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In Search of a Learning Culture: Developing Operational-Level Leaders in the CF

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In agrarian-age warfare, strength and cunning were valued. In industrial-age warfare, organization and discipline were valued. In information-age warfare, the treasured capabilities are knowledge and creativity.[1]

Introduction

In recent years, no less than six commissions, special commissions and special advisory groups have been formed to introduce change within the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Forces (CF).[2] In October 1997, a Minister's Monitoring Committee was appointed to oversee what its report termed as a "reform program." While advocating change in several areas, this paper is concerned only with those which called for renewed and vigorous leadership and for educational programs to support this requirement. In its *1998 Interim Report*, the Committee stressed the importance of a focused and effective education, training and development program as a driver of change. In its *1999 Interim Report*, the Committee reported that while progress had been made, it was largely the result of "local initiatives" by the various CF educational institutions and that these local initiatives were running ahead of strategic guidance. "Put simply, the activity 'cart' got before the conceptual 'horse'."[3]

It is the contention of this paper that the CF educational institutes have indeed taken the lead in effecting change however, that corresponding changes in CF leadership

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[1] Gregory A. Roman, "The Command or Control Dilemma: When Technology and Organizational Orientation Collide", *The Maxwell Papers*, No 8 (February 1997), p I-28/33.
[2] *Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces -- Interim Report 1999*, p viii.
[3] *Ibid*, p 2.

doctrine, educational policy, defence policy and organizational culture have not kept pace. In the course of presenting this argument, this paper will review the current CF educational approach, the state of leadership doctrine, defence policy and the military's interaction with the Canadian public. It will conclude with recommendations to facilitate the attainment of the desired results.

Change is needed for two reasons -- first, it has been directed by the Minister of National Defence (MND) in response to the recommendations of the various committees and special commissions in the Minister's Monitoring Committee Report, and secondly, because there is a real and growing requirement through peacekeeping commitments, to produce officers who can command, function and lead in a multinational setting. With Canada's commitment to the United Nations (UN) and the UN's expanding mandate which includes socio-ecomonic, environmental and humanitarian security, peacekeeping[4] has become a growth industry for the Canadian military -- a very demanding one in terms of numbers and the level of ability of military personnel. It is now more important than ever to produce high quality officers.

This paper makes two basic assumptions. The first is that training and education have different goals and achieve different aims. Training identifies instruction that is oriented to a particular military specialty and designed to develop a technical skill. It also

[4] Alex Morrison, "Canada and Peacekeeping: A Time for Reanalysis?," David B. Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown, editors, *Canada's International Security Policy*, (Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada Inc, 1995), p 201. Peacekeeping is an ever-broadening umbrella under which all activities are placed which are habitually placed within the categories of peacekeeping or any of its variants by the United Nations, other competent international organizations or by regional organizations. These include peace building, peace enforcement, peace establishment, peace making, and peace restoration.

includes tactical training of land, sea, and air units and tends to focus on standardized conduct of physical or mental tasks, whether simple or complex. Training may be given directly to the individual or to organized units and larger groups and is generally associated with the tactical level of operation. Education, on the other hand, implies instruction or individual study for the purpose of intellectual development and the cultivation of wisdom and judgment.[5] It concentrates on expanding intellectual horizons while offering the opportunity to pursue ideas in depth[6] and is associated with both the operational and strategic levels of operation. While the professional training of officers is important, this paper will focus on the educational aspects of officer development.

The second assumption is that the operational level is the vital link between the tactical (training) level and the strategic (conceptual) level -- that is, where training transitions to education. It has been traditionally accepted that there are distinctive experiences, knowledge and skills required for operational commanders. Clive Milner describes the "shopping list" of a commander's military qualities and virtues to include "courage, decisiveness, dependability, endurance, initiative, integrity, judgement, sense of justice, loyalty, robustness, knowledge, experience, confidence, charisma."[7] What has been called into question in recent years is the CF's ability to produce the quality of

[5] John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radway, *Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p 50.
[6] Randy Wakelam, "Senior Professional Military Education for the 21st Century", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, 27 No 4 (Summer 1998), p 15.
[7] Clive Milner, "Command and Control of International Forces," in *The New Peacekeeping Partnership*, Alex Morrison (ed.), James Kiras and Stephanie A. Blair (assistant eds.),)Halifax: The Printer, 1995), p 170.

leaders who will excel in the operational art. The first obstacle in this process is to define exactly what is encompassed in the operational art.

