

THE MILITARY-MEDIA RELATIONSHIP: A CLASH OF CULTURES?

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There can be few professions more ready to misunderstand each other than journalists and soldiers.¹

— S.F. Crozier

INTRODUCTION

Over the last decades, and particularly in the more recent past, the military and media institutions have often been at odds. "There has always been a lot of tension between the two sides, and the source of stress has always been the same, namely the difficult question of how much information could and should be given to journalists."² Current military attitudes about the media continue to interfere with the establishment of a more cooperative military-media relationship. In addition to viewing media activities as getting in the way of the soldier's ability to fight wars, military personnel believe that news organizations are motivated by economics rather than by public service, and that they present slanted news to sell papers and make profits. Consequently, the military has become "distrustful of the media, seeing its reporting as biased, selective, unfair and untrue."³

The relationship between the military

and society is also strained. In recent years, the Canadian Forces (CF) came under intense scrutiny and received much public criticism due to the numerous front-page stories featured in the media. In fact, public opinion about the military has suffered as a result of the more scandalous news items which received coverage; the Somalia inquiry, the hazing videos, and the numerous allegations of sexual abuse and misconduct, have all over-shadowed the more positive coverage the CF received for its disaster relief efforts. Instead of laying the blame solely on the media, the military institution must acknowledge its share of responsibility for the ill handling of the information that led to those stories.

The CF face the challenge of continuing to improve communications with Canadians, and of strengthening public understanding of the role and relevance of the CF to contemporary Canadian society.⁴ Since the Canadian public has a fundamental right to know about the CF, and that same public gets its information through the media, then it is in the military's best interest to provide the media with the information they require. Furthermore, the CF must take positive actions to ensure that its members are better equipped to

deal with future media items — negative or otherwise.

Therefore, it is imperative that the CF develop a proactive, open, and transparent relationship with the media, in order to improve its communications with the Canadian public. This paper will examine both the military and the media cultures to demonstrate that the military's mistrust of the media is the partial result of a poor understanding of the role of the press. It will also analyze the power of the media to influence public opinion and study the impact of technology on the military-media relationship — two dimensions which continue to shape the CF posture with respect to media interaction. Finally, a number of recommendations are provided for the military to improve its relationship with the media, including better education for its members, and the adoption of a proactive public affairs approach.

THE MILITARY AND THE MEDIA CULTURES

The armed forces are seen by journalists as the epitome of the establishment, because of the obvious hierarchical structure, the uniform, the strict discipline, and — traditionally — the tight-lipped approach to media relations.⁵

— General (Ret) Paul Manson

The first step towards identifying areas to improve media-military relations is to look at the makeup of the two organizations. The military is a disciplined, traditional, and hier-

archical institution, surrounded by regulations. Its members live within a closed, corporate-oriented culture, and they focus on the performance of their mission, which is often centered on discretion, and even secrecy. The media, by contrast, are public-oriented and advocates of an open society. Their role “in relation to the government has been summarized aptly as being neither that of a lap dog nor an attack dog but, rather, a watch dog [*sic*].”⁶ Since the media considers it has a “journalistic responsibility to probe, challenge and criticize institutions and public officials,”⁷ it uses its role of watchdog of government policies and activities to better educate and inform the public at large.

The main reasons for the military's mistrust of the media are the lack of understanding on the role of the press, coupled with ignorance of some of the mechanical constraints facing journalists. One such constraint is deadlines; since media deadlines are sacred, journalists are under continual pressure to produce news stories. In their search for time-ly, topical, and interesting material, these same journalists tend to over-simplify the issues, and place constant emphasis on the personal and the dramatic. Furthermore, since profit drives most major news media, they tend to provide whatever sells; this includes spectacular, titillating, eye catching, or sensational stories, where the truth, accuracy, or context can sometimes become a secondary consideration.⁸ “Deadlines and headlines are extremely important. Unfortunately, good news is rarely deemed worthy of headlines, and so the media persistently resort to stories of scandal, incompetence, fraud, waste or mistreatment, real or imagined.”⁹

