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The Naval Officer Identity Crisis: Who are we?

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ABSTRACT

This paper suggests that the Canadian Navy must make a greater effort in providing sufficient identification measures for the naval community. It will explore the history and nature of professions to demonstrate the sociological reasoning behind the formation of professions and why it is important that the individual be recognized within their chosen profession. Acceptance that military service is indeed a similar profession, but also a profession of arms, this paper will show that individual identification within the military is still an important factor in morale and establishment of the idea of a sense of self. It examines the history of the Canadian navy through the last nearly 100 years as a means of demonstrating from where the navies history and heritage, or its identity, comes. Through the post-war years and Unification, this paper will indicate the erosion of the identity of the naval officer before going into the post Unification years to show the inconsistency of professional recognition standards currently in practice in the navy. This paper concludes that the naval officer's distinct identity and professional qualifications earned through a career must be recognized so that the personal morale, esprit de corps and sense of self remain contributing factors to a successful career both for the benefit of the CF and the member themselves.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section One – The Background

INTRODUCTION

"Everything we do is for the success of the service. Always give of yourself to make things better."[1] To this motto is the justification for this paper.

It is interesting, if not actually disappointing, that in a paper dedicated to the identity of the navy and its individuals, a caveat for clarity must lead off the comments, just as found in Canada's own guidance to the future navy in *Leadmark: the Navy's Strategy for 2020.* Naval officers do not serve in Canada's "Navy", for the proper name of Canada's navy is actually Maritime Command (MARCOM). To its own people in its own publication, though accepted it will get wider distribution, even Maritime Command must provide subject matter clarity of identification so that personnel in security and other defence establishments don't assume "maritime" to adopt its generally more accepted definition. This definition is found in the Oxford dictionary, which defines maritime as: "relating to shipping or other activity taking place on the sea."[2]

It is also of interest to note that on the West side of building D206 in Her Majesty's Canadian (HMC) Dockyard, Halifax, Nova Scotia (in metre-high letters) is installed a sign that reads simply, 'Canada's East Coast Navy'. This sign is indicative of the identity problem in Maritime Command, compelling MARCOM to provide clarification in its own work.

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[1]Department of National Defence, Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), in Assistant Deputy Minister (Public Affairs), End Year Messages 2008.

[2]The Pocket Oxford English Dictionary, Ninth Edition, Edited by Catherine Soanes. Oxford: oxford University Press, 2001, 552.

Apart from the insanely easy and convenient way 'MARLANT' rolls of the tongue in everyday 'Navy speak', no one uses it. It would be a challenge to find a sailor that, when asked what he does, responds with, "I'm in MARLANT", or, "I'm a serving member of Maritime Command". This vernacular is unique to maybe ten or twelve thousand people in the world. And they're all Canadian. No one else knows what this means. The Canadian Navy or better still, because the navy remains a constitutional monarchy, The Royal Canadian Navy, is a response that makes sense and comes from the heart. It's only a name but it has the potential to do so much. However, just as with *Leadmark 2020,* to avoid confusing the masses into assuming this paper might be a study of a national shipbuilding policy, oceans management, employment of the merchant marine, or international maritime law, the term "navy" will be used throughout this paper to refer to the Canadian Navy.[3]

100 Years of the Canadian Navy

The 100th anniversary of the Navy occurs May 10th, 2010, marking a moment to celebrate a centennial as a proud national institution.[4] Up to this historic event the history of the navy will be celebrated across Canada and recognized in many of the nations of Canada's friends. There will be ceremonial mess dinners from coast to coast, naval-oriented civilian stakeholders will host events and cities will hold parades. Ceremonial port visits will occur along both Canadian coasts and major fleet assemblies will occur in Halifax, Nova Scotia and Esquimalt, British Columbia. In addition, there

[3]Canada. Chief of the Maritime Staff. Directorate of Maritime Strategy. *Leadmark : The Navy's Strategy for 2020*. Ottawa: Directorate of Maritime Strategy, 2001, 3.

[4]*Ibid*., 3.

will be presentations made to every Canadian city, town or Nations People for a ship which has carried their name. Articles will be written for the Maple Leaf, The Trident and The Outlook documenting the proud history of the Canadian Navy.[5] "All these celebrations will be geared to build and strengthen in Canadians an appreciation for their navy and to demonstrate the navy's role in our national development."[6] At a time of celebrating the navy, one might suggest that it would be inappropriate to cast dark shadows on the positive events expected across Canada. History reveals a different approach. It suggests that now is the perfect time to bring to light issues that have prevented the proud sailors in Canada's Navy from achieving the personal sense of identity, and the pride that is possible, especially in the officer corps.

In 1983, the Sub-Committee on National Defence on the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs submitted a report on Canada's Maritime Defence. Within this report were various recommendations for remedies to many recognized negative impacts remaining within the navy following the Canadian Forces Integration and Unification policies. They identified the importance that naval personnel are allowed to wear distinction uniforms and recognizable badges and ranks to allow distinct identification. Additionally, they saw 1985, the 75th anniversary of the Canada's sea-going forces, as the ideal opportunity to implement their recommendations.[7]

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[5]The Maple Leaf is the national weekly newspaper of the Department of National Defence with a history that dates back to WWII. The Trident is the East Coast navy's newspaper and The Outlook is the Newspaper of the West Coast.

[6]Department of National Defence, Assistant Deputy Minister (Public Affairs), "Canadian Naval Centennial 1910-2010," 2008.

[7]Department of National Defence, Report of the Sub-committee on National Defence of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Canada's Maritime Defence, May 1983.

Accordingly, 25 years later it is again an appropriate time to recognize the strength of the navy and its sailors, but also to leap at a most opportune moment in history to implement further changes within the navy. These changes would not only reflect pride in naval service but it would bring to a halt, in particular, the naval officer's loss of identity in today's navy.

> Given the current distribution of responsibilities and expertise between officers and [Non-Commissioned Members (NCMs)], each corps has a distinct identity. These respective identities are reflected in the insignias of rank that visibly denote responsibility, authority and specialized expertise.[8]

From the Canadian Forces (CF) publication Duty With Honour, the explicitness of this statement attests to the fact that as a member of the officer corps, the naval officer earns an expectation to be separated visibly from peers, seniors and subordinates within their element as well as within the CF as a whole. This paper presents the argument that there exists an inefficient degree of personal recognition for today's naval officer corps.

It must be stated that to even bring the identity issue to bear strikes a note of untraditional naval officer attitude. Hanging above the entranceway at the Naval Officer Training Center in Esquimalt B.C. is a plaque 5 feet wide with the inscription "Duty is the great business of a sea officer; all private considerations must give way to it, however painful it may be."[9] A famous Horatio Nelson quote, it is taken to heart by many naval officers that walk through those doors at the commencement of their careers. The

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[8]Department of National Defence. Duty with Honour : the Profession of Arms in Canada : A-PA-005-000/AP. Ottawa: Dept. of National Defence, 2003, 21.

[9] Horatio Nelson, written in a letter to Frances Nisbet, http://pearcemayfield.typepad.com/patrick_mayfield-/2005/10/index.html; Internet; accessed 1 March 2009.

contemporary version of this lies in Duty With Honour with the recognition that all members receive their sense of identity from three core concepts: "voluntary military service, unlimited liability and service before self." [10] Equally important to duty is the requirement to ensure the health of the sea officer's profession. With that tone, of being for the good of the navy, the study proceeds, with the acceptance that the navy in the 21st century has regained much of its lost identity, but this paper is focused on the individual, with emphasis on the Maritime Surface officer.

The identity crisis of the navy itself has been a thoroughly examined controversy since the navy's earliest days of inception. Some say the Battle of the Atlantic during World War II was the symbolic equivalent to the army's Vimy Ridge, when the navy finally turned from a colonial navy to the Canadian Navy through the mass recognition it received through the media.[11] Few can claim the Unification policy of the Canadian Forces during the 1960s did not practically destroy this identity and then create a very long road to recovery. Recovery of the naval identity as a Canadian Institution, for the most part, has remained a difficult process through the remainder of the century. A more in-depth study of the significance of uniforms and symbols that contribute to an individual naval officer's sense of identity and how they wish to be separated from others within their own environment is required now. "Many of those individuals that have served in Canada's navy endure the commonality of existing within a profession that both

[10] Duty with Honour Chapter 1, 20.

[11] Michael L. Hadley, The Popular image of the Canadian Navy, in Micheal L. Hadley, Robert Huebert and Fred W. Crickland, A Nation's Navy: In Quest of Canadian Naval Identity, (McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal and Kinston, 1996), Ch 2, 37.

defines their identity and obscures it."[12] A kin to the Unification policy the navy, air force and army endured through the 1960s and 1970s, the naval officer continues to endure their own pseudo "unification" due to the similarity of uniforms and lack of distinctive identifier.

The effective study of this identity crisis must include an educational piece to set the background of what is behind this crisis. First, the importance of identity in professions, and the study of the military as a profession, will be addressed. This will be covered because only through the acceptance of what a profession is, and what responsibility a profession has towards its professionals, being one of understanding reward, instilling personal identity, recognition and the acceptance of the significance of "self" can one truly begin to understand what responsibilities the military profession has in recognizing their professionals.

This is not saying the military on a whole is failing its people, for various elements and institutions within the CF, from the Royal Military College (RMC) to Canada's Army, have grasped the importance of recognition and instilment of identity within its environment and they continue to expend efforts to ensure that sense of identity is maintained. Within the navy there is acknowledgement, at many levels, that recognition and personal identity have immeasurable values. In the 1950s, Welfare committees were introduced in ships and RCN establishments across the country to

[12]Micheal L. Hadley, Robert Huebert and Fred W. Crickland, A Nation's Navy: In Quest of Canadian Naval Identity, (McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal and Kinston, 1996, 3.

address morale issues within the navy.[13] With the Centennial of the navy drawing nearer, now is the time to bring the identity issues of naval officers to the table in a similarly focused review. This paper does not intend to cast blame on organizations or leaders, for truth is told that the navy remains reaped with great traditions. However, the sense of erosion of individual officer's naval identity, their sense of esprit de corps and personal pride at times is palpable. In many opinions there are easy fixes that would bring personal pride in distinctive profession back to the naval officer. The study of the history of professions, the history of the navy and the struggle of the naval officer to retain their traditional sense of identity will result in the identification of simple recommendations to regain the naval officer's sense of pride and distinction within the great naval community.

