

## Archived Content

Information identified as archived on the Web is for reference, research or record-keeping purposes. It has not been altered or updated after the date of archiving. Web pages that are archived on the Web are not subject to the Government of Canada Web Standards.

As per the [Communications Policy of the Government of Canada](#), you can request alternate formats on the "[Contact Us](#)" page.

## Information archivée dans le Web

Information archivée dans le Web à des fins de consultation, de recherche ou de tenue de documents. Cette dernière n'a aucunement été modifiée ni mise à jour depuis sa date de mise en archive. Les pages archivées dans le Web ne sont pas assujetties aux normes qui s'appliquent aux sites Web du gouvernement du Canada.

Conformément à la [Politique de communication du gouvernement du Canada](#), vous pouvez demander de recevoir cette information dans tout autre format de rechange à la page « [Contactez-nous](#) ».

CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE/COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES  
ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAMME 10



RESEARCH PAPER / MÉMOIRE DE RECHERCHE

**CANADA'S STATURE AND INFLUENCE  
IN COALITIONS:  
A QUESTION OF SALIENCE, RELEVANCE AND INTEROPERABILITY**

By/Par

Commander E.F. Boettger

30 Octobre 2007 / 30 octobre 2007

*This paper was written by a student attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfillment of one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus, contains facts and opinions which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.*

*La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale.*

## ABSTRACT

The Defence volume of Canada's International Policy Statement *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World* acknowledges that the expeditionary capabilities of the Canadian Forces will be committed "when it is in Canada's interest and ability to do so" and it advances "our place in the world". Canada has always deployed military forces abroad within alliances and coalitions and will continue to do so in the future. The paper examines the strategic context and operational factors that are important in achieving stature and influence within coalition operations. The examination applies an analytical framework that examines the concepts of salience, relevance and interoperability to help identify the key capabilities Canada must provide to a coalition in order to achieve any significant profile, influence and effect at the operational level. It is argued that Canada's strategic objective to have a role of pride and influence among allies and the greater international community are in fact closely linked to Canada's role as a partner ready to invest blood and treasure to coalition operations commensurate with her wealth and capacity. Influence and effect within coalitions are achieved by degrees, rather than all or nothing, so it is possible for even relatively modest contributions to generate some influence and noteworthy stature. Special circumstances surrounding the scale of the operation or the particular nature of a contribution to coalition are obvious enablers of at least some influence. Nevertheless, contributions of small tactical unit and sub-unit "packets" will generally earn acknowledgement and even appreciation, but not significant influence among coalition leaders and partners. The logical units of "currency" for influence and effect in coalition operations in modern times are the tactical combat "packages" that can deliver significant operational effect: brigade combat teams, naval task groups and combat air wings. Through Canada's commitment and contributions to coalitions, including its current operation in Afghanistan, Canada has tried to enhance its standing as a responsible and reliable coalition partner. Since Canada has the luxury to be highly selective in her contribution to coalition operations, the degree of pride, stature and influence Canada wishes to achieve is dependent on the *salience*, *relevance* and *interoperability* of military capabilities she brings to the fight.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

|   |    |
|---|----|
| ABSTRACT.....                                       | i  |
| TABLE OF CONTENTS .....                             | ii |
| INTRODUCTION.....                                   | 1  |
| ALLIANCES AND COALITIONS.....                       | 5  |
| CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY:.....                       | 8  |
| CANADA: STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT AS AN ALLY .....       | 12 |
| SALIENCE, RELEVANCE AND INTEROPERABILITY (SRI)..... | 16 |
| APPLICATION OF SRI.....                             | 20 |
| THE CASE OF OPERATION “ATHENA” IN KANDAHAR.....     | 23 |
| CONCLUSION.....                                     | 27 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY .....                                  | 30 |

**CANADA’S STATURE AND INFLUENCE  
IN COALITIONS:  
A QUESTION OF SALIENCE, RELEVANCE AND INTEROPERABILITY**

By Commander E. F. Boettger

... Canadians have always wanted a government that plays a role in the world. But in a shrinking, changing, dangerous world, our government must play a role in the world. And I believe that Canadians want a significant role – a clear, confident and influential role. As proud citizens, they don’t want a Canada that just goes along; they want a Canada that leads. They want a Canada that doesn’t just criticize, but one that can contribute. They want a Canada that reflects their values and interests, and that punches above its weight.<sup>1</sup>

Stephen Harper,  
Prime Minister of Canada

... Vision for the Canadian Forces...an effective, integrated military force valued by allies, partners and friends that stands ready to protect Canada and Canadians and, through the conduct of its missions, gives our country the strategic impact to shape and protect Canadian interests.<sup>2</sup>

General Rick Hillier  
Chief of the Defence Staff

## **INTRODUCTION**

Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s statement in a speech to the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars signalled a slight adjustment to the previous government’s approach to international engagement. It was stated in national strategic, not military, terms, but in October 2006 its contextual backdrop was Canada’s acceptance and execution of pivotal and deadly combat operations in Afghanistan’s Kandahar province. This strategic vision is reinforced and “operationalized” in the vision for the Canadian Forces (CF) provided by General Hillier.

---

<sup>1</sup> Harper, Stephen, “Reviving Canadian Leadership in the World,” Speech to the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, Ottawa, October 5, 2006, The Office of the Prime Minister Home Page <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?category=2&id=1343>

<sup>2</sup> Gen. R. Hillier, CDS SITREP 5, Canadian Forces General Message, CANFORGEN 159/07 dated 19 October 2007, p.2

The Defence volume of Canada's International Policy Statement (IPS): *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World* acknowledges that the expeditionary capabilities of the Canadian Forces will be committed "when it is in Canada's interest and ability to do so" and it advances "our place in the world".<sup>3</sup> Canada has always deployed military forces abroad within alliances and coalitions and will continue to do so in the future. Traditionally, these deployed operations have been under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Although it is conceivable that Canada may independently and unilaterally utilize combat-capable forces in non-domestic crises, cooperative and coordinated multilateral responses with alliance and coalition partners will no doubt continue to be the norm in international crises that threaten our interests and values.

Military force is not the only capability that Canada can contribute and apply to these crises. Defence is, after all, but one of the pillars of the IPS, and any full understanding of Canada's intended approach to future engagements overseas would naturally include addressing the potential significance of all pillars of "3D plus C": Defence, Diplomacy, Development and Commerce.<sup>4</sup> Potentially, most of Canada's future engagements may be dominated by considerations and contributions that are non-military in nature, with the Canadian Forces playing a much smaller and less robust role than currently observed in Afghanistan. It would be imprudent, however, to discount too heavily the need to respond with significant military power to crises or operations that have a substantial security dimension.

---

<sup>3</sup> *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World – DEFENCE*, Canada's International Policy Statement, Department of National Defence, 2005, p. 3.

<sup>4</sup> *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World – OVERVIEW*, Canada's International Policy Statement, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2005, Forward from the Prime Minister.

