



WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY: CANADA'S CALLING ON THE WORLD STAGE

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It's impossible to understate the importance of advancing the meaningful participation of women in peace and security operations.

– General W.D. Eyre, Handover Ceremony of WPS Security Chiefs of Defence Network

An Introduction to Women, Peace, and Security

Historically, a struggle has existed between societal norms and gender disparity, with women historically being given lower status in civilizations worldwide across all facets of life. This gap extends to the realm of warfare and into the modern era, with rape, slavery, loss of income and sex trafficking being some of the real consequences of war for women. The 20th century saw a massive change in how nations cooperated. Two World Wars later, the United Nations (UN) was established in October 1945 to prevent future world wars and “maintain international peace and security, give humanitarian assistance to those in need, protect human rights, and uphold international law.”¹ On 31 October 2000, the UN unanimously adopted UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, which has become the cornerstone document that the world has built upon to further the agenda of Women, Peace and Security (WPS). Since the 2000 adoption, “nine additional Resolutions (1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106, 2122, 2422, 2467 and 2493)”² have been accepted towards this agenda, broadening the importance of the role that women play in conflict situations and adding the threat of gender-based sexual violence to the agenda.

Canada was an early advocate for the WPS agenda, as it nests neatly within our “rich tradition of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding.”³ The world perceives Canada as a leading nation in Women, Peace and Security, with Canada ranking 12th on the WPS index out of 170 countries.⁴ However, synergies between policy development and implementation of Canada's WPS initiatives can be found. While evolving, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) approach to the WPS portfolio is sometimes disjointed, with apparent gaps that can be improved. This paper will outline the challenges Canada and, specifically, the CAF are facing with implementing the WPS agenda in accordance with its own policy. By examining previously published policies and current draft policies, this paper will apply policy models to demonstrate how the CAF can find gaps between policy and implementation and provide recommendations to rectify them.

Background and Context of Women, Peace and Security

Research and evidence-based studies show that including women's participation in all facets of the peace process (peacemaking, prevention and peacebuilding) leads to sustainable progress and lasting peace in conflict regions and can improve this sustainability “by 30% over

¹ The United Nations, ‘History of the United Nations’, n.d., <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/history-of-the-un>.

² NATO, ‘Women, Peace and Security’, Women, Peace and Security, 17 April 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_91091.htm.

³ Borys Wrzesnewskyj, ‘M-163 Women, Peace and Security Ambassador - Borys Wrzesnewskyj’ (2018).

⁴ Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security and Peace Research Institute Oslo, ‘Women, Peace, and Security Index 2021/22 Summary: Tracking Sustainable Peace through Inclusion, Justice, and Security for Women.’ (Washington, DC, 2021), 2.

15 years.”⁵ Societies that empower women to influence peacemaking when conflicts arise generally have more success with this process through women’s presence as “negotiators, mediators, witnesses and signatories.”⁶ Furthermore, it has been statistically proven that “where women are more empowered, countries are less likely to go to war with their neighbors or to be rife with crime and violence within their society.”⁷ Finally, after conflicts end, including women in the peacebuilding process ensures the likelihood of sustained peace through reconstruction. Through representation in governing bodies and broadening societal participation, countries in post-conflict situations with the active participation of women reduce their “risk of relapse.”⁸ The UN spearheaded several world conferences on women to generate discussions with member nations starting in Mexico City (1975), Copenhagen (1980), Nairobi (1985), and Beijing (1995). As a precursor to the adoption of UNSCR 1325, the Beijing conference ended with a unanimous Declaration by 189 countries that stood as a “comprehensive global policy framework and blueprint for action”⁹ for the agenda of women’s empowerment. The nations unanimously declared that they would:

Dedicate [themselves] unreservedly to addressing these constraints and obstacles and thus enhancing further the advancement and empowerment of women all over the world and agree that this requires urgent action in the spirit of determination, hope, cooperation and solidarity, now and to carry us forward into the next century.¹⁰

Covering 12 areas of concern, “poverty; education and training; health; violence; armed conflict; economy; power and decision-making; institutional mechanisms; human rights; media; environment; and the girl child,”¹¹ the Platform for Action paired with the Declaration outlined holistic areas where women’s rights could be improved. While the 12 areas of concern listed above were not specific to peace and security, it is clear that WPS was included within the broader intent of the Declaration and Plan for Action.