[13]Capt(N) Wilfred Gourlay Dolphin Lund, OMM, CD, The Rise and Fall of the Royal Canadian Navy, 1945-1964: A Critical Study of the Senior Leadership, policy and Manpower Management, University of Victoria, Victoria, 1999. 140.

Section Two - Identity within Professions and the Notion of Self

"A profession is organized around the knowledge system it applies, and hence with profession simply reflects degree of involvement with this organizing knowledge."[14] According to the Oxford English Dictionary, a profession involves the application of specialized knowledge of a subject, field, or science to fee-paying clientele.[15] If the fee-paying clientele is the tax-payer within the society then the military clearly satisfies this definition. Professions begin when people start doing full time a task their community requires. The work is usually so specialized that it is inaccessible to anyone without education and experience, raising the issue of training, which is usually pushed by recruits or clients.[16] Thus, the second aspect of professions is that there is a requirement for schools to be created in order to fulfil formal training requirements. Formal education systems, if not begun within universities, immediately seek affiliation with them.[17] Inevitably, they then develop higher standards, longer training, earlier commitment to the profession, and a group of full-time teachers.

The teaching professionals, along with their first graduates, then combine to promote and create the professional association. The more active professional life

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[14]Andrew Abbott, *The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labour*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1988. 118.

[15]Oxford Pocket Dictionary, 716.

[16]Eliot Freidson, *Professionalism: The Third Logic* (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago), 2001, 1.

[17]Svante Beckman, Professionalization: Borderline authority and autonomy in work, in Burrage Michael and Rolf Torstendhal, Professions in Theory and History: Rethinking the study of Professions. Sage Publications, London Newbury Park New Delhi, 1990.118.

enabled by this association leads to self-reflection, to possible change of name, and to the explicit attempt to separate competent from incompetent.[18]

A profession can be defined further by its attributes, that to be a profession there should exist distinguishing attributes such as a systematic body of theory, a recognized authority, sanction by the community, an ethical code of conduct and its own culture.[19]

The systematic body of theory states that the main separation between professions and non-professions is the element of superior skill that must be acquired above what on-the-job training through apprenticeship could achieve.[20] This requirement to attain specialized training above a layman grants the professional the authority within the professional-client relationship and provides a sense of security to the client. The professional-client relationship and the power that the existing authority can place within a profession require a great acceptance by the community in which it operates. Normally this acceptance is provided through community approval that may be strengthened through the community's policing powers, often in the form of a community–created licensing system.[21]

The power that the profession is given through superior knowledge and community licensing is controlled by a code of conduct or ethics to prevent abuse of the power and privileges the community has granted, giving the profession its legitimacy.

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[18]Abbott, 10.

[19]Howard M. Vollmer and Donald L. Mills, *Professionalization* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Ciffs), 1966, 10.

[20]*Ibid*., 11.

[21]Eliot Freidson, *Professionalism,* 56.

Legitimacy is the acceptance of a profession's expertise by those outside of it.[22] For example, society at large commonly understands that doctors are medical professionals and that lawyers belong to the legal profession. But true membership in a profession requires more than simply the possession of expertise. Legitimacy requires that the profession establish means of controlling its members to ensure that they adhere to a specific set of values and a common ethical system, ensuring that members within the profession uphold the responsibility of fulfilling their special function competently and objectively for the benefit of their community.[23] As an example, the American Bar Association exercises such control for the legal profession. Finally, the segregation the profession has from the community by the features of a profession mentioned above creates a distinctive culture that consists of values, norms and symbols.[24]

The nature of a profession has been established. The importance of this establishment rests in the recognition that it is widely accepted that the military satisfies these basic definitions. The military professional, comprised of the 'caste-like division of order-givers (commissioned officers) and order-takers (enlisted men)"[25], can be defined in terms of the following major elements: professional knowledge, professional cohesion,

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[22]W.L. Zwerman, *Professionalism and the Canadian Forces* (Canadian Forces Leadership Institute), March 2003), 2.

[23]*Duty with Honour*, 6.

[24]Vollmer and Mills, *Professionalism*, 16.

[25]Randall Collins. "Market closure and the conflict theory of the professions," in Burrage Michael and Rolf Torstendhal, *Professions in Theory and History: Rethinking the study of Professions* (London: Sage Publications), 1990, 35.

and professional motivation and identity.[26] Of these elements, identity will be the focus of the military and civilian profession comparison.

The term identity is not easily defined. It can be who one thinks they are or perceives how others might see them. By Oxford's it is a psychological orientation that a person assumes when relating to something else, be it a person or a group.[27] Such relation produces an emotional association with the group. By in large assuming an identity is an unconscious process whereby an individual models thoughts, feelings, and actions after those attributed to what they believe ought to be the identity associated with the association, or profession, to which they belong. If a professional derives their identity from their profession, then the manner that a profession instills or enforces that identity becomes an important part of a feeling of self. The relevance of this comes from the realization that when an individual identifies themselves with their profession, their aims conform to the aims of their profession. They revel in the successes of their profession and experience the anguish of its failures.

'Identity' represents a complete or genuine identity which it is not merely taken as a given, static fact about oneself, but the result of a long, dynamic and critical process. The search for a recognized identity is one of the main pursuits most individuals conduct in all their lives. Desire for distinct identity can be found in the changes in standards of dress through the 20th century, when those of higher status sought identity through what they wore or what type of car they owned. These were symbols of their identity. But

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[26]Martin Cook, *The Moral Warrior: Ethics and Service in the U.S. Military* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press), 2004, 66.

[27]Oxford Pocket Dictionary, 449.

rather than seeing identity as a possession, however, identity should be seen as something that an individual cultivates throughout their life. As a continuous process, identities remain open to change as new statures are attained or professions changed, altering one's identity in response to either individual or social influences and concerns (or both).[28] Returning to the main theme of this paper, that being the requirement for a profession to instil a sense of identity within a profession, it must be realized that professions can become large institutions of thousands of individuals. Civilian institutions recognize that within these larger professions there can be a division of labour that demands unique identification. Failure to do so may result in an individual losing their sense of self identity with the organization under the over-reaching identity of the profession on a whole.[29]

An expansion of Abbott's view of professional legitimacy between professions can be applied to within the military as a system of professions. "[P]rofessions jockey for position within a given society as different professions and non-professional groups attempt to gain jurisdiction over spheres of human labour …"[30] just as divisions of labour, or sub-professional groups, within a profession struggle for jurisdiction.

The importance of the division of labour is recognized by Abbott but he also recognizes the difficulty in maintaining that division, and thus obtaining their

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[28]Dr. Pauline M. Kaurin, "Identity, Loyalty and Combat Effectiveness: A Cautionary Tale," JSCOPE 2006, http://www.usafa.edu/isme/JSCOPE06/Kaurin06.html; Internet; accessed 15 January 2009.

[29]Freidson, *Professionalism*, 22-24.

[30] Cook, *The Moral Warrior*, 59.

professional identification.[31] Though they may be in a larger institution, individuals identify themselves, thus answering the question "Who am I?" through the use of names or positions with categories of professions in which they participate. By applying trade names to themselves they identify who they are.[32] The individual identifies who they are to others, both with the distinct group and to those outside, by historically established and recognizable signals found within their dress, attitude and speech. A professional doctor historically wears a white coat while technicians wear green. The laboratory coat is granted to them at what is called a White Coat Ceremony (WCC) conducted at most medical schools. A distinctive uniform for nearly 100 years, many critics believe WCCs create an unhealthy sense of entitlement to trust and respect that may foster a sense of elitism. However, the WCC remains an almost quasi-religious significance symbolizing the acceptance of a lay person into the medical profession.[33]

Dress, in this case a white laboratory coat, has assumed a symbolic identifier of the physician. "Since professionals draw their self-esteem more from their own world than from the public, this status mechanism gradually withdraws entire professions into the purity of their own worlds."[34] That is to say, the identification of the divisions of labour, and the acceptance of the significance of personal identity is not for the "outsiders" but for those within the profession. An individual's self-esteem comes from

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[31]Abbott, 74.

[32]Nelson A. Foote, "Identification as the Basis for a Theory of Motivation," *American Sociological Review*, #16, February 1951, 14.

[33]Eric M. Flanders, DONNING THE HEALERS' HABIT Ceremony 2001-10-11, Professor of Palliative Medicine McGill University. Internet, http://www.medicine.mcgill.ca/physicianship/whitecoatceremony.htm; Internet; accessed 16 February 2009.

[34] Abbott 119

recognition by his peers, not the public. Cynics may scoff at the notion of the need for a symbolic dress code as a source of pride and identity, but the wearer of the badge, crest or even laboratory coat may see the granting ceremony as a large motivation to achieve the professional expertise their vocation demands. Military personnel are no different in this respect. "They seek a clearly defined identity within their society and within the military organization: identity to the servicemen is of paramount importance."[35] The lack of propagating its importance can have a negative impact at all levels of retention.