It is likely that Canada will be one of a relatively few nations that will be called upon and expected to contribute combat-capable forces to the more challenging coalition responses in failed, fragile and hostile states over the coming decades. For modern coalitions, among the most precious and increasingly rare commodities are expeditionary military forces that are salient, relevant and interoperable so as to contribute significantly in the most dangerous locations and most brutal phases of coalition operations. Canada can expect to be called upon to “punch above its weight” in the military domain, as well as in other elements of national capabilities.

This paper examines the strategic context and operational factors that are important in achieving a role of stature<sup>5</sup> and influence through appropriate force contributions and employment within coalition operations. Stature and influence are linked concepts that are notoriously difficult to quantify, or even qualify, but nevertheless exist as significant motivators and objectives of international engagement in coalition operations. National stature and influence at the strategic level are often built over prolonged periods based on a tradition and history of significant international engagement. Within the context of coalition operations, however, one must be cognizant that national stature and influence is quickly discounted or elevated based on the military contribution to coalition campaign objectives.

It is argued in this paper that Canada’s strategic objective to have a role of stature and influence among allies and the greater international community are in fact closely linked to Canada’s role as a partner ready and able to invest *blood and treasure* to coalition operations commensurate with her wealth and capacity. At the operational level, it is also argued that in

---

<sup>5</sup> Notwithstanding the title of the International Policy Statement, the concept of “pride” has been replaced by a proxy concept: stature. Whereas pride is a sentiment felt by Canadians through international efforts, from the perspective of the international community and allies, stature is what is gained through pursuit of important international roles.

coalition operations with a significant military/security dimension, Canada's stature, influence and effect within the coalition will be determined by the degree to which her deployed military forces and capabilities are salient, relevant and interoperable.

The examination of operational factors that follows applies an analytical framework that examines the concepts of *salience*, *relevance* and *interoperability* (SRI) to help identify the key capabilities Canada must provide to a coalition in order to achieve any significant stature, influence and effect at the operational level.<sup>6</sup> Influence and effect within coalitions are achieved by degrees and confluence of SRI, rather than all or nothing. Special circumstances surrounding the scale of the operation or the particular nature of a contribution to coalition are obvious enablers of at least some influence. Nevertheless, contributions of small tactical units and sub-units "packets" will generally earn acknowledgement and even appreciation, but not significant influence among coalition leaders. It will be demonstrated in a later section how even relatively small contributions (such as a battalion battle group, ship(s) and aircraft squadron/flight) can yield disproportionate effect and influence as a function of enhanced SRI. Nevertheless, the logical units of "currency" for influence and effect in coalition operations in modern times are the tactical combat "packages" that can deliver significant operational effect: brigade combat teams; naval task groups; combat air wings; and joint forces of two or more units built at this level. Since Canada has the luxury to be highly selective in her contribution to coalition operations, the degree of stature and

---

<sup>6</sup> This framework is adapted from that used in Paul Mitchell, "A Transformation Agenda for the Canadian Forces: Full Spectrum Influence", *Canadian Military Journal*, Winter 2003, Vol 4, No 4, pp. 9-12 and Sean Maloney, "The Revolution in Military Affairs: Possible Implications for Canada", *International Journal*, Vol LIV, No. 3, Summer 1999, p. 458.



influence Canada wishes to achieve is dependent on the salience, relevance and interoperability of military capabilities she brings to the fight..<sup>7</sup>

Canada has obtained stature and influence on the international stage through a wide range of coalition commitments: from the extreme commitment through national mobilization in the world wars; to the moderate commitment as a NATO alliance partner within the terms of that treaty; and the more modest commitments to collective security, stability and humanitarian operations performed as part of separate coalitions under the auspices of the UN. Over the past century, Canada's stature and influence has ebbed and flowed. If not necessarily proportionate to our absolute and relative level of coalition commitment, it can be assumed that there is at least a positive correlation between commitment and stature/influence.<sup>8</sup>

## **ALLIANCES AND COALITIONS**

Since the Second World War, Canada has oriented its defence policy and military forces for operations within formal standing alliances as a member of NATO and the bilateral North American Air (now Aerospace) Defence (NORAD) agreement. During the same post-war period, Canada has also been a frequent contributor to United Nations-mandated coalitions created in the interests of collective security and international stability.

Alliances have several properties that make them distinct from coalitions. According to NATO's own definition, an alliance is "the result of a formal agreement (e.g. a treaty)

---

<sup>7</sup> The issue of what Canada commits to coalition operations, and for what strategic effect for Canada, is but one issue. The totality of issues surrounding the transformation of the Canadian Forces into a modernized and organized institution satisfying all its mandate cannot be properly addressed within the scope and size of this paper beyond acknowledging their existence.

<sup>8</sup> Demonstration of such shifts are inherently problematic. The assumption is based on the general observation that nations, like individuals, obtain "credits" and "debits" among peers based on long-term conduct of good works and short-term performance of tasks critical to the peer group. Ebb and flow of stature and influence are a function of the rate and weight of accumulation and loss of credits and debits.

between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives which further the common interest of its members.”<sup>9</sup> Alliances in general, and NATO in particular, tend to be created as a response to a specific and abiding threat. They establish expectations of the nature and level of member commitment as the basis for membership, and may, again in the case of NATO, provide for development of coordinated plans, protocols and doctrine. According to Bueno de Mesquita and Singer, alliance form between states “for the putative purpose of coordinating their behaviour in the event of certain specified contingencies of a military nature”.<sup>10</sup> Alliances forged in peacetime tend to reflect one of three general categories with progressively less demanding bonds and norms: defence pacts, non-aggression pacts, and ententes.<sup>11</sup> A peacetime alliance can take on the character of a coalition when the alliance is called upon to respond to unforeseen contingencies outside the terms of the original enacting treaty or charter.<sup>12</sup>

In Canadian military doctrine, a coalition is “an ad hoc agreement between two or more sovereign nations for a common action.”<sup>13</sup> From a broader Canadian foreign policy perspective, Douglas Bland explains that “...coalitions tend to be positive undertakings between Canada and other states in order to aggregate their political, economic and military powers to accomplish national goals that none can effectively achieve alone.”<sup>14</sup> Since coalitions tend to be very crisis or event specific, without the standing relationships and

---

<sup>9</sup> NATO, AJP-01(B), *NATO Joint Doctrine* (Bruxelles: NATO Standardization Agency, 2002), Glossary-1.

<sup>10</sup> Kegley Charles and Raymond, Gregory *When Trust Breaks Down: Alliance Norms and World Politics*, p.52

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 53-58 provides a fuller discussion of motivations, conditions and norm for alliance creation.

<sup>12</sup> Under these circumstances, well exemplified by the current NATO mission in Afghanistan, even standing alliance partners may opt out, or apply great discretion in providing forces to a nominal alliance effort. Similarly, the change in the strategic environment can fundamentally impact the underpinnings, assumptions and expectations of long-standing alliance arrangements for NATO, such as with the demise of the Soviet Union, and then again with the attacks of 11 September 2001.

