
15	2019	CDS	Radm	Donovan	CP	DG - CSC	NW	GS	Manager	
16	2019	CDS	Mgen	Gosselin	JPHH	CProg	R22eR	AK	Manager	
17	2019	CDS	Cmdre	Patterson	R	DG - SMRC	HSO	https://wy	Leader	Formerly NUR
18	2019	CDS	Mgen	Joyce	DW	DG - International Security	ACSO	OB	Manager	
19	2019	CDS	Mgen	Pelletier	JPA	PL - RCAF Figher Replacer	PLT	https://wy	Manager	
20	2019	CDS	Mgen	Lalumiere	JRM	PL - RCAF Figher Replacer	PLT	https://wy	Manager	
21	2019	CFINTCOM	Radm	Bishop	SEG	CDI	NW	AK	Leader	
22	2019	CFINTCOM	Bgen	Wright	MC	COS - CFINTCOM	PPCLI	OB	Manager	Served in other RegF Inf Regts
23	2019	CDS	Mgen	Eldaoud	N	Special - Journey Project	EME	GS	Leader	
24	2019	CDS	Lgen	Bowes	SJP	VAC	ARMD	https://wy	Leader	
25	2019	CDS	Vadm	Norman	MAG	Special - Supernumary	NW	AK	Exception	
26	2019	CMP	Lgen	Lamarre	CA	CMP	LOG	GS	Leader	Army
27	2019	CMP	Lgen	Eyre	WD	CMP	PPCLI	AK	Leader	
28	2019	CMP	Radm	Edmundson	HC	Dcomd - CMP	NW	https://wy	Manager	
29	2019	CMP	Cmdre	Page	JAS	COS - CMP	NAV ENG	https://wy	Manager	
30	2019	CMP	Mgen	Whelan	SJR	Chief - Mil Pers Programs	RCR	OB	Manager	
31	2019	CMP	Bgen	Tattersall	VC	Comd - MILPERSGEN	LOG	Blatherwic	Leader	Army
32	2019	CMP	Bgen	Bedard	JGS	COS - ADM(Pers)	AEC	REF	Manager	
33	2019	CMP	Bgen	Misener	M	Comd - CAF Transition Grc	ENGR	AK	Leader	
34	2019	CMP	Bgen	Savard	MCD	DG - MILPERS Managemer	PHARM	Blatherwic	Manager	Exceptional
35	2019	CJOC	Lgen	Rouleau	MN	CJOC	ARTY	GS	Leader	SOF
36	2019	CJOC	Mgen	Seymour	WF	Dcomd - CJOC	ACSO	https://wy	Manager	
37	2019	CJOC	Radm	Santarpia	B	COS Ops - CJOC	NW	GS	Leader	
38	2019	CJOC	Bgen	Anderson	DJ	DCOS Ops - CJOC	PPCLI	GS	Manager	
39	2019	CJOC	Bgen	Bourgon	MHL	COS Readiness - CJOC	PLT	Blatherwic	Leader	
40	2019	CJOC	Bgen	Bernard	JAS	COS Plans - CJOC	R22eR	OB	Leader	
41	2019	CJOC	Bgen	Prevost	JPR	DCOS Plans - CJOC	PLT	OB	Manager	
42	2019	CJOC	Bgen	MacIsaac	DA	COS Support - CJOC	ENGR	GS	Leader	
43	2019	CANSOFC	Mgen	Dawe	PS	CANSOFCOM	PPCLI	https://wy	Leader	SOF
44	2019	DG	Bgen	Cochrane	DB	Comd - Cadet and Jr Rangr	ACSO	WA	Leader	
45	2019	DG	Bgen	Ermel	RW	DG - Capability and Structr	ARMD	GS	Manager	
46	2019	DG	Bgen	Moritsugu	SM	DG - Military Signals and Ir	SIGS	GS	Leader	
47	2019	DG	Bgen	Benson	AT	DG - Land Equipment	EME	OB	Manager	Deduced
48	2019	DG	Bgen	Mackenzie	RRE	DG - Land Reserves	INF	https://wy	Leader	
49	2019	DG	Bgen	Bury	PJ	DG - Reserves and Cadets	INF	http://hub	Leader	
50	2019	DG	Bgen	Meloche	JPL	DG - Defence Security	ARMD	REF	Manager	
51	2019	DG	Bgen	Basinger	DD	DG - Capability and Structr	ENGR	AK	Manager	
52	2019	DG	Bgen	Barker	MR	DG - Aerospace Equip Proj	AERE	REF	Manager	
53	2019	DG	Bgen	Tremblay	MIN	DG - Aerospace Equip Proj	AERE	OB	Manager	
54	2019	DG	Bgen	Sabourin	PC	DG - Info Mgt	CELE	OB	Manager	Deduced
55	2019	DG	Bgen	Kenny	EJ	DG - Air Readiness	PLT	OB	Manager	
56	2019	DG	Bgen	Lalumiere	JRM	DG - AF Development	PLT	https://wy	Manager	
57	2019	DG	Bgen	Keiver	CR	DG - AF Development	PLT	https://ing	Manager	Assumed as CO 436?
58	2019	RCAF	Bgen	Day	AR	DG - Air Staff and Air Rese	PLT	OB	Leader	
59	2019	DG	Bgen	Whale	KG	DG - Space	PLT	https://wy	Leader	
60	2019	DG	Bgen	Jayne	AR	DG - Cyberspace	ENGR	AK	Leader	
61	2019	DG	Cmdre	Feltham	RA	DG - Naval Force Developr	NW	OB	Manager	
62	2019	DG	Cmdre	Sutherland	CF	DG - Military Careers	NW	OB	Manager	
63	2019	DG	Cmdre	Hamilton	JM	DG - Defence Force Planni	NW	OB	Manager	
64	2019	DG	Cmdre	Watson	MB	DG - Compensation and Br	LOG	https://wy	Manager	
65	2019	DG	Cmdre	Cantelon	SN	DG - Personnel and Family	NW	https://wy	Leader	

Serial	Year	Organization	Rank	Last Name	Initials	Position	Trade	Source	Position Ty	Notes
66	2019	DG	Cmdre	Earl	CS	DG - Maritime Equipment	NAV ENG	GS	Manager	
67	2019	DG	Cmdre	Waddell	SM	DG - Naval Strategic Readiness	NW	https://www	Manager	
68	2019	DG	Cmdre	Kurtz	MTJ	DG - Security	NW	Blatherwic	Leader	
69	2019	DG	Cmdre	Carosielli	L	PM - CSC	NAV ENG	OB	Manager	
70	2019	DG	Mgen	Chapdelaine	JJG	Chaplain General	CHAP	AK	Specialist	
71	2019	SJS	Mgen	Lavoie	O	DOS	RCR	OB	Leader	
72	2019	SJS	Bgen	Boivin	JMS	DDOS	R22eR	OB	Manager	
73	2019	SJS	Cmdre	Peats	BA	DG - J5 Plans	NW	OB	Leader	
74	2019	SJS	Bgen	Davies	DA	Senior Delegate - AF Strat	PLT	REF	Leader	
75	2019	MND	Bgen	Simoneau	ED	Seconded - PCO	PLT	OB	Leader	
76	2019	Army	LGen	Lanthier	JM	Comd - CA	ARMD	OB	Leader	
77	2019	Army	Mgen	Turenne	CJ	Dcomd - CA	ARMD	https://au	Manager	
78	2019	Army	Bgen	Quinn	DA	COS Ops - CA	CONST ENCL	Blatherwic	Manager	
79	2019	Army	Bgen	Kelsey	SR	COS Strat - CA	ARMD	OB	Manager	
80	2019	Army	Bgen	McGarry	LP	COS Ops - CA	ARTY	OB	Manager	
81	2019	Army	Mgen	Fortin	JSSD	1Div	ARTY	OB	Leader	
82	2019	Army	Bgen	Cadieu	TJ	3Div	ARMD	OB	Leader	
83	2019	Army	Bgen	Stanton	ND	Dcomd - 3Div	ARMD	OB	Leader	
84	2019	Army	Bgen	Awalt	DRA	Dcomd - 3Div	SIGS	OB	Leader	
85	2019	Army	Bgen	Paul	JMM	4Div	R22eR	OB	Leader	
86	2019	Army	Bgen	Campbell	MEK	Dcomd - 4Div	INF	REF	Leader	
87	2019	Army	Bgen	Carignan	MAJ	2Div	ENGR	AK	Leader	
88	2019	Army	Bgen	Mercier	JBC	Dcomd - 2Div	R22eR	OB	Leader	
89	2019	Army	Bgen	Pelletier	R	5Div	R22eR	OB	Leader	
90	2019	Army	Bgen	Macaulay	DA	5Div	ARMD	OB	Leader	
91	2019	Army	Bgen	Camsell	JF	Dcomd - 5Div	LOG	OB	Leader	
92	2019	Army	Bgen	Thomson	GB	Dcomd - 5Div	INF	REF	Leader	
93	2019	Army	Bgen	Aitchison	C	Dcomd USAR Alaska	RCR	OB	Leader	
94	2019	Army	Bgen	St-Louis	MHL	Dcomd 1 Corps USAR	R22eR	OB	Leader	
95	2019	Army	Bgen	Boivin	JRS	Dcomd 1 Corps USAR	ARMD	OB	Leader	
96	2019	Army	Bgen	Fletcher	WH	Dcomd 18 Airborne USAR	PPCLI	OB	Leader	
97	2019	RCN	Radm	Auchterloni	JR	MARPAC	NW	OB	Leader	
98	2019	RCN	Cmdre	Topshee	AI	CFP	NW	OB	Leader	
99	2019	RCN	Radm	Baines	CA	MARLANT	NW	OB	Leader	
100	2019	RCN	Cmdre	Skjerpen	CT	CFA	NW	OB	Leader	
101	2019	RCN	Cmdre	Hopper	M	Naval Reserves	NW	GS	Leader	
102	2019	RCN	Cmdre	Mulkins	M	Naval Reserves	NW	Blatherwic	Leader	
103	2019	RCN	Vadm	Lloyd	MFR	RCN	NW	WA	Leader	
104	2019	RCN	Radm	McDonald	AG	RCN	NW	OB	Leader	
105	2019	RCN	Radm	Sutherland	CF	Dcomd - RCN	NW	OB	Manager	
106	2019	RCN	Radm	McDonald	AG	Dcomd - RCN	NW	OB	Manager	
107	2019	RCAF	LGen	Meinzingger	AD	RCAF	PLT	OB	Leader	
108	2019	RCAF	Mgen	Frawley	BF	Dcomd - RCAF	PLT	OB	Manager	
109	2019	RCAF	Mgen	Wheeler	DLR	CF Tgt Initiative	PLT	REF	Leader	
110	2019	RCAF	Bgen	Cloutier	JEG	Special Advisor CAS	PLT	REF	Manager	
111	2019	RCAF	Bgen	Day	AR	Air Reserve Adv and Dep C	PLT	OB	Leader	
112	2019	RCAF	Bgen	Rafter	MML	Strat J4 at NDHQ	LOG	OB	Manager	Air
113	2019	RCAF	Mgen	Drouin	JHC	1CAD	PLT	https://www	Leader	
114	2019	RCAF	Mgen	Pelletier	JPA	1CAD	PLT	OB	Leader	
115	2019	RCAF	Bgen	Boyle	S	Dcomd Support 1CAD	AEC	OB	Manager	
116	2019	RCAF	Bgen	Huddleston	IS	Dcomd FG 1CAD	PLT	OB	Manager	
117	2019	RCAF	Bgen	LeBlanc	M	2CAD	ACSO	OB	Leader	
118	2019	MND	Cmdre	Bernatchez	G	JAG	LEGAL	Blatherwic	Specialist	
119	2019	MND	Bgen	Trudeau	JS	Provost Marshal	MPO	OB	Specialist	Deduced
120	2019	CDL	Bgen	Thomas	LE	Canadian Defence Liaison	ARMD	http://www	Leader	
121	2019	CDL	Mgen	Hetherington	SC	CDL Washington	ARTY	GS	Leader	
122	2019	CDL	Bgen	Dunne	TP	CDL - Pentagon	PLT	OB	Leader	
123	2019	CDL	Bgen	Peyton	PJ	LO - Cyber Comd	ARMD	OB	Leader	
124	2019	CDL	Bgen	Laroche	JRP	LO - PACOM	PLT	OB	Leader	
125	2019	CDA	Radm	Cassivi	L	CDA	NW	OB	Leader	
126	2019	Army	Mgen	Cadden	S	CADTC	ARMD	OB	Leader	
127	2019	Army	Bgen	De Sousa	L	Dcomd CADTC	INF	REF	Manager	
128	2019	CDA	Bgen	Bouchard	S	RMC	EME	OB	Leader	
129	2019	CDA	Bgen	McPherson	BWG	CFC	ARTY	AK	Leader	
130	2019	CDA	Bgen	Cotten	KR	Special Projects Officer - C	ARTY	https://www	Leader	

Serial	Year	Organization	Rank	Last Name	Initials	Position	Trade	Source	Position Ty	Notes
131	2019	DG	Bgen	Robidoux	JDM	Dcomd - Reserves and Cac	SIGS	Blattherwic	Manager	Confirm?
132	2019	RCAF	Bgen	Reid	GM	DG - RCAF Reserves	ACSO	REF	Leader	
133	2019	Special	Bgen	Turnbull	JL	Advisor - Comm Res	SIGS	https://www	Leader	
134	2019	Special	Bgen	Downes	AMT	Surgeon General	MED	https://www	Specialist	
135	2019	JTFN	Bgen	Carpentier	JBP	JTFN	AEC	OB	Leader	
136	2019	Special	Bgen	Lacroix	SM	DG - Inter-american defen	ARMED	OB	Manager	
137	2019	CDL	Mgen	Friday	SG	Dcomd CENTCOM HQ	AEC	OB	Leader	
138	2019	NATO	Vadm	Hawco	DC	LO - NATO	NW	OB	Leader	
139	2019	NATO	LGen	Whitecross	C	Cmdt - NATO Mil College	CONST ENCL	AK	Leader	
140	2019	NATO	LGen	Juneau	JCG	Dcomd - JFC Naples	R22eR	http://www	Leader	
141	2019	NATO	Radm	Bishop	SEG	Chair - NATO Int Committe	NW	AK	Leader	
142	2019	NATO	Cmdre	Halle	MJM	ACOS - J4 SHAPE	NAV ENG	GS	Manager	
143	2019	NATO	Bgen	Smith	GR	ACOS - J5 SHAPE	RCR	OB	Manager	
144	2019	NATO	Bgen	Quinn	DA	LO - SHAPE	CONST ENCL	Blattherwic	Leader	
145	2019	NATO	Cmdre	Garnier	DM	Comd - CTF150	NW	https://ott	Leader	
146	2019	NATO	Cmdre	Kurtz	MTJ	Comd - Standing NATO Ma	NW	OB	Leader	
147	2019	NORAD	LGen	Coates	CJ	Dcomd - NORAD	PLT	OB	Leader	
148	2019	NORAD	Mgen	Lowthian	DW	Dir - Combat Operations J	PLT	OB	Leader	
149	2019	NORAD	Cmdre	Clarke	JA	NORAD & NORTHCOM J5	NW	OB	Leader	
150	2019	NORAD	Bgen	Clancy	SN	Dcomd - Alaskan NORAD	PLT	OB	Leader	
151	2019	NORAD	Bgen	Menard	SY	Dcomd - CONUS NORAD	PLT	OB	Leader	
152	2019	UN	Mgen	Eyre	WD	Dcomd - UN Comd Korea	PPCLI	AK	Leader	
153	2019	UN	Bgen	Gagne	RJM	Comd - Op Proteus	R22eR	OB	Leader	
154	2019	UN	Bgen	Girard	JJM	LO - UNHQ	SIGS	OB	Leader	Deduced
155	2019	JTFI	Bgen	Keiver	CR	JTFI	PLT	OB	Leader	
156	2019	JTFI	Bgen	St-Louis	MH	JTFI	R22eR	OB	Leader	
157	2019	JTFI	Mgen	Fortin	JSSD	Comd - LCC	ARTY	OB	Leader	
158	2019	JTFI	Bgen	Whelan	SJR	LO - Ministerial Ln Team	RCR	OB	Manager	
159	2019	JTFI	Bgen	Delaney	RP	LO - Ministerial Ln Team	MPO	GS	Manager	
160	2016	MND	Bgen	Therault	MML	DG - Public Affairs	PAO	https://ott	Specialist	
161	2016	CDL	Vadm	Maddison	P	High Commissioner - Aust	NW	WA	Leader	
162	2016	MND	Bgen	Martin	DE	Comd - CFPSA	PLT	https://ev	Leader	
163	2016	MND	Mgen	Patch	AC	COS - ADM(Mat)	EME	https://www	Specialist	
164	2016	MND	Bgen	Liedtke	W	COS - ADM(Fin)	LOG	https://www	Specialist	Air
165	2016	MND	Mgen	McQuillan	KD	COS - ADM(IE)	ENGR	https://cm	Specialist	
166	2016	MND	Mgen	Loos	GD	COS - ADM(IM)	CELE	https://dw	Specialist	
167	2016	MND	Radm	Stuart	EM	Seconded - TB	LOG	https://www	Specialist	Navy
168	2016	CDS	Gen	Vance	JH	CDS	RCR	AK	Leader	
169	2016	CDS	LGen	Thibault	GR	VCDS	SIGS	https://www	Manager	
170	2016	CDS	Cmdre	Santarpia	B	COS - VCDS	NW	GS	Manager	
171	2016	CDS	Bgen	Harris	TL	Senior Special Advisor to CA	AEC	Blattherwic	Leader	
172	2016	CDS	Radm	Hawco	DC	CFD	NW	OB	Manager	
173	2016	CDS	Mgen	Madower	JC	CProg	AERE	https://www	Manager	
174	2016	CDS	Mgen	Wynnyk	PF	CDI	ENGR	AK	Leader	
175	2016	CDS	Radm	Bishop	SEG	DG - International Security	NW	AK	Manager	
176	2016	CDS	Radm	Bennett	JJ	DG - SMRC	LOG	REF	Leader	Navy
177	2016	CMP	LGen	Whitecross	C	CMP	CONST ENCL	AK	Leader	
178	2016	CMP	Mgen	Joyce	DW	Dcomd - CMP	ACSO	OB	Manager	
179	2016	CMP	Bgen	Eldaoud	N	COS - CMP	EME	GS	Manager	
180	2016	MND	Bgen	Bedard	JGS	COS - ADM(Pers)	AEC	REF	Manager	
181	2016	CMP	Bgen	Colwell	LJ	PL - Military Personnel Ma	LOG	REF	Manager	FCWM
182	2016	CMP	Mgen	Milne	JG	Chief - MPMCT	ARMED	REF	Leader	
183	2016	CMP	Bgen	Sirois	JS	PL - MPMCT	ENGR	AK	Manager	
184	2016	CJOC	LGen	Bowes	SJP	CJOC	ARMED	https://www	Leader	
185	2016	CJOC	Radm	Ellis	JETP	Dcomd - CJOC	NW	https://www	Manager	
186	2016	CJOC	Bgen	Ploughman	B	COS Readiness - CJOC	PLT	https://ad	Leader	
187	2016	CJOC	Bgen	Horlock	KW	COS Support - CJOC	LOG	REF	Leader	
188	2016	CJOC	Bgen	Bourgon	MHL	COS Ops - CJOC	PLT	Blattherwic	Leader	
189	2016	CANSOFCC	Bgen	Rouleau	M	CANSOFCOM	ARTY	GS	Leader	SOF
190	2016	DG	Bgen	Woiden	KL	Comd - Cadet and Jr Rang	ARMED	REF	Leader	
191	2016	RCAF	Bgen	Ormsby	P	PL - MHP	ACSO	https://www	Manager	
192	2016	DG	Bgen	Lavoie	O	DG - Defence Force Planni	RCR	OB	Manager	
193	2016	DG	Bgen	Rutherford	P	DG - Info Mgt	SIGS	GS	Manager	
194	2016	DG	Bgen	Girard	JJM	DG - Military Signals and Ir	SIGS	OB	Leader	
195	2016	DG	Bgen	Moritsugu	SM	DG - Military Signals and Ir	SIGS	GS	Leader	

