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Performance Measurement, A Critical Element

In

Transformation

Of The Canadian Forces

By/par ...

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ABSTRACT

This paper, *Performance Measurement (PM), A Critical Element In Transformation of the Canadian Forces*, briefly looks at transformation and what it means to the Canadian Forces. It examines what constitutes performance measurement and how it is critical to the success of transformation. It argues that meaningful transformation requires a robust, user-friendly system which clearly enunciates what needs to be measured, how it is to be measured, and when it is to be measured.

The paper also looks at leadership and cultural impediments to the transformation process. The author arrives at the conclusion that the issue of transformational change represents one of the greatest challenges to an organization, particularly one as complex as CF/DND and therefore, requires a system to qualify and quantify the results of transformation. The author also argues that transformation will require *strong leadership*, a significant change in *culture* and an *effective and simplified Performance Measurement Framework*, which respects modern *comptrollership*, and *best business practices* such as *benchmarking* if transformation is to be successful.

To test the theoretical aspects of the paper, the author, recognizing the importance of education to the development of the 'strategic' thinker, develops a PM Framework Model for the Canadian Forces College based on Kaplan and Norton's "Balance Scorecard", a government tool of choice for measuring organizational effectiveness. The paper concludes by illustrating the importance of PM in ensuring that the curriculum of CFC continues to meet the strategic and national security developmental needs of the Canadian Forces senior officer corps.

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And it ought to be remembered that there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things.

- Niccolo Machiavelli¹

Part 1-Canadian Forces Transformation

Introduction

The Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) in his Annual Report 2002-2003, titled “A Time for Transformation” states that the Canadian Forces (CF) must move forward rapidly in transforming the CF and National Defence on the three levels of thinking, management structures/processes and force structure.² Subsequent to this report, a study commissioned as the Minister’s Advisory Committee on Administrative Efficiencies was released on 22 October 2003. Of particular interest to this paper were the recognition, need and reinforcement of “performance management initiatives to support decision-making and to enhance managerial accountability” as a result of the rapid rate of technological change and information technology.³ Specifically, the Report recommended that “more specific linkages between business plans and their results, outcomes and senior manager’s performance appraisals, including ‘at risk’ pay, be established.”⁴

This paper will briefly look at transformation and what it means to the Canadian Forces. I will look at what constitutes *performance measurement* and will illustrate how *performance measurement* is critical to the success of transformation. Next, I will argue that meaningful

¹ Nicocolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, W.K. Marriott, trans. Vol 23, The Great Books of the Western World Chicago: *Encyclopedia Britannica*, Inc., 1952, p. 9.

² *Chief of the Defence Staff Annual Report 2002-2003*, p.1

³ Minister’s Advisory Committee On Administrative Efficiencies

⁴ *Annex A to Administrative Efficiencies Action Plans* dated Dec 2003, A-14/46

transformation requires a robust, user-friendly system which clearly enunciates what needs to be measured, how it is to be measured, and when it is to be measured. I will conclude by demonstrating that the success of transformation in the Canadian Forces is highly dependent on strong leadership, which if not properly placed, will often result in the derailing of major change initiatives. To test this theory on the need for a Performance Measurement Framework, a model will be created for the Canadian Forces College (CFC) using Kaplan and Norton's Balanced Scorecard, a strategic management methodology designed to enable decision-makers to monitor the workings of the organization in financial and non-financial areas in a 'balanced fashion'.⁵

Transformation

The term "Transformation" has recently entered the lexicon of DND and like many other buzzwords such as change management, re-engineering, total quality management, continuous improvement, revolution in military affairs, etc., means different things to different people. According to the *Oxford Dictionary*, transformation is "a marked change in nature, form or appearance."⁶ Gen Sullivan, a former US army Chief of Staff, in his book *Hope is not a Method* states that transformation is "moving an organization to a higher plane, leading it to become qualitatively different while retaining its essence."⁷ In his view, Transformation is all about "continuity, change and growth."⁸ The use of the term, however, became very popular during the US 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, which defines military transformation as "the set of activities by which DOD [Department of Defense] attempts to harness the revolution in military

⁵ Canada, National Defence, *The Balanced Scorecard in DND*. [www.vcds.force.gc.ca/dgsc/...1]

⁶ Pocket Oxford English Dictionary, Ninth Edition, ed. Catherine Soanes (Oxford University Press, 2001)

⁷ Sullivan, Gordon R, *Hope is not a Method, What Business Leaders Can Learn From the Army*, (New York: Random House, 1996) 148

⁸ *Ibid.* p.149, Change refers to adjustments made necessary by the end of the Cold War. Growth came to stand for building the future Army, actually realizing the vision, while continuity was a constant reminder that history is important and values would not change.

affairs to make fundamental changes in technology, operational concepts and doctrine, and organization structure.”⁹ The Aerospace Power Journal also refers to the importance of transformation as “an underlying driver of where, why, and how the Department of Defense will be shaped to meet the challenges of the evolving security environment.”¹⁰

The US Transformation Study Group reporting to Secretary Rumsfeld in 2001 described a process of “changes in concept, organization, process, technology application and equipment through which significant gains in operational effectiveness, operating efficiencies and/or cost reductions are achieved.”¹¹ In late 2002, the US Director of Transformation, Vice Admiral (Retired) Cebrowski, added a further definition stating that it was “those continuing processes and activities which create new sources of power and yield profound increases in military competitive advantage as a result of new, or the discovery of, fundamental shifts in the underlying rule sets.”¹²

According to the Secretary of State, Donald Rumsfeld, Transformation should not be interpreted as a radical change or acquiring of new capabilities. He was quoted in General Hawley and John Backschie’s article *Closing the Global Strike Gap*, as saying that Transformation can be achieved by “new ways of arranging, connecting, and using existing capabilities” without an increase in defense spending.¹³ Although changes can occur in more ways than one, in order for a true transformation of a military to occur, Hans Binnendijk, in his

⁹ Michele Flournoy, Project Director, *Report of the National Defense University Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 Working Group*. Washington DC: National Defence University Institute for National Strategic Studies, Nov 2000, p.14.

¹⁰ *Aerospace Power Journal*, Fall 2001.

¹¹ Department of Defense, Transformation Study Group. Transformation Study Report, April 27, 2001. *Transforming Military Operational Capabilities*, p.5. [<http://www.cdi.org/mrp/transform-pr.cfm>]

¹² Department of Defense, *Special Briefing on Force Transformation by Arthur K. Cebrowski, Director, Force Transformation*. Nov 2001 p. 3 [<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/nov2001>].

¹³ Armed Forces Journal International, *Closing the Global Strike Gap*, September 2001, p40

book, *Transforming America's Military*, states that transformation must be guided by “coherent rules and concepts and that it must produce alterations in structures and functions.”¹⁴ He also recognizes that transformation “must be accompanied by a sound resource strategy and balanced investments.”¹⁵

While the US had set ou h287uS

In the Canadian context, the Director General of Strategic Planning (DGSP) has proposed that “transformation is a departmental process of strategic re-orientation in response to anticipated or tangible change to the security environment, designed to shape a nation’s armed forces to ensure their continued effectiveness and relevance.”¹⁷ It would appear based on numerous Government security initiatives, including the publication of Canada’s first National Security Policy, that the CF is following the lead of the US in response to a changing security environment fuelled by the terrorist attacks on the US of September 11, 2001. How will we ensure that transformation of the Canadian Forces will achieve the desired results, that objectives are advanced, that progress is monitored, and goals met within assigned or targeted resources?

Catalyst for Change

During the past several years, there has been a greater emphasis on running the Department of National Defence to operate in a more businesslike manner. Just as companies are accountable to shareholders, it has become increasingly apparent that the Department of National Defence must be accountable to taxpayers. As first seen in the United States, taxpayers have increasingly demanded that the dollars they invest in their government be managed and spent responsibly. Numerous studies by the United States Government Accounting Office have reported that federal agencies often failed to effectively manage their finances, identify clearly what they intended to accomplish, or to complete the job effectively with a minimum of waste.¹⁸ In respect to Defense, the US 2001 *Quadrennial Defense Review* quickly identified that an essential element for managing transformation was the “identification, and institutionalizing of a set of metrics for evaluating, advancing, and monitoring progress in attaining the operational

¹⁷ *Pre-Decision Draft 2.6, 14 Feb 2003, DGSP, p. 2.*

¹⁸ *GAO/GGD-96-118 Government Performance and Results Act, June 1996, p.1.*

goals.”¹⁹ By matching operational goals to metrics, the Acquisition and Technology Policy Center (ATPC) as part of RAND’s “Metrics for the QDR Transformation Operational Goals” project was able to identify appropriate metrics for evaluating progress in attaining the goals.