<sup>13</sup> Department of National Defence, *Canadian Forces Operations*, B-GG-005-004/AF-000 Change 2, 15 August 2005, p. GL-3.

<sup>14</sup> Bland, “Canada and Military Coalitions: Where, How and with Whom?”, p. 10

commitments of alliance partners, national governments may exercise their discretion on whether to join a coalition operation. That discretion extends to setting very specific terms and commitment levels based on their own calculation of interests and values impacted, as well as their respective capacity to devote forces, blood and treasure to the campaign.

For almost all members of a coalition, even those that are moved initially by value-based response to conditions, the calculation of participation and commitment levels will, first and foremost, be interest-based and constrained by available capacity to “invest” in the venture over the short and long haul. In essence, trade offs are calculated to balance risks and liabilities against the prospects of enhanced standing among nations and contributing to positive change. For nations balancing risk, investment, leverage and influence within coalition, Christian Jonsson noted that “bargaining power accrues not necessarily to the party possessing superior resources generally, but to the party which possesses issue-specific resources”<sup>15</sup> that is brought to bear to create positive and meaningful effect on coalition objectives.

The legacy of Canada’s significant involvement in the major coalition operations of the last century, is both an image and an expectation that Canada has a significant role to play in the world. Similarly, defence policy statements, especially those of the post-Cold War era, are employed to frame the “announced” Canadian Forces capabilities for alliance and coalition expeditionary endeavours in the interest of collective security and international stability.

---

<sup>15</sup> Kegley Charles and Raymond, Gregory, Op Cit., p.55.

## **CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY: FORCES FOR ALLIANCES AND COALITIONS**

Even a cursory review of Canadian defence policy since the end of WWII reveals the enduring orientation toward seeking security and stability through coalitions and alliances. Canada's *announced* capacities for expeditionary coalition operations have generally been expressed in terms of force size, capability, and sustainability. Allies, potential adversaries, and the broader international community were advised through these statements about the range of force Canada could potentially elect to bring to any coalition operation.

Equally significant was the implicit understanding demonstrated throughout various defence policy statements that the formation level of brigades, wings and naval task groups were the significant unit of "currency". Lesser formations and small tactical units were identified for specialized and rapid reaction commitments, but the significant units remained brigades, and air wings.<sup>16</sup>

During the Cold War, Canada maintained a standing commitment of forces either actually stationed in Europe or stationed in Canada but committed to Europe's defence. In the 1964 White Paper on Defence, Canada iterated its commitment to maintain one brigade in Europe with one or two deployable brigades held in Canada. At the same time, Canada also committed to maintain an air division of eight combat squadrons in Europe.<sup>17</sup> Following a comprehensive defence review in 1969, a new posture was announced in *Defence in the 70's* to reduce Canada's standing footprint in Europe to one brigade and a wing of three fighter squadrons. A commitment was made to deploy a Canadian Air Sea Transportable

---

<sup>16</sup> Interestingly, no specific naval force commitments were articulated, beyond the understanding that Canada's Atlantic fleet would be fully engaged in any new "Battle of the Atlantic" since the ocean was actually part of Canada's strategic foreshore and indivisible from her vital national interests.

<sup>17</sup> *White Paper on Defence*, 1964, p.21

<http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/downloads/White%20Paper%20on%20Defence%20-%20March%201964.pdf>

(CAST) brigade combat group and two combat squadrons to bolster NATO's northern flank in the event of imminent hostilities.<sup>18</sup>

Towards the close of the Cold War, 1987's defence policy statement, *Challenge and Commitment* still maintained a formal commitment of two brigade groups (that would fight as one small division), supported by an air wing of five squadrons of combat aircraft for the Central Front.<sup>19</sup> Notwithstanding the announced policy, by this time the so-called "capability-commitment gap" long perceived by allies and thereby undercutting our stature and influence in NATO, was acknowledged by Canada. If there was any question about Canada's deficiencies to provide this level of military capability during this period, it was confirmed during the Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991.<sup>20</sup>

In 1992, the dust had settled sufficiently after the demise of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact that Canada formally negotiated the repatriation of its standing combat forces from Europe, but maintained a commitment to deploy a brigade group and two combat squadrons from Canada when needed.<sup>21</sup> The dominant contributions to coalition operations during this brief interlude were the sustained deployment of two separate battalion battle groups for UNPROFOR I (Croatia) and UNPROFOR II (Bosnia), as well as a battalion battle group in Somalia under UNITAF.<sup>22</sup>

---

<sup>18</sup> *Defence in The 70's*, pp.34-35 <http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/downloads/Defence%20in%20the%2070s.pdf>

<sup>19</sup> Of which one brigade and three squadrons were based in West Germany. Canada, *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada*, 1987, pp.60-64.

<sup>20</sup> Maloney, Sean, "Missed Opportunity: Operation BROADSWORD, 4 Brigade, and the Gulf War, 1990-1991", Abstract, <http://www.seanmmaloney.com/i0029.html> and Maloney, Sean, *Are We Really Just Peacekeepers? The Perception Versus the Reality of Canadian Military Involvement in the Iraq War*, p.7. Canadian had to abort deploying a brigade group from Europe (Operation Broadsword) to go along with the two CF-18 squadrons and naval task force. Canada thereby provided only marginal support to the main effort

<sup>21</sup> *Canadian Defence Policy*, 1992, p.9

<sup>22</sup> For a detailed compendium describing all CF deployments from 1990-2003, see Bland, Douglas and Maloney, Sean, *Campaigns for International Security: Canada's Defence Policy at the Turn of the Century*, pp.227-266

By 1994, Canada had effectively closed its bases in Germany and repatriated its forces such that in future, all Canadian expeditionary operations would have to deploy from Canada itself without a national European staging area. The Defence White Paper of that year, dominated as it was by the imperatives of fiscal contraction, nevertheless maintained an “announced” commitment for significant forces to support international crises:

As a matter of general principle, the Canadian Forces will remain prepared to deploy on UN operations contingency forces of up to a maritime task group, a brigade group plus an infantry battalion group, a wing of fighter aircraft, and a squadron of tactical transport aircraft. Were these forces to be deployed simultaneously, this could conceivably involve in the order of 10,000 military personnel.<sup>23</sup>

This main effort, collectively referred to as a Main Contingency Force (MCF) was not activated in its entirety prior to retirement of the concept as a result of the new thrust of transformation in 2005. Canadian participation in coalition operations during this period were focussed primary on battle groups provided for NATO-lead stabilization missions in the former Yugoslavia (IFOR, SFOR, and KFOR).<sup>24</sup> Potential candidates for significant portions of MCF capability arose in 1995 for the potential forced entry by NATO into Kosovo under KFOR,<sup>25</sup> the aborted Canadian-lead mission to Zaire in 1996,<sup>26</sup> and potentially Iraq in 2003 if Canada elected to join the “coalition of the willing”<sup>27</sup>. None of these actually came to pass, in no small part because Canada’s capabilities to actually deliver had significantly atrophied.<sup>28</sup>

---

<sup>23</sup> 1994 White Paper on Defence, Ch 6 <http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/content.asp?id={C33426DC-2B97-4942-B29A-FFF0A014427A}>. This level of contribution would require three months to deploy and be sustainable for up to six-months only. It would follow a smaller high-readiness “vanguard” force into a theatre.