The Military as a Profession

Literary study has defined what makes a profession. The study of the military and how it relates to professions reveal that the true birth of militaries as a profession of arms began in the 19th century. Advances in military technology and the development of civil authority over the military brought about professionalization similar to civilian forms. New technologies required specialized training, which in turn brought on the establishment of training systems and accreditation requirements, noted previously as having been recognized in the civilian professions of medicine and law. Similar to these professions, the military service demanded adoption of the professional attributes of responsibility, expertise, identity and ethics. These form the basis of the military profession and the foundation for establishing a military ethos. [36]

The future success of the CF rests with the goal of all those who serve obtaining an understanding of military ethos so that they might embrace both a collective and

[35]Capt(N) R.D. Yanow, Canadian Forces Identity, Service paper, 21 April 1977, 26.

[36]Duty with Honour, 5-7.

individual identity as members of the Canadian profession of arms.[37] Individual identity within CF is found through the ability to define oneself from others in a military adaptation of the civilian definition of a "division of labour."

Within the CF the "division of labour" of the military profession is maintained, in a broad sense, through the use of distinctive uniforms, badges and crests. The degree to which this division occurs within the CF varies substantially between elements, except possibly during the period of Unification (which will be addressed later in this paper). The variation of divisions relates to the importance respective elements place upon traditional individual recognition, because the military profession is one that, though taking great pride in honour and sense of duty, has deep-rooted history in the visual recognition found in the uniform. The division is also maintained to remind service personnel of who they are and what role they fill, how they see the world around them and what is supposed to motivate them, especially when times are tough.

Civilian examples of resolute traditionalism in legitimacy through visual recognition are police forces, firemen, physicians and particularly English lawyers, both the solicitors and, particularly, the barristers. Both groups have drawn strength from character values and from the traditional nature of accoutrements and procedures.[38] Their dress is seen as symbolic, representing the status or function they hold in a particular group. In a court room the presiding judge wears a robe. Though their identity

[37]Duty With Honour, 4.

[38] *Ibid*., 192.

as a judge is fulfilled by their position behind the bench, the judicial robe remains an important status symbol to this day.

While wealthier members of primitive societies attempted to wear more jewelry and more clothing as a method of distinguishing themselves from the poorer members of the society, militaries began to distinguish themselves through the uniform. "The practice of wearing some identifying device, usually on the head-dress, is an ancient one which originated in the need to distinguish friend from foe."[39] Not only friend from foe, but within respective peer groups, the uniform, when properly identifiable and adorned with specialization indicators, performs the same function, they can separate the trained from untrained, the specialized from the generic and the successful from the non-successful.

Historically, the purpose of a soldier being in uniform was to identify the wearer in close combat and at the same time afford them protection. Knights in the 11th century wore the uniform of armour for protection and easily discernible colorful plumes on their helmets for identification. Family or king coat of arms that adorned shields were once thought to have the goal of enabling a knight to be recognized by his followers during battle. The coat of arms became a traditional method of identifying a knight that had inherited the right to lead or implanted the duty to follow another leader in battle. By the 14th century the coat of arms was seen as a military status symbol, allowing participation in pageant tournaments due to the importance of social standing. As such, a coat of arms also became a mark of noble status. Throughout the following centuries armies began to

[39]Department of National Defence, Regimental Dress Distinctions, Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, Directorate of Social and Economic Analysis, Staff note 1/86. January 1986, 3.

be dressed uniformly in a standard that would allow a lone leader standing apart for the battle to readily identify their troops through their uniforms. Predominant colours arose – the English infantry was in red, the French in white and the Dutch in blue, to name a few.[40]

Navies first began to adopt uniforms in the mid-18th century, when a committee of naval officers prepared a report for the Lords of the Admiralty that recommended the adoption of a standardized uniform. In 1857, the lower-deck sailors were adorned in a few-known jumpers, bell-bottom pants and a round cap that became a uniform for the RN and, with minor variations, the uniform of virtually every other country's navy, including Canada in 1910.[41]

In modern day, many of the centuries-past attributes continue today. The uniform identifies the individual as being in the service of their country, providing a clear indication of their combatant status and therefore providing them rights under the modern rules contained within the Law Of Armed Conflict (LOAC).[42] Along with this LOAC tangible value there have existed emotional intangible values that leaders and governments have been concerned about throughout history, most notably the morale of their troops. For the majority of those serving in the military, pride in service is established through the distinction and privilege of wearing the uniform of your country's armed services.

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[40]Yanow, 15.

[41]*Ibid*., 16.

[42]Department of National Defence. *The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level* (Ottawa: Office of the Judge Advocate General, 5 September 2001). Art 304, Ch.3, 2.

However, group identification or protection of a combatant is not the sole function of the uniform. At the institutional level, the use of distinctive uniforms contributes to the internalization of the messages the profession wants to create with the individual so that they might do the right thing, at the right time, in the right way without having someone else tell them what to do. Distinction occurs first by operational environment (naval, army or air), and then by support functions within respective elements. Further differentiation occurs for specific roles, but the clearest differentiation occurs through the use of ranks, giving distinction between the commissioned officers and non-commissioned members of the profession. Each of these many distinctions accounts for the military professional's identity but also for the role they hold within the profession.[43]

Equally important to a sailor's service dress is their 'walking out' uniform, the manner in which they project their pride in service to the public. The external appearance of the individual gives them there own ability to 'strut their stuff.' The individual that has attained significant milestones in their career or attained distinct levels of professional expertise has earned every right to add a certain amount of swagger to their step. It is the leadership's responsibility to ensure that they give the individual the tools from which to initiate that swagger. These come from a uniform that distinguishes them

[43]Air University Review, "Professional Identity in a Plural World: The focus of junior officer eductation in the U.S. Air Focre", January-February 1976, 27 April 03, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles-/aureview/1976/jan-feb/ralph.html; Internet; accessed 21 January 2009.

from other elements, but also from their peers. By making the individual think well of themselves they will project this to others so that they in turn think well of them.[44]

In societies where the military was important, the soldiers were dressed to impress the population and themselves. If the commander raised and equipped the troops out of his own pocket, the appearance of the soldiers was also designed to impress his superiors. Attractive or distinctive uniforms could make a military career desirable to young men (the "peacock" factor). In the United States, the symbol of the modern soldier is captured in the traditional image of the Marine in dress blues or in the Air Force the helmeted pilot in his flight suit. This is to say that the strength of their profession and the individuality they receive is from their traditional image. Recognized by Field Marshall Montgomery of the British Army, he stated that "leaders knew well what the soldier was thinking and what he wanted most, and they always made a careful study of human factors. If a leader neglects the human factors he will fail."[45]

Failure at the individual level may result from the individual themselves, however, and not at the leadership level. When an individual fails to accept that to be a professional military officer means to welcome, and indeed seek, these traditional images, the possibility that they may leave military service after short careers increases. "Those who remain are inclined to blame the departing individuals for their failure to share the professional ethos."[46] Ethos is gained by a sense of identity within the group,

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[44]Yanow, 19.

[45]Field Marshall Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, *Military Leadership* (London: Oxford University Press), 1946, 10-11.

[46]Cook, *The Moral Warrior,* 56.

and thus any policy (read Unification) that is a measure against ensuring a sense of identity will have to be seen as a contributing factor to the individual officer of being unable to retain a sense of position within the military society. Any policy that helps instil a sense of identity within the group can only assist in the professional welcoming, and indeed seeking, personal identities that promote the professional ethos.

The fact that all naval officers are practically identical when in uniform, and not wearing headdress, is preventing their ability to gain the personal sense of identity required to achieve the sense of pride and belonging to a more defined group within their profession. They may find professional ethos within the navy, but further identification of professional expertise they have attained assists in developing the ethos of their vocation, whether that be in warfare, engineering or logistics vocations.

The famous quote from Horatio Nelson implies that a naval officer, and more specifically – a 'sea-going officer'- must see duty above all else, but both the naval officer and the navy itself understands that this sentiment of years gone by can no longer be expected to exist today. Nor can it be expected to exist tomorrow. Quality of life (QOL) initiatives reflect the goal the Government of Canada, the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Forces (CF) have in ensuring each service member and their family are able to seek a better life for themselves tangential with their service to country. Taking up the military profession thus allows what Abbott refers to as the chance for independent life chances.[47] However, the nature of the military is such that while it can offer independence outside the organization, being within it hampers

[47]Abbott, 324.

individuality unless the profession of the military, like that of civilian institutions, adopt the understanding of the critical aspect the sense of identity in pride in service.

This significance of identity within the CF is characterized with the CF's guide to the profession of arms - *Duty with Honour*. As the defining document for Canada's profession of arms, it "must be read and understood by all who wear the uniform. I have therefore directed that it serve as a cornerstone document within the Canadian Forces professional development system.[48] Written as a statement of identity within military service, it exemplifies the importance of individual recognition in gaining pride, military ethos and esprit de corps in a military career.

Figure 1 depicts identity as possessing a critical role in establishing military ethos for CF members. "The military ethos reflects how military professionals view themselves (identity), how they fulfill their function (expertise) and how they relate to

[48]Duty With Honour, 1.

their government and to society (responsibility)."[49]

Figure 1 - Theoretical Construct of the Profession of Arms in Canada

If the naval officer is expected to maximize their ethos of military service, proper attention must be given to the identity gained from their unique function within the navy. On enrolment a naval officer gains identity as a member of the CF, but as detailed earlier in this paper, identifying with their environment through the use of a common set of badges and symbols of rank is an important aspect of developing pride in service and military ethos. As a group they accept a naval identity, but accepting the importance of this triad at the individual level, a naval officer's identity is equally as important as the expertise they spend their career obtaining and the responsibility they assume in its application.

The Canadian Navy possesses a wide range of customs and traditions, many related to its initial affiliation with the RN. Original branch and environmental

[49]*Ibid*, 7.

identification gave naval officers the distinguishing characteristics that bonded its members together. These customs and traditions produced special social structures that contributed to a sense of unity and military identity. [50] The history of the navy will be explored now in order to provide substance to the desire to restore many of the traditions found in the navy, those traditions which gave the naval officer their sense of identity, pride in service and esprit de corps.