Building on the broad approach of the Beijing conference, five years later, the UN’s first resolution specific to WPS was adopted in 2000. UNSCR 1325 consisted of four pillars, “the role of women in conflict prevention, women’s participation in peacebuilding, the protection of the rights of women and girls during and after conflict and women’s specific needs during repatriation, resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction.”¹² UNSCR elevated women from mere victims of their circumstances to actors who could impact the peace process. With this UNSCR, the UN narrowed the scope from women’s empowerment to issues related to peace and security and entrenched a common belief and purpose that civil society organizations and governments alike could strive towards together. Barnes and

⁵ Hon Robert D. Nault, ‘An Opportunity for Global Leadership: Canada and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda. Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development’ (Parliament of Canada, October 2016), 11.

⁶ Marie O’Reilly, ‘Why Women? Inclusive Security and Peaceful Societies’ (Inclusive Security, October 2015), 6.

⁷ O’Reilly, 4.

⁸ O’Reilly, 10.

⁹ The United Nations, ‘Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action’, 1995, https://www.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/Headquarters/Attachments/Sections/CSW/PFA_E_Final_WEB.pdf.

¹⁰ The United Nations, 14.

¹¹ The United Nations, 9.

¹² The United Nations, ‘Women, Peace and Security’, 2023, <https://dppa.un.org/en/women-peace-and-security>.

Olonisakin posit that the UNSCR framework is designed to work for the UN context but also acts as a driver of change outside the UN.¹³ Internationally, other organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), recognized the WPS agenda, framing their own approach to WPS “around the principles of integration, inclusiveness and integrity.”¹⁴ Releasing its first policy on the subject in December 2007, *the NATO/EAPC Policy on Women, Peace and Security*, NATO has pushed allied nations to advance their own WPS agenda by encouraging the creation of National Action Plans (NAPs), formalizing the role of Gender Advisors (GENADs) and Gender Focal Points (GFPs) on NATO missions and throughout the structure of the organization and establishing the Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations (NCGM) in Sweden. NATO has also influenced allied nations by creating the Secretary General’s Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security in 2012. This position “serves as the high-level focal point for all of NATO’s work on the WPS agenda”¹⁵ and was a precursor of many NATO nations creating similar positions of importance. All these steps taken by the UN and NATO influence the nations involved in these organizations and elevate the WPS agenda as a platform to be taken seriously.

In the Canadian context, the government of Canada adopted the use of Gender-Based Analysis (GBA) shortly after the Beijing conference. Subsequently, a revision followed that saw the method transition to include the ‘+’ and become GBA+.¹⁶ GBA+ is an analytical framework that organizations can use to ascertain the effectiveness of policies, initiatives and programs and root out systemic inequalities. GBA+ also examines “other identity factors such as race, ethnicity, religion, age, and mental or physical disability”¹⁷ and how the intersection of these factors can impact an individual’s experiences with government policies. GBA+ is the lens of choice of the federal government to monitor and examine the political commitment of WPS and the policy, programs and services it is built upon.¹⁸ While analyzing GBA+ in detail is outside the scope of this paper, it is essential to note the close relationship between the adoption of this analytical tool and the progress of the WPS agenda on a national level. There are challenges within the government regarding which organization ‘owns’ this portfolio. Global Affairs Canada (GAC) is the release authority for the various Canadian National Action Plans (C-NAP). However, this portfolio requires a multi-departmental collaboration, including the Department of National Defence (DND) and CAF playing a considerable role.

Canada’s national interest in the WPS agenda returns to our seminal experience as peacekeepers, where arguably, the CAF earned its reputation. The Canadian population has long tied its military identity to peacekeeping, with “over 125,000 CAF members having served on

¹³ Funmi Olonisakin, Karen Barnes, and Eka Ikpe, *Women, Peace and Security: Translating Policy into Practice*, Book, Whole (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon [England]; New York; Routledge, 2011), 7, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203837085>.

¹⁴ NATO, ‘Women, Peace and Security’.

¹⁵ NATO.

¹⁶ Government of Canada, ‘What Is Gender-Based Analysis Plus’, What is Gender-Based Analysis Plus, 16 June 2022, <https://women-gender-equality.canada.ca/en/gender-based-analysis-plus/what-gender-based-analysis-plus.html>.