<sup>24</sup> Bland and Maloney, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 233-235

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p.235

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p.247

<sup>27</sup> Maloney, Sean, *Are We Really Just Peacekeepers? The Perception Versus the Reality of Canadian Military Involvement in the Iraq War*, pp.17-26

<sup>28</sup> Chief of Review Services, *Perspectives on Vanguard/MCF Readiness and Sustainment*, p.III. [http://www.dnd.ca/crs/rpt/pvmcfrs\\_e.htm](http://www.dnd.ca/crs/rpt/pvmcfrs_e.htm). Only the Navy was deemed able to meet its high-readiness tasking while no prospect existed for the Army or Air Force to generate or sustain their required forces. Arguably the Navy effectively demonstrated this capability at the opening of Operation Apollo with a five ship task group.

The Defence pillar of Canada's IPS identifies the main combat formations Canada is prepared to generate and deploy in expeditionary operations. It represents the first time since the Korean War that Canada no longer maintains even an announced capability to generate and sustain either a brigade or air wing for expeditionary operations. In addition to a deployable Special Operations Group, a significant new concept is the deployable Standing Contingency Task Force (SCTF).<sup>29</sup> The SCTF would notionally include a naval task group of four combatants plus one or more support/amphibious ships, an imbedded light infantry battalion and some associated maritime patrol aircraft and helicopters sustainable for six months until follow-on Mission-Specific Task Forces can arrive in theatre.<sup>30</sup>

It is apparent from the preceding survey that Canada has, up until recently, recognized the implicit presumption that combat forces in alliance and coalition operations deal with significant combat formations (brigade, air wing and naval task group). Years of operation in low-intensity peacekeeping and stability operations, and the relentless fiscal pressures on the defence budget may have put at risk Canada's capability to contribute substantially to coalitions engaged in medium or high intensity combat operations and maintain some measure of stature. This trend is naturally being well monitored by our closest allies, who often lament the steady degradation of the CF to provide the quantity and quality of capabilities desired of a trusted and reliable partner. Regardless of any wishful thinking to the contrary within Canada, it remains a fact of international relations that the

---

<sup>29</sup> *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World – DEFENCE*, Canada's International Policy Statement, Department of National Defence, 2005, pp. 12-13. Of note, as of this writing, there are serious indications that the concept championed by Gen Hillier may not be developed. For some background see Pugliese, David, "Military shelves plans for expansion: Focus on mission in Afghanistan, security at Vancouver Olympics behind decision, Gen. Hillier says", *The Ottawa Citizen*, (07 March 2007) at <http://www.canada.com/components/print.aspx?id=0f5cdc2f-32c5-4522-98cd-a745a178dcb4>

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.29-31. Although not specifically characterized as such in the document, it is conceivable that aggregating both potential Mission-Specific Task Forces battle groups identified for indefinite sustainment to produce a weak (two-battalion) brigade combat team that could be augmented by a coalition partner.

“quality and size of the forces that a country can muster and deploy on global missions have a huge impact on its international standing.”<sup>31</sup>

## **CANADA: STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT AS AN ALLY**

No doubt in some foreign circles there are those who would only be satisfied if Canada made investments in military capabilities that are completely unrealistic for a country of Canada’s “strategic culture”<sup>32</sup> Canada’s closest allies, however, are no doubt well aware of the practical range of options and levels of investment in military capability Canada will expect during times of general peace.

One American analyst, Dwight Mason, has in fact tried to quantify and qualify some of the key defence and security preferences the US would like to see from Canada. For our purposes, his assessments of the core military components will suffice to see that the expectations for all capabilities are not outside the realm of the possible. In particular, the US and potentially other close allies would look for Canada to deploy and sustain anywhere in the world 2000-4000 combat troops for several rotations, 12-16 modernized CF-18s (and eventually Joint Strike Fighters) for one year, and four frigates for several rotations.<sup>33</sup>

During his appointment as US Ambassador to Canada, Paul Cellucci, was known to lament Canada’s lack of adequate investment in defence matters. In his public discourse,

---

<sup>31</sup> Nunez, “Canada’s Global Role: A Strategic Assessment of its Military Power”, p.84.

<sup>32</sup> “The habit of ideas, attitudes and norms toward strategic issues, and patterns of strategic behaviour, which are relatively stable over time.” In Bloomfield, Alan and Nossal, Kim, “Towards an Explicative Understanding of Strategic Culture: The Cases of Australia and Canada”, p.286

<sup>33</sup> The modest acceptable wish-list is described in Mason, D. “Canadian Defense Priorities: What Might the United States Like to See?”, pp.9-14



though, it was clear that the official US idea of realistic hopes for Canada's defence posture was very similar in scale and scope to Mason's.<sup>34</sup>

In fact, these and similar wishes and expectations from key allies, are consistent with a reasonable and realistic capability for the CF. In effect, it is looking to have the major components achieve the capabilities Richard Gimblett attributes to a third rank national military: a Medium Global Force Projection Military.<sup>35</sup> A Medium Global Force Projection Military is one that may not possess the full range of capabilities, but has credible capacity in certain of them and *consistently demonstrates a determination to exercise them at some distance from the homeland*, in cooperation with other Force Projection Militaries. Such a military ranks below the first and second rank militaries such as the US and UK, respectively, who can project and sustain *major* military power around the world. For a coalition leader, the fact that Canada possesses even a small force that is available to deploy for difficult missions around the world is valued.

The capability of a nation to project military power, vigorously employ it, and sustain it over time and distance is of course of great importance. Lack of that capability constitutes a burden on other coalition partners who have made the long-term and costly investment in such capabilities. As Robert Nunez noted in reference to the state Canada had allowed it capabilities to fall by 2004, "A country that cannot muster and deploy even one self-sufficient

---

<sup>34</sup> Remarks by Ambassador Paul Cellucci, Keynote Speaker at Conference of Defence Associations Seminar (CDAI) "Canada-US Security Relations and the Role of the Canadian Forces", March 3, 2005 at [http://canada.usembassy.gov/content/embconsul/cellucci\\_030305.pdf](http://canada.usembassy.gov/content/embconsul/cellucci_030305.pdf)

<sup>35</sup> Gimblett, Op. Cit.,p.10. Gimblett applies the principles of the naval typology presented in Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020. By this typology, Canada's Navy is in the third rank (Medium Global Force Projection Navy) along with Australia and the Netherlands.

brigade to global hot spots is not going to be taken very seriously, and is certainly not a middle power by military measure.”<sup>36</sup>

