Information identified as archived on the Web is for reference, research or record-keeping purposes. It has not been altered or updated after the date of archiving. Web pages that are archived on the Web are not subject to the Government of Canada Web Standards.

As per the Communications Policy of the Government of Canada, you can request alternate formats on the "Contact Us" page.
The Joint Interagency Multi-national and Public (JIMP) Environment: Making Sense of a Crowded Battle-space

By/par Colonel Jim Simms

This paper was written by a student attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one of the requirements of the Programme of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions, which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.

La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du programme. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale.
Abstract

This paper written by a senior Canadian army officer examines the relationship of the Joint, Interagency, Multi-national and Public (JIMP) construct with the comprehensive approach (CA) to operations and the whole of government (WoG) policy. The paper posits that JIMP is the environment and not the approach and must be considered in the analysis (estimate) at all levels – from the strategic to the tactical – similar to the consideration of other traditional factors of enemy and ground - amongst others. The author further explains that this JIMP environment analysis will help “make sense of the crowded battle space” by clearly showing the links between various classes of actors superimposed on the backdrop of the master element of JIMP – the public. The paper proposes a hierarchy of language and works its way to an exploration of this relatively new construct of looking at the operating environment – as one characterized by the term JIMP. Furthermore, the paper successfully focuses in on the more challenging aspects of that environment for military forces – essentially centred on the interagency and public dimensions and especially the public dimension. The paper makes use of a case study on the current action in Afghanistan (NATO ISAF mission) to reinforce the hypothesis. In essence this paper is suggesting that JIMP is not normative but a description of reality (the environment).
“This work was not born from a desire to establish a new method of the art of war; I compose it to amuse and instruct myself.”\textsuperscript{1}

Introduction

The Canadian Forces is in a dynamic period of operations most often characterized by our participation in the international community’s engagement in Afghanistan. This participation serves to highlight a refocused policy of engaging the instruments of national power towards a common or shared goal. The delineation of how this policy is translated into a conceptual approach, what encompasses this approach and the doctrinal ramifications to this approach is not universal and would benefit from clearer and more concise language and, eventually, doctrine. At the centre of the employment of the Canadian Forces to realize government policy is the numerous and ever-more complex relationships. There are numerous terms used to describe these relationships or the interaction of military forces with other actors and stakeholders in any action the military may be engaged – be it domestic or international.

Doctrinal and academic terms have not been consistent and, at times, are being used without context or understanding. The goal of this paper is to contribute to the clarification of a key conceptual/doctrinal term – JIMP or joint, interagency, multinational and public.\textsuperscript{2}


\textsuperscript{2} JIMP as a conceptual term has been used in Canada since 2003. It has been accepted by the Army Terminology Board and was featured prominently in the 2004 draft for discussion purposes of the Strategic Operating Concept for the Canadian Forces. This SOC was never published in its final form. Canada’s key allies have not embraced the Public element of JIMP. For a background
Specific to this paper, there is a requirement for a wider professional discussion of what JIMP is, what it is not, and where it fits within a comprehensive approach to operations. Furthermore, as an institutional embracing of the so-called “comprehensive approach to operations” is being used to define our forward looking advancement of military capabilities, it is imperative that an understanding of the environment in which military forces will operate is realized.

This paper posits that military operations take place in an environment that can be generally characterized as being (to different degrees each time) joint, interagency, multinational and public. Therefore, contrary to the position forwarded by the Army capability developers and others, JIMP is the environment and not the approach and must be considered in the analysis at all levels – from the strategic to the tactical – similar to the consideration of other traditional factors of enemy and ground - amongst others. This JIMP environment analysis will help “make sense of the crowded battle space” by clearly showing the links between various classes of actors superimposed on the back drop of the master element of JIMP – the public. In order to succeed in this endeavour, this paper will propose a hierarchy of language and work its way to an exploration of this relatively new construct of looking at the operating environment – as one characterized by the term JIMP. The paper will attempt to focus in on the more challenging aspect of that environment for military forces and posit that that challenges surround the interagency and public

---

look at JIMP refer to the work of Defence Scientist and Strategic Analyst Peter Gizewski at Gizewski, Peter, Toward a Comprehensive Approach to Canadian Forces Operations: The Land Force JIMP Concept, September 2007, Defence Research and Development Canada.
dimensions and especially the public dimension. This latter part will be achieved with the use of a case study on the current action in Afghanistan (NATO ISAF mission).