¹⁷ Government of Canada.

¹⁸ Government of Canada, ‘Integrating Gender-Based Analysis Plus into Evaluation: A Primer (2019)’, 30 September 2019, <https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/audit-evaluation/evaluation-government-canada/gba-primer.html#H-04>.

peacekeeping operations since 1947;”¹⁹ it also speaks to our “altruistic desire to improve international peace and security”²⁰ as a nation. Canada’s leadership as a peacekeeping nation was evident as its “presence on the UN Security Council during the time of the adoption of UNSCR 1325 was particularly critical, as its focus on human security issues was able to influence the discussions in the Council.”²¹ Equally critical to consider is the politicization of the WPS agenda in Canada. As a progressive Western nation, the WPS agenda dovetails perfectly with the values of the government, which has been in power since 2015. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau became famous for his remark, “Because it’s 2015,”²² when asked why he decided to push gender parity as a priority for forming his cabinet, which speaks to the government’s approach to foreign policy. In 2017, the Canadian federal government introduced Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy that “policy experts, and development practitioners applauded...for building on the existing work of the Canadian government and civil society organizations to centre development challenges around gender equality and women’s empowerment.”²³ Subsequently, in 2019, Canada’s House of Commons accepted a motion in the 42nd session of parliament to appoint a new Ambassador for WPS with the mandate to lead Canada’s WPS efforts.²⁴ Canada’s trajectory as a peacekeeping, liberal democracy that advocates for women’s equality is self-evident based on the country’s foreign policy track record of the last 50 years.

National Action Plans and Canada’s Policy Evolution

In October 2004, the UN Secretary-General tabled a report to provide a follow-up on the progress of the implementation of UNSCR 1325. The report clearly identified progress made in four years since the adoption of UNSCR 1325; however, it also identified extant gaps and challenges. This report followed two previous presidential statements which called for the following:

Member States, entities of the United Nations system, civil society and other relevant actors to develop clear strategies and action plans with goals and timetables, including monitoring mechanisms on the integration of gender perspectives in peace support and humanitarian operations and in post-conflict reconstruction.²⁵

Nations worldwide accepted this call to action and began preparing their NAPs to put their national strategy on paper for greater accountability. As a national-level policy, the NAPs vary greatly depending on the domestic and political situation of the country from which they originate. As of February 2023, 105 countries have released a NAP on WPS.²⁶ Canada was one

¹⁹ Walter Dorn, ‘Canadian Peacekeeping: Proud Tradition, Strong Future?’, *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 12, no. 2 (Fall 2005): 8.

²⁰ Dorn, 19.

²¹ Olonisakin, Barnes, and Ikpe, *Women, Peace and Security: Translating Policy into Practice*, 19.

²² Jennifer Ditchburn, “‘Because It’s 2015’: Trudeau Forms Canada’s 1st Gender-Balanced Cabinet”, *The Canadian Press*, 4 November 2015, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-trudeau-liberal-government-cabinet-1.3304590>.

²³ Sheila Rao and Rebecca Tiessen, ‘Whose Feminism(s)? Overseas Partner Organizations’ Perceptions of Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy’, *International Journal* 75, no. 3 (1 September 2020): 349–66, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702020960120>.

²⁴ Wrzesnewskyj, M-163 Women, Peace and Security Ambassador - Borys Wrzesnewskyj.

²⁵ <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/534/14/PDF/N0453414.pdf?OpenElement>.

²⁶ Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, ‘National Action Plans for WPS’, February 2023, <http://1325naps.peacewomen.org/>.

of the first countries to accept this call; however, it took six years before the first C-NAP was released in 2010. An update to the C-NAP was released in 2017, and a third iteration is currently in draft, awaiting approval for release. The evolution of Canada's approach to C-NAP delivery can be compared to the overall growth in understanding WPS over the years. The first C-NAP, in effect from 2010-2016, was primarily an external-facing policy document geared toward Canada's international commitments. The second iteration, in effect from 2017-2022, was domestic facing in contrast to its predecessor. The latest C-NAP, currently in draft form awaiting approval, proves to blend and build upon both previous documents.²⁷

The first C-NAP was developed over several years through a collaborative consultation process. The policy was structured around the four previously mentioned WPS pillars of protection, prevention, participation and post-conflict relief and recovery efforts while outlining five key Canadian commitments:

