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**INCREASING CANADIAN FORCES INFLUENCE**

**IN DEFENCE POLICY DECISION-MAKING**

*“ We must make sure that the measures adopted for the organization of our defences are in harmony with our national requirements and our means ”.*

*Colonel Pope in 1937.<sup>1</sup>*

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<sup>1</sup> “Memorandum on a Canadian Organization for the Higher Direction of National Defence”. 28 December 1937. File 112.1009 (D21).

## ABSTRACT

Canada is an efficient nation. It is ranked as one of the best nations to live in by the United Nations. Policies are normally rooted in basic socio-economic realities such as geography, demography, level of industrialization, rate of urbanization, relative affluence and level of education. Defence policy has always been a dilemma for Canadian politicians. They want to provide just enough defence to gain international influence whilst at the same time minimizing the impact of defence expenditures on domestic policy priorities.

There are four major stakeholders that decide what defence policy Canadians will have; the political executive, the central bureaucratic agencies, senior Department of National Defence (DND) appointments and Canadian Forces (CF) strategic planners. Each of these stakeholders view defence policy through different perspectives that results in conflicts and consequences. Four areas of conflict are examined in the paper. These are: the short-term defence policy view of political executive versus the long-term view of the Canadian Forces; the governmental view of efficient defence policy versus the Canadian Forces view; the internal friction between DND and CF senior appointments; and the narrow defence policy focus of Canadian Forces versus the much broader view of defence policy by other stakeholders.

Canadian Forces understanding of policy decision-making should be broadened through more intergovernmental secondments and education in external institutions to promote debate and dialogue with society. The Canadian Forces should take the lead for developing defence policy options within an open process that includes the public. In addition, defence policy and planning should identify specific military capabilities needed to maintain and improve defence over the long-term. Lastly, leaders that promote defence “thinking” should be rewarded ahead of their peers who only manage process.

## **Purpose**

This paper hypothesizes that the Canadian Forces must increase its influence throughout governmental decision-making processes; otherwise defence policy will not provide Canadians with the defence they need.

The paper examines the defence policy perspectives of four specific stakeholders; the political executive, central bureaucratic agencies, Department of National Defence senior appointments and Canadian Forces strategic planners. The formal authority and responsibilities of each stakeholder is reviewed as well as their ability to influence defence policy decision-making and their attitudes towards defence. Areas of conflict between these stakeholders and the consequences of these conflicts are then developed from a Canadian Forces point of view. The paper concludes with recommendations for increasing the influence of the Canadian Forces within the defence policy decision-making process. Recommendations made are:

- The creation of an open and transparent defence policy development framework managed by the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) that allows all stakeholders including the public to establish the overall context for defence policy.
- Defence policy options and strategies should contain specific core military capabilities that are to be maintained, enhanced over time and new capabilities to be procured so that all stakeholders understand exactly what capabilities exist and will exist.
- Canadian Forces personnel with executive potential should be seconded to Privy Council Office (PCO), Treasury Board (TB) and Department of Finance to better understand how government works.
- Canadian Forces leaders who actively promote broad defence “thinking” internally and externally to the Canadian Forces should be rewarded ahead of those who only manage process.

- Senior leader education must blend the strengths of Canadian Forces, Public Service and other public/private institutions to ensure that these leaders can critically debate defence and broader policy issues with a cross section of Canadian society.

## **Background**

Joseph Heath argues that efficiency has replaced religion as the primary source of value in our culture. Efficiency creates win-win scenarios allowing Canadians to achieve social order in the context of a pluralistic society. Canada has been ranked as the top country in the world to live in for a number of years by the United Nations. Canada has its flaws, but these flaws are for the most part there for a reason. The easy problems have been eliminated but there are those that are a lot harder to fix. These difficult issues cannot be addressed without making trade-offs among the various values that Canadians cherish.<sup>2</sup>

Economic markets strive for efficiency. Markets create opportunities for win-win scenarios. These markets are based on the rules, norms, and conventions (from property rights to contract laws) that allow society to coordinate their expectations and behaviours. Good government must provide the economic institutions and policies that under-girds markets. They do so by providing: skilled public services; public education; subsidised transportation; communication and energy infrastructures; and relatively balanced distribution of wealth. Differences in government competence and capability- and, consequently, in the kinds of institutions and policies that prevail- help explain why some societies are rich and others poor.<sup>3</sup>

Policy normally considers ends, ways and means. Ends define how much government involvement there is in our lives. Ways defines the form of involvement, be they governmental incentives or regulations. Lastly, means define the resources to implement and sustain the policy.

At the root of most policy are certain basic socio-economic realities. The geography, demography, level of industrialization, rate of urbanization, relative affluence and level of education are just some of the

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<sup>2</sup> Heath, Joseph. The Efficient Society. Toronto: Penguin Books, 2001. 300.