The paper concludes that the “P” component of JIMP is the most problematic (and also the most enigmatic) mainly because it covers such a vast swath of the engagement space, requiring the military to develop strategies (employing info ops and public affairs) that will allow it to engage effectively with the “P” whose support the military is ultimately dependent on. While the “P” is miles wide and the most diverse collection of actors, it can be concluded that many of the sub-elements of “Public” are neutral observers, in that they are not particularly well informed on the issues nor do they have a direct (visceral) stake in one side or the other (unless they themselves are in the middle of the conflict). This might be viewed as in contrast to the Interagency (“I”) actors, who could see the military as “competitors” encroaching into the civil and humanitarian space, which they view as their own domain, while being unwilling to align their own activities with what the military might be doing. Finally, in the conclusion, the paper will highlight the requirement to pursue intellectual and practical developments in a number of areas to overcome the challenges posed by the JIMP environment. In the end the military has no choice but to accept a crowding of the battle space so it behooves the Canadian Forces to find solutions to optimize its actions within this crowded space.
The Policy and the Approach

Nowhere is Canada making a difference more clearly than in Afghanistan. Canada has joined the United Nations-sanctioned mission in Afghanistan because it is noble and necessary. Canadians understand that development and security go hand in hand. Without security, there can be no humanitarian aid, no reconstruction and no democratic development. Progress will be slow, but our efforts are bearing fruit. There is no better measure of this progress than the four million Afghan boys and two million girls who can dream of a better future because they now go to school.³

In Canada only the government can make public policy. Certainly departments are empowered to provide policy advice and recommendations. For the purposes of this paper the following hierarchy of terms will be used:

![Figure 1: The Hierarchy of Terms]

This diagram merely indicates that, conceptually, there needs to be a methodology to describe how intent – government intent for the purposes of this paper – is translated into action that realizes that intent. Typically intent is very broad and action is a series of very specific and often inter-related activities. The term policy refers to “the actions, goals, and decisions of authoritative political actors – or, more commonly, governments.”\textsuperscript{4} It is suggested that a conceptual approach is a very broad “strategy” that bridges policy and the dominant environmental considerations and provides some guidelines for how policy will need to be resourced and put into action. The environment includes those major considerations (analysis) that must be made with the resultant deductions that lead to concrete courses of action. Strategy is the how and can be viewed from a tactical, operational or strategic level.

In the absence of a new or refreshed defence policy since the minority Conservative government came to power in 2006 we need to examine the sources of policy indications such as speeches from the throne, budget speeches and other key announcements by the prime minister or his key ministers. At the highest level the current government continues to link security with the development and diplomacy actions of Canada.

This is evident in direct reference such as the 2007 speech from the throne quoted above. This is consistent with the more formalized policy that was put forth in the Defence Policy Statement of the Liberal government in 2005. The DPS stated that, “the Government will

pursue an integrated strategy that draws on Canada's diplomatic, development and defence resources. This includes a central role for the Canadian Forces.”5 Even more specifically it connects a policy of “whole of government” with the major government instruments to effect the whole of government policy.

*The Government is committed to enhancing Canada's ability to contribute to international peace and security and, in particular, restore stability in failed and failing states. Achieving this objective in today's complex security environment will require, more than ever, a "whole of government" approach to international missions, bringing together military and civilian resources in a focused and coherent fashion. As part of this strategy, and building on recent experience gained in Afghanistan and elsewhere, the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces will work more closely with other government departments and agencies, including Foreign Affairs and the Canadian International Development Agency, to further develop the integrated "3D" approach (defence, diplomacy and development) to complex conflict and post-conflict situations.*6

It is reasonable to note the similarities in policy on the formal synchronization and packaging of the instruments of government power to the realization of a strategic effect.

From a multi-lateral perspective the North Atlantic Treaty Organization refers to a policy of using all the instruments of power available to its member states. In effect NATO states that:

*To this end, NATO must be able to draw effectively together and improve its various crisis management instruments. It is recognised that the civil and economic levers of power of Alliance member nations mostly reside in other international organisations, and that NATO has no requirement to develop capabilities strictly for civilian purposes. Notwithstanding the above, Alliance forces engaged in an*

---


6 Ibid
NATO considers that this policy of drawing effectively together the various instruments of “crisis management” or power results in its higher level concept called “the comprehensive approach.” The comprehensive approach is broader than a whole of government policy in that it recognizes that there are various other players in the battle space than just those controlled by the nation states and its proxies. This broadness of approach facilitates coordination between the various actors and stakeholders. In fact, one could surmise that what is truly different in today’s battle space is this interaction of various players - some with agendas and some without. With this increase in players - or actors - are many competing demands and many haphazard relationships.