Serial	Year	Organization	Rank	Last Name	Initials	Position	Trade	Source	Position Ty	Notes
196	2016	DG	Bgen	Mackenzie	RRE	DG - Land Reserves	INF	https://www	Leader	
197	2016	DG	Bgen	Bury	PJ	DG - Reserves and Cadets	INF	http://hub	Leader	
198	2016	RCAF	Bgen	Howden	SA	DG - Air Staff and Air Rese	ACSO	https://www	Leader	
199	2016	DG	Bgen	Meloche	JPL	DG - Defence Security	ARMD	REF	Manager	
200	2016	DG	Bgen	Cadden	SM	DG - Land Capability Deve	ARMD	OB	Manager	
201	2016	DG	Bgen	Benson	AT	DG - Land Equipment	EME	OB	Manager	Deduced
202	2016	DG	Bgen	Balfe	TN	DG - Air Readiness	PLT	REF	Manager	
203	2016	DG	Bgen	Garbutt	PFC	DG - AF Development	AERE	REF	Manager	
204	2016	DG	Bgen	Lalumiere	JRM	DG - Space	PLT	https://www	Leader	
205	2016	DG	Bgen	Matheson	MA	DG - Compensation and Br	LOG	https://ca	Manager	Army
206	2016	DG	Bgen	Allen	FJ	DG - Cyberspace	CELE	AK	Leader	
207	2016	DG	Cmdre	Edmundson	HC	DG - Military Careers	NW	https://www	Manager	
208	2016	DG	Cmdre	Cantelon	SN	Chief - Force Developmen	NW	https://www	Manager	
209	2016	DG	Cmdre	Watson	MB	DG - Personnel and Family	LOG	https://www	Leader	
210	2016	DG	Cmdre	Page	JAS	DG - Maritime Equipment	NAV ENG	https://www	Manager	
211	2016	DG	Cmdre	McDonald	AG	DG - Naval Force Developr	NW	OB	Manager	
212	2016	DG	Cmdre	Cassivi	L	DG - Naval Strategic Readi	NW	OB	Manager	
213	2016	DG	Cmdre	Wood	MD	PM - CSC	NAV ENG	REF	Manager	
214	2016	DG	Bgen	Chapdelain	JJG	Chaplain General	CHAP	AK	Specialist	
215	2016	SJS	Mgen	Lamarre	CA	DOS	LOG	GS	Leader	Army
216	2016	SJS	Bgen	Dawe	PS	DG - J3 Ops	PPCLI	https://www	Leader	
217	2016	SJS	Cmdre	Auchterloni	JR	DG - J5 Plans	NW	OB	Leader	
218	2016	MND	Bgen	Paul	JMM	Seconded - PCO	R22eR	OB	Leader	
219	2016	MND	Bgen	Jorgensen	MP	Seconded - PCO	RCR	GS	Leader	
220	2016	Army	LGen	Hainse	M	Comd - CA	R22eR	WA	Leader	
221	2016	Army	Mgen	Juneau	JCG	Dcomd - CA	R22eR	http://www	Manager	
222	2016	Army	Bgen	Gosselin	JPHH	COS Ops - CA	R22eR	AK	Manager	
223	2016	Army	Bgen	Carignan	MAJ	COS Ops - CA	ENGR	AK	Manager	
224	2016	Army	Mgen	Milner	DJ	1Div	ARMD	GS	Leader	
225	2016	Army	Bgen	Eyre	WD	3Div	PPCLI	AK	Leader	
226	2016	Army	Bgen	Stanton	ND	Dcomd - 3Div	ARMD	OB	Leader	
227	2016	Army	Bgen	Thomas	LE	4Div	ARMD	http://www	Leader	
228	2016	Army	Bgen	Patterson	DA	Dcomd - 4Div	ARTY	GS	Leader	
229	2016	Army	Bgen	Lafaut	JRAS	2Div	R22eR	http://www	Leader	
230	2016	Army	Bgen	De Sousa	L	Dcomd - 2Div	INF	REF	Leader	
231	2016	Army	Bgen	Turenne	CJ	5Div	ARMD	https://au	Leader	
232	2016	Army	Bgen	Camsell	JF	Dcomd - 5Div	LOG	OB	Leader	
233	2016	Army	Bgen	Fortin	JSSD	Dcomd 1 Corps USAR	ARTY	OB	Leader	
234	2016	Army	Bgen	Hetheringt	SC	Dcomd 18 Airborne USAR	ARTY	GS	Leader	
235	2016	RCN	Vadm	Norman	MAG	RCN	NW	AK	Leader	
236	2016	RCN	Radm	Lloyd	MFR	Dcomd - RCN	NW	WA	Manager	
237	2016	RCN	Radm	Newton	JF	MARLANT	NW	WA	Leader	
238	2016	RCN	Cmdre	Baines	CA	CFA	NW	OB	Leader	
239	2016	RCN	Radm	Couturier	JPG	MARPAC	NW	WA	Leader	
240	2016	RCN	Cmdre	Zwick	JB	CFP	NW	http://www	Leader	
241	2016	RCN	Cmdre	Mulkins	M	Comd - NRD	NW	Blatherwic	Leader	
242	2016	RCAF	LGen	Hood	MJ	RCAF	PLT	WA	Leader	
243	2016	RCAF	Mgen	Meinzing	AD	Dcomd - RCAF	PLT	OB	Manager	
244	2016	RCAF	Bgen	Cloutier	JEG	Special Advisor CAS	PLT	REF	Manager	
245	2016	RCAF	Bgen	Reid	GM	Dcos Support	ACSO	REF	Manager	
246	2016	RCAF	Bgen	Russell	NE	Strat J4 at NDHQ	LOG	REF	Manager	Air
247	2016	RCAF	Mgen	Wheeler	DLR	1CAD	PLT	REF	Leader	
248	2016	RCAF	Bgen	Frawley	BF	Dcomd Support 1CAD	PLT	OB	Manager	
249	2016	RCAF	Bgen	Lowthian	DW	Dcomd FG 1CAD	PLT	OB	Manager	
250	2016	RCAF	Bgen	Cochrane	DB	2CAD	ACSO	WA	Leader	
251	2016	MND	Mgen	Cathcart	BB	JAG	LEGAL	GS	Specialist	
252	2016	CDL	Bgen	Overton	MK	CDL London	PPCLI	https://cd	Leader	
253	2016	CDL	Radm	Truelove	WS	CDL Washington	NW	https://ww	Leader	
254	2016	CDL	Bgen	Anderson	DJ	CDL - Pentagon	PPCLI	GS	Leader	
255	2016	CDL	Bgen	Mazzolin	RG	CDL - Cyber Command	SIGS	https://usc	Leader	SSF Troop Comd
256	2016	CDL	Bgen	Seymour	WF	LnO - PACOM	ACSO	https://ww	Leader	
257	2016	CDA	Mgen	Tremblay	JGE	CDA	RCA	GS	Leader	
258	2016	Army	Mgen	Lanthier	JM	CADTC	ARMD	OB	Leader	
259	2016	CDA	Bgen	Whelan	SJR	Dcomd - CDA	RCR	OB	Manager	
260	2016	Army	Bgen	Stack	AT	Dcomd - CADTC	ENGR	GS	Manager	

Serial	Year	Organization	Rank	Last Name	Initials	Position	Trade	Source	Position Ty	Notes
261	2016	CDA	Bgen	Friday	SG	RMC	AEC	OB	Leader	
262	2016	CDA	Bgen	Cotten	KR	CFC	ARTY	https://ww	Leader	
263	2016	Special	Bgen	MacKay	HC	Surgeon General	MED	GS	Specialist	SIGS
264	2016	NATO	Mgen	Bernier	JJR	Chair - NATO COMEDS	MED	REF	Specialist	Formerly PPCLI
265	2016	JTFN	Bgen	Nixon	MA	JTFN	ARMD	https://cat	Leader	
266	2016	CDL	Bgen	Corbould	GD	CDL - J5 CENTCOM	PPCLI	GS	Leader	
267	2016	NATO	LGen	Parent	JAJ	Dcomd - JFC Naples	PLT	https://ww	Leader	
268	2016	NATO	Vadm	Davidson	RA	Canadian Military Rep - N/ NW		https://ww	Leader	
269	2016	NORAD	LGen	St Amand	JPJ	Dcomd - NORAD	PLT	https://ww	Leader	
270	2016	NORAD	Mgen	Coates	CJ	Dir - Combat Operations J:	PLT	OB	Leader	
271	2016	NORAD	Bgen	Drouin	JHC	NORAD & NORTHCOM J5	PLT	https://ww	Leader	
272	2016	NORAD	Bgen	Pelletier	JPA	Dcomd - CONUS NORAD	PLT	OB	Leader	
273	2016	NORAD	Bgen	Laroche	JRP	Dcomd - Alaskan NORAD	PLT	OB	Leader	
274	2016	UN	Bgen	Chagnon	JF	Comd - Op Proteus	SIGS	OB	Leader	
275	2016	UN	Bgen	Cadieu	TJ	Comd - Op Proteus	ARMD	OB	Leader	
276	2016	UN	Mgen	Thompson	DW	Comd - MFO	RCR	AK	Leader	
277	2016	JTFI	Bgen	Constable	DS	JTFI	PLT	https://ott	Leader	
278	2016	JTFI	Bgen	Brennan	SA	JTFI	PPCLI	REF	Leader	
279	2016	JTFI	Bgen	Irvine	JA	JTFI	PLT	https://ww	Leader	
280	2016	JTFI	Bgen	Macaulay	DA	JTFI	ARMD	OB	Leader	
281	2016	JTFI	Bgen	Laroche	JRP	CAOC	PLT	OB	Leader	
282	2016	JTFI	Bgen	Pelletier	JPA	CAOC	PLT	OB	Leader	
283	2013	MND	Bgen	Madower	JC	DG - Public Affairs	AERE	https://ww	Specialist	
284	2013	MND	Bgen	Bedard	JGS	DG - ADM(PA)	AEC	REF	Specialist	
285	2013	MND	Bgen	Martin	DE	Comd - CFPSA	PLT	https://eve	Leader	
286	2013	MND	Radm	Finn	PT	COS - ADM(Mat)	NAV ENG	GS	Specialist	
287	2013	CMP	Cmdre	Steele	EM	Dcomd CMP	LOG	Blatherwic	Manager	Navy
288	2013	MND	Mgen	Bertrand	RPF	DG - ADM(Fin)	LOG	REF	Specialist	
289	2013	MND	Mgen	Whitecross	C	COS - ADM(IE)	CONST EN	AK	Specialist	
290	2013	MND	Mgen	Neasmith	DG	COS - ADM(IM)	SIGS	GS	Specialist	
291	2013	CDS	Gen	Lawson	TJ	CDS	PLT	WA	Leader	
292	2013	CDS	Vadm	Donaldson	AB	VCDS	NW	WA	Manager	
293	2013	CDS	Bgen	King	CR	COS - VCDS	PPCLI	GS	Manager	
294	2013	CDS	Radm	Lloyd	MFR	CFD	NW	WA	Manager	
295	2013	CDS	Mgen	Poulter	IC	CProg	EME	GS	Manager	
296	2013	CDS	Mgen	Rousseau	JMC	CDI	ENGR	GS	Leader	
297	2013	CDS	Mgen	Day	DM	DG - International Security	PPCLI	GS	Manager	SOF
298	2013	CMP	Mgen	Millar	DB	CMP	AERE	REF	Leader	
299	2013	CMP	Radm	Smith	AM	CMP	NAV ENG	GS	Leader	
300	2013	CMP	Bgen	Overton	MK	Dcomd CMP	PPCLI	https://cdc	Manager	
301	2013	CMP	Bgen	Meloche	JPL	Comd - CFRG	ARMD	REF	Leader	
302	2013	CMP	Bgen	Bedard	JGS	COS - ADM(Pers)	AEC	REF	Manager	
303	2013	CMP	Bgen	Colwell	LJ	PL - Military Personnel Ma	LOG	REF	Manager	
304	2013	CMP	Radm	Smith	AM	Chief - MPMCT	NAV ENG	REF	Leader	
305	2013	CMP	Mgen	Howard	AJ	Chief - MPMCT	ARTY	REF	Leader	
306	2013	CMP	Bgen	Cotten	KR	PL - MPMCT	ARTY	https://ww	Manager	
307	2013	CJOC	LGen	Beare	SA	CJOC	ARTY	GS	Leader	
308	2013	CJOC	Radm	Ellis	JETP	Dcomd - Expeditionary	NW	https://ww	Leader	
309	2013	CJOC	Mgen	Foster	RD	Dcomd - Continental	PLT	REF	Leader	
310	2013	CJOC	Mgen	Coates	CJ	Dcomd - Continental	PLT	OB	Leader	
311	2013	CJOC	Bgen	Thomas	LE	COS - Expeditionary	ARMD	http://www	Leader	
312	2013	CJOC	Mgen	Noonan	SP	CJOSG	ENGR	https://cm	Leader	
313	2013	CJOC	Bgen	MacKay	JCF	CJOSG	LOG	REF	Leader	Army
314	2013	CANSOFCC	Bgen	Thompson	DW	CANSOFCOM	RCR	AK	Leader	
315	2013	MND	LGen	Semianiw	W	VAC	PPCLI	https://vet	Leader	
316	2013	MND	Bgen	Jaeger	HJ	VAC	MED	Blatherwic	Leader	INF, LOG
317	2013	DG	Bgen	Loos	GD	DG - Cyberspace	CELE	https://dw	Leader	
318	2013	DG	Bgen	Brennan	SA	CFD	PPCLI	REF	Manager	
319	2013	DG	Bgen	Patch	AC	DG - Land Equipment	EME	https://ww	Manager	
320	2013	DG	Bgen	Mazzolin	RG	DG - Info Mgt	SIGS	https://usc	Manager	SSF Troop Comd
321	2013	DG	Bgen	Williams	RS	DG - Military Signals and Ir	INT	AK	Leader	
322	2013	DG	Bgen	Kowal	HJ	DG - Military Careers	AERE	https://ww	Manager	
323	2013	DG	Bgen	Woiden	KL	DG - Land Reserves	INF	REF	Leader	
324	2013	DG	Bgen	Milne	JG	DG - Reserves and Cadets	ARMD	REF	Leader	
325	2013	DG	Bgen	McQuillan	KD	DG - Land Operations CA	ENGR	https://cm	Leader	