Similarly, the media do not always understand the constraints place on the commander. Since the military's business is based on security, officers' training teaches them that secrecy is the essence of successful warfare. Therefore, the importance of opera-

tional security and the potential risks associated with the release of information — where a soldier's survival could be at stake — must be clearly explained to reporters covering a mission. However, balancing the media's requirement for access to the battlefield with the military's need for operational security can sometimes be difficult. In fact, the military are normally reluctant to divulge strategic and operational information, on grounds of security, especially in time of crisis or war.¹⁰ As depicted in Figure 1, which illustrates the results of a survey conducted by Frank Aukofer and William Lawrence, both the military and the media agree that secrecy exists because of lack of trust or fear that potential enemies might learn information that could damage operational security.¹¹ On the one hand, the press wants freedom and always looks for full disclosure; on the other hand, the military wants control and tends to withhold information. General (Ret) Paul Manson, former Chief of the Defence Staff, observes that a historical rift has developed between the military and the media.

There is a legacy of mistrust on the part of the media towards the military, who were often seen to be restricting information more to protect themselves and their reputations than to protect national security.... The military's historic obsession with secrecy has exacted a heavy price in the lingering suspicion which colours today's relationship.¹²

Sending reporters to battlefields — where they can develop a first-hand understanding of military requirements — can go a long way towards laying security breach fears to rest. During the Gulf War, the media joined a pool system; they were part of the military organization, and the military provided them with good filming opportunities. “[O]fficers and soldiers alike were proactive and media-aware, and encouraged to develop a trusting and good relationship.”¹³ Therefore, the jour-

nalists obtained access to the battlefield, and the military provided them the information required to fulfil their own media aims of maintaining morale and public support for the war.




Figure 1 — Survey Results: Secrecy Concerns

Having distinguished one institution from the other, there are also a number of similarities between the media and the military. As author Alan Hooper states in his book “The Military and the Media”:

The newsman and the military officer consider many of the same qualities to be important in their respective professions: initiative, responsibility, professionalism, dedication, efficiency, teamwork, delegation of authority, self-discipline, forward planning and flexibility.¹⁴

Both professions are highly structured and unique, possess a distinct code of ethics, and rely on teamwork to get the job done. Staffs in newsrooms and operations rooms are composed of hard-working, dedicated professionals striving to make crucial decisions based on limited available information; they are “subjected to immense pressures as they

wrestle with the problem of making decisions against the clock.”¹⁵ Journalists owe as much to their organizations as military members do to theirs: “The soldier owes his loyalty to superiors, the officer to his subordinates; the reporter owes his loyalty to his editor, the editor to his public.”¹⁶ Finally, both institutions “share a common purpose — the upholding of a free, open and democratic society for the citizens of the country they serve.”¹⁷ The role of the military is to defend citizens’ rights and freedoms, while the media is also the guardian of fundamental freedoms: the freedom of opinion and the freedom of expression. Although a perfect cooperative union between the media and the military is likely impossible, the two organizations’ ultimate goal — the preservation of freedom — is the same.¹⁸ As citizens of a country that actively promotes these basic tenets, Canadians are free to form their own opinions about the military, and in doing so, they rely heavily on the information presented by the media.

PUBLIC OPINION AND THE INFORMATION AGE

Public opinion tends to respond to what the public sees and hears on its television set. That can be very dangerous, or it can be very helpful. The world, to some extent, was driven into Somalia because of the media coverage.¹⁹

— Barbara McDougall
Former Secretary of State for External Affairs

The Canadian public has a fundamental right to know about CF activities and operations. For this reason, the CF needs to promote understanding and awareness among Canadians of its role, mandate, and activities, as well as its contribution to Canadian society and the international community.²⁰ Since the public gets the bulk of this information through the media, and the latter has a profound impact on public opinion, it is in the military’s best interest to speak openly with the media whenever possible. The increasing

accessibility of fax and electronic mail technology also enhances the power of public opinion; computer-literate citizens can now flood governments and commercial establishments with their public expression, thus making their voice heard in response to events portrayed in the media. This influx of input into public affairs can have a tremendous impact on the shaping of policies: it sometimes forces governments to respond to events — much like the horrible images of Rwandan refugees prompted Canada’s Prime Minister to initiate a military intervention.