The long-term investment to build capabilities that are salient, relevant and interoperable is not trivial. Notwithstanding, incremental increases to operating and capital budgets for Defence in Canada in recent years, we will not expect to see our relative weakness within the core American-British-Canadian-Australian (ABCA)<sup>37</sup> countries improve markedly, especially considering the impoverished base Canada started at in the 1990’s. Table 1 gives a snapshot that shows the current situation in ABCA nations (minus recent member New Zealand) after several years of modest growth in Canada’s defence budget. Canada’s strategic culture, compared to the more robust cultures of the others is such that it would be unlikely that these budgets would allow Canada to invest as much as smaller, but more strategically vigorous, Australia. Barring a reversal in government direction and return to ever diminishing real resources for military capabilities, Canada’s should be able to make modest progress in establishing credibility and stature as a reliable strategic ally and operational coalition partner.

|                   |                | <b>Canada</b> | <b>Australia</b> | <b>United Kingdom</b> | <b>United States</b> |
|-------------------|----------------|---------------|------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| Defence Budget    | USD (billions) | 15.32         | 18.69            | 75.47                 | 629.50               |
| Defence Budget    | % GDP          | 1.19          | 2.26             | 2.76                  | 4.53                 |
| Major procurement | USD (billions) | 3.36          | 3.63             | 12.65                 | 126.30               |

Table 1 Comparative 2007 Defence Expenditures in ABCA<sup>38</sup>

<sup>36</sup> Nunez, Op. Cit., p. 90

<sup>37</sup> ABCA: originally established after WWII to foster interoperability among these armies. Ongoing effort to align doctrine, training and equipment among a special group of allies have helped cement the links between national forces.

<sup>38</sup> Derived from Jane’s Military and Security Assessment, <http://jmsa.janes.com/JDIC/JMSA/changePage.do?resultsCurrPage=2>

As a recent assessment from a British observer, Julian Lindsey Finch, makes clear, there is a lot on the line for Canada as it tries to assert a role of pride and influence in the world, especially among its closest allies. These allies will want to see if

...the stirrings in Ottawa amount to more than the empty security and defence rhetoric of the past decade. After years of effectively writing Canada off, expectations have now been raised and delivery is thus vital. Get it right and Canada will once again take the place its past sacrifice should have earned it as one of the west's leaders."<sup>39</sup>

Conversely, of course, if Canada backslides in deference to domestic politics of the moment, or simply fatigue in maintaining even modest progress in rebuilding its military capabilities, then Canada risks losing any strategic posture it had (barely) managed to retain over the past decades. Our closest ABCA allies as well as those in NATO

...will conclude that Canadians are not serious security actors and are all too happy to be carried along by their more energetic partners. That is why the defence policy review and international policy statement are more than just statements of intent. They are political affidavits against which Canada will be judged—by allies and partners as much as by its own citizens.<sup>40</sup>

Part of the rehabilitation of Canadian resolve to be a serious security actor has been going on for a number of years before the 2005 International Policy Statement. Canada has actually been making small progress at building credibility within close allies through the exemplary actions of its military once engaged in coalition operations. It started from a low-point of 1996's potential disaster in not having the capability to lead a UN operation into Zaire, at a point where the leadership role Canada sought after the tragedy of Rwanda, exposed the range of deficiencies Canada had allowed to develop through neglect including

---

<sup>39</sup> Julian Lindsey-Finch, "Reconnecting Canada to the World (via Europe)", p. 664

<sup>40</sup> Ibid. p.664

such key capabilities as strategic lift, logistics, intelligence.<sup>41</sup> Sean Maloney characterized “the long road back” to operational credibility as follows:

The failure of Canada to lead an effective multinational coalition into Zaire in 1996 damaged Canada’s reputation amongst the ABCA countries, countries who are the mainspring of the effort in Afghanistan. Canada’s commitment to lead the military effort in RC South in Afghanistan will be part of the long road back from the debacles of the early and mid-1990s. That process started with Kosovo in 1999 and has continued throughout our time in Afghanistan.<sup>42</sup>

For understanding the operational factors in the journey so far into a position and role of pride and influence of the CF, and by extension the Canadian strategic level, in coalition operations, we will look at the concepts of salience, relevancy and interoperability.

### **SALIENCE, RELEVANCE AND INTEROPERABILITY (SRI)**

The analytical framework is adopted from Dr. Paul Mitchell’s description of how to conceive of potential for influence in future coalition by a transformed Canadian military. The essence of the framework identifies that influence within a coalition can be viewed as a function of salience, relevance and interoperability.<sup>43</sup>

The Venn diagram at Figure 1 used by Mitchell illustrates the potential reinforcing and complimentary overlap of saliency, relevance and interoperability.

---

<sup>41</sup> Delvoie, Louis. "Canada and International Security Operations: The Search for Policy Rationales.", p.22

<sup>42</sup> Sean Maloney, “Why we are in Afghanistan”, Ottawa Citizen, 16 January 2006  
<http://www.seanmmaloney.com/OC16jan06.pdf>

<sup>43</sup> Although not quite as rich as an heuristic framework, Sean Maloney also presents much the same basic idea, but with two factors: salience and effectiveness. See Maloney, Sean, *Are We Really Just Peacekeepers? The Perception Versus the Reality of Canadian Military Involvement in the Iraq War*, pp.14-22.




Figure 1<sup>44</sup>

“Salience is distinguished from relevance in its concern with operational performance and effect. Thus, salient contributions are those that distinguish a formation for a particular effect they have had on operations.”<sup>45</sup> To have salience, a contribution must provide a unique or rare capability, or be usable in extraordinary ways, or be prepared to accept the type of missions that most other coalition partners cannot accept or perform.<sup>46</sup> Related to this last point is the importance of salient attributes such as robust ROE free of cumbersome national “caveats”, fighting spirit and effective combat leadership capabilities of conventional forces.

“Relevance concerns itself with operational pertinence, with the fact that Canadian contributions should have a significant and demonstrable bearing on the *requirements* of the coalition’s operations.”<sup>47</sup> Sloan suggests that “relevance is associated largely with the number of troops, but it can also be correlated with the specialization of the troops

---

<sup>44</sup>Mitchell, p.10

<sup>45</sup> Mitchell, p.10

<sup>46</sup> Maloney, Sean, *Are We Really Just Peacekeepers? The Perception Versus the Reality of Canadian Military Involvement in the Iraq War*.p.14

<sup>47</sup> Mitchell, p.11

provided.”<sup>48</sup> Relevance can thereby also be derived from several other such as cohesive forces organized for the appropriate intensity of conflict, relative combat power of a formation, and a vigorous operational tempo..

Nevertheless, Sloan reminds us that coalition leaders have their own criteria which may put numeric thresholds or other criteria in place that Canada may not be able to reach for some operations. This is the case if the US hardens its stated position to only accept an army contribution for high-intensity coalition warfare if it is of brigade size.<sup>49</sup> This may be of relatively little impact on Canada since she has already withdrawn from any conflict scenarios beyond medium intensity spectrum. It is not inconceivable that the US would extend the general rule to include mid-intensity combat operations if the US determines that operating alongside certain small allied forces constitute an elevated source of risk for US personnel or equipment.