The Operational Art

While the operational level in military operations is readily defined, the concept of the operational art is less so. Campaign planning for instance, is a systematic, analytical process of getting from here to there. The operational art is more an intuitive way of thinking, of discerning patterns in diversity, and is a continuing process rather than a finite end.[8] The operational art is a concept that has been emerging since the time of Napoleon. In traditional Napoleonic-style warfare, *operations* described what occurred when assembled armies were concentrated and manoeuvred against each other to force a single, climactic battle. Followers of Napoleon's strategy, determined that there were three levels of war -- tactical, operational and strategic. In the mid-1850s, Moltke coined the term "operational" as the level which links the pursuit of strategic objectives with the tactical employment of large forces.

By the beginning of the 20th century, the nature of operations had changed from wars of finite affairs leading to a single decisive battle, to a complex mixture of military actions and battles linked by time, place and intent. During World War II, the blending of air power and armour with combat technique created the combined arms concept. Later thinking focused on operational design, including center of gravity, lines of

operation, decisive points and culmination. This has further evolved to include regional threats which must contend with the complexities of planning and action within a theatre with a variety of armed forces with a variety of capabilities.[9]

By and large, contemporary war has become limited war[10] which increasingly takes the form of intrastate conflict and complex humanitarian emergencies. In the future, technology may well continue to accelerate the pace of conflict which could therefore flatten the three levels of war into a single, joint structure. In his predictions for leadership requirements for United States Marines, Harry J. Hewson, in an article in the *Marine Corp Gazette*, stated that tomorrow's Marines Corps will demand an education that includes knowledge of the "bigger picture." Marines might operate at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels all at once.[11] At the 1999 conference on professional military education at the Naval Postgraduate School and Office of Naval Research, on Military Education for the 21st Century Warrior, when predicting the future role for the US military, Harry J. Thie, a senior researcher at the Rand Corporation, forecast that:

> known threats would become varied threats; the unitary mission of global conflict would become diverse missions within an overall policy of selective and flexible engagement; single missions for units would become multiple missions for units; variable hierarchies would replace fixed organizational hierarchies; advanced

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[8] William McAndrew, "Operational Art and the Canadian Army's Way of War" in *The Operational Art: Developments in the Theories of War*," edited by B.J.C. McKercher and Michael A. Hennessy, (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1996), p 88.
[9] Bruce W. Menning, "Operational Art's Origins," *Military Review*, 5 (September-October, 1997), p 35-45.
[10] British strategic analyst John Garnett identifies four reference points for the idea of limited war: limitation to a relatively small area of conflict, limited objectives, limited means, and some restraint or choice in the selection of targets for attack (John Baylis, Ken Booth, John Garnett, and Phil Williams, *Contemporary Strategy*, (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1975), p 121-24.
[11] Harry J. Hewson, "Leadership in the 21st century Marine Corps: six ideas for success during radical change", *Marine Corps Gazette,* 82 No 12 (Dec 1998), p 39.