In summary, this section has detailed that professional legitimacy is derived from a requirement for expertise and accountability, and in doing so creates a distinctive culture that consists of values, norms and symbols.

[50]Duty With Honour, 20.

Section Three – Navy Roots of Identification: 1910 to Unification

The importance of individual identity for the establishment of sense of self has been covered in the previous sections. This section will review the history of the Canadian navy as of means of clarifying where naval officer identity in Canada found its roots.

Canada became a nation in 1867.[51] As a colony of Britain without its own naval service, the country relied on the protective services of the Royal Navy (RN) into the 1900s. As a portion of the British Empire's resolve to provide defence for countries within its Dominion, Canada was provided financial aid, men and equipment from the RN and the birth of Canadian Naval traditions occurred.

In 1909 a resolution for the establishment of the Canadian Naval Service was introduced in the House of Commons. Nearly a year later the resolution became a bill. Following royal assent on May 4, 1910, the Naval Service of Canada was created as a government department responsible for the changeover from the Royal Navy to the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN).[52] At that moment the Canadian Navy' identity, both collectively and individually, shaped itself after the RN. Based on the small size of the navy and the question of its continued relevance and existence, the RCN was patterned after the RN. Lack of a ship building capacity meant many new ships were built in the UK, bringing an organizational and personnel structure along with them. Even with the establishment of

[51]Canada, Library and Archives Canada, Canadian Confederation http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca-/confederation/023001-2000-e.html; Internet, accessed 17 January 2009.

[52]National Defence, Canadian Naval Centennial, http://www.navy.forces.gc.ca/centennial/0/0-c_eng.asp?category=67; Internet, accessed 16 January 2009.

the Royal Naval College of Canada (RNCC) in 1910, many officers and men received initial training in the UK. Those training in the RNCC came under the tutelage and profound influence of a former RN officer, Commander Edward Atcherly Eckersall Nixon.

Appointed to the staff when the college was founded, he became the college's Captain in 1915. [53] "Six future Chiefs of the Naval Staff had Commander Nixon as their mentor and the RNCC experience as a common point of reference throughout their careers."[54] It would prove nearly impossible to make the RCN a truly Canadian institution in the early years of the navy owing to this RN influence and the realization that the legacy of Nixon and the RNCC produced many of the officers that would direct the RCN up to Unification. However, the officers and men adopted this identity easily and it served them well through the first decades of the navy's evolution.[55] Much of this identity remains today and reflects a heritage in which the navy is proud. Much of it was taken away, though, and needs to be restored.

At the outbreak of the First World War the RCN was assuming a sea-going role in the defence of Canada. Expansion of the RCN commenced alongside the RN and Canadian sailors were allowed to select either service, of which most chose the latter. This expansion was not extensive, with most of Canada's efforts focused on the

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[53]Capt(N) Wilfred Gourlay Dolphin Lund, OMM, CD, *The Rise and Fall of the Royal Canadian Navy, 1945-1964: A Critical Study of the Senior Leadership, policy and Manpower Management* (Victoria: University of Victoria), 1999, 23-24.

[54]*Ibid*., 24.

[55]Commodore E.P. Tisdale, "The Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on RCN Personnel Structure," Naval Headquarters Ottawa, 1957, 2.

development of land forces. The only true threat to Canada came from German U-Boats, and that threat was considered negligible. Small patrols were established off the Eastern seaboard and with the Gulf of St. Lawrence, mainly to guard against German infiltrators. It appeared at the on-set of the war that the RCN's contribution to the war effort would be made through the supply of personnel to the RN.[56] Though the force grew through the war, including the arrival of the navy's first submarines, the majority of Canadian sailors would serve in the overseas division of the Royal Naval Canadian Volunteer Reserve (RNCVR) force. The makings of RCN traditions and identity founded from the RN were firmly established by war's end.

During the intra-war period this connection with the RN grew. Funding cuts, reductions in fleet size and closure of the RNCC in 1922 (now in Esquimalt following the 1917 Halifax explosion) sent all naval cadets to the Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, England. With most of Canadian naval training now occurring in the UK and Canadian officers gaining sea-going experience from lengthy periods on board RN ships, as well as staff experience ashore (Commander L.W. Murray, later Rear-Admiral and Commander-in-Chief, served in the RN Operations Division), RN doctrine and culture were embedded within the very ideal of what it was to be a naval officer.[57]

The navy grew extensively during the Second World War and by the end of the war the RCN was the third-largest navy in the world, behind the United States and the

[56]Roger Sarty, "Hard Luck Flotilla: The RCN's Atlantic Coast Patrol, 1914-1918," in W.A.B. Douglas, *The RCN in Transition 1910-1985* (Vancouver: The University of British Columbia Press), 1988, 104-105.

[57]Lund, 26-28.

United Kingdom.[58] The RNCC reopened as the new Royal Canadian Naval College (RCNC), Royal Roads, near Esquimalt on 21 October, 1942. Opening on the anniversary a great British victory, Trafalgar Day, signaled the navy's linkage with RN history.[59] Training remained steeped in the traditions of the RN because the RCNC essentially "became a copy of the former RNCC, itself based on the RN model.[60] The college had borrowed RN instructors and the requirement to complete Sub-Lieutenant training in Greenwich, England followed by two years at sea remained. Additionally, any officer progressing to engineering occupations completed further training at the Royal Naval Engineering College at Keyman.[61] The bound with the RN grew.

Over the years Royal Roads went through many changes and ended its service to the navy as a joint services college. Though it remained associated with its heritage found in the RN, the college shut its doors in 1995 as a distinctly Canadian educational facility that helped mold the Canadian naval officer's identity.[62]

With the end of the war in Europe approaching Britain was feeling the financial strains of sustaining a massive war effort for nearly five and a half years. With the United States recognized as the major naval force in the Pacific, the RN was able to conduct a post-war downsizing. In order to reduce the size of its navy many surplus

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[58] Willmott, H.P. ,*World War* (London: Dorling Kindersley Limited), 2004, 168.

[59] William A. March, "A Canadian Departure: The evolution of HMCS Royal Roads, 1942-1948", in Micheal L. Hadley, Robert Huebert and Fred W. Crickland, *A Nation's Navy: In Quest of Canadian Naval Identity* (McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal and Kinston, 1996), Ch 13, 303.

[60]Lund, 44.

[61] Richard A. Preston, "MARCOM Education: Is it a Break from Tradition?" In W.A.B. Douglas, *The RCN in Transition 1910-1985,* Vancouver: The University of British Columbia Press, 1988, 68-69

[62]March, 308-309.

warships were transferred to Australia, New Zealand and Canada, the aim of which was to create a large Commonwealth fleet able to protect the British Empire and her dominions well into the future. An offset of this was an increased identification of the Canadian Navy as a continuation of the RN. Accepted by many officers based on their training and sea experience with the RN, the ramifications of this failure to establish a unique force with its own identity, one that sailors could have pride in, would have a substantial role to play in a series of events that shocked the navy soon after the war.

The events occurred over a three month period, between February and March, in 1949, and were termed official "Incidents" as opposed to "Mutinies" by the navy. The first occurred in HMCS ATHABASKAN during a fuelling stop in Mexico. Approximately ninety men, all under the rating of Leading Seamen, were involved. They refuse to report to their stations and had locked themselves into their mess, demanding to see the Captain. When the Captain entered the mess deck he noticed a list of demands from the crew but he covered it with his hat to avoid acknowledging its existence. Following a discussion with the Captain the men returned to work, though many receive formal cautions due to their actions.[63]

Nearly two weeks later, on March 15, a similar “protest” was held in HMCS *Crescent* while she was alongside Nanjing, China. In this incident, eighty-three Leading

[63]Report on certain "Incidents" which occurred on board H.M.C. Ships ATHABASKAN, CRESCENT and MAGNIFICENT and on other matters concerning the Royal Canadian Navy / Rapport sur certains "incidents" survenus à bord de L'ATHABASKAN, du CRESCENT et du MAGNIFICENT et sur d'autres questions relatives à la Marine royale canadienne (short title, The Mainguy Report) (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1949),14. By consciously not noticing the written demands of the sailors the Captain was able to avoid it being used as evidence in a Mutiny trial.

Seamen and below refused to report for a Hands Fall-in pipe, though once again it was defused following an 'unofficial discussion' with the protesters.[64]

The final incident occurred on March 20th when thirty-two aircraft handlers in the aircraft carrier HMCS MAGNIFICENT, then at sea in the Caribbean Sea, refused an order to conduct morning cleaning stations.[65] Once again, the Commanding Officer was able to restore order and avoid what could have evolved into a mutiny.[66]

Why are these incidents important in the study of individual identity in the navy? Their importance is found in the representation of the massive impact a loss of identity can have on individuals within group dynamics. The structure of a military force along with the instillation of a sense of duty and respect for legitimate authority is designed to prevent such occurrences, but in the Social Identity Theory, studied by Tajfel and Turnera in *Psychology of Intergroup Relations* it is accepted that a social group can establish its own identity, sometimes overpowering the personal identity even as important as that may become. Identity within a group and establishment of the much talked about esprit de corps comes from the history of the group but also what all the individuals bring to the group.[67]

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[64]Mainguy Report, 17.

[65]Dr. Richard Gimblett, "Too many chiefs and not enough seamen: the lower-deck complement of a post war Canadian Navy destroyer - The case of HMCS CRESCENT, March 1949," re-printed in Andrew Lambert, (ed), *Naval History 1850-Present, Volume II*, London: Ashgate,1.

[66]Dr. Richard Gimblett, *Dissension in the Ranks "Mutinies" in the Royal Canadian Navy*. http://www.navalandmilitarymuseum.org/resource_pages/controversies/rcn_mutinies.html; Internet, accessed 16 January 2009.