Beyond the question of participation, of course, the objective is to have influence within the coalition. Richard Gimblett forcefully characterized the situation in stating that for military “capability” translates to some degree to stature, effect and influence, and that this capability “has both qualitative and quantitative dimensions” and that Canada will only qualify for the inner circle of the coalition if it contributes large capable units warranting “independent command” of a brigade group, air wing or naval task group.<sup>50</sup>

Gimblett, a naval historian, goes on to note, however, that notwithstanding the contribution of significant and effective maritime and air capabilities, “a nation’s contribution will always be remembered – and measured – by its contribution of fighting

---

<sup>48</sup> Mitchell, p.11

<sup>49</sup> Sloan, p.12

<sup>50</sup> Gimblett, p.8

troops on the ground.”<sup>51</sup> Certainly, in a land-centric campaign, such as the Gulf War Of 1990-1991, Canada’s moderate contribution to both maritime and air domains only, Canada was discounted as a significant contributor.

“Finally, interoperability is defined as the ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services and/or accept services from others forces to enable them to operate effectively together.”<sup>52</sup> Interoperability is among allies is being stressed by the varying stages and approaches being pursued to respond to and exploit the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). According to Elinor Sloan, the current RMA is having an impact not only in the technology, but also doctrine and organization.<sup>53</sup> For countries that must make modest and targeted investments in RMA, a key consideration is identifying where to place their efforts to get the most significant returns in terms of dramatically enhanced combat efficiencies and continued interoperability with allies vigorously investing in the RMA. This cautious approach to RMA exploitation is also warranted because the promise of the US vision for network-centric RMA may be blunted by adversaries applying their own variant of RMA based on asymmetry and socio-political networks.<sup>54</sup> For Canada, selective implementation of the affordable RMA measures to design the capabilities of a future force and thereby preserve interoperability will be critical.

In general terms, interoperability, then, seeks to overcome a number of service or national obstacles to the more effective functioning of multinational and joint forces that

---

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., p.9

<sup>52</sup> Mitchell, p.10

<sup>53</sup> Sloan, pp. 7-8

<sup>54</sup> See Christopher Schnaubelt, “Whither the RMA?”, *Parameters*, (Autumn 2007) for a reassessment on the wisdom of attempts “use information management and networked systems in lieu of increased firepower, better armor, and more manpower” to combat both massed conventional forces and dispersed insurgent and guerilla forces.

operate as seamlessly as possible. Many times the most problematic obstacles will not be related to technology or equipment. Sometimes the most intractable obstacles are doctrinal, cultural and organizational.<sup>55</sup>

## **APPLICATION OF SRI**

With the benefit of the preceding presentation of the concepts of salience, relevance and interoperability, the framework will be applied to examine a range of potential Canadian capability options. The options are indicative of capabilities that could be applied in different coalition circumstances depending on the nature and gravity of the crisis, the potential composition of the coalition and the adversaries, as well as the degree of stature and influence Canada seeks in committing forces to the effort.

In Figure 2, Mitchell in effect populates the Venn diagram with a number of cases that highlight the dynamics of the model. For Cases A, B, and C, only one of the desired attributes of a coalition contribution is present in any significant degree. A with the only one of the concept's three attributes, whereas Cases 1 through 4, on the other hand, involve operations application of two or three combinations of the three attributes of contributed forces. Of all the cases, only Case 4 "is the perfect conjunction: a 'sweet spot', permitting Canada to take advantage of maximum political influence within a coalition operation", while the remaining six cases "influence is circumscribed by an imperfect combination of forces."<sup>56</sup>

---

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid*, p.12

<sup>56</sup> Mitchell, p.11






Figure 2<sup>57</sup>

Examples of each of the cases in Figure 2 include:

**Case A: Salience only.** “Military contributions might consist of politically salient troops, but operating in non-strategic sectors and with limited interoperability, as the Syrians did” during the 1990-1991 Gulf War. In that case the salient attribute was that Syria had basically an adversarial relationship with the West, but was now setting aside differences to address a common menace who happened to be a Muslim.<sup>58</sup>

**Case B: Relevance only.** In contributing to a coalition, a third world country sends a battalion. Unfortunately, it provides no special capabilities to achieve positive effect, it is not familiar with doctrine, equipment and communications of coalition partners.

---

<sup>57</sup> Mitchell, p.12

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., p.11

**Case C: Interoperability only.** A nation contributes a corvette or frigate that is highly interoperable with other coalition vessels. As only one ship instead of a task group that can influence the littoral mission which consists primarily of ground troops ashore, the ship is not able to provide significant effect nor respond to the basic requirement for “boots on the ground”.

**Case 1: Salience and Relevance:** If in the Gulf War of 1990-1991, the Syrian forces had engaged their forces in a key combat sector, operating with minimal interface with other coalition forces with whom they were not interoperable, then both salience and relevance attributes would have been satisfied.

**Case 2: Salience and Interoperability:** 3 PPLCI Battle Group, when imbedded in the US Brigade task force at Kandahar integrated seamlessly into the organization at the third maneuver battalion. As a light infantry formation, the contingent fit the style of operation, culture and doctrine of the airborne brigade. The addition of sniper teams with greater long range capabilities and the Coyote reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities were unique and effective additions to the task force. Unfortunately, the battle group had no means of inter- or intra-theatre mobility in terms of vehicles or aviation. The Canadian force was not the balanced self-sufficient unit it should have been in order to be independently relevant.

**Case 3: Relevance and Interoperability:** A coalition package may be made up of highly capable troops that have a high degree of interoperability, but the relatively small size of the contribution will limit the ability to influence the situation. This seemed evident in the

deployment of a company of the Royal 22e Regiment to East Timor in 1999” who were imbedded as the third company in a New Zealand battalion.<sup>59</sup>

**Case 4: Salience, Relevance and Interoperability:** The UK forces in Helmand province consist of a full brigade, supported by UK and coalition aircraft, as well as in the Basra region of Iraq during the major combat operations phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Australian task force in the western Iraqi desert during the major combat operations phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

## **THE CASE OF OPERATION “ATHENA” IN KANDAHAR**

How instructive will the SRI analytical framework be in reviewing and understanding the nature of Canada’s current operations in Afghanistan, and in particular its operations in Kandahar province under OPERATION ATHENA? To accomplish its mission Canada has maintained a contribution to the coalition built around an augmented battalion battle group and a robust Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) with a total force of about 2300 persons. In Kandahar province,

...Canada is in perhaps the most **troubled region** of the country, where the challenges of establishing security and stability are more pointed than in other parts of Afghanistan. We are there because the job has to be done, **if reconstruction and a better life** for the people in the southern region are to be a reality.<sup>60</sup>

---

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., p.11

<sup>60</sup> For a more detailed summary of Canadian Forces operations in Afghanistan, see “Why are we there?”, Backgrounder: Canadian Forces Operations in Afghanistan (BG-07.009 - August 14, 2007) at [http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view\\_news\\_e.asp?id=1703](http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1703)

The Canadian battle group and Provincial Reconstruction Team for Kandahar province is arguably an example of Case 4 in that it has all SRI attributes. Although its relevance is diminished because it is not the brigade size force that would be more appropriate for the mission, and it is devoid of adequate tactical aviation (fighters, utility and attack helicopters), it is still performing the full range of combat and security missions and thereby helping keep the province from being lost to the Taliban. Salient attributes include robust ROE and effective combat leadership of conventional forces by a nation other than the US and UK in theatre that permit significant engagement of the Taliban forces. In this, Canada's commitment is a rare commodity within ISAF.