- Increasing the meaningful participation of all women in peace ops, processes, managing conflict situations, and decision-making;
- Increasing the effectiveness of peace operations, including protecting and promoting the rights and safety of women and girls;
- Improving the capacity of Canadian personnel to help prevent violence and to contribute to protecting the human rights of women and girls;
- Promoting and supporting relief and recovery efforts in a manner which takes into account the differential experiences of women and men, boys and girls; and
- Making the leadership of peace operations more accountable for carrying out their mandated responsibilities in accordance with UNSCR 1325.²⁸

While applauded for being one of the first NAPs to include actions and indicators,²⁹ critics identified five perceived shortcomings of the Plan:

- The word 'gender' was not used, and the overall gender analysis was weak;
- The actions and indicators lacked targets or context for measuring progress;
- It focused on the victimization of women and girls instead of actors for change;
- The Plan was not funded in the budget, nor was it provided staffing resources; and
- There was a lack of structure and mechanisms for consultation with civil society.³⁰

²⁷ Alan Okros, Interview between Dr. Alan Okros and author on WPS., MS Teams, 4 April 2023.

²⁸ Women, Peace and Security Network – Canada, 'Worth the Wait? Reflections on Canada's NAP & Reports on Women, Peace and Security' (Women, Peace and Security Network – Canada, May 2014), 6, <chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://wpsncanada.files.wordpress.com/2012/05/worth-the-wait-report.pdf>.

²⁹ Beth Woroniuk, 'Looking Back, Looking Forward: Consultations on Canada's National Action Plan. Background Note #2: Reflections on the First C-NAP and Recommendations Made to Date for the New C-NAP' (Women, Peace and Security Network-Canada, April 2017), 1.

³⁰ Woroniuk, 1.

There was also a strong critique of DND’s lack of reporting “in terms of detailed quantitative and qualitative data.”³¹ It is also important to note that the independent midterm review referenced above was conducted after a change in government, with the Conservative Party of Canada publishing the first C-NAP and the Liberal Party of Canada taking control in 2015.

Canada’s second C-NAP, *Gender Equality: A Foundation for Peace*, was released by the Liberal government in 2017 and fit in step with the government’s Feminist Foreign Policy. This C-NAP was regarded as a more comprehensive and substantive document and far more inward facing than the first. The second C-NAP addressed Canada’s internal WPS challenges, such as the long-standing mistreatment of Indigenous women and girls and Canada’s legacy of colonialism and residential schools.³² In addition to an openly collaborative plan highlighting the various government departments required to ensure success, the second C-NAP saw detailed Implementation Plans published by each department alongside the Action Plan. By breaking out implementation by department, each department could take ownership of its own plan and give the federal government better oversight for progress tracking. Under the DND Implementation Plan, the CAF identified four key priorities for implementation:

- Implement the tenets of UNSCR 1325 and all aspects of the Departmental Diversity Plan with indicators including GBA+ integration, creating a WPS champion, and establishing routine use of GENADs and GFPs;
- Recruitment and Retention to leverage Canada’s diverse population with indicators including increasing the percentage of women in the CAF to 25% by 2026, improving diversity and employment equity, and responding to inappropriate behaviour through Operation HONOUR;
- Increase awareness of GBA+ through education and training at home, during pre-deployment and while training with allies; and
- Support international cooperation on Women, Peace and Security through engagement with foreign defence and security organizations.³³

In conjunction with the second C-NAP, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) released the *CDS Directive for Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Related Resolutions into CAF Planning and Operations*. This document took the political strategic-level C-NAP and departmental-level Implementation Plan and provided operational-level direction to the CAF. The CDS directive married the direction from the UNSCR, NATO’s WPS policy and the C-NAP framework to provide the CAF with a clear mission and concept of operations broken down into two Lines of Effort (LoE)—operational effects and institutional effects.³⁴ The C-NAP also brought more

³¹ Women, Peace and Security Network – Canada,

‘Worth the Wait? Reflections on Canada’s NAP & Reports on Women, Peace and Security’, 10.

³² Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, ‘Explore a NAP: Canada’, 2023, <http://1325naps.peacewomen.org/index.php/canada/>.