As in the US, it is obvious that the Canadian Defence Budget, which stands at approximately 13 billion dollars, will continue to come under close scrutiny. Therefore, an important missing element in the Canadian definition of ‘Transformation’ is the need to track the progress of transformational or change initiatives within the Department of National Defence vis à vis an effective Performance Measurement Framework that ensures that the Canadian taxpayer will receive the “best bang” for his/her buck. There is nothing new here since the Auditor General has long recognized that good performance reporting is fundamental to effective accountability to Parliament for the decisions and actions of government. The information, in turn, is also used to tell Canadians what value they are getting for their taxes, and the difference a department is making for Canadians.²⁰

Not unlike the term ‘Transformation,’ the term ‘Performance Measurement’ (PM) (which includes results-based management at the heart of its framework), conjures up many things to many people. It can range from measures of organizational performance to measures of individual performance that are traditionally used for personnel performance appraisals or student evaluations in education. Various purposes are cited for adopting a PM system, from improved profitability to more effective decision-making.

Result for Canadians: A Management Framework for the Government of Canada, published in 1999, builds on previous Treasury Board initiatives in providing a framework and

¹⁹ Rand, *Metrics for the Quadrennial Defense Review’s Operational Goals*, p.1.

²⁰ Canada: *Report of the Auditor General to the House of Commons*. Chap 6, p.3.

agenda in guiding public managers. The Policy, in general, directs departments to develop meaningful, “results-oriented strategic goals and improve measurement and reporting of related outputs and outcomes.”²¹ Notwithstanding this directive, it is important to understand what value performance measurement can bring to the organization and why all organizations should develop an appropriate and effective performance measurement framework.

An important aspect of this plan is the need to integrate modern comptrollership and risk management into management practices. Comptrollership in the CF is that part of the resource management framework which assists in delivering defence capabilities in the most effective and efficient manner with due regard to probity. It must, therefore, pervade all resource management decisions, while at the same time ensuring that resource utilization and results achieved are properly recorded, tracked, assessed and reported. Comptrollership provides that part of the resource management framework required by managers and commanders to control resources effectively and to meet accountability requirements.

Decision-makers at all levels must adopt comptrollership in their management thinking and as an integrated function within their operation – it is using resources to deliver defence capabilities in a manner which is clearly effective, efficient and ethical.²² Taking this a step further, modern comptrollership represents “a long term effort to develop standards and practices to integrate financial and non-financial performance information, to properly assess and manage risk and to ensure appropriate control systems.”²³ Of particular interest within the PM domain is also the need to assure “responsible spending” by ascertaining that the costs of initiatives are

²¹ Canada, Defence on Line, WWW.VCDS.forces.gc.ca/dpon1 p. 1.

²² Canada, Treasury Board, *Report of the Independent Review Panel on Modernization of Comptrollership in the Government of Canada*, pp. 1-6.

²³ Canada, Treasury Board, *Results for Canadians: A management Framework for the Government of Canada*, 21.

linked with results, thus ensuring that expenditures are fully transparent and that taxpayers are receiving the best value for their money.²⁴ Historically, the government had paid attention to resource inputs (expenditures), activities (what they do) and outputs (what they produce). While this type of information is useful, it doesn't project the full picture of what results must be achieved. The value of focusing on results cannot be overestimated. Clearly defining the results to be achieved enables the organization to "measure and evaluate performance and to make adjustments to improve both efficiency and effectiveness."²⁵ According to the Treasury Board, the greatest challenge of all Government organizations is the capability to apply results-based management "to all major activities, functions, services and programs."²⁶

Risk Management is a "continuous, proactive, systematic process for understanding, managing and communicating risk from an organization wide-perspective."²⁷ It is about making decisions that contribute to the achievement of overall DND/CF objectives. Although risk-management is an integral part of everyday planning and management in many CF units, the department currently has no framework that encompasses these efforts which will help establish a blueprint for a department-wide integrated-risk management programme.²⁸ As the financial pressures on the CFC increase, it will be necessary to ensure the resources are applied efficiently and effectively. A methodology for applying the CFC resources is necessary and will be developed whereby resources will be allocated based on risk (a methodology that will determine priorities for procurement through the use of risk management practices). Achieving this cultural

²⁴ Canada, *Results for Canadians, A Management Framework for the Government of Canada*, p 6

²⁵ *Ibid*, p 11.

²⁶ *Ibid*, p11.

²⁷ Canada, *National Defence 2003-2004 Estimates, Part III- Reports on Plans and Priorities*, p 4.

²⁸ *Ibid*. p. 4.

change will require a sustained commitment throughout the CFC over a number of years as practices evolve.

Why Measurement Performance?

Robert Behn, in his article “*Why Measure Performance? Different Purposes Require Different Measures*,” managers can use performance measures to “evaluate, control, budget, motivate, promote, celebrate, learn and improve.” He stresses that no single performance measure is appropriate to satisfy these eight purposes. Managers, however, must identify the purposes which performance measures might serve and how these measures could be effectively employed.²⁹ Many businesses and corporations use Performance Measurement to attract business and to satisfy shareholders. The performance measures in these instances are primarily financial in nature and are not appropriate for use in the public sector. So what should the public sector use to measure performance? How should performance be measured and for what purposes?

The US Governmental Accounting and Standards Board suggests that performance measures are “needed for setting goals and objectives, planning program activities to accomplish these goals, allocating resources to these programs, monitoring and evaluating the results to determine if they are making progress in achieving the established goals and objectives, and modifying program plans to enhance performance.”³⁰ David Osborne and Peter Plastrik write in the “Reinventor’s Fieldbook” that Performance Measurement “enables officials to hold organizations accountable and to introduce consequences for performance. It helps citizens and

²⁹ Robert D Behn, *Public Administration Review* (Washington: Sep/Oct 2003. Vol. 63. Iss. 5, p. 586.

³⁰ Harry P.Hatry, James R. Fountain, Jr., Jonathan M. Sullivan, and Lorraine Kremer, 1990. *Service Efforts and Accomplishments Reporting: Its Time Has Come*, p.1-49.

customers judge the value that government creates for them. And it provides managers with the data they need to improve their performance.”³¹

Harry Hatry’s article, “*Service Efforts and Accomplishments Reporting: Its Time Has Come*,” offers one of the few expanded lists of uses for performance measurement. He suggests that public managers can use Performance Measurement information to perform the ten following different tasks:

- 1) respond to elected officials’ and the public’s demands for accountability;
- 2) make budget requests;
- 3) do internal budgeting;
- 4) trigger in-depth examinations of performance problems and possible corrections;
- 5) motivate;
- 6) contract;
- 7) evaluate;
- 8) support strategic planning;
- 9) communicate better with the public in building trust; and
- 10) improve.³²

As previously indicated, Robert Behn identified only eight performance measurement purposes. However, according to him the primary and real purpose of performance measurement is to “improve performance” [item 10] with the other factors [1-9] being the means for achieving

³¹ David Osborne and Peter Plastrik, *The Reinventor’s Fieldbook*, p.247.

³² Harry P. Hatry, James R. Foutain, Jr, Jonathan M. Sullivan, and Lorraine Kremer, 1990. *Service Efforts and Accomplishments Reporting: Its time Has Come*, pp101-104.

this ultimate purpose.³³ Prior to accepting Robert Behn's assertions at face value, it is important to look at his purposes in greater detail.