<sup>3</sup> Homer-Dixon, Thomas. The Ingenuity Gap. Toronto: Random House, 2001. 244.

environmental factors that shape the type of policy that governments can make. There is always competition among various groups (with either pluralistic or elitist views) to have their policy wishes accepted by government. Social attitudes and beliefs also define the issues and range of policy alternatives open to the government.<sup>4</sup> The domestic policy issues for the federal government throughout the 1990s have been: national unity, North American economy and security, multiculturalism, urbanization, demographics, regionalism and federal-provincial-municipal relationships. Today the high profile domestic policy agendas are health, education, aboriginal, environment and public security. Institutional constraints and procedural rules also influence policy because they translate policy decisions into action. A key point to understand is that the rationality of any policy decision is always political.

A government has to decide if it wants to make a policy decision once an issue arises in society. By not making a decision the government leaves the issue in the hands of the economic markets to solve. The government could decide to apply “lip service” to an issue by employing minimal resources or it could opt to make a substantive decision using incentives (subsidies, grants, transfer payments) or directives (regulations, taxation) as implementation tools. Bureaucrats dominate policy implementation because they control resources.

The federal government is responsible for the defence of the nation. Since the early 1960’s the government has produced four Defence White Papers in 1964, 1971, 1987 and 1994. In Canada, there is currently no National Security Council and no Cabinet Committee on Defence. The Minister is responsible to Cabinet and the Prime Minister for defence. Since the end of the Cold War, changing economic circumstances and social priorities have resulted in a lower priority for defence policy. The dilemma for Canadian politicians is to provide just enough defence to gain international power and

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<sup>4</sup> Inwood, G. Understanding Canadian Public Administration: An Introduction to Theory and Practice. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1999. 202-204.

influence whilst at the same time minimizing the impact of defence expenditures on key domestic agendas.<sup>5</sup>

### **The Political Executive**

The Prime Minister is the central figure in Canadian politics. He is an elected member of Parliament and the leader of the national party which has won an election. He has the right to govern based on a popular mandate. The Prime Minister: controls the organization of government; chairs the cabinet; determines the timing of the next election; and controls appointments to cabinet, key bureaucratic posts such as deputy ministers as well as the Chief of Defence Staff. The Prime Minister and his cabinet formulate policy and direct the administrative operations as long as they have the mandate of the House of Commons.

Cabinet ministers are individually accountable to Parliament. They have the responsibility to explain to the House of Commons all issues of their jurisdiction. They are not, however, the administrative heads of their departments. This function belongs to a Deputy Minister. Cabinet ministers shape the overall policy of government, defend that policy in public forums, and interpret government policy for their deputies and other officials of their departments. They must also carry the public's message back to the government and in particular to their department.<sup>6</sup>

Collective responsibility, which defines Canadian cabinet government, demands consensus and is critical for policy decisions. The Prime Minister must work out a consensus in cabinet to make policy. Once a decision is made all cabinet members are expected to enthusiastically support the policy regardless of their personal opinion. The Prime Minister has to constantly remind ministers; "Don't worry about your department- it may not be yours for long. Worry about what is best for the whole government."<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Bland, Douglas. "Everything Military Officers Need To Know About Defence Policy-Making In Canada". Advance or Retreat? Canadian Defence in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. The Canadian Strategic Forecast 2000, The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies: 2000.17-21.

<sup>6</sup> Blakeney, Allan. Political Management in Canada: Conversation on Statecraft. Toronto: University of Toronto, 1998. 5-6.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid. 59.

Key attitudes displayed by politicians include the need to be in charge. They firmly believe that they are the decisions makers of the people. The bureaucracy may develop a course of action from a technical point of view that is sound but not acceptable to the public. Politicians who feel that a large percentage of the public would reject a course of action after solid and reasonable efforts to explain it will normally not accept such bureaucratic advice. Politicians, therefore, focus their time on the electorate and not the bureaucracy. They demand flexibility from the bureaucracy to allow them to react to changing public demands and unexpected opportunities that will allow them to increase their chances of re-election. At the same time, however, politicians deal with uncertainty by refusing to make a decision until a decision is necessary. In addition, commitment is something that one might have to do some day; it is not something that one commits resources to in advance.<sup>8</sup>

If there is a particular policy that is extremely critical to the success of a government then the political executive may directly control the implementation of the policy. The political executive often organizes special project teams, task forces or committees to carry out these implementations. An example of this implementation control was for the December 1994 Mexico currency crisis. The huge national deficit and the lack of international confidence in the Canadian dollar and fiscal management abilities caused the government to conduct a major program review. The Prime Minister set up a Co-ordinating Group of Ministers that met at least weekly. This was not a formal Cabinet subcommittee but cabinet was briefed on the outcomes of the group's deliberations. In addition, a Steering Committee of Deputy Ministers, chaired by the Clerk of Privy Council, contributed to building a sense of the importance for this exercise. These committees brought government spending into line. Most domestic social programs suffered some