> weapons would become integrated systems and processes; and, a service focus in operational matters would continue to be replaced by a joint perspective.[12]

In the Canadian context, it can be argued that it is unlikely that the CF will ever unilaterally commit our navy, army or air force to enforce national policy and therefore never really wage war at the operational level on a unilateral basis. However, the realities of our limited military capabilities and our established defence policy suggest that Canada will continue to participate under the ever expanding UN mandate in a variety of peacekeeping roles, mainly within an alliance or coalition setting. It is in the context of these joint or alliance settings that Canadian senior officers must be capable of participating and understanding the higher level concepts of the operational art held by our allies.[13]

Whether at the operational level, or as a participant in joint or alliance operations at a lower level, intelligent leadership will be required to reach decisions on the basis of situations that cannot be predicted.[14] This was further stated in a 1982 report from the Walter Reed Army Institute for Research which noted that leaders must sustain "intellectual and cognitive effort" when future warfare will have a pace, intensity, and technological complexity of unprecedented dimension. There will be a need for leaders to be able to "not only maximize the probability of successfully completing their current

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[12] Harry J. Thie, Remarks at the Naval Postgraduate School and Office of Naval Research Conference on Military Education for the 21st Century Warrior, www.nps.navy.mil/futurewarrior/.
[13] K.T. Eddy, "The CF and the operational level of war", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, 5 (April 1992), p 22.
[14] Douglas A. MacGregor, "Future Battle: The Merging Levels of War", *Parameters,* (Winter 1992-93), p 33-44.

mission, but to conserve what (human) resources they can for the mission that will surely follow."[15]

The first hurdle in addressing the leadership change that has been mandated for the CF, is that at this point in time, there are relatively few officers with university degrees in comparison to other militaries in the Western world. Only half of Canadian officers have a university degree and less than ten percent have graduate degrees, most in technical areas. By comparison, in the United States armed forces, virtually every officer has a degree and as in the United States Air Force, the standard for promotion to major is a graduate degree.[16] Canada is currently lacking an educational philosophy and overall policy for addressing these shortfalls.

The Case For Education

In response to the *1998 Interim Report* by the Minister's Monitoring Committee, many educational initiatives have been put in place. The University of Ottawa inaugurated a new program for Land Forces Officers. Maritime Forces Staff made arrangements with Dalhousie University, Memorial University and Royal Roads University, and the Air Staff is actively developing similar programs through the Royal Military College. In addition to the post-graduate program currently available at RMC, a Master of Strategic Studies was established at the University of Calgary. The CF is also pursuing ties with key organizations involved in continuing education, including the

[15] Walter F. Ulmer, "Military Leadership into the 21st Century: another bridge too far?", *Parameters*, 28 No 1 (Spring 1998), p 4-25.

Canadian Association of Continuing Education (CAUCE), The Canadian Association of Distance Educators (CADE) and The Labour Force Development Board (LFDB).[17] As well, a Centre for Leadership and Ethics, based at the Royal Military College, is being developed to conduct research on leadership. The *1999 Interim Report* stated however that while the initiatives taken by DND to improve officer education were supported, "a central plan was absent".[18]

In Canada, the Officer Development Review Board, conducted by Lieutenant-General (retired) B. Morton began just as the National Defence College closed as part of the 1994 federal budget. Published in the autumn of 1995, the Report[19] included over 280 recommendations and findings. In response to recommendations on training and leadership, an Officer Professional Development Working Group was established to develop proposals for changes to the professional development system. While not all of the recommendations were accepted, many were consolidated in *The Officers' Professional Development Handbook*, which was published in March 1997. The professional development model mapped out seven core themes: leadership, communications, ethics, ethos, history, management and technology. The Officer Professional Development System helped the individual develop these themes using four pillars: education, training, operational and command experience and self-development.[20] This structure is essentially based on Bloom's Taxonomy, which divides learning into six

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[16] J.L. Granatstein, *For Efficient and Effective Military Forces*, A Paper Prepared for the Minister of National Defence, (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1997), p 19.
[17] *Educating Canada's Military,* Workshop Report, 7-8 December 1998, iii-vii.
[18] *Minister's Monitoring Committee*, p 41.
[19] *Report of the Officer Development Review: Part I,* (Department of National Defence, Ottawa 1995), p 9.

levels ranging from simple knowledge acquisition to the ability to evaluate complex theoretical and practical problems.[21]