Serial	Year	Organization	Rank	Last Name	Initials	Position	Trade	Source	Position Ty	Notes
326	2013	DG	Bgen	Rutherford	P	DG - Security	SIGS	GS	Leader	
327	2013	DG	Bgen	Simms	JB	DG - Land Capability Deve	RRCR	https://www	Manager	
328	2013	DG	Bgen	Matte	PR	DG - Capability Developm	ACSO	http://new	Manager	
329	2013	DG	Bgen	Kummel	SJ	DG - AF Development	ACSO	REF	Manager	
330	2013	DG	Bgen	Russell	NE	DG - Air Personnel	LOG	REF	Manager	Air
331	2013	RCAF	Bgen	Reid	GM	DG - Air Staff and Air Rese	ACSO	REF	Leader	
332	2013	DG	Bgen	Pitre	RR	DG - Space	AEC	https://new	Leader	
333	2013	DG	Cmdre	Bisson	L	DG - Compensation and Br	LOG		Blatherwic Manager	Navy
334	2013	DG	Cmdre	Watson	MB	DG - Personnel and Family	LOG	https://www	Leader	
335	2013	DG	Cmdre	Halle	MJM	DG - Maritime Equipment	NAV ENG	REF	Manager	
336	2013	DG	Cmdre	Sing	DL	DG - Naval Force Developr	NW	REF	Manager	
337	2013	DG	Cmdre	Adamson	MS	PM - CSC	NAV ENG	GS	Manager	
338	2013	DG	Bgen	McLean	KR	Chaplain General	CHAP	GS	Specialist	
339	2013	SJS	Mgen	Vance	JH	DOS	RRCR	AK	Leader	
340	2013	SJS	Mgen	Hood	MJ	DOS	PLT	WA	Leader	
341	2013	SJS	Bgen	Lamarre	CA	DG - J3 Ops	LOG	GS	Leader	Army
342	2013	SJS	Bgen	Matheson	MA	DG - J5 Plans	LOG	https://ca	Leader	Army
343	2013	SJS	Bgen	Davies	DA	Senior Delegate - AF Strat	PLT	REF	Leader	
344	2013	MND	Mgen	Millar	DB	PCO	AERE	REF	Leader	
345	2013	MND	Bgen	Joyce	DW	PCO	ACSO	OB	Leader	
346	2013	Army	LGen	Devlin	PJ	Comd CA	RRCR	WA	Leader	
347	2013	Army	Mgen	Wynnyk	PF	Dcomd - CA	ENGR	AK	Manager	
348	2013	Army	Mgen	Collin	JGJC	1Div	ARMD	REF	Leader	
349	2013	Army	Bgen	Juneau	JCG	3Div	R22eR	http://www	Leader	
350	2013	Army	Bgen	Mackenzie	RR	Dcomd - 3Div	PPCLI	https://www	Leader	INF
351	2013	Army	Bgen	Bury	PJ	Dcomd - 3Div	INF	http://hub	Leader	
352	2013	Army	Bgen	Lavoie	O	4Div	RRCR	OB	Leader	
353	2013	Army	Bgen	Chapman	JC	4Div	INF	GS	Leader	
354	2013	Army	Bgen	Giguere	JR	2Div	R22eR	OB	Leader	
355	2013	Army	Bgen	Hebert	S	Dcomd - 2Div	ENGR	REF	Leader	
356	2013	Army	Bgen	Thurrott	CC	5Div	LOG	https://www	Leader	Army
357	2013	Army	Bgen	Henley	JDG	Dcomd - 5Div	ARTY	REF	Leader	
358	2013	Army	Bgen	Lanthier	JM	Dcomd 1 Corps USAR	ARMD	OB	Leader	
359	2013	Army	Bgen	Milner	DJ	Dcomd 3 Corps USAR	ARMD	GS	Leader	
360	2013	Army	Bgen	Eyre	WD	Dcomd 18 Airborne USAR	PPCLI	AK	Leader	
361	2013	Army	Bgen	Putt	TE	Dcomd 5 Corps USAR	ARMD	REF	Leader	
362	2013	RCN	Vadm	Maddison	PA	RCN	NW	WA	Leader	
363	2013	RCN	Radm	Norman	MAG	Dcomd - RCN	NW	AK	Manager	
364	2013	RCN	Radm	Newton	JF	MARLANT	NW	WA	Leader	
365	2013	RCN	Cmdre	Hawco	DC	CFA	NW	OB	Leader	
366	2013	RCN	Radm	Truelove	WS	MARPAC	NW	https://www	Leader	
367	2013	RCN	Cmdre	Bishop	SEG	CFP	NW	AK	Leader	
368	2013	RCN	Cmdre	Craig	D	Comd - Reserve Forces Qu	NW	REF	Leader	
369	2013	RCN	Cmdre	Gagliardi	DP	PTL - French	NAV ENG	GS	Exception	
370	2013	RCAF	LGen	Blondin	JAY	RCAF	PLT	WA	Leader	
371	2013	RCAF	Mgen	Hood	MJ	Dcomd - RCAF	PLT	WA	Manager	
372	2013	RCAF	Mgen	Foster	RD	Dcomd - RCAF	PLT	REF	Manager	
373	2013	RCAF	Bgen	Cloutier	JEG	Special Advisor CAS	PLT	REF	Manager	
374	2013	RCAF	Bgen	Reid	GM	Air Reserve Adv and Dep C	ACSO	REF	Leader	
375	2013	RCAF	Mgen	St Amand	JPJ	1CAD	PLT	https://www	Leader	
376	2013	RCAF	Bgen	Ploughman	JB	Dcomd - 1CAD	PLT	https://ad	Manager	
377	2013	RCAF	Bgen	Wheeler	DLR	Dcomd Support 1CAD	PLT	REF	Manager	
378	2013	RCAF	Bgen	Galvin	MMP	2CAD	AEC	https://www	Leader	
379	2013	MND	Mgen	Cathcart	BB	JAG	LEGAL	GS	Specialist	
380	2013	CDL	Bgen	Dabros	MR	CDL London	PLT	GS	Leader	
381	2013	CDL	LGen	Thibault	GR	Chair - IADB	SIGS	https://www	Leader	
382	2013	CDL	Mgen	Matern	EN	CDL Washington	R22eR	http://www	Leader	SOF
383	2013	CDL	Bgen	Ormsby	P	CDL - Pentagon	ACSO	https://www	Leader	
384	2013	CDA	Mgen	Forgues	PJ	CDA	AEC	http://airc	Leader	
385	2013	Army	Mgen	Bowes	SJP	CADTC	ARMD	https://www	Leader	
386	2013	Army	Bgen	Stack	AT	Dcomd - CADTC	ENGR	GS	Manager	
387	2013	CDA	Bgen	Tremblay	JGE	RMC	RCA	GS	Leader	
388	2013	CDA	Bgen	Hilton	DC	CFC	ARMD	GS	Leader	
389	2013	Special	Bgen	Bernier	JRS	Surgeon General	MED	REF	Specialist	
390	2013	JTFN	Bgen	Hamel	JRG	JTFN	PLT	REF	Leader	

Serial	Year	Organization	Rank	Last Name	Initials	Position	Trade	Source	Position Ty	Notes
391	2010	MND	Bgen	Blanchette	RV	DG - ADM(PA)	R22eR	REF	Specialist	
392	2010	MND	Bgen	Martin	DE	Comd - CFPSA	PLT	https://evc	Leader	
393	2010	MND	Mgen	Poulter	IC	DCOS - Material	EME	GS	Manager	
394	2010	MND	Bgen	McQuillan	ME	COS - ADM(Mat)	LOG	https://inf	Specialist	Army
395	2010	MND	Bgen	Rochette	JGCY	DG - Finance	LOG	REF	Specialist	
396	2010	MND	Mgen	Benjamin	DJRS	COS - ADM(IE)	ENGR	GS	Specialist	
397	2010	MND	Mgen	Thibault	GR	COS - ADM(IM)	SIGS	https://ww	Specialist	
398	2010	CDS	Gen	Natynczyk	WJ	CDS	ARMD	AK	Leader	
399	2010	CDS	Vadm	Rouleau	JAD	VCDS	NW	WA	Manager	
400	2010	CDS	Bgen	Barabe	JGJC	COS - VCDS	ARTY	REF	Manager	
401	2010	MND	Mgen	Beare	SA	CFD	ARTY	GS	Manager	
402	2010	MND	Mgen	Bertrand	RPF	CProg	LOG	REF	Manager	
403	2010	CFINTCOM	Mgen	MacDonald	MG	CDI	ARMD	GS	Leader	
404	2010	CFINTCOM	Mgen	Rousseau	JMC	CDI	ENGR	GS	Leader	
405	2010	MND	Mgen	Ward	MJ	DG - International Security	ARMD	REF	Manager	
406	2010	MND	Cmdre	Gardam	DC	DG - MILPERS Managemer	NW	https://ww	Manager	
407	2010	CMP	Mgen	Semianiw	W	CMP	PPCLI	https://vet	Leader	
408	2010	CMP	Cmdre	Smith	AM	Assistant CMP	NAV ENG	REF	Manager	
409	2010	CMP	Bgen	Madower	JC	Assistant CMP	AERE	REF	Manager	
410	2010	CMP	Cmdre	MacKeigan	DM	Comd - CFRG	NW	http://ww	Leader	
411	2010	CMP	Bgen	Colwell	LJ	PL - Military Personnel Ma	LOG	REF	Manager	
412	2010	CMP	LGen	Leslie	AB	Chief of Transformation	ARTY	WA	Leader	
413	2010	CMP	Bgen	Menard	JBD	PL - MPMCT	R22eR	http://ww	Manager	
414	2010	CJOC	Vadm	Donaldson	AB	CANCOM	NW	WA	Leader	
415	2010	CJOC	LGen	Semianiw	W	CANCOM	PPCLI	https://vet	Leader	
416	2010	CJOC	Bgen	Champagne	JAG	Dcomd CANCOM	R22eR	https://jm	Manager	
417	2010	CJOC	Bgen	Lacroix	JPP	COS CANCOM	ARMD	OB	Manager	
418	2010	CJOC	Bgen	Matte	GCP	COS CANCOM	PLT	GS	Manager	
419	2010	CJOC	LGen	Lessard	JGM	CEFCOM	R22eR	OB	Leader	
420	2010	CJOC	Mgen	Devlin	PJ	Dcomd CEFCOM	RCR	WA	Manager	
421	2010	CJOC	Bgen	Parent	JAJ	COS Ops CEFCOM	PLT	https://ww	Leader	
422	2010	CJOC	Bgen	Matern	EN	COS Ops CEFCOM	R22eR	http://ww	Leader	SOF
423	2010	CJOC	Mgen	McQuillan	ME	CANOSCOM	LOG	https://inf	Leader	Army
424	2010	CJOC	Bgen	Whitecross	C	Dcomd CANOSCOM	CONST EN	AK	Manager	
425	2010	CJOC	Bgen	Thurrott	CC	Dcomd CANOSCOM	LOG	https://ww	Manager	Army
426	2010	CANSOFCC	Bgen	Day	DM	CANSOFCOM	PPCLI	GS	Leader	SOF
427	2010	MND	Bgen	Rousseau	JMC	Dir - PCO	ENGR	GS	Leader	
428	2010	MND	Bgen	Millar	DB	Dir - PCO	AERE	REF	Leader	
429	2010	DG	Bgen	Patch	AC	DG - Land Equipment	EME	https://ww	Manager	
430	2010	DG	Bgen	Kampman	MD	DG - Force Development	ARMD	GS	Manager	
431	2010	DG	Bgen	Noonan	SP	DG - Info Mgt	ENGR	https://cm	Manager	
432	2010	DG	Bgen	Turnbull	JL	DG - Military Signals and Ir	SIGS	https://ww	Leader	
433	2010	DG	Bgen	Madower	JC	DG - Military Careers	AERE	REF	Manager	
434	2010	DG	Bgen	Obrien	GJP	DG - Land Reserves	INF	https://ww	Leader	
435	2010	DG	Bgen	Tremblay	JRA	DG - Land Capability Deve	EME	http://rcer	Manager	
436	2010	DG	Bgen	Matte	PR	DG - Capability Developme	ACSO	http://new	Manager	
437	2010	DG	Bgen	Davies	DA	DG - AF Development	PLT	REF	Manager	
438	2010	DG	Bgen	Leversedge	TFJ	DG - Air Personnel	AERE	GS	Manager	
439	2010	RCAF	Bgen	Thuen	EB	DG - Air Staff and Air Rese	ACSO	https://jm	Leader	
440	2010	DG	Cmdre	Greenwood	RW	DG - Maritime Equipment	NAV ENG	https://ww	Manager	
441	2010	DG	Cmdre	Hickey	LM	DG - Maritime Personnel	NW	https://ww	Manager	
442	2010	DG	Cmdre	Ellis	JETP	DG - Maritime Force Deve	NW	https://ww	Manager	
443	2010	DG	Cmdre	Sing	DL	DG - Naval Force Developr	NW	REF	Manager	
444	2010	DG	Cmdre	Maclsaac	JR	DG - Reserves and Cadets	LOG	https://ww	Leader	Navy
445	2010	DG	Cmdre	Finn	PT	PM - CSC	NAV ENG	REF	Manager	
446	2010	DG	Cmdre	Adamson	MS	PM - CSC	NAV ENG	GS	Manager	
447	2010	DG	Bgen	Kettle	DC	Chaplain General	CHAP	GS	Specialist	
448	2010	DG	Bgen	McLean	KR	Chaplain General	CHAP	GS	Specialist	
449	2010	SJS	Radm	Davidson	RA	DOS	NW	https://ww	Leader	
450	2010	SJS	Cmdre	Gardam	DC	DG - Strategic Coordinatio	NW	https://ww	Manager	
451	2010	SJS	Bgen	King	CR	DG - J3 Ops	PPCLI	GS	Leader	
452	2010	SJS	Bgen	Kummel	SJ	DG - J5 Plans	ACSO	REF	Leader	
453	2010	SJS	Cmdre	Williams	KE	Chief of Strategic Review	NW	REF	Manager	
454	2010	SJS	Mgen	Fraser	DA	Commander Designate Joi	PPCLI	http://ww	Leader	
455	2010	Army	LGen	Leslie	AB	Comd CA	ARTY	WA	Leader	

Serial	Year	Organization	Rank	Last Name	Initials	Position	Trade	Source	Position Ty	Notes
456	2010	Army	LGen	Devlin	PJ	Comd CA	RCR	WA	Leader	
457	2010	Army	Mgen	Fraser	DA	Dcomd - CA	PPCLI	http://www	Manager	
458	2010	Army	Mgen	Howard	AJ	Dcomd - CA	ARTY	REF	Manager	
459	2010	Army	Bgen	Thompson	DW	COS CA	RCR	AK	Manager	
460	2010	Army	Bgen	Jorgensen	MP	3Div	RCR	GS	Leader	
461	2010	Army	Bgen	Woiden	KL	Dcomd - 3Div	INF	REF	Leader	
462	2010	Army	Bgen	Collin	JGJC	4Div	ARMD	REF	Leader	
463	2010	Army	Bgen	Milne	JG	Dcomd - 4Div	ARMD	REF	Leader	
464	2010	Army	Bgen	Laroche	JRMG	2Div	R22eR	WA	Leader	
465	2010	Army	Bgen	Hebert	S	Dcomd - 2Div	INF	GS	Leader	Uncertain
466	2010	Army	Bgen	Neasmith	DG	5Div	SIGS	GS	Leader	Exception
467	2010	Army	Bgen	Stack	AT	Dcomd - 5Div	ENGR	GS	Leader	
468	2010	Army	Bgen	Tremblay	JGE	Dcomd 1 Corps USAR	RCA	GS	Leader	
469	2010	Army	Bgen	Atkinson	PJ	Dcomd 3 Corps USAR	ARMD	http://www	Leader	
470	2010	Army	Bgen	Juneau	JCG	Dcomd 17 Corps USAR	R22eR	http://www	Leader	
471	2010	Army	Bgen	Matern	EN	Dcomd 18 Airborne USAR	R22eR	http://www	Leader	SOF
472	2010	RCN	Vadm	McFadden	PD	RCN	NW	WA	Leader	
473	2010	RCN	Radm	Greenwood	NS	Dcomd - RCN	NW	https://www	Manager	
474	2010	RCN	Radm	Maddison	PA	MARLANT	NW	WA	Leader	
475	2010	RCN	Cmdre	Norman	MAG	CFA	NW	AK	Leader	
476	2010	RCN	Radm	Pile	THW	MARPAC	NW	https://cm	Leader	
477	2010	RCN	Cmdre	Lloyd	MFR	CFP	NW	WA	Leader	
478	2010	RCN	Cmdre	Bennett	JJ	Naval Reserves	LOG	Blatherwic	Leader	Navy
479	2010	RCN	Cmdre	Gardam	DC	Maritime Warfare Centre	NW	https://www	Leader	
480	2010	RCN	Cmdre	Gagliardi	DP	PTL - French	NW	REF	Exception	
481	2010	RCAF	LGen	Deschamps	JPA	RCAF	PLT	WA	Leader	
482	2010	RCAF	Mgen	Lawson	TJ	Dcomd - RCAF	PLT	WA	Manager	
483	2010	RCAF	Bgen	Thuen	EB	DG - Air Staff and Air Rese	ACSO	https://jm	Leader	
484	2010	RCAF	Bgen	Clark	RH	Senior Air Reserve Advisor	AEC	REF	Leader	
485	2010	RCAF	Bgen	Cloutier	JEG	Special Advisor CAS	PLT	REF	Manager	
486	2010	RCAF	Bgen	Foster	RD	Dcomd FG 1CAD	PLT	REF	Manager	
487	2010	RCAF	Mgen	Blondin	JAY	1CAD	PLT	WA	Leader	
488	2010	RCAF	Bgen	Brennan	PL	COS - Reserves	LOG	REF	Leader	
489	2010	RCAF	Bgen	Pitre	RR	2CAD	AEC	https://ne	Leader	
490	2010	MND	Bgen	Watkin	K	JAG	LEGAL	REF	Specialist	
491	2010	MND	Bgen	Cathcart	BB	JAG	LEGAL	GS	Specialist	
492	2010	CDL	Mgen	Hincke	JDA	CDL London	PLT	REF	Leader	
493	2010	CDL	Mgen	Gosselin	JPYD	CDL London	R22eR	AK	Leader	
494	2010	CDL	Mgen	Langton	DW	CDL Washington	ACSO	https://www	Leader	
495	2010	CDA	Mgen	Gosselin	JPYD	CDA	R22eR	AK	Leader	
496	2010	CDA	Mgen	Ward	MJ	CDA	ARMD	REF	Leader	
497	2010	Army	Mgen	Hainse	M	CADTC	R22eR	WA	Leader	
498	2010	Army	Bgen	Parsons	RG	Dcomd CADTC	INF	REF	Manager	
499	2010	Army	Bgen	Stafford	GR	Dcomd CADTC	INF	GS	Manager	
500	2010	CDA	Cmdre	Truelove	WS	RMC	NW	https://www	Leader	
501	2010	CDA	Bgen	Hilton	DC	CFC	ARMD	GS	Leader	
502	2010	DG	Mgen	Tabbemor	DC	DG - Reserves and Cadets	INF	https://www	Leader	
503	2010	Special	Cmdre	Jung	HW	Surgeon General	MED	WA	Specialist	
504	2010	JTFN	Bgen	Millar	DB	JTFN	AERE	REF	Leader	
505	2010	JTFN	Bgen	Hamel	JJRG	JTFN	PLT	REF	Leader	
506	2010	JTF(AFG)	Mgen	Sullivan	CA	Dcomd (Air) - ISAF	PLT	https://www	Leader	
507	2010	JTF(AFG)	Bgen	Menard	JBD	Comd	R22eR	http://www	Leader	
508	2010	JTF(AFG)	Bgen	Vance	JH	Comd	RCR	AK	Leader	
509	2010	JTF(AFG)	Bgen	Milner	DJ	Comd	ARMD	GS	Leader	
510	2010	JTF(AFG)	Mgen	Ward	MJ	Dcomd NTMA	ARMD	REF	Manager	
511	2010	JTF(AFG)	Bgen	Jaeger	HF	Medical Advisor to Comd	MED	Blatherwic	Specialist	INF, LOG
512	2010	JTF(AFG)	Bgen	King	CR	Dcomd Strategic Effects	PPCLI	GS	Leader	
513	2010	JTF(AFG)	Bgen	Bowes	SJP	Dcomd Plans and Projects	ARMD	https://www	Manager	
514	2010	JTF(AFG)	Bgen	Ferron	JR	LO - CENTCOM	ARMD	GS	Leader	
515	2010	JTF(AFG)	Bgen	Whitecross	C	DCOS ISAF Comms	CONST EN	AK	Manager	
516	2010	JTF(AFG)	Bgen	Corbould	KA	Dcomd 10 Mtn Div USAR	ENGR	https://cm	Leader	
517	2010	JTF(AFG)	Bgen	Wynnyk	PF	Acomd Combined Transiti	ENGR	AK	Leader	
518	2010	JTF(AFG)	Bgen	Neasmith	DG	Acomd Combined Transiti	SIGS	GS	Leader	
519	2010	NATO	LGen	Bouchard	JJ	Dcomd - JFC Naples	PLT	WA	Leader	
520	2010	NATO	LGen	Maisonneu	JOM	COS - NATO SAC Norfolk	ARMD	http://www	Leader	