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<sup>8</sup> Bland, Douglas. "Everything Military Officers Need To Know About Defence Policy-Making In Canada". Advance or Retreat? Canadian Defence in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. The Canadian Strategic Forecast 2000, The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies: 2000. 25.

pain but defence and external affairs budgets were reduced by \$1.5 billion. In addition, some 45,000 public servants and Canadian Forces personnel were retired or let go.<sup>9</sup>

“The Canadian government provides extensive information about things they want Canadians to know; they hide to the greatest extent possible what they do not want Canadians to know. The Janus-like, two-faced approach to information shapes the daily work of government.”<sup>10</sup> The sensitivity of politicians to what they calculate the public will find acceptable is a critical factor that influences decision-making. As soon as a “file” gains attention in the media or the public, it becomes political and is managed by the politicians. The public inquiry set up by the government to examine military activities in Somalia is an example. Close political management of international military operations is increasing because of the public opinion dimension. This increases the temptation of politicians to micromanage military operations. It is therefore essential that military leaders improve their understanding of political logic and dynamics so that they can combat this micromanagement from politicians.<sup>11</sup>

“Pork barrelling” extends favours to whole regions or communities as an inducement for political support. This notion is an essential part of politics providing the glue that keeps parties together and the political system stable.<sup>12</sup> Since confederation, defence expenditures have been used by governments for pork barrelling. The government directed the navy’s new frigates be built in a number of different shipyards in the 1980s to provide employment to depressed regions. It also demanded production facilities for the new army radio be established in Calgary in an attempt win western votes.

Historically, Canadian defence policy has been a very low policy priority in the minds of Canadian politicians. They have consistently attempted to minimize military commitments to alliances and use saved funds for social programs. When Trudeau halved the number of Canadian Forces stationed in

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<sup>9</sup> Savoie, Donald J., Governing From The Centre: The Concentration of Power In Canadian Politics. Toronto: University of Toronto, 1999.180-181.

<sup>10</sup> Simpson, Jeffery. The Friendly Dictatorship. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2001. 53.

<sup>11</sup> Dandeker, Christopher. “The Military in Democratic Societies.” Society. September/October 2001. 22.

<sup>12</sup> Jackson, Robert. Canadian Government in Transition. 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1999. 139-140.

Europe, his European allies quickly advised him that access to economic markets was dependant on Canada maintaining quality defence assets in Europe. Few politicians believe that Canada will have to fulfill defence commitments on short notice. They see many other NATO partners with defence postures similar to Canada. Commitments will be whatever the government or parliament decides for a specific situation. “Political leaders continue to manage defence policy sporadically from crisis to crisis and issue to issue, free from the fetters of any national strategy.”<sup>13</sup>

### *Summary of the Political Executive Perspective*

The political executive approves policy by focusing on the “big picture” and achieving consensus. The complexity of policy issues demands that priorities are set. Policies that will create a positive impact on the electorate are normally given high priority. The political executive demands flexibility from the bureaucracy to allow them to react to changes in public demands. In some cases politicians implement important policy themselves because they do not trust the bureaucratic systems. Politicians are sensitive to public opinion and take action when issues become high profile. Efficient defence policy involves “just enough” resources to please allies and distributing defence expenditures to secure votes (pork-barrelling).

### **The Central Agencies**

The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) is political. It acts as a monitoring agency tracing political developments and their implementations for the Prime Minister. The PMO constantly seeks to develop policy suggestions to boost the political fortunes of the PM and his or her party. It also carries out extensive public affairs activities such as gathering survey data from pollsters, helping to prepare press releases and dealing with the media.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Bland, Douglas. “Everything Military Officers Need To Know About Defence Policy-Making In Canada”. Advance or Retreat? Canadian Defence in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Toronto 1999. 16.

<sup>14</sup> Inwood, G., Understanding Canadian Public Administration: An Introduction to Theory and Practice. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1999. 136.

The main organization supporting the cabinet and the Prime Minister is the Privy Council Office (PCO). The Clerk of the Privy Council and his staff set the cabinet agenda, take the minutes of cabinet meetings and convey decisions to the bureaucracy. PCO is responsible for the development and coordination of overall government policy. PCO possesses a research capability to analyse policy options developed by line departments. Career bureaucrats seconded from various government departments staff the PCO.<sup>15</sup>

A cabinet minister (who is president of the board) heads Treasury Board (TB). Five other ministers are on the board. The board has two broad responsibilities: to review government expenditures and personnel management. The annual budgets of all government departments are screened and approved by TB. It also monitors all requests for money from line departments, evaluates them and provides an overall budget based on the priorities and objectives expressed by cabinet. There is continuous consultation and negotiation between the TB and line departments, normally through the minister or deputy minister of each department. TB also manages public service personnel. It exerts control over salaries and job classifications.<sup>16</sup>