The attribute of relevance is met to a degree in two regards: where Canada has committed itself; and the nature of forces deployed to achieve its mission. In accepting the volatile province of Kandahar, Canada has committed itself to the security and development mission in arguably the most vital sector of the Afghan theatre after Kabul. Relevance includes the commitment of forces organized and equipped to perform medium-intensity, as well as low-intensity, combat operations if and when required in an operationally and strategically critical province.

Canada has not taken the initiative to augment the forces with additional infantry battalions to create a brigade combat team comparable to the UK in the neighbouring province of Helmand, reduces the relevance of its commitment. There are, of course, institutional explanations why Canada did not initially, nor subsequent to operational evaluation, commit a more relevant force with robustness adequate to establish security and deliver development.

Critical among these explanations are the extent to which Canada has not maintained a force posture and infrastructure to deploy, employ, rotate and sustain a brigade group with appropriate supporting aviation that cannot pertaining to lack of capability of personnel and material that restrain applying sufficient forces to actually succeed in a reasonable timeframe by primarily Canadian efforts. There is no public indication that the notion of surging additional Canadian capacity by such means as extending and overlapping tours to provide a more effective security footprint while accelerating the build-up of local Afghan security forces are being seriously considered. Beyond these considerations, significant increases in numbers of forces appear to be largely unsupportable politically and socially within Canada.

While the overall numbers in Kandahar have not grown appreciably, Canada has continually upgraded the composition of the mechanized forces by introducing progressively more robust armoured vehicles in the face of evolving threats posed from enemy fire, suicide bombings and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). These incremental measure have helped ensure that the forces were sufficiently armoured to patrol and prevail without reducing operations. Progressively increasing the armour of Canada's land vehicles did not directly address the issue of aviation resources. Canada did not provide any organic tactical lift or attack aircraft so that Canadian movement, re-supply and reinforcement could be executed without having to rely entirely on vulnerable and predictable road routes. The lack of this basic *relevant* set of capabilities in the Canadian inventory, and consequently our over-reliance on scarce coalition partner air support and transport was a conspicuous detractor to capacity of the Canadian contingent to operate effectively without experiencing relatively heavy casualty rates among people and equipment.

The Canadian battle group enjoys good doctrinal interoperability with coalition forces with whom they operate in the southern region. This is not surprising given the shared NATO, as well as ABCA, doctrinal foundations. The baseline level of equipment interoperability is satisfactory given the nature of Canadian operations. Canadian operations are largely semi-autonomous and self-contained. Where operational interface is most critical, that is, between Canadian ground forces and supporting coalition air support, communications interoperability is solid and complimented by doctrinal rigour and close coordination.

In summary, the preceding displayed that Canada has deployed forces and employed them in such a manner that all the attributes of SRI have been satisfied to a degree. It therefore places Canada within the Case 4 “sweet spot”. Although Canada arguably sits within the center, it is still a relative lightweight in the sense that Canada’s relevance is weakened by not supplying the numbers of troops and aviation assets necessary to fully achieve its mission. Ultimately, this can be considered a NATO problem to resolve by addition of capabilities and troops from other nations. Even in a coalition operation lead by ISAF, Canada is expected to deliver on its responsibility for effective deployment of the PRT in Kandahar. Canada’s enhanced stature and influence gained over the past two years in Kandahar is somewhat diminished because it is not able to “deliver” security and reconstruction to its assigned province in a timely. In this respect, one can characterize the situation in late 2007 as a case of a glass half full or half empty. Regardless, the conceptual framework of SRI provided an alternate and useful way of understanding Canada’s place in its most important coalition operation of the post-Cold War era.

## CONCLUSION

“Our operations are also delivering strategic effect for Canada by firmly establishing us as a reliable ally with an increased voice in international operations.”<sup>61</sup>

General R. Hillier

The Defence volume of Canada’s International Policy Statement *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World* acknowledges that the expeditionary capabilities of the Canadian Forces will be committed “when it is in Canada’s interest and ability to do so” and it advances “our place in the world”. Canada has always deployed military forces abroad within alliances and coalitions and will continue to do so in the future. The paper examined the strategic context and operational factors that are important in achieving a role of pride and influence within coalition operations. The examination applied an analytical framework that examines the concepts of salience, relevance and interoperability to help identify the key capabilities Canada must provide to a coalition in order to achieve any significant stature, influence and effect at the operational level. Using this framework, past Canadian commitments and contributions to UN, NATO and other coalition operations were put in perspective to better appreciate their operational impact using the concepts of salience, relevance and interoperability. This construct was then applied in more detail to understand in more analytical terms the nature of Canada’s current operational focus in Kandahar province. Although much room for interpretation and subjective evaluation still persists, in part because the mission is still unfolding, the analytical benefits of SRI were validated.

---

<sup>61</sup> Gen. R. Hillier, CDS SITREP 5, Canadian Forces General Message, CANFORGEN 159/07 dated 19 October 2007, p.6

In the Kandahar mission, Canada is clearly playing a crucial role on behalf of the UN-mandated, NATO-led coalition that has deployed ISAF. Although lacking important organic capabilities and capacity to enable it to achieve the ultimate mission, Canada has gone a long way in re-establishing its bona fides as a coalition partner with fighting spirit and resolve. The degree to which this can be quantified and transferred out of this context into a lasting stature and influence among its important circles of nations is obviously difficult to assess. It is hard to imagine, however, that in an international environment where combat is increasingly anathema in many advanced nations, those that are still capable of engaging in the most difficult work of coalition will be appreciated by coalition leaders and the international institutions that rely on robust coalitions of the willing. As this function in the world settles more and more on the shoulders of the nations of the American “commonwealth”, Canada has re-established itself as a nation to be counted. Even conceding that Canada did not necessarily expect the Kandahar mission to be this bloody when it accepted it, the fact that Canada remains in an area where many NATO allies fear to tread, makes it a foremost power in NATO.