The visual images that accompany today’s news also have a catalytic effect on public reaction. Strong images often engage people’s attention, especially if a respected commentator accompanies them, and the shock value and impact of these visual images on public opinion is undeniable. The public outrage and call for action generated as a result of the media airing of the Somalia torture pictures and the ensuing Airborne Regiment hazing video were both quick and powerful. The Government had no choice but to set up a formal inquiry to examine these incidents. Furthermore, the strong public reaction generated by the Somalia incident inevitably contributed to the disbanding of the Canadian Airborne Regiment and the resignation of senior officers. Moreover, large troop deployments have often resulted from disturbing images viewed by the public; the first American troops sent to Somalia came on the heels of a poignant televised broadcast about Mogadiscio aired by the show *60 Minutes*. Although the media does not dictate interventions, it is very difficult for Governments to ignore the call for action which often results from the graphic images shown in the news.

The advent of television as the dominant news medium in the 1960s and 1970s had a significant impact on the reporting of military operations. During the Vietnam

War, television crews had virtually unlimited access to the area of operation. Competing for ratings, the networks required visually exciting material — sometimes at the expense of sacrificing the context of the broadcast for that material.²¹ Since the imperative was to get the story on air, journalists ignorant of military matters were often under pressure to give instant analysis.²² Although reporting of the news has changed considerably since Vietnam, television still dominates the information age. “Television is impressionistic, selective, superficial and sensationalist, and very poor at conveying the complexities of any situation.”²³ The television medium is “governed by the need to be fresh and to attract an audience. It seeks out controversy, violence and all the heartaches of the world in an insatiable appetite for novelty.”²⁴ Additionally, the extraordinary speed in news delivery today has created a continuous information society; instant global coverage of newsworthy events has become routine, largely through the application of satellite communications. Television provides immediacy: a live link and instantaneous feedback for soldiers and politicians alike. This phenomenon of presentation of the news in near real-time, where the journalist is under tremendous pressure due to time constraints, is commonly known as the “CNN factor.”

The current improvements to satellites and portable transmission dishes, the development of global television news, satellite telephones and newsroom automation, and the advent of the Internet as a powerful communications tool, all have an impact on the military-media relationship. The Internet facilitates the global exchange of massive amounts of information by broadening news coverage. As witnessed during the current crisis, there are thousands of journalists using the Internet to report the Kosovo story. Once again, this revolution in technology has a direct impact on military affairs, and the CF are already aware of the powerful influence

of the “Net” to affect public opinion. Consequently, the Department of National Defence now possesses its very own Internet site, with constantly updated information on military units, exercises, and other activities. The site also contains numerous public affairs items such as news releases and recent speeches, and allows visitors to electronically mail their views and ideas regarding the military. This utilization of the Internet as a valuable medium to propagate the CF message is but one indication that the military is ready and willing to take the steps required to become more open and to develop a better relationship with the media and the public.

THE ROAD TO AN IMPROVED MILITARY-MEDIA RELATIONSHIP

With a few notable exceptions, Canada has not recently produced educated, articulate and thoughtful spokesmen on military affairs.²⁵

— General (Ret) Paul Manson

Solutions to problems in the military-media relationship begin with an understanding of the challenges, dilemmas, and responsibilities facing both the military and the media. Mutual ignorance is one of the primary reasons for misunderstanding between the military and the media. Getting to know journalists and understanding how they work reduces the likelihood of future misunderstandings and confrontations. Through education of its members on the media and its functions, the CF will gradually overcome its mistrust of the media. Consequently, it is recommended that awareness of the media’s role in society be included in training at all levels. Although the prevailing view among military personnel used to be that relations with the media should be handled only by public affairs personnel, the current policy is that everyone, especially commanders, must be prepared to interact with the media. Since current “education about the media does not

adequately prepare a future commanding officer for the realities of command in today's media dominated society,"²⁶ officers must receive adequate news media education and training as they move up through the ranks. A case in point is the recent resignation of one of Canada's youngest — and arguably brightest — Chiefs of the Defence Staff, widely believed to be the direct result of his poor handling of the media and the commissioners during the Somalia Inquiry.