Evaluation. How well is the organization performing? Evaluation is usually the reason for measuring performance; however, to evaluate the performance of the organization, the manager needs to know what the organization/agency is supposed to accomplish. An advisory panel of the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) observed, "Performance measurement of program outputs and outcomes provides important, if not vital, information on current program status and how much progress is being made toward important program goals. It provides needed information as to whether problems are worsening or improving, even if it cannot tell us why or how the problem improvement (or worsening) came about."³⁴ It would appear, therefore, that performance measurement will assist an organization in 'evaluating' the success of its programs.

Control. How Can Managers Ensure Their Subordinates Are Doing The Right Thing? Burns, in a Harvard Business School article on "Responsibility Centers and Performance Measurement" writes that "Management control depends on measurement." Robert Kaplan and David Norton, in their dissertation on the "Balanced Scorecard," which will later be explained in greater detail, refer to business having a control bias: probably because traditional measurement systems have sprung from the finance function, the systems have a control bias. That is, traditional performance measurement systems specify the particular actions they want employees to take and then measure to see whether the employees have in fact taken those actions. In that way, the

³³ Robert Behn, *Public Administration Review* (Washington: Sep/Oct 2003, Vol. 63, Iss. 5, p.3.

³⁴ *National Academy of Public Administration, NAPA 1994*, p 2.

systems try to control behavior. Such measurement systems fit with the mentality of “the industrial age.”³⁵

Budgeting. On what programs, people, or projects should the public’s money be spent?

Performance Measurement can assist managers to make budget allocations. Performance budgeting, performance-based budgeting, and results-oriented budgeting according to Behn are some of the names given to performance measures in the budgetary process. But like so many other phrases in the PM business, they can mean different things to different people. For example, budgets are only one of many considerations in improving performance. While Budget data may provide useful information for resource allocation, they don’t show the whole picture such as the state of leadership, morale, or internal work processes, which should form a key aspect of an effective performance measurement framework.

Motivation. How can staff/employees be motivated to improve performance? Managers can use PM to motivate employees by the setting of goals, which help to focus employees on continuous improvement initiatives, which in turn, can lead to a fair degree of job satisfaction. In this type of atmosphere, employees can be self-motivated (and creative) to exceed specific targets.

Promotion. How can the organization convince its superiors/political masters that it is doing a good job? PM can help organizations to reflect their successes, and/or failures. The US National Academy of Public Administration’s Center for Improving Government Performance reports that performance measures can be used to “validate success; justify additional resources; earn customer, stakeholder, and staff loyalty by showing results; and win recognition inside and

³⁵ Robert S Kaplan. *The Balanced Scorecard: Translating Strategy into action*, pp. 6-8.

outside the organization.”³⁶ In a study, “Toward Useful Performance Measures,” a US National Academy of Public Administration advisory panel declared that “performance indicators can be a powerful tool in communicating program value and accomplishments to a variety of constituencies.”³⁷ In addition to “the use of performance measurement to communicate program success and worth”, the panel noted the “major values of a performance measurement system” include potential “to enhance public trust.”³⁸ Accordingly, performance measurement can help to establish and promote the value and competence of the organization. This is particularly important to the Government and to the public in general.

Celebration. What accomplishments are worthy of celebrating? Celebrating accomplishments is important in motivating, promoting, and recruiting and retaining of personnel. Both small and large victories or accomplishments can help to motivate personnel to perform better and to focus on the next challenge. So what accomplishments should be celebrated? Robert Behn sees the need to officially recognize and celebrate small milestones as well as unusual achievements and unanticipated victories, which “provide an opportunity for impromptu celebrations that call attention to these accomplishments and to the people who made them happen.”³⁹ Witnessing the sparkle in the eye of personnel who have been acknowledged amongst their peers, superiors and/or subordinates can undoubtedly contribute to further success.

Learning. The objective of ‘evaluation’ is to determine what is working and what isn’t. The objective of ‘learning’ is to determine why.⁴⁰ Based on effective Performance Measurement criteria, managers can learn what is not working and can modify or eliminate processes to reach

³⁶ *National Academy of Public Administration 1999*, p.10.

³⁷ *Ibid.* p.11.


³⁸ *Ibid.* p.12.

³⁹ Robert Behn, *Public Administration Review* (Washington: Sep/Oct 2003. Vol 63, Iss. 5 p. 7.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

the desired end state. Therefore, Performance Measurement can help ma

Defence Strategic Planning and Performance Management Process




The Department’s PM framework continues to evolve to ensure alignment to strategy and the identification of strategic measures. One of the key characteristics of the DND PM framework is based on Robert Kaplan and David Norton’s “balanced scorecard.” Key perspectives, which generally correspond to the input, activity, output, outcome flow to most performance management and reporting regimes, are the basis for comparing performance in a number of key areas.⁴⁴ The four key areas developed and adopted for DND are - A Professional, Effective and Sustainable Defence Team; Manage Program Resources; Deliver Defence Outputs; and Shape Future Defence and Security Outcomes.⁴⁵ These Key Perspectives are further subdivided to connect the Department’s functional activities and processes with the strategic goals. By creating appropriate key indicators under the Key Perspectives, the Department is able to connect its strategic goals with specific Defence Tasks and Change initiatives. In turn, the

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* p. 1.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* p. 3.

Department is able to create a “Strategy Map” which links the strategy to tasks as depicted in the following diagram.⁴⁶

DND/CF Strategy Map



Corporate PM Responsibilities

It is a corporate responsibility to define “what is to be achieved in terms of strategic goals, to communicate these goals to senior managers and to choose suitable performance

⁴⁶ DGSP Presentation to NSSC on Force Structure, 24 Feb 04

measures and indicators to allow the monitoring and decision-making.”⁴⁷ The responsibility of senior managers is then to choose suitable performance measures and indicators to translate into taskings to subordinate organizations and to establish performance measurement structures capable of monitoring and controlling their internal activities as well as remitting requested performance measurement information for contribution to the Corporate Strategic PM framework.

Level 1 organizations which consist of Environmental Chiefs and Group Principals, were tasked to assist in the development of suitable measures and indicators, as well as to provide data and related analysis in support of specifically assigned elements of the Level 0 data collection activities which represent the CDS/VCDS. Of the 16 Strategic Objectives developed, the one which is most applicable to the role/mandate of the Canadian Defence Academy is to “Promote Continuous Learning” with the desired outcome of building a “leading edge learning, sharing and knowledge-based organization.”⁴⁸ These objectives will become critical to developing the CFC’s Performance Measurement Framework.

Implementation Delays

The direction to produce a Performance Management Framework under the “Results for Canadians” document was first issued in 1999. Why then, doesn’t a system exist, five years later (year 2004), which cascades throughout the Department of National Defence. As reported by the Auditor General in Apr 2002, federal agencies “have made some progress over the past seven years in improving the quality of their performance reporting to Parliament, but their progress

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* p. 4.

⁴⁸ Canada, National Defence. *Performance Management*, pp. 5-8.

[http://www.vcds.forcesl.gc.ca/dpon1...performance_10.02_0_0_10.02_284.02_659_74.34006_Tm.as, pp

has been slow.”⁴⁹ I would contend that the greatest impediment to introducing such a comprehensive and pan-CF evaluation system is resistance to change and to some extent the related emphasis on consensus decision-making.

Large organizations inherently resist change, and the CF/DND is no exception. The process of reforming the CF needs to begin with a new strategic orientation, producing appropriate methods and concepts, including performance measurement that guides transformation. In addition, there must also be greater attention to cultural change within the organization since the costs of getting things wrong can be detrimental to CF/DND already limited resources.

Cultural Imperatives

As demonstrated time and time again, culture does not change because we want it changed. Frances Hesselbein, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Peter F. Drucker Foundation for Non-profit Management contends that culture changes only when the organization has been transformed. In his view, “the culture reflects the realities of people working together every day.” He feels that culture defines the heart of the organization, and that a “change of heart is not to be taken lightly.”⁵⁰ He further adds that the “capacity to change and to serve is the essence of a great and vibrant culture.”⁵¹

According to Larry Bossidy, one of the world’s most acclaimed CEOs, an organization’s culture is no more than “the sum of its shared values, beliefs, and norms of behavior.”⁵²

⁴⁹ *Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons*, Chapter 6, p. 6.

⁵⁰ Frances Hesselbein, *On Leading Change*, p. 2.

⁵¹ *Ibid*, p.5.