Critics of this approach argue that the CF is left with a mixture of business and military concepts that has caused the problems of leadership. The CF "must now write business plans for operational units, pay consultants to teach 30-year-old lateral thinking processes (Bloom, referred to above), and employ civilian experts to teach military officers ethics."[22] Van Creveld further argues that regardless of the instructional approach, "a skill may no more be acquired in class than studying military history makes one fit to command an armored brigade. Not even the strongest advocates of postgraduate schooling were able to claim that it did much to increase the military effectiveness of its recipients."[23]

Other criticism of the current approach is aimed at the CF educational institutions themselves. For example, the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College uses guest lecturers and syndicate discussions. Opponents argue that the lecture method is not very effective as a device for conveying information and that syndicate discussions are at too low a level. One recommendation is that "scholars should be brought in to shake up the entrenched military views with different teaching styles that stimulate argument and discussion."[24] A similar concern was expressed by Dr. Williamson Murray at the

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[20] Wakelam, *Senior Professional Military*, p 6-11.
[21] John F. Travers et al, *Educational Psychology*, (Madison: Brown and Benchmark, 1993), p 238.
[22] J.W. Hammond, "First things first: improving Canada's military leadership", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, 27 No 4 (Summer 1998), p 9.
[23] Martin VanCreveld, *The Training of Officers:From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance*, (NewYork: The Free Press, 1990), p 77.
[24] J.L. Granatstein, *For Efficient and Effective*, p 21.

previously mentioned Naval War College conference on professional military education, in that education at the intermediate and senior levels should be based on the same principles that guide education at the graduate level at the best universities. The various services have not been willing to provide graduate-level education for those who are going to teach at either the intermediate or senior level.[25] The same is true in both Canada and the United States.

Despite the above initiatives, there is an overall lack of CF policy on education. This was observed by Minister's Monitoring Committee and in a workshop on educating Canada's military, held in December 1998 at RMC. A recommendation from the workshop stated:

> The CF should develop and promulgate a clear policy stating that education is a core concern and articulating a master plan with appropriate milestones. The full support of the Chief of the Defence Staff as a champion of the program is seen as essential.[26]

Any educational policy however must be completed in concert with an articulated leadership doctrine which is crucial to the development of the means by which to produce officers and this will be addressed in the following section.

CF Leadership Doctrine

As regards to military leadership, it is easier to say what a good leader should not

[25] Dr. Williamson Murray, Remarks at the Naval Postgraduate School and Office of Naval Research Conference on Military Education for the 21st Century Warrior, www.nps.navy.mil/futurewarrior/, p 5-6.
[26] *Educating Canada's Military*, p vi.

be than what a good leader should be. In a recent article, J. W. Hammond wrote "There is a leadership problem in the Canadian Forces. Those who still refused to believe it after the Somalia Inquiry, the Bakovici study, or the endless press reports, must face up to it now that the Minister of National Defence and the Chief of the Defence Staff have instituted policy steps to correct it." He further describes the CF's leadership concepts as "a constantly changing hodgepodge of old manuals, reading, and faddish briefings from consultants" and that every leader trained over the last 30 years has studied the leader-follower-situational model. "Leaders must be taught to continually study leadership models and styles and to adapt them to their own personality and character, not *vice versa.*"[27]

Whether or not one agrees with Hammond's assessment of leadership doctrine in the CF today, it is clear that there is a need to develop senior officers with the breadth of experience to command CF elements on joint or combined multinational operations. In order to be successful, leaders must be comfortable in both direct and indirect leadership roles, and in staff roles. How leadership is taught is a product of leadership doctrine. It outlines the basic concepts that any organization teaches, promotes, believes and practices. In order to be effective, leadership doctrine must be developed, published and supported from the very top of any organization, and this needs to be articulated within the CF. The Minister's Monitoring Committee states that leadership standards seem to be

[27] Hammond, *First Things First*, p 9-10.

developing in an ad hoc manner.[28] For its part, the *1999 Interim Report* was harshly critical of the CF and cites that:

