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Canadian Maritime Defence Diplomacy:

Canada's Ambassadors at Sea

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**CANADIAN MARITIME DEFENCE DIPLOMACY: CANADA'S
AMBASSADORS AT SEA**

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Par la capitaine de corvette R.G.S. Bell

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ABSTRACT

Unlike most other military platforms, warships regularly patrol, exercise, and operate globally, both in times of peace, as well as war. The unrivaled mobility, sustainability, as well as flexibility that is inherent in naval platforms make them excellent assets from which to support the diplomatic efforts and foreign policy objectives of the state. Warships have been used as diplomatic tools since the origin of warfare at sea, and the utilization of naval vessels to undertake maritime defence diplomacy activities continues to the present day in navies around the world. This paper argues that while Canada's recent return to conducting focused maritime defence diplomacy deployments is a step in the right direction, much work at the policy and planning levels needs to take place in order to maximize the return on these deployments for the government of Canada. To achieve this, maritime defence diplomacy will be divided into three categories that require analysis and optimization, those being Principles, Policy, and Practice. First, the principles behind maritime defence diplomacy will be reviewed, with an emphasis on how these can be integrated into the regular activities that Canadian warships undertake. Following this the defence diplomacy policies of Canada and the UK will be compared so as to identify areas where the Canadian policy structure can be improved. Finally, this paper will conduct a detailed look at the current practice of Canadian maritime defence diplomacy, specifically those activities that are being undertaken under Operation *PROJECTION*, before assessing how the activities undertaken during these deployments could be employed across the full spectrum of RCN ship based deployments. By integrating best practices from both domestic and international sources into the Canadian maritime defence diplomacy program, the CAF can further leverage the global reach of Canada's naval fleet in order to maximize the support that can be provided for Canada's diplomatic and foreign policy objectives.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

2015 NSS – The 2015 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review

ADM(Fin) – Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance)

ADM(Mat) – Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel)

ADM(Pol) – Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy)

ADM(RS) – Assistant Deputy Minister (Review Services)

AOR – Auxiliary Oil Replenishment Vessel

ASEAN – Association of South-East Asian Nations

BPC – Building Partner Capacity Operations

CA – Canadian Army

CAF – Canadian Armed Forces

CDA – Canadian Defence Attaché

CDLS(L) – Canadian Defence Liaison Staff (London)

CDLS(W) – Canadian Defence Liaison Staff (Washington)

CDS – Chief of the Defence Staff

CJOC – Canadian Joint Operations Command

CMS – Combat Management System

Comd RCN – Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy

CSSF – The United Kingdom's Conflict Stability and Security Fund

CTCBP – Counter Terrorism Capacity Building Partnership Program

DFL – Directorate of Foreign Liaison

DM – Deputy Minister

DMTC – Directorate of Military Training and Cooperation

DND – Department of National Defence

DNOP – Directorate of Naval Operations and Plans

DVCDS – Deputy Vice Chief of the Defence Staff

FCO – The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office

FE – Force Employment

FG – Force Generate

FONOPS – Freedom of Navigation Operations

GAC – Global Affairs Canada
GE – Global Engagement
GES – Global Engagement Strategy
GIPDE – Guidance on International Priorities for Defence Engagement
GOFO – General Officer / Flag Officer
HADR – Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
IRSS – Infrared Suppression System
JDP 0-10 - Joint Doctrine Publication 0-10 – UK Maritime Power
L1 – Level One Organization
LMC – Lockheed Martin Canada
MARPAAC – Maritime Forces Pacific
MC – Memorandum to Cabinet
MCE(Strat) – Maritime Coordination Element (Strategic)
MDA – Maritime Domain Awareness
Mil-Mil – Military to Military
MND – Minister of National Defence
MTCP – Military Training and Cooperation Program
NTOG – Naval Tactical Operations Group
OFA – Operations Funding Account
OOTW - Operations Other than War
OUTCAN – Out of Canada exchanges and postings
PLAN – Peoples Liberation Army Navy
PRMNY – Permanent Resident Mission in New York
RAST – Recovery Assist and Secure Traverse
RCAF – Royal Canadian Air Force
RCN – Royal Canadian Navy
RIMPAC – Exercise Rim of the Pacific
RN – Royal Navy
SDSR – The 2010 UK Strategic Defence and Security Review
SHINCOM – Shipboard Integrated Communications System
SJS – The Strategic Joint Staff

SSE – Strong, Secure, and Engaged – Canada’s Defence Policy
STTT – Short Term Training Team
UK – The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UK DES – The United Kingdom Defence Engagement Strategy
UK MOD – The United Kingdom Ministry of Defence
UNCLOS – The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNSC – United Nations Security Council
USA – The United States of America
USAFRICOM – United States Africa Command
USN – The United States Navy
VCDS – Vice Chief of the Defence Staff
WoG – Whole of Government
WPNS – Western Pacific Naval Symposium
WW2 – The Second World War

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

A warship is no ordinary piece of military equipment. A naval vessel is first and foremost a reproduction in scale of a society . . . it is a floating showcase of customs, culture and history. When visitors board a warship, they are visiting the country of its flag.

- Dr. Alessio Patalano, Maritime Diplomacy in the 21st Century

It is 1000, on the 13th of March, 2019 in the port of Takoradi, Ghana, as two Canadian warships slowly glide up to the jetty, and begin settling into their berths under the rising African sun. The purpose for the visit of these two ships during Operation *PROJECTION AFRICA* is to refuel and re-provision following a trans-Atlantic voyage. Despite this, during their three day visit they will also support the local Canadian diplomatic mission through the hosting of a cocktail party, conduct community outreach events at a local orphanage, and participate in International Women's day festivities, all before departing the port and contributing to regional maritime stability through cooperative maritime exercises. All of these actions share a common set of objectives, those being to increase in the visibility and esteem of Canada as a nation within the Ghanaian population, to provide support for the advancement of the Canadian government's international objectives, as well as to strengthen the ties between the two nations. While the activities these warships conducted while visiting Ghana would not be considered by most to be typical military activities, each of these tasks falls within the realm of maritime defence diplomacy. Sitting within the sphere of military operations other than war, maritime defence diplomacy can be defined as those maritime activities that signal to both allies and potential adversaries the intent and policies of the state, in order to advance the foreign policy and diplomatic goals of the nation.¹ These actions can be both supportive, as illustrated above, but

¹ Christian Le Mière, *Maritime diplomacy in the 21st century: Drivers and challenges*, (London: Routledge, 2014), 2-3.

also coercive in nature, seeking to provide a deterrent effect to a potential adversary against a particular action or policy. Indeed, almost any action taken by a warship outside of actual combat can be seen to fall somewhere within the realm of maritime defence diplomacy, and as such, with proper planning, coordination, and execution, can be utilized to further the desires of the state.

The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) has an extensive history of utilizing maritime defence diplomacy activities in peace time to support Canadian government objectives. With the exception of a brief period at the end of the Second World War (WW2), the RCN has spent the vast majority of its existence as a medium, or small power navy. As such, lacking the combat capability to undertake independent war-fighting operations at sea, Canada, like most medium power nations, has tended to more frequently utilize its naval fleet in support of foreign policy objectives.² Historical examples of the Canadian use of maritime defence diplomacy have included the positioning of warships to support diplomatic missions, such as occurred off China in 1949, and Vietnam in 1974, as well as the deployment of warships to express political concern and to monitor a deteriorating political situation, such as occurred off of Haiti in 1987. Canada has also dispatched warships to conduct goodwill port visits aimed at improving diplomatic relations, as was done with the visit of a Canadian naval task group to Vladivostok, within the Soviet Union, in 1989.³ This longstanding tradition of utilizing Canadian naval forces in a maritime defence diplomacy role has become increasingly formalized over the last three years with the creation of the defence diplomacy focussed Op *PROJECTION*. As a result of this shift towards the regular use of maritime defence diplomatic deployments, it has become increasingly

² Fred Crickard and Gregory Witol, “The Political Uses of Medium Power Navies” in *Canadian Gunboat Diplomacy: The Canadian Navy and Foreign Policy*, ed. Ann Griffiths et al (Halifax: Dalhousie University, 1998), 249.

³ Bruce Fenton, “Foreign Policy and Naval Forces: A Canadian Perspective” in *Canadian Gunboat Diplomacy: The Canadian Navy and Foreign Policy*, ed. Ann Griffiths et al (Halifax: Dalhousie University, 1998), 141.

beneficial to undertake a fulsome review of the Canadian implementation of maritime defence diplomacy as a military activity, and to make changes to the way that these activities are executed in order to maximize their return for the government of Canada.

The topic for this paper came as a result of the author's experience working as the Senior Staff Officer Naval Operations – Europe, Africa, and the Middle East within the Directorate of Naval Operations and Plans (DNOP) within the Naval Staff in Ottawa between 2016 and 2019. During this period, I was responsible, at the staff officer level, for managing all global engagement requests, as well as overseeing, on behalf of the RCN, the navy requirements to support CAF operations within those regions. I draw on my experiences in helping to manage the RCN defence diplomacy program, and assisting in the production of tasking directives and deployment orders for Op *PROJECTION* deployments during this time period for some of the material and information in this paper. Vignettes and examples that draw on those experiences are noted as such using discursive footnotes.

This paper will conduct an assessment of the Canadian maritime defence diplomacy program in three parts, those being principles, policy, and practice. Firstly, under principles, a review of the theory behind the use of maritime defence diplomacy will be conducted, examples of each category of maritime defence diplomacy activities will be provided, and a brief overview of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) organizations that have a defence diplomacy mandate will be included. This will be done to establish the background and history of maritime defence diplomacy, as well as to provide an overview of the current state of defence diplomacy within the CAF. Secondly, under policy, Canadian defence diplomacy policy will be contrasted with the United Kingdom's (UK) policy structure to identify best practices and areas for improvement. This will be done to demonstrate where Canada's policy structure as it pertains to defence

diplomacy is currently lacking, and to identify areas where more explicit policy could assist in improving the planning and execution of Canada's defence diplomacy program. Finally, under practice, an assessment will be conducted of the current Canadian maritime defence diplomacy deployments being executed through Op *PROJECTION*. This will then be used to demonstrate where maritime defence diplomacy activities could be further integrated into the wider RCN deployment program. This will be done so as to show how the planning processes and practices employed for Op *PROJECTION* deployments could be utilized to integrate a greater number maritime defence diplomacy activities into the wider RCN international sailing program. It is through these three categories of principles, policy, and practice that it will be demonstrated that changes to the Canadian policy structure and deployment planning processes could result in a greater return to the government of Canada through the broader implementation of maritime defence diplomacy.

CHAPTER 2: PRINCIPLES

In order to undertake a study of Canadian maritime defence diplomacy, it is first necessary to look at the broad concepts and activities that form the basis for military diplomacy in general, and the naval application of these concepts specifically. The use of militaries to further diplomatic aims has a lengthy history within modern human civilization, and as Clausewitz is famously over quoted as stating: “war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on by other means”.⁴ Although Clausewitz was referring to the employment of military forces within combat, his observation can also be seen to apply to the peace time uses of military forces as well. Over the last 150 years, the role that maritime forces have played in diplomatic functions has ebbed and flowed conforming to the political necessities of the day. Correspondingly, the literature on this subject has also gone through a series of transformations, periodically focusing solely on a particular grouping of naval diplomatic actions, before broadening out to include the wider sphere of diplomatic activities that naval forces can be tasked to undertake. This chapter will provide an overview of the academic discourse on the subject of maritime defence diplomacy, highlighting the broad divisions of thought within the academic community. Additionally, a general summary of defence diplomacy will be undertaken, along with a detailed overview of the various activities that warships can undertake, along with examples of when these concepts have been applied. The field of maritime defence diplomacy is a broad and diverse grouping of actions, and an understanding of the full spectrum of maritime diplomacy is necessary before undertaking an assessment of the Canadian use of these activities.

⁴ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 87.

Literary Review of Maritime Defence Diplomacy

The body of literature on the diplomatic uses of naval power is large and diverse. Discussions of how a state can best use its naval forces to further government interests, and increase national power, have persisted throughout much of modern history. Many of the early modern naval scholars, such as Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, focused their studies on the application of naval power during combat operations.⁵ As they concentrated their analysis on naval diplomacy as a means of national deterrence, they avoided discussions on the applications of naval forces during peace time, and in Operations Other than War (OOTW). However, over the last 150 years, scholars have explored the potential uses of naval forces during periods when a nation is not actively engaged in combat operations. As a result, the ways that naval forces can further the diplomatic and foreign affairs objectives of a nation has become a major trend in security scholarship. This literature review will break down the predominant scholarship in this field into two categories thematically. The first category will focus on authors that focused on the diplomatic uses of naval forces on the antagonistic end of the OOTW spectrum, while the second category will explore works by authors that expanded the diplomatic uses of naval forces to include strictly diplomatic uses of naval power.

The use of warships in an antagonistic fashion as a means of diplomatically compelling a potential adversary has been common throughout history. Consequently, much has been written about the use of naval forces in activities just short of war. Authors writing within this category tend to focus on the utility of placing warships in close proximity to potential adversary nations as a means of compelling other nations to take, or not take, certain actions. These outward displays of force, through the antagonistic deployment of naval assets are often termed “Gunboat

⁵ Geoffrey Till, *Seapower: A guide for the twenty-first century*, (London: Routledge, 2018), 360-361

diplomacy”, which takes its name from the Royal Navy’s (RN) use of small gunboats during the mid to late 1800s to enforce its will against weaker nations such as China and Japan.⁶ One of the most prominent writers on this subject was Sir James Cable, who as a diplomat and author wrote extensively on the subject of Gunboat diplomacy. Cable focused his efforts on exploring what he termed the use of “limited naval force” during OOTW. He believed that naval assets were particularly adept at threatening potential adversaries through their presence and outward displays of naval power. He wrote that warships could not be seen to be used to advance the cause of wider diplomatic efforts if the desired target was not threatened by their presence and the potential of their use in combat.⁷ In this way, Cable believed that maritime diplomacy was primarily coercive in nature, and broadly limited to the ability to use warships as a means of demonstrating the potential for future violence against an adversary.⁸ Admiral Stansfield Turner, a United States Navy (USN) officer who commanded the US Naval War College in the 1970s, echoed Cable’s views in *Missions of the US Navy*, in which he introduced the concept of the Naval Presence mission. Turner’s presence mission concept focused on the preventative use of naval power to deter actions that were undesirable by the United States of America (USA), while also reactively employing naval powers in a crisis to encourage the de-escalation of a potentially dangerous situation through a show of force.⁹ It is evident in both Cable and Turner’s writings that they viewed the diplomatic utility of maritime assets as the ability to deter other nations through the provision of a threatening naval presence.

⁶ Stansfield Turner, “Missions of the US Navy,” *Naval War College Review* (1974): 89.

⁷ Andrew Tan, *The politics of maritime power: a survey*, (London: Routledge, 2010), 8.

⁸ James Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy 1919-1991*, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 12-13.

⁹ Stansfield Turner, “Missions of the US Navy,” . . . , 99.

In addition to Cable and Turner, numerous authors have expanded on the concept of the use of naval forces as a means of furthering diplomatic efforts through the threat of force. One of the earlier writers on this topic was British Naval historian Julian Corbett, who was instrumental in influencing major overhauls to the composition and use of the RN in the early twentieth century. Corbett wrote *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* in 1911, which was one of the early works to explicitly link naval strategy with foreign policy objectives.¹⁰ He saw the link between the two being the ability of naval forces to exert influence against potential adversaries through the inherent mobility of warships at sea, and the flexibility found in the application of their force. Expounding a view of maritime diplomacy that was largely antagonistic in nature, he wrote that naval forces existed in peace time to support or obstruct diplomatic effort as required.¹¹ Building upon the work of both Corbett and Cable, Edward Luttwak wrote, in *The Political Uses of Seapower*, that maritime diplomacy was predominantly focused on the application of active and latent naval suasion.¹² While Luttwak broke from Cable, Turner, and Corbett in that he saw the utility of using maritime diplomacy in a supportive or reassurance role towards allies, his work largely focused on the use of pre-positioned naval forces, such as the US Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, which he viewed as being able to exert a deterrence effect against potential adversaries.¹³ Thus, Luttwak, Corbett, Cable and Turner grounded their works in the belief that maritime diplomacy was fundamentally antagonistic in nature, relying on displays of force and threats of violence in order to achieve the aims of the state.

¹⁰ Geoffrey Till, *Seapower: A guide for the twenty-first century* . . . , 20.

¹¹ *Ibid*, 1.

¹² *Ibid*, 3.

¹³ Edward Luttwak, *The political uses of sea power*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), 7.