There are no indications that the CF will ever return to the days where it sustained a force structure predicated on expeditionary forces of brigades, air wings and large naval task groups. There is similarly, no strong indication that the institutional inertia for retaining the principle of having general-purpose combat-capable forces will be overcome by the concept of niche forces in the foreseeable future. As much as it holds attraction on an intellectual level for a nation that will always act abroad multilaterally; for a sovereign G-8 nation, it will be difficult to embrace. The deathwatch over the CF as a general-purpose combat-capable force will persist as Canada continues to find a way to eke out an expeditionary capacity



from its military. It would appear that at the strategic level that there will be sufficient investment to slow the rate of decline, and keep on life-support potentially salient, relevant and interoperable military expeditionary capabilities. Although the absolute size and capability of Canadian expeditionary forces may be trending downward, in relative terms among non-ABCA nations in NATO, Canada's stature and influence may actually be on the rise with the US and other potential coalition leaders who value fellow combatants at their sides. With judicious exploitation of key RMA advances, even the absolute and relative combat power of ever smaller forces can be enhanced. Part of the promise of the RMA for Canada may be to help ensure that the interoperable "packets" provided for coalitions operations provide as big an effect as previously delivered by "packages". The other key element to ensure that is to deliver and sustain a combat-capable force of whatever size that is imbued with that scarcest of resource: fighting spirit for the tough missions. Ultimately, Canada's stature and influence as a reliable and effective coalition partner will depend on providing forces that are salient, relevant and interoperable.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bland, Douglas. "Canada and Military Coalitions: Where, How and with Whom?" *Policy Matters* 3.3 (2002): 1-50.
- Bland, Douglas and Maloney, Sean, *Campaigns for International Security: Canada's Defence Policy at the Turn of the Century*, McGill-Queens University Press, (2004)
- Bloomfield, Alan and Nossal, Kim, "Towards an Explicative Understanding of Strategic Culture: The Cases of Australia and Canada", *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 28, No. 2, (August 2007):286-307
- Canada. Department of National Defence. Chief Review Service, *Perspectives on Vanguard/MCF Readiness and Sustainment*. Ottawa: National Defence, (2004).
- Canada. Department of National Defence. Directorate of Strategic Analysis, *Strategic Assessment 2006-2007*. Ottawa: National Defence, (2006).
- Canada. Department of National Defence. Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, *Future Force: Concepts for Future Army Capabilities*. Kingston: DND Canada, (2003).
- Canada. Department of National Defence, *White Paper on Defence*, Ottawa: Queen's Printer (1964)
- Canada. Department of National Defence, *Defence in the 70's: White Paper on Defence*, Ottawa: Information Canada (1971)
- Canada. Department of National Defence, *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada*, Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, (1987)
- Canada. Department of National Defence, *Canadian Defence Policy*, Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, (1992)
- Canada. Department of National Defence, *1994 White Paper on Defence*, Ottawa: DND (1994)
- Canada. Department of National Defence, *Canadian Forces Operations*. Ottawa: DND Canada, (2005).
- Canada. Department of National Defence, Directorate of Maritime Strategy, *Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020*,. Ottawa: DND Canada, (2001).
- Canada. Department of National Defence, Land Operations 2021: Adaptive Dispersed Operations, The Force Employment Concept for Canada's Army of Tomorrow, Directorate of Land Concepts and Design, Kingston (2007)

- Cancian, Mark F., "Is There a Coalition in your Future," *Marine Corps Gazette* 80, no. 6 (June 1996): 28 – 30.
- Coombs, Howard. "Perspectives on Operational Thought," Chap. 2 in *Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives Context and Concepts*. Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005.
- Delvoie, Louis. "Canada and International Security Operations: The Search for Policy Rationales." *Canadian Military Journal* 1, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 13-24.
- Fergusson, James. "Getting to 2020: The Canadian Forces and Future Force Structure and Investment Considerations." *Canadian Foreign Policy* 9.3 (2002): 21-30.
- Gimblett, Richard H. "A Strategic Overview of the Canadian Security Environment." *Canadian Foreign Policy* 9.3 (2002): 7-20.
- Lindley-Finch, Julian, "Reconnecting Canada to the World (via Europe)", *International Journal*, Vol. 60, No. 3 (Summer 2005): 651-665
- Kegley Charles and Raymond, Gregory *When Trust Breaks Down: Alliance Norms and World Politics*, Columbia SC: University of South Carolina, (1990)
- Krepinevich, Andrew, *Transforming America's Alliances*, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington, DC (2000)
- Maloney, Sean, *Are We Really Just Peacekeepers? The Perception Versus the Reality of Canadian Military Involvement in the Iraq War*, Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP) Working Paper Series No. 2003-02, (2003)
- Maloney, Sean, *Helpful Fixer or Hired Gun? Why Canada goes Overseas*, Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP) Policy Options (January-February 2001)
- Maloney, Sean, "Missed Opportunity: Operation BROADSWORD, 4 Brigade, and the Gulf War, 1990-1991", *Canadian Military History* (Spring 1995)
- Mason, Dwight, "Canadian Defense Priorities: What Might the United States Like to See?" Center for Strategic and International Studies, *Policy Papers on the Americas*, Vol. XV, Study 1 (March 2004)
- McDonough, David, "The Paradox of Afghanistan: Stability operations and the renewal of Canada's international security policy?", *International Journal*, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Vol 62, Iss 3 (Summer 2007): 620-641
- Morton, Desmond. *A Military History of Canada: From Champlain to the Gulf War*, 3rd ed., Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, (1992).

Middlemiss, Danford and Stairs, Dennis, *The Canadian Forces and the Doctrine of Interoperability: The Issues*, Institute for Research on Public Policy, Vol. 3, no. 7, (June 2002).

Mitchell, Paul, "A Transformational Agenda for the Canadian Forces: Full Spectrum Influence", *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol. 4, No. 4, (Summer 2003): 1-17

NATO. AJP-01(B), *NATO Joint Doctrine*. Bruxelles: NATO Standardization Agency, 2002

Noetzel, Timo and Scheipers, Sibylle "Coalition Warfare in Afghanistan: Burden-sharing or Disunity?" Briefing Paper, Asia and International Security Programmes, Chatham House (October 2007)

Nunez, Joseph, "Canada's Global Role: A Strategic Assessment of its Military Power", *Parameters*, US Army War College, (Autumn 2004): 75-93

Pugliese, David, "Military shelves plans for expansion: Focus on mission in Afghanistan, security at Vancouver Olympics behind decision, Gen. Hillier says", *The Ottawa Citizen*, (07 March 2007) at <http://www.canada.com/components/print.aspx?id=0f5cdc2f-32c5-4522-98cd-a745a178dcb4>

Richter, Andrew C. "Alongside The Best? The Future of the Canadian Forces." *The Naval War College Review* (Winter 2003): 67-107.

Riscassi, Robert. "Principles for Coalition Warfare," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 1 (Summer 1993): 58-71.

Sloan, Elinor, "Canada and the Revolution in Military Affairs: Current Response and Future Opportunities", *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Autumn 2000): 7-14

Ward, Mike, "Task Force Kosovo: Adapting Operations to a Changing Security Environment," *Canadian Military Journal* Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 2000): 67 - 74.