That said, the importance attached to public relations training has improved significantly in the last few years, and the various military schools and colleges now incorporate public affairs modules in their curricula. For example, the Canadian Forces College includes a weeklong session of media-related training for students attending the Command and Staff Course. But despite the recent addition of military-media training such as lectures, discussions, and interview techniques on many of the CF school syllabi, it would appear that these training modules were developed more or less on an *ad hoc* basis. Consequently, overall military education about the media and their role is still inadequate, as a whole. There is a requirement to coordinate the separate syllabi into a progressive curriculum that reinforces some key learning aspects while eliminating duplication in training. "[M]edia training should be so arranged that it progressively prepares an officer for his dealings with the media at each stage in his career."²⁷ Training cannot be limited to interview techniques; it must include lectures on the role of the media and how they influence public relations for the military, and must stress the requirement for proactively providing journalists the information they need. Furthermore, familiarization visits to newspapers, radio and television newsrooms could also be included as part of general officer training. The office of the Director General Public Affairs, which currently offers special training sessions for command-

ers, senior officers, and non-public-affairs personnel, must continue to assume increasing responsibility for this training in the future.

The CF must also continue to exploit the idea of media participation in training missions, and a "concerted effort must be made to continuously incorporate the media in all major military exercises. This would have the two-fold benefit of giving commanders experience in dealing with the media and it would also serve to educate the media in the ways of the military."²⁸ Only through direct dealings with the media can an officer truly understand the complexities and the value of coordinated military-media activities. The incorporation of the media into military exercises gives the CF added exposure; it introduces officers and troops alike to the reality of having to deal with media presence during an operation, and provides the military some insight into media requirements and implications. It also provides the media first hand experience on the hardships of military deployments, and an opportunity to talk to the troops. Members of the CF are all potential spokespersons about their responsibilities. Our junior members — who normally come across as very natural and believable during interviews — can generate enormous support and understanding from the public through their open and frank answers to media questions. Consequently, commanders have a responsibility to provide their subordinates with information on the plans, policies, programs, and activities happening in the workplace to enable them to deal properly with media queries. They must "ensure that their organizations are in the best position to conduct professional news media relations programs appropriately tailored to their assigned missions."²⁹

In addition to better preparing themselves and their troops to deal with the pressures of the media, commanders must person-

ally involve themselves in planning for media support in military operations. "Many military leaders have become aware that news media coverage of their operations can be a force multiplier;" it develops public awareness and enhances morale by informing families and friends of the activities of their troops.³⁰ Indeed, in his recommendations to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on media-military relations, Major General (Ret) Sidle states that "public affairs planning for military operations [must] be conducted concurrently with operational planning,"³¹ because to "account for and accommodate the media is a command function considered alongside the other central elements of military planning and procedure."³² Although provisions do exist for the inclusion of a media plan in the Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process, it is often relegated to a lower priority and produced as a last-minute add-on to the more important Campaign Plan. Public relations is at least as important as any other staff function such as operations, intelligence, or logistics, but this fact has yet to be fully accepted in the CF. The consequences of having a poorly developed media plan can be devastating. For example, the centre of gravity of a military deployment is often the will of the nation and public support for the mission; without a clearly developed and thoroughly thought-out media plan to keep the population and the government informed on troop activities, this national resolve could be severely jeopardized.

The requirement for additional education does not stop with the military; there is also a need to educate the media about the military.

Because contextual inaccuracies and sensationalist distortions are often the result of a lack of knowledge about the military, rather than malicious misrepresentation ... [w]e in the defence community have the obligation to educate

the media and, through them, the Canadian public about the complexities of the military profession in the modern era.³³

An examination of media credentials reveals that reporters "are generally well educated and mature: 65 percent have university education, 25 percent college education; 50 percent are in their 30s, 35 percent over 40."³⁴ Some journalists are specialists but the majority are generalists; they cover many different topics and usually work on more than one story each day. Few journalists today are knowledgeable about the military profession; indeed "there are very few journalists who specialize in military and national security issues; and their numbers are decreasing as the trend continues toward reporters with 'general' expertise."³⁵ Many of the editors and producers responsible for news and current affairs programs have no knowledge of the military. This is not surprising since the CF only comprises 0.21% of the Canadian population³⁶ and our country has not been involved in a major military conflict since the Korean War, excluding the more recent Gulf War and the emerging Kosovo crisis. "Ignorance of the military amongst those in positions of influence in the media is supplemented by the inadequate education on this subject for trainee journalists."³⁷ Figure 2 shows that 74% of news people agree that few members of the U.S. media are knowledgeable about defense matters, such as military personnel and equipment capabilities.³⁸ News organizations must make every effort to give reporters, editors, and news directors background training in military affairs. Because the media has assumed a greater role in educating the public, they have an "obligation to ensure that their trainee journalists receive a broad education so that they are well prepared to fulfill this increasingly important function."³⁹