> the lack of direction from the very top of the Department and the CF may explain why aspects of this program which involve the definition and articulation of critical conceptual principles, such as accountability, ethics, leadership attributes, the difference between education and training and the role of the reserves, were not completed and embraced in a corporate manner before the derivative activities were initiated.[29]

Published at the same time as the Committee report, is a document called *Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020* published in June 1999, that states that the CF is committed to "develop and sustain a leadership climate that encourages initiative, decisiveness and trust while improving our leaders' abilities to lead and manage effectively."[30] In order to effect a CF-wide commitment to leadership principles, an effective policy needs to be designed, implemented and supported by the top levels in the CF, which in turn will provide the necessary framework to design an effective educational program. However, the precursor of the development of leadership doctrine is embedded in the Canadian political scene and how the CF relates to other government departments, especially foreign affairs.

The CF in the Canadian Political Scene

In general, the Canadian public is more preoccupied with unemployment, the deficit, health care and national unity, than with defence. There is not even consensus

[28] *Minister's Monitoring Committee*, p 40.
[29] *Minister's Monitoring Committee*, p 2.
[30] *Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020,* June 1999, p 9.

within government as to whether the CF should continue with the 1994 White Paper's multi-purpose, combat-capable force posture. This lack of consensus is further complicated by the fact that defence policy is often not understood in the foreign policy community. Canada's foreign policy is continually committing Canadian troops in support of international peacekeeping/making and humanitarian relief missions without it seems, consideration for the ability of the CF to fulfil the mission, nor of the cost to the CF. One solution, proposed by Thomas Dimoff in a paper to the MND, is to foster a better understanding in Parliament and among Canadians on defence issues.[31] The MND has responded by announcing in March 1997, his intention that DND and the CF will be more responsive to Parliamentarians on defence-related matters and will be required to submit annual reports on the state of the CF to the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA).

In another report to the MND, Albert Legault, a professor at Laval University, states that "The military have a profound ignorance of politics, and politics ignore the military to a similarly unacceptable extent."[32] A similar sentiment is expressed by Richard H. Kohn, a professor of history at the University of North Carolina, who states that "like the rest of the American population, military officers are frequently ignorant of American history."[33] While both these statements are generalizations, they do serve to

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[31] Thomas Dimoff, *The Future of the Canadian Armed Forces: Opinions from the Defence Community,* A Paper Prepared for the Minister of National Defence, 1997, p 4.
[32] Albert Legault, *Bringing the Canadian Armed Forces Into the Twenty-First Century*, A Paper Prepared for the Minister of National Defence, (Quebec: Laval University, 1997), p 3.
[33] Richard N. Kohn, Remarks at the Naval Postgraduate School and Office of Naval Research Conference on Military Education for the 21st Century Warrior, www.nps.navy.mil/futurewarrior/, p 5.

illustrate that the military in both Canada and the United States is perceived to be isolated from the general population. The broader question is that if senior officers do not understand or work in their own country's political arena, how can they deal in the complex, multinational environment at the international operational level? In an effort to promote further debate on defence related issues, a military journal, based at the Royal Military College, has been proposed. It is intended to publish articles by both military and civilian specialists on Canadian security and defence.[34] It is anticipated that such a journal will stimulate an interest in and engage the Canadian public in the debate on defence policy. As well, efforts must be made to enhance the CF's visibility to the Canadian public and this is the last area to be reviewed.