The Department of Finance is a regular department but is politically sensitive. It analyzes taxation policy and studies the impact of government activities on the economy. It also engages in long-range economic forecasting and suggests ways to maximize the performance of the economy. Its statutory authority is: taxation policy; economic development and government finances; fiscal policy and economic analysis; and international trade and finance.<sup>17</sup>

Individual line departments normally sponsor new policy initiatives. These departments have the experts to develop new initiatives as well as first hand experience with the public. As a result, there is very little long-term planning originating out of the central agencies. The central agencies seldom define a strategic

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<sup>15</sup> <<http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca>>

<sup>16</sup> <<http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca>>

<sup>17</sup> Jackson, Robert. Canadian Government in Transition. 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1999. 145.

direction that the politicians and line departments can consider and contribute to. The central agencies are short-term thinkers much like the politicians.

Central agencies play the role of coordinator and arbitrator for all policy issues. They iron out wrinkles through consultation to avoid conflict between line departments and their ministers. For example, the PCO coordinates foreign affairs and defence policy because the two are so interrelated. Additionally, the purchase of military equipment is complex and expensive. Since there is, a considerable impact on the government's expenditure budget TB monitors and advises on all aspects of this procurement. Large military contracts also have regional implications so provinces and communities often vie for a share of the action. PMO is always very interested in ensuring the right players get part of the action.<sup>18</sup>

Micromanagement of issues by the central agencies is now common. Rather than let line departments deal with issues that belong under their mandate the central agencies are now demanding to manage these issues because they can “potentially” impact on the governments priorities. To counter micromanagement from the central agencies, some line departments have created interdepartmental coordination and liaison units. These units seek information from other departments and the central agencies that is of interest to the line department and their senior management. They also represent the interest of their department at interdepartmental meetings called by central agencies to review a proposal. These units understand what issues are “hot” politically and are well connected across the central agencies. This connectivity and communication prevents surprises and develops a degree of trust at the working level between a department and the central agencies.<sup>19</sup>

Central agencies can use a number of different methods to resolve conflict between various stakeholders. Finance and TB control the amount of funds that will be given to a line department. They also monitor and evaluate all expenditures. TB also controls the expenditure process as well as human resource

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<sup>18</sup> Savoie, Donald J, Governing From The Centre: The Concentration of Power In Canadian Politics. Toronto: University of Toronto, 1999. 326-327.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid. 282-283.

management. PMO and PCO control the Prime Minister's schedule as well as the agendas for cabinet. The control of access and process is a key tool to force consensus before allowing an issue to "see the light of day" in front of the political executive.

Central agencies have bright analysts that review line department policy proposals. These agencies can also hire "think tanks" and consultants to develop alternative policies if they believe a particular line department is not providing a full range of options. Lastly, the senior bureaucrats across government are well connected with politicians, lobby groups, the media and each other. These informal connections can be extremely powerful especially if the formal systems become grid locked.

One of the critical functions of the central agencies is to "firefight" crises. The central agencies are large; PMO - 80/120 personnel, PCO - 662 personnel, Treasury Board Secretariat - 837 personnel and the Department of Finance - 584 personnel. In addition, the brightest public servants man these central agencies. With this horsepower, the centre can rapidly form flexible task forces or committees. The role, scope or composition of these task forces can be changed quickly; experts can come and go as required. The level and size of the task force will vary to suit the issue. The clerk of the Privy Council can organize a team of Deputy Ministers from concerned departments to deal with a major issue such as the coordination of policy options in response to international events such as the terrorist attacks in New York in September 2001. Lower level officials would deal with smaller crisis.<sup>20</sup>

#### *Summary of the Central Agencies Perspectives*

Individual line departments normally sponsor new policy initiatives based on their understanding of the public need. Central agencies coordinate and arbitrate interdepartmental policy and process. They control all the decision-making tools including access to the political executive for policy development and implementation. They micromanage governmental policy crises in order to protect the priorities set by the political executive. They crisis manage by creating flexible task forces and committees. Some individual

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid. 298.

departments create interdepartmental coordination and liaison units to assist central agencies crisis management and to minimize central agencies micromanagement.