Serial	Year	Organizati	Rank	Last Name	Initials	Position	Trade	Source	Position Ty	Notes
521	2010	NATO	LGen	Davis	CJR	Canadian Military Rep - N/ARMD		https://www	Leader	
522	2010	NATO	Mgen	Hines	AG	Dir - NATO HQ Consultatio	SIGS	GS	Manager	
523	2010	NATO	Bgen	Selbie	JJ	DOS - SHAPE	ARTY	http://rca	Leader	
524	2010	NATO	Bgen	St Amand	JPJ	J5 Director Strat Plans NAT	PLT	https://www	Leader	
525	2010	NORAD	LGen	Duval	JM	Dcomd - NORAD	PLT	WA	Leader	
526	2010	NORAD	Mgen	Forgues	PJ	Dir - Combat Operations J:	AEC	http://airc	Leader	
527	2010	NORAD	Bgen	Checkan	RJ	NORAD & NORTHCOM J5	AEC	REF	Leader	
528	2010	NORAD	Bgen	Viens	JYRA	Dcomd - Continental USA	PLT	REF	Leader	
529	2010	UN	Bgen	Laroche	JRMG	Comd - JTF(Haiti)	R22eR	WA	Leader	

Total	529
Leader	317
Manager	170
Specialist	39
Exception	3
Checksum	529

ANNEX B: TRADE DATA

ORIGINAL DATA

	COL	LCOL	MAJ	CAPT/LT
TOTAL	366	1407	4252	5793
ACSO	18	61	178	199
AEC	10	37	148	279
AERE	10	60	234	319
ARMD	20	59	158	186
ARTY	18	54	162	240
BIO	0	2	11	21
CELE	8	45	146	162
CHAP	3	15	55	113
CONST ENGR	6	29	74	76
DENT	2	10	60	45
EME	13	48	133	154
ENGR	17	61	161	151
HCA	0	0	33	123
HSO	7	31	32	0
INF	35	144	315	475
INT	11	45	166	207
LEGAL	12	37	94	0
LOG	43	193	552	746
MED	13	41	120	26
MPO	3	18	60	98
MS ENG	0	0	113	119
MUSIC	0	1	4	6
NAV ENG	12	38	0	0
NCSE	0	0	111	126
NUR	0	3	23	197
NW	48	137	315	375
PA	0	1	9	93
PAO	3	15	59	87
PHARM	0	2	7	35
PHYSIO	0	1	5	29
PLT	39	127	379	735
PSEL	1	13	51	62
SIGS	13	66	212	197
SOCW	0	1	9	14
TRG DEV	1	12	63	98

MODIFIED DATA

	CAPT/LT	MAJ	LCOL	COL
TOTAL	5793	4252	1407	366
ACSO	199	178	61	18
AEC	279	148	37	10
AERE	319	234	60	10
ARMD	186	158	59	20
ARTY	240	162	54	18
CELE	162	146	45	8
CONST ENGR	76	74	29	6
EME	154	133	48	13
ENGR	151	161	61	17
INF	475	315	144	35
INT	207	166	45	11
LEGAL	0	94	37	12
LOG	746	552	193	43
MPO	98	60	18	3
NAV ENG	245	224	38	12
NW	375	315	137	48
PAO	87	59	15	3
PLT	735	379	127	39
PSEL	62	51	13	1
SIGS	197	212	66	13
TRG DEV	98	63	12	1

ANNEX C: REFINED DATA

Serial	Year	Organization	Rank	Last Name	Initials	Position	Trade	Source	Position Ty	Notes
93	2019	Army	Bgen	Aitchison	C	Dcomd USAR Alaska	RCR	OB	Leader	
11	2019	CDS	Mgen	Allen	FJ	DVCDS	CELE	AK	Manager	
38	2019	CJOC	Bgen	Anderson	DJ	DCOS Ops - CJOC	PPCLI	GS	Manager	
97	2019	RCN	Radm	Auchterlonie	JR	MARPAC	NW	OB	Leader	
84	2019	Army	Bgen	Awalt	DRA	Dcomd - 3Div	SIGS	OB	Leader	
99	2019	RCN	Radm	Baines	CA	MARLANT	NW	OB	Leader	
52	2019	DG	Bgen	Barker	MR	DG - Aerospace Equip Proj Mgt	AERE	REF	Manager	
51	2019	DG	Bgen	Basinger	DD	DG - Capability and Structure	ENGR	AK	Manager	
32	2019	CMP	Bgen	Bedard	JGS	COS - ADM(Pers)	AEC	REF	Manager	
47	2019	DG	Bgen	Benson	AT	DG - Land Equipment	EME	OB	Manager	Deduced
40	2019	CJOC	Bgen	Bernard	JAS	COS Plans - CJOC	R22eR	OB	Leader	
118	2019	MND	Cmdre	Bernatchez	G	JAG	LEGAL	Blatherwic	Specialist	
21	2019	CFINTCOM	Radm	Bishop	SEG	CDI	NW	AK	Leader	
72	2019	SJS	Bgen	Boivin	JMS	DDOS	R22eR	OB	Manager	
95	2019	Army	Bgen	Boivin	JRS	Dcomd 1 Corps USAR	ARMD	OB	Leader	
128	2019	CDA	Bgen	Bouchard	S	RMC	EME	OB	Leader	
39	2019	CJOC	Bgen	Bourgon	MHL	COS Readiness - CJOC	PLT	Blatherwic	Leader	
24	2019	CDS	Lgen	Bowes	SJP	VAC	ARMD	https://wv	Leader	
115	2019	RCAF	Bgen	Boyle	S	Dcomd Support 1CAD	AEC	OB	Manager	
49	2019	DG	Bgen	Bury	PJ	DG - Reserves and Cadets	INF	http://hub	Leader	
126	2019	Army	Mgen	Cadden	S	CADTC	ARMD	OB	Leader	
82	2019	Army	Bgen	Cadieu	TJ	3Div	ARMD	OB	Leader	
86	2019	Army	Bgen	Campbell	MEK	Dcomd - 4Div	INF	REF	Leader	
91	2019	Army	Bgen	Camsell	JF	Dcomd - 5Div	LOG	OB	Leader	
65	2019	DG	Cmdre	Cantelon	SN	DG - Personnel and Family Support	NW	https://wv	Leader	
87	2019	Army	Bgen	Carignan	MAJ	2Div	ENGR	AK	Leader	
69	2019	DG	Cmdre	Carosielli	L	PM - CSC	NAV ENG	OB	Manager	
135	2019	JTFN	Bgen	Carpentier	JBP	JTFN	AEC	OB	Leader	
125	2019	CDA	Radm	Cassivi	L	CDA	NW	OB	Leader	
7	2019	MND	Mgen	Chagnon	FJ	COS - Info Management	SIGS	OB	Specialist	
70	2019	DG	Mgen	Chapdelaine	JJG	Chaplain General	CHAP	AK	Specialist	
150	2019	NORAD	Bgen	Clancy	SN	Dcomd - Alaskan NORAD	PLT	OB	Leader	
149	2019	NORAD	Cmdre	Clarke	JA	NORAD & NORTHCOM J5	NW	OB	Leader	
110	2019	RCAF	Bgen	Cloutier	JEG	Special Advisor CAS	PLT	REF	Manager	
147	2019	NORAD	LGen	Coates	CJ	Dcomd - NORAD	PLT	OB	Leader	
44	2019	DG	Bgen	Cochrane	DB	Comd - Cadet and Jr Ranger Sp Gp	ACSO	WA	Leader	
130	2019	CDA	Bgen	Cotten	KR	Special Projects Officer - CDA	ARTY	https://wv	Leader	
74	2019	SJS	Bgen	Davies	DA	Senior Delegate - AF Strat Engagement	PLT	REF	Leader	
43	2019	CANSOFCOM	Mgen	Dawe	PS	CANSOFCOM	PPCLI	https://wv	Leader	SOF
58	2019	RCAF	Bgen	Day	AR	DG - Air Staff and Air Reserves	PLT	OB	Leader	
127	2019	Army	Bgen	De Sousa	L	Dcomd CADTC	INF	REF	Manager	
159	2019	JTFI	Bgen	Delaney	RP	LO - Ministerial Ln Team	MPO	GS	Manager	
15	2019	CDS	Radm	Donovan	CP	DG - CSC	NW	GS	Manager	
134	2019	Special	Bgen	Downes	AMT	Surgeon General	MED	https://wv	Specialist	
113	2019	RCAF	Mgen	Drouin	JHC	1CAD	PLT	https://wv	Leader	
122	2019	CDL	Bgen	Dunne	TP	CDL - Pentagon	PLT	OB	Leader	
66	2019	DG	Cmdre	Earl	CS	DG - Maritime Equipment Program	NAV ENG	GS	Manager	
28	2019	CMP	Radm	Edmundson	HC	Dcomd - CMP	NW	https://wv	Manager	
23	2019	CDS	Mgen	Eldaoud	N	Special - Journey Project	EME	GS	Leader	
45	2019	DG	Bgen	Ermel	RW	DG - Capability and Structure	ARMD	GS	Manager	
27	2019	CMP	Lgen	Eyre	WD	CMP	PPCLI	AK	Leader	
61	2019	DG	Cmdre	Feltham	RA	DG - Naval Force Development	NW	OB	Manager	
96	2019	Army	Bgen	Fletcher	WH	Dcomd 18 Airborne USAR	PPCLI	OB	Leader	
81	2019	Army	Mgen	Fortin	JSSD	1Div	ARTY	OB	Leader	
108	2019	RCAF	Mgen	Frawley	BF	Dcomd - RCAF	PLT	OB	Manager	
137	2019	CDL	Mgen	Friday	SG	Dcomd CENTCOM HQ	AEC	OB	Leader	
153	2019	UN	Bgen	Gagne	RJM	Comd - Op Proteus	R22eR	OB	Leader	
145	2019	NATO	Cmdre	Garnier	DM	Comd - CTF150	NW	https://ott	Leader	
154	2019	UN	Bgen	Girard	JJM	LO - UNHQ	SIGS	OB	Leader	Deduced
5	2019	MND	Bgen	Goodyear	RW	DCFO - Finance	LOG	OB	Specialist	
16	2019	CDS	Mgen	Gosselin	JPHH	CProg	R22eR	AK	Manager	
142	2019	NATO	Cmdre	Halle	MJM	ACOS - J4 SHAPE	NAV ENG	GS	Manager	
63	2019	DG	Cmdre	Hamilton	JM	DG - Defence Force Planning	NW	OB	Manager	
138	2019	NATO	Vadm	Hawco	DC	LO - NATO	NW	OB	Leader	
121	2019	CDL	Mgen	Hetherington	SC	CDL Washington	ARTY	GS	Leader	
101	2019	RCN	Cmdre	Hopper	M	Naval Reserves	NW	GS	Leader	
13	2019	CDS	Bgen	Horgan	KG	COS - VCDS	CONST ENGR	AK	Manager	
116	2019	RCAF	Bgen	Huddleston	IS	Dcomd FG 1CAD	PLT	OB	Manager	
1	2019	MND	Bgen	Janzen	J	DG - Public Affairs	PAO	AK	Specialist	
60	2019	DG	Bgen	Jayne	AR	DG - Cyberspace	ENGR	AK	Leader	
18	2019	CDS	Mgen	Joyce	DW	DG - International Security (ADM(POL))	ACSO	OB	Manager	
140	2019	NATO	LGen	Juneau	JCG	Dcomd - JFC Naples	R22eR	http://wv	Leader	
57	2019	DG	Bgen	Keiver	CR	DG - AF Development	PLT	https://inc	Manager	Assumed as CO 436?
79	2019	Army	Bgen	Kelsey	SR	COS Strat - CA	ARMD	OB	Manager	

55	2019 DG	Bgen	Kenny	EJ	DG - Air Readiness	PLT	OB	Manager	
68	2019 DG	Cmdre	Kurtz	MTJ	DG - Security	NW	Blatherwic	Leader	
136	2019 Special	Bgen	Lacroix	SM	DG - Inter-american defence BD Wash.	ARMD	OB	Manager	
20	2019 CDS	Mgen	Lalumiere	JRM	PL - RCAF Fighter Replacement	PLT	https://wv	Manager	
26	2019 CMP	Lgen	Lamarre	CA	CMP	LOG	GS	Leader	Army
76	2019 Army	LGen	Lanther	JM	Comd - CA	ARMD	OB	Leader	
124	2019 CDL	Bgen	Laroche	JRP	LO - PACOM	PLT	OB	Leader	
71	2019 SJS	Mgen	Lavoie	O	DOS	RCR	OB	Leader	
117	2019 RCAF	Bgen	LeBlanc	M	2CAD	ACSO	OB	Leader	
103	2019 RCN	Vadm	Lloyd	MFR	RCN	NW	WA	Leader	
148	2019 NORAD	Mgen	Lowthian	DW	Dir - Combat Operations J3	PLT	OB	Leader	
90	2019 Army	Bgen	Macaulay	DA	5Div	ARMD	OB	Leader	
42	2019 CJOC	Bgen	MacIsaac	DA	COS Support - CJOC	ENGR	GS	Leader	
48	2019 DG	Bgen	Mackenzie	RRE	DG - Land Reserves	INF	https://wv	Leader	
2	2019 CDL	Vadm	Maddison	P	High Commissioner - Australia	NW	WA	Leader	
3	2019 MND	Bgen	Martin	DE	Comd - CFPSPA	PLT	https://ew	Leader	
104	2019 RCN	Radm	McDonald	AG	RCN	NW	OB	Leader	
80	2019 Army	Bgen	McGarry	LP	COS Ops - CA	ARTY	OB	Manager	
129	2019 CDA	Bgen	McPherson	BWG	CFC	ARTY	AK	Leader	
107	2019 RCAF	LGen	Meinzinger	AD	RCAF	PLT	OB	Leader	
50	2019 DG	Bgen	Meloche	JPL	DG - Defence Security	ARMD	REF	Manager	
151	2019 NORAD	Bgen	Menard	SY	Dcomd - CONUS NORAD	PLT	OB	Leader	
88	2019 Army	Bgen	Mercier	JBC	Dcomd - 2Div	R22eR	OB	Leader	
12	2019 CDS	Bgen	Mialkowski	CJJ	COS - CDS	RCR	https://wv	Manager	
33	2019 CMP	Bgen	Misener	M	Comd - CAF Transition Group	ENGR	AK	Leader	
46	2019 DG	Bgen	Moritsugu	SM	DG - Military Signals and Intelligence	SIGS	GS	Leader	
102	2019 RCN	Cmdre	Mulkins	M	Naval Reserves	NW	Blatherwic	Leader	
25	2019 CDS	Vadm	Norman	MAG	Special - Supernumary	NW	AK	Exception	
4	2019 MND	Mgen	Ormsby	P	DCOS - Material	ACSO	https://wv	Manager	
29	2019 CMP	Cmdre	Page	JAS	COS - CMP	NAV ENG	https://wv	Manager	
17	2019 CDS	Cmdre	Patterson	R	DG - SMRC	HSO	https://wv	Leader	Formerly NUR
85	2019 Army	Bgen	Paul	JMM	4Div	R22eR	OB	Leader	
73	2019 SJS	Cmdre	Peats	BA	DG - J5 Plans	NW	OB	Leader	
89	2019 Army	Bgen	Pelletier	R	5Div	R22eR	OB	Leader	
114	2019 RCAF	Mgen	Pelletier	JPA	1CAD	PLT	OB	Leader	
123	2019 CDL	Bgen	Peyton	PJ	LO - Cyber Comd	ARMD	OB	Leader	
41	2019 CJOC	Bgen	Prevost	JPR	DCOS Plans - CJOC	PLT	OB	Manager	
78	2019 Army	Bgen	Quinn	DA	COS Ops - CA	CONST ENGR	Blatherwic	Manager	
112	2019 RCAF	Bgen	Rafter	MML	Strat J4 at NDHQ	LOG	OB	Manager	Air
132	2019 RCAF	Bgen	Reid	GM	DG - RCAF Reserves	ACSO	REF	Leader	
131	2019 DG	Bgen	Robidoux	JDM	Dcomd - Reserves and Cadets	SIGS	Blatherwic	Manager	Confirm?
35	2019 CJOC	Lgen	Rouleau	MN	CJOC	ARTY	GS	Leader	SOF
54	2019 DG	Bgen	Sabourin	PC	DG - Info Mgt	CELE	OB	Manager	Deduced
37	2019 CJOC	Radm	Santarpia	B	COS Ops - CJOC	NW	GS	Leader	
34	2019 CMP	Bgen	Savard	MCD	DG - MPMCT	PHARM	Blatherwic	Manager	Exceptional
36	2019 CJOC	Mgen	Seymour	WF	Dcomd - CJOC	ACSO	https://wv	Manager	
75	2019 MND	Bgen	Simoneau	ED	Seconded - PCO	PLT	OB	Leader	
6	2019 MND	Mgen	Sirois	JS	COS - Infrastructure	ENGR	AK	Specialist	
100	2019 RCN	Cmdre	Skjerpén	CT	CFA	NW	OB	Leader	
143	2019 NATO	Bgen	Smith	GR	ACOS - J5 SHAPE	RCR	OB	Manager	
83	2019 Army	Bgen	Stanton	ND	Dcomd - 3Div	ARMD	OB	Leader	
94	2019 Army	Bgen	St-Louis	MHL	Dcomd 1 Corps USAR	R22eR	OB	Leader	
105	2019 RCN	Radm	Sutherland	CF	Dcomd - RCN	NW	OB	Manager	
31	2019 CMP	Bgen	Tattersall	VC	Comd - MILPERSGEN	LOG	Blatherwic	Leader	Army
8	2019 MND	Bgen	Therault	MM	Seconded - Public Affairs	PAO	https://ott	Specialist	
120	2019 CDL	Bgen	Thomas	LE	Canadian Defence Liaison	ARMD	http://wv	Leader	
92	2019 Army	Bgen	Thomson	GB	Dcomd - 5Div	INF	REF	Leader	
98	2019 RCN	Cmdre	Topshee	AI	CFP	NW	OB	Leader	
53	2019 DG	Bgen	Tremblay	MIN	DG - Aerospace Equip Proj Mgt	AERE	OB	Manager	
119	2019 MND	Bgen	Trudeau	JS	Provost Marshal	MPO	OB	Specialist	Deduced
77	2019 Army	Mgen	Turenne	CJ	Dcomd - CA	ARMD	https://au	Manager	
133	2019 Special	Bgen	Turnbull	JL	Advisor - Comm Res	SIGS	https://wv	Leader	
9	2019 CDS	Gen	Vance	JH	CDS	RCR	AK	Leader	
67	2019 DG	Cmdre	Waddell	SM	DG - Naval Strategic Readiness	NW	https://wv	Manager	
64	2019 DG	Cmdre	Watson	MB	DG - Compensation and Benefits	LOG	https://wv	Manager	
59	2019 DG	Bgen	Whale	KG	DG - Space	PLT	https://wv	Leader	
109	2019 RCAF	Mgen	Wheeler	DLR	CF Tgt Initiative	PLT	REF	Leader	
30	2019 CMP	Mgen	Whelan	SJR	Chief - Mil Pers Programs	RCR	OB	Manager	
139	2019 NATO	LGen	Whitecross	C	Cmdt - NATO Mil College	CONST ENGR	AK	Leader	
22	2019 CFINTCOM	Bgen	Wright	MC	COS - CFINTCOM	PPCLI	OB	Manager	Served in other RegF Inf Regts
10	2019 CDS	Lgen	Wynnyk	PF	VCDS	ENGR	AK	Manager	
14	2019 CDS	Radm	Zwick	JB	CFD	NW	http://wv	Manager	