The CF and the Canadian Public

There is little consensus on what caused the well documented deficiencies in leadership in the CF in recent years. To some, it was the imposition of civilian values that have eroded military leadership values. Bureaucratization is seen as a threat to the military's separateness and the cause of the erosion of the warrior ethos of leadership.[35] Others counter that the distribution of responsibility between civilians and the military within DND "meets the requirements of a modern society. Whether they like it or not,

[34] *Minister's Monitoring Committee*, p 7.
[35] Donna Winslow, *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia: A Social-cultural Inquiry,* (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 1997), p 7.

the senior ranks must accept reality; they are part of, and must continue to be part of, the civilian decision-making apparatus of DND."[36]

Another view is that DND should be given special status. Commercial organizations do not ask employees to make the ultimate sacrifice; to comply with both civilian laws and be subject to the Code of Service Discipline; to be deprived of basic rights and freedoms of democracy; and to have limitations placed on their right of freedom of expression.[37] Nevertheless, the public has well defined concepts of responsibility, accountability, ethical behaviour and professional performance and the CF is measured against these standards.[38] The public expects DND and the CF to be open, responsible and effective to the same standard as other government departments are, or at least, are perceived to be.

In addition to having unique legislation to contend with, the past practice of the military training personnel within the department has been seen to further isolate the military from contemporary society. For example, acronyms are seen as a secret military language that few civilians can understand.[39] The Canadian public in turn needs to be educated as to the many demands in a military operational environment and of the considerable effort that is required to prepare people to operate effectively in that environment. Cathy Downes, in writing on the British military, felt that increasing

[36] Legault, *Bringing the Canadian Armed Forces,* p 2.
[37] Ulmer, *Military Leadership*, p 9.
[38] *Educating Canada's Military,* Workshop Report 7-8 December 1998, p 5.
[39] Winslow, *The Canadian Airborne,* p 54.

awareness of the public will counter and diffuse the negative reaction of the public to the military.[40]

One proposed solution to reducing the isolation of the military from the public is to have all graduate work undertaken at a civilian university. It is seen to be good for officers in mid-career to mingle with students and faculty and thereby connect directly with the society they serve. This has been echoed by Richard N. Kohn at the Naval War College conference on professional military education, who stated hat in the United States a masters degree in residence at a civilian university should become essential for higher responsibility.[41] Those who oppose this approach feel that civilian courses do not teach the leadership skills that are needed for the senior military officer and that pursuing degrees through civilian universities, especially on a part-time basis, is a drain on both the individuals and their organizations.[42]

Others see the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and various other pieces of human rights and employment equity legislation as having impaired the CF's ability to fight[43] or that it was the imposition of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms on the military selection process that has had a negative effect on the morale and combat cohesion of the army in particular.[44] However, this view is countered in that the military cannot be sheltered from social policies on homosexuality, employment equity, and women in the

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[40] Cathy Downes, *Special Trust and Confidence: The Making of An Officer,* (Portland: International Specialized Book Services, Inc, 1991), p 3.
[41] Kohn, *Remarks* ,p 3.
[42] Wakelam, *Senior Officer Military,* p 16.
[43] Granatstein, *For Efficient and Effective,* p 13.
[44] Dimoff, *The Future,* p 9.

armed forces, and continuing to do so only further widens the gap between military and civilian societies.[45]

Few would argue that military culture is characterized by its combat, masculine-warrior paradigm. The majority of the Canadian public view the military as an organization that is rigid and resistant to change. In a similar observation on the United States Marines, it was stated that "when change is forced upon the Corps by the outside world, resistance is even stronger."[46] However, unlike many other government departments, military leadership is based on discipline and a centralized hierarchy. If the initiative and impetus for change is strongly routed through the chain if command, there is a greater potential for change than in most departments. There are, however, two sides to bonding within a strong culture. "One side produces strong team efforts toward the mission, while the other maintains a conservative approach to institutional change."[47] Strong authoritarian cultures have the potential for dramatic change if it is strongly supported by very senior leadership. Integration of minority members into the US Army is one example of such change.[48] The CF needs to better exploit this potential for introducing change. It has committed in its strategic plan for 2020, to "meeting the highest of public standards in terms of ethos, values and professionalism"[49] and for the past several years, programming such as the Standard for Harassment and Racism Prevention (SHARP) program and employment equity have been implemented. Again,

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[45] Legault, *Bringing the Canadian Armed Forces,* p 56.
[46] Hewson, *Leadership in the 21st Century,* p 39.
[47] Ulmer, *Military Leadership,* p 9.
[48] Charles C. Moskos and John Sibley Butler, *All That We Can Be*, (New York: Basic Books, 1996).
[49] *Shaping the Future,* p 5.

there is not a clear, overarching and comprehensive communications plan with the appropriate milestones for implementing a CF wide program to address the arms length perception of the military by the Canadian public. What is needed in the CF at this time is a fundamental change in organizational culture and attitudes -- or a new paradigm to form the basic tenet of military ethos -- that of cohesiveness.