One difficulty has been the discriminate replacing of terms to describe both policy and the approach that will realize that policy. For example, and from a Canadian involvement in Afghanistan perspective, the Chief of Review Services has chosen a definition that combines both “whole of government” and “approach.” This body has used the following definition for a *whole of government approach* as provided by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development: “one where a government actively uses formal and/or informal networks across the different agencies within that government to coordinate the design and implementation of the range of interventions that the government’s agencies will be making in order to increase the effectiveness of those

---

interventions in achieving the desired objectives.”8 Once again the policy of the use of all instruments of national power is coupled with modalities of how that policy will be achieved. There will be a requirement to work around the language used by various academics and, more importantly, the actors that will be involved in crisis response.

The fact that there is a combination of the use of instruments of power or crisis management is not new – there are plenty of historical examples of just this sort of thing. That NATO is intimately involved in combining the elements of power into action should be a surprise to no one. One has to but examine the post World War II/Commencement of the Cold War era to see how the elements of statecraft and economic power were combined with military forces to achieve political objectives.9 What is new is the pervasive nature of the comprehensive approach at all levels of military operations from tactical to strategic and in all considerations.10 General Lance Smith, Commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command, notes the importance of his lessons-learned process (Joint Center for Operational Analysis) and the capturing of the experience of the leadership at all levels because “it is clear to all of them that the battle space has changed; you have to understand who all the players are and how they are linked .... Who is most effective at influencing the people ....”11 This is certainly even more evident because of the nature of the counter-

---

8 Chief of Review Services, Evaluation of CF/DND Participation in the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team, October 2007 (1258-156 (CRS)), 22.
10 For a useful viewpoint on this please see the interview between Joint Force Quarterly and General Lance L. Smith, Commander U.S. Joint Forces Command at Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 44, 1st Quarter 2007, 39 – 43.
11 Ibid., 41.
insurgency battle but, arguably, will be the standard for all military involvement into the future.

This comprehensive approach is also evident in other international organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This pan-European security body – a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter – advertises itself as having a unique approach to security that is both comprehensive and co-operative. It is comprehensive “in that it deals with three dimensions of security: the human, politico-military and the economic/environmental.”\(^\text{12}\) The point is that a combination of instruments of power and security might commence at the higher policy level but once it starts being embraced at broader and wider levels then it goes beyond policy to a concept to an over arching approach answering the question of \textit{how}.

In its conceptual development of the Army of Tomorrow the Land Staff have developed a force employment concept summarized as adaptive dispersed operations. Dispersion can be in relation to time, to space or to purpose. For the rationale of this paper it is purpose dispersion that is most important. That is to say that “Land Force units and soldiers must be able to operate effectively – in either a supported or supporting role – in all whole of government campaign plan lines of operation.”\(^\text{13}\) Here we can now see policy permeating the conceptual development of the way military forces must operate and this, in turn will

\(^{12}\) OSCE Information Sheet (undated). Also see the OSCE website at www.osce.org for more information.

lead to a further development and refinement of specific doctrine – encapsulated in the comprehensive approach.

A comprehensive approach, then, is an approach that is mindful of the old and new players in the battle space. It is not an approach that attempts to define the role of the various actors but rather to understand the actors and improve mechanisms for coherence (or as a minimum de-confliction) of actions. As NATO notes, there is a requirement “to move, when appropriate, from ad hoc actions by interested parties to more institutionalized and standardized relationships; thus the need to address insufficiency of formal mechanisms to promote, or even permit interaction between actors.”

One concern has to be the leading role military forces – including the Canadian Forces – have taken in developing the approach. Gizewski, one of Canada’s premier analysts and conceptual developers, notes that a comprehensive approach to military operations “involves the military’s development of a capacity to interact with a range of diverse players in a cooperative, constructive manner.” This begs the question whether a comprehensive approach such as that espoused by the OSCE is any different than one focused on military operations. Certainly the point – highlighted by Gizewski and others - that core competencies must cut across traditional “stove pipes” and develop new linkages

---

15 Gizewski, 3.
and not rely only on traditional linkages is key.\footnote{Ibid., 4.} The following diagram titled \textit{Increasing Organizational Efficiency and Effectiveness} is instructive in this manner.\footnote{Ibid.}

Therefore, the government recognition of its requirement to synchronize and use, in a holistic manner, all the instruments of national power (whole of government policy) has led to this integrated (conceptual) approach to operations. In response to this, military forces require an enhanced ability to “operate in harmony with joint, interagency and other multinational partners.”\footnote{AoT FEC, p. 25.} It must also take a coordinated approach to operations that recognize the public and the media as key players. As the Army notes, “outward-focused, integrated and multidisciplinary approaches must be the norm to address the complex problems and challenges posed by an increasingly multidimensional security environment.”\footnote{AoT FEC, p. 25.}
If it is accepted that there is a policy level that is developing that involves the whole of government towards complex security situations and if it accepted that there is a broad concept for action entitled the comprehensive approach being explored and tried ‘on the ground’ then the question might be what is the environment in which the policy and the approach must be put into action?