	CAPT/LT	MAJ	LCOL	COL	GOFO	GOFO per Captain	GOFO per Col
TOTAL	5793	4252	1407	366	146	2.52%	39.89%
ACSO	199	178	61	18	6	3.02%	33.33%
AEC	279	148	37	10	4	1.43%	40.00%
AERE	319	234	60	10	2	0.63%	20.00%
ARMD	186	158	59	20	14	7.53%	70.00%
ARTY	240	162	54	18	6	2.50%	33.33%
CELE	162	146	45	8	2	1.23%	25.00%
CONST ENGR	76	74	29	6	3	3.95%	50.00%
EME	154	133	48	13	3	1.95%	23.08%
ENGR	151	161	61	17	7	4.64%	41.18%
INT	207	166	45	11	0	0.00%	0.00%
LEGAL	94	94	37	12	1	1.06%	8.33%
LOG	746	552	193	43	6	0.80%	13.95%
MPO	98	60	18	3	2	2.04%	66.67%
NAV ENG	245	224	38	12	4	1.63%	33.33%
NW	375	315	137	48	26	6.93%	54.17%
PAO	87	59	15	3	2	2.30%	66.67%
PLT	735	379	127	39	23	3.13%	58.97%
PSEL	62	51	13	1	0	0.00%	0.00%
SIGS	197	212	66	13	6	3.05%	46.15%
TRG DEV	98	63	12	1	0	0.00%	0.00%
INF	475	315	144	35	25	5.26%	71.43%
RCR					6		
PPCLI					5		
R22eR					9		
Excluded	0	0	0	0	4		

Ottawa Citizen Count (2018)

Bgen	79 1-Star	98	67.1%	85
Cmdre	19			
Mgen	23 2-Star	33	22.6%	33
Radm	10			
Lgen	10 3-Star	14	9.6%	11
Vadm	4			
Gen	1 4-Star	1	0.7%	1
Adm	0			
Total	146	146		130
Total	146			
Leader	85			
Manager	51			
Specialist	9			
Exception	1			
Checksum	146			

Serial	Year	Organization	Rank	Last Name	Initials	Position	Trade	Source	Position Ty	Notes
206	2016	DG	Bgen	Allen	FJ	DG - Cyberspace	CELE	AK	Leader	
254	2016	CDL	Bgen	Anderson	DJ	CDL - Pentagon	PPCLI	GS	Leader	
217	2016	SJS	Cmdre	Auchterlonie	JR	DG - J5 Plans	NW	OB	Leader	
238	2016	RCN	Cmdre	Baines	CA	CFA	NW	OB	Leader	
202	2016	DG	Bgen	Balfe	TN	DG - Air Readiness	PLT	REF	Manager	
180	2016	MND	Bgen	Bedard	JGS	COS - ADM(Pers)	AEC	REF	Manager	
176	2016	CDS	Radm	Bennett	JJ	DG - SMRC	LOG	REF	Leader	Navy
201	2016	DG	Bgen	Benson	AT	DG - Land Equipment	EME	OB	Manager	Deduced
264	2016	NATO	Mgen	Bernier	JJR	Chair - NATO COMEDS	MED	REF	Specialist	Formerly PPCLI
175	2016	CDS	Radm	Bishop	SEG	DG - International Security (ADM(POL))	NW	AK	Manager	
188	2016	CJOC	Bgen	Bourgon	MHL	COS Ops - CJOC	PLT		Blatherwic	Leader
184	2016	CJOC	LGen	Bowes	SJP	CJOC	ARMD	https://ww	Leader	
278	2016	JTFI	Bgen	Brennan	SA	JTFI	PPCLI	REF	Leader	
197	2016	DG	Bgen	Bury	PJ	DG - Reserves and Cadets	INF	http://hub	Leader	
200	2016	DG	Bgen	Cadden	SM	DG - Land Capability Development	ARMD	OB	Manager	
275	2016	UN	Bgen	Cadieu	TJ	Comd - Op Proteus	ARMD	OB	Leader	
232	2016	Army	Bgen	Camsell	JF	Dcomd - 5Div	LOG	OB	Leader	
208	2016	DG	Cmdre	Cantelon	SN	Chief - Force Development	NW	https://ww	Manager	
223	2016	Army	Bgen	Carignan	MAJ	COS Ops - CA	ENGR	AK	Manager	
212	2016	DG	Cmdre	Cassivi	L	DG - Naval Strategic Readiness	NW	OB	Manager	
251	2016	MND	Mgen	Cathcart	BB	JAG	LEGAL	GS	Specialist	
274	2016	UN	Bgen	Chagnon	JF	Comd - Op Proteus	SIGS	OB	Leader	
214	2016	DG	Bgen	Chapelaine	JJG	Chaplain General	CHAP	AK	Specialist	
244	2016	RCAF	Bgen	Cloutier	JEG	Special Advisor CAS	PLT	REF	Manager	
270	2016	NORAD	Mgen	Coates	CJ	Dir - Combat Operations J3	PLT	OB	Leader	
250	2016	RCAF	Bgen	Cochrane	DB	2CAD	ACSO	WA	Leader	
181	2016	CMP	Bgen	Colwell	LJ	PL - Military Personnel Management	LOG	REF	Manager	FCWM
277	2016	JTFI	Bgen	Constable	DS	JTFI	PLT	https://ott	Leader	
266	2016	CDL	Bgen	Corbould	GD	CDL - J5 CENTCOM	PPCLI	GS	Leader	
262	2016	CDA	Bgen	Cotten	KR	CFC	ARTY	https://ww	Leader	
239	2016	RCN	Radm	Couturier	JPG	MARPAC	NW	WA	Leader	
268	2016	NATO	Vadm	Davidson	RA	Canadian Military Rep - NATO	NW	https://ww	Leader	
216	2016	SJS	Bgen	Dawe	PS	DG - J3 Ops	PPCLI	https://ww	Leader	
230	2016	Army	Bgen	De Sousa	L	Dcomd - 2Div	INF	REF	Leader	
271	2016	NORAD	Bgen	Drouin	JHC	NORAD & NORTHCOM J5	PLT	https://ww	Leader	
207	2016	DG	Cmdre	Edmundson	HC	DG - Military Careers	NW	https://ww	Manager	
179	2016	CMP	Bgen	Eldaoud	N	COS - CMP	EME	GS	Manager	
185	2016	CJOC	Radm	Ellis	JETP	Dcomd - CJOC	NW	https://ww	Manager	
225	2016	Army	Bgen	Eyre	WD	3Div	PPCLI	AK	Leader	
233	2016	Army	Bgen	Fortin	JSSD	Dcomd 1 Corps USAR	ARTY	OB	Leader	
248	2016	RCAF	Bgen	Frawley	BF	Dcomd Support 1CAD	PLT	OB	Manager	
261	2016	CDA	Bgen	Friday	SG	RMC	AEC	OB	Leader	
203	2016	DG	Bgen	Garbutt	PFC	DG - AF Development	AERE	REF	Manager	
194	2016	DG	Bgen	Girard	JJM	DG - Military Signals and Intelligence	SIGS	OB	Leader	
222	2016	Army	Bgen	Gosselin	JPHH	COS Ops - CA	R22eR	AK	Manager	
220	2016	Army	LGen	Hainse	M	Comd - CA	R22eR	WA	Leader	
171	2016	CDS	Bgen	Harris	TL	Senior Special Advisor to CDS	AEC		Blatherwic	Leader
172	2016	CDS	Radm	Hawco	DC	CFD	NW	OB	Manager	
234	2016	Army	Bgen	Hetherington	SC	Dcomd 18 Airborne USAR	ARTY	GS	Leader	
242	2016	RCAF	LGen	Hood	MJ	RCAF	PLT	WA	Leader	
187	2016	CJOC	Bgen	Horlock	KW	COS Support - CJOC	LOG	REF	Leader	
198	2016	RCAF	Bgen	Howden	SA	DG - Air Staff and Air Reserves	ACSO	https://ww	Leader	
279	2016	JTFI	Bgen	Irvine	JA	JTFI	PLT	https://ww	Leader	
219	2016	MND	Bgen	Jorgensen	MP	Seconded - PCO	RCR	GS	Leader	
178	2016	CMP	Mgen	Joyce	DW	Dcomd - CMP	ACSO	OB	Manager	
221	2016	Army	Mgen	Juneau	JCG	Dcomd - CA	R22eR	http://www	Manager	
229	2016	Army	Bgen	Lafaut	JRAS	2Div	R22eR	http://www	Leader	
204	2016	DG	Bgen	Lalumiere	JRM	DG - Space	PLT	https://ww	Leader	
215	2016	SJS	Mgen	Lamarre	CA	DOS	LOG	GS	Leader	Army
258	2016	Army	Mgen	Lanthier	JM	CADTC	ARMD	OB	Leader	
273	2016	NORAD	Bgen	Laroche	JRP	Dcomd - Alaskan NORAD	PLT	OB	Leader	
192	2016	DG	Bgen	Lavoie	O	DG - Defence Force Planning	RCR	OB	Manager	
164	2016	MND	Bgen	Liedtke	W	COS - ADM(Fin)	LOG	https://ww	Specialist	Air
236	2016	RCN	Radm	Lloyd	MFR	Dcomd - RCN	NW	WA	Manager	
166	2016	MND	Mgen	Loos	GD	COS - ADM(IM)	CELE	https://dw	Specialist	
249	2016	RCAF	Bgen	Lowthian	DW	Dcomd FG 1CAD	PLT	OB	Manager	
280	2016	JTFI	Bgen	Macaulay	DA	JTFI	ARMD	OB	Leader	
263	2016	Special	Bgen	MacKay	HC	Surgeon General	MED	GS	Specialist	SIGS
196	2016	DG	Bgen	Mackenzie	RRE	DG - Land Reserves	INF	https://ww	Leader	
161	2016	CDL	Vadm	Maddison	P	High Commissioner - Australia	NW	WA	Leader	
173	2016	CDS	Mgen	Madower	JC	CProg	AERE	https://ww	Manager	
162	2016	MND	Bgen	Martin	DE	Comd - CFPSA	PLT	https://ew	Leader	
205	2016	DG	Bgen	Matheson	MA	DG - Compensation and Benefits	LOG	https://ca	Manager	Army

255	2016	CDL	Bgen	Mazzolin	RG	CDL - Cyber Command	SIGS	https://us	Leader	SSF Troop Comd
211	2016	DG	Cmdre	McDonald	AG	DG - Naval Force Development	NW	OB	Manager	
165	2016	MND	Mgen	McQuillan	KD	COS - ADM(IE)	ENGR	https://cm	Specialist	
243	2016	RCAF	Mgen	Meinzinger	AD	Dcomd - RCAF	PLT	OB	Manager	
199	2016	DG	Bgen	Meloche	JPL	DG - Defence Security	ARMD	REF	Manager	
182	2016	CMP	Mgen	Milne	JG	Chief - MPMCT	ARMD	REF	Leader	
224	2016	Army	Mgen	Milner	DJ	1Div	ARMD	GS	Leader	
195	2016	DG	Bgen	Moritsugu	SM	DG - Military Signals and Intelligence	SIGS	GS	Leader	
241	2016	RCN	Cmdre	Mulkins	M	Comd - NRD	NW	Blatherwic	Leader	
237	2016	RCN	Radm	Newton	JF	MARLANT	NW	WA	Leader	
265	2016	JTFN	Bgen	Nixon	MA	JTFN	ARMD	https://ca	Leader	
235	2016	RCN	Vadm	Norman	MAG	RCN	NW	AK	Leader	
191	2016	RCAF	Bgen	Ormsby	P	PL - MHP	ACSO	https://ww	Manager	
252	2016	CDL	Bgen	Overton	MK	CDL London	PPCLI	https://cd	Leader	
210	2016	DG	Cmdre	Page	JAS	DG - Maritime Equipment Program	NAV ENG	https://ww	Manager	
267	2016	NATO	LGen	Parent	JAJ	Dcomd - JFC Naples	PLT	https://ww	Leader	
163	2016	MND	Mgen	Patch	AC	COS - ADM(Mat)	EME	https://ww	Specialist	
228	2016	Army	Bgen	Patterson	DA	Dcomd - 4Div	ARTY	GS	Leader	
218	2016	MND	Bgen	Paul	JMM	Seconded - PCO	R22eR	OB	Leader	
272	2016	NORAD	Bgen	Pelletier	JPA	Dcomd - CONUS NORAD	PLT	OB	Leader	
282	2016	JTFI	Bgen	Pelletier	JPA	CAOC	PLT	OB	Leader	
186	2016	CJOC	Bgen	Ploughman	B	COS Readiness - CJOC	PLT	https://ad	Leader	
245	2016	RCAF	Bgen	Reid	GM	Dcos Support	ACSO	REF	Manager	
189	2016	CANSOFCOM	Bgen	Rouleau	M	CANSOFCOM	ARTY	GS	Leader	SOF
246	2016	RCAF	Bgen	Russell	NE	Strat J4 at NDHQ	LOG	REF	Manager	Air
193	2016	DG	Bgen	Rutherford	P	DG - Info Mgt	SIGS	GS	Manager	
170	2016	CDS	Cmdre	Santarpia	B	COS - VCDS	NW	GS	Manager	
256	2016	CDL	Bgen	Seymour	WF	LnO - PACOM	ACSO	https://ww	Leader	
183	2016	CMP	Bgen	Sirois	JS	PL - MPMCT	ENGR	AK	Manager	
269	2016	NORAD	LGen	St Amand	JPJ	Dcomd - NORAD	PLT	https://ww	Leader	
260	2016	Army	Bgen	Stack	AT	Dcomd - CADTC	ENGR	GS	Manager	
226	2016	Army	Bgen	Stanton	ND	Dcomd - 3Div	ARMD	OB	Leader	
167	2016	MND	Radm	Stuart	EM	Seconded - TB	LOG	https://ww	Specialist	Navy
160	2016	MND	Bgen	Therault	MML	DG - Public Affairs	PAO	https://ott	Specialist	
169	2016	CDS	LGen	Thibault	GR	VCDS	SIGS	https://ww	Manager	
227	2016	Army	Bgen	Thomas	LE	4Div	ARMD	http://ww	Leader	
276	2016	UN	Mgen	Thompson	DW	Comd - MFO	RCR	AK	Leader	
257	2016	CDA	Mgen	Tremblay	JGE	CDA	RCA	GS	Leader	
253	2016	CDL	Radm	Truelove	WS	CDL Washington	NW	https://ww	Leader	
231	2016	Army	Bgen	Turenne	CJ	5Div	ARMD	https://au	Leader	
168	2016	CDS	Gen	Vance	JH	CDS	RCR	AK	Leader	
209	2016	DG	Cmdre	Watson	MB	DG - Personnel and Family Support	LOG	https://ww	Leader	
247	2016	RCAF	Mgen	Wheeler	DLR	1CAD	PLT	REF	Leader	
259	2016	CDA	Bgen	Whelan	SJR	Dcomd - CDA	RCR	OB	Manager	
177	2016	CMP	LGen	Whitecross	C	CMP	CONST ENGR	AK	Leader	
190	2016	DG	Bgen	Woiden	KL	Comd - Cadet and Jr Ranger Sp Gp	ARMD	REF	Leader	
213	2016	DG	Cmdre	Wood	MD	PM - CSC	NAV ENG	REF	Manager	
174	2016	CDS	Mgen	Wynnyk	PF	CDI	ENGR	AK	Leader	
240	2016	RCN	Cmdre	Zwick	JB	CFP	NW	http://ww	Leader	