In earlier times, military units could be comprised of relatively heterogeneous ethnic, racial, class, even regional groups. However, few modern operations will have homogeneous group of individuals. [50] In a joint or combined operations, there is a high likelihood that it will be comprised of people from other branches, non-governmental organizations, or even be contracted civilians.[51] The current open immigration policies and subsequent cosmopolitan makeup of the Canadian population makes this highly unlikely within Canada and even less likely outside of Canada in coalition settings. As a consequence, there is now a need to devise a new paradigm for cohesiveness. Cohesiveness, in the traditional military sense of a homogeneous groups of predominantly white, Eurocentric, Christian males, is a thing of the past. Cohesiveness in the future will have to revolve around things like common goals, shared experiences, level of knowledge and skill levels rather than those of race, class and/or ethnic background. Diversity issues will extend beyond women, minorities and aboriginal peoples to include Buddhists, Moslems and Hindus.[52] Within the CF it was reported that

[50] Frederick Manning, "Morale, Cohesion and Esprit De Corps", Chap 23, *Handbook of Military Psychology,* Leuven Gal and A. David Mangelsdorff (eds), (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1991), p 462.
[51] Hewson, *Leadership in the 21st Century,* p 40.
[52] Kohn, *Military Education for the 21st Century,* p 1.

as of March 31, 1999, over 94,515 people had been trained in the Standard for Harassment and Racism Prevention (SHARP).[53] There are many factors which influence unit cohesion, such as complexity of operations, gender integration, employment equity, and critical incident stress. Questionnaires have been designed to provide commanders with a method to accurately measure unit cohesion. In its vision for the future, the CF has committed to meeting this change by building a "a strong, self disciplined and well motivated work force, both full and part-time, with multiple skills permitting flexible employment"[54] again without a clear policy on how and when this will be implemented and seeming without strong and consistent support from the CDS, attitudes will not change.

Conclusion

Ready or not, change has come to the CF. It has come from outside of Canada through its UN commitments and a willingness to play an ever increasing role in the international stage. There is no indication that Canada will cease to participate in collective security and humanitarian security around the globe. From within, change has been mandated and it implementation monitored. Both sources for change have asked for the same entity -- to produce military leadership who can operate in multilateral coalitions with proficiency and professionalism and who will also reflect the values and makeup of the rest of the Canadian public within the CF.

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[53] *Shaping the Future,* p 30.
[54] *Ibid,* p 5.

At the direction of the MND, a Monitoring Committee has been formed to oversee change in the CF. In response to the mandated changes, several changes have occurred in CF education, training and development that are aimed at preparation for operational level commanders and staff officers. However, as identified by the Monitoring Committee, this has been done in the absence of an overall plan. Before the impetus for change can be truly recognized, there are several areas that need clear direction through the promulgation of policy and subsequent implementation programs. These include:

a. An educational philosophy and policy supported by the CDS to create a learning environment in the CF;
b. A leadership doctrine which outlines the basic concepts and doctrine of the CF and is reinforced at all levels;
c. A communications policy that includes visibility and openness with the Canadian public; and
d. An overall plan to change the military culture to one that can embody both the military ethos and greater participation of all members of Canadian society.

Without the development of these essential supporting policies and without the full support of the CDS and senior military officers, CF education initiatives will not be incorporated into the culture and ethos. Unless all these areas are developed in parallel, the mandated changes will not be successful.

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