⁵² Larry Bossidy and R Charan, *Execution: The Discipline of Getting Things Done*, p.89.

Similarly, Edgar Schein, an expert on organizational effectiveness, proposes a more fundamental reason for learning failures [cultural change], derived from the fact that in every organization, there are three particular cultures based among its subcultures, two of which have their roots outside the organization and are therefore more entrenched in their particular assumptions. He calls the internal culture based on its operational successes the ‘*operator*’ culture.’ The second is the ‘*engineering*’ culture which consists of those designers and technocrats who drive the core technologies. Finally, there is the third culture group, the ‘*executive*,’ consisting of executive management, the CEO, and his/her immediate subordinates.

Schein argues that it is these three different, non-aligned cultures that present the greatest challenge to organizational learning.⁵³ Schein uses education as an example of a theoretical model wherein conflicts occur between teachers who value the human reaction with students (*operator culture*), and the proponents of sophisticated computerized educational systems on one hand (*engineer culture*) and the cost constraints imposed by school administrators (*executive culture*) on the other hand. Schein adds that if the engineers win, money is spent on computers and technology; if the administrators win, classes become larger and undermine the classroom climate. In any case, Schein sees the operators (teachers) losing out and the opportunity for ‘human innovations’ in learning is lost.⁵⁴

Schein concludes by stating that organizations will not learn effectively until they recognize and confront the implications of the three occupational cultures. Until executives, engineers, and operators discover that they use different languages and make different assumptions about what is important, and until they learn to treat the other cultures as valid and

⁵³ Edgar Schein, *Three Cultures of Management: The Key to Organizational Learning*. P.2.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* p.8.

normal, organizational learning efforts will continue to fail. Accordingly, it is important to understand this unique organizational relationship within the workplace and to use it effectively to promote change.

Leadership/Change Management

While recognizing that distinct cultural groups exist in every organization, another important aspect of building a strategy for change is to seek out the natural leaders within the organization based on their “performance, clarity of vision and quality of heart.”⁵⁵ In Hesselbein’s opinion, change starts with the ‘Passionate Few.’⁵⁶ Many organizations fail in change management because many managers treat the organization as a machine, expecting unrealistic change. Peter Drucker, a leading expert in organizational leadership, says that it is better to think of the organization as a ‘living organism’, which needs time to adjust to change. Donald Sull, an assistant professor of Strategy and International Management at the London Business School and assistant professor of Business Administration at Harvard University states that it is often a manager’s past commitments which pose the greatest obstacle to the future vitality of the organization. He sees committing to the future often requires breaking historical commitments. According to him, changing commitments of the leader’s ‘own making’ entails a loss of face and credibility, and those leaders who are unable to break with the past should be replaced. Sull concludes by saying that “good leaders make and honor commitments, but great leaders also know when to make way for the future.”⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Frances Hesselbein, *On Leading Change: a leader to leaders guide*. p. 27.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* p.27.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

In light of these potential impediments to cultural change and/or transformation, why does it take so long to implement significant change within the military? Perhaps it is because the military has a culture which is so powerful and engrained that it is often very difficult to make a clear break from the past. Douglas McGregor, in his book *Transformation Under Fire*, offers a very realistic explanation of this phenomenon in stating that it is institutional military culture which represents the totality of behaviour patterns, beliefs, and values that is perhaps the most important factor of all in determining the success or failure of transformation.⁵⁸ If indeed this is the case, then what type of leader does the CF need to successfully achieve transformation?

The Transformational Leader

Experience tells us that leaders should possess character, intelligence, courage and an open mind. McGregor writes that true leaders strive to do ‘what is right,’ but not necessarily the “right thing.” He explains that there is an important distinction between the two. For example, officers who spend their time checking with supervisors or peers concerning the wisdom of making a decision are not pursuing what is right. According to McGregor, these officers are ‘staying in their lane.’ Conversely, officers with the moral courage to take a stand, even when it means making an decision unpopular with subordinates, peers or supervisors are committed to doing what is right. Experience has shown that subordinates have dreaded working for officers who were either incapable of making a decision or, as McGregor eloquently puts it, “staying in their lane” to avoid making a mistake which could have a negative impact on their careers.⁵⁹

Without the moral courage to make choices that serve the interest of the Department and

⁵⁸ Douglas Macgregor, *Transformation Under Fire*, p. 190.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* p. 191.

successful transformation, it will be difficult if not impossible to remove the stovepipes, demolish the rice bowls and eliminate indifference, key problems which often characterizes change in the CF.

Having identified the critical leadership characteristics for success in transformation, the question arises, how are we doing? Are we finding the right people and promoting them to positions from which they can significantly influence transformation, or are we content with the status quo, hoping that transformation will occur on its own? While this topic could generate a paper on its own, the short and simple answer is ‘no’. We clearly work in a structure which unfortunately values compliance, often more than competence, moral courage and strong leadership. When it often appears that little but nepotism drives the selection process for higher command and promotion, the quality and content of leadership are likely to suffer.

In a politically sensitized climate which often pervades our Headquarters, advancement to senior rank often appears to have more to do with one’s conformity and popularity rather than one’s specific accomplishments within the civilian-military framework. McGregor contends that it is for these reasons that “the vast majority of officers advanced to the senior ranks are predictably conservative and conformists *in extremis*.”⁶⁰ He further notes that as long as the system perceives officers who manifest ‘agile’ minds and ‘character’ as a threat to the organization, transformation will likely not succeed. Accordingly, DND must pay greater attention to selecting the right leaders to champion the transformation of the CF. These leaders, or, as the name implies, transformational leaders focus their efforts on change and individuals and are concerned with “values, ethics, standards and long-term goals.”⁶¹

⁶⁰ Douglas MacGregor, *Transformation Under Fire*, p. 197.

⁶¹ Peter G. Northouse, *Leadership: Theory and Practice*, 2nd Ed. 2001, p. 131.

According to Peter Northouse in his work on Leadership, transformational leadership involves assessing followers' motives, satisfying their needs and treating them as full human beings.⁶² In comparison to transactional leadership, which results in expected outcomes being met, transformational leadership "results in performance that goes well beyond what is expected."⁶³

Switzerland Experience

Perhaps the Canadian Forces could adopt a page from the transformation experience in the Swiss Armed Forces. An innovative but radical approach to selecting the right leaders for implementing transformation consisted of hiring a consultant to examine the files of every flag/general officer in the Switzerland Armed Forces. Following extensive personal interviews with the general/flag officers to assess their ability to adapt to change as well as to implement transformation, a decision saw 20 flag/general officers being retired immediately. Moreover, the officer selected to lead the overall transformation effort was promoted from Colonel to Major-General rank having skipped Brigadier-General rank.⁶⁴ In the corporate sector, Larry Bossidy transformed Allied Signals into one of the world's most admired companies in 1997 and insists that the success of change requires that "the right people have to be in the critical jobs, and that the core processes must be strong enough to ensure that resistance is dissolved and plans executed."⁶⁵ This can be achieved through the leader's personal involvement, understanding and commitment to overcome resistance. If the Canadian Forces are to be successful in its

⁶² *Ibid.* p. 132.

⁶³ *Ibid.* p. 139.

⁶⁴ *Briefing to NSSC 6, during the FSE to Geneva, 09 Feb 04*, MGen Jakob Baumann, Staff of the Chief of the Armed Forces, Chief of Planning Staff.

⁶⁵ Larry Bossidy and R Charan, *Execution: The Discipline of Getting Things Done*, p. 41.

transformation effort, then the Switzerland Armed Forces experience may be worth further examination.

Benchmarking

One final but important aspect of performance measurement is “benchmarking” which implies a need to conduct a constant evaluation of processes against best practices to ensure that they are achieving optimum capability.⁶⁶ It presumes that most processes can be improved upon and that a worthwhile model may be found in other organizations.

The methodology of benchmarking can be applied to both military core and non-core functions. The logic behind benchmarking is that someone, somewhere in the world, can do a better job in specific activities. The key is to find these improved management practices and to adapt them to the CF. Benchmarking allows decision-makers to consider viable alternatives based on objective criteria and best practices in industry or government.⁶⁷ Benchmarking becomes particularly important in organizations which have not clearly developed performance measurement criteria such as educational institutions. In such cases, benchmarking may be the only means of assessing their overall performance and therefore a very critical and essential tool to performance measurement.