**The Environment**

Firstly, this approach of coordinated action (the comprehensive approach) needs to be agile and versatile enough to cater to a host of possibilities. For the Canadian Forces this could be either domestic or expeditionary based. Arguably the “new” environment is characterized by the expanding list of actors, participants or stakeholders. How to cater to this crowded battle space is, therefore, one of the challenges of the current and future operations. Thomas O’Connell, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defence for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, notes that we are “now dealing with many disparate and complex issues that require a large number of governmental agencies, different countries, numerous private companies and NGOs to achieve our goals.” 20 He further notes that “warfare is inherently inefficient because the environment is difficult to control and subject to the vagaries of human interactions.” This environment has been presented as “multi-dimensional.” What is certain is the environment is characterized my new and pervasive human interactions – all action resulting in the reaction/counteraction chain.

---

20 Joint Force Quarterly interview with Assistant Secretary Thomas W. O’Connor in *Joint Force Quarterly*, Issue 44, 1st Quarter 2007, 9.
In fact the development work leading to the Canadian Forces Strategic Operating Concept (SOC) noted that the “modern operating environment has increasingly become an interdependent, complex system of political, military, social, economic and physical elements, which is nowhere more evident than in failing states, and for the purpose of conducting operations can be considered the ‘multidimensional battle space.’”

Noteworthy, the first Canadian reference to the term JIMP appeared in this early draft of the Strategic Operating Concept. There has been a considerable amount of discussion as to what JIMP is and what JIMP is not. One definition of JIMP refers to it as a framework of Joint, Interagency, Multinational, and Public actors who collaborate and cooperate at all levels of command to achieve shared objectives. This, however, seems to suggest that there is a common consensus among the players on collaboration and cooperation. Furthermore it seems to suggest that all the players in any action can be, and want to be, identified. This is likely too simple an approach. Proposed definitions for the component parts or elements are suggested as follows:

---

21 See Department of National Defence (Canadian Forces), Canadian Forces Strategic Operations Concept, Draft 4.4 dated 21 May 2004 (For CDS Review), p. 7.
22 See Department of National Defence (Canadian Forces), Canadian Forces Strategic Operations Concept, Draft 4.4 dated 21 May 2004 (For CDS Review).
Component Definitions: 23

- **Joint** - involving other national military elements and support organizations,
- **Interagency** - involving other government departments (OGDs) and agencies (OGAs) both domestic and foreign,
- **Multinational** - involving one or more allies or international coalition partners,
- **Public** - involving variety of elements including; domestic and international publics, non-governmental organizations (NGO), public volunteer organizations (PVO), private sector, media and commercial organizations (both domestic and foreign).

For the purposes of this paper each of these components of JIMP will be referred to as elements of operating environment. Not all Canadian Forces operations are multi-national. In fact key operational activities such as the military response to the Oka crisis and routine fisheries patrols are purely national. This paper, however, is emphasizing the most difficult case scenario of a multiplicity of actors of all different sorts. Additionally, it is obvious that the public grouping is very broad – indeed, perhaps too broad. There is so dichotomy of terms between public and private as one example of the complications. Suffice it to say that the large grouping underscores the importance of military forces to recognize the power of actors and stakeholders outside the militaries direct engagement and, often, coordination. When considered as a group the complete grouping of elements of JIMP might resemble a series of interactions as described below and previously suggested by Canadian Forces Joint Concept Developers.

---

23 Gizewski, 7.
One criticism of the above diagram must be that it is military centric. That is to say the interactions are viewed from the point of the military being the focal point. Another criticism, as alluded to earlier, has to be the simplification or vagueness of the public element. In fact until last year – led by the Land Staff capability developers – little conceptual or practical development work was directed at the “P.” Our key Allies have generally advanced the notion of JIM and there is of yet no ABCA concept paper on the subject outside of the discussion of it produced by Canadian staff in their lead of the ABCA future concepts paper. Some of Canada’s allies believe that the “P” is a bridge too far at

---

24 See Department of National Defence (Canadian Forces), Canadian Forces Strategic Operations Concept, Draft 4.4 dated 21 May 2004 (For CDS Review), p.16.