### **The Department of National Defence**

The Minister of National Defence is charged with the management and direction of the Canadian Forces and of all matters relating to national defence as well as the advancement of civil preparedness in Canada for emergencies of all types. The Minister, being accountable to Parliament for the actions of departmental officials, expects to be kept fully informed of any decision or activities by the Canadian Forces or departmental personnel that may be of concern to Parliament or the public.<sup>21</sup>

A Deputy Minister supports the Minister. The Deputy advises the Minister on policy issues and manages the department on behalf of the Minister. The Deputy has interdepartmental networks as well as friends within the central agencies. He attends the weekly Coordinating Committee of Deputy Ministers, chaired by the clerk of Privy Council, where major policy issues of the day are reviewed and debated. These networks amongst peers are a source of advice and information for the Deputy Minister. In addition, the Deputy Minister controls most resources within the department because policy, finance, material management and infrastructure functions report directly to him/her. These departmental functions are mainly lead by public servants. The Deputy Minister decides on their future careers. If the Deputy Minister does not agree with a program proposal, he can stop it until he is convinced of its value. The current ongoing debate concerning the requirement for an organic Canadian Forces strategic lift capability is an example of the Deputy's power.<sup>22</sup>

The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) has primary responsibility for the command, control and administration of the Canadian Forces and military strategy, plans and requirements. The CDS advises the Minister on military requirements, capabilities, options and possible consequences of undertaking or failing to undertake various military activities. He or she also advises the Prime Minister and cabinet

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<sup>21</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence. "Organization and Accountability." 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed. Ottawa, 1999.

<sup>22</sup> Ward, J. "Plans Stall for New Air Force Transports" The Halifax Herald Limited. 5 April. 2002.

directly on major military developments.<sup>23</sup>

the future. Development of the strategy employed rigorous stakeholder consultation, detailed internal and external environmental scans as well as a detailed analysis of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. Strategy 2020 provides the Department of National Defence long-term vision. This strategy assumes that the fundamental underpinnings of the existing defence policy are sound but the department and the Canadian Forces must evolve to face the challenges of the future. The five-year targets for each of the strategy's major objectives contain few specifics. Five-year target examples are: the need to design a viable and affordable force structure; a modernization program with 23% of the budget in a capital program; new task tailored capabilities to deal with asymmetric threats and weapons of mass destruction; enhanced strategic airlift and sealift capability; and to undertake joint planning with Other Government Departments to achieve synergies and efficiency.<sup>26</sup> The Strategy is, however, only a departmental vision of the future. Neither the government nor the central agencies have endorsed Strategy 2020. The lack of identifiable core military capabilities within the five-year targets makes Strategy 2020 almost useless for developing future defence policy.

The 1994 Defence White Paper parallels Strategy 2020 for its lack of identification of core military capabilities. There are one and half pages of objectives where military capabilities are tasked. From these tasks the Canadian Forces has designed and developed its current force structure. The 1994 Defence White Paper appeals to the government because it can be interpreted 1000 different ways by 1000 different people. The government is not committed to specific military capabilities, timelines or budgets in this policy.

A review of the British and Australian Defence White Papers tells a different story. The British preceded their 1999 Defence White Paper with a Strategic Defence Review (SDR) in 1998. The SDR was a foreign policy-led, open and inclusive process that demonstrated the value of harnessing the knowledge, experience and ideas of many rather than a few. The SDR consultations included: an expert panel; public

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<sup>26</sup> Department of National Defence. Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020. June 1999. 9-11.

seminars; direct discussions with military and civilian personnel throughout defence; trade unions; allies; parliament; cabinet; and industry.<sup>27</sup> The resulting 1999 Defence White Paper is very specific as to the military capabilities and force structure required to implement the SDR. For example, a new joint helicopter command formed in Oct 1999 that included 10,000 personnel and 350 aircraft. This new command was operational by April 2000 as directed in the policy.<sup>28</sup>

The Australian 2000 Defence White Paper was also open and maximized inputs from the public. The white paper clearly identifies specific military capabilities and provides projected 10 year costing for: the maintenance of the present capability, improving these capabilities through capital investments to meet future requirements; and identifies additional personnel, operating and maintenance costs for the improved capabilities.<sup>29</sup> There is no doubt that the military leadership in both of these countries provided well-reasoned and realistic military advice that was included in these policies.

*Summary of the Department of National Defence Perspectives.*

The split of accountability between the CDS and the Deputy Minister creates internal departmental friction between policy and strategic long-term planning development. This disharmony is further amplified because of the two different cultures, bureaucratic and military. The lack of specific identifiable military capabilities in policy and strategy documents do not allow stakeholders to compared options and set the context for defence policy. In addition, Strategy 2020 is only a departmental document that has not been endorsed by the political executive or the central agencies. The current Canadian defence policy and strategic long-term planning are weak products when compared to those recently developed by our allies.