Figure 2 - Survey Results: Media Knowledge of the Military

The military establishment can also contribute to media training on military matters. Firstly, despite the wide belief that information sessions targeted at the media would be poorly attended, the CF should offer briefings on defense policies to journalists on a regular basis. These briefings would help educate the reporters that cover the military. However, the briefings cannot follow the trend of the bland and institutionalized sessions of the past — a common tendency when routine sets in.⁴⁰ They must be informative and meaningful. Witness the briefings provided by the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff on the current Kosovo situation: a score of journalists attend the daily news conferences and continually report the military developments to the Canadian public. Secondly, commanders should participate in editorial boards, much like the Minister of National Defence does during his visits to CF units.⁴¹ This would further enhance the sense of openness and transparency the CF is attempting to convey and make military members more approachable to the public. Additionally, DND should consider allowing senior members of the media to attend various CF schools and colleges, in the same vein as public service employees are invited to participate. Finally, very few programs currently exist to bring top military public affairs representatives together with news organizations to discuss military issues on a regular basis. One such program, however, is the Security and Defence Forum, a Canada-wide outreach

program with government departments, non-governmental organizations, and journalists. The Forum — which is financed by DND and includes members such as Carleton University in Ottawa and Dalhousie in Halifax — promotes activities ranging from conferences, to public debates and media contributions. An important element of the Forum's mandate is to establish links with the wider Canadian community in order to inform, educate, share and discuss matters of interest that pertain to international and Canadian security and defence matters. Media participation is a staple of this attempt at greater dissemination of military information to the community at large. This DND partnership with Canadian educational institutions is a perfect example of the type of proactive attitude the CF must continue to adopt in its quest for improved public relations.

THE NEED FOR A PROACTIVE APPROACH

War is something we train for with the hope of never having to do it. Public affairs in crises is something we often do but rarely, if ever, train for.⁴²

— Lieutenant Commander Arthur A. Humphries

The way in which various crises are handled by the CF contributes directly to the public's perception of the military: "Whether they are the result of vehicle, aircraft or equipment accidents, international developments, domestic unrest, or, local incidents, establishing and maintaining good public communications is a key factor in Canadian Forces crisis management."⁴³ The best approach to use when scandals break is to face the situation squarely and get the story out quickly, because headlines "are always bigger if the press believes there has been an attempt to stonewall or cover up."⁴⁴ Since the speed of modern communications can transmit television pictures via satellite from a military area of operation to a mass audience faster than information can travel over the military

communications network, it is important to react quickly — maximum exposure with minimum delay is always key in times of crisis. Likewise, experience proves that it is better to tell bad news sooner rather than later. As journalist Denis Stairs points out in his article on the media and the military:

[T]he truth will almost always come out, and ... if it comes out easily, naturally, and early, it usually does not hurt. If it *does* hurt, it probably *should* hurt. But even if it is going to hurt, it will hurt a lot less if it is made available right away than if it has to be teased out later.⁴⁵

Media-military interaction is a two-way street. In fact, the “military does not exist in isolation: the media is its main conduit to the public.”⁴⁶ Although the CF should not expect “the community of journalists to be enthusiastically pro-active in propagating the military’s cause,”⁴⁷ they must use the media to inform the public about their policies, programs, and activities. As such, it is important for the CF to assist the media in educating the public on the conduct of military operations and the military lifestyle as a whole. The military must strive for openness and transparency in its dealings with the media, and continue to lift the secrecy veil in which it has shrouded itself in the past. “While it may be true . . . that the military cannot let it all ‘hang out,’ there is certainly a military interest, as well as a public interest, in allowing more of it to hang out than has been the custom in the past.”⁴⁸ In their quest for a story, the media will want both information and access to the source of that information. Denying journalists free access to military facilities pushes them to resort to alternate means to obtain the footage required to cover a story. In fact, “[c]utting off information will not restrict the news flow. Telling the media nothing only forces them to guess, and they will often guess right;”⁴⁹ however, the

final product may end up biased, inaccurate, or shown out of context. The military can shape the images of war seen on television and the accounts of military operations and exercises printed in newspapers via the control of media access to CF installations and missions.⁵⁰ By allowing the journalist to access the material first-hand, the Commander ensures the accuracy, timeliness, and proper context of the sought-after information, while at the same time emphasizing the military message.