³³ Department of National Defence, ‘Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces Implementation of Canada’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security’, 2017, <https://www.international.gc.ca/transparency-transparence/women-peace-security-femmes-paix-securite/2017-2022-implementation-plans-mise-oeuvre-dnd.aspx?lang=eng>.

³⁴ Department of National Defence, ‘CDS Directive for Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Related Resolutions into CAF Planning and Operations’, 29 January 2016, <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/conduct/cds-directive-unscr-1325.html>.

robust political support, including the appointment of Canada's first WPS Ambassador in 2019.³⁵ While lauded as a step forward from the first C-NAP, this Plan also drew its own criticisms. The first issue identified was the lack of timeliness of the annual reporting cycle. With reports coming out 9-12 months after target dates, analysts found it “frustrating to read a document that reports on events that seem so far in the distance.”³⁶ An Ambiguity of resourcing was also critiqued; while more transparent than the first C-NAP, it remained complicated to understand the transparent funding and staffing allocations. Finally, as with many NAPs, the second C-NAP was deemed heavy on lists of activities and lacking in metrics to measure progress details. The progress reports left readers unclear about “what results are being achieved and what learning is happening.”³⁷

With the second C-NAP expiring in 2022, a third C-NAP is currently in draft form, awaiting approval. While this author has been able to source the draft DND/CAF Implementation Plan and accompanying Performance Measurement Framework (PMF), a draft of the Government of Canada C-NAP was not made available for writing this paper. The draft DND/CAF Implementation Plan and PMF acknowledge some of the shortcomings of previous C-NAPs listed above and strive to advance the accountability yardstick.³⁸ The DND/CAF Implementation Plan outlines six Action Plan Focus Areas:

- Building and Sustaining Peace:
 - engagement with Women’s Rights Organizations (WROs); and
 - increasing policy and strategic influence with international organizations to engage with women’s rights leaders and WROs.
- Security, Justice and Accountability:
 - increasing integration of WPS issues and gender perspectives in military operational planning, implementation, and reporting;
 - strengthening a gender-responsive intelligence cycle;
 - strengthening the use of gender-responsive approaches to the prevention of, and response to the unlawful recruitment and use of girl and boy child soldiers; and
 - increasing the knowledge and awareness of the impact of gender inequality and evolving issues such as cybersecurity, countering violent extremism, and climate change.

³⁵ Wrzesnewskyj, M-163 Women, Peace and Security Ambassador - Borys Wrzesnewskyj.

³⁶ Women, Peace and Security Network - Canada, ‘September 2021, Reporting on Progress: Reflections on the Latest CNAP Report’, September 2021, 8, https://wpsn-canada.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/WPSNC_Progress-Report_Sept-2021_final-low-res.pdf.

³⁷ Women, Peace and Security Network - Canada, 8.

³⁸ Okros, Interview between Dr. Alan Okros and author on WPS.

- Crisis Response:
 - ensure that gender-responsive approaches are incorporated in contingency planning and the operational guidance provided for Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Response and Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations.
- Sexual and Gender-based Violence (SGBV):
 - strengthen gender-responsive direction and capacity on the prevention and response to Sexual Exploitation and Assault (SEA) and Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV); and
 - strengthen gender-responsive and inclusive systems and services for the prevention of and response to Sexual Misconduct and Military Sexual Trauma within the Defence Team.
- Leadership and Capabilities:
 - increase the institutionalization of GBA+ under a new Enterprise Approach;
 - strengthen a sustainable GENAD and GFP system for Operations;
 - increase policy and strategic influence with international organizations on the implementation of the WPS agenda;
 - strengthen technical cooperation with allied and partner militaries to build capacity on WPS agenda implementation; and
 - align principal policies and directives with the WPS agenda and inform them with a GBA+ and related GoC C-NAPs.
- Inclusion:
 - seek to increase understanding of and targeted responses to the barriers of diverse women regarding recruitment, retention and career success, and the increased deployment of uniformed women on UN Peace Operations.³⁹

Compared to the first two C-NAPs, this Implementation Plan demonstrates a combined domestic and international approach to the WPS agenda. Each focus area is balanced in international and domestic objectives, as it has been learned that WPS needs to start at home to succeed abroad.⁴⁰ It identifies that a key lesson learned from previous iterations is that performance measurement is paramount.⁴¹ The PMF provides more accountability during progress reporting by breaking each Focus Area into Intermediate and Immediate Outcomes. Each type of outcome is then further broken down by indicator, timeframe, indicator type (new or old), and resources required to achieve the outcome.⁴² The breakdown of large focus areas using the SMART method into

³⁹ Department of National Defence, 'DRAFT - Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces Implementation of Canada's National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security', 17 April 2023, 4–6.