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<sup>27</sup> <<http://www.mod.uk/issues/sdr/process>>

<sup>28</sup> <<http://www.mod.uk/publications/whitepaper1999/chapter3.htm>>

<sup>29</sup> [www.whitepaper.defence.gov.au](http://www.whitepaper.defence.gov.au)

## **The Canadian Forces**

The missions of the Canadian Forces are: the defence of Canada and the protection of Canadian sovereignty; the bilateral defence of North American continent, in cooperation with the United States; and contributions to international security. As in the Foreign Policy White Paper, the defence White Paper reaffirms that the nation's interests are best served by helping to ensure global peace and security. It stresses the need for operationally ready multipurpose combat-capable forces and continued commitment to collective defence and cooperative security institutions such as NATO and the United Nations.<sup>30</sup>

The Canadian Forces has realised after more than 50 years of inter-service rivalry that it is essential to establish a holistic view of the Canadian Forces. An integrated decision-making approach, not based on the single service or platform-centric approaches of the past, is now in use to enhance bureaucratic and political trust in capability requirements. The Capability Based Planning process ensures that the Canadian Forces will accomplish the mission set for them by government and deliver the defence capabilities required by Canada with the resources allocated. DND/CF senior leaders requested strategic planners develop a "pro-active innovation" program that could be credibly defended as representing the best balance between achievability and risk and that could be logically explained to those outside of the department.<sup>31</sup>

The Canadian Forces has identified capital projects to correct deficiencies in its capabilities. There is a demand for almost \$11 billion over the next five years to meet the estimated capability demand. The current budget projection has programmed \$ 6.5 billion for capital capabilities. Specific issues that the Canadian Forces are concerned with today include improving its anti-terror capability; fusing its intelligence sensors and analysis; improving its global strategic lift capability; defining a meaningful role for land reserve forces; defining defence requirements for northern sovereignty; and developing better

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<sup>30</sup> Canada. "1994 Defence White Paper." Ottawa: 1994.

<sup>31</sup> Canada. National Defence Headquarters. "Strategic Capability Planning for the Canadian Forces." Ottawa, 2000. <[www.vcds.dnd.ca/subjects/key\\_documents\\_e.asp](http://www.vcds.dnd.ca/subjects/key_documents_e.asp)>

combined-joint & inter-agency interoperability and doctrine with allies and other government departments.

In addition to the shortages in capital funding, there has been a constant rise in the costs of operations and maintenance. Peacekeeping costs quadrupled between 1991-1996. New technical equipment improves military capabilities and ensures interoperability with coalition partners but these equipments costs more to operate and maintain than the older capabilities. For example, the army's new reconnaissance vehicles cost \$ 15.4 million per year to operate and maintain 275 percent more than the vehicle the army retired. The Canadian Forces has a huge infrastructure spread across Canada that it no longer needs because of downsizing. Base closures would reduce costs but closures are political. The politicians prefer the status quo. Operations and maintenance costs have now exceeded 30 percent of the DND/CF annual budget.<sup>32</sup> These escalating costs clearly dictate that the status quo is not an option.

The current modernization approach taken by Canadian Forces is to focus on the technologies that will improve tri-service military capabilities. The leadership has explored a few less costly defence options using reserve forces but most of these failed due to the lack of commitment for funds and regular force assistance. The creation of some joint military capabilities has also occurred but most capability planning continues to assume a tri-service force structure model. The politicians have been demanding that the Canadian Forces transform to a more cost efficient structure to provide them with more flexibility to deal with more high priority policy areas. In its most recent budget, the government was very careful to give the Department of National Defence additional funds for specific capabilities: anti-terror, infrastructure protection and homeland surveillance tasks. The government had little faith that the Canadian Forces would develop the correct capabilities needed because they were outside the traditional "defence" roles that a tri-service regular force would normally invests in.

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<sup>32</sup> Auditor General of Canada. "National Defence: Equipping and Modernizing the Canadian Forces". 1998 Report of the Auditor General of Canada. <[www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/9803ce.html](http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/9803ce.html)>

Canadian Forces personnel deal with diversity of people and cultures, tolerate ambiguity, take initiative and ask questions even to the point of questioning authority when on operations. They expect their senior leader to be successful external leaders who act as their spokesperson and gain the respect and influence in wider circles.<sup>33</sup> Canadian Forces leaders must be comfortable dealing with politicians, bureaucrats, allies, NGOs, the media and the public. The current education and training of Canadian Forces leaders is narrow and conducted mainly in a closed military environment. Formal education is done at the Canadian Defence Academy for most officers and all training is conducted in military schools such as Canadian Forces College or Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College. As a result, military leaders do not debate defence and broader policy issues with a cross section of Canadian society to allow them to fully appreciate the complex policy issues facing the nation.

*Summary of the Canadian Forces Perspective.*

Canadian Forces planners are now using integrated processes to develop long-term capabilities for the Canadian Forces. The current Canadian Forces structure is not sustainable due to increasing capital, operating and maintenance costs. In addition, the future Canadian Forces modernization model based on tri-service regular force capabilities does not satisfy the present political realities in Canada. Canadian Forces leaders and planners must better understand the external political, social and cultural constraints that affect defence policy.

**Conflicts and Consequences**

The perspective review clearly indicates the following four areas of conflict that exist between the Canadian Forces and the other three stakeholders:

- The political executive and central agencies take a short-term view for policy development and implementation. The lack of definition of core military capabilities in Canadian Forces strategies

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<sup>33</sup> Dandeker, Christopher. "The Military in Democratic Societies." *Society* 38, 6 (2001): 16-24.

and departmental defence policy options allows the government and public remain uncommitted in regards to the long-term.