[67]Faye Bellanca, The Social Identity Theory, Progressive Resources Ltd, Exeter University Hampshire, Internet, http://www.teambuilding.co.uk/social_identity_theory.html; Internet, accessed 1 February 2009.

The Mainguy report, submitted by the commissioner of the investigation, Rear-Admiral Rollo Mainguy, concurs with this theory in their report of the incidents, what their interviews revealed and the subsequent reasoning behind their recommendations. Within these recommendations was the concept of individual identity. There was an almost unanimous response that the current uniforms were inadequate. An absence of any badges or styling failed to create a distinguished Canadian identity in the Navy. As well, there was an assertion of "an uncaring officer corps harbouring aristocratic British attitudes inappropriate to Canadian democratic sensitivities"[68] that went beyond the issue of a sailors' morale and addressed the very basic nature of Canadian Navy identity.

The Mainguy report is supported by naval historians as a valid study, and is described by Dr Gimblett as "a watershed in the Navy's history, whose findings, recommendations and conclusions remain a potent legacy."[69] Certainly there were other factors that lead to the 'incidents', but the importance of personal identity and the effect it has on the individual with respect to job satisfaction cannot be discounted. The navy accepted many of the recommendations of the Mainguy report and as a result ended the practice of sending midshipmen executive officers to the RN for training.

This is not to say that the leaders in the navy should be concerned of an officer-lead mutiny because it is practically impossible to tell the difference between an Engineering officer, a Personnel Selection Officer, a MARS officer or a naval Cadet Instructor Cadre (CIC) officer. What it does show, however, that there is credence to the

[68]Gimblett, Dissension in the Ranks.

[69]*Ibid.*

fact that personal identity is an important factor in establishing pride in service. The loss of the professional identity uniquely belonging to the aforementioned officers, as well as all those that don the naval uniform, may not cause mass exodus from the CF, but re-introduction of identity can improve the pride in service of the naval officer.

Important to consider is that the Mainguy report was the result of "incidents" initiated by junior ranked sailors. Thus, most of the results and recommendations focused on their complaints. Not two years earlier, in 1947, the identity of the regular service MARS officer was reduced when a Naval Board, responding to complaints about an elitist type of separation that Reserve officers reported as existing between the Regular and Reserve Force naval officer. This signaled the end of the "Wavy Navy" when the wavy lace was ordered removed from Reservists uniforms in order to standardize the appearance between the two forces.[70] Though brought on by supposed complaints, the removal of the wavy braid had negative impacts on both forces, and possibly more so with the naval reservist.

For the Regular Force MARS officer it was the loss of a distinguishing as a full-time naval officer, but the Reservist lost the ability to indicate their unique contribution to the navy. Most Reservist MARS officer holds down full-time civilian jobs and dedicates hours away from their employment to naval service. This sacrifice warrants special identification and should be recognized by their profession. To take away this special identity found in the wavy braid lumps them into the naval officer 'family' is indeed actually a blow to their sense of self and pride in a unique dedication to service.

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[70]Lund, 140.

The lessons learned concerning the importance identity following the Mainguy report were again lost in the naval officer community within years. While efforts were made to have Canadian badges appear on uniforms of NCMs and maple leaf emblems on ship funnels, some of the ramifications of reducing the British traditions in such areas as ensigns and uniforms within the navy led to many painful events for the naval officers over the decades to follow.[71]

By 1955 the navy had taken more steps away from the RN identity with the move from British naval aircraft to American as well as the design of the uniquely Canadian St. Laurent Class of warship.[72] In the late 1950's a further step at separating RCN and RN identities was taken through the ceasing of the British practice of distinguishing between non-executive officers through the use of colours between the rank stripes and a union of officers into a General List, Special Duty list or Limited Duty List. First to occur was a naval officer listing policy based on enrolment criteria following release of the Admiral Tisdall Ad Hoc Committee report on RCN personnel structure.

Seen as a method of actually breaking down the branch atmosphere in the navy, the General List principle would be enforced if all distinctive cloth and insignia was removed from officer uniforms.[73] To support the notion of General Lists it was argued as well that it was becoming just far too complicated to attempt to distinguish between all

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[71]Alan Filewood, "Theatre, Navy and The Narrative of 'True Canadianism'," in *Theatre Research in Canada*, Vol. 13 No. 1&2 (Spring/Fall 1992).

[72]Peter Haydon, Sailors, Admirals, and Politicians: The Search for Identity after the War, in Micheal L. Hadley, Robert Huebert and Fred W. Crickland, A Nation's Navy: In Quest of Canadian Naval Identity (McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal and Kinston, 1996), Ch 13, 234-235.

[73]Commodore E.P. Tisdale, *The Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on RCN Personnel Structure*, Naval Headquarters Ottawa, 1957, 107.

the various types of non-executive officers that existed with the navy. The Ad Hoc committee of 1957 had felt that the traditional system of branches and specialization was too rigid for a modern naval service, and that the new system would make the RCN a more efficient and economical force.[74] Without true consideration to the identity of the officer corps, from 1959 onward there would be basically two types of officers; executive, or combatant officers, and non-combatant officers, such as Medical, Legal or Selection Officers (often referred to as purple occupations).

Though simple in theory, it must be realized that this return to the seventeenth and eighteenth century days of executive and non-executive was to a time when the only type of naval officer was what today would be termed a MARS officer. A naval officer's personal sense of identity would not have been an issue then. However, in the nineteenth century the occupation of an officer engineer emerged, as well as pursers, surgeons and parsons, eradicating the former simple identification process.[75]

As additional occupations had emerged in the twentieth century the use of colours had given the various occupations a personal sense of pride in identification with a distinguishable naval occupation. That ability was now gone. The sole distinction that remained was that of the "sea-going officer" through the use of the executive curl on sleeves and shoulder ranks. This too would soon be gone when the Unification Policy struck at the heart of CF and naval identity.

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[74]Tisdale., 117-118.

[75]Graeme Arbuckle, *Customs and Traditions of the Canadian Navy* (Halifax: Nimbus Publishing), 1984, 148.

Section Four – The Unification Years – Assumption of the Army Identification

The sense of identity is a critical factor in directing an individual through their career.[76] Previous sections illustrated the nature of the profession and its identity requirements, and where Canadian naval identity arose. This next section reviews perhaps the darkest moments for the navy – Unification.

Between 1960 and 1980 Canada took on the process of casting off its colonial mentality. Early in this process Canadians had started measuring the RCN in its own right, as the service of an independent, sovereign state. This was facilitated by armed forces unification, announced in 1964 and put into effect on 1 January 1968. With that the Royal Canadian Navy ceased to exist, becoming Maritime Command of the New Canadian Armed Forces and adopting the new standard green uniform of the combined forces. Unification shock the navy to its core, forcing a process of redefinition and the retirement of many of the last wartime veterans, who either did not nor could not accept Canadianization of the navy.

"Among the many crises that the Canadian navy has experienced, perhaps few have been regarded as so bent upon destroying the naval identity as [Minister of National Defence] Paul Hellyer's policies of armed forces unification."[77] Paul Hellyer was appointed as Minister of National Defence in the Spring of 1963 and within hours of assuming the office he set out making changes. Defence expenditure programs were

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[76]S. Albert, B. Ashforth and J. Dutton (2000), Organizational Identity and Identification: Charting New Waters and Building New Bridges, *Academy of Management Review*, Vol. 25, No. 1, 13-14.

[77]Micheal L. Hadley, Robert Huebert and Fred W. Crickland, A Nation's Navy: In Quest of Canadian Naval Identity, (McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal and Kinston, 1996, 11.

either cut or put under review and the first indications of bold new changes in the military began to arise.[78]

Unification occurred on February 1, 1968, when the RCN, the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) and the Canadian Army were merged to form the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). The navy was no longer a navy, but a force under the title of Maritime Command.[79] From the moment of unification, the navy has experienced an exceptional loss of naval traditions and naval identity. "Morale in the armed forces has suffered [from] the trauma of changing traditional navy, army and air force uniforms for look-alike green outfits…."[80] Another aspect of assuming the army green uniforms was that there was no longer a way to even differentiate between the Master Seaman and Below, the Chiefs, Petty Officers or Officers by uniform. The traditional square rig uniform worn by the sailors and known universally world-wide was gone, as were the distinctive 8-button tunics for officers.[81]

The loss of the executive curl for the sea-going naval officer put MARS, Naval Engineers and Sea Logistic officers in an elite group following Unification. Unfortunately, being a member of this group was not a bragging right for most sea-going Canadian naval officers, for it places them in the small group of France and Bulgaria as the only other navies in the world that do not distinguish their sea-going naval officer

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[78]Jeffry V. Brock, The Thunder and the Sunshine with many voices, McClelland and Steward Limited, 1983, 16-18.

[79]Marc Milner, *Canada's Navy: The First Century* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press), 1999, 261.

[80]Peter Ward, "Playing Defence," *Weekend Magazine* (The Whig Standard, April 16, 1977), 4.

[81]Tony German, *The Sea is at Our Gates: The History of the Canadian Navy* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart)1990, 303.

from their shore-bound counter-parts.[82] As stated by Albert, Ashforth and Dundon, identity is a critical aspect of directing an individual through their working world. The naval officer truly works worldwide and a loss of recognizable identity worldwide is counter to this philosophy.

Independence from the Monarch may have been a Unification goal, but the executive curl is not a symbol of the Monarch or the UK but uniquely navy, just as world renowned as the navy rank structure. One must consider, however, that the Commander-in Chief of the CF is the Governor General, the Queen's representative in Canada. Canadian warships bear the name of Her Majesty's Canadian Ship and the dockyard in Halifax, NS, is Her Majesty's Canadian Dockyard. The precedence has been set by higher authority than the navy. Even if the curl was linked to Her Majesty, would this not be just an extension of a tradition already established? A lack of an executive curl has on occasion seen a naval officer suffer the same indignity recognized in the Mainguy report; they are not recognized as Canadian sea-going naval officers but as Canadian officers. It may be a subtle difference but it is enough to reduce the identity of the true hard-sea officer occupations.