In summary, it is clear that the issue of transformational change represents one of the greatest challenges to an organization, particularly one as complex as the CF/DND. This notwithstanding, it is obvious that the success of any transformational initiatives will have to be

⁶⁶ APQC White Paper for Senior Management, *Benchmarking: Leveraging Best-Practices Strategies*, 1 [<http://www.apqc.org/free/whitepapers/bmksm/>]

⁶⁷ Department of National Defence, *Alternative Service Delivery at Department of National Defence: Participation of Defence Personnel in the Program*, [http://www.vcds.dnd.ca/dgrms/asd/details1_e.asp] 4

fully qualified and quantified if we are to be assured of their success. Accordingly, I contend that these successes/and or failures along the way to true transformation of the CF/DND will require strong transformational leadership, a significant change in culture, and an effective and simplified Performance Measurement Framework which respects modern comptrollership and best-business practices and reports on key outcomes rather than activities and outputs.

Equally important is the need for Performance Measurement criteria that focus more on the benefits/value added that are provided to Canadians. Perhaps in dealing with transformation, the words of Machiavelli ring as true today as they were in 1513 when he said, “*there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things.*”⁶⁸

Part II - PM In Higher Education/CFC as an Illustrative Case Study

Background

In 1967, on the direction of General J.V. Allard, then Chief of the Defence Staff, a major study was initiated to review the Professional Development system. It was completed in 1969 and called the *Report of the Officer Development Board*.⁶⁹ The report identified deficiencies in professional development; however, only some of the recommendations were implemented.

In the 30 years after Rowley’s report, numerous other studies followed and provided advice similar to that contained in the 1969 report. One of the more significant findings, as it relates to the professional development role of Canadian Forces College (CFC), is that “many

⁶⁸ Nicocolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, W.K. Marriott, trans. Vol. 23, The Great Books of the Western World, Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. 1952, p. 9.

⁶⁹ Bernd Horn and Stephen J. Harris, *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral*, St Catharines, Ont: Vanwell publishing Ltd, 2001, p .485.

officers... particularly the most senior, were deemed to be short on higher level military abilities and also lacked strategic vision and political awareness.⁷⁰ It is in this context that, the CFC must transform to create a culture throughout the College which ensures that our curriculum continues to meet the strategic and national security developmental needs of our senior officer corps.

A model will be created for CFC, using Kaplan and Norton's Balanced Scorecard, a strategic management methodology designed to enable decision-makers to monitor the workings of the organization in financial and non-financial areas in a 'balanced fashion' to ensure our core curriculum subjects remain relevant and provide the senior officer with the tools to "move beyond analytical to integrative thinking."⁷¹ The end result must be "an officer capable of strategic thinking, the one quality that distinguishes a senior officer from a junior officer."⁷²

The Challenge

Performance Measurement in the 1980s in higher education for specific quantitative performance indicators (PIs), as well as qualitative judgements, was seen in many universities as a weakening of trust amongst peers.⁷³ H.R. Kells in his work on *Self-Study Processes* provides a more plausible reason in that academics have learned "to doubt, to question, and to pursue truth- or at least answers- almost at any cost."⁷⁴ Such training makes them very competent in their chosen field; however, problems arise when it comes to getting things done through, and with, other people such as functioning in groups, planning together, reaching a consensus or

⁷⁰ Canada, *Report of the Officer Development Board* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1969), p.10.

⁷¹ BGen Ken C. Hague, *Strategic Thinking General/Flag Officers: The Role of Education*. P. 517.

⁷² *Ibid.* p. 516.

⁷³ Martin Cave, Steve Hanney and Mary Henkel, *Performance Measurement in Higher Education: Public Money & Management*, Dec 1995, p.17.

⁷⁴ H.R Kells, *Self-Study Processes: A Guide to Self-Evaluation in Higher Education*: U.S.A:ORYX Press. P.4

participating in such processes as self-study or evaluation.⁷⁵ Moreover, the absence of any meaningful performance criteria in public service organizations had made measurement difficult, and the role of quantified PIs had not expanded in the way that one would have imagined considering the increased emphasis on accountability and value for money.⁷⁶

In the US, under the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), every major federal agency had to ask itself some basic questions: What is the mission? What are the goals and how to achieve them? How can performance be measured? How will that information be used to make improvements?⁷⁷ For years, Federal organizations focused on the tasks completed as a measure of performance.⁷⁸

Today's environment is much more results-oriented, one in which the public is holding government accountable for outcomes rather than inputs and outputs. For example, at the Canadian Forces College, the number of students that graduate would be considered an output. To report on the outcome, such as quality of professional military education (PME) and its relevant use after the course would be an outcome. The organizations studied by the Government Accounting Office (GAO) in the US seeking to become results-oriented, all defined a clear mission and desired outcomes; measured performance to gauge progress; and used performance information as a basis for decision-making.⁷⁹

Similarly, agencies that were successful in measuring their performance generally had applied two practices. First, they developed performance measurement based on four

⁷⁵ *Ibid.* p. 4.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.* p. 17.

⁷⁷ GAO/DDG-96-118, *Government Performance and Results Act*, June 1996, p.1.

⁷⁸ Canada, Auditor General Report, Chapter 9, *Modernizing Accountability in the Public Service*, p. 4,

⁷⁹ GAO/GGD-96-118, *Government Performance and Results Act*, p. 10.

characteristics. The measures selected were linked to program goals and demonstrated the degree to which the desired results were achieved; the measures were limited to a vital few that were considered essential for producing data for decision-making; the measures could respond to multiple priorities; and responsibility was linked to establishing accountability for results. Secondly, all agencies ensured that the data collected were complete, accurate, and consistent to be useful in decision-making.⁸⁰

In developing an effective Performance Measurement Framework for an institution of higher education, it is important to determine what type of information is required for both internal and external information users. Of course, the information has to be accurate and should include only information that the users require. For example, in the case of the Canadian Forces College, the Canadian Defence Academy (CDA) and the Assistant Deputy Minister Human Resources-Military (ADH HR-Mil) would require only performance information that ensures that programs meet intended aims, that programs promote continuous improvement, and that they operate in an effective and efficient fashion. Based on the US experience, GPRA performance reports were likely to be more useful if they met the following conditions:

- < described the relationship between the agency's annual performance and its strategic goals and missions
- < included cost information
- < provided baseline and trend data
- < explained the uses of performance information,
- < incorporated other relevant information, and
- < presented performance information in a user-friendly manner.⁸¹

⁸⁰ *Ibid.* p. 23.

⁸¹ *Ibid.* p. 35

Currently, Performance Measurement in DND continues to be focused at the corporate level and based on the corporate Performance Measurement Framework (PMF) with performance measures and indicators being developed solely at the corporate level. Furthermore, and as previously noted, DND is using the “Balanced Scorecard” as its primary strategic-level performance measurement tool which assists senior leaders in decision-making and resource allocation.⁸² It is only a matter of time before all units will be tasked with developing a Performance Measurement system, which invariably links to the Corporate PM framework. Accordingly, this part of the paper offers a framework for the CFC, which conforms to the principles, spirit and intent of current DND initiatives and the foregoing business philosophies on Performance Measurement. Furthermore, it is based on best practices using the RCMP Departmental Case Study (which won the first CCAF-Treasury Board of Canada Award 2001 for the pursuit of excellence in public performance reporting for large departments with budgets over \$0.5 billion),⁸³ and the US Army War College Strategic Readiness System at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.⁸⁴

Current Situation/Progress/Overview of Approach

The Canadian Forces College has already commenced its journey to integrated management and accountability. By adopting an incremental approach that started with defining the vision [National Center of Excellence for PME in the CF for OPDP 3&4] and the creation of the Directorate of Curriculum Support with its Quality Assurance (QA) cell, the visibility and effectiveness of quality assurance which form an integral part of the Performance Measurement Framework have been significantly improved within the College. Moreover, a formal QA

⁸² Canada, National Defence, *2003-2004 Estimates, Part III-Report on Plans and Priorities*, p. 4.