The second category of academic discourse on maritime diplomacy centers on the broad view of maritime diplomatic support that includes the full spectrum of coercive and supportive diplomatic functions that can be exercised by naval forces in support of national interests. Moving beyond the purely antagonistic employment of naval forces, authors such as Peter Hayden expanded maritime diplomacy by creating new sub categories of maritime diplomatic activities. Hayden argued that in addition to Cable’s categories of overt maritime diplomacy, that four additional maritime diplomatic functions needed to be included: Confidence building activities —such as cooperative exercises intended to build understanding and trust—, Support to economic sanctions —such as blockades and maritime interdiction operations—, Support of trade and national industries —such as domestic industrial production and economic advancement promotion activities—, and General diplomatic support activities —such as direct support to ambassadorial functions and diplomatic negotiations—. ¹⁴ These categories expanded the view of maritime diplomacy to include activities that didn’t focus solely on potential adversaries, but instead also focused on allies and partner nations as well. Ken Booth, a British international relations professor, further developed the idea of non-overt maritime diplomacy in his work, *Navies and Foreign Policy*, by proposing the triangle of naval roles. His theory stated that all naval functions break down into one of three categories: Constabulary, Military Force, and Diplomacy. Within the maritime role of diplomacy, Booth further expanded the range of maritime diplomatic activities, ranging from overt presence, to non-combatant evacuation, allied re-assurance activities, presence operations and support to diplomatic missions. ¹⁵ Booth’s work

¹⁴ Peter Hayden, “Naval Diplomacy: Is It Relevant in the 21st Century?”, in *The Politics of Maritime Power: A Survey*, ed. Andrew Tan (London: Routledge, 2010), 78-79.

¹⁵ Canada. Department of National Defence. Royal Canadian Navy, *Leadmark: The Navy’s Strategy for 2020*. (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2001), 31-34.

in expanding the roles of maritime forces is of particular note within the Canadian context, as it forms the basis for the foundation of RCN doctrine.¹⁶ Finally, Christian Le Mière, in *Maritime Diplomacy in the 21st Century*, put forth a three category system that brought all naval diplomatic activities together under the categories of Co-operative, Persuasive, and Coercive maritime diplomacy.¹⁷ Le Mière's categorization of maritime diplomacy fully articulated the complete spectrum of diplomatic activities that naval forces can undertake, and it is his categories that will be used to explore specific examples of maritime diplomacy in the following sections. Through their works, authors such as Le Mière, Booth and Hayden were important as they expanded the discourse on maritime diplomacy to include non-overt uses of force, and moved beyond an adversary focused maritime diplomacy viewpoint.

While the academic discourse on maritime diplomacy can be categorized into “antagonistic” and “broad spectrum” groupings, it is the broad spectrum theories that are most often incorporated into Canadian maritime diplomacy activities. It is these broad spectrum systems for the categorization of maritime diplomatic activities that will be used throughout the rest of this paper to analyze Canadian maritime diplomatic activities.

Overview of CAF Defence Diplomacy Activities

Prior to looking at specific categories and examples of Canadian maritime defence diplomacy, it is important to briefly summarize the overall CAF defence diplomacy program. As an internationally-focused organization, units within the CAF at all levels interact with foreign nations and external partners on a regular basis. Despite this, there are several organizations

¹⁶ Canada. Department of National Defence. Royal Canadian Navy, *Canada in a New Maritime World: Leadmark 2050*. (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2016), 12.

¹⁷ Christian Le Mière, *Maritime diplomacy in the 21st century* . . . , 7.

within the CAF whose sole mandate is to manage foreign relations and carry out international engagement activities within the defence realm. The majority of these organizations are all loosely grouped together into a single program, titled the Defence Engagement Program, which falls under the authority of the Vice Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS). As such, it is within the VCDS's mandate to manage external foreign liaison, and coordinate international engagement on behalf of the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS).¹⁸ The majority of Canada's defence diplomacy activities within the CAF originate within two organizations, those being the Canadian Defence Attaché (CDA) network, and the Directorate of Military Training and Cooperation (DMTC), and together these two programs represent Canada's dedicated ongoing defence diplomacy efforts.

As the primary front line diplomacy representatives of the CAF, the CDAs and their associated staff form the persistent Canadian defence presence within many nations around the world. Working within the Canadian embassy system managed by Global Affairs Canada (GAC), the CDAs are senior military officers of the rank of Captain (Navy) / Colonel and Commander / Lieutenant Colonel designated as Defence Attachés, who represent the CAF within the diplomatic mission and act as military advisors to the ambassador. Historically, the practice of embedding military officers within the staffs of diplomatic missions first became common during the Napoleonic wars, when Napoleon Bonaparte seconded officers to support diplomatic efforts by appointing them as assistants and military advisors to his ambassadors. This practice quickly spread, and by 1857 these officers had attained full diplomatic status; since that time, most Western nations have utilized Defence Attachés within their embassy staffs.¹⁹ Within the

¹⁸ Canada, DND, *ADM(RS) Evaluation of Global Engagement / Military Diplomacy*, (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2018), IV.

¹⁹ Andrew Cooper, Jorge Heine, and Ramesh Thakur, *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*, (London: Oxford University Press, 2013), 2.

CAF, the CDA network is run out of the Directorate of Foreign Liaison (DFL) within the VCDS organization. In addition to managing the CDA network, DFL is also responsible for all high-level visits, both those of foreign dignitaries to Canada, as well as visits of Canadian General Officers and Flag Officers (GOFO) to foreign countries. A geographically dispersed organization, as of 2018, the deployed component of DFL consisted of 41 separate offices within Canadian embassies, providing military representation to 138 different countries.²⁰ These offices represent the CAF's only front line and permanently deployed defence diplomacy presence, and as such carry out the vast majority of defence diplomacy activities on behalf of the Canadian government, such as military to military (Mil-Mil) engagement, military industrial sales support, and host nation information gathering.

Despite the scope of their responsibilities, and the large number of countries that the CDA network provides coverage for, the CDA program is executed utilizing a very small number of personnel, spread out across a wide variety of missions. As of 2018, the total number of deployed staff within the CDA program was just 118, of which a significant number of those personnel were located in the three large missions: Canadian Defence Liaison Staff (Washington) (CDLS(W)), Canadian Defence Liaison Staff (London) (CDLS(L)) and the Permanent Resident Mission in New York (PRMNY).²¹ As such, it can be seen that the size of the CDA network, coupled with the sheer number of countries for which they are responsible, precludes them from being able to execute the full spectrum of defence diplomacy responsibilities without assistance from other organizations within the CAF and the Department of National Defence (DND). The limited size of the CDA program is also important when

²⁰ Canada, DND, *ADM(RS) Evaluation of Global Engagement . . .*, 2.

²¹ *Ibid*, 4.

considering maritime defence diplomacy, as the CDAs play an important role in preparing for ship visits, providing information on their host nations, and establishing contacts within the host nation's military, political, and industrial communities, which are vitally important for the success of many maritime defence diplomacy activities. As the permanently deployed, and most widely dispersed defence diplomatic apparatus, the CDA network provides valuable information on local conditions, and permanent in country military representation that supports other CAF defence diplomatic activities.

The second major component of the CAF's defence diplomatic program is DMTC, and the wide variety of education and training programs it sponsors and executes around the world. DMTC was first established in the 1960s as the Military Training and Cooperation Program (MTCP), and was setup in response to a series of international agreements that aimed to help the newly-independent Commonwealth countries that had achieved independence in the post World War Two (WW2) period.²² The DMTC mandate later expanded beyond its initial Commonwealth focus, and the program now provides training programs for international military members both in Canadian training centers, as well as internationally, working in cooperation with host nations. In its current form, DMTC operates through the Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy) (ADM(Pol)) organization, under the Director General International Security Policy group. As the primary provider of training and education programs to foreign militaries within the CAF, DMTC focuses the majority of its efforts on language training, peace support operations preparedness, professional development programs, and staff officer training courses.²³ As the international demand for training in these fields far outstrips the ability of any one country

²² Canada, DND, *Directorate of Military Training and Cooperation: 2017-2018 Annual Report* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2019), 5.

²³ *Ibid*, 3.

to provide it, DMTC is perennially oversubscribed in its program participation, requiring them to strictly limit their programs so as to best meet their mandate. The demand for DMTC's services is best demonstrated by the fact that in 2018, DMTC provided training and education programs to over 1500 foreign military members, from 56 different countries.²⁴ Although DMTC represents the CAF's primary foreign training and education authority, the demand for such services necessitates the involvement of other organizations within the CAF in order to meet the CAF's demand for foreign training, relationship building and cooperation. As such, other Level 1 (L1) organizations within the CAF engage in a wide variety of training and education programs for foreign militaries as a means of augmenting the program executed under DMTC. The inclusion of wider organizations and activities, such as maritime diplomacy is necessary to meet CAF diplomatic objectives.

The CAF's dedicated defence diplomacy program, while representing a valuable resource for building foreign relations, expanding Canadian influence, and meeting the CAF's diplomatic objectives, is unable to fulfill this mandate without assistance from the wider CAF. Additionally, the fact that the two major defence diplomacy organizations within the CAF report through two different chains of command, meeting together only at the Deputy Minister (DM) and CDS level, provides challenges for the central coordination of their efforts. As shown above, both the CDA network and DMTC find themselves perennially overprescribed in regards to the wide variety of diplomatic requirements facing the defence diplomacy program, and therefore are unable to meet the demand for defence diplomatic services for the wide variety of countries that the CAF maintains defence diplomatic relationships with. It is as a result of this disconnect between

²⁴ Ibid, 10.

demand and resources that has necessitated the involvement in defence diplomacy activities by organizations such as the RCN and the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC).

Types of Maritime Defence Engagement Activities

The spectrum of activities that warships can undertake in support of diplomatic objectives is broad, and therefore it is necessary to look at these activities within sub-divided categories in order to best understand their purpose and effect. The categorization of these activities helps one to understand the specific foreign policy objectives for each maritime activity, and in doing so, illuminates how the deployment of naval forces supports broader national objectives. As was noted above, the classification system that will be used within this paper is Christian Le Mière's three categories of maritime diplomatic activities, which divides diplomatic actions into the broad categories of Co-operative, Persuasive, and Coercive maritime diplomatic activities.²⁵ Le Mière's system was selected because it covers the full spectrum of maritime diplomatic engagements, spanning from activities that are completely peaceful in nature, to those activities that are on the verge of active naval combat. Additionally, unlike other systems for categorizing maritime diplomacy, Le Mière's system provides an increased level of detail on activities that fall within the Cooperative sphere. This is important for this thesis, as this is the group of diplomatic activities which best lends itself to the analyses of Canadian maritime defence diplomacy. It is also worth noting that like all broad categorization systems, not all diplomatic activities will fit neatly into one category, and thus some maritime defence diplomatic activities will overlap between categories. This ambiguity is created by the fluid nature of maritime diplomacy, which can often result in a diplomatic activity being seen as cooperative to one

²⁵ Christian Le Mière, *Maritime diplomacy in the 21st century* . . . , 7-8.

country, and coercive to a potential adversary nation.²⁶ Despite this ambiguity, a detailed knowledge of the full spectrum of maritime defence diplomatic activities is necessary in order to assess the efficacy of the Canadian maritime defence diplomacy program. The following paragraphs will provide greater detail for each category of maritime defence diplomacy, and provide Canadian and international examples for when these activities have been undertaken.

Cooperative Maritime Diplomacy

Cooperative maritime diplomacy, as the most peaceful of Le Mière's three categories, is the group of maritime diplomatic activities that Canada often employs its Naval forces to undertake. This category can best be defined as the use of naval forces to entice, inspire or reassure other, non-adversarial nations. Additionally, cooperative maritime diplomacy, as a voluntary and collaborative form of diplomacy, necessarily cannot include actions aimed at deterring, compelling or using force against a potential adversary.²⁷ The actions in this category seek to use naval forces in a peaceful and constructive way, in order to create a positive view of the ship-sending nation and enhance relationships, and in doing so, help to achieve the foreign policy objectives of the sending state. While three of these actions will be explored below, it is worth noting that this category includes a broad swath of maritime operations, including Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations, medical ship deployments, and assistive maritime operations such as mine clearance operations.²⁸ As will be shown below, during maritime operations other than war, a large percentage of the actions taken by warships

²⁶ Ibid, 123.

²⁷ Ibid, 11.

²⁸ James Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*. . . , 133.

while deployed outside of their territorial waters can be described as being at least partially supportive of cooperative maritime diplomatic objectives.

A hallmark cooperative diplomatic function, the “goodwill port visit” represents one of the most recognizable and frequently-utilized cooperative maritime defence diplomacy action. Goodwill port visits differ from normal operational port visits-- those which are primarily executed with the intent to provision, repair, and provide crew relaxation-- in that goodwill visits are undertaken to achieve a strategic objective, and oftentimes the sending nation will attempt to link the visit of the ship with a specific policy or priority.²⁹ A common maritime diplomatic activity for Canadian naval forces, one of the most significant uses of this tactic was the 1989 deployment of three Canadian warships to the port of Vladivostok, USSR. This port visit was planned and executed as a gesture of friendship, with the strategic objective of acting as a means of opening up more regular relations between Canada and the USSR.³⁰ A more recent example was the visit of *HMCS Ville de Quebec* to Tunis, Tunisia, in August of 2018, which was conducted as a part of the ship’s Operation *REASSURANCE* deployment as a means of fostering good will and improving relations between Canada and Tunisia.³¹ Tunisia had recently been declared a priority nation for Canadian defence engagement, and this port visit was conducted with the specific aim of reinforcing the newly-revitalized relationship between Canada and Tunisia.³²

Beyond the presence of the ship itself, the power of a goodwill port visit lies in the activities that are undertaken both onboard the vessel and ashore during the visit. These activities

²⁹ Ken Booth, *Navies and Foreign Policy*, (London: Routledge, 2014), 19-20.

³⁰ Bruce Fenton, “Foreign Policy and Naval Forces: A Canadian Perspective”. . . , 141.

³¹ “Canadian, Tunisian navies train during Operation Reassurance” *Naval Today*, last modified 04 September, 2018, <https://navaltoday.com/2018/09/04/canadian-tunisian-navies-train-during-operation-reassurance/>.

³² “News Release: Canada Strengthens Collaboration with Tunisia”, last modified 19 June 2018, <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2018/06/canada-strengthens-collaboration-with-tunisia0.html>.

range from cocktail parties for local dignitaries, official meetings, and military tours of the ship and local defence establishments, to humanitarian and community aid projects undertaken by sailors ashore, such as the refurbishment of an orphanage or rural school. Indeed, the actions taken by a ship's sailors in support of strategic national objectives during goodwill port visits are so important that Vice Admiral Bob Davidson, Canada's former senior military representative to NATO, was quoted in Le Mière, 2014, describing sailors in these situations as "mini ambassadors, representing the country and its interests and values in every port of call".³³

Goodwill port visits, such as those listed above, are able to, through the actions undertaken while in port, leverage the impressive nature of modern warships, and the novelty of their presence, to create a positive diplomatic effect that is more difficult to produce through the visit of military aircraft or uniformed troops.

While both land and air forces can conduct official goodwill visits to foreign nations, both types of forces have a variety of requirements that preclude them from having the same diplomatic effect that is generated through a goodwill port visit. Some of these requirements include the reliance that land and air forces necessarily have on expansive host nation support and sustainment structures, the relative remoteness and military controlled access nature of most land based training facilities and military airports, as well as the normally hostile nature of their presence within a foreign nation.³⁴ Beyond these differences, the utility of utilizing warships for goodwill visits is in the public perception of such an activity. A visiting warship in the harbor of a major city would be most often seen by the civilian population as a benign and friendly gesture,

³³ Christian Le Mière, *Maritime diplomacy in the 21st century* . . . , 119-120.

³⁴ *Ibid*, 9.

whereas the citizens of most countries would be unlikely to see a division of tanks rolling through their streets in the same positive light.³⁵

Another major form of cooperative maritime diplomacy is the participation of naval forces in international exercises and capacity-building events. While international training exercises are normally seen as force generation focused events, with the ultimate goal of readying forces for operations, international exercises can also provide opportunities for diplomacy. Examples of these opportunities include the strengthening of ties between countries, and the building of mutual confidence as a precursor to the development of stronger political connections between states.³⁶ These diplomatic effects are not only directed towards nations with which one is attempting to establish a political relationship; military exercises, executed for diplomatic reasons are also routinely utilized to strengthen and re-affirm relationships with established allies. This concept was best demonstrated by the participation of RN warships in Exercise *CUTLASS FURY* 2019; the RN's participation was the direct result of Mil-Mil discussions between the UK and Canada, and was executed with the express purpose of strengthening the maritime ties between Canada and the UK. Additionally, large scale multi-national exercises such as Exercise *Rim of the Pacific* (RIMPAC) can be at least partially executed in order to influence the deployment decisions of foreign nations through the strengthening of multi-lateral contact. This was demonstrated by the UK decision to deploy a naval task group to the Arabian sea in the early 2000s in support of US efforts within the region,

³⁵ Geoffrey Till, *Seapower: A guide for the twenty-first century* . . . , 364-365.