Acceptance of this drastic loss of identity was painful for those that had 'grown up' in the navy and had once had great pride in the naval service traditions born from their roots in the British RN. Harder to accept was that while unification was promoted as brought on by budget concerns within the government, but was actually a measure for

[82] *Jane's Fighting Ships 2007-2008.* Edited by Commodore Stephan Saunders RN. Coulsdon: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 39-65.

the government to gain public acceptance of its defence policy.[83] Commonality of service may be cost effective but the blow it delivered to the institution of the navy, the morale it destroyed and the esprit de corps it prevented is without doubt.[84]

The Minister of National Defence of the time, Paul Hellyer, presented the proposal for Unification to Parliament attested that Unification would create a common identity stronger than the existing elements currently enjoyed, that a "higher loyalty beyond that which is given to a particular service,"[85] a loyalty to the entire force and its total objectives on behalf of Canada. It was felt that with a higher loyalty to the Canadian Forces as a whole there would be a more objective analysis and assessment of military operations and requirements. Though the Army initially supported the proposal and the Air Force remained somewhat neutral, the navy was against it from the initial stages.[86] The navy fight was not just against loss of identity though, for the Armed Forces had a very complex command structure that was bound to be destroyed by unifying three very specialized branches of defence. Many other nations looked on with concern about the weakening effect Unification would have on the fighting effectiveness of the three services.[87]

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[83]Michael Hennessey, "Fleet Replacement and the Crisis of Identity," in Michael L. Hadley, Robert Huebert and Fred W. Crickland, *A Nation's Navy: In Quest of Canadian Naval Identity* (McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal and Kinston), 1996, 131.

[84]Paul Kennedy, "Naval Mastery: The Canadian Context," in Douglas, RCN in Transition 1910-1985, 32.

[85]Government of Canada, House of Commons Debates, Official Report, 1st Session, 27th Parliament, Vol X, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 17 November – 18 December, 1967, 10829.

[86]Paul Hellyer, *Damn the Torpedoes: My fight to unify Canada's armed forces* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart), 1990, 117.

[87]Brock, 123-125.

The passing of Bill C-243 titled the *Canadian Forces Reorganization Act* in 1968 spelt the end for the Royal Canadian Navy, the Royal Canadian Air Force and the Canadian Army as separate entities while destroying the unique identities of the RCN and RCAF. Although potentially the move made economic sense, the amount of history, colour and tradition lost was catastrophic. Canadian Naval Officers and their men found themselves displaced from a fiercely proud organization to one without identity or recognizable symbols and rank structures overnight. Uniforms, ranks, and the name of a sailor's ship were eradicated from uniforms with almost brutal efficiency and the navy was clothed in a green, non-descript uniform not unlike any other serviceman in the country. Recognized as a precondition by Abbott for the development of positive employee attitudes towards their jobs, the negative impact of unification is understood; loss of unique identification

Concern over this loss of identity did not rest solely within the navy. General Jean Allard, the second Chief of the Defence Staff under unification, was concerned that his beloved Van Doos would be lost in an attempt to emulate the Marines in a tri-service structure so he opposed certain aspects of the unification policy. He even appealed to Rear-Admiral Landymore for support, one of the most notable Admirals to be affected by the Unification policy, reasoning that unification would threaten the traditions within the RCN as well. However, Landymore was against unification in whole and would later be relieved of his duties.[88] Thus, with one shortsighted bill, sixty years of Canadian Naval history and an even longer connection with the Royal Navy was tossed aside.

[88]Doublas, 78-80.

Promoted primarily as a means of fiscal restraint, Hellyer sold the unification of the Forces as a measure of attaining greater pride in service through a family-type of connotation: "One force with one name, a common uniform, and common rank designations will nurture this total family loyalty."[89] There was even consideration that with the greater numbers of non-traditional line officer occupations in the military, such as dental, legal, pay and intelligence, there may be the requirement to develop a fourth element uniform for support trades. As opposed to the adoption of identifiers on uniforms, four uniforms seemed extreme and the common-sense solution was to just choose one – and the green uniform was born.[90] As far as the navy was concerned, forgotten were the lessons from Mainguy Report on the concerns of Canadian sailors having an absence of Canadian identification in the navy and the subsequent recommendations for identification changes.[91] Though mostly concerning the 'ratings' at the time, this lack of recognition has now shifted to the officer corps. As illustrated in the earlier discussion of professional legitimacy in sections two, this loss of identifiers is contrary to the sociologically studied and recognized requirement to instill a sense of self in individuals.

Hellyer's budget cut measures displayed the unwillingness of the Canadian government to maintain the navy at a level that could contribute effectively to collective defence, an example of which was the cancellation of the General Purpose Frigate (GPF)

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[89]Government of Canada, House of Commons Debates, Official Report, 1st Session, 27th Parliament, Vol X, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 17 November – 18 December, 1967, 10828.

[90]Hellyer, 173.

[91]Mainguy Report, 33.

project in October 1963.[92] Though the cancellation was explained as coming as a result of cost overruns in the program, it was actually tied more to the reforms in defence policies and defence spending by the new Liberal government.[93] The loss of the GPF meant the RCN's search for an identity as a force capable of operations anywhere in the word was gone, leaving Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) as the navy's only *raison d'etre*.[94] The fleet was restricted now to this essentially anti-submarine role with fewer hulls, focused on a token commitment to the newly established Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) under the North American Treaty Organization (NATO), a specialization that only made sense if the Canadian navy oriented principally as a component of the NATO alliance. Canadian Naval Identity, in other words, was now almost entirely predicated upon is integration in NATO.[95]

Integration with NATO was followed soon after by Unification and the 'Admirals Revolt' which included RAdm Landymore.[96] A decorated World War II veteran and in command of the East Coast fleet at the time of Unification, Landymore was "popular, admired by all ranks, and is remembered as being a forthright, four-square, hands-on

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[92]Dan W. Middleness, "Economic Considerations in the Development of the Canadian Navy since 1945", in W.A.B. Douglas, *The RCN in Transition 1910-1985*, 264.

[93]Michael A. Hennessy, Fleet Replacement and the Crisis of Identity, in Micheal L. Hadley, Robert Huebert and Fred W. Crickland, A Nation's Navy: In Quest of Canadian Naval Identity, (McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal and Kinston, 1996, Ch 8, 151.

[94]*Ibid.*, 133.

[95] Micheal L. Hadley, Robert Huebert and Fred W. Crickland, *A Nation's Navy: In Quest of Canadian Naval Identity* (McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal and Kinston), 1996, 11.

[96]R.B. Byers, "Canada and Maritime Defence: Past Problems, Future Challenges," in Douglas, 321.

commander and staff officer."[97] Using this popularity as a weapon against unification, he took on the Defence Minister Hellyer over the consequences to naval identity that unification threatened. Unfortunately, it would mean his forced release from the military when he deliberately defied Hellyer over his plan to unify the three services into a single force wearing a green uniform.

Landymore's believed passionately in the RCN's British heritage and his defiance was due to his fear of the navy losing its unique identity along with the traditional naval uniform and rank structure. Faced with the un-envious position of being the head of the navy, to not accept the orders of the government he was given no choice but to resign unless he relented to the unification policy. However, Landymore believed in the requirement to maintain the navy's identity, feeling that unification would ultimately split the military as opposed to the plan of bringing it together into one family. "In his professional opinion, economy and proper command and control could be achieved by integration alone."[98] Landymore felt that "Unification was unnecessary and highly unpalatable to the vast majority, he said - and Landymore knew his people."[99]

In a struggle to restore the identity crisis the navy was fighting and as a measure of maintaining the soul of the RCN, Landymore organized an opposition designed to fight Hellyer's unification policy. Though facing the appearance of being disloyal, he convened meetings in Halifax, NS, with over 300 officers of the rank of Lieutenant

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[97]Micheal Whitby, Richard H. Gimblett and Peter Haydon, *The Admirals: Canada's Senior Naval Leadership in the Twentieth Century* (Toronto : Dundurn Press), 2006, 279.

[98]Tony German, *The Sea is at Our Gates: The History of the Canadian Navy*. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, c1990. 285.

[99]*Ibid*., 285.

Commander and above to discuss the loss of naval identity issue. He received a nearly unanimous support to his position.[100] These results were reported to Hellyer and they received the anticipated response: Hellyer was shocked that a senior officer of Landymore's stature would defy his directions in such an open forum, but was equally impressed by Landymore's sense of duty towards to navy, stating:

> To his credit … he took me seriously and worked out a strategy not unlike a political campaign. He made frequent visits 'below decks' to ingratiate himself with the sailors… He would be [the sailors] champion.[101]

A standing committee of national defence was scheduled for June 1965 to address naval concerns over unification. Protocol demanded that Landymore submit his report prior to attending the committee. His remarks concerning the loss of identity of the navy that unification would pose to the navy were changed by Hellyer's staff due to their negative connotations. In open defiance to Hellyer, Landymore delivered his original testament unchanged so that his expert evidence concerning the importance of identity in the navy would be heard.[102]

With no option left to him, Hellyer requested that Landymore resign his position on July 12, 1966. When Landymore refused, preferring that the minister relieve him of his duties, Hellyer took action: "There was no alternative but to fire Landymore," wrote Mr. Hellyer. "He didn't seem too surprised when he heard the verdict."[103]

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[100]German., 286.

[101]Paul Hellyer, *Damn the Torpedoes: My fight to unify Canada's armed forces* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart), 1990, 158.

[102]Marc Milner, *Canada's Navy: The First Century* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press), 1999, 251-252.

[103]Hellyer, 159.