⁴⁰ Okros, Interview between Dr. Alan Okros and author on WPS.

⁴¹ Department of National Defence, 'DRAFT - Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces Implementation of Canada's National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security', 7.

⁴² Department of National Defence, 'Defence Team Draft Implementation Plan Performance Measurement Framework: DRAFT - C-NAP 3 on the WPS Agenda', 6 March 2023.

clear outcomes with specific, measurable, attainable, and realistically resourced objectives within a well-defined period will allow better tracking and oversight.

The policies and directives discussed in this section show an evolution of Canada's actions regarding WPS. From the initial internationally focussed C-NAP to the subsequent C-NAP penned by a different party with a different perspective and feminist agenda to the latest C-NAP, which takes a holistic approach to WPS, Canada, DND, and the CAF are learning from mistakes and lessons learned to work towards better accountability on this crucial agenda by developing more robust policy and frameworks for oversight; there is, however, still room for improvement.

Gap Analysis and Policy Modeling

Within the CAF context of the various C-NAPs, Implementation Plans and Directives, three institutional gaps could impede the success of the desired outcomes. The first gap identified is from a doctrinal perspective. At the same time, the CAF has stand-alone directives on WPS; the topic needs to be enshrined in how decision-making occurs, or operational planning unfolds. The WPS agenda is often conflated with GBA+ initiatives at the tactical, operational and strategic levels and needs to be given stand-alone attention during the CAF Operational Planning Process (OPP), the capstone planning tool for the organization. In collaboration with all services, a joint doctrinal review is required to review how to best imbed WPS in the fabric of our collective thought process. This situation is not the first time the organization has required a paradigm shift regarding a non-traditional topic. For example, the rise of the use of child soldiers precipitated the CAF to review its policies, directives and procedures as a result of the Vancouver Principles launched in 2017. The Vancouver Principles are a set of political commitments, very similar to the type of commitment made by nations regarding WPS, that aim to “prevent and address the recruitment and use of children by armed forces and armed groups during United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations.”⁴³ In response to the recommendations of the Implementation Plan, the CAF developed an interim Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) in 2017 to provide guidance to the CAF to “mitigate the broad challenges posed by the presence of child soldiers in areas where the CAF undertakes missions.”⁴⁴ This JDN was promulgated by the Strategic Joint Staff (SJS) and outlined the challenges the unique topic of child soldiers posed to many existing CAF doctrines, including within the OPP cycle. In 2022, a new JDN was explicitly written to address the prevention of recruitment of child soldiers, as the 2017 JDN was geared towards providing direction on how to deal with encounters with child soldiers. The 2022 JDN, in line with the Vancouver Principles, aims to “identify the role of the military in preventing the unlawful recruitment and use of child soldiers by armed forces and armed groups across all relevant operations.”⁴⁵ A similar approach has yet to be taken by the CAF regarding WPS. Introducing an interim WPS JDN could have the same effect as the JDNs produced

⁴³ Government of Canada, ‘Vancouver Principles Implementation Guide’, 2019, 6, <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/632482dc1b943212b681b181/t/634850b2d2665a46c78ee4e3/1665683637227/VP-Implementation+Guidance.pdf>.

⁴⁴ Department of National Defence, ‘Canadian Forces Joint Doctrine Note 2017-01 Child Soldiers’, January 2017, 6.

⁴⁵ Department of National Defence, ‘Joint Doctrine Note 2022 - 01 Vancouver Principles - Canadian Armed Forces Responses to Preventing the Unlawful Recruitment and Use of Children in Conflict’, 2021, 6.

regarding child soldiers and push the CAF to incorporate the specific needs of the WPS agenda within CAF doctrine and planning tools.