25 ABCA refers to the interoperability programme of the United States, United Kingston, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
the moment. However, there was recognition at the ABCA annual meeting in Victoria in April 2007 that there is a lot of pressure within American Army circles to tackle the complexity of the P issue. In the fullness of time there is no doubt that the public element needs to further broken down into sub-elements and explored in greater depth.

The Canadian Army currently defines JIMP as follows:

A domestic and foreign collaborative framework involving military elements and support organizations, other government departments (OGDs) and agencies (OGAs), one or more allies or coalition partners, and a variety of public elements including non-governmental organizations (NGO), public volunteer organizations (PVOs), the private sector, the media, commercial organizations and the citizenry, who cooperate at all levels of command to achieve shared objectives.28

This definition is problematic in the sense that reference to a “collaborative framework” suggests that there is wide spread agreement between these players on a framework objective and modalities. Penetrating analysis, however, does not support this statement.29 In fact some would even suggest that based on the experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan that

27 Email from Mr. Peter Gizowski, Strategic Analyst, Land Staff dated 5 February 2008.
28 Email from LCol MB Boswell, Senior Staff Officer Capability Development, Land Staff on 6 Feb 08. This definition has been endorsed by the Army Terminology Panel (ATP) and submitted to the Defence Terminology Standardization Board (DTSB) for approval.
there should be a decoupling of such efforts as humanitarian from military objectives because competing goals obscure other objectives.30

If it is accepted that JIMP is about the environment where military operations will be conducted and that the comprehensive approach will be about striving to achieve a holistic, collaborative and cooperative approach beyond just the military campaign or action, what will be the most challenging element of the JIMP construct for the military and how might it be overcome? In order to answer this question a requirement exists to explore the elements of JIMP. Certainly antecedent of the joint and multinational components is the continental staff system and this is well established doctrinally and operationalized. Antecedent of interagency and, to a limited degree, the public component is civil military cooperation (CIMIC). It is, however, when the four elements are considered together that the public aspect becomes obvious as, somewhat, the antithesis to the culture of military structure and control. The military must accept that it will have no control but certainly influence over the public element of the JIMP environment and must develop strategies to over any limitation this may pose to achieving success in the comprehensive approach to operations.

What seems to be missing, however, is the so what? It seems to be of little value just to acknowledge that there is a requirement for greater interaction between military forces and other government departments and inter-agency actors. It seems to be too obvious that the

public element is important. We see this on a regular basis as citizens of Afghanistan and Iraq are killed as unfortunate outcomes of military action and we also see it as domestic public opinion puts pressure on political elites to act – one way or another. Some, such as Gizewski and Rostek, suggest that JIMP or being JIMP compliant is “one means of operationalizing a comprehensive CF approach to operations.” By extension this would also be operationalizing a whole of government policy approach. Frankly, a comprehensive approach is much more complicated than this and involves authorities, understanding, will and resources. Where the concept of JIMP is key is in the understanding of the environment in which the key actors will interact or chose not to interact.

Therefore, it is posited here that JIMP is about the environment and is fundamental to being successful in a comprehensive approach. In essence it is about making sense of the crowded battle space. The more comprehensive the approach the more complicated will be the environment and the more important will be the requirement to understand that environment. Regardless of how comprehensive the approach, current military operations will – in some manner – be conducted in an environment that is joint, interagency, usually multinational and public. It should also be noted that the JIMP environment does not displace the importance of more traditional elements of the military environment such as enemy or terrain but is a tool to understand the other actors within the environment.

31 Gizewski, 7.
The Environment – Determining an Appropriate Model

There are a number of different models that can be used to encapsulate the interaction of the four elements of the JIMP environment. This environment is not entirely new but an understanding of the effect of this environment on overall success of the comprehensive approach in realizing strategic intent has gained prominence. This environment should not be confused with the environment of geography (ground), air, space, etc – in essence the “bubble” but rather a look at how the crowding of the battle space by the multitude of players can be analyzed in a manner that will make some semblance of sense.

An examination of doctrine will certainly show that military organizations see themselves at the centre of the battle space effectors. Military organizations are quick to develop strategies or organizational diagrams that depict how others will fit within that battle space. For example a key contributing “enabling concept” to the Canadian Army’s Force Employment Concept for the Army of Tomorrow (AoT) is JIMP. In fact considerable attention is afforded the idea that ultimately to “win the war” and not just individual battles there will be a requirement to operate with JIMP partners and build trust relationships that “extends beyond the immediate, intimate social group.” How much extension is useful and possible is the fundamental question and it is here that a theoretical model would be useful. A follow-on question would have to be how far is the Canadian Forces willing to go to meet the needs of CIDA, the RCMP, DFAIT, CBSA and others?