However, Landymore did not give up the ship easily, a testament to the importance he saw in maintaining identity in the naval services he loved. He sought a meeting with Prime Minister Lester Pearson in an attempt to persuade Pearson to stop unification. This, too, failed. Though Pearson did promise that traditions of the naval would not be affected, unification would proceed as a fully supported policy. Landymore was faced with the finality of his fight when Pearson neither stopped unification nor protected the navy's beloved traditions.[104]

The controversy that Landymore stirred through his much publicized attack on the policy of unification presents an indicator of the true weight he placed on the identity of the naval. Ships would remain painted grey and would serve as a force at sea, but the loss of the unique uniform removed the ability for a sailor or naval officer to be identified by the uniform they wore. Loss of the identity of the sailor and a simple title change, from the Royal Canadian Navy to Maritime Command, forced Landymore into a battle that would cost him his career.

The publicity of this battle won him the admiration of the sailors for whom he fought. His dismissal was public knowledge, as were the reasons behind the action, and the enormous controversy it created was arguably the greatest in Canadian military history. As a testament to its magnitude, hundreds of letters of protest were sent to Pearson, though without success. Landymore, confident that he had done what was best for the navy with his attempts to warn of the ramifications of unification, released his farewell message to the fleet, in which he stated. "I have tried every way I know to bring

[104]German, 288.

to the attention of the proper authorities my concern about the growing unrest in the navy over the consequences which would arise from loss of our identity."[105]

His stance is similar to that of Abbott and Albert from previous sections. This importance of identity is seen from the direction he passed to all his officers and sailors, for he believed the loss of a naval identity was worth releasing from the navy, but the fact that it is so critical to the individual their decision should be supported without repercussion.[106]

Landymore was not the only senior officer to leave the military over the controversial Unification policy. Within weeks of the unification announcement retirements started, all but one before reaching retirement age. By July 1966, only 2 of the Canadian Forces top thirteen officers remained in service, six of those retiring were admirals.[107]

Though certainly not as extreme an issue today as it was then, many personal accounts from naval officers reflect this stance: when the navy lost its identity they lost their reason to serve the navy. This ideal provides testament to the extreme effect personal identity holds even above the duty to serve. If the navy does not recognize a naval officer's accomplishments, professional achievements or distinct identity, their reasons to remain in the navy are diminished to the point of them possibly seeking early retirement for civilian employment. Landymore expressed regret for not being successful

[105]RAdm Landymore, *From RADM Landymore* (CANMARCOM 190429Z JULY 1966, UNCLAS MARGEN 149 0225 FROM RADM LANDYMORE), Para 2.

[106]Landymore, MARGEN 149, Para 3.

[107]German, 288.

and maintaining the naval identity he knew was at the heart and soul of every sailor. He also knew he was leaving the navy at a time when it was very vulnerable. He was correct. Unification went forward and the RCN ceased to exist.

Seen in Figure one, the military profession is made up of three basic facets; identity, expertise and responsibility. These factors are not used solely to differentiate the profession of arms from other professions, but it also serves to differentiate within the service, allowing all to differentiate from each other. Had this concept been realized in the Unification years it is doubtful the policy would have been supported. However, this section revealed the ramifications of the policy on the navy and the Forces in general. The following sections will review the recovery of identity post Unification.

Section Five – Post Unification to Present – Efforts to regain Identity

The Unification years remain the lowest in Canadian naval history, as Unification was a constant reminder to the navy that the RCN was gone and along with it went many traditions, primarily the identity gained by wearing the tradition naval uniform recognized around the world. From the previously mentioned Mainguy report, the lack of distinctive Canadian markings on the RCN uniform was a concern to many sailors, but they were at least identifiable as sailors and naval officers. Unification took even that away. The MARS officer's naval uniform was gone, as was the rank structure. Worse still, sailors looked on while the title of their fleet, Royal Canadian Navy, was replaced with Maritime Command, even though the army maintained their heritage – the Royal Canadian Regiment, Royal 22nd, Royal Canadian Artillery, etc. lived on.

Abbott noted that professionals draw much of their self-esteem more from their own world than from the public, but the world of a naval officer consists of interaction with other navies. Interaction during a foreign port reception may see several navies interacting socially and professionally. In this atmosphere it is pride in uniform as well as recognizable identifiers that allow self-esteem to be established amongst peers. During Unification the wearing of the green uniform would be contrary to any recommendation of a proper method of establishing esprit de corps or pride. Though the Mainguy report confirmed that the RCN was in desperate need of its own sense of

identity, to separate them from all other navies in NATO was certainly not within Mainguy's recommendations.[108]

The identity concern was having on morale within the navy were forces that drove many high ranking naval officers, both serving and retired, to maintain pressure on the government to re turn the CF to a tri-service institution. Defence committees in 1979 (the Fyffe committee) and in 1983 (the Lafond committee) heard from several naval officers that the navy was now being ridiculed in their green uniforms and for their lack of naval traditions. A Task Force set up to review Unification also reported that CF members were unhappy about there loss of identity.[109] The Liberal government had no inclination to return to a distinctly tri-element service but the Conservatives noted the concerns and strong desires of senior officers to cease the Unification Policy. Included in their campaign promises in 1984, the Conservatives promised to return a sense of identity to the services if elected into power. Upon their election, they moved quickly to fulfil this promise.[110]

Naval morale finally began to regain its strength in 1985. Equally important to the announcement of new ships was the Conservative plan to eliminate certain aspects of

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[108] Peter Haydon, "Sailors, Admirals, and Politicians: The Search for Identity after the War", in Micheal L. Hadley, Robert Huebert and Fred W. Crickland, *A Nation's Navy: In Quest of Canadian Naval Identity* (McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal and Kinston, 1996), Ch 13, 233.

[109] G.M. Pyffe – Chairman, Dr. H. Critchley – Member, Dr. A. Legault – Member, Mr. E.A. Olmstead – Member, Major-General P.A. Neatby – Member, W.M. Ritchie – Executive Secretary, Task Force on Review of Unification of The Canadian Armed Forces: Final Report, 15 March, 1980, (Ottawa: Ministry of National Defence, 1980), 98.

[110] R.B. Byers, *Canada and Maritime Defence: Past Problems, Future Challenges*, Ch 16, in Douglas, 321-322.

Unification, specifically the restoration of the tradition coloured uniforms in the form of a Distinctive Environmental Uniform (DEU). The importance of returning to a distinctive naval uniform cannot be underestimated, for "although the tendency is to focus on ships as the essential elements of a navy, it is in fact the people that make a navy what it is."[111] Senior officers within MARCOM supported the return to the traditional navy blue uniform as an inspirational measure of returning the professional sea service attitude the navy had found in the RN and the RCN of previous years. The MARS officer could now be identified as a naval officer, but not distinctively MARS yet. As the navy set a course for a more Canadianized navy it worked to instil the sense of identity in individuals. Return of the naval uniform was a positive step. Loss of traditional toasts of the day was seen as a negative step. However, the naval identity was returning, and while some of the traditions of the RN may have been lost, many remained. The separation from the RN would remain amicable.[112]

In broad terms it is also accepted that the navy has acknowledged the importance of identity for other service elements when working within MARCOM and has taken lessons learned from the introduction of the Canadian Disruptive Pattern (CADPAT) as dress of the day in headquarters positions National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ). When CADPAT uniforms were worn in headquarters areas by all elements, it was practically a return step towards previous Unification concerns. However, the desire to maintain the environmental identity brought about authority for naval personnel wearing

[111]Peter Haydon, Sailors, Admirals, and Politicians: The Search for Identity after the War, in Micheal L. Hadley, Robert Huebert and Fred W. Crickland, A Nation's Navy: In Quest of Canadian Naval Identity, (McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal and Kinston, 1996), Ch 13, 231.

[112]Richard A. Preston, MARCOM Education: Is it a Break from Tradition? In W.A.B. Douglas, The RCN in Transition 1910-1985, The University of British Columbia Press, 1988, 89.

CADPAT to wear distinctive tee-shirts under their uniforms, namely black to reflect the navy.[113] It was a small measure, but it was also an obvious indication of acceptance of the importance identity is for the individual.

While the navy was concerned with a lack of naval identity when wearing CADPAT uniforms, they realized they may be just as guilty of striking a blow to the identity of army and air force personnel working within naval units where Naval Combat Dress (NCDs) is the directed uniform for all personnel, except fire fighters and air crew. To rectify the loss of identity, corrective measures were taken to solve this dissatisfying situation. Naval personnel were authorized to wear black tee-shirts as an undergarment to their NCDs. Additionally, for all personnel that wore the army Distinctive Environmental Uniform (DEU) were authorized to wear green tee-shirts under NCDs and all air force personnel that wear air force DEU were authorized to wear blue tee-shirts.[114]

This measure was in conjunction with another effort to retain air force and army identities in the navy; distinctive name tags. Air force and naval personnel in CADPAT wear distinctive nametags but the practice was not emulated within the navy. However, in 2006 proposals were put forth by the navy to provide air force and army personnel wearing NCDs air force and army nametags at an approximated cost of $10 000. Utilizing the design currently in use for CADPATs, the implementation of the dress amend would have army and air force personnel wearing the naval coloured name tapes and a symbol depicting their respective environmental affiliation (crossed sword or

[113]National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) meesage – Maritime Staff MARGEN 027-08 CMS 048-08 NAVAL DRESS UPDATE - NAVAL COMBAT DRESS CANFORGEN 027/07 - 07 CMS 008/07 191431Z FEB 07.