- The political executive, central/departmental bureaucrats and the Canadian Forces see defence efficiency differently.
- The internal friction between departmental bureaucrats and military results in vague strategic plans and defence policy that are not easily implementable by the Canadian Forces or understood by Canadians.
- The Canadian Forces planners' narrow defence policy focus is at odds with the broader policy views of the political executive and central agencies.

*Conflict #1-Long-term versus short-term.*

The procurement, training and development of doctrine for new defence capabilities require time. On average major capital projects, require 15 years from conception until they are operational within the Canadian Forces. Political mandates are five-year terms and governmental budgets are annual affairs. The conflict is an issue of commitment. Politicians do not like to make long-term commitments because these commitments decrease their flexibility to react to unexpected opportunities. The consequence of this short-term thinking at the political and bureaucratic centre is periods of rust-out of military capabilities and increasing risk for Canadian Forces personnel who deploy operationally. At some point senior Canadian Forces leaders are faced with a moral dilemma; continue to put subordinates at increasing risk due to inferior military capabilities or tell the politicians that their defence policy is no longer achievable.

Our allies have been able to achieve long-term commitments from their political executive by being very specific about the core military capabilities they need today, those capabilities that will need to be enhanced in the future and by defining what new capabilities will be needed in the future. Political commitment is achieved by making defence policy reviews transparent and open to as many defence

stakeholders as possible including the public. This openness demonstrated to the political executive that long-term investment in core military capabilities is acceptable to the electorate. Our allies' political situation may change and therefore long-term commitments may also change or be cancelled. The key is that all stakeholders understand that there must be change and why.

*Conflict #2-Flexible efficiency.*

Efficiency, as implied in Strategy 2020, is improving resource stewardship. The Canadian Forces needs to carefully balance investment to maintain current operational capabilities against investment for future capabilities.<sup>34</sup> Departmental and central agencies would define efficiency in business terms. A good result for bureaucrats would be good financial management, no demands for increases in defence budgets and improving Office of the Auditor General reports. From a political perspective, efficiency means the distribution of discretionary defence funds across Canada (pork barrelling) to maximize re-election probabilities and sufficient forces deployed internationally to keep Canada at coalition tables.

The consequences to the Canadian Forces resulting from these different views of efficiency are huge. Bureaucrats, both central agencies and departmental, impose a variety of business processes and tools on the Canadian Forces that demand huge amounts of time to manage and monitor. Canadian Forces leaders must develop a "business" attitude towards these processes and tools. Senior business executives provide management tools to middle managers to give them sufficient corporate information so they can use the information for innovation and efficiencies. Senior business executives focus on motivating people, creating a culture of leadership and networking internally and externally to develop informal relationships with stakeholders.<sup>35</sup> Canadian Forces leaders should concentrate on leading change and developing the future leaders; not micromanaging business processes. Performance and compensation packages should reward those who lead versus manage.

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<sup>34</sup> Department of National Defence. Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020. June 1999. 5.

<sup>35</sup> Kotter, John. "What Leaders Really Do". Best of Harvard Business Review: Breakthrough Leadership. December 2001. 96.

“Pork barrelling” creates numerous consequences. The Canadian Forces, in a majority of cases, is told to buy Canadian even if the product offers inferior military capabilities. The procurement of the Bell Ranger helicopter from a Montreal based company is an example. The helicopter did not meet the Army’s lift requirements but the Montreal area was politically critical for the government. If the procurement is international then the Canadian Forces will undoubtedly be told to procure the equipment that offers the best industrial benefits to the regions desired by the politicians.

The Canadian Forces require practical experience in such agencies as the Privy Council Office, Department of Finance and Treasury Board Secretariat to understand the government policy decision-making process and issues such as pork barrelling. The Canadian Forces should select individuals to work in these government agencies and departments so that the Canadian Forces can use their practical experience when these individuals achieve higher rank. Like many other government departments the Canadian Forces should also create an interdepartmental coordination team whose responsibility is to promote defence issues across other government departments and to provide senior leaders with information and intelligence from other departments. This team should report directly to the CDS.

### *Conflict#3-Departmental Headquarters Restructuring.*

The strategy, structure and systems approach to managing defence is no longer adequate to ensure a relevant defence policy of Canada. This management approach offers discipline, focus and control but the size and diversity, complexity, increasing technological reliance and requirement for innovative and knowledgeable people in modern organizations demand a new approach.<sup>36</sup> Modern organizations must become learning organizations. This requirement is clearly stated in both the Public Service 2000 and Strategy 2020.

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<sup>36</sup> Bartlett, C and Ghoshal S. “Changing the Role of Top management: Beyond Strategy to Purpose”. Harvard Business Review. November-December 1994. 4.