Many factors, such as costs and the ability of the reporter to reach the story, come into play when determining which story is of potential interest and worthy of additional research. The media are more apt to cover human interest issues than to deal with the dry complexities of security policies; they demonstrated this repeatedly during the controversy surrounding the issue of sexual harassment and assault in the military, seeming to fixate unreasonably on these stories because of the element of drama.⁵¹ Therefore, the military can go a long way in getting their positive stories on the air by packaging some catchy footage and providing reporters with background information — known as back-grounders — and publishable news material. “An adept public affairs staff can capture air time for military stories. By providing television stations with material which would interest the audiences, the staff achieves their own goals and satisfies the station’s needs as well.”⁵²

The last area where the military can make in-roads at developing a better rapport with the public and the media is community relations. The aim of community relations is to develop positive, healthy relationships between CF members and the people in their host community. Active measures to foster good community relations include open houses, air shows, and sporting events. The media must be included in the planning for

community relations activities such as air shows or ship's visits, because these activities are the perfect vehicle for members of the civilian community to meet the military. They also provide the Commander an opportunity to inform the local civilian community on the role of the military, thereby molding the public's perception. The media play an integral part in this process and must be offered every opportunity to participate and cover these events.

CONCLUSION

The optimum solution to ensure proper coverage of military operations is to have the military — represented by competent, professional public affairs personnel and commanders who understand media problems — working with the media — represented by competent, professional reporters and editors who understand military problems — in a non-antagonistic atmosphere.⁵³

— Major General (Ret) Winant Sidle

The road to a better relationship between the military and the media institutions is paved with cultural clashes, stereotypes, and misunderstandings. The military and the media are both “woefully deficient in their knowledge of the other institution and in their training for those tasks necessary to make and report news during a military operation.”⁵⁴ Therefore, more dialogue between the media and the military is necessary so that each institution can educate the other about its culture and professional responsibilities. The military professional development process must include a progressive curriculum of public relations training. “The military has an overriding self-interest in getting its overwhelmingly positive story out. To do so, it must communicate the leadership's views from the top down, and improve public affairs education at all levels.”⁵⁵ Similarly, background training in military affairs should become a prerequisite for all reporters and edi-

tors covering CF activities and missions.

In addition to progressive media education for its members, the CF must continue to expand media training as part of field exercises, affording the press maximum opportunity to participate and be a link with the Canadian public. “As commanders, we must follow the adage — train in peacetime as you would fight in war — and that includes working with the media.”⁵⁶

Although press access and military security are inherently at odds with each other, the Gulf War showed that the media and the military could peacefully co-exist without endangering lives. “Media relations work better by treating the media as allies rather than as enemies, and by trust rather than by restriction.”⁵⁷

Because new generations of Canadians have grown up without any experience of war, and few people have direct contact with the CF, the media have a vital role to play: that of keeping the military and the public in touch with each other. Indeed, the news media have assumed an increasing educational role and, combined with a whole new generation of information technologies, now shape the public's view of the world. The media's growing influence on public opinion and its power to shape the political decision-making process is a reality that the CF must embrace and use to its advantage. Every media visit to a unit is an opportunity to tell Canadians what the CF is doing and every member has an important part to play in communicating this message to the Canadian public. “Since it is the media's portrayal, more than any other factor, which determines how Canadians feel about their military, it is vitally important for the CF to ensure that that portrayal is accurate, honest, balanced and positive.”⁵⁸

For several years, the military has endeavored to establish a “modern, progressive and professional approach to public affairs

that actively encourages openness and transparency,”⁵⁹ and to empower its members to speak more openly to Canadians about what they do and how they make a difference to Canada. In doing so, the CF must foster a relationship of trust and mutual understanding with the media. The development of consistent and helpful public affairs guidance to assist the entire chain of command in dealing with the media and communicating the CF message, will help achieve unity in these efforts at improving media relations and establishing a better rapport with the Canadian public. The process of instituting a proactive, open, and transparent relationship with the media must continue into the next millennium, and each member of the CF can and must be part of that process.⁶⁰

NOTES

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⁴Colonel Ralph Coleman, “Public Affairs Management,” Address to Command and Staff Course 25, Canadian Forces College Toronto, 26 October 1998. (Quoted with permission)

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¹⁴Alan Hooper, *The Military and the Media* (Aldershot, Hants: Gower Publishing Company Limited, 1982), p 211.