³⁶ Christian Le Mière, *Maritime diplomacy in the 21st century* . . . , 78.

which was the result of a request from the USA following mutual participation in both RIMPAC and the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) events.³⁷

Naval exercises can also be utilized to attempt to affect the decisions of potential adversaries, as was demonstrated in the 2012 US decision to invite China to participate in RIMPAC commencing in 2014. This invitation, made as part of the US 2011 “Pacific Pivot”, was part of a high level strategy to re-engage with China, grow the US presence within the Asia Pacific region, and reduce maritime tensions within the South China Sea.³⁸ After years of increasing tensions between the two nations, and with China conducting overt intelligence gathering activities against American and partner forces during successive RIMPACs, the USN extended an invitation for the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to participate in the biannual exercise. This was done in the hopes of using RIMPAC participation to discourage the militarization of the South China Sea, and to provide a demonstration of the futility of engaging in great power competition with the USA.³⁹ After China’s initial RIMPAC participation, the then US Secretary of Defence Ash Carter, further underscored the US strategy of utilizing naval exercises as a means of influencing foreign decisions when he stated that the US intended to keep inviting China to participate in RIMPAC as a means of encouraging them to establish themselves as a member of a system of peaceful cooperative nations.⁴⁰ Like all diplomatic efforts however, success in utilizing naval exercises as a means of influencing foreign decisions is far

³⁷ Ben Lombardi, *The Future Maritime Operating Environment and the Role of Naval Power*, (Ottawa: DRDC, 2016), 68.

³⁸ Eric Lerhe, *The Asia-Pacific and the Royal Canadian Navy* (Calgary: Canadian Global Affairs Institute-Institut canadien des affaires mondiales, 2015), 3.

³⁹ Ben Werner, “China’s Past Participation in RIMPAC Didn’t Yield Intended Benefits of Easing Tensions.” *United States Naval Institute*, 24 May 2018, <https://news.usni.org/2018/05/24/33834>.

⁴⁰ Megan Eckstein, “SECDEF CARTER: China Still Invited to RIMPAC 2016 Despite South China Sea Tension.” *United States Naval Institute*, 18 April 2018, <https://news.usni.org/2016/04/18/secdef-carter-china-still-invited-to-rimpac-2016-despite-south-china-sea-tension>.

from guaranteed. Following China's participation in RIMPAC 2014 and 2016, the US revoked their invitation to participate in RIMPAC 2018 as a result of the China's increased militarization of the South China Sea.⁴¹ As the above example demonstrates, the use of military exercises as a means of attempting to influence the decisions of foreign nations is a well established, but not always successful maritime diplomatic activity.

The use of maritime assets for the support and advancement of military equipment production and procurement as a support to domestic industry, is a key component of cooperative maritime diplomacy. On the economic side, Canada has a long history of utilizing its naval forces to advance the economic interests of domestic companies producing maritime military equipment. In the years following the introduction of the Halifax-class frigates, several international deployments were organized in order to attempt to inspire other countries to purchase Halifax-class ships for their own fleets, or to purchase Canadian equipment that was being utilized on the new class of warships. These deployments included the 1995 deployment of *HMCS Fredericton* to the Middle East, as well as HMC Ships *Vancouver* and *Regina's* deployment to the Asia Pacific region, to showcase the new ships and technology to international partners and potential foreign buyers.⁴² While no foreign nations opted for purchasing Canadian produced Halifax class warships for their naval fleets, Canadian produced Halifax-class component systems, such as the Recovery Assist and Secure Traverse (RAST) aircraft handling system, the Shipboard Integrated Communications (SHINCOM) system, and the Infrared Suppression System (IRSS) for masking the thermal emissions of maritime propulsion engines have all been successfully marketed during warship deployments, and exported internationally to

⁴¹ Ben Werner, "China's Past Participation in RIMPAC . . .".

⁴² Bruce Fenton, "Foreign Policy and Naval Forces: . . .", 141-142.

foreign navies.⁴³ More recently, since 2015, deployments of Halifax class warships have been utilized to successfully promote foreign sales of Lockheed Martin's Canadian produced, Combat Management System (CMS). CMS, which forms the tactical "brain" of the Halifax-class ships, has been successfully sold to both New Zealand and Chile for use within their warships, generating ongoing economic benefits within Canada. The ongoing use of Canadian warships to undertake industrial promotion activities in support of Canadian industrial and economic policy is an excellent example of Canadian cooperative maritime diplomacy at work.

The distribution of naval aid as a means of increasing influence and supporting the capabilities of allies and partners is an important component of cooperative maritime diplomacy. As very common practice, many nations around the world routinely provide gifts of previously used ships, boats, equipment, and weapons to less affluent nations. As such, a significant number of nations have warships that they acquired through naval aid programs as the main force within their naval fleets.⁴⁴ These programs are often undertaken in order to assist nations in carrying out their own domestic and regional security responsibilities, such as the Australian Patrol Boat program in the 1980s and 1990s. This program saw Australia give more than 20 ocean going patrol boats, and associated training, to 12 different Pacific island nations as a means of increasing Australia's regional influence and assisting smaller nations in fulfilling their security and territorial obligations after the signing on the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1992.⁴⁵ While Canada does not normally participate in the gifting of warships to other nations, GAC's Counter Terrorism Capacity Building Partnership (CTCBP) fund has been

⁴³ Janet Thorsteinson, "Canadian Naval Technology Earns Global Sales: In the Beginning was the Canadian Patrol Frigate." *Canadian Naval Review* 5, no. 1 (April 2009): 25-26.

⁴⁴ Ken Booth, *Navies and Foreign Policy* . . . , 44.

⁴⁵ Christian Le Mière, *Maritime diplomacy in the 21st century* . . . , 89.

regularly used to provide equipment such as training aids, safety equipment, and tactical clothing to foreign nations. This program was most recently used under Operation *EDIFICE* to provide equipment to the Tunisian Navy's 51st and 52nd Maritime Commando regiments in support of the wider CAF efforts to increase Canada's relationship with Tunisia.⁴⁶ As the Australian and Canadian examples illustrate, the use of naval aid as a means of strengthening relationships, while also assisting partner nations in undertaking their own security operations is a valuable component of cooperative maritime diplomacy.

Persuasive Maritime Diplomacy

Persuasive maritime diplomacy is best defined as any maritime actions designed to increase the general recognition of a nation's ability to operate within a particular region or sphere of influence. As the most nebulous of the three maritime diplomatic categories, persuasive maritime diplomacy is most easily identified by how it differs from coercive and cooperative diplomacy. Unlike cooperative maritime diplomacy, persuasive maritime diplomacy does not include collaboration, or voluntary participation as a primary feature. Nor does it include intimidation or deterrence, which are common features of coercive diplomatic actions.⁴⁷ Instead, persuasive maritime diplomatic actions are unfocused expressions of maritime capability or power, seeking to increase the recognition of a nation's prestige within a region or sphere. Existing in between these two categories of diplomatic action, persuasive maritime diplomacy includes any actions seeking to increase the recognition of one's maritime or national power, and in gaining this recognition, increasing the international prestige of the nation.

⁴⁶ Department of National Defence, *BN: Overview of NTOG BPC Activity in Tunisia under Op EDIFICE* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2018), 1.

⁴⁷ Christian Le Mièrre, *Maritime diplomacy in the 21st century* . . . , 12.

The second half of the twentieth century was replete with examples of nations utilizing persuasive maritime diplomatic actions as a means of progressing their national foreign policy objectives. Internationally, a good example of persuasive maritime diplomacy was Iran's 2011 deployment of warships through the Suez Canal, and their subsequent port visit into Syria. The transit of the Suez canal, Iran's first since the revolution in 1979, was not intended to specifically project power towards any individual nation, but instead was executed to demonstrate their national ability to exert influence in the maritime sphere outside of their own territorial waters.⁴⁸ Merely by having their warships present in a region where they didn't previously normally operate, Iran was able to send a diffused message regarding their increasing maritime power and capabilities, and potentially increase their regional prestige. This type of signaling is effective due to the wide variety of support structures, capabilities and competencies that are required for a nation to effectively operate a naval force beyond their home waters. Assets such as Auxiliary Oil Replenishment (AOR) ships to conduct at sea replenishment operations, advanced sensors and navigation equipment necessary to transit unfamiliar waterways, and long distance communication equipment are all necessary before a fleet of warships can effectively operate outside of their traditional "home" waters. In visibly possessing these capabilities, and transiting outside of their normal operating waters of the Arabian sea, and into the Mediterranean, Iran was demonstrating that they had transitioned from a local, coastal based naval force, often termed a "brown water navy" to an expeditionary naval force, or "blue water navy".⁴⁹ Therefore, the presence of warships operating competently within an expeditionary and unfamiliar environment

⁴⁸ Ben Lombardi, *The Future Maritime Operating Environment* . . . , 69.

⁴⁹ Christian Le Mièrè, *Maritime diplomacy in the 21st century* . . . , 13.

necessarily increases the prestige of the sending nation, as the act of persuasive maritime diplomacy provides a tangible and visible demonstration of national capability and interest.

The use of persuasive maritime diplomacy is also common amongst Canada's allies. Both the USA and France have routinely utilized their warships in this way over the last thirty years through the execution of Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS). These FONOPS patrols, executed regularly and in all parts of the world, are intended to demonstrate that the executing state possessed the maritime power and capability to freely utilize the world's waterways in accordance with UNCLOS.⁵⁰ While not a commonly-used Canadian maritime diplomatic tactic, there are a few examples of Canadian warships being deployed in support of persuasive maritime diplomatic objectives. Two examples of this are when Canadian warships were deployed to patrol off the coasts of China in 1949, and off Vietnam in 1974, as gestures of concern over armed insurrections that were taking place within those countries. Additionally, the ships were maintained within the region to stand ready to respond if the evacuation of Canadian diplomatic personnel was required.⁵¹ In both of these cases, the warship deployments can be considered persuasive maritime diplomatic actions as their presence was not intended to threaten or coerce the nearby nation, but merely to demonstrate the ability of Canadian warships to operate in the region as desired during a period of conflict. As these examples illustrate, persuasive maritime diplomatic actions have been routinely utilized since the end of WWII as a means of demonstrating power, capability, and prestige without directly threatening a nation or provoking an armed response.

⁵⁰ James Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*. . ., 150-151.

⁵¹ Bruce Fenton, "Foreign Policy and Naval Forces: . . .", 141.

Coercive Maritime Diplomacy

The most recognizable of the three categories of maritime defence diplomacy, coercive maritime diplomacy constitutes all actions taken by warships just below the threshold of open war. Traditionally known as gunboat diplomacy, this can be defined as any threat of the use of force, or the limited use of naval force, that is undertaken in order to further the interests of a state during an international dispute, or against a foreign state within their territorial waters.⁵² Unlike persuasive maritime diplomacy, coercive diplomacy is a targeted endeavor, and is undertaken as a means of deterring an escalation of conflict, or to encourage a potential adversary nation to take actions that are in the interests of the acting state through the demonstration of maritime force.⁵³ Unlike the other two forms of maritime diplomacy, coercive maritime diplomatic actions necessarily take place within an already existing international dispute or low-level conflict. In this way, the maritime forces a nation uses to undertake an act of coercive maritime diplomacy are also very useful to both the target state, and observing nations, as a signal of the potential level of force and intensity of conflict that could result if the target state does not acquiesce.⁵⁴ Coercive naval diplomacy is highly specific to its intended foreign policy objectives, and therefore does not include the widespread use of naval force found in open conflicts. As a result of this focus, coercive maritime diplomacy has been described as: “a screwdriver used to torque a particular screw, not a hammer used to drive home a point”.⁵⁵ Coercive maritime diplomacy can best be summarized as the targeted use of threatening naval force in support of a nation’s foreign policy objectives during a low-level dispute or conflict.

⁵² James Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*. . . , 10.

⁵³ Ken Booth, *Navies and Foreign Policy* . . . , 41.

⁵⁴ Christian Le Mière, *Maritime diplomacy in the 21st century* . . . , 48.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, 74.

It is important to note that the involuntary nature of coercive maritime diplomacy on the part of its target nation, is incongruent with some of the wider accepted definitions of diplomacy, those being the voluntary conduct of relations between states through the use of intermediaries and representatives.⁵⁶ Despite this, coercive maritime diplomacy is an accepted term within the maritime defence diplomacy community, and as such will be utilized within this paper.

As coercive maritime diplomacy is necessarily aggressive by definition, there exists few examples of the Canadian application of this diplomatic action; many international examples of coercive diplomacy, both historical and contemporary, exist. As mentioned above, coercive maritime diplomacy is often referred to as “gunboat diplomacy”. This name is derived from the use of small armed gunboats by the RN and USN in the nineteenth century, in order to force less powerful states to open markets and resources to exploitation. This was best exemplified by Commodore Perry, who commanded a squadron of USN warships to Japan in 1853. Commodore Perry and his fleet had been dispatched to Japan on a mission from President Millard Fillmore to provide a display of naval force to compel the Tokugawa shogunate to abandon its historical policy of isolationism, and establish trade relations with the US.⁵⁷ In this instance, by deploying the fleet of warships inside Japanese territorial waters, and within Uruga harbor itself, the US employed coercive maritime diplomacy as a means of encouraging Japan to make policy changes deemed beneficial to the US. In a more modern context, the deployment of US carrier strike groups is often carried out to provide strategic messaging and coercive diplomacy. The 1996 deployment of two American carrier strike groups to the waters near Taiwan was conducted as a maritime show of force in response to missile exercises that China had recently executed within

⁵⁶ Geoff Berridge and Lorna Lloyd, *The Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Diplomacy: Third Addition* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 97-98.

⁵⁷ Ben Lombardi, *The Future Maritime Operating Environment . . .*, 70.

the region. Additionally, these deployments were intended to provide China with a tangible demonstration of US support for Taiwan, and to deter further Chinese aggression towards the island state.⁵⁸ The deployment of a large naval force in close proximity to China qualified as coercive diplomacy as it was targeted, threatening in nature, and was aimed at deterring against actions that were undesirable to the interests of the US. As both of these examples illustrate, the use of coercive maritime diplomacy is often undertaken by a powerful maritime force as a means of exerting control, or to deter a lesser nation or naval power.

The inherent flexibility and mobility of naval forces means that they are able to carry out a wide range of activities ranging from overt conflict through to peaceful cooperative patrol and relationship building with allies and partner nations. Le Mière's three broad categories of maritime diplomatic activities —cooperative, persuasive, and coercive diplomacy— are a useful tool to sort the myriad activities and deployment options that fall within the realm of maritime diplomacy. While many nations today routinely undertake coercive maritime diplomatic deployments as a means of furthering their national objectives, the vast majority of the Canadian uses of maritime diplomacy can be sorted into the cooperative and persuasive spheres. The common thread amongst all three categories of maritime diplomatic actions however is that at their base they are a means of utilizing naval forces to send diplomatic signals to allies, partners, neutral states, and potential adversaries.⁵⁹ It is through these signals that nations have the ability to reinforce alliances, build relationships with potential partners, and deter nations from particular undesirable actions or escalating international incidents into armed conflicts. It is these

⁵⁸ Christian Le Mière, *Maritime diplomacy in the 21st century* . . . , 23.

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, 27-28.

signals, and their associated diplomatic actions, that will be utilized throughout the next chapters of this paper to assess the use of Canadian warships to further Canadian diplomatic goals.

Conclusion

As the above sections have demonstrated, the field of maritime defence diplomacy contains a broad spectrum of activities that can be undertaken in order to further the political and foreign policy objectives of a state. While academics have traditionally focused on the more coercive aspects of maritime diplomacy, writing on the historical use of “gunboat diplomacy”, the body of academic discourse has broadened over the last 50 years to include a full spectrum approach to the subject. Indeed, as was demonstrated above, the Canadian applications of maritime defence diplomacy rarely fall within the coercive or antagonistic end of the maritime diplomacy spectrum, with Canadian naval forces most commonly being employed in a cooperative or persuasive diplomatic role. It is these cooperative and persuasive diplomatic functions that will be addressed in later chapters as the Canadian maritime diplomatic program is further assessed. Far from being a secondary deliverable to a naval deployment, maritime defence diplomatic actions are powerful tools that can be utilized to further the interests of the state, and the categorization of these activities allows for a discussion of the topic beyond the normally held belief that these actions are “what warships do when there are no wars to fight”.

CHAPTER 3: POLICY

In the modern bureaucratic system of government, policy forms the root of most actions that nations undertake, and as such, are essential tools that enable, guide, and constrain the actors of the state. Without clear and coherent policy in place to guide the planning and execution of maritime diplomatic deployments, the overall results of these efforts are prone to being isolated within a single department, and being out of step with greater government foreign relations objectives. As any decision to utilize naval forces in support of foreign policy and broader diplomatic objectives must come from the highest levels of government officials, policy is a crucial aspect to ensure that a state's warships are not behaving as independent actors, but are controlled implementers of national objectives.⁶⁰ As a result, in order to understand the Canadian maritime defence diplomatic program, it is necessary to review the policies that pertain to defence diplomacy, and the diplomatic uses of Canadian and allied warships. This chapter will consist of a comparison of defence engagement and maritime defence diplomacy policy structures of both the UK and Canada. This will provide a contrasting perspective on policy approaches to maritime defence diplomacy, and allow for recommendations for improvements to the Canadian maritime defence diplomacy policy structure.