	CAPT/LT	MAJ	LCOL	COL	GOGO	GOGO per Captain	GOGO per Col
TOTAL	5793	4252	1407	366	122		2.11% 33.33%
ACSO	199	178	61	18	6		3.02% 33.33%
AEC	279	148	37	10	3		1.08% 30.00%
AERE	319	234	60	10	2	0.63%	20.00%
ARMD	186	158	59	20	13	6.99%	65.00%
ARTY	240	162	54	18	5	2.08%	27.78%
CELE	162	146	45	8	2	1.23%	25.00%
CONST ENGR	76	74	29	6	1	1.32%	16.67%
EME	154	133	48	13	3	1.95%	23.08%
ENGR	151	161	61	17	5	3.31%	29.41%
INT	207	166	45	11	0	0.00%	0.00%
LEGAL	94	94	37	12	1	1.06%	8.33%
LOG	746	552	193	43	10	1.34%	23.26%
MPO	98	60	18	3	0	0.00%	0.00%
NAV ENG	245	224	38	12	2	0.82%	16.67%
NW	375	315	137	48	19	5.07%	39.58%
PAO	87	59	15	3	1	1.15%	33.33%
PLT	735	379	127	39	20	2.72%	51.28%
PSEL	62	51	13	1	0	0.00%	0.00%
SIGS	197	212	66	13	6	3.05%	46.15%
TRG DEV	98	63	12	1	0	0.00%	0.00%
INF	475	315	144	35	19	4.00%	54.29%
RCR					5		
PPCLI					6		
R22eR					5		
Excluded	0	0	0	0	4		
Bgen	72	1-Star	84	68.9%			
Cmdre	12						
Mgen	18	2-Star	27	22.1%			
Radm	9						
Lgen	7	3-Star	10	8.2%			
Vadm	3						
Gen	1	4-Star	1	0.8%			
Adm	0						
Total	122		122				
Total	122						
Leader	74						
Manager	38						
Specialist	10						
Exception	0						
Checksum	122						

Serial	Year	Organization	Rank	Last Name	Initials	Position	Trade	Source	Position Ty	Notes
337	2013	DG	Cmdre	Adamson	MS	PM - CSC	NAV ENG	GS	Manager	
307	2013	CJOC	LGen	Beare	SA	CJOC	ARTY	GS	Leader	
302	2013	CMP	Bgen	Bedard	JGS	COS - ADM(Pers)	AEC	REF	Manager	
389	2013	Special	Bgen	Bernier	JRS	Surgeon General	MED	REF	Specialist	
288	2013	MND	Mgen	Bertrand	RPF	DG - ADM(Fin)	LOG	REF	Specialist	
367	2013	RCN	Cmdre	Bishop	SEG	CFP	NW	AK	Leader	
333	2013	DG	Cmdre	Bisson	L	DG - Compensation and Benefits	LOG	Blatherwic	Manager	Navy
370	2013	RCAF	LGen	Blondin	JAY	RCAF	PLT	WA	Leader	
385	2013	Army	Mgen	Bowes	SJP	CADTC	ARMD	https://ww	Leader	
318	2013	DG	Bgen	Brennan	SA	CFD	PPCLI	REF	Manager	
351	2013	Army	Bgen	Bury	PJ	Dcomd - 3Div	INF	http://hub	Leader	
379	2013	MND	Mgen	Cathcart	BB	JAG	LEGAL	GS	Specialist	
353	2013	Army	Bgen	Chapman	JC	4Div	INF	GS	Leader	
373	2013	RCAF	Bgen	Cloutier	JEG	Special Advisor CAS	PLT	REF	Manager	
310	2013	CJOC	Mgen	Coates	CJ	Dcomd - Continental	PLT	OB	Leader	
348	2013	Army	Mgen	Collin	JGJC	1Div	ARMD	REF	Leader	
303	2013	CMP	Bgen	Colwell	LJ	PL - Military Personnel Management	LOG	REF	Manager	
306	2013	CMP	Bgen	Cotten	KR	PL - MPMCT	ARTY	https://ww	Manager	
368	2013	RCN	Cmdre	Craig	D	Comd - Reserve Forces Quebec	NW	REF	Leader	
380	2013	CDL	Bgen	Dabros	MR	CDL London	PLT	GS	Leader	
343	2013	SJS	Bgen	Davies	DA	Senior Delegate - AF Strat Engagement	PLT	REF	Leader	
297	2013	CDS	Mgen	Day	DM	DG - International Security (ADM(POL))	PPCLI	GS	Manager	SOF
346	2013	Army	LGen	Devlin	PJ	Comd CA	RCR	WA	Leader	
292	2013	CDS	Vadm	Donaldson	AB	VCDS	NW	WA	Manager	
308	2013	CJOC	Radm	Ellis	JETP	Dcomd - Expeditionary	NW	https://ww	Leader	
360	2013	Army	Bgen	Eyre	WD	Dcomd 18 Airborne USAR	PPCLI	AK	Leader	
286	2013	MND	Radm	Finn	PT	COS - ADM(Mat)	NAV ENG	GS	Specialist	
384	2013	CDA	Mgen	Forgues	PJ	CDA	AEC	http://airc	Leader	
309	2013	CJOC	Mgen	Foster	RD	Dcomd - Continental	PLT	REF	Leader	
369	2013	RCN	Cmdre	Gagliardi	DP	PTL - French	NAV ENG	GS	Exception	
378	2013	RCAF	Bgen	Galvin	MMP	2CAD	AEC	https://ww	Leader	
354	2013	Army	Bgen	Giguere	JR	2Div	R22eR	OB	Leader	
335	2013	DG	Cmdre	Halle	MJM	DG - Maritime Equipment Program	NAV ENG	REF	Manager	
390	2013	JTFN	Bgen	Hamel	JJRG	JTFN	PLT	REF	Leader	
365	2013	RCN	Cmdre	Hawco	DC	CFA	NW	OB	Leader	
355	2013	Army	Bgen	Hebert	S	Dcomd - 2Div	ENGR	REF	Leader	
357	2013	Army	Bgen	Henley	JDG	Dcomd - 5Div	ARTY	REF	Leader	
388	2013	CDA	Bgen	Hilton	DC	CFC	ARMD	GS	Leader	
340	2013	SJS	Mgen	Hood	MJ	DOS	PLT	WA	Leader	
305	2013	CMP	Mgen	Howard	AJ	Chief - MPMCT	ARTY	REF	Leader	
316	2013	MND	Bgen	Jaeger	HJ	VAC	MED	Blatherwic	Leader	INF, LOG
345	2013	MND	Bgen	Joyce	DW	PCO	ACSO	OB	Leader	
349	2013	Army	Bgen	Juneau	JCG	3Div	R22eR	http://www	Leader	
293	2013	CDS	Bgen	King	CR	COS - VCDS	PPCLI	GS	Manager	
322	2013	DG	Bgen	Kowal	HJ	DG - Military Careers	AERE	https://ww	Manager	
329	2013	DG	Bgen	Kummel	SJ	DG - AF Development	ACSO	REF	Manager	
341	2013	SJS	Bgen	Lamarre	CA	DG - J3 Ops	LOG	GS	Leader	Army
358	2013	Army	Bgen	Lanthier	JM	Dcomd 1 Corps USAR	ARMD	OB	Leader	
352	2013	Army	Bgen	Lavoie	O	4Div	RCR	OB	Leader	
291	2013	CDS	Gen	Lawson	TJ	CDS	PLT	WA	Leader	
294	2013	CDS	Radm	Lloyd	MFR	CFD	NW	WA	Manager	
317	2013	DG	Bgen	Loos	GD	DG - Cyberspace	CELE	https://dw	Leader	
313	2013	CJOC	Bgen	Mackay	JCF	CJOSG	LOG	REF	Leader	Army
350	2013	Army	Bgen	Mackenzie	RR	Dcomd - 3Div	PPCLI	https://ww	Leader	INF
362	2013	RCN	Vadm	Maddison	PA	RCN	NW	WA	Leader	
283	2013	MND	Bgen	Madower	JC	DG - Public Affairs	AERE	https://ww	Specialist	
285	2013	MND	Bgen	Martin	DE	Comd - CFPSPA	PLT	https://evs	Leader	
382	2013	CDL	Mgen	Matern	EN	CDL Washington	R22eR	http://www	Leader	SOF
342	2013	SJS	Bgen	Matheson	MA	DG - J5 Plans	LOG	https://ca	Leader	Army
328	2013	DG	Bgen	Matte	PR	DG - Capability Development	ACSO	http://new	Manager	
320	2013	DG	Bgen	Mazzolin	RG	DG - Info Mgt	SIGS	https://usg	Manager	SSF Troop Comd
338	2013	DG	Bgen	McLean	KR	Chaplain General	CHAP	GS	Specialist	
325	2013	DG	Bgen	McQuillan	KD	DG - Land Operations CA	ENGR	https://cm	Leader	
301	2013	CMP	Bgen	Meloche	JPL	Comd - CFRG	ARMD	REF	Leader	
298	2013	CMP	Mgen	Millar	DB	CMP	AERE	REF	Leader	
324	2013	DG	Bgen	Milne	JG	DG - Reserves and Cadets	ARMD	REF	Leader	
359	2013	Army	Bgen	Milner	DJ	Dcomd 3 Corps USAR	ARMD	GS	Leader	
290	2013	MND	Mgen	Neasmith	DG	COS - ADM(IM)	SIGS	GS	Specialist	
364	2013	RCN	Radm	Newton	JF	MARLANT	NW	WA	Leader	
312	2013	CJOC	Mgen	Noonan	SP	CJOSG	ENGR	https://cm	Leader	
363	2013	RCN	Radm	Norman	MAG	Dcomd - RCN	NW	AK	Manager	
383	2013	CDL	Bgen	Ormsby	P	CDL - Pentagon	ACSO	https://ww	Leader	
300	2013	CMP	Bgen	Overton	MK	Dcomd CMP	PPCLI	https://cd	Manager	

319	2013 DG	Bgen	Patch	AC	DG - Land Equipment	EME	https://ww	Manager	
332	2013 DG	Bgen	Pitre	RR	DG - Space	AEC	https://ne	Leader	
376	2013 RCAF	Bgen	Ploughman	JB	Dcomd - 1CAD	PLT	https://ad	Manager	
295	2013 CDS	Mgen	Poulter	IC	CProg	EME	GS	Manager	
361	2013 Army	Bgen	Putt	TE	Dcomd 5 Corps USAR	ARMD	REF	Leader	
331	2013 RCAF	Bgen	Reid	GM	DG - Air Staff and Air Reserves	ACSO	REF	Leader	
374	2013 RCAF	Bgen	Reid	GM	Air Reserve Adv and Dep Comd Sup	ACSO	REF	Leader	
296	2013 CDS	Mgen	Rousseau	JMC	CDI	ENGR	GS	Leader	
330	2013 DG	Bgen	Russell	NE	DG - Air Personnel	LOG	REF	Manager	Air
326	2013 DG	Bgen	Rutherford	P	DG - Security	SIGS	GS	Leader	
315	2013 MND	LGen	Semianiw	W	VAC	PPCLI	https://vet	Leader	
327	2013 DG	Bgen	Simms	JB	DG - Land Capability Development	RCR	https://ww	Manager	
336	2013 DG	Cmdre	Sing	DL	DG - Naval Force Development	NW	REF	Manager	
299	2013 CMP	Radm	Smith	AM	CMP	NAV ENGR	GS	Leader	
375	2013 RCAF	Mgen	St Amand	JPJ	1CAD	PLT	https://ww	Leader	
386	2013 Army	Bgen	Stack	AT	Dcomd - CADTC	ENGR	GS	Manager	
287	2013 CMP	Cmdre	Steele	EM	Dcomd CMP	LOG	Blatherwic	Manager	Navy
381	2013 CDL	LGen	Thibault	GR	Chair - IADB	SIGS	https://ww	Leader	
311	2013 CJOC	Bgen	Thomas	LE	COS - Expeditionary	ARMD	http://ww	Leader	
314	2013 CANSOFCOM	Bgen	Thompson	DW	CANSOFCOM	RCR	AK	Leader	
356	2013 Army	Bgen	Thurrott	CC	5Div	LOG	https://ww	Leader	Army
387	2013 CDA	Bgen	Tremblay	JGE	RMC	RCA	GS	Leader	
366	2013 RCN	Radm	Truelove	WS	MARPAC	NW	https://ww	Leader	
339	2013 SJS	Mgen	Vance	JH	DOS	RCR	AK	Leader	
334	2013 DG	Cmdre	Watson	MB	DG - Personnel and Family Support	LOG	https://ww	Leader	
377	2013 RCAF	Bgen	Wheeler	DLR	Dcomd Support 1CAD	PLT	REF	Manager	
289	2013 MND	Mgen	Whitecross	C	COS - ADM(IE)	CONST ENGR	AK	Specialist	
321	2013 DG	Bgen	Williams	RS	DG - Military Signals and Intelligence	INT	AK	Leader	
323	2013 DG	Bgen	Woiden	KL	DG - Land Reserves	INF	REF	Leader	
347	2013 Army	Mgen	Wynnyk	PF	Dcomd - CA	ENGR	AK	Manager	

	CAPT/LT	MAJ	LCOL	COL	GOGO	GOGO per Captain	GOGO per Col
TOTAL	5793	4252	1407	366	103		1.78% 28.14%
ACSO	199	178	61	18	6	3.02%	33.33%
AEC	279	148	37	10	4	1.43%	40.00%
AERE	319	234	60	10	3	0.94%	30.00%
ARMD	186	158	59	20	9	4.84%	45.00%
ARTY	240	162	54	18	4	1.67%	22.22%
CELE	162	146	45	8	1	0.62%	12.50%
CONST ENGR	76	74	29	6	1	1.32%	16.67%
EME	154	133	48	13	2	1.30%	15.38%
ENGR	151	161	61	17	6	3.97%	35.29%
INT	207	166	45	11	1	0.48%	9.09%
LEGAL	94	94	37	12	1	1.06%	8.33%
LOG	746	552	193	43	10	1.34%	23.26%
MPO	98	60	18	3	0	0.00%	0.00%
NAV ENG	245	224	38	12	5	2.04%	41.67%
NW	375	315	137	48	11	2.93%	22.92%
PAO	87	59	15	3	0	0.00%	0.00%
PLT	735	379	127	39	13	1.77%	33.33%
PSEL	62	51	13	1	0	0.00%	0.00%
SIGS	197	212	66	13	4	2.03%	30.77%
TRG DEV	98	63	12	1	0	0.00%	0.00%
INF	475	315	144	35	18	3.79%	51.43%
RCR					5		
PPCLI					7		
R22eR					3		
Excluded	0	0	0	0	4		
Bgen	58	1-Star	68	66.0%			
Cmdre	10						
Mgen	20	2-Star	27	26.2%			
Radm	7						
Lgen	5	3-Star	7	6.8%			
Vadm	2						
Gen	1	4-Star	1	1.0%			
Adm	0						
Total	103		103				
Total	103						
Leader	66						
Manager	28						
Specialist	8						
Exception	1						
Checksum	103						