The second gap identified is the mandate ownership gap within the CAF. Between the SJS, the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC), Assistant Deputy Minister for Policy (ADM(Pol)) and the newly formed Chief Professional Conduct and Culture (CPCC), there are many stakeholders for this portfolio. Each of these stakeholders has a unique role in developing the CAF's WPS policies; however, collaborative effort is required to ensure that the correct information arrives for senior decision-makers to ensure alignment with the strategic WPS vision. Nevertheless, who has the lead? Who is at the helm to ensure the CAF is forging the correct path? This gap extends to the lack of ownership of training and Professional Military Education (PME) on WPS. Currently, only senior leaders such as those on the Joint Command and Staff Program (JCSP) or National Security Program (NSP), those in General or Flag Officer (GOFO) positions or those pursuing dedicated secondary education receive formal learning on WPS. For the importance of WPS to permeate throughout the organization, training and PME are required at the JCSP, NSP, GOFO and secondary education levels and throughout the CAF.

The third gap identified is that there is no translation of the WPS agenda into operational or tactical levels beyond the CDS Directive from 2016 and therefore is not permeating through the organization at all levels. The ideas have been left ambiguously floating at the strategic level and have yet to permeate into everyday use by most of the CAF. An example of progress on this subject, in addition to a JDN, would be creating a 'WPS Aide-mémoire' for every CAF member. A milestone achievement for the CAF was the publication of the *Integrating Gender Perspective in Operations: A Gender Aide-mémoire for the Canadian Armed Forces*. This 2019 document was published by the SJS to "assist all members of the CAF to integrate gender perspectives and the principles of GBA+ into operations."⁴⁶ This document defines and outlines the value proposition of incorporating GBA+ and gender perspectives to increase operational effectiveness. It explains the direction from the political and strategic levels down to the operational and tactical levels and further expands to include what integrating gender perspectives would look like in each step of the OPP. The Gender Aide-mémoire leaves the reader with an apparent last line; "the integration of gender perspectives is a command responsibility,"⁴⁷ much like the integration of the WPS should also be a command responsibility. It is important to note that there is no mention of WPS in the Aide-mémoire, nor does it tie the importance of GBA+ to the WPS agenda.

In addition to the recommendations proposed above, Scott's Institutional Policy Model could be analyzed to provide a way ahead for the institutional gaps identified. Scott formulated his Model on three pillars, regulative, normative and cultural/cognitive; an institution such as the CAF must pay attention to all three pillars at once to understand the organizational baseline and what is required for real change.⁴⁸ The regulative pillar refers to the laws and organization's

⁴⁶ Department of National Defence, 'Integrating Gender Perspectives in Operations - A Gender Aide-Memoire for the Canadian Armed Forces', 2019, 5, file:///C:/Users/Student/Downloads/CDACADE_19-025_Memorie_Interior_E_v10.pdf.

⁴⁷ Department of National Defence, 37.

⁴⁸ W. Richard Scott, *Institutions and Organizations: Ideas, Interests, and Identities*, 4th ed., Book, Whole (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2014) <https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/institutions-and-organizations/book237665>.

formal rules, the normative pillar refers to the organization's ideals, values and ethos, and the cultural/cognitive pillar refers to what is actionably done within the organization. The second layer of the pillar identifies what needs to occur to produce change within the pillar, and the model's base reflects the method by which the pillar changes can be reinforced.⁴⁹

Scott's Institutional Analysis Model




Figure 1: Scott's Institutional Analysis Model (produced by the author, developed from course notes and Scott 2014)

When applied to the first doctrinal gap, the regulative pillar would be the prominent place to start with promulgating a JDN (a 'new rule'). However, if the cultural pillar is simultaneously exercised through consultation throughout the CAF to produce the JDN as opposed to a small number of staff officers working in isolation, it could strengthen the output of the JDN and bolster the normative pillar by exposing more members to the values of including WPS within the organization, changing the perfection of CAF ideals these members then go on to spread. The second gap can also be improved through a concerted effort in all three pillars. By clearly regulating a lead organization, the CAF can ensure greater compliance with C-NAP goals and expected outcomes. It is challenging when each organization, SJS, CJOC, ADM(Pol) and CPCC each has their own mandates and priorities, which can skew the trajectory of the Implementation Plan. Culturally and cognitively, if the CAF opens training and education along WPS themes to a broader array of the chain of command, this opportunity will begin to change the normative understanding of WPS within the organization. The third gap is similar to how Scott's model could apply to the first one. An Aide-mémoire produced through a collaborative effort would incorporate the creativity of comprehensive consultation through the cultural/cognitive pillar while changing the regulative pillar with new guidelines for members; this adjustment would, in turn, change the behaviour of the overall organization. The application of Scott's Institutional Analysis Model to the gap analysis of the CAF's Implementation Plan for WPS is one tool that could be used to assess the way ahead for these gaps. It is important to note that Scott's model is rooted in sociology, which may not be enough to view the complex issue of CAF's response to