⁸³ Canada, *Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons*, Apr. 2002, Chap 6, p. 12.

⁸⁴ DCS Staff Visit-Trip Report-US Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA 4-8 Feb 04.

Campaign Plan has been developed which includes the critical elements of evaluation and validation (the latter is rarely found in public institutes of higher learning).

At many universities, program review [evaluation] is primarily aimed at program improvement. Other purposes include better decision-making, planning and accountability.⁸⁵ Evaluation within the context of the CFC is considered a “process with an internal focus to the College” that ensures the effectiveness and efficiency of its programs.⁸⁶ Evaluation of programs is determined from a variety of sources such as written critiques (Recordex), student performances and verbal or written feedback.

Validation, on the other hand, has an external focus and is essentially the process of accumulating evidence that a programme accomplishes what it says it will. It verifies that the educational system within the College has adequately prepared and continues to prepare graduates to perform the operational and strategic tasks and to meet specified performance requirements. The Director of Academics at CFC best explains validation as a “cradle to grave” concept whereby students are tracked from the time they arrive at CFC to as long as possible after they have left the College to confirm the “excellence” of CFC programmes.⁸⁷

Validation data or feedback 2997eer6(ain)Tj-0.00011 Tc -0.0211 Tw 12 0 0 123125.8001 252.95999

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overall OPI for the Validation process. It is noteworthy that a validation of the Advanced Military Studies Course (AMSC) was conducted in 2003, “in part to test a generic validation methodology for education.”⁸⁹ The results from this validation are being used to improve the curriculum of subsequent courses.

Notwithstanding these excellent quality assurance initiatives, what is lacking in our PM framework is the identification of specific indicators to measure the desired outcomes. Using the “balanced scorecard” as the tool to ensure that management is focused on optimal performance and reporting against the strategic framework, the CFC will be able to define a set of clear results which are logically and organizationally integrated to receive appropriate management attention.

While no formal pan-CFC strategic plan exists for the College, the strategic framework formulated in Nov 2002 for the newly created Directorate of Curriculum Support (DCS) Division serves as an excellent template in developing the ultimate outcome/results for the College. It should also be noted that the DCS Strategic Plan has been fully endorsed by the Commandant as the ‘way ahead’ for the DCS organization. Accordingly, this plan could be easily modified to include the strategy and objective of the other Directorates, thus providing a formalized pan-CFC Strategic Document, which is a critical step in developing a Performance Measurement framework.⁹⁰

Management Structure/Canadian Forces College (CFC)

At the CFC, six Directors report to the Commandant: the Director of Curriculum Support, the Director Professional Development 3, the Director Professional Development 4, the Director of

⁸⁹ *CDA Validation Activities*, CANFORGEN 016/04 ADMHRMIL 002 062023ZFeb2004. [http://barker.cfc.dnd.ca/Admin/Canforngen/2004/cdg04016_e.html]

⁹⁰ Canadian Forces College, Directorate of Curriculum Support. *A Strategy for the Future.* 2002

Academics, the Director of Joint Reserve Command and Staff Course, and the Chief of Staff. An outline of the responsibilities of key positions follows:

- a. **Chief of Staff (COS)**. COS is responsible to the Commandant for the administration and day-to-day running of the College.
- b. **Director of Curriculum Support (DCS)**. The DCS is responsible to the Commandant for the delivery of courseware, evaluation/validation of curricula, curriculum coordination, exercise and simulation, and registrar services including graduate studies coordination.
- c. **Director Development Period 3 (DP 3)**. DP3 is responsible to the Commandant for the development and implementation of the Command and Staff Course (CSC) and Joint Staff Operations Course (JSCO) programmes of studies and for the development of the curriculum for the JRCSC.
- d. **Director Development Period 4 (DDP4)**. DDP 4 is responsible to the Commandant for the development and implementation of the Advanced Military Studies Course (AMSC), the National Security Studies Course (NSSC), the General and Flag Officers Course (GOFO), and the National Security Studies Seminar (NSSS).
- e. **Director Joint Reserve Command and Staff Course (DJRCSC)**. The Director DJRCSC is responsible to the Commandant for the implementation and delivery of the Joint Reserve Command and Staff Course for Senior CF and allied Reserve Officers.
- f. **Director of Academics (DACAD)**. The Director of Academics is responsible to the Commandant for the provision of efficient and effective academic services,

responsive to the academic needs of the CFC while respecting the professional needs of the College's academic staff.⁹¹

For both responsibility and accountability purposes, the CFC must pursue its PM framework through the six business activities relating to the functions within each of the Directorates. Directors are expected to work together in a complementary and often horizontal way to ensure that PM is fully integrated to deliver on the College mission "*to develop the leadership, command, war-fighting, defence management, and staff skills and knowledge of its students through professional military education in an environment that encourages life-long continuous learning.*"⁹² An added and essential strategic component of this mission is the need to prepare officers intellectually to be able to cope with ambiguity and complexity.⁹³ Moreover, as the Commandant's Chief Administrator of the College, the COS will be responsible for overseeing the process and maintaining the various reports for presentation to the Commandant on a quarterly or as-required basis.

The Vision

The Canadian Forces College (CFC), a subordinate unit of the Canadian Defence Academy, is the national center of excellence for War, Peace and Security for development periods 3 and 4 windows of the Officer Professional Development Programme and for selected senior bureaucrats from across Canada. The Commandant's vision includes:⁹⁴

⁹¹ Canada, National Defence, *Canadian Forces College Handbook*, CFC 215, 2003/04 Edition

⁹² *Ibid.* p. 2


⁹³ BGen Ken C. Hague, *Strategic Thinking, General/Flag Officers: The Role of Education*, p. 517,

⁹⁴ Commandant's Vision has been extracted from various Briefings provided to visitors to the College.

- < Model of excellence for education/professional development in “jointness” and imparting the right knowledge and skills to prepare senior officers for command and staff responsibilities across the spectrum of conflict and battle space in which they will operate.
- < Being proactive rather than reactive in staying abreast of the latest changes in the educational methodologies/delivery.
- < Better education and greater accessibility to the wider security community.
- < Being better able to strategically anticipate and plan for the future – this requires a good understanding of changes in professional development and a strong partnership with our similar professional institutions such as other NATO war-colleges, the latter which would satisfy our benchmarking purposes.
- < Having the resources for effective service/program delivery and processes.
- < A robust and credible quality assurance program.
- < A dynamic ‘employer of choice’ for our military and civilian personnel.
- < More relevance through the provision of more flexible delivery methods.
- < Greater credibility if and when measured against academic (university) measure units (for both curriculum design and delivery).

Strategic Framework

For the CFC, the framework establishes a single high-level strategic goal (ultimate outcome) for the College, “Excellence in PME of DP3/4”, and four strategic priorities: effective internal processes; promotion and delivery of learning; value for resources; and a dynamic and progressive workplace. By concentrating our efforts in these four areas, the strategic goal of “Excellence in PME of DP3/4” would be assured and perhaps enhanced. This can best be illustrated in the following figure.



The Balanced Scorecard

A performance management regime using the “balanced scorecard” as a tool ensures that management is focused on optimal performance and reporting against the strategic framework.

The balanced scorecard created by Kaplan and Norton is designed to be comprehensive, includes a number of generic measures, and is balanced because it has a balanced perspective, which is both qualitative and quantitative.

While many organizations look at their performance by reviewing the financial aspects, it has been determined that financial measures alone do not present a balanced view of the critical success factors of any organization, since financial measurements provide historical data. Other factors such as morale, leadership, and internal processes are equally important, particularly in a public service organization.