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¹⁶*Ibid*, p 7.

¹⁷Lieutenant Commander R.L. Walker, “The Canadian Forces and the Media: Adversaries or Allies?” (unpublished New Horizons essay, Canadian Forces College, 1996), p 10.

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²⁰Department of National Defence, DAOD 2008-0 *Public Affairs Policy*, p 3.

²¹Stewart and Carruthers, *War, Culture and the Media*, p 153.

²²*Ibid*, p 156.

²³*Ibid*, p 15.

²⁴MacNeil, *Modern Media and International Affairs*.

²⁵Manson, Military and Media Relations.

²⁶Hooper, *The Military and the Media*, p 214.

²⁷*Ibid*, p 212.

²⁸Major B.J. Ryan, "The Military and the Media: Bridging the Gap" (unpublished New Horizons essay, Canadian Forces College, 1988), p 25.

²⁹Charles W. Ricks, *The Military-News Media Relationship: Thinking Forward*, Report to the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, December 1, 1993 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Printing Office, 1993), p 2.

³⁰Aukofer and Lawrence, *America's Team: The Odd Couple*, p 4.

³¹Sidle Report, p 4.

³²Stewart and Carruthers, *War, Culture and the Media*, p 2.

³³Manson, *Military and Media Relations*.

³⁴DND, *You, the Media and the Public*.

³⁵Ricks, *The Military-News Media Relationship*, p 6.

³⁶According to the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies — Strategic Profile Canada, November 1997, there are currently 62,449 Regular Force members, which translates into 0.21% of the Canadian population.

³⁷Hooper, *The Military and the Media*, p 217.

³⁸Aukofer and Lawrence, *America's Team: The Odd Couple*, p 32.

³⁹Hooper, *The Military and the Media*, p 217.

⁴⁰Sharon Hobson, Extract from an electronic mail interview conducted 22–26 April 1999.

⁴¹During his numerous visits to CF units and bases, the MND always reserves time in his schedule to meet with the local media, often in a formal editorial board format.

⁴²Lieutenant Commander Arthur A. Humphries, "Two Routes to the Wrong Direction: Public Affairs in the South Atlantic War," *Naval War College Review* (May/June, 1983), p 58.

⁴³DND, *You, the Media and the Public*.

⁴⁴Aukofer and Lawrence, *America's Team: The Odd Couple*, p 5.

⁴⁵Denis Stairs, "The Media and the Military in Canada: Reflections on a Time of Troubles," *International Journal* (Summer 1998), p 553.

⁴⁶Sharon Hobson, "Public Affairs Management," Address to Command and Staff Course 25, Canadian

Forces College Toronto, 26 October 1998. (Quoted with permission)

⁴⁷Stairs, *The Media and the Military in Canada*, p 552.

⁴⁸*Ibid*, p 553.

⁴⁹Stewart and Carruthers. "War, Culture and the Media", p 18.

⁵⁰*Ibid*, p 2.

⁵¹Stairs, *The Media and the Military in Canada*, p 549.

⁵²Colonel J.E. Miller, "Working With the Media to Influence Public Opinion About the Canadian Forces" (unpublished Course Paper, National Defence College of Canada, 1993), p 17.

⁵³Sidle Report, p 17.

⁵⁴Ricks, *The Military-News Media Relationship*, p 25.

⁵⁵Aukofer and Lawrence, *America's Team: The Odd Couple*, p 5.

⁵⁶Major General Paul E. Funk, "Accommodating the Wartime Media: A Commander's Task", *Military Review* (April 1993), page unknown.

⁵⁷Stewart and Carruthers, *War, Culture and the Media*, p 18.

⁵⁸Walker, *The Canadian Forces and the Media*, p 3.

⁵⁹DND, *Public Affairs Policy*, p 3.

⁶⁰Manson, *Military and Media Relations*.