Serial	Year	Organizati	Rank	Last Name	Initials	Position	Trade	Source	Position Ty	Notes
446	2010	DG	Cmdre	Adams	MS	PM - CSC	NAV ENG	GS	Manager	
469	2010	Army	Bgen	Atkinson	PJ	Dcomd 3 Corps USAR	ARMD	http://www	Leader	
400	2010	CDS	Bgen	Barabe	JGJC	COS - VCDS	ARTY	REF	Manager	
401	2010	MND	Mgen	Beare	SA	CFD	ARTY	GS	Manager	
396	2010	MND	Mgen	Benjamin	DJRS	COS - ADM(IE)	ENGR	GS	Specialist	
478	2010	RCN	Cmdre	Bennett	JJ	Naval Reserves	LOG	Blatherwic	Leader	Navy
402	2010	MND	Mgen	Bertrand	RPF	CProg	LOG	REF	Manager	
391	2010	MND	Bgen	Blanchette	RV	DG - ADM(PA)	R22eR	REF	Specialist	
487	2010	RCAF	Mgen	Blondin	JAY	1CAD	PLT	WA	Leader	
519	2010	NATO	LGen	Bouchard	JJC	Dcomd - JFC Naples	PLT	WA	Leader	
513	2010	JTF(AFG)	Bgen	Bowes	SJP	Dcomd Plans and Projects	ARMD	https://www	Manager	
488	2010	RCAF	Bgen	Brennan	PL	COS - Reserves	LOG	REF	Leader	
491	2010	MND	Bgen	Cathcart	BB	JAG	LEGAL	GS	Specialist	
416	2010	CJOC	Bgen	Champagn	JAG	Dcomd CANCOM	R22eR	https://im	Manager	
527	2010	NORAD	Bgen	Checkan	RJ	NORAD & NORTHCOM J5	AEC	REF	Leader	
484	2010	RCAF	Bgen	Clark	RH	Senior Air Reserve Advisor	AEC	REF	Leader	
485	2010	RCAF	Bgen	Cloutier	JEG	Special Advisor CAS	PLT	REF	Manager	
462	2010	Army	Bgen	Collin	JGJC	4Div	ARMD	REF	Leader	
411	2010	CMP	Bgen	Colwell	LJ	PL - Military Personnel Management	LOG	REF	Manager	
516	2010	JTF(AFG)	Bgen	Corbould	KA	Dcomd 10 Mtn Div USAR	ENGR	https://cm	Leader	
449	2010	SJS	Radm	Davidson	RA	DOS	NW	https://www	Leader	
437	2010	DG	Bgen	Davies	DA	DG - AF Development	PLT	REF	Manager	
521	2010	NATO	LGen	Davis	CJR	Canadian Military Rep - NATO	ARMD	https://www	Leader	
426	2010	CANSOFCO	Bgen	Day	DM	CANSOFCOM	PPCLI	GS	Leader	SOF
481	2010	RCAF	LGen	Deschamp	JPA	RCAF	PLT	WA	Leader	
456	2010	Army	LGen	Devlin	PJ	Comd CA	RCR	WA	Leader	
414	2010	CJOC	Vadm	Donaldson	AB	CANCOM	NW	WA	Leader	
525	2010	NORAD	LGen	Duval	JM	Dcomd - NORAD	PLT	WA	Leader	
442	2010	DG	Cmdre	Ellis	JETP	DG - Maritime Force Development	NW	https://www	Manager	
514	2010	JTF(AFG)	Bgen	Ferron	JR	LO - CENTCOM	ARMD	GS	Leader	
445	2010	DG	Cmdre	Finn	PT	PM - CSC	NAV ENG	REF	Manager	
526	2010	NORAD	Mgen	Forgues	PJ	Dir - Combat Operations J3	AEC	http://airc	Leader	
486	2010	RCAF	Bgen	Foster	RD	Dcomd FG 1CAD	PLT	REF	Manager	
454	2010	SJS	Mgen	Fraser	DA	Commander Designate Joint HQ	PPCLI	http://www	Leader	
457	2010	Army	Mgen	Fraser	DA	Dcomd - CA	PPCLI	http://www	Manager	
480	2010	RCN	Cmdre	Gagliardi	DP	PTL - French	NW	REF	Exception	
406	2010	MND	Cmdre	Gardam	DC	DG - MILPERS Management Capability Transformation	NW	https://www	Manager	
493	2010	CDL	Mgen	Gosselin	JPYD	CDL London	R22eR	AK	Leader	
440	2010	DG	Cmdre	Greenwood	RW	DG - Maritime Equipment Program	NAV ENG	https://www	Manager	
473	2010	RCN	Radm	Greenwood	NS	Dcomd - RCN	NW	https://www	Manager	
497	2010	Army	Mgen	Hainse	M	CADTC	R22eR	WA	Leader	
505	2010	JTFN	Bgen	Hamel	JJRG	JTFN	PLT	REF	Leader	
465	2010	Army	Bgen	Hebert	S	Dcomd - 2Div	INF	GS	Leader	Uncertain
441	2010	DG	Cmdre	Hickey	LM	DG - Maritime Personnel and Readiness	NW	https://www	Manager	
501	2010	CDA	Bgen	Hilton	DC	CFC	ARMD	GS	Leader	
492	2010	CDL	Mgen	Hincke	JDA	CDL London	PLT	REF	Leader	
522	2010	NATO	Mgen	Hines	AG	Dir - NATO HQ Consultation C2	SIGS	GS	Manager	
458	2010	Army	Mgen	Howard	AJ	Dcomd - CA	ARTY	REF	Manager	
511	2010	JTF(AFG)	Bgen	Jaeger	HF	Medical Advisor to Comd JTF(Afg)	MED	Blatherwic	Specialist	INF, LOG
460	2010	Army	Bgen	Jorgensen	MP	3Div	RCR	GS	Leader	
470	2010	Army	Bgen	Juneau	JCG	Dcomd 17 Corps USAR	R22eR	http://www	Leader	
503	2010	Special	Cmdre	Jung	HW	Surgeon General	MED	WA	Specialist	
430	2010	DG	Bgen	Kampman	MD	DG - Force Development Review	ARMD	GS	Manager	
447	2010	DG	Bgen	Kettle	DC	Chaplain General	CHAP	GS	Specialist	
451	2010	SJS	Bgen	King	CR	DG - J3 Ops	PPCLI	GS	Leader	
452	2010	SJS	Bgen	Kummel	SJ	DG - J5 Plans	ACSO	REF	Leader	
417	2010	CJOC	Bgen	Lacroix	JPP	COS CANCOM	ARMD	OB	Manager	
494	2010	CDL	Mgen	Langton	DW	CDL Washington	ACSO	https://www	Leader	
464	2010	Army	Bgen	Laroche	JRMG	2Div	R22eR	WA	Leader	
482	2010	RCAF	Mgen	Lawson	TJ	Dcomd - RCAF	PLT	WA	Manager	
412	2010	CMP	LGen	Leslie	AB	Chief of Transformation	ARTY	WA	Leader	
419	2010	CJOC	LGen	Lessard	JGM	CEFCOM	R22eR	OB	Leader	
438	2010	DG	Bgen	Leversedge	TFJ	DG - Air Personnel	AERE	GS	Manager	
477	2010	RCN	Cmdre	Lloyd	MFR	CFP	NW	WA	Leader	
403	2010	CFINTCOM	Mgen	MacDonald	MG	CDI	ARMD	GS	Leader	
444	2010	DG	Cmdre	MacIsaac	JR	DG - Reserves and Cadets	LOG	https://www	Leader	Navy
410	2010	CMP	Cmdre	MacKeigan	DM	Comd - CFRG	NW	http://www	Leader	
474	2010	RCN	Radm	Maddison	PA	MARLANT	NW	WA	Leader	
409	2010	CMP	Bgen	Madower	JC	Assistant CMP	AERE	REF	Manager	

520	2010 NATO	LGen	Maisonnel	JOM	COS - NATO SAC Norfolk	ARMED	http://www	Leader	
392	2010 MND	Bgen	Martin	DE	Comd - CFPSA	PLT	https://ev	Leader	
422	2010 CJOC	Bgen	Matern	EN	COS Ops CEFCOM	R22eR	http://www	Leader	SOF
418	2010 CJOC	Bgen	Matte	GCP	COS CANCOM	PLT	GS	Manager	
436	2010 DG	Bgen	Matte	PR	DG - Capability Development	ACSO	http://new	Manager	
472	2010 RCN	Vadm	McFadden	PD	RCN	NW	WA	Leader	
448	2010 DG	Bgen	McLean	KR	Chaplain General	CHAP	GS	Specialist	
423	2010 CJOC	Mgen	McQuillan	ME	CANOSCOM	LOG	https://inf	Leader	Army
507	2010 JTF(AFG)	Bgen	Menard	JBD	Comd	R22eR	http://www	Leader	
428	2010 MND	Bgen	Millar	DB	Dir - PCO	AERE	REF	Leader	
463	2010 Army	Bgen	Milne	JG	Dcomd - 4Div	ARMED	REF	Leader	
509	2010 JTF(AFG)	Bgen	Milner	DJ	Comd	ARMED	GS	Leader	
398	2010 CDS	Gen	Natynczyk	WJ	CDS	ARMED	AK	Leader	
466	2010 Army	Bgen	Neasmith	DG	5Div	SIGS	GS	Leader	Exception
431	2010 DG	Bgen	Noonan	SP	DG - Info Mgt	ENGR	https://cm	Manager	
475	2010 RCN	Cmdre	Norman	MAG	CFA	NW	AK	Leader	
434	2010 DG	Bgen	O'Brien	GJP	DG - Land Reserves	INF	https://ww	Leader	
421	2010 CJOC	Bgen	Parent	JAJ	COS Ops CEFCOM	PLT	https://ww	Leader	
498	2010 Army	Bgen	Parsons	RG	Dcomd CADTC	INF	REF	Manager	
429	2010 DG	Bgen	Patch	AC	DG - Land Equipment	EME	https://ww	Manager	
476	2010 RCN	Radm	Pile	THW	MARPAC	NW	https://cm	Leader	
489	2010 RCAF	Bgen	Pitre	RR	2CAD	AEC	https://ne	Leader	
393	2010 MND	Mgen	Poulter	IC	DCOS - Material	EME	GS	Manager	
395	2010 MND	Bgen	Rochette	JGCY	DG - Finance	LOG	REF	Specialist	
399	2010 CDS	Vadm	Rouleau	JAD	VCDS	NW	WA	Manager	
404	2010 CFINTCOM	Mgen	Rousseau	JMC	CDI	ENGR	GS	Leader	
523	2010 NATO	Bgen	Selbie	JJ	DOS - SHAPE	ARTY	http://rca	Leader	
415	2010 CJOC	LGen	Semianiw	W	CANCOM	PPCLI	https://vet	Leader	
443	2010 DG	Cmdre	Sing	DL	DG - Naval Force Development	NW	REF	Manager	
408	2010 CMP	Cmdre	Smith	AM	Assistant CMP	NAV ENG	REF	Manager	
524	2010 NATO	Bgen	St Amand	JPJ	J5 Director Strat Plans NATO SHAPE HQ Belgium	PLT	https://ww	Leader	
467	2010 Army	Bgen	Stack	AT	Dcomd - 5Div	ENGR	GS	Leader	
499	2010 Army	Bgen	Stafford	GR	Dcomd CADTC	INF	GS	Manager	
506	2010 JTF(AFG)	Mgen	Sullivan	CA	Dcomd (Air) - ISAF	PLT	https://ww	Leader	
502	2010 DG	Mgen	Tabbarnor	DC	DG - Reserves and Cadets	INF	https://ww	Leader	
397	2010 MND	Mgen	Thibault	GR	COS - ADM(IM)	SIGS	https://ww	Specialist	
459	2010 Army	Bgen	Thompson	DW	COS CA	RCR	AK	Manager	
439	2010 RCAF	Bgen	Thuen	EB	DG - Air Staff and Air Reserves	ACSO	https://jm	Leader	
425	2010 CJOC	Bgen	Thurrott	CC	Dcomd CANOSCOM	LOG	https://ww	Manager	Army
435	2010 DG	Bgen	Tremblay	JRA	DG - Land Capability Development	EME	http://rcr	Manager	
468	2010 Army	Bgen	Tremblay	JGE	Dcomd 1 Corps USAR	RCA	GS	Leader	
500	2010 CDA	Cmdre	Truelove	WS	RMC	NW	https://ww	Leader	
432	2010 DG	Bgen	Turnbull	JL	DG - Military Signals and Intelligence	SIGS	https://ww	Leader	
508	2010 JTF(AFG)	Bgen	Vance	JH	Comd	RCR	AK	Leader	
528	2010 NORAD	Bgen	Viens	JYRA	Dcomd - Continental USA NORAD	PLT	REF	Leader	
496	2010 CDA	Mgen	Ward	MJ	CDA	ARMED	REF	Leader	
490	2010 MND	Bgen	Watkin	K	JAG	LEGAL	REF	Specialist	
424	2010 CJOC	Bgen	Whitecross	C	Dcomd CANOSCOM	CONST EN	AK	Manager	
453	2010 SJS	Cmdre	Williams	KE	Chief of Strategic Review	NW	REF	Manager	
461	2010 Army	Bgen	Woiden	KL	Dcomd - 3Div	INF	REF	Leader	
517	2010 JTF(AFG)	Bgen	Wynnyk	PF	Acomd Combined Transition Security Comd	ENGR	AK	Leader	

	CAPT/LT	MAJ	LCOL	COL	GOFO	GOFO per Captain	GOFO per Col
TOTAL	5793	4252	1407	366	120		2.07% 32.79%
ACSO	199	178	61	18	4		2.01% 22.22%
AEC	279	148	37	10	4		1.43% 40.00%
AERE	319	234	60	10	3		0.94% 30.00%
ARMD	186	158	59	20	14		7.53% 70.00%
ARTY	240	162	54	18	5		2.08% 27.78%
CELE	162	146	45	8	0		0.00% 0.00%
CONST EN	76	74	29	6	1		1.32% 16.67%
EME	154	133	48	13	3		1.95% 23.08%
ENGR	151	161	61	17	6		3.97% 35.29%
INT	207	166	45	11	0		0.00% 0.00%
LEGAL	94	94	37	12	2		2.13% 16.67%
LOG	746	552	193	43	8		1.07% 18.60%
MPO	98	60	18	3	0		0.00% 0.00%
NAV ENG	245	224	38	12	4		1.63% 33.33%
NW	375	315	137	48	17		4.53% 35.42%
PAO	87	59	15	3	0		0.00% 0.00%
PLT	735	379	127	39	16		2.18% 41.03%
PSEL	62	51	13	1	0		0.00% 0.00%
SIGS	197	212	66	13	4		2.03% 30.77%
TRG DEV	98	63	12	1	0		0.00% 0.00%
INF	475	315	144	35	18		3.79% 51.43%
RCR					4		
PPCLI					5		
R22eR					9		
Excluded	0	0	0	0	11		

Bgen	64 1-Star	81	67.5%
Cmdre	17		
Mgen	22 2-Star	26	21.7%
Radm	4		
Lgen	9 3-Star	12	10.0%
Vadm	3		
Gen	1 4-Star	1	0.8%
Adm	0		

Total 120 120

Total	120
Leader	70
Manager	39
Specialist	10
Exception	1
Checksum	120

ANNEX D: DATA ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this annex is to articulate the methods employed to derive the statistical and historical data cited in this report.

The data employed in this report were taken from the website <https://www.blatherwick.net/>. This site, recommended by the Canadian Forces College library and the second Pagerank result from Google for “Canadian General Officers” (as trialed 28 January 2020) is a collection of lists of award recipients and senior personnel from the Canadian Forces.

The data provided were an annual list of all general officers and flag officers, by position. It was determined that using the newest data (2019) and then sampling every three years (2016, 2013, 2010) would provide a reasonable sample of modern GOFOs over time. 2013’s data closely resemble the modern institutional layout while 2010’s include entities such as Land Forces Command and Canada Command. As such, the data provide sufficient depth to see the CAF in a different organizational structure but further recursion was not assessed to contribute significantly to understanding the model of the modern GOFO. This assessment, along with the decision to sample at three year periods, was made by the author under guidance from Dr. Robert Engen.

Each year’s data are provided twice, once for January and once for July. The January data were used in all cases. From the January data, all GOFO were extracted; the list also provides information about senior civilians, senior appointment Chief Warrant Officers, and some senior position Colonels – these were omitted. Some positions were listed twice due to the structure of the list. For example, Commander Joint Task Force Atlantic and Commander Maritime Forces Atlantic (MARLANT) are always the same person. In these cases, the elemental position (MARLANT, in the example preceding) was used.

The position title was abbreviated using conventional acronyms, abbreviations and truncation when the outcome would be clear enough. When a position title changed over the course of the sample period, the most modern name for that position was used throughout to facilitate comparison.

The trade of each GOFO was then identified. First, all generals whose trade was known a priori by the author were input. The trade abbreviation was used except for Naval Warfare Officer (NWO) because it kept autocorrecting to NOW and it was easier to use NW than to fix it. Also, in support of the infantry case study, the regiment of origin, rather than trade, was used if it was one of the three regular force regiments; any other infantry unit was listed as INF. These were taken from MNET (<http://caface-rfacace.forces.gc.ca/mnet-oesc/en/cafSearch>) when not part of the author's a priori knowledge. The source of the trade data was taken from Author's Knowledge (AK), Google Search (GS), Official Biography (OB), Wikipedia Article (WA), or the linked web-source. A small number of generals were identified by reference to another individual, mostly students on JCSP 46, when the above methods were not fruitful (REF). This data being factual, public, simple and non-controversial, this level of validity was deemed sufficient in the interest of research efficiency. When a trade changed names, the 2019 name was used throughout, such as for example, all Air Navigators being listed as Air Combat Systems Officers. All of this information was consolidated in Annex A.

Once all of the GOFO and trades were compiled, each position was assigned a type. This could be one of four: Leader, Manager, Specialist or Exception. Exceptions were positions out of the ordinary, such as second language training which the author assessed to be outliers in the data. Specialist positions were those which were very strongly correlated to a specific trade or small group of related trades, such as the Surgeon General to Medical or the COS ADM(IE) for

Engineer or Construction Engineer. In general, positions of command were assessed as Leaders and Deputies and Chiefs of Staff as Manager. However, several exceptions were identified.

The exceptions are based on several considerations. The first exception was that most liaison positions were identified as leader positions as the leader of the Canadian contingent, even if it was a Deputy or COS of the multinational organization. However, the role was considered in the definition. The second exception was that the COS positions at CJOC were labelled as Leaders because Commander CJOC has a deputy, and the COSes have deputies, implying that they are in the chain of command and directly leading rather than managing operations. A third exception was that the Deputy Commanders of the Canadian Army divisions were listed as leaders because they are generally reserve officers representing the interests and experience of the reserves to the commander of the division, clearly a position of leadership rather than management. The fourth exception was that certain key leadership, planning and operations positions, such as but not limited to some J5 and J3 positions, were classed as leader positions due to the highly operational nature of those jobs. Similarly, certain COS, DG and Deputy positions related to management of people, especially reserves, were assessed as leader positions. Unless they fell into one of those categories, the majority of Director General positions were assessed as manager positions.

In this fashion, each position was assigned to one of the four categories. It should be reinforced that for GOFO, every position has leadership and managerial expectations. The purpose of this assessment is to weigh the balance of emphasis in the position. The assignment of positions is very arguable; it should be remarked that the weight of argument placed on the assignment of the positions is small; the emphasis is on the existence of different types of positions rather than the determination of which is which.