The UK provides an excellent example against which to compare Canadian defence diplomacy policies, based on the similarities in composition and practice between the two nations. In order to effectively engage in maritime defence diplomacy, a navy must be capable of deploying and sustaining operations in an expeditionary manner globally—that is, to be what is commonly referred to as a “blue water” navy. The distinction between “blue water” and “brown water” navies is important for these comparisons, as these terms reference the general capability

⁶⁰ Andrew Tan, *The politics of maritime power: a survey*, (London: Routledge, 2010), 65.

of a navy to undertake operations outside of their own coastal waters. A “blue water” navy is one that can operate in an expeditionary manner in the open ocean, and has the sustainment and support mechanisms in place to maintain maritime operations globally for extended periods of time. Conversely, a “brown water” navy is one that is largely territorial in focus, and generally operates within its own coastal waters.⁶¹ Within this definition both the UK and Canadian navies are globally deployed “blue water” navies, who regularly conduct maritime defence diplomatic deployments in support of wider government objectives, and as such, execute similar maritime defence diplomacy activities.⁶²

The RN, as the originator of a large portion of the RCN’s procedures and traditions, is a navy that compares in size and composition in several categories to the RCN. Possessing a general purpose surface combatant fleet of 19 frigates and destroyers, as compared to Canada’s current surface fleet of 12 frigates, the RN’s general purpose warship fleet is of approximate size and capability to the Canadian fleet.⁶³ Beyond the surface combatant fleet however the composition of the two navies differ, in that the RN’s two *Queen Elizabeth* class aircraft carriers, and 11 nuclear attack and ballistic missile submarines, provide capabilities that are superior to the RCN’s force composition. Despite these differences, the mainstay of the RN’s defence engagement programs are undertaken by personnel and naval units that are of similar capability, composition, and force employment to the Canadian fleet. Therefore, the RN, as a medium sized

⁶¹ The United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence. *Joint Doctrine Publication 0-10: UK Maritime Power* (London: Ministry of Defence UK, 2017), 35.

⁶² Benjamin Hess, “RCN’s Blue Water Capabilities: New Supply Ships” *NATO Association of Canada*, last modified 17 February 2016, <http://natoassociation.ca/rcns-blue-water-capabilities-new-supply-ships/>. While the loss of the RCN’s at sea replenishment capability in 2015 has spurred debate about the RCN’s status as a “Blue Water Navy”, the recent leasing of the MV ASTERIX to provide an interim at sea replenishment capability can be seen to have at least partially restored the RCN’s claim to this status.

⁶³ The United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence and Foreign & Commonwealth Office, *National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015* (London: Ministry of Defence UK, 2015), 31-32.

“blue water” navy, is a useful naval force to compare Canadian defence engagement and maritime defence diplomacy policy structure against.

In order to conduct a comparison between defence diplomacy policies of the UK and Canada, the levels of policy of the two nations will be divided into three. Firstly, the political level will consist of policy documents and pronouncements by elected government officials. The departmental level is any policy documents or guidance that is released at the ministerial level, or is endorsed by senior public servants or representatives within each countries defence or foreign affairs departments. Finally, in order to assess how these policies pertain to maritime defence diplomacy specifically, the third level of policy reviewed will consist of documents and procedures at the service level, that being either the RN or RCN.

United Kingdom Defence Engagement Policy

Beginning with the *2015 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review* (2015 NSS), the UK has developed an interdepartmental, resourced, and centrally managed defence engagement policy structure, which has raised the profile and role of defence engagement within the RN. As was noted in Chapter 2, the UK has a long history of utilizing its warships to further foreign policy objectives, and to reinforce traditional diplomatic actions such as negotiations and ambassadorial duties, through the practice of maritime defence diplomacy.⁶⁴ Despite this history, the second half of the twentieth century, as the UK’s previously world-wide empire was slowly dismantled, saw a reduction in the use of RN warships in support of diplomatic objectives, such as the generation of influence and soft power. This shift saw the RN reduce its regular presence and maritime defence diplomacy operations in large regions of the

⁶⁴ Christian Le Mière, *Maritime diplomacy in the 21st century* . . . , 14-15.

world; for example the RN withdrew its previously permanent presence “East of the Suez” in the mid-1970s.⁶⁵ This trend began to reverse itself during the first fifteen years of the 21st century, with the UK gradually increasing the use of its fleet for diplomatic purposes. Despite this, prior to the *2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR)*, defence engagement / defence diplomacy was not explicitly mentioned as a defence activity, let alone one of the UK Ministry of Defence’s (UK MOD) core tasks.⁶⁶ Following the release of the 2015 NSS, a full top-down revision of UK defence diplomacy policy occurred, the end result of which was a fully nested framework of policy at the political, departmental, and service level to guide the use of naval forces in maritime defence engagement deployments.

UK Defence Diplomacy Policy Overview

At the political level, the release of the 2015 NSS represented a watershed moment for defence diplomacy within the UK, as it fully vested defence engagement as a core task within the UK armed forces. This document, a follow up to the 2010 NSS, was important as it set out a new vision for the role that Britain would play, within what the 2015 NSS characterized as an increasingly dangerous and uncertain modern world.⁶⁷ As a political level overarching policy document, or “Grand Strategy”, the 2015 NSS provided priorities, objectives, and procurement plans for a broad spectrum of UK governmental departments. The government organizations tasked in the 2015 NSS included the defence, foreign affairs, economic development, and foreign aid departments, as well as the nation’s various intelligence agencies. Within the realm of

⁶⁵ Jürgen Haacke and John Harley Breen, “From Benign Neglect to Effective Re-engagement? Assessing British Strategizing and Policies Towards Southeast Asia Since 2010.”, *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 41, no. 3 (2019): 345.

⁶⁶ Jason Denis, *Strengthening the Private Sector’s Role in UK Defence Engagement* (London: Chatham House: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2017), 2.

⁶⁷ The United Kingdom, *National Security Strategy* . . . , 5-6.

defence, the 2015 NSS laid out the eight core tasks of the UK Armed Forces, as well as detailed major funding and capability procurement commitments for the force for the fifteen-year period between 2015 and 2030. Operating from a central vision of “a secure and prosperous United Kingdom, with global reach and influence” the 2015 NSS set out the goal for the UK to act as “the world’s leading soft power”.⁶⁸ Building from this central vision of projecting global influence, the 2015 NSS formally added defence engagement (the predominant UK term for defence diplomacy) as one of the eight core tasks assigned to the UK Armed Forces.

As the 2015 NSS was not limited to a single government department, the newly re-instated focus on defence diplomacy within the UK government was further strengthened by the mandated inclusion of a wide variety of governmental agencies in these efforts. The end goal of the inclusion of diverse governmental departments was to ensure that defence diplomatic efforts would act in concert with broader government actions and objectives.⁶⁹ The coordination of these efforts across the full spectrum of globally-engaged UK government departments was enabled through the inclusion within the 2015 NSS of a listing of government engagement priorities, broken down by region. This summary of regional priorities and ambitions identified key target nations within each region, and laid out regional and national foreign relations, development, and security objectives for each.⁷⁰ The inclusion of these regional priorities and objectives allowed for the focused and coordinated use of UK government resources that all foreign interfacing departments within the UK government could use to plan operations, and prioritize the use of resources in support of government aims.

⁶⁸ Ibid, 9.

⁶⁹ Ibid, 6.

⁷⁰ Ibid, 52-53.

At the departmental level, the *UK International Defence Engagement Strategy* (UK DES) provides policy guidance for all defence engagement activities within the UK MOD, as well as mandating the inclusion of the foreign service. Following the release of the 2015 NSS, the UK MOD, as well as the Foreign and Commonwealth office (FCO) (the UK equivalent of GAC), collaborated on a joint policy document to guide the UK defence engagement program. This document, co-signed by the ministers of both departments, defined UK defence engagement as the use of UK military personnel and resources in the service of preventing conflict, building stability, and increasing the influence of the UK globally.⁷¹ In order to accomplish this, the UK DES mandated that the defence engagement program be complementary to the UK's regional diplomatic efforts. This was accomplished through the principle that defence engagement activities be long term in their scope, and consistent in their approach, to ensure the maximum returns for both the UK and the recipient nation.⁷² As the central government document for all aspects of UK defence engagement, the UK DES also provides policy guidance for the UK defence attaché program, the high- and senior level international engagement program (this being the coordinated visits by senior public servants, as well as General and Flag Officers), foreign education and capacity building programs, as well as the international military exercises program.⁷³ In addition to these traditional aspects of defence engagement, the UK DES also mandates the leveraging of defence engagement activities to provide internal economic benefits to the UK, through the inclusion of defence export support activities within defence engagement activities.⁷⁴ It is through the increased foreign sales of British military products that the UK DES

⁷¹ The United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence and Foreign & Commonwealth Office, *UK's International Defence Engagement Strategy* (London: Ministry of Defence UK, 2017), 1.

⁷² *Ibid*, 3.

⁷³ *Ibid*, 10-15.

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, 16.

seeks to not only advance domestic economic prosperity, but also contribute to the strengthening of military relationships and alliances. As a departmental level policy document, the UK DES provides specific program based direction regarding defence engagement activities that expands on the overarching defence diplomacy and foreign relations guidance set out in the 2015 NSS.

At the service level, the RN's *Joint Doctrine Publication 0-10 – UK Maritime Power* (JDP 0-10), released in October of 2017, built upon the defence diplomacy policy foundations laid out by the two previously discussed policy documents. In addition to providing updated general guiding principles for the application of sea power, and articulating the requirements for the composition of the RN over the next twenty years, JDP 0-10 also provided specific Navy policy to guide defence engagement activities. In this document, the RN, referencing the inclusion of defence engagement as a new core task for the UK MOD, adopted Booth's triangle approach towards the application of naval power (as outlined in the theory section of Chapter 2), as the guiding principle for RN roles and responsibilities. Utilizing Booth's work on the applications of naval power, JDP 0-10 established three equal roles for the RN, those being war fighting, maritime security, and defence engagement.⁷⁵ In doing so, the RN endorsed the concept espoused by Booth, Le Mière, and others, that the diplomatic uses of military forces should hold equal prominence with the traditional war-fighting and security applications. With defence engagement as one of the three primary roles for the RN, JDP 0-10 mandated that UK naval forces be utilized in such a way to complement the other diplomatic efforts of the state. This would be accomplished through the long-term and habitual engagement with identified allies and partners, in order to increase the influence of the UK internationally, and help guarantee the

⁷⁵ The United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence. *Joint Doctrine Publication 0-10 . . .*, 51-53.

security of the state.⁷⁶ Additionally, the RN's maritime power doctrine further reinforced the value of maritime defence diplomacy operations by explicitly drawing the link between the UK's diplomatic objective to be the world's premier soft power, and the requirement to use globally deployed naval forces and personnel as a means of promoting and projecting UK soft power.⁷⁷

UK Defence Diplomacy Key Themes

In reviewing the changes made to UK policy regarding defence diplomacy since the release of the 2015 NSS, two major themes emerge which are worthy of considering for implementation within Canadian policy. These two themes are the concept of defence engagement as an official military task, and the Whole of Government (WoG) approach to implementing and coordinating defence diplomacy activities. The inclusion of these two themes throughout the UK policy structure has fundamentally altered the way that defence engagement activities are undertaken by UK forces, and have proven themselves to be valuable additions as they have led to an increase in the size and frequency of UK defence engagement deployments in the years since their adoption.

The first of these themes, the designation of defence engagement as an official task, which originated with the 2015 NSS, brought defence engagement to the forefront of the scope of activities the UK MOD regularly engages in. Previous to the release of the 2015 NSS, defence engagement had only received cursory mention in previous security and defence policy documents, and as a non-mandated task for the UK MOD, it was often undertaken as a secondary objective, subordinate to the core assigned tasks of the military force.⁷⁸ The designation of

⁷⁶ Ibid, 53.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Jason Denis, *Strengthening the Private Sector's Role*. . . , 1.

defence engagement as one of the eight core tasks of the UK MOD officially sanctioned the process of utilizing military personnel and assets to directly support the diplomatic objectives of the UK. The primary effect of this designation was the re-prioritization of defence diplomacy's place amongst the many of tasks the military regularly undertakes, placing it on equal footing with the more traditional core war fighting focused military tasks.⁷⁹ This designation ensured that resources and personnel were prioritized for the execution of defence diplomacy tasks, which may have otherwise only occurred on a "as possible" basis as resources and operational tempo allowed. This prioritization filtered down through all levels of the UK MOD, even to the service level, as was demonstrated through the designation of defence engagement as one of the three core missions of the RN. This designation placed defence diplomacy activities on an equal basis within the RN's primary doctrine and policy document with the more conventionally respected warfighting and security roles.⁸⁰ As such, it can be seen that officially designating defence engagement as a core military task increased the visibility and priority of defence engagement activities across all levels of the UK MOD.

The years following the designation of defence engagement as one of the primary tasks of the UK MOD saw a rapid increase in funding and defence diplomatic activity. As one of the eight core military tasks, defence engagement received dedicated and directed funding following the release of the 2015 NSS.⁸¹ Prior to this designation, similar to Canada, all defence diplomacy activities within the UK MOD were funded through other fiscal envelopes within the respective services. The creation of dedicated funding for all defence diplomacy activities saw the establishment of yearly budget for defence engagement within the UK MOD for the first time.

⁷⁹ The United Kingdom, *UK's International Defence Engagement Strategy*. . . , 1.

⁸⁰ The United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence. *Joint Doctrine Publication 0-10*. . . , 51.

⁸¹ The United Kingdom, *National Security Strategy*. . . , 49.

This funding allotment, initially set at 80 million British pounds in 2017, was bolstered with a government promise to continue to increase this amount annually through to 2022.⁸² Further funding for defence diplomacy activities was also made available by the post 2015 NSS reform of the Conflict Stability and Security Fund (CSSF). This fund, a UK government wide funding apparatus worth 1.1 billion British Pounds annually, allocates funds for activities that support increased international stability and peace support activities, and as a result, these changes further increased the funding available for defence engagement deployments.⁸³ The end result of these funding changes was a stable and predictable funding source for defence engagement activities within the UK MOD, which supported an increase in the scope and frequency of these deployments.

The most visible effect that the designation of defence engagement as a core task within the UK MOD had was the increase in defence engagement activities in the years following the release of the 2015 NSS. Further evidence of the importance of the designation of defence engagement as an official core UK MOD task can be seen in the increase in defence engagement activities that were undertaken by UK forces in the years following the 2015 NSS. Prior to the designation of defence engagement as a core task, the UK MOD was executing around 1900 separate international capacity building training events annually. This level of activity continually increased after 2015, with the total number of defence engagement capacity building events for the 2017-2018 fiscal year (the last year that figures are currently available) rising to 2,269.⁸⁴ During this same time period, the number of Short Term Training Team (STTT)

⁸² Megan Karlshoej-Pedersen, “The True Cost of Defence Engagement” *Oxford Research Group*, Last modified 14 June 2018, <https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/the-true-cost-of-defence-engagement/>.

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ The United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, *Ministry of Defence Single Departmental Plan – 2019*, (London: Ministry of Defence UK, 2019), 16.

deployments, those being small team, short duration international training events, increased by over 50% above 2015 levels.⁸⁵ Within the maritime sphere, the designation of defence engagement as an official task, both at the departmental and service level, has led to an increase in maritime defence diplomacy deployments. This is best characterized by the RN's re-engagement within South-East Asia, which commenced following the 2015 NSS. Most recently, this took the form of RN participation in the Australian led, multi-national Exercise Talisman Sabre 2019. This large scale joint exercise, included US, Japanese, New Zealand, and Australian warships, as well as *HMCS Regina* (who was in the region on a defence diplomacy deployment), and a large number of land and air forces. This exercise, which took place off the North Coast of Australia, was directly linked by UK planners to the 2015 NSS objective of increasing engagement and interoperability with key East Asian allies and partner nations.⁸⁶ As has been shown above, the designation of defence engagement as an official UK MOD core task resulted in a rapid increase in dedicated resources, both financial and physical, that saw the level of defence diplomacy activities executed by the UK MOD continually elevate following the release of the 2015 NSS.

The second of the two central themes that dominate the newly-revised UK defence engagement policy framework, is the concept of defence diplomacy as part of a wider, coordinated, WoG undertaking. One of the realities of working in a modern bureaucratic state is the propensity for the efforts of individual governmental departments to operate in isolation from the rest of the state apparatus, and in doing so, their efforts lack the effect that a coordinated, multi-departmental approach would generate. The UK government sought to solve this

⁸⁵ The United Kingdom, *UK's International Defence Engagement Strategy*. . . , 14.

⁸⁶ Jürgen Haacke, "From Benign Neglect to Effective Re-engagement. . .", 341.

shortcoming when it released the 2015 NSS as a government wide “grand strategy” policy document, which transcended individual departmental policy, and laid out government-wide priorities and objectives. This government-wide focus was further underscored by the fact that the 2015 NSS was signed by the UK Prime Minister himself, instead of the traditional approach of departmental policy documents being released by the responsible departmental minister.⁸⁷ Instead of providing direction to a single department, as is often the case with policy documents, the 2015 NSS set out broad government-wide objectives, and mandated that the entirety of the international-facing UK governmental apparatus work together to achieve these objectives. While an interdepartmental approach to government policy, and specifically foreign relations, had been featured in previous policy documents, the 2015 NSS saw the concept of utilizing a WoG approach to defence engagement reach a new level of prominence within government policy.⁸⁸ The role of maritime defence diplomacy was specifically highlighted in the 2015 NSS description of the WoG approach when it described how the visit of RN warships could be used to simultaneously improve international security, strengthen UK diplomatic efforts, and assist in the domestic economic development of the UK through the promotion of defence exports.⁸⁹ As such, it can be seen that by branding defence engagement as complementary and integral to a wide assortment of government objectives, the hoped for increased inter-departmental coordination for these activities will yield better results.