The balanced scorecard, being based on four key perspectives, allows organizations to define a number of key objectives, and assign an agreed set of measurement criteria to each factor. The balanced scorecard allows the organization to capture the big picture and how changes in one area affect achievement in another.⁹⁵ An organizational model, which fosters cooperation, learning, innovating, and facilitating process management, leads to continuous improvement of processes, products and services and to employee fulfillment.⁹⁶

The balanced scorecard looks at four areas- *financial*; the *customer*, who in the case of the CFC is primarily the student; *internal processes/business activities*; and *people/innovation growth assets*-that contribute to the College's mission. Developing goals in each of these four areas enables the College to assess its effectiveness and efficiency. This tool will enable the College to clearly define the desired results and to ensure that these results are logically and

⁹⁵ Ian McDonald, Mohamed Zairi, Mohd Ashari Idris, *Measuring Business Excellence, Sustaining and Transferring Excellence*. p. 7.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.* p. 9.

organizationally integrated and receive the appropriate management attention. Implementation must be undertaken in three steps:


Step 1: Development of Strategy Maps

This initial stage of Performance Management involves the review of pertinent information including delegated Defence Tasks and Strategic Objectives. The strategy map identifies high-level results or objectives, which the CF must achieve in order to obtain the outcomes. These objectives as they relate to Professional Military Education (PME) are then cascaded down through the organization and tailored to reflect the role/responsibilities of CFC.

The strategy maps integrate the objectives by showing how they relate to one another (cause-and-effect hypothesis). In this way, the strategic-level strategy maps define and integrate all the major results that the CFC is trying to achieve. Each strategy map contains a number of objectives, some of which are common to most strategy maps such as effective communications, recruiting, developing and retaining the right people; sound stewardship of resources, etc. The strategy maps for the strategic priorities identify and integrate the objectives and clarify the organizational unit responsible for their achievement. The following CFC strategic map was developed using information from the CDA Strategy Map to ensure congruence with their key objectives:⁹⁷

⁹⁷ *CDA Strategy Map*, dated 17 Jun 03.

CFC Strategy Map, Version 1, Mar 04.




Step 2: Scorecards/Objectives Matrices

The next step is to define measures and indicators that reflect the most critical elements of performance, drawing upon Strategy 2020 Strategic Objectives, CDA Strategy Map, change initiatives and institutional measures from an academic/professional development perspective. The balanced scorecard is the recommended tool for the CFC since it will put substance to the Strategic Framework and enable the CFC to measure progress and report against the strategic agenda. Furthermore, since it is the preferred model of National Defence Headquarters, this will facilitate the linkage and reporting of results when PM is fully implemented throughout the

Canadian Forces. As well, the balanced scorecard will provide a clear statement of the outcomes/results that the CF aims to achieve, and will identify who is accountable for achieving the results. While modeled on the traditional balanced scorecard developed by Kaplan and Norton⁹⁸, as illustrated in the following model, it is recommended that the CFC adapt it to better meet its particular learning/educational needs and how it fits into the overall corporate model:

The Balanced Scorecard of Kaplan and Norton



The scorecard contains for each objective: a target area, strategic objective, measures, critical success factors, key performance indicators and the individual responsible for the objective or initiative. Once individual measures and indicators are identified, they are tested to

⁹⁸ Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton, *The Balanced Scorecard*, p. 11.

determine their usefulness and practicality. Assumptions derived from the analysis are verified. Once data are collected, they are used to conduct basic trend and causal analysis. All measurements will be results-oriented in accordance with TB directives in “Managing for Results.” It will focus on economy, efficiency and effectiveness. Wherever possible, performance data collection, analysis and display activities will be automated and integrated.⁹⁹

In the development of these scorecards, the focus must remain on ensuring that the right objectives have been defined and that critical initiatives are aligned with the objectives. The intent is to identify critical measures and targets for each objective in the scorecard. The role of performance measures is to help managers to assess the extent to which initiatives are effective in achieving the objectives and to provide a structured way to “performance measurement.” The four key perspectives of performance in the balance scorecard could be applied to CFC as follows:

Financial Controls

One of the primary purposes of a government Performance Measurement system is to ensure that we are getting the best value for our money. In pursuit of this objective, Directors need financial controls. By carefully analysing quarterly financial reports against planned expenditures as part of the Budgeting process, the Commandant through his COS will be able to identify areas of excessive expenditures against proposed spending. Of course, when the budget is formulated, it should become the planning tool for directed activities. It establishes what activities are important and which ones can be used for “planning and controlling.”¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹ Canada, National Defence, *Defence Planning & Management*, http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/dp_perf-man_e.asp.

¹⁰⁰ *Controlling for Organizational Performance*. p. 470.

Budgets also provide managers with quantitative standards against which to measure and compare resource consumption. If the deviations between standard and actual consumption become significant, it could indicate a problem requiring corrective action. Managers, however, must use caution in analyzing budgetary information since a budget surplus or deficiency does not necessarily mean there is a problem. For example, a “budget surplus might indicate that services were provided in an efficient manner, that the quality of services was decreased, or that resources were simply over-budgeted. Similarly, a deficit might suggest poor financial management, inefficient operating practices, weak budgetary practices, inadequate allocation of funds for the mission, or the need to offer an unexpected level of services.”¹⁰¹ The onus is on the management team to determine if a problem exists and what measures are needed to rectify the situation.

Financial

Target Area	Strategic Objective	Critical Success Factors	Key Performance Indicators	OPI
(F) Financial	(F1) Adequate financial resources to satisfy annual program requirements.	Funding shortfalls do not negatively impact on program delivery.	(F-1a) Fluctuations between budget and expenditures identified early enough to correct.	All Directors
	(F2) Adequate funding to meet recapitalization needs.	Long-Term Capital Programme needs are funded IAW the LTCP.	(F-2a) Slippage in programmes.	COS

¹⁰¹ Robert Parry, Sharp, Florence, Wallace, Wanda A, Vreeland, Jannet, Accounting Horizons. The role of service efforts and accomplishments reporting in a total quality management: Implications for accountants. P .3. [<http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index>].

Target Area	Strategic Objective	Critical Success Factors	Key Performance Indicators	OPI
(F) Financial	(F3) Optimize resource utilization.	Achieve the best strategic balance investment in personnel, equipment and facilities.	(F-3a) Remain within budget, while meeting all commitments and resource requirements.	All Directors

Customer

Providing value to the customer/student is the *raison d'etre* of the college's existence

and written assignments. Finally, while a great deal of this information can be garnered from Recordex’s, student surveys and end-course critiques for determining whether the needs of the student/customer are being met, it is important that the senior executives at CFC, with the input of their staff, have a say on the final selected PM Indicators for this area. The “Bottoms-up” approach in developing CSFs and KPIs is the most successful way to achieve “buy-in” at all levels.

Customer

Target Area	Strategic Objectives	Critical Success Factors	Key Performance Indicators	OPI
(C) Customer	(C1) Impart the right knowledge and skills in order to prepare senior officers for command and staff responsibilities across the spectrum of conflict and across the battle space in which they will operate.	Provide students the resources, environment, time and guidance for critical reflection as they prepare for their future in both operational and strategic arenas.	(C1a) Percentage of student satisfaction with instructional quality as measured in the Recordex, surveys, and After Action Reports.	DP3 DP4 DAcad DJCRSC
	(C2) Provide high quality, relevant curricula consistent with CFC’s Mission.	Continually refine the skill development process necessary for their success and to sustain our senior leadership development programme so that our leaders are experts in the strategic application of force.	(C2a) Percentage of student/instructor/supervisor satisfaction with the Curriculum based on the Recordex and post-course Validations.	DP3 DP4 DAcad DJCRSC

Target Area	Strategic Objective	Critical Success Factors	Key Performance Indicators	OPI
	(C3) Provide excellent instruction/high quality faculty programmess for Professional Development	Focus on recruiting and retaining a highly qualified and fully credentialed civilian and military faculty.	(C3a) Percentage of faculty positions meeting criteria for Instructing. For example, PhDs for Academic Staff, and Master's for military staff.	

Internal Processes/Business Activities

Having completed the CFC Strategic Plan and as part of the Strategy Mapping exercise, it is important to map out all the key activities and processes which have a major and direct impact on the outcome, i.e. to impart the right skills in order to prepare senior officers for command and staff responsibilities across the spectrum of conflict and across the battle space in which they will operate.