32 See AoT FEC p. 11.
One relatively simple way to depict the environmental interactions is as follows:

![Figure 4 – A Structured and Controlled Environment](image)

This is certainly in line with an earlier diagram (figure 3) introduced in this paper and used by CF concept developers recently that displayed the environment from a military centric point of view. Using this model certain conclusions could be made. Firstly, it would suggest that the military is the lead – or as a minimum the lynchpin – in any operation. This would further suggest a holistic, collaborative and cooperative approach to operations building on Civil Military Cooperation – the antecedent of Interagency and Public elements and the Continental Staff System – the antecedent of Joint and Multinational components. It would also suggest a move from knowledge management to knowledge sharing based on structural, institutional and operational linkages.
A more realistic model might be one that accepts as the starting premise that each and every situation will have random interactions and, while there can be a certain amount of agreement and coordinating protocols put in place, many other factors outside the environment’s control - such as national intent (including caveats), service rivalries, inter-governmental agendas – and the like – will necessitate a first principles look at all actors and all interactions between those actors in each activity (operation). This, therefore, might be characterized as follows.

Figure 5 – Each Environment (Operation) Results in New Dynamics

A third option is to examine recent operations to see if, in fact, there has been the development of any accepted way of examining the environment. Keeping with the idea that this is first, and foremost, about how the military might enhance its understanding of the environment it could look like the following model in which the military has a certain amount of structural control over the actors from a joint and multinational perspective and has some form of dialogue and shared interest - if not shared intent - with the interagency.
piece but that the real change is the realization that the public element permeates all activities and considerations.

In all three of the models posited here it can be realized that the JIMP environment is about people and relationships – building understanding, respect and trust. The environment is directly proportional to how comprehensive an approach is demanded or driven by policy. In the extreme a comprehensive approach will demand that the Canadian Forces – or any military force for that matter cannot lead and must cultivate involvement in key non-military actors.

In a complex battle space the ability to understand, dissect and explore the environment is crucial. While no one solution will fit all situations it is desirable to develop a modality to fully consider all the factors that will provide a clear appreciation. One such way is to
consider the key divisions. Not enough has been written about the JIMP\textsuperscript{34} approach but, as explored above, JIMP is less an approach than a characterization of the environment. Each of these elements of the environment will have a different weight depending on a multitude of variables including the level considered (strategic, operational or tactical), the type of engagement on the spectrum of conflict and on the strength of the players involved.

As also alluded to in the introduction, the environmental elements of joint and multinational are closely tied to the continental staff system. More than ever countries are unlikely to “go it alone” even if they have the military wherewithal to do so. Canada’s present and future involvement in operations is largely influenced by both NATO and by our interoperability programme with America, the United Kingdom, Australia and, to some degree, New Zealand. For the Canadian Army this interoperability is the subject of a well developed programme – commonly known as ABCA. As noted earlier Canada has been a key shaper of ABCA’s forward vision – a vision that denotes the comprehensive approach driving the importance of the JIMP environment. As stated in its future concept:

\textit{it should be borne in mind that military operations need to be part of a broader, coherent cross-government and internationalized response to tackle the causes of, and remove the threats to, ABCA partners.}\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{34} JIMP as a doctrinal or conceptual term has not been accepted by all our key partner nations. The US uses JIM and has not embraced the P or public element.

\textsuperscript{35} The ABCA Future Concept (FC), 31 Mar 06, paragraph 4.
It is obvious that as NATO expands and as all international operations become even more coalition based that more attention needs to be afforded the joint and multi-national elements of JIMP. It will be the inter-agency synchronization piece and the public importance of the battle space that should garner much of the future analysis and exploration of conceptual developers.

The Environment – Afghanistan as an Example

“In order to persuade Afghan citizens to side with their government against the insurgents, Afghans must see that their government has the ability to deliver basic services, provide the rule of law, uphold human rights and extend economic opportunities.”

-U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Boucher, 14 Feb 08

Few would argue that, for Canada and its key Allies, Canadian action in Afghanistan is a veritable laboratory of the interactions of military forces and all the other actors and stakeholders in action in the current operating environment. In fact, against the backdrop of the notion of failed and failing states and the responsibility to protect, and in line with the expectation that counter-insurgency operations will be the norm for the next 15 or more years (i.e. the future security environment) Afghanistan has become the analysis vehicle of choice. But is Afghanistan instructive for the purposes of examining the utility of the doctrinal terms and concepts introduced in this paper?