[114]NDHQ message – Chief of Maritime Staff 3371-5250-1 2008/09/02 CMS 048-08 NAVAL DRESS UPDATE - NAVAL COMBAT DRESS.

albatross) beside their name embossed in the Naval coloured thread. The Director of Maritime Personnel presented the recommendation to the Naval Board Executive Committee (NBEC) in 2005. Acceptance of the change is pending.[115]

While these measures assist in retaining identity, pride and esprit de corps within the elements on a whole, they are also useful in fighting a bigger negative impact of personnel within each of the elements; the philosophy of the CF and DND as a Defence Team. The team philosophy certainly is a positive enforcer of unity, sense of belonging to a greater cause and a way of putting into effect the notion that the institution is indeed a collection of individuals that have a common goal. If seen as a jigsaw puzzle, all the pieces are required to make the entire picture. In the profession of arms, the concept of all personnel being needed in place to get the job done is supportable, but there are aspects of the team ideal that can be a concern.

The "Defence Team" and its negative impact on identity

The Canadian Forces and DND are identified as a Defence Team that consists of the Regular Force, the Reserves, Civilians employees and contractors, etc. Included in the Reserves is the Cadet Instructor Cadre, the commissioned cadet officers that instruct cadets. The Defence team goal, to instil a sense of everyone pulling in the same direction, of having the same goal and priorities, can remain as a driving philosophy, but

[115]Director of Maritime Personnel Requirements - 3371-5250-Vol 1 (D Mar Pers 3-4-2/RDIMS # 86385) 26 Sep 2006.

there must remain consideration that it does not in effect take away from the individual's unique identity as a professional in their respective elements.

The method of aligning beliefs, motivations and cultures that instil that sense will maintaining identity is achieved through the distinctiveness of uniforms, of traditions within the element and even down to specific units. The Defence team brings the CF together, but within the Defence team are individuals that relate their profession to the Profession of Arms in Canada. These philosophies can clash within the warrior who sees his identity merely as a member of a team that consists of civilians and contractors that hold equal status. The division of labour must be utilized to protect the professional warrior sense in those that seek it.

Also, adoption of this team philosophy should not be expected to promote a notion of self like some other military forces. Ask a pilot, infantryman, Supply Officer or Administration Clerk in the U.S. Marines want they do for a living and their first response will most likely be "I'm a Marine". The Canadian Forces does not have that identity nor should it be expected to have one. In Franke's book on identity within the US Marines, he describes the extreme effect that the graduation ceremony has on the establishment of individual identity within a new Marine. Marines conduct some of the most intensive training of an armed force over a 54 week training regiment, an endeavour labelled "The Crucible" by a former commandant of the Marine Corps. On graduation from basic training, successful Marines "are awarded the Marine globe and anchor insignia - a mark of distinction among armed forces which designates the chosen few

accepted into the culture of the Corps." [116] The significance of this simple decoration is captured in a story Krulak recalls about one specific young marine that completed "The Crucible" successfully. Emerging from the graduation ceremony, clutching the newly acquired Marine decoration, he declared through tears that "I am somebody!"[117]

To the Marines, receipt of their anchor and globe is a symbol of accomplishment and acceptance into a new vocation that separates them from other peer groups within the US armed forces. They have a visual representation that they are now a professional Marine. The CF defence team attitude can adversely affect this type of personal sense of self and identity if it does not also strive to recognize the individuals within the team.

"While the Marine Corps is truly distinctive, each of the armed services seeks to make new recruits feel they are part of something important, distinctive, and purposeful. The imperative for this approach transcends patriotic purpose or nationalism."[118] The Canadian Army has adopted this philosophy. An Infantry, Artillery, Armour or Logistics officer is identified by collar decorations, thus signifying their occupation. For many regiments their affiliation adorns their slip-ons as well. Similarly, the Air Force awards differentiating wings to pilots, navigators, air weapons controllers, etc. as a recognition factor for accomplishment as well as self identity.

Unification may have sought to inspire this ideal in all Canadian service personnel, but Canada can not pursue such a sense of association to a larger organization

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[116]Volker Franke, Preparing for Peace: Military Identity, Value Orientations, and Professional Military education, Westport, Conn : Praeger, 2000, xi.

[117]Franke, xii.

[118] Franke, xii.

as a way of establishing a notion of self. "The military probably plays a relatively minor part in the formation of an identity in a country such as Canada. Canada, lacking a revolutionary tradition, gives even less significance to the military than the United States.[119] The notion of "I'm a marine" comes from a long history of service to the United States and a brilliant recruiting motto that speaks to the heritage that they are a unique force. "The Few. The Proud. The Marines."[120]

The US Army had approached this method of identity with "An Army of One" in the early 2000s but found that it lost some of its identity in the individual serviceman. The Marines can be seen as a force of Marines, but the "Army of One" brought about a loss of the personal identity and made the individual of lesser importance than the whole. Recognizing the importance for identity, the US Army adopted the recruitment slogan of "Army Strong." This slogan returns the focus to the individual through the statement: "You are strong. We'll make you Army Strong."[121] The Army recruiting strategy has captured Abbott's stance on identity - recognition of the individual is key to motivation in grander professions.

As previously stated, the importance of the uniform as a military force, that soldiers, sailors and air personnel all look alike, has deep roots in history. However, the requirement to encourage esprit de corps at the lowest levels remains. On a day-to-day basis it serves as a reminder to all about who is who and about what is important. In

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[119]Mildred A. Schwartz, *Public opinion and Canadian Identity* (Berkeley: University of California Press), 51.

[120]US Government, US Marine Corps motto, www.marines.com; Internet, accessed 11 February 2009.

[121]US Government, US Army recruiting slogan, www.goarmy.com; Internet, accessed 11 February 2009.

situation where individuals are brought together quickly it serves also as an instant developer of trust while establishing order and hierarchy quickly.

A further example is found in the unit cohesion difficulties the US Army faced in the 1980s following the Vietnam War period. Solutions included ensuring longer terms in the same unit to ensure soldiers could gain recognition within the group, but it also included the encouragement of units developing distinct uniform unit identifications and accoutrements.[122] Comparably recognized as important at the NCM level within the navy, trade badges were adorned on every uniform short of naval combat dress following the Unification era, but the officer corps to date has received no considerations for their natural desire to be identified within their element.

Theodore Caplow theorized that all true professions want to establish professional associations so that explicit membership prevents exclusion of the unqualified. They change their names so that they can lose their past identity and move forward, seeking a new legal recognition that protects it from outsiders.[123] The serviceman can attain his explicit membership and identity through his uniform. A Regular, Reserve or Cadet Instructor Officer gains the identity of a naval officer through the naval uniform they wear. Leaders that have commanded forces successfully throughout history recognize that their ability to elevate an individual's status or influence within the force, accomplished through promotions and associated pay increases, produces long term satisfaction for the professional within their profession. Recognition appears to be the

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[122]General Sir John Hackett, *The Profession of Arms*, (London: Sidgwick and Jackson), 1983, 195.

[123]Abbott, 11.

most important factor in producing satisfied professionals with civilian and military associations, because an individual always has wished to distinguish themselves from their peers by some outward sign.[124] The navy has grasped this concept, but in an inconsistent manner at best.

The Navy's Specialty Badges – The Recognition of the few

As stated, the navy has learned lessons from the past and taken measures to inspire pride in accomplishments. By fulfilling Abbott's sense of the worth requirement, some elements have clear identification methods for specific individuals and have understood important self-identity factors. "One way to recognize an individual for their distinct, earned qualification is to authorize the wear of a unique badge."[125] Until recently the only naval qualification badges were the submarine dolphins, ship's team diver pin and explosive ordinance (Clearance Diver) badge, all specialty badges that once earned are worn for the remainder of the respective career.

A submariner earning their "Dolphins" is a significant event in their career, one of those special high points that infuse tremendous personal pride and a sense of accomplishment. Earned through a process of intense self-study and examination, a submariner is now

Figure 2 – The Canadian Submariner Dolphin

Source: www.dundrun.com

[124]Capt(N) R.D. Yanow, "Canadian Forces Identity", Service paper, 21 April 1977, 14.

[125]CPO1 J.M. Davis, "Navy Dress," *Matelot* 2009, page 60.

recognizable as a unique individual with an expert knowledge within their profession, and the use of the submarine dolphin badge to recognize submariners meets the professional legitimacy factors sought through the study of professionals detailed in section 2 of this paper.

Just as the dolphin badge meets the sense of legitimacy in self, the Clearance Diver badge satisfies that requirement in the Clearance Divers community. Clearance Divers are all former ship's team or combat divers and thus have existing experience with underwater operations and the associated personal equipment. However, to earn the privilege of being employed as a clearance diver they must complete a grueling preliminary two-week course to even qualify for attendance of the year-long course. Successful completion means acceptance into an occupation within the navy that carries a great sense of personal achievement and pride. The navy recognizes the achievement of the divers and on successful completion of the course the students are awarded the coveted "dolphin" badge of the Clearance Diver (figure 3).[126]

Figure 3 – The Clearance Diver badge

Source: http://www.navy.forces.gc.ca/marpac/1/1-w_eng.asp?category=47&title=281

These two badges represent the legitimacy ideal of establishing identity of individual naval personnel amongst their peers. With these badges a sense of pride and self-esteem in their occupation is found.

[126]Department of National Defence, Maritime Force Pacific (MARPAC) website, http://www.navy.forces.gc.ca/marpac/1/1-w_eng.asp?category=47&title=281; Internet, access 23 January 2009.

Following the tradition of recognizing individuals, two additional badges have entered service within the last few years, namely the Reserves Port Inspection Diver (PID) badge that will replace the Clearance Diver Badge and the Naval Boarding Party (NBP) badge, though the latter is for shipboard use only. [127]

The trade of Port Inspection Diver is a specific Naval Reserve occupation, created as a stand-alone trade for divers in 1991, and requires trained divers to conduct underwater inspections of port and harbour facilities, underwater search and recovery operations and possibly anti-sabotage ordinance removal. A unique and respected occupation in the Reserves, their traditional qualification badge was that of the Regular Force Clearance Diver. Though similar in occupation, the Clearance Diver badge held a great source of personal pride for those who had earned it, and the awarding of the badge to those "less-qualified" was a strike against the