Processes

Target Area	Strategic Objective	Critical Success Factors	Key Performance Indicators	OPI
(IP) Internal Processes	(IP1) Have in place highly effective and efficient Business Models/Processes	Improve business processes throughout CFC by identifying efficiency improvement opportunities and minimizing redundant processes in the cost of operating the College.	(IP1a) Adequate processes are in place to facilitate/streamline programme delivery.	COS DCS

Target Area	Strategic Objective	Critical Success Factors	Key Performance Indicators	OPI
(IP) Internal Processes	(IP2) Leverage Technologies into Key Processes	Achieve an overarching methodology to link and synchronize CFC life cycle processes to enhance decision-making, education and professional development.	(IP2a) Percentage of students/staff with IT resources as provided by the College. (IP2b) Percentage of trouble calls on IT equipment and time to effect repairs as determined by tracking and reporting of problems.	COS COS
	(IP3) Text Production/Distribution of Curriculum packages.	Timely turnaround of course planner packages, etc.	(IP3a) Level of satisfaction with quality & timeliness of curriculum material produced as determined by surveys.	DCS

People/Innovation/Growth Assets

Asset management refers to the process of acquiring, managing, renewing or disposing of assets.¹⁰⁴ Tracking decision-making in these areas should lead to higher levels of performance. Since achieving high organizational performance is important, the management of assets as a key performance measure is important to the PM framework. Capital acquisitions, and life cycle management costs, must be carefully monitored to ensure that replacement equipment is identified and suitably replaced in a timely fashion, i.e. infrastructure, information systems, etc. Similarly, the ability to measure HR successes is critical to mission accomplishment. Employees

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid* p. 465.

who are treated with fairness and equity and accept ‘balanced decision-making’ between employees and management as a *modus operandi* are likely to be on the high commitment end of the continuum of high performance organizations.¹⁰⁵

The development of an effective HR system and monitoring of internal processes as they relate to HR must specify who does what, process delivery (how) and effectiveness (output). Moreover, it must be emphasized that the most sophisticated HR practices in the world will not be very effective if the organizational culture does not support employee performance of business objectives.¹⁰⁶ It has been unequivocally proven over and over again that treating employees well and having HR policies that align the individual interests and performance with those of the organization are likely to pay off in greater productivity.¹⁰⁷

A key contributor to this performance measure is the training and development of personnel to properly integrate them into the College. Enhancing their current skills will enable them to maintain a competitive edge in the realm of higher education. In this vein, it is of prime importance that funding be identified and specifically reserved and utilized for training and development of HR resources.

¹⁰⁵ Ellen Kossek and Richard Block, *Managing Human Resources in the 21st Century*, p. 1.24.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid*, p. 2.27.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid*, p. 2.28.

People/Human Resources

Target Area	Strategic Objective	Critical Success Factors	Key Performance Indicators	OPI
(HR) Human Resources	(HR1) Enhance Well-being	Provide an acceptable infrastructure, high quality services, and safe environment to live, work, study, and visit to enhance a sense of community.	(HR1a) Percentage based on feedback in Recordex, course critiques, and the written comments on visitors.	COS
	(HR2) Improve Training and Professional Development	Provide opportunities for staff members to enhance their personal overall “well-being.”	(HR2a) Percentage of staff members resourced for professional development identified in the College development plan/Business Plan.	All
(HR) Human Resources	(HR3) Staff/Employee satisfaction with conditions of work.	Provide a positive command climate for the workforce.	(HR3a) Percentage of grievances based on total college population. Level of absenteeism.	COS
			(HR3b) Percentage leave usage against leave entitlements.	COS

Note: The above CSFs and KPIs are provided solely as a means of demonstrating the value of a PM framework for CFC. Accordingly, it is recognized that more work and refinement of these selected CSFs and KPIs may be required to reflect the CFC’s true requirements.

Step 3: The Dashboard (Performance Monitoring and Reporting)

The dashboard or as it is sometimes called, the traffic signal approach, enables the reporting of progress against the objectives and their corresponding initiatives, measures and

targets identified in the scorecard in a simple and easy-to-read format. Progress on the various initiatives would be reported every 90 days. In performance reporting, the “owner” of an initiative must answer three questions:

- < Status of identified initiative, e.g. complete, in progress, pending;
- < Is it within budget?
- < Were desired results achieved?

Each ‘dashboard’ is coloured green, yellow or red which gives an immediate reading to the Commandant of whether things are on track and if not, why not. Completed items would be reflected in green, ongoing items in yellow, and items which have missed their objectives/ specific target date would be reported in red. Comments/explanatory notes could be entered to provide additional information as required.

Perspective	Performance Code	Objective	Measures	OPI	Actual
Financial	F1	Adequate financial resources to satisfy current program requirements.	F1a - Fluctuations between budget and expenditures identified early enough to correct	All Directors	
	F2	Adequate funding to meet recapitalization needs	F2a - Slippage in programs	COS	
	F3	Optimize resource utilization	F3a - Remain within budget, while meeting all commitment, resource requirements.	All Directors	
Customer	C1	Impart the right knowledge and skills in order to prepare senior officers for command and staff responsibilities across the spectrum of conflict and across the battle space in which they will operate	C1a - Percentage of student satisfaction with instructional quality as measured in the RECORDEX, surveys, After Action Reports	DP3, DP4D, Acad, DJCRSC	
	C2	Provide high quality, relevant, curriculum consistent with CFCs Mission	C2a - Percentage of student/instructor/ supervisor satisfaction with the Curriculum based on the RECORDEX and post-course Validations	DP3, DP4D, Acad, DJCRSC	
	C3	Provide excellent instruction/high quality faculty programs for Professional Development	C3a - Percentage of faculty positions meeting criteria for Instructing. For example, PhDs for Academic Staff, and Master's for military staff	DP3, DP4D, Acad, DJCRSC	

Note: The objectives and measures in this box represent only a sampling of the CSFs and KPIs identified in the four main areas of Financial, Customer, Processes and People/Innovation/Growth Assets and are provided for illustration purposes to highlight the potential value of using such a reporting mechanism to facilitate the reporting of results and potential problems.

While the foregoing proposal in no way purports to be the ideal performance measurement model for the CFC, it does, however, provide the basis for further thought, intellectual debate, and further developments which in the end should serve the college well. The adoption of a proper Performance Measurement Framework at CFC will help to maximize management effectiveness and enable the College to withstand public scrutiny of its programmes and activities.

Conclusion

Part I briefly looked at transformation and what it means to the Canadian Forces. It examined what constitutes performance measurement and how performance measurement is critical to the success of transformation. It argued that meaningful transformation requires a robust, user-friendly system which clearly enunciates what needs to be measured, how it is to be measured, and when it is to be measured. Part I arrived at the conclusion that the issue of transformational change represents one of the greatest challenges to an organization, particularly one as complex as CF/DND and therefore, requires a system to qualify and quantify the results of transformation. It is also argued that transformation requires strong leadership, a significant change in culture, and an effective and simplified Performance Measurement Framework, which respects modern comptrollership, and best business practices such as benchmarking if transformation is to be successful.

Part II of the paper looked at the challenges of implementing a Performance Measurement system in an academic setting as part of the Transformation. Using the CFC as an illustrative case study, a Performance Measurement Framework model is created based on Kaplan and Norton's 'Balanced Scorecard.' When implemented, the Performance Measurement

system will ensure that CFC, as an institute of strategic instruction, will continue to produce, as LGen Morton states, an “aggregate of leaders who are educated, skilled and experienced experts in the profession of arms, from which selections for senior appointments can be made with confidence.”¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, transformation within the CFC will ensure that our curriculum continues to meet the strategic and national security developmental needs of our senior officer corps.

In summary, there is no doubt that the conditions in the changing world will continue to challenge the leadership of tomorrow’s Canadian Forces, thus demanding more and better education. As Sun Tzu (500 BCE) wrote in the *Art of War*, one should “...try to overcome the enemy with wisdom, not by force alone.”¹⁰⁹ The implementation of a robust and effective performance measurement system will ensure that the Canadian Forces College will continue to be an effective and relevant institute of higher learning and will continue to meet the strategic leadership requirements of our Canadian Forces senior officer corps.

¹⁰⁸ LGen Morton, *Contemporary Canadian Generalship and the Art of the Admiral: The Importance of Intellectualism in the General Officer Corps*. p. 490.

¹⁰⁹ Han-chang T’as, Sun Tzu’s *The Art of War*, New York: Sterling, 1990, p. 13.

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