The first task is to conduct an examination of whether Afghanistan meets the definition of whole of government policy. The answer here would have to be yes. As introduced early
in the paper this issue was specifically addressed in the latest federal speech from the
throne. Likewise the mere formulation of the Manley Commission underlies the
importance of the policy and the broad implications of that policy across government. This
is reinforced by the recommendations of the report. Certainly the political ramifications
of the report underlie the importance of the report and the government way ahead from a
political and policy perspective.

The second task is an examination of the approach to realizing the policy – whether it can
be deemed a comprehensive approach or not. Here it is instructive to review the report of
the Chief of Review Services (2007) and the comments pertaining to this very subject.
Additionally, upon examination of the initiatives of both the Department of Foreign Affairs
and the Canadian International Development Agency we see that while there may be some
terminology challenges there is indeed a comprehensive approach to realizing the whole of
government intent. To determine how comprehensive this approach is will require a
further examination outside just the inter-agency Canadian piece. For this an examination
is made of the NATO Regional Command SOUTH Headquarters of the ISAF mission. It is
instructive to note that there are currently three key branches of this military organization
(plus a more traditional branch of Support functions): operations; stability and security
reform; and re-construction and development. A fourth branch is being planned by the

36 16 October 2007 Speech from the Throne accessed 12 March 2008 at http://www.sft-
ddt.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1364
37 The full Manley Report can be viewed at http://www.independent-panel-independant.ca/report-
eng.html
38 See for example the National Post article on January 23, “Manley report invokes the spirit of
chief of staff designate in consultation with the commander designate from the
Netherlands. This will be a branch for governance and influence. The fact that operations
are considered comprehensively across the spectrum of possible actions is one indication.
Another would be the number of civilian advisors to the commander and staff in this
headquarters including: a stability advisor (STABAD); three political advisors (POLADs);
a US Aid advisor, a US State Department advisor; amongst others. From a Canadian
national perspective, the appointment of a senior DFAIT representative in 2007
underscores the desire to bring a balanced approach to the demand for a comprehensive
approach to all action in Afghanistan.

The third requirement is to assess if the environment is largely characterized as JIMP. This
is yes from both a NATO/Coalition perspective and a Canadian National perspective.
While land operations centric, the mission depends on aviation and air support – a large
amount of that air support provided by NATO naval forces. Add to this the special forces
nature of much of the action and the special assets providing the ISR enabling function and
this theater of operation is as joint as a theatre can be. The interagency piece is obvious
with the involvement of multiple government departments and agencies including Defence,
DFAIT, CIDA, Correctional Services Canada and RCMP.39

---

39 In fact on 29 Apr 08 a high level team designated “Rolling Start” of government officials went
to Kandahar for an extended technical assistance visit. This team included high ranking officials
from the PCO along DFAIT, CIDA, DND (IS Pol), RCMP and others. The team was
accompanied and advised by DCOMD CEFCON. The team will back brief the Clerk of the Privy
Council Office in Kandahar during the week of 5 May 2008 on options to further “civilianize” the
mission including commanding the PRT, taking over the Strategic Advisory Team (SAT) and
appointing a civilian equivalent (or even higher) to the Commander Task Force Afghanistan.
Information provided by numerous conversations with these government officials 29 Apr to 2 May
and in office call with Comd TFA in Kandahar on 1 May 08.
The multinational environment is evident in the number of nations involved in the mission both from a military perspective and from a civilian perspective. Certainly in the Canadian area of interest there is a multinational aspect at every level including at the NATO Regional Headquarters SOUTH (RC (S)) where the command and control of the mission rotates between the UK, Canada and the Netherland and perhaps, soon, the United States. The Afghanistan mission public environment is undeniably the most complicated of the elements of the JIMP environment but, arguably, the most important. From a public perception point of view the Afghanistan mission is critical – at home – to sustain national will, political intent and resources. From a host nation perspective the public environment is even more critical. In fact the centre of gravity for both the Taliban and for the NATO forces is the public support and certainly the public acceptance of the legitimacy and the capability of the Afghanistan government – federal, provincial and district – is a key criteria for mission success.

---

40 The US has continually provided both tactical forces and key enablers to RC (S) under the ISAF mission besides the forces (mainly special forces) operating in the area as part of US Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). In early Spring 08 the US surged in considerable ground tactical forces including 24 Marine Expeditionary Unit and has a renewed focus in the SOUTH.
The number of actors involved in this particular battle space can be partly visualized as follows:

![Figure 7 - RC (S) Representation of Stakeholders](image)

This representation is useful to introduce that what happens in one set of interactions certainly will have an effect on other interactions. For example, the NGO community is largely associated with the larger international involvement by the local population. There are some local NGOs. When the NGOs decide to pull out of a particular area because of the security risk there is a corresponding effect on the relationship between the local population and the NATO/ISAF military forces. What is not represented in this diagram is the mass public – the individual Afghan. At the end of the day it is about this element – certainly in the counter-insurgency battle space. Here we have to go back to the

---

41 Provided by Chief of Staff RC (S) 2 May 08.
representation presented earlier in this paper at diagram 5 where everything must be considered in its impact on the public.