A learning organization is not built overnight. The first step is to create time for leaders to think. Senior leadership performance and compensation packages should reward those who publish papers, lead seminars and conferences that discuss and debate defence policy and strategic issues. In addition training in brainstorming, problem solving and evaluating experiments are skills that all leaders need. Ideally this learning should take place in a multi-cultured and multi-disciplined learning environment to maximize the knowledge transfer between participants. The Public Service and some universities have executive development centres that deliver specialized short courses (1-2 weeks) to provide the necessary knowledge in these areas.

The current boundaries between strategic planning (military) and policy option development (public service) should be removed immediately. A single leader must be made accountable to the Minister for defence policy option development and long-term strategies. The CDS as the senior military advisor to the government is the logical choice. The CDS would have to ensure defence policy options catered to political, social and cultural concerns. To ensure that the CDS develops realistic policy options and strategies, he or she must institute an open and transparent framework to engage the maximum number of stakeholders, including the public.

#### *Conflict# 4-External Focus.*

The lack of an external focus by Canadian Forces as a whole allows the other stakeholders to control defence policy decision-making. The Deputy Minister has formal authority over defence policy in the department. Central agencies know defence is not a political priority so they ensure defence issues do not appear on the political radar screen. Defence only becomes a political issue if there is something positive or negative to explain to the public. The latter has been the norm throughout the 1990s.

One of the major reasons for the lack of an external focus by the Canadian Forces is because they are educated and trained within closed military schools and establishments. Learning how to engage the media and public are taught at these institutions as a necessary evil rather than a critical skill required for

future success of the Canadian Forces. The new Officer Professional Development (OPD) program that provides formal strategic and operational training for senior military leaders is attempting to overcome this “closed mentality”. However, getting public servants and other executives/academia to attend 4-6 month courses is proving difficult to arrange. Senior military leaders therefore debate defence policy amongst themselves. As mentioned above, the Public Service and universities offer education and training in a number of similar disciplines. By blending the strengths of Canadian Forces, Public Service and public/private educational institutions, senior leaders could broaden their knowledge of national policy issues and debate them with an intellectual cross-section of Canadian society.

In addition, few Canadian Forces personnel are employed within the central agencies where they can gain practical experience on how government works. There is a single military officer in PCO and a few junior positions in TB. The lack of formal and informal contact between Canadian Forces personnel and central agencies bureaucrats creates a climate of distrust between the two cultures. Trust can be developed if opportunities for more contact are established; be they conferences, seminars, secondments or through liaison teams.

## **Conclusion**

This paper demonstrates that at present the Canadian Forces has little influence in the determination of defence policy. Formal authority for defence policy rests with the political executive. The political executive and central/departmental bureaucrats control most other sources of “power” for defence policy development. These sources are: the ability to control resources assigned to defence; control over the rules and regulations that apply to policy development; the control of the defence policy decision-making process; control of knowledge and information on government-wide policy requirements; and interpersonal alliances and networks that controls the informal processes that support the formal processes. The Canadian Forces on the other hand has the technical knowledge and experience essential for the development of more robust defence policy options. The resulting defence policy is vague and

open to many interpretations by the various stakeholders. Canadians are not getting the defence policy they need!

The four key areas of conflict identified in the paper between the Canadian Forces and the other decision-making stakeholders can be mended over time. The Canadian Forces will have to initiate the “change actions” because the other stakeholders have the power and are comfortable with the status quo. Fundamental cultural change of the Canadian Forces leadership is necessary to achieve more influence within defence policy decision-making.

Firstly, there is the educational requirement. Current Canadian Forces senior leader education is too narrowly focused on military matters. The broader policy issues of the nation from a political, economic and social point of view are not studied or understood. Public opinion, media exposure and pork barrelling are essential political tools that the military must understand and leverage. In addition, military leaders have little practical experience outside of defence on how government really works both through formal processes and informal networks. Lastly, the Canadian Forces have a stated objective to become a learning organization. Evolving from a hierarchical top-down bureaucratic structure will require significant effort by senior leaders; external and internal communication being the most demanding.

The development defence policy options and strategic plans require a single focus within the department. The current defence policy and strategy products are the results of compromises between two cultures; bureaucratic and military. The CDS must take ownership of these products as the senior military advisor to the government. Open and transparent public debate is essential to achieve the right defence policy for Canada.

The following recommendations are made to assist in changing the Canadian Forces leaders culture:

- An open defence policy development framework managed by CDS must be set up so that the public can tell their politicians what type of defence they are willing to pay for. The CDS should

have a single policy and strategic planning staff that reports directly to him. In addition, this staff should be used by the CDS to conduct interdepartmental policy coordination and liaison.

- Defence policy options and strategies developed by the Canadian Forces must contain specific core military capabilities required so that the government and public understand exactly what defence they are procuring.
- Canadian Forces personnel

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