⁴⁹ Vanessa Brown, 'Advanced Topics in Institutional Policy Development' (PowerPoint, Toronto, 12 April 2023).

the WPS agenda. That spirit of innovation is still required as conflicts change and the role of the CAF abroad changes. Until recently, when CAF members deployed, the focus was on protection, the first of the four pillars of WPS. However, with the changing nature of conflict, the CAF is increasingly trying to support the prevention pillar; this will require changes in our planning which can only occur if we actively include WPS in our doctrine. Further research is recommended using other types of policy analysis tools; however, that is beyond the scope of this paper.

Concluding Thoughts

It has been 23 years since the release of UNSCR 1325, the catalyst of change worldwide for WPS initiatives. In those 23 years, empirical evidence and tested data have reinforced what UNSCR 1325 initially demanded—that women be given the opportunity to be considered equal actors and not just victims in the peace process for peace to succeed. Other organizations, such as NATO, hoisted on board the message of UNSCR 1325 and worked within their own frameworks to further this critical agenda, innovating and developing new best practices, such as using GENADS and GFPs along the way.

Canada has made immense progress on the WPS agenda and has proven to be among the world's leading nations in approaches taken over the last 23 years. Although it took Canada ten years to release its first C-NAP, Canada's early support of the WPS agenda helped other countries buy into what the UN was trying to achieve. That is not to say that the first C-NAP was not without fault. As described above, it was a weak outward-facing document that was light on accountability and follow-through. However, Canada learned some very key policy development lessons from the publishing of C-NAP 1. It produced a more inclusive, collaborative, and comprehensive plan for releasing the second C-NAP in 2017. The introduction of Departmental Implementation Plans was a decisive step forward in the evolution of C-NAPs, allowing the federal government greater oversight and more detail on the progress and including direct content from many of the key stakeholders across the government. Much like the review completed on C-NAP 1, Canada has continued to review its approach and examine what can be improved from C-NAP 2. The draft C-NAP 3, coupled with the DND/CAF Implementation Plan, is the most substantial step forward of them all. The iterative approach to developing this plan considers lessons learned over the past 23 years and a realistic look ahead to future CAF operations. As discussed earlier, the way the CAF conducts WPS operations is shifting. More frequently, the CAF faces prevention-type activities as opposed to the traditional protection-type activities it has historically conducted under the WPS umbrella. While the C-NAPs and Implementation Plans have consistently evolved in the right direction, three clear gaps that require attention have been identified that could jeopardize the progress forecasted for CNAP-3. The importance of including WPS in CAF doctrine, identifying a clear lead within the organization and working to educate the wider organization on the importance of the WPS agenda are all areas of improvement that would further bolster the upcoming Implementation Plan. Analyzing these gaps through a policy model, Scott's Institutional Analysis Model provides a fresh perspective on why the proposed solutions would work, detailed in the gap analysis, and how they would impact the CAF as an institution through the various lenses of regulatory, normative and cultural/cognitive pillars of the model.

Canada has always prided itself on being a leader on the world stage of the UN; whether its storied history with innovations in peacekeeping after the World Wars of the 20th century to routinely vying for a seat on the prestigious security council, its commitment to the UN's push for a more equitable world for women has only cemented this reputation. WPS is an agenda that is important not only to the UN and Canada but to NATO as well as most like-minded nations and allies. If Canada wants to remain a leader in this agenda and within the UN, NATO, and amongst its allies, it must continue to review its WPS policies with a critical approach driven by improvement and keep progress at the forefront of decision-making. The CAF is vital in this approach as a critical organization within the government that is actioning this agenda daily. In order to continue to excel as a WPS leader, Canada must take the lessons learned from the critical approach and couple them with the resources required to generate lasting change; the welfare of women worldwide in dire situations depends on it.

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