The Afghanistan model does demonstrate a key point – that while there is a direct correlation between the degree of comprehensiveness in the approach and the preponderance of certain JIMP actors, the fact remains that even in a more military and kinetic focused period or approach the environment will still be characterized as being JIMP. Therefore the results of any action need to be considered in line with the environment and the deductions that this analysis will bring. For example, it could be said that NATO forces in SOUTHERN Afghanistan can use its considerable influence and resources to advance the government agenda (with action/focus at the provincial and district levels) in the right direction. This could be through the influence of the task forces and, also, through the use of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (military). However, an analysis using the JIMP environment framework and considering the multiple and dynamic interactions of all the elements against the backdrop of the master element – public might lead to a conclusion that ISAF driven re-construction and development outside the framework of effective Government only sends a signal that the Afghan Government is not in control or is indifferent to the concerns of the population. This, in turn, might lead to a deduction that the government must be seen to be delivering public services and re-construction and development and might lead to changes in the scheme of manoeuvre of the military forces to ensure that governance is considered in all actions.
Conclusion - A Strategy to Enhance Process

*Land Operations 2021: The Force Employment Concept for Canada’s Army of Tomorrow* notes that “in the future, and given our increasingly globalized, interdependent world, each dimension of the conflict web promises to encompass more actors, more motivations and more varied strategies and means for achieving the goals of those involved.” The key point is that all the players in the international arena of action are likely examining their way of effecting others and sometimes working with a multitude of actors and, at times, just needing to understand the interactions and interests of all those in the arena. The more actors and the more goals in this environment leads to a likelihood that there will be more complexity. How does the military then maximize its effectiveness and influence?

In the first instance it is important to have a conceptual model for analysis and for further force development of concepts and capabilities. The final analysis will show that a whole of government policy lends itself to a comprehensive approach to realizing intent. This comprehensive approach necessitates new analysis and considerations - especially as it pertains to the environment characterizing this comprehensive approach. This environment is largely Joint, Interagency, Multinational and Public. An appreciation and ongoing analysis of this environment will emphasis new planning processes, more common language, the requirement to assist others in building capacity and capabilities, the

understanding and respect for mandates and authorities of partners and the need to create networks of people, processes and technologies.

Arguably the Canadian Forces should not be the lead in the refinement of the comprehensive approach concept and all the supporting and enabling concepts and, indeed, the development of non-military capabilities. However, as the Canadian Forces will need a full institutional embracing of this concept, it behooves the Forces to take a leading role. A fundamental part of this leading role will be to designate a Centre of Excellence (CoE) for CA force development. Based on current mandates and possibilities this is likely best placed in the nascent Canadian Forces Warfare Centre – the Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre.

As it pertains to the elements of the JIMP environment, none should be taken for granted. Using the Afghanistan case model we can see that there are still many experiences to be further explored pertaining to the joint and multi-national elements and initiatives such as that being implemented by ABCA to place analysts to study the interoperability aspects should be supported and encouraged. Close attention should be paid to the “rolling start” Canadian initiative to enhance civilianization of the Canadian involvement (inter-agency) in Kandahar province. Along with this an awareness of whether the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) can start playing a role in the five southern provinces. At present there are 10 UNAMA personnel only playing a liaison role in Kandahar City. UNAMA may be pressured to do more as NATO RC (S) Headquarters continues to develop its non-kinetic actions including in the realm of governance.
Finally, the Public element will continue to be the dominant element of the environment. The influence of the home population and the host nation population must be further explored and how to affect that influence will be the subject of considerable analysis. RC (S) is furthering developing its Joint Effects Analysis Cell that will enhance measurement of effects – especially those broader effects sought with the comprehensive approach. This includes a new contract for quarterly polling of the Afghanistan population and the use of operations research analysts and other specialists to determine trends of influence among the population.

In the final analysis, the JIMP environment must be embedded as a reality within the military school houses and in the force generation training activities in order for today’s and tomorrow’s actions to be comprehensive and successful.
Sources


Foreign Affairs Homepage. Canada’s PRT.


McNerney, Michael J. “Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?” Parameters, Winter 2005-06.


United States Government. Secretary of Defence presentation. www.ndu.edu/ITEA/storage/687/Army%20Support%20to%20SSTR