The inter-departmental approach to defence engagement policy that was established with the 2015 NSS resulted in the establishment of a framework of inter-departmental cooperation for defence engagement activities at all levels of the UK government. This approach was placed at

⁸⁷ The United Kingdom, *National Security Strategy* . . . , 5-7.

⁸⁸ Jason Denis, *Strengthening the Private Sector's Role*. . . , 2.

⁸⁹ The United Kingdom, *National Security Strategy* . . . , 49.

the forefront of the 2017 UK DES when the decision was made to have the policy co-signed by both the Secretary of State for Defence, as well as the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, underscoring the necessary inclusion of both departments in defence diplomacy activities.⁹⁰ This relationship between the defence and foreign affairs departments extended beyond symbolic gestures, as the interconnected nature of both department's mandates formed one of the guiding principles for UK's defence engagement program. This interconnectedness was summarized within the DES when it described the role of defence engagement as those activities that use the capabilities, capacity, and reputation of the MOD to complement the other tools of government influence, including diplomacy and economic development.⁹¹ Within the maritime sphere, the RN integrated this approach into their own doctrine for both defence diplomacy and maritime operations through the adoption of what they call the "full spectrum approach" to employing naval power. This approach, which calls for the use of both diplomatic and economic government instruments to achieve political and strategic objectives, mandated the view of naval power as a tool to complement the other efforts of the state.⁹² By integrating an inter-departmental approach to defence diplomacy at all levels of their defence engagement policy structure the UK sought to ensure synergy between the various levers of the state.

While the UK's WoG approach to defence engagement is less than five years old, its early positive results have led to international acclaim. Within Canada, the Assistant Deputy Minister (Review Services) (ADM(RS)) organization within DND, in its 2018 report on the Canadian Global Engagement (GE) program, used the UK's approach to defence diplomacy as

⁹⁰ The United Kingdom, *UK's International Defence Engagement Strategy*. . . , 1.

⁹¹ *Ibid*, 10.

⁹² The United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence. *Joint Doctrine Publication 0-10* . . . , 64.

an example of how the current CAF GE program could be improved. This was underscored by their finding that the vast majority of CAF and GAC personnel who were surveyed as part of their review felt that a cross-departmental document outlining government defence diplomacy objectives would increase efficiencies, lead to better results, and foster more inter-departmental cooperation within the Canadian defence diplomacy program.⁹³ Outside of Canada, the UK's push to re-engage and expand influence within South-East Asia has been praised for the use of RN warship deployments to support the broader regional security, economic, and political objectives that were established within the 2015 NSS.⁹⁴ As such, it can be seen that the integration of a WoG approach for defence engagement policy has, in the short time since its adoption, led to early success and international acclaim.

While the changes that the UK made to their defence engagement policies have received positive reviews, this praise has been far from unanimous. The creation of a dedicated funding envelope for defence engagement activities that was done as part of the 2015 NSS was an attempt to resolve the long standing lack of financial resources for these activities. Despite this new source of funding, the lack of authorization within the 2015 NSS for any new personnel or platforms to carry out this new core task has led to many UK defence engagement activities to struggle with insufficient numbers of trained personnel or available platforms to undertake these missions.⁹⁵ Additionally, while the 2015 NSS articulated government objectives and priorities for each global region, this approach has been criticized for not integrating the desires and objectives of regional actors as planning factors for UK defence engagement activities. The use of RN warship deployments to Asian waters in support of the UK's objective of reinforcing its

⁹³ Canada, DND, *ADM(RS) Evaluation of Global Engagement . . .*, 15-16.

⁹⁴ Jürgen Haacke, "From Benign Neglect to Effective Re-engagement. . .", 344.

⁹⁵ Jason Denis, *Strengthening the Private Sector's Role. . .*, 3.

relationship with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been criticized for potentially alienating ASEAN members by pushing a values based agenda and not sufficiently supporting their regional security objectives during the deployments.⁹⁶ The integration of defence engagement as a bona fide military task, and the mandating of a WoG approach to defence engagement activities has generated early successes for the UK within the realm of defence diplomacy, but this new policy structure is clearly a work in progress which requires continually refinement and adjustment.

Canadian Defence Engagement Policy

Similar to the review of defence diplomacy policy that was undertaken by the UK commencing in 2015, Canada refreshed much of its defence diplomacy policy commencing with the 2017 release of *Strong, Secure, and Engaged – Canada’s Defence Policy* (SSE). Prior to the release of SSE, the RCN, and the CAF at large, had been actively engaged in defence diplomacy activities, despite none of these activities being enshrined in policy as official military tasks. Following the release of SSE, policies were created and updated at the political, departmental, and service level which were intended to guide the use of military assets in undertaking these important endeavors. Despite this renewed focus on defence diplomacy, the Canadian policy structure that pertains to this still suffers from a lack of continuity, and is hampered in executing these activities utilizing a WoG approach.

⁹⁶ Jürgen Haacke, “From Benign Neglect to Effective Re-engagement. . .”, 353-54.

Canadian Defence Diplomacy Policy Overview

Unlike the UK, at the political level, Canadian defence diplomacy policy is not vested in a central “grand strategy”, but can only be found in disparate, and disconnected documents and speeches. The absence of a pan departmental Canadian security policy, like the UK’s 2015 NSS, has meant that at the political level, defence diplomacy policy is difficult to locate, is fragmented in location, and contains few directive details. The primary source for political level defence diplomacy policy can be found in the ministerial mandate letters. These letters, which were publically released for the first time following the 2015 Canadian federal election, are the primary means that a Prime Minister uses to provide guidance to newly appointed ministers on the direction they should be taking their new departments. Appearing in both the 2015, and 2019 mandate letters given to the Minister of National Defence (MND), was the requirement to work with the Minister of Foreign Affairs to ensure that all deployments of CAF personnel were conducted in line with Canada’s national interests and policy objectives.⁹⁷ In addition to this direction, the mandate letters for the Minister of Foreign Affairs correspondingly requires GAC to ensure that all deployments of CAF personnel line up with Canadian interests, and that linkages exist between Canadian foreign, defence, development and trade policies.⁹⁸ Despite the lack of detail or in-depth direction, the references to ensuring that CAF deployments align with government objectives within the ministerial mandate letters form the basis for the official mandate, at the political level, for the CAF to engage in defence diplomatic activities in support of government objectives.

⁹⁷ Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, “Minister of National Defence Mandate Letter.” 12 November 2015, <https://web.archive.org/web/20190805182411/https://pm.gc.ca/en/mandate-letters/minister-national-defence-mandate-letter>; Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, “Minister of National Defence Mandate Letter.”, 13 December 2019, <https://pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-national-defence-mandate-letter>.

⁹⁸ Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, “Minister of Foreign Affairs Mandate Letter.” 13 December 2019, <https://pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-foreign-affairs-mandate-letter>.

Beyond the mandate letters, the only other source for political level defence diplomacy policy is found in speeches given in the House of Commons, such as the one given by the then Foreign Affairs Minister Christina Freeland on 06 June 2017. It was in this speech, which preceded the release of SSE, that the minister, while laying out Canada's foreign policy objectives, directly linked the concepts of economic, political, and security interests with the deployments executed by CAF personnel. In doing so, this speech connected the objectives of Canadian military deployments with some of Le Mière's main cooperative defence diplomatic activities, such as strengthening alliances, building international stability, and spreading domestic and international economic prosperity.⁹⁹ Similar to what was stated regarding the ministerial mandate letters above, using parliamentary speeches as a source of policy guidance has the downside of providing little coordinating detail for the implementation of the policy themes introduced, and therefore leaves much to the interpretation of individual departments, often at the expense of wider intra-departmental coordination.

At the departmental level, DND has created several policy documents over the last three years that provide direction regarding CAF defence diplomacy activities. The first, and most important of these departmental level documents is the current Canadian defence policy, SSE. SSE represented a key policy change for defence diplomacy within DND, as it devoted one of its seven chapters specifically to defence diplomacy (titled within the document: Global Engagement). The dedication of a chapter of the national defence policy to defence diplomacy signified an increase in the role and awareness of defence diplomacy as a bona fide military activity. Through its chapter on Global Engagement, SSE highlighted the role that military

⁹⁹ Minister of Foreign Affairs Christina Freeland, "Address by Minister Freeland on Canada's foreign policy priorities.", 06 June 2017, https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2017/06/address_by_minister_freelandoncanadasforeignpolicypriorities.html.

deployments could play in advancing the objectives of other governmental departments by stating: “Cooperative defence relationships also support the advancement and promotion of broader government priorities – particularly national security, trade, international assistance, and foreign policy objectives”.¹⁰⁰ In defining defence engagement, SSE provided a very similar list of activities and objectives to those provided by both Booth and Le Mière when they described cooperative defence diplomacy as a concept. In addition to expounding the benefits of using military deployments to strengthen existing alliances, the defence diplomacy chapter of SSE provided a brief set of diplomatic objectives for each region of the world. These objectives were included within SSE to guide the planning of defence diplomacy operations, and were presented in a similar, but less detailed way, than the regional objectives list found in the UK’s 2015 NSS.¹⁰¹ The most important defence diplomacy policy change that was instituted through SSE was the designation of capacity building operations as one of the eight core CAF mandates.¹⁰² Capacity building, or as it is often referred to, Building Partner Capacity (BPC) operations, is a long-standing activity within all branches of the CAF, however these operations were not previously recognized as an official task, or a primary military activity. The designation of BPC operations as an official core CAF task elevated a classic defence diplomacy activity to one of the CAF’s core mandates, and in doing so further enshrined defence diplomacy within the key ways that the CAF delivers effects for the government of Canada.

The Guidance for International Priorities for Defence Engagement (GIPDE), which was released in 2019, was designed to complement the direction found in SSE, and serves as the

¹⁰⁰ Canada. Department of National Defence, *Strong, Secure and Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy*, (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2017), 89.

¹⁰¹ Ibid, 90-92.

¹⁰² Ibid, 17.

second primary piece of defence diplomacy policy at the departmental level. In addition to drawing from the priorities for global engagement that were laid out in SSE, The GIPDE also pulled from a variety of departmental and government sources to create list of initiatives, nations, and organizations, broken down by region, that were to be prioritized for defence diplomacy activities.¹⁰³ GIPDE replaced the CAF's Global Engagement Strategy (GES), which had acted as the primary document guiding the priorities for defence engagement within the CAF since 2014. GIPDE was a large improvement in both detail and presentation over its predecessor, which had broken the entire world down into only four tiers of engagement priorities. Building upon the cooperative defence diplomacy focus that was established in SSE, the GIPDE called for the execution of a variety of military diplomatic tasks that fall within the cooperative diplomatic spectrum such as defence industrial support, the strengthening of multi-lateral institutions (such as NATO) through regular military presence, as well as the provision of support to emerging partners through BPC activities.¹⁰⁴ In this way the GIPDE forms an important component of the defence diplomacy policy structure within Canada, as it provides detail-oriented, regionally-based priorities for cooperative defence diplomatic actions across all sections of the CAF.

At the service level little specific policy exists to direct the use of maritime assets in support of defence diplomacy initiatives. The primary policy document that guides the composition and employment of naval forces at the service level is *Leadmark 2050: Canada in a New Maritime World*, released in 2016. This document, which built upon its predecessor policy document, *Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020* (2001), expanded on the earlier document's guidance through an increased focus on naval interaction with the wider CAF, and other

¹⁰³ Canada. Department of National Defence, *2018 Guidance on International Priorities for Defence Engagement* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2019), 3.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid*, 5-6.

governmental departments through joint operations.¹⁰⁵ *Leadmark 2050*, similar to the RN's JDP 0-10, utilizes Booth's triangle approach to the roles of naval forces as the basis for its' vision for the utilization of the Canadian naval fleet.¹⁰⁶ Despite this, *Leadmark* does not include defence diplomacy as one of the core roles for the RCN; instead, it includes defence diplomatic activities as a secondary objective under one of its three primary lines of effort: forward deployed continental and international operations.¹⁰⁷ As defence diplomacy is not considered by *Leadmark* to be one of the RCN's core tasks, very little direct reference to defence diplomatic activities appears within the document, which points to an overall downgrading of the importance of these activities within the RCN, despite the prominent role they play within SSE. The low visibility that defence diplomacy plays within RCN doctrine can at least partly be attributed to the maritime combat focus of the navy's leadership. At a time when the RCN is attempting to modernize its fleet through the re-capitalization of its primary surface combatants, many within the RCN leadership are reluctant to focus on any aspect of naval power other than combat proficiency, out of fear that this may justify reductions in the number or capabilities of the future fleet. Despite this lack of prominence, *Leadmark* does state that the RCN has a role to play in global conflict prevention, and in this realm, RCN global engagement activities, such as port visits, cooperative deployments and capacity building exercises, form an important part of the Canadian government's efforts to stabilize the international system through conflict prevention.¹⁰⁸ As such, it can be seen that while defence diplomacy does not figure prominently

¹⁰⁵ Canada, Department of National Defence, Royal Canadian Navy, *Canada in a New Maritime World: Leadmark 2050* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2016), ix-x.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid*, 12.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid*, 42.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid*, 18-19.

in RCN policy and doctrine, the foundations of cooperative maritime defence diplomacy are included as key activities that the RCN expects its warships to undertake.

Canadian Defence Diplomacy Observations

In reviewing the various components of the Canadian defence diplomacy policy structure, and comparing the Canadian system to its UK counterpart, a number of observations and recommendations can be made. While it is important to note that no government's policy system is perfect, the recently restructured UK policies regarding defence diplomacy have some clear advantages over the Canadian system. It is my assertion that these advantageous policies ought to be considered for adoption within Canadian defence diplomacy policy at the political, departmental, and service levels.

The first of these observations regarding Canadian defence diplomacy policy is that while calling for inter-departmental coordination, the Canadian policy structure does not formally adopt the WoG approach needed to maximize returns on military diplomatic deployments. As was shown above, the ministerial mandate letters, SSE, as well as ministerial speeches in the House of Commons, all call for DND and GAC to coordinate efforts in regards to defence diplomacy, and the deployment of military forces internationally. Despite this, the lack of a political level, multi-departmental "grand strategy" to coordinate defence diplomatic activities between various governmental departments has resulted in the Canadian application of the WoG approach being less than effective. This disconnect between the different government departments was highlighted by ADM(RS) in their review of the Canadian defence diplomacy system. In conducting this review, they found that almost 60% of the personnel who worked in senior global engagement and defence diplomacy positions within the CAF reported routinely

receiving inconsistent and sometimes conflicting opinions and direction between the various organizations and departments involved in their duties, such as GAC, ADM(Pol), and the CAF Chain of Command.¹⁰⁹ This lack of coordination between governmental departments has resulted in missed diplomatic opportunities, and Canadian defence diplomatic activities within a region not being in line with wider government objectives. This disconnect is best demonstrated by the fact that despite Maritime Forces Pacific (MARPAF) possessing expertise in Canadian Asia Pacific relations, this knowledge and experience has rarely been leveraged by GAC or other departments operating within the region, resulting in Canadian engagement in Asia appearing to be ad hoc in nature.¹¹⁰ As such, it can be seen that a stronger emphasis on departmental coordination and a WoG approach is necessary to ensure a consistent approach to Canadian defence diplomacy.

The UK defence diplomacy policy structure offers several solutions to address the challenges of interdepartmental coordination for Canadian defence diplomacy. Chiefly amongst these is that a wider, cross-departmental strategy for international relations and engagement is necessary in order to ensure that all arms of the government are working in concert towards the same objectives. The relative success of the 2015 NSS “grand strategy” policy approach in the four years since it was released has prompted multiple Canadian foreign policy research groups to recommend that Canada adopt a similar policy frame work to better coordinate Canadian foreign relations and engagement.¹¹¹ Beyond producing a unified government-wide approach to defence diplomacy, a central defence diplomacy decision-making body, similar to the UK’s

¹⁰⁹ Canada, DND, *ADM(RS) Evaluation of Global Engagement / Military Diplomacy* . . . , 15-16.

¹¹⁰ Jinelle Piereder and Alex Brouse, “Gone AWOL? Canada’s Multi-track Diplomacy and Presence in the Asia Pacific” *Canadian International Council*, Last modified 08 June 2018, <https://thecic.org/gone-awol/>.

¹¹¹ McRae, et al, *Canada’s International Security and Defence Policy*, (Ottawa: University of Ottawa, 2015), 5 and 11.

Defence Engagement Board, would assist in ensuring a coordinated and consistent approach to the diplomatic uses of military forces.¹¹² The utility of such a cross-departmental defence diplomacy coordinating body was demonstrated in 2018 when a training team dispatched by the RCN to assist in the East Africa focused BPC event *CUTLASS EXPRESS*, arrived in Kenya to discover that a similar team from the Canadian Coast Guard was also participating.¹¹³ The presence of two similar Canadian maritime training teams, in the same exercise, without the knowledge of either department highlighted the need for greater inter-departmental coordination of such activities. This level of regular coordination was also endorsed by ADM(RS), who noted that while relations between GAC and DND were quite good, the complex nature of modern defence diplomacy required a closely aligned and cooperative approach to planning and executing these deployments that currently did not exist within the Canadian policy structure.¹¹⁴ As it has been shown above, an increased focus on a WoG approach to defence diplomacy, and the creation of policy and committees that enforce this approach will assist in improving Canada's defence diplomatic program.

The second of these observations is that the adoption of capacity-building as a core CAF task unnecessarily restricts the range of defence diplomacy tasks that the CAF can carry out as official departmental responsibilities. The 2015 UK designation of defence engagement as a core military task provided increased flexibility for the UK MOD to use the full spectrum of cooperative defence diplomacy activities to complement wider government objectives.¹¹⁵ By contrast, the Canadian adoption of “capacity-building activities” as a core CAF task within SSE

¹¹² Jason Denis, *Strengthening the Private Sector's Role* . . . , 5.

¹¹³ Vignette occurred January-February 2018, while the author was managing maritime global engagement for Africa, Europe, and the Middle East in DNOP.

¹¹⁴ Canada, DND, *ADM(RS) Evaluation of Global Engagement / Military Diplomacy* . . . , 7-8.

¹¹⁵ The United Kingdom, *National Security Strategy* . . . , 49.

was more narrow in focus, and restricted the use of defence diplomacy activities to a small portion of Le Mière's grouping of cooperative defence diplomatic activities. This designation results in the vast majority of defence diplomatic activities, such as good-will port visits, cooperative exercises, and direct support to diplomatic endeavours, being relegated to secondary objectives during deployments, versus primary deployment goals. This narrow interpretation of defence diplomacy tasks has implications for the Canadian defence diplomacy program in both resourcing and prioritization.

The omission of defence diplomacy as a core task within the CAF's mandate has resulted in problems in prioritization and funding when compared to the UK defence diplomacy program. As was noted above, in addition to declaring defence engagement as a core military task, the 2015 NSS also established dedicated funding sources for defence diplomacy activities, in order to ensure that these activities would be equally prioritized and resourced alongside the other core military responsibilities.¹¹⁶ Conversely, the Canadian decision to only designate BPC activities as a core task, came with no dedicated fiscal or materiel resources to support these deployments. As a result of this, despite the increase in prominence that having capacity building declared an official task has lent to defence diplomacy, ADM(RS) found that the trend of fiscal restraint hampering the execution of defence diplomacy activities has continued post SSE.¹¹⁷

Finally, the last observation regarding potential ways that Canadian defence diplomatic policy could be improved is through the centralization of defence diplomacy responsibilities within the CAF. Following the release of the 2015 NSS, and the UK DES, the UK MOD created a centralized organization that was responsible for all aspects of their defence engagement

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Canada, DND, *ADM(RS) Evaluation of Global Engagement / Military Diplomacy . . .*, 16-17.

program. This was done to ensure that all UK MOD actions were complimentary to wider government policy, and that consistent direction was provided for all foreign deployments of UK military forces.¹¹⁸ This organization, designated as the UK Deputy Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (DVCDS), inherited overall responsibility for all defence engagement deployments, as well as the Defence Attaché network, and is to act as the central liaison authority with the UK FCO, and industrial relations. This change has resulted in the centralized planning, execution, and monitoring of all defence engagement activities within the UK MOD.

Within the CAF however, the various entities that are responsible for defence diplomacy activities are spread amongst a variety of L1 organizations, including the VCDS, ADM(Pol), CJOC, the Strategic Joint Staff (SJS), as well as the environmental command establishments. Each of these organizations currently executes its duties separately, with no formal requirement to align activities even within the same geographic region to ensure cooperative effect. The disconnected nature of the CAF defence diplomacy establishment has resulted in the inconsistent application of CAF policy, competing regional engagement activities, and a lack of awareness of CAF engagement activities amongst the involved organizations.¹¹⁹ This lack of central coordination, and general disconnect between individual organizations was best demonstrated when the RCN organized a BPC event with the Tunisian navy, utilizing the Naval Tactical Operations Group (NTOG), only to discover upon arrival that elements of the Canadian Army (CA) were already present in country conducting a separate training event.¹²⁰ Additionally, CDAs have repeatedly complained about only becoming aware of CAF activities within one of

¹¹⁸ Ibid, VI.

¹¹⁹ Ibid, 16.

¹²⁰ Vignette occurred February-March 2017, while the author was managing maritime global engagement for Africa, Europe, and the Middle East in DNOP.

their responsible nations either upon arrival of the forces, or, in some cases, when the CAF personnel had already departed. The success of the UK centralized model for defence diplomacy management has prompted several organizations, including ADM(RS), to recommend that the CAF adopt the UK approach, and centralize the management of all defence diplomacy activities within the CAF under a single organization reporting to the VCDS.¹²¹ Such a centralization of defence diplomacy authorities and responsibilities would undoubtedly assist in improving the planning, coordination, and execution of the various defence diplomatic activities that the CAF undertakes on a daily basis.

Conclusion

As was shown in the above sections, that while both the UK and Canada have undergone a period of policy change regarding the planning and execution of defence diplomacy activities over the last five years, the UK policy structure has provided several examples worth emulating within the Canadian system. The release of SSE in 2017, and the subsequent development of the GIPDE to coordinate CAF global engagement activities has increased the level of prominence and sophistication for defence diplomacy activities within the CAF over the last three years. Despite these improvements, the de-centralized nature of the various organizations within DND that interact with foreign nations, combined with a lack of a strong inter-departmental coordination structure between DND, GAC, and other governmental departments has created numerous areas where the Canadian defence diplomacy policy can be improved. The UK policy approach to defence diplomacy provides several examples of policies, organizations and coordinating structures that are worth considering for implementation within the Canadian

¹²¹ Ibid.

system in order to improve the planning, coordination and execution of defence diplomacy activities.

CHAPTER 4: PRACTICE

While the use of Canadian warships to undertake maritime defence diplomatic activities is not new within the RCN, the years following the 2017 release of SSE has seen the emergence of focused maritime defence diplomatic deployments under the banner of Op *PROJECTION*. As a result of the creation of this new operation, the Canadian maritime defence diplomatic program can now be divided into two categories. The first of these categories is focused maritime defence diplomacy deployments, those being the deployment of ships which have as their primary objective the undertaking of cooperative or persuasive maritime defence diplomacy activities. The second category of deployments can be termed as un-focused maritime defence diplomatic deployments, those being all other warship deployments where cooperative and persuasive maritime defence diplomacy activities are undertaken as secondary, or tertiary objectives. This chapter will consist of an overview of the maritime defence diplomacy activities undertaken under Op *PROJECTION*, before shifting to examining how greater maritime defence diplomacy effects can be generated by integrating defence diplomacy activities into the deployments that comprise the remainder of the RCN's deployment program.

Separate from the ship based maritime defence diplomacy activities that are currently being undertaken by RCN warships, shore based diplomatic activities play an important part in the Canadian use of maritime defence diplomacy. These activities, executed ashore, by small groups of RCN personnel, are key enablers to the wider ship based maritime defence diplomatic program being undertaken by the Canadian naval fleet. The most visible of these activities is the regular meeting of representatives of allied and partner navies that take place as part of Navy to Navy staff talks. These talks, led by a flag officer, or the Commander of the RCN (Comd RCN) himself, occur between the RCN and existing allies and partner nations such as the USA, UK,

France, and Australia. Navy to Navy talks are also used to create and strengthen newer naval relationships with partner nation naval forces in regions of the world where Canada wishes to increase its influence, such as Tunisia and Israel. The aim of these talks is to enhance existing partnerships, coordinate mutual activities, and strengthen the relationships that exist between naval forces. The output from each round of navy to navy talks normally includes agreements on cooperative deployments, requests to assist in ongoing operations, plans for the future exchange of personnel, as well as the transfer of information that allows for improved interoperability between naval forces. The action items from these navy to navy talks are often accomplished through naval activities, port visits, and exchanges of personnel during Op *PROJECTION* deployments, and in this way, these talks form an important part of the maritime defence diplomacy planning process. Beyond the straightforward coordination of activities between two navies, the strategic importance of navy to navy talks as a form of cooperative defence diplomacy was highlighted by US Vice Admiral Andrew Lewis, who linked the operational success of the newly re-established USN 2nd Fleet —responsible for the East coast of North America and the North Atlantic ocean— to the relationships and intra-service understanding that was developed and maintained through regular navy to navy talks with the RCN.¹²²

In addition to Navy to Navy talks, the RCN engages in non-ship based defence diplomacy through personnel exchanges, such as the *REGULUS* training exchange program. This program, which was created by the RCN in 2010, sees Canadian sailors sent abroad to receive training with allied and partner navies, as well as to make connections within the

¹²² United States of America, “U.S. Navy, Coast Guard, Royal Canadian Navy Conduct Tri-party Staff Talks.” Last modified 19 July 2019, https://www.c2f.navy.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1910124/us-navy-coast-guard-royal-canadian-navy-conduct-tri-party-staff-talks/fbclid/IwAR2VMhmdBKhbABLG1FHL7yAJIAjwx0NO_KLOrU7dApdBpIOiqkvY7Rm2dQQ/.

international naval community. Based on its initial success, the *REGULUS* program was expanded to also include the hosting of international sailors on Canadian warships, and on RCN training serials, as a means of strengthening relations between allied and partner nation navies.¹²³ This program has been utilized on Op *PROJECTION AFRICA* to facilitate West African naval personnel to join Canadian warships in advance of deployment, as a means of increasing the interoperability and ties between the two nations.¹²⁴ It is through these non-warship focused maritime defence diplomatic activities that the focused and non-focused ship based maritime defence diplomatic deployments that will be discussed in the following sections are supported.

Focused Maritime Defence Diplomacy

While maritime defence diplomacy deployments were not officially operationalized within the CAF until after the release of SSE in mid-2017, the history of these deployments preceded the release of SSE by over a year. Vice-Admiral Ron Lloyd, then Comd RCN, instigated in 2016 the policy of deploying Canadian warships for Force Generation (FG) and defence diplomacy purposes outside of North American waters, under the title “Generate Forward”. This policy resulted in two types of RCN defence diplomacy deployments taking place in late 2016 and early 2017. In the Atlantic, two *Kingston* class ships were deployed in early 2017 to the Gulf of Guinea, at the request of the USN, in order to assist in United States Africa Command’s (USAFRICOM) annual West African BPC event, *Obangame Express*, and to engage with key partner nations, under the deployment name *NEPTUNE TRIDENT*.¹²⁵ In the

¹²³ Jamie Cook, “REGULUS keeps sailor’s skills sharp” *The Lookout*, last modified 12 January 2015, <https://www.lookoutnewspaper.com/regulus-program/>.

¹²⁴ Linda Coleman, “Exchange officer from Ivory Coast Navy gains a new RCN family” *The Maple Leaf*, last modified 28 March 2018, <https://ml-fd.caf-fac.ca/en/2018/03/11835>.

Pacific, *HMCS Vancouver* was deployed to the Asia-Pacific region for six months in the second half of 2016 to strengthen relationships within the region, participate in multi-lateral international exercises, and support diplomatic engagements under the deployment name *POSEIDON CUTLASS*.¹²⁶ In addition to the maritime defence diplomacy activities that were the focus of *HMCS Vancouver*'s deployment, they also participated in a HADR operation, along with allied navies, after an earthquake struck New Zealand on 14 November 2016. The programs for these two deployments were based around classic cooperative maritime defence diplomatic activities, such as support to diplomatic missions through goodwill port visits, cooperative exercises with allied partners, as well as BPC events, and these two deployments represented the first maritime defence diplomacy focused deployments for Canadian warships in many years. The experience gained through these deployments, along with the positive feedback received from the participating nations, set the stage for the fully operationalized program of maritime defence diplomacy deployments that would commence with the creation of Op *PROJECTION* in late 2017.

The success of the RCN led defence diplomacy deployments in 2016 and 2017, coupled with the release of SSE, led to creation of a new series of maritime presence operations under the umbrella of Op *PROJECTION* in late 2017. This new operation, which targets regional areas of interest, was based around the concept that the pre-positioning of naval assets in areas of strategic importance, in order to develop relationships and regional experience, was beneficial to

¹²⁵ Canada, Department of National Defence, "News Release: Royal Canadian Navy Deploys to African West Coast" Last modified 18 February 2017, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2017/02/royal_canadian_navydeploystoafricanwestcoast.html.

¹²⁶ Canada, Department of National Defence, "News Release: HMCS Vancouver returns home after a six-month deployment" Last modified 14 December 2016, <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2016/12/hmcs-vancouver-returns-home-after-six-month-deployment.html>.

wider government objectives.¹²⁷ Three regional areas of interest have been established under Op *PROJECTION* to date, those being Op *PROJECTION AFRICA*, Op *PROJECTION ASIA-PACIFIC*, and Op *PROJECTION EUROPE*. The first two of these deployment regions were based on the previously executed RCN activities described above, whereas the third was temporarily established to facilitate the deployment of a submarine to the Mediterranean in 2018 in response to a NATO shortfall of submarines, and is not anticipated to be re-activated. Despite its status as an official CAF operation, Op *PROJECTION* differs from other operations in that it is funded through the RCN's FG budget—with the exception of operationally-related benefits for deployed personnel—and not from the CAF's Operations Funding Account (OFA).¹²⁸ This unconventional funding arrangement means that unlike other operations, the RCN retains a measure of control over the planning and execution of maritime defence diplomacy operations, and therefor close coordination between SJS, CJOC, and the RCN is required regarding the planning, approval, and execution of Op *PROJECTION* deployments.

Focused Defence Diplomacy Planning Process

The creation of Op *PROJECTION* necessitated a new process for planning naval deployments that included wider consultation and longer lead times regarding the communication of deployment intentions. As a result of this requirement, a new navy-specific approval process was created to ensure that maritime defence diplomacy deployments were planned so as to maximize the support for wider government objectives. This new approval and

¹²⁷ Canada, Department of National Defence, "Operation PROJECTION" Last modified 25 January 2020, <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-projection.html>.

¹²⁸ Department of National Defence, Royal Canadian Navy, *RCN TASKING DIRECTIVE – HMCS OTTAWA DEPLOYMENT 2019* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2018), 5.

consultation process revolves around a document called the RCN Three Year Plan. This document, which originates within the Naval staff, provides an overview of all international deployments of Canadian warships for the next three years —both operational and RCN led deployments— to include deployment objectives, key engagement priorities, and potential secondary activities. Once endorsed by Comd RCN, the RCN Three Year Plan is then sent to CJOC, SJS, and ADM(Pol) for consultation. While consultation of this product outside of DND is included through ADM(Pol) – GAC liaison, the vast majority of the inputs to this plan remain internal to DND. Once complete, the finalized document is then sent for approval by both the CDS and DM, before being sent to the MND for his endorsement of the naval deployments contained within, to be designated as official CAF activities. This designation means that the deployments detailed within the RCN Three Year Plan are then eligible for operationalization under Op *PROJECTION* by the CDS. The aim of this process is to ensure that the maritime FG and Force Employment (FE) deployment plan meets not only RCN, but also wider CAF requirements, while integrating, where possible, wider government inputs into the planning process for defence diplomacy deployments.

Operation PROJECTION AFRICA

Op *PROJECTION AFRICA*, much like its predecessor deployment, *NEPTUNE TRIDENT*, is Canada's primary maritime defence diplomacy activity within the African continent. This operation takes the form of an annual deployment of two *Kingston*-class ships, along with shore-based training teams and support personnel to West and North Africa, specifically focusing on the Gulf of Guinea and Western Mediterranean regions. To date, four rotations have been conducted, with deployments normally commencing in January, executing

engagements and BPC activities with African partner nations in February, March, and early April, before returning to Canada in early May. The primary objective of these deployments is to assist USAFRICOM in conducting their annual West and North African focused BPC events, *OBANGAME EXPRESS* and *PHOENIX EXPRESS*.¹²⁹ As BPC events, both exercises are intended to increase regional maritime security capabilities, counter maritime based illicit activity, as well as to improve information sharing regarding regional Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).¹³⁰ These BPC events, which are supported by maritime forces from the USA, UK, France, Belgium, Brazil, Germany, as well as Canada, have as their ultimate objective, to increase the capabilities of participating African nations to undertake regional maritime security responsibilities, and in doing so, to increase regional stability and economic prosperity within West and North Africa.

Secondary to the operation's primary objective of supporting BPC activities as detailed above, the ships deployed on Op *PROJECTION AFRICA* conduct a wide variety of community based cooperative maritime defence diplomacy activities. These activities, aimed at increasing Canadian diplomatic influence within the region, include activities like the provision of direct support to diplomatic events such as official meetings, cocktail parties, and international women's day speaking engagements, as well as community outreach activities such as school visits, and the provision of support for school and orphanage maintenance projects.¹³¹ These activities not only support the efforts of Canada's diplomatic missions within the region, but are complementary to wider government objectives, such as the government's focus on women,

¹²⁹ Canada, Department of National Defence, Royal Canadian Navy, *RCN TASKING DIRECTIVE – RCN Africa Engagement 2019*, (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2018), 2.

¹³⁰ United States of America, United States Africa Command, "Obangame Express." Last accessed 26 March 2020, <https://www.africom.mil/what-we-do/exercises/obangame-express>.

¹³¹ Darlene Blakely, "West African deployment a "once in a lifetime" journey" *Crowsnest* 11, no. 2 (Spring 2017): 2-3.

peace, and security in Africa, as well as the campaign to secure a seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 2020.¹³² It is through these secondary, community-focused defence diplomacy activities that Rear-Admiral Bob Davidson’s statement, quoted in Le Mière, 2014, that all sailors are to a certain extent mini-ambassadors for their country, is best demonstrated.¹³³

Operation PROJECTION ASIA-PACIFIC

The commencement of Op *PROJECTION ASIA-PACIFIC* in 2017 saw the CAF re-establish its routine presence on the Western side of the Pacific Ocean, and commit significant resources to conduct maritime defence diplomacy within the region. Unlike Op *PROJECTION AFRICA*, which consists of a single annual deployment, this deployment is executed on a near persistent basis, with two, 4 to 6 month deployments of *Halifax* class frigates annually, along with the periodic deployment of the replenishment ship MV *ASTERIX*. The size and scope of this operation is illustrated by the fact that since 2017, Op *PROJECTION ASIA-PACIFIC* has been the primary deployed operation that Canada’s Pacific fleet has supported, with nine ships and submarines deploying during that period. Op *PROJECTION ASIA-PACIFIC*’s primary objective is to enhance the Canadian presence within the Asia-Pacific region, while assisting with ongoing diplomatic efforts, and providing support to allies through BPC activities and cooperative exercises.¹³⁴ As a demonstrative activity, the objective of proving Canada’s ability to sustain maritime operations within the Asia-Pacific region is in itself an act of persuasive maritime defence diplomacy; however, a wide variety of cooperative maritime defence diplomacy

¹³² Canada, Global Affairs Canada, “Women at the table: Peace and Security in Côte d’Ivoire” Last modified 13 December 2019, <https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/stories-histoires/2019/cotedivoire-peace-paix.aspx>.

¹³³ Christian Le Mière, *Maritime diplomacy in the 21st century* . . . , 119-120.

¹³⁴ Canada, Department of National Defence, “Operation PROJECTION”.

activities are also integrated into these deployments. The establishment of a near persistent Canadian military presence within the region is intended to signal Canada's interest in the region, while also increasing Canadian influence with regional partner nations and organizations.

The primary cooperative maritime defence diplomacy activity undertaken by ships during Op *PROJECTION ASIA-PACIFIC* is the participation in large-scale multi-national military exercises with allied navies and regional partner nations. Recent Op *PROJECTION ASIA-PACIFIC* rotations have seen Canadian warships participate in several such exercises, including the Australian-led exercise KAKADU, the Japanese-led exercise KAEDEX, as well as the US-led RIMPAC.¹³⁵ In each case, participation in these exercises, undertaken in order to build and re-inforce Canada's regional military partnerships, served as the "anchor activity" or primary coordinating events of the deployment. The use of largescale multi-national exercises as a means of strengthening or re-enforcing existing alliances and relationships is a well-established cooperative maritime defence diplomacy activity, whose objective is to strengthen bonds between naval forces, and build the foundations for future wartime maritime coalitions.¹³⁶ The deliberate nature of the Canadian use of this tactic was reflected in the original deployment objectives for Op *PROJECTION ASIA-PACIFIC*. These objectives linked the ship's participation in multi-national maritime exercises with the national goal of strengthening Canada's strategic ties with regionally important nations such as the USA, Australia, Korea, and Japan.¹³⁷ As such, although military exercises are often seen as simply FG events, the deployment of Canadian warships to the Asia-Pacific region to participate in these exercises can be seen as an act of

¹³⁵ Targeted News Service, "HMCS Calgary Concludes Operation PROJECTION, Returns to CFB Esquimalt." Last modified 18 December 2018, <https://search-proquest-com.cfc.idm.oclc.org/docview/2158223368>.

¹³⁶ Christian Le Mière, *Maritime diplomacy in the 21st century* . . . , 8-9.

¹³⁷ Canada, Department of National Defence, Royal Canadian Navy, *RCN TASKING DIRECTIVE – HMCS CALGARY DEPLOYMENT 2018*, (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2017), 2.

cooperative maritime defence diplomacy, aimed at strengthening Canada's ties with regional partner nations.

Secondary to the participation in multi-national maritime exercises, ships deployed on Op *PROJECTION ASIA-PACIFIC* conduct a wide variety of shore-based cooperative maritime defence diplomacy activities. As a result of the integration of the RCN Three Year Plan, and the GIPDE within the planning process for Op *PROJECTION ASIA-PACIFIC* deployments, a wide variety of targeted diplomatic engagements are supported by Canadian warships. The higher profile of these cooperative maritime defence diplomacy engagements has included the 2018 visit by HMCS *Vancouver* to the port of Hong Kong, making it only the third Canadian warship to visit China since 2007. This port visit included official meetings between the PLAN and the Deputy Commander of the RCN, as well as community visits and charity events. This port visit culminated with a rare cooperative exercise between HMCS *Vancouver* and PLAN ships upon departure from Hong Kong, aimed at developing a common understanding for potential future maritime cooperation.¹³⁸ The timing of this ship visit was noteworthy from a foreign policy perspective, as Canada was pursuing closer economic and diplomatic relations with China at that time, and concluded the first *Canada-China Economic and Financial Strategic Dialogue*, in November of that year which committed the two governments to work closer together on shared economic and industrial matters.¹³⁹ Other notable good-will port visits include the three port visits to Vietnam that have been conducted since 2016, which were undertaken in support of a

¹³⁸ Christy Leung, "Canadian navy frigate HMCS Vancouver begins six-day port call in Hong Kong" *South China Morning Post*, Last modified 03 May 2018, <https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/community/article/2144523/canadian-navy-frigate-hmcs-vancouver-begins-six-day-port>.

¹³⁹ Canada, Global Affairs Canada, "Joint Outcomes of the First Canada-China Economic and Financial Strategic Dialogue" last modified 12 November 2018, <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2018/11/joint-outcomes-of-the-first-canada-china-economic-and-financial-strategic-dialogue.html>.

wider Canadian government re-engagement with Vietnam.¹⁴⁰ This re-engagement, which is guided by the *Canada-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership Agreement* that was reached in 2017, sets out increased economic, diplomatic, and military connections between the two countries as some of its primary objectives, including a specific focus on maritime security and disaster relief.¹⁴¹ As such, the regular visit by Canadian warships to Vietnam could be seen to serve as a visible and tangible demonstration of Canada's commitment to the new agreement. As these two examples demonstrate, as a focused maritime defence diplomacy deployment, extra effort is expended during the planning process of Op *PROJECTION ASIA-PACIFIC* to ensure that ship's port visits are carefully selected in order to further wider government objectives, and that community activities, high level visits, and cooperative exercises are leveraged to increase Canada's standing within the region.

Operation PROJECTION Results

Assessing the impact of any diplomatic activity can be difficult, and for many diplomatic endeavors it takes years of sustained activity before any results are evident, however media reports and government communications offer early insight into the effectiveness of Canada's maritime defence diplomacy deployments. In the short time since Op *PROJECTION* was commenced, these activities have garnered a significant amount of media interest, both within Canada, as well as internationally. In order to assess the potential effects generated by Op

¹⁴⁰ Canada, Department of National Defence, "News Release: Minister Sajjan Attends Shangri-La Dialogue and Visits Japan" Last modified 04 June 2019, <https://www.canada.ca/en/departement-national-defence/news/2019/06/minister-sajjan-attends-shangri-la-dialogue-and-visits-japan.html>.

¹⁴¹ Justin Trudeau, "Joint Statement by Canada and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on the establishment of a comprehensive partnership" Office of the Prime Minister of Canada, last modified 08 November 2017, <https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2017/11/08/joint-statement-canada-and-socialist-republic-vietnam-establishment>.

PROJECTION, this section will first look at the Canadian media coverage, before assessing the foreign media coverage of these deployments.

Using media coverage as a means of determining the potential effect of the Canadian maritime defence diplomacy program is useful, as cooperative maritime defence diplomacy is primarily based upon the concept of soft power. Soft power, a concept popularized in the early 1990s by Joseph Nye of Harvard University, can be best described as the ability to achieve one's objectives through the force of attraction.¹⁴² As most cooperative maritime defence diplomacy activities include a measure of direct interaction with a foreign nation's population—be that through cocktail parties, community visits, or speaking engagements—it can be seen that such direct communication is intended to increase the level of attractiveness of Canadian culture, lifestyle, and values amongst that population, and in doing so, make that population more amiable to Canadian objectives. The use of foreign media coverage therefor is particularly useful as a means of determining if these deployments have increased the overall attractiveness of Canadian culture, lifestyle, and values within a particular region, and in doing so, increased Canadian soft power.

Within Canada, deployments of warships in support of Op *PROJECTION* have consistently received generous and positive media attention, raising the domestic profile of Canada's defence diplomacy program, as well as of the RCN itself. The departure from and return to Canada of Op *PROJECTION* warships has consistently received both local and national news coverage that often focusses on the strengthening of relationships between Canada and the involved nations. These articles highlight many of the main cooperative defence diplomacy

¹⁴² John Simmons, *The Routledge handbook of soft power*, Edited by Naren Chitty, Li Ji, Gary D. Rawnsley, and Craig Hayden, (London: Routledge, 2017), 62.

activities involved in the deployments, including BPC events, as well as the increase in coordination and cooperation between naval forces.¹⁴³ The level of domestic news coverage that these warships receive regarding their involvement with many of the cooperative defence diplomacy aspects of Op *PROJECTION* deployments underscores the fact that these activities resonate particularly strongly with the Canadian public, and are therefore routinely highlighted by national news organizations. This point is further demonstrated by the relative lack of national news coverage for the arrival and departure of warships on non-maritime defence diplomacy deployments of similar duration, such as the CAF's counter-narcotic focused Operation *CARIBBE*.

In addition to the national news coverage that these deployments generate, Op *PROJECTION* deployments have also generated a number of articles in communities across Canada that normally wouldn't cover RCN deployments or operations. These articles, which often focus on a local resident who participated in the deployment, predominantly emphasize the community based cooperative defence diplomacy activities that the ships undertake —school visits, community construction projects, and international women's day events— as a means of demonstrating the good work that Canada is undertaking abroad.¹⁴⁴ This surge in national and local news coverage regarding Op *PROJECTION* deployments also has the secondary effect of increasing the awareness of the RCN's mandate and missions in areas of the country beyond its

¹⁴³ David Pugliese, "HMCS Regina and Asterix supply ship leave for deployment to Asia-Pacific and Middle East" *Ottawa Citizen*, last modified 06 February 2019, <https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/hmcs-regina-and-asterix-supply-ship-leave-for-deployment-to-asia-pacific-and-middle-east/>; Alexander Quon and Alexa Maclean, "Crews of HMCS Shawinigan and HMCS Glace Bay bid farewell, deploy to Africa" *Global News*, last modified 27 January 2020, <https://globalnews.ca/news/6463738/halifax-navy-forces-deploy-africa/>.

¹⁴⁴ Desiree Anstey, "Islander on board HMCS Summerside embarks on a wave of adventure in Africa" *Journal Pioneer*, last modified 08 April 2018, <https://www.journalpioneer.com/news/local/islander-on-board-hmcs-summerside-embarks-on-a-wave-of-adventure-in-africa-200073/>; Derek Hagggett, "Moncton Man serves with navy in West Africa" *The Times*, last modified 04 April 2018, <https://search-proquest-com.cfc.idm.oclc.org/docview/2021165278>.

coastal communities. As the element of the CAF that is most removed from the daily awareness of the Canadian public due to its location only on the coasts, such national and local news coverage assists in the RCN's efforts to combat the "naval blindness" that often persists amongst the Canadian population.¹⁴⁵ As a result of this, domestic news coverage of Op *PROJECTION* deployments can be seen to be assisting in the creation of a positive viewpoint within the Canadian population of both the CAF in general, and the RCN specifically.

Internationally, the cooperative maritime defence diplomacy activities carried out by Canadian warships during Op *PROJECTION* deployments often provide positive news coverage for Canada. As a major industrialized western state, Canada normally receives infrequent and cursory news coverage in the international sections of most major publications in nations that Canada maintains regular relations with. Visits by Canadian warships during Op *PROJECTION* deployments however often result in news coverage of Canadian activities within the countries themselves, which can be seen to assist in the establishment a more direct and predominantly positive impression of Canada through this coverage. Community based cooperative defence diplomacy activities, such as school visits, volunteer work, and charity events have been particularly effective in generating positive local news coverage of Canada's role and influence within the nation.¹⁴⁶ Additionally, in keeping with one of the major objectives of these deployments, that being the strengthening of ties between Canada and the engaged nation, many local news stories also highlight the historical and political significance of the visit of a Canadian warship. This was demonstrated by the coverage of HMCS *Regina's* visit to the port of Cam

¹⁴⁵ Peter Haydon, "Editorial: Maritime Blindness, you say?" *Canadian Naval Review* 6, no. 3 (Fall 2010): 2-3.

¹⁴⁶ Ghana News Agency, "Sekondi School for the Deaf Receives Canadian Navy" last modified 15 March 2019, <https://newsghana.com.gh/sekondi-school-for-the-deaf-receives-canadian-navy/>; Asia News Monitor, "Vietnam: Royal Canadian Navy's Ships Visit Da Nang City" last modified 01 Oct 2018, <https://search-proquest-com.cfc.idm.oclc.org/docview/2114375482>.

Ranh Bay, Vietnam in 2019, where the local news coverage focused specifically on the fact that the ship was the first Canadian warship to visit the military port in the 45 years since diplomatic relations were established between the two nations.¹⁴⁷ Such international news coverage supports the growth of a positive view of Canada within the nations that are selected for engagement during these deployments, and in doing so is evidence of early success of building the foundations of Canadian influence within these regions.

Unfocused Maritime Defence Diplomacy

Outside of the maritime defence diplomacy focused deployments that are conducted under Op *PROJECTION*, the RCN also integrates a limited number of maritime defence diplomacy activities into its wider deployment and sailing program. Over the last three years, the RCN has, on average, visited 74 international ports, on 6 continents, involving over 2,250 sailors each year.¹⁴⁸ As Op *PROJECTION* deployments account for only a minority of the international sea days within the yearly RCN sailing program, the majority of the RCN's international sailing program is therefor only infrequently utilized to support maritime defence diplomacy activities. International non-maritime defence diplomacy deployments such as Op *CARIBBE* cover areas of the world where the government of Canada has indicated that it wishes to increase its influence, such as South and Central America.¹⁴⁹ As a result, these international maritime deployments

¹⁴⁷ Xuan Ngoc, "Canadian naval ships to make first ever port call at Vietnam military base" *VN Express*, last modified 24 May 2019, <https://e.vnexpress.net/news/news/canadian-naval-ships-to-make-first-ever-port-call-at-vietnam-military-base-3927768.html>.

¹⁴⁸ Canada, Royal Canadian Navy, "Royal Canadian Navy's 2019 Year in Review" last modified 31 December 2019, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6xyZHv1IaSw>; Canada, Royal Canadian Navy, "Year in Review 2018" last modified 02 January 2019, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U97M-1UEn1A>; Canada, Royal Canadian Navy, "Year in Review 2017" last modified 19 March 2018, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n7AAh5B3zLI>.

¹⁴⁹ Canada. Department of National Defence, *2018 Guidance on International Priorities*. . . , 7-8.

represent a large potential opportunity for increasing the impact of the Canadian maritime defence diplomacy program through the utilization of sea days and port visits that are not currently dedicated to maritime defence diplomacy activities.

Despite the lack of a coordinated approach to the integration of maritime defence diplomacy activities into the wider RCN sailing schedule, a variety of these activities centered around good-will port visits have already been successfully integrated. The RCN's primary ongoing expeditionary deployment is Operation *REASSURANCE*, which consists of the CAF's air, land, and maritime contributions to NATO's standing forces. In support of this operation the RCN maintains a persistent deployed presence of a *Halifax* class frigate as part of the NATO standing maritime task groups which operate in Northern European and Mediterranean waters.¹⁵⁰ Ships deployed on this operation make frequent port visits throughout Europe and North Africa, and therefore provide an excellent opportunity for increased participation in maritime defence diplomacy events. Over the last several years Op *REASSURANCE* ships have been utilized infrequently to undertake cooperative maritime defence diplomacy activities. This has included HMCS *Ville de Quebec*'s December 2018 visit to Israel. This visit, which was scheduled to support a visit by the heads of the RCN and the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), was the first visit of a Canadian warship to Israel in over four years, and inaugurated a new navy to navy relationship between Canada and Israel.¹⁵¹ Other cooperative maritime defence diplomacy activities that have been integrated into the Op *REASSURANCE* program have included the hosting of numerous events intended to provide support to Canadian industry. Such events have

¹⁵⁰ Canada, Department of National Defence, "Operation REASSURANCE", last modified 24 January 2020, <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-reassurance.html>.

¹⁵¹ Anna Ahronheim, "Heads of Canadian Air Force and Navy join HMCS Ville de Quebec in Israel" *The Jerusalem Post*, last modified 15 December 2018, <https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/heads-of-canadian-air-force-and-navy-join-hmcs-ville-de-quebec-in-israel-574417>.

been executed to provide a venue for product marketing for Lockheed Martin Canada (LMC) and other Canadian military industrial producers in the form of ship tours and systems demonstrations during international port visits. These tours provide Canadian companies with a cost-effective way to demonstrate their products to potential foreign military customers, and as a result, these tours have the potential to provide direct assistance to the Canadian economy through foreign military sales.¹⁵² The limited integration of cooperative maritime defence diplomacy activities into Op *REASSURANCE* port visits provides tangible evidence of the potential that non-maritime defence diplomacy deployments have to provide further benefits for Canada through the utilization of the already existing port visit schedule.

The execution of cooperative maritime exercises with partner navies during RCN operational deployments is another example of cooperative maritime defence diplomacy being integrated into the RCN's wider deployment program. This integration of cooperative maritime exercises is best demonstrated by the regular inclusion of maritime encounters between the Canadian and Mexican navy during Op *CARIBBE* deployments.¹⁵³ These exercises originated with a request from the Mexican navy during mil-mil talks between Canada and Mexico in 2017, as Mexico had recently returned to "blue water" operations, and was looking for assistance in the execution of open ocean deployments.¹⁵⁴ Since that time, *Kingston* class vessels deploying on Op *CARIBBE* have included maritime exercises with the Mexican navy as part of their regular

¹⁵² Op *REASSURANCE* ships have provided support to LMC's efforts to market their CMS multiple times between 2015 and 2020. The author was the primary liaison between the RCN and the Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel) (ADM(Mat)) staff for the coordination of these efforts while serving as the SSO Naval Operations - Europe, Africa, and the Middle East within the Naval Staff.

¹⁵³ Vice Admiral Art McDonald, Twitter Post, 16 September 2018, 1000 a.m., accessed 03 April 2020, https://twitter.com/Comd_RCN/status/1041326009793036288.

¹⁵⁴ This request was received from the Mexican delegation during the 2017 Mexico-Canada mil-mil talks that were organized by SJS. The author was present when this request was made as he was serving as the RCN representative to these talks.

deployment program. These regular at-sea interactions have helped increase the interoperability between the two navies, and have strengthened the wider military relations between Canada and Mexico, as the RCN helps the Mexican navy transition back into “blue water” operations. The integration of cooperative maritime exercises into the wider RCN deployment program offers the unique opportunity to strengthen relationships and interoperability between naval forces on a non-interference basis with the primary operational objectives of the deployment.

Despite these successes, the integration of maritime defence diplomacy activities into the broader RCN deployment program has experienced significant challenges. The first of these challenges is that the vast majority of these events are externally generated by foreign nations, international organizations and business groups, and as a result are not proactively entered into the deployment program. Unlike the Op *PROJECTION* deployments, the majority of the maritime defence diplomacy activities that are undertaken during these deployments originate as the result of these external requests, and are undertaken as targets of opportunity, and only if they fit within the already planned deployment program. The Op *REASSURANCE* events in support of Canadian industry are excellent examples of this challenge: with no formal process in place to communicate potential international marketing opportunities to Canadian companies, the vast majority of these events occur as last-minute requests from the companies themselves, after they learn about an upcoming ship’s visit from external sources.¹⁵⁵ Additionally, as these events are not proactively solicited and integrated throughout the planning process, they often can only be carried out if they fit within the already established sailing program, as in, if the ship is already planned to visit a particular port at that requested time. This lack of proactive planning severely

¹⁵⁵ Vignette occurred while the author was managing maritime global engagement for Africa, Europe, and the Middle East within the Naval Staff.

restricts the scope of maritime defence diplomacy activities that can be supported, as it does not allow deployment programs to be shaped to meet anything beyond the primary operational objective. The reliance on these events to be pushed, vice pulled into the RCN deployment program means that many potentially valuable defence diplomacy opportunities are discovered too late, or lost altogether as a result of the lack of broad-based communication and consultation within the deployment planning process.

The integration of these activities within non-maritime defence diplomacy focused deployments has been further hampered by the elimination of the dedicated positions within the naval staff that carried out these responsibilities. Prior to mid-2019, DNOP, later renamed the Maritime Coordination Element (Strategic) (MCE(Strat)) was responsible for maritime defence diplomacy, and global engagement activity management on behalf of the RCN. This organization managed the RCN maritime defence diplomacy program through three regionally tasked desk officers. These desk officers were responsible for managing all defence diplomacy requests and opportunities within their regions, including mil-mil talks, regionally based deployment orders, the maintenance of liaison with CDAs, as well as the analysis and staff work in response to any internationally received invitations for exercises, events, and operations. It was through these desk officers that the vast majority of the defence diplomacy opportunities that were executed outside of Op *PROJECTION* deployments were identified and planned. Unfortunately, a re-organization of portions of the Naval Staff and the Maritime Component Commander's (MCC) staff in mid-2019 resulted in two of the three of these positions being eliminated, thus removing the regionally-based expertise within the Naval Staff regarding maritime defence diplomacy activities.¹⁵⁶ As a result of this re-organization, the responsibility for maintaining global

¹⁵⁶ Vignette occurred in mid-2019 while the author was managing maritime global engagement for Africa, Europe, and the Middle East within the Naval Staff.

engagement situational awareness, and the staff work associated with international engagement invitations has been allocated to Comd RCN's Global Engagement advisor, effectively combining four jobs into a single position. The elimination of the maritime defence diplomacy expertise within the Naval Staff has significantly hampered the ability for naval planners to proactively identify and prioritize maritime defence diplomacy activities for implementation within the RCN's deployment program.

Conclusion

As this chapter has demonstrated, the CAF and the RCN have experienced early success with the implementation of dedicated maritime defence diplomacy deployments through Op *PROJECTION*. However, the implementation of such activities into the wider deployment program has experienced challenges. In the three years since Op *PROJECTION* was first instituted as an official CAF operation, a variety of military and wider government of Canada diplomatic objectives have been accomplished through the deployment of warships to areas of strategic interest. These deployments have not only provided the Canadian government with increased visibility within these regions, but also the pre-positioning of maritime assets has allowed for an unparalleled level of flexibility to respond to unforeseen events, as was demonstrated by HMCS *Vancouver's* response to the 2016 New Zealand earthquake.¹⁵⁷ As Op *PROJECTION* represents only a small portion of the RCN's overall deployment program, there is ample opportunity to integrate additional maritime defence diplomacy activities into the broader RCN at sea program. Despite this opportunity, the lack of a proactive planning process for the identification and prioritization of these activities, coupled with the elimination of the

¹⁵⁷ Canada, Department of National Defence, "News Release: HMCS Vancouver returns home. . ."

positions within the Naval Staff that had previously undertaken these responsibilities, has meant that integrating defence diplomacy activities within non-defence diplomacy focused deployments has met with limited success. Wider communication and consultation of the RCN sailing program, coupled with dedicated planning resources could allow the RCN to dramatically increase the level of maritime defence diplomacy support that the CAF can provide to government of Canada objectives, without sacrificing operational focus, or significantly increasing deployment costs.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As the previous chapters have demonstrated, while Canada is currently experiencing a resurgence in the use of maritime defence diplomacy, this practice is neither new, nor exclusive to Canada. As was covered in Chapter 2, the traditions of maritime defence diplomacy reach back to near the beginnings of early human civilization, with the dispatch of armed ships to sea so that their visible presence would convey a diplomatic message, or provide a deterrence against potential adversary action.¹⁵⁸ This practice has matured and increased in complexity over time, with modern maritime defence diplomacy consisting of a wide variety of potential actions ranging from cooperative activities, intended to reassure allies and strengthen relationships with partner nations, to persuasive deployments, intended to demonstrate capability and establish influence within a region, to coercive activities, intended to use the threat of force to influence the actions of potential adversary nations. The vast majority of the maritime defence diplomacy activities undertaken by the CAF fall within the realm of cooperative defence diplomacy, and as such are executed as a means of increasing Canadian influence, providing support to wider government objectives, and to strengthen military relationships with both allies and partner nations alike. The increased use of maritime defence diplomacy activities offers the Canadian government an effective way to increase its influence in a globally connected world.

While maritime defence diplomacy offers Canada tangible advantages, the current policy structure that governs the use of these activities is hampered by a lack of centralized authority and government wide coordination. As was demonstrated in Chapter 3, Canada lacks a centralized government-wide foreign policy and national security strategy. This lack of central coordination has resulted in government departments undertaking foreign policy activities

¹⁵⁸ Geoffrey Till, *Seapower: A guide for the twenty-first century* . . . , 360.

independently, without sufficient coordination of efforts and objectives between disparate government activities. The UK's implementation of the 2015 NSS offers Canada an excellent example of how such a "grand strategy" approach could help foster a more efficient implementation of foreign policy, and therefore allow for the leveraging of military assets and activities to further the objectives of other governmental departments. In order to maximize the benefits of this approach, such a policy review would need to be continued at both the departmental and service levels, ensuring wider communication and consultation of international activities so as to maximize the returns on government-wide coordination of foreign interfacing efforts. The current Canadian policy approach regarding the implementation of defence diplomacy hampers the implementation of a WoG approach to such activities, and resolving this would allow for the more efficient use of such naval assets in a defence diplomacy role.

Finally, while the CAF has achieved early success with maritime defence diplomacy focused deployments under Op *PROJECTION*, the implementation of these activities into the wider RCN sailing program has encountered difficulties. In the three years since Op *PROJECTION* was commenced, the CAF has executed a wide variety of cooperative maritime defence diplomacy activities in Africa and the Asia-Pacific aimed at increasing Canadian visibility and influence within those regions. While a small amount of maritime defence diplomacy activities have been integrated into the wider RCN deployment program, the lack of wider consultation and communication of this sailing schedule has meant that these activities are normally pushed, not pulled, into the program, and are executed largely as "targets of opportunity". Changes to the way that defence diplomacy is managed and communicated both within, and external to the RCN, are required to take advantage of the maritime defence diplomacy potential that exists within the remainder of the RCN sailing program.

Recommendations

The above analysis of the principles, policy, and practice of Canadian maritime defence diplomacy has identified several areas where change is recommended in order to increase the benefits that these activities could generate in support of government of Canada objectives. As the CAF, like all government organizations, exists perpetually within a resource-constrained environment, it is acknowledged that any changes made to increase the output of defence diplomacy activities must be balanced against wider resource requirements and constraints. To assist with this, the following list of recommendations are sorted with the most resource neutral recommendations first, working towards those recommendations that would require the allocation of significant financial, or personnel resources to achieve. With that in mind, this paper provides the following recommendations for potential improvements to Canada's maritime defence diplomacy program:

Recommendation 1: Increased Communication of the RCN Sailing Program. The reinstatement of the previously active Ship's Visit Committee, would provide a resource neutral way of proactively increasing the awareness of the regions and countries that will be included within the RCN sailing program. This committee, which previously met twice annually, and included the RCN, ADM(Pol), and representatives from GAC, could be strengthened with the inclusion of wider DND representation, such as ADM(Mat) —to coordinate defence industrial support—, and other maritime organizations, such as the Canadian Coast Guard. This committee would allow for greater integration of DND and government of Canada defence engagement priorities to be included within the RCN sailing program, and defence diplomacy opportunities to

be pro-actively communicated to organizations that could either assist, or be assisted by the presence of a Canadian warship.

Recommendation 2: Consolidation of RCN Defence Diplomacy Responsibilities. A consolidation all maritime defence diplomacy responsibilities within the RCN into a single directorate within the Naval staff would allow for central management and prioritization of RCN defence diplomacy activities. The amalgamation of the organizations that are currently responsible for global engagement, *REGULUS* training opportunities, and navy to navy talks into a single directorate would avoid duplication of effort, and enable the RCN to execute a single coherent centrally managed defence diplomacy program. Secondary to this would be the drafting of an RCN global engagement policy that would draw from SSE, GIPDE and the CJOC Regional Operations Outlooks, and translate this into tangible direction for maritime planners and ship's captains.

Recommendation 3: Consolidation of DND Defence Diplomacy Responsibilities. The consolidation of all defence diplomacy organizations within DND into a single organization would allow for efficient coordination, communication, and prioritization across the full spectrum of defence diplomacy activities. Such an organization would see the amalgamation of organizations such as the CDA program, DMTC's international training serials, as well as the organization that manages CAF Out of Canada (OUTCAN) exchanges into a single organization that would be similar to the UK Deputy VCDS organization. The consolidation of all DND entities that handle defence diplomacy would not only allow for the efficient use of CAF defence diplomacy resources, but would provide the L1 organizations with a single entity to manage the external consultation with other government departments for matters pertaining to defence

diplomacy. Such a centralized approach would be especially helpful in increasing CAF access to external funding sources, such as GAC's CTCBP.

Recommendation 4: Creation of Dedicated Defence Diplomacy Funding. The establishment of a dedicated funding source for defence diplomacy activities would provide the resource stability needed to maintain a consistent implementation of the defence diplomacy program, such as was done in the UK. One such source for funding would be the creation of a defence diplomacy focused Memorandum to Cabinet (MC) that would provide dedicated defence diplomacy funding under a single CAF operation. The approval of such an MC would transfer the financial responsibility for defence diplomacy away from L1 operating budgets, and in doing so eliminate the current resourcing issues encountered with Operations *EDIFICE* and *PROJECTION*. Such an approach would also allow for the regular government review and central management of the CAF's defence diplomacy program.

Recommendation 5: Include Defence Diplomacy as a Core CAF Task. The replacement of capacity building operations with the broader term of defence diplomacy as one of the CAF's eight core tasks would provide increased flexibility in the scope of diplomatic activities that the CAF could undertake as part of its core business. While capacity building as a core task does enable the official execution of limited defence diplomacy activities as mandated operations, the adoption of the wider defence diplomacy term, as was done for the UK MOD, would reduce the constraints on what actions outside of combat could be considered core CAF business. The widening of this mandate would not only better reflect the full scope of activities already being undertaken by the CAF today, but would provide operational flexibility for politicians and military planners alike.

Recommendation 6: Draft a Government-Wide Foreign Policy “Grand Strategy”. The lack of a central government-wide strategy that directs all foreign relations activities that the government of Canada undertakes has resulted in unsynchronized and duplicated efforts by disparate government departments. The adoption of a “grand strategy” approach to a national security strategy document, as was done in the UK, would provide a single coherent and prioritized plan for all government external relations, and would help facilitate better intra-departmental communication and cooperation. The drafting of such a strategy would require significant work on the part of politicians and senior public servants to articulate a clear picture of Canada’s national security threats, its economic and diplomatic interests, as well as a generally agreed upon set of national values to be promoted through government action.¹⁵⁹ The drafting of such a strategy would be difficult within the current Canadian context as it would require not only a clear consensus amongst the Canadian population as to what our national interests and priorities are, but also the political will to openly articulate national threats and the role that international organizations play within the future of Canada.¹⁶⁰ Despite the difficulties that would be encountered in drafting such a strategy, a Canadian “Grand Strategy” would help advance national interests by providing the CAF with clear direction on how to best utilize military assets and resources to contribute to the government of Canada’s political, diplomatic, economic, and industrial objectives.

¹⁵⁹ David Pratt, “Is there a Grand Strategy in Canadian Foreign Policy?” *Policy Options*, last modified 01 September 2007, <https://policyoptions.irpp.org/fr/magazines/reasonable-accommodation/is-there-a-grand-strategy-in-canadian-foreign-policy/>.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

Conclusion

This paper has argued that while Canada's current maritime defence diplomacy program has achieved some early success, changes are required within the principles, policy, and practice of maritime defence diplomacy in order to maximize this program's return to the government of Canada. With the RCN at the beginning of what is anticipated to be a two decade long re-capitalization of the vast majority of its surface and subsurface fleet, costing the Canadian tax payer upwards of 100 billion dollars, now is the time to identify areas where the Canadian naval fleet can increase the return it provides to the Canadian government to justify this investment. It is through the increased scope and efficiency of the Canadian maritime defence diplomacy program that the RCN and the CAF can provide this return on investment, by utilizing the Canadian naval fleet to support a wide variety of political, diplomatic, economic, and industrial objectives. In discussing naval contributions to affairs of the state, British international relations professor Colin Gray stated "The greatest value [of the Navy] will be found in events that fail to occur because of its influence".¹⁶¹ It is in this vein that it can be seen that Canada's naval fleet can make a greater contribution through the execution of maritime defence diplomacy activities to strengthen alliances, build partnerships, and contribute to international stability through capacity building operations, and in doing so can continue to provide maritime security, while also helping achieve wider Canadian government objectives.

¹⁶¹ The United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence. *Joint Doctrine Publication 0-10* . . . , 36.

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