The next step was to establish the baseline population of the officer trades. Annex B contains a list of all officer trades. For each trade, the number of Subalterns (Captain and below), Majors, Lieutenant-Colonels and Colonels belonging to that trade are shown. These data in the Original Data column are drawn directly from Military Personnel Command and are referenced to <http://cmp-cpm.mil.ca/en/support/military-personnel/dpgr-index.page> . They were provided by Major Corrine Koekhuyt on 7 February, 2020. The values shown are for the 2019 data. It is assessed that the rate of change of these figures is sufficiently low that the 2019 data can be used as a baseline for the 2010 to 2019 period. The data show the Trained Effective Strength for each trade and rank, which means that members in the table completed basic training and all qualification courses to reach the starting rank in their trade.

In the second large column, labelled Modified Data, are the data used for comparison against the GOFO counts. This data was modified from the Original Data in the following ways. First, all Health and Chaplaincy trades were removed (BIO, CHAP, DENT, HCA, HSO, MED, PA, PHARM, PHYSIO, SOCW). Second, NCSE and MS ENG were combined as the two streams of naval engineering merge at the rank commander into the Naval Engineering trade (NAV ENG). They were consolidated under NAV ENG. Finally, as the only remaining trade with no Colonel's position, MUSIC was removed; this is consistent with this analysis as the employment of the MUSIC trade is distinctly segregated from the operations of the CAF. This Modified Data was then used for comparison against the GOFO numbers year over year.

The subsequent step was to look at GOFO for each of the four sample years separately. To do so, the data for each year were isolated. Then, duplicate entries for an individual were removed. For example, a GOFO who was posted during the reporting period might appear twice. When removing a duplicate entry, a deployed position was removed first, then the position with

the higher rank was retained, then the position assessed as leader, then manager, then specialist, then exception was retained and finally, if none of those criteria differentiated the two, the position with the lower serial number was retained.

Methodological Weaknesses

A number of limitations with the data have come to light during the preparation and calculation steps. These are noted here for completeness, along with their estimated impact on the output.

The first and most serious weakness is the inclusion of the reserves. A number of positions are exclusively occupied by reservists (for example, the deputy commanders of the regional army divisions). The counts of generals include the reserves, but the counts for subalterns and colonels do not. The counts of reserve officers at the lower ranks would skew the evaluation in some senses, due to the different force mix of the reserve (more tactical, less institutional) but it is not evident that the reserve GOFO should be omitted. The impact of their inclusion is modest with less than 10% of GOFO assessed to be reserve. Due to the nature of the count, a good estimate of the number from the infantry can be derived: all those not members of the RCR, PPCLI or R22eR. This was 20% of infanteer GOFO in 2019. A sensitivity analysis showed that the exclusion of the 5 reserve infantry GOFO would have reduced the GOFO/Subaltern rate by one percentage point (minor impact, still in the top 5) but it would have dropped the GOFO/Colonel rate from 71% to 57%, moving it from first to fifth highest. Ultimately, the impact is assessed as moderate because while it does affect the ranking, especially vis-à-vis the Colonels, it does not change the top versus bottom trades.

The second biggest limitation in the data is that it implies correlations beyond those which are valid. When saying that in 2019 there were 7.53/100 armoured GOFO per armoured subaltern, it is natural to interpret that as meaning that a random armoured subaltern has a 7.53%

chance of becoming a GOFO. This should be close to valid, but there are two limitations to that deduction. The first is that, to find the probability that a subaltern armoured officer would become a GOFO in 2019, we should be looking at the subaltern counts from about 1985 which might be very differently proportioned between the trades than the 2019 counts. The second issue is that it accounts GOFO of all four ranks (BGen to Gen) and in so doing slightly overcounts the number of GOFO in 2019 (since any who become MGen, for example, are assumed to have also been BGen at some point). So, this does not predict the rate at which subalterns (or Colonels, although they are less affected by the first issue of changes over time) will be promoted. However, it does provide a valid comparison between the amount of work being done at more junior levels and the amount of leadership at the institutional level for each trade; for example, it shows that armoured officers are not proportional to logistics officers.

A third consideration in the data is the fashion in which retirements are reported in the source data for GOFOs. Because anyone who holds a position during the six month reporting period is listed, some positions may have two separate generals listed, the retiree and the one promoted to backfill. The data conditioning process accounts for this when the replacement is a general, but when a colonel is promoted to take a position, that position will be counted twice. Remark that the generals are not counted twice, only the position. The result is that there is a slightly higher count of generals than the official count. The impact of this is that there is slightly more data about the sourced trades but the absolute counts of general officers are slightly higher than the official counts.

Beyond these important weaknesses and limitations, the author acknowledges the inevitability of data errors of all sorts. In the transcription of over five hundred generals and their positions, it is inevitable that some errors have been introduced. Relatedly, the original source

was found to have at least one error, there may be more. Consequently, there are inevitably minor errors in spelling of names, initials and other data. These are not assessed to have a significant impact on the analysis, but may be discovered if the data is applied for other purposes.

ANNEX E: ACCUMULATED DATA

Trade	2019	2016	2013	2010	Total
Total	146	122	103	120	491
ACSO	6	6	6	4	22
AEC	4	3	4	4	15
AERE	2	2	3	3	10
ARMD	14	13	9	14	50
ARTY	6	5	4	5	20
CELE	2	2	1	0	5
CONST ENGR	3	1	1	1	6
EME	3	3	2	3	11
ENGR	7	5	6	6	24
INT	0	0	1	0	1
LEGAL	1	1	1	2	5
LOG	6	10	10	8	34
MPO	2	0	0	0	2
NAV ENG	4	2	5	4	15
NW	26	19	11	17	73
PAO	2	1	0	0	3
PLT	23	20	13	16	72
PSEL	0	0	0	0	0
SIGS	6	6	4	4	20
TRG DEV	0	0	0	0	0
INF	25	19	18	18	80
RCR	6	5	5	4	20
PPCLI	5	6	7	5	23
R22eR	9	5	3	9	26
Excluded ¹⁰³	4	4	4	11	23

Table 1 : Number of GOFO By Trade (Top 5 Highlighted)

¹⁰³ Excluded trades are medical and chaplaincy, see Annex D.

Trade	2019	2016	2013	2010
Total	2.52%	2.11%	1.78%	2.07%
ACSO	3.02%	3.02%	3.02%	2.01%
AEC	1.43%	1.08%	1.43%	1.43%
AERE	0.63%	0.63%	0.94%	0.94%
ARMD	7.53%	6.99%	4.84%	7.53%
ARTY	2.50%	2.08%	1.67%	2.08%
CELE	1.23%	1.23%	0.62%	0.00%
CONST ENGR	3.95%	1.32%	1.32%	1.32%
EME	1.95%	1.95%	1.30%	1.95%
ENGR	4.64%	3.31%	3.97%	3.97%
INT	0.00%	0.00%	0.48%	0.00%
LEGAL	1.06%	1.06%	1.06%	2.13%
LOG	0.80%	1.34%	1.34%	1.07%
MPO	2.04%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
NAV ENG	1.63%	0.82%	2.04%	1.63%
NW	6.93%	5.07%	2.93%	4.53%
PAO	2.30%	1.15%	0.00%	0.00%
PLT	3.13%	2.72%	1.77%	2.18%
PSEL	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
SIGS	3.05%	3.05%	2.03%	2.03%
TRG DEV	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
INF	5.26%	4.00%	3.79%	3.79%
RCR	2.52%	2.11%	1.78%	2.07%
PPCLI	3.02%	3.02%	3.02%	2.01%
R22eR	1.43%	1.08%	1.43%	1.43%

Table 2 : Proportion of GOFO to Subalterns (Top 5 Highlighted)

Trade	2019	2016	2013	2010
Total	39.89%	33.33%	28.14%	32.79%
ACSO	33.33%	33.33%	33.33%	22.22%
AEC	40.00%	30.00%	40.00%	40.00%
AERE	20.00%	20.00%	30.00%	30.00%
ARMD	70.00%	65.00%	45.00%	70.00%
ARTY	33.33%	27.78%	22.22%	27.78%
CELE	25.00%	25.00%	12.50%	0.00%
CONST ENGR	50.00%	16.67%	16.67%	16.67%
EME	23.08%	23.08%	15.38%	23.08%
ENGR	41.18%	29.41%	35.29%	35.29%
INT	0.00%	0.00%	9.09%	0.00%
LEGAL	8.33%	8.33%	8.33%	16.67%
LOG	13.95%	23.26%	23.26%	18.60%
MPO	66.67%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
NAV ENG	33.33%	16.67%	41.67%	33.33%
NW	54.17%	39.58%	22.92%	35.42%
PAO	66.67%	33.33%	0.00%	0.00%
PLT	58.97%	51.28%	33.33%	41.03%
PSEL	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
SIGS	46.15%	46.15%	30.77%	30.77%
TRG DEV	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
INF	71.43%	54.29%	51.43%	51.43%
RCR	39.89%	33.33%	28.14%	32.79%
PPCLI	33.33%	33.33%	33.33%	22.22%
R22eR	40.00%	30.00%	40.00%	40.00%

Table 3 : Proportion of GOFO to Colonel (Top 5 Highlighted)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

- Babij, Colonel Orest. Email conversation with author, 17 March 2020.
- Bishop, Rear-Admiral Scott. Email conversation with author, 10 March 2020.
- Ferguson, Colonel Hugh. Email conversation with author, 13 March 2020.
- Gosselin, Major-General Hercule. Telephone conversation with author, 9 March 2020.
- Harding, Brigadier-General Carla. Email conversation with author, 18 March 2020.
- Sirois, Major-General Sylvain. Email conversation with author, 10 March 2020.
- Williams, Brigadier-General (Retired) Robert. Email conversation with author, 8 March 2020.

Other Sources

- Barno, David, Nora Bensahel, Katherine Kidder and Kelley Sayler. *Building Better Generals*. Washington: Centre for New American Security, 2013.
- Berman, Evan, Chun-Yuan Wang, Chung-An- Chen, CiaoHu Wang, Nicholas Lovrich, Chung-yuang Jan, Yijia Jing, Wei Liu, Ricardo Gomes, Jose Tiu Sonco II, Claudio Melendez and Jun-yi Hsieh. “Public Executive Leadership in East and West: An Examination of HRM Factors in Eight Countries.” *Review of Public Personnel Administration* 33 no 2 (2013).
- Birchfield, Reg, “The Challenge of Choosing a CEO: Choosing a chief executive is a board’s single, most important task.” *New Zealand Management: Auckland* 68 (October 2011). <https://search.proquest.com/docview/963521013?pq-origsite=summon>
- Blatherwick.net, “General & Flag Officers 1964 to Current.” Accessed 30 March 2020, <https://www.blatherwick.net/general%20and%20flag%20officers%201964%20to%20current/>
- Canada. Department of National Defence. A-PA-005-000/AP-004. *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*. Ottawa: DND Canada, 2005.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. A-PA-005-000/AP-006. *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution*. Ottawa: DND Canada, 2007.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. A-PD-055-0001/AG-001. *The Canadian Armed Forces Military Employment Structure*. Ottawa: DND Canada, 2015.

- Canada. Department of National Defence. B-GJ-005-309/FP-001. *Targeting*. Ottawa: DND Canada, 2014.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. B-GL-300-001/FP-001. *Land Operations*. Ottawa: DND Canada, 2008.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. "Medical Standards for Military Occupations. Annex E – Minimum Medical Standards for Officers and Non-Commissioned Members." Accessed 31 March 2020, <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/medical-standards-military-occupations/minimum-medical-standards-for-officers-and-non-commissioned-members.html>
- Canada. Department of National Defence. "MNET – MOSID/NOC Equivalency Tool." Accessed 30 March 2020, <https://caface-rface.forces.gc.ca/mnet-oesc/en/cafSearch>
- Canada. Department of National Defence. "Personnel Report." Accessed 7 February 2020, DWAN Only <http://cmp-cpm.mil.ca/en/support/military-personnel/dpgr-index.page>
- Casserly, Meghan. 2012. *The Secret Power of the Generalist - And How They'll Rule the Future*. July 10. Accessed May 16, 2019. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/meghancasserly/2012/07/10/the-secret-power-of-the-generalist-and-how-theyll-rule-the-future/#7b3489f92bd5>
- Connelly, Mary Shane, Janelle A. Gilbert, Stephen J. Zaccaro, K. Victoria Threfall, Michelle A. Marks, and Micheal D. Mumford. Spring 2000. "Exploring the Relationship of Leadership Skills and Knowledge to Leader Performance." *The Leadership Quarterly* (Elsevier) 11 (1): 65-86. <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1048984399000430>
- Dewitt, Rink and George Stiles. "After choosing CEO, it's time to groom executive for top job." *The Boston Business Journal* 19 : Boston, no. 22 (July 1999). <https://search.proquest.com/docview/216345687?pq-origsite=summon>
- Elsaid, Eahab, Bradley Benson and Dan L. Worrell. "Successor CEO Functional and Educational Backgrounds: Influence of Predecessor Characteristics and Performance Antecedents." *The Journal of Applied Business Research* 32 no 4 (July/August 2016). <https://search.proquest.com/docview/1923972495?pq-origsite=summon>
- Elsaid, Eahab. "The Effect of Change in CEO Gender, Functional and Educational Background On Firm Performance and Risk." *Journal of Applied Business Research* 30 no 6 (2014). <https://search.proquest.com/docview/1655564846?pq-origsite=summon>
- English, Allan. 2018. "Rethinking RCAF Senior Officer Professional Military Education in the 21st Century: Learning from the Past." *Royal Canadian Air Force Journal* (Department of National Defence) 7 (1): 36-47. http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2018/mdn-dnd/D12-16-7-1-eng.pdf

- Goodall, Amanda H., interview by Sarah Green Carmichael. 2018. *Why Technical Experts Make Great Leaders* Harvard Business Review, (April 24).
<https://hbr.org/ideacast/2018/04/why-technical-experts-make-great-leaders>
- Google.ca. "Book Review – Moving Mountains; Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War." Accessed on 31 March 2020,
https://books.google.ca/books/about/Moving_Mountains.html?id=H2pnPwAACAAJ&source=kp_book_description&redir_esc=y
- Hardy, Steve. 2013. *Leaders as Generalists*. December 17. Accessed May 16, 2019.
<http://creativegeneralist.com/2003/12/leaders-as-generalists/>
- Hufnagel, Sasika and Maria Hassan, "Women in International Policing: Replacing an "Old Boys Club"?" *Salus Journal* 6 no. 1 (2018).
<https://doaj.org/article/9149507a94404da191376ab01ee04ccb>
- International Cyber Risk Management Conference. "Brigadier General R.G. Mazzolin Ph.D., P.Eng., OMM, CD." Accessed 30 March 2020, <https://usa-canada.icrmc.com/speaker/bgen-r-g-mazzolin-ph-d-p-eng-omm-cd/>
- Melchers, Klaus and Hubert Annen. "Officer Selection for the Swiss Armed Forces: An Evaluation of Validity and Fairness Issues." *Swiss Journal of Psychology* 69 (2010).
<https://econtent.hogrefe.com/doi/10.1024/1421-0185/a000012>
- Neumann, William. "Generals doing Generals' Work." National Security Studies Program Course Paper, Canadian Forces College, 2002.
- Pagonis, William G. and Jeffery L. Cruikshank. *Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1992.
- Peck, David. "Choosing a CEO: the Board's Six Biggest Mistakes." *Nonprofit World* 10: Madison, no. 2 (March/April 1992). <https://search.proquest.com/docview/221255150?pq-origsite=summon>
- Pugliese, David. "A 60 per cent increase in Canada's generals – Vance says more to come." *Ottawa Citizen*, 5 May 2018.
- Ricks, Thomas E. *The Generals*. New York: The Penguin Press, 2012.
- Rimmer, Abi, "'Old boys club' culture at BMA undermined female members and staff, sexism report finds." *British Medical Journal (Online): London* 387 (October 2017).
<https://search.proquest.com/docview/2306415296?pq-origsite=summon>
- Robart, Brent. "Leadership Requirements in Emerging Domains of Operations." Joint Command and Staff Program Course Paper, Canadian Forces College 2019.
- Rowley, Roger. *The Report of the Officer Development Board*. Edited by Randall Wakelam and Howard Coombs. Waterloo: LCMSDS Press, 2010.

- Sakinah, Nada. "Employees' Attitude toward the Implementation of Open Selection System for Senior Executive Service Positions." *Bisnis & Birokrasi* 24 no 1 (Jan 2017).
- Schaffer, Utz, Alexander Schmidt and Erik Strauss, "An old boys' club on the threshold to becoming a professional association: The emergence and development of the association of German controllers from 1975 to 1989." *Accounting History* 19 no. 1-2 (February 2014).
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1032373213517867?utm_source=summon&utm_medium=discovery-provider&
- Stoller, James K., Amanda Goodall, and Agnes Baker. 2016. "Why the Best Hospitals are Managed by Doctors." *Harvard Business Review Online* n.d.
<https://hbr.org/2016/12/why-the-best-hospitals-are-managed-by-doctors>
- Sutherland, Chris. "Competency-based Professional Development for Strategic Level Military Leadership." College Command and Staff Course New Horizons Paper, Canadian Forces, 2006.
- Teodoridis, Florenta, Keyvan Vakili, and Micheal Bikard. 2017. "Can Specialization Foster Creativity? Mathematics and the Collapse of the Soviet Union." *Academy of Management Proceedings*. <https://journals.aom.org/doi/abs/10.5465/ambpp.2017.224>
- United States. Department of Defence. *The United States Army in World War II*. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, n.d.
- Wade, Arthur P. "Roads to the Top – An Analysis of General-Officer Selection in the United States Army, 1789-1898." *Military Affairs* 40: Lexington, no. 4 (December, 1976).
<https://search.proquest.com/docview/1296718104?accountid=9867&pq-origsite=summon>
- Youssef, Nancy A. "In Generational Shift, Army Uses a New System to Promote Hundreds of Officers." *The Wall Street Journal*, 4 March 2020.
- Zaccaro, Stephen J., Jennifer P. Green, Samantha Dubrow, and MaryJo Kolze. 2018. "Leader individual differences, situational parameters, and leadership outcomes: A comprehensive review and integration." *The Leadership Quarterly* (Elsevier Inc.) 29 (1): 2-43. Accessed March 2019.
<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1048984317300784?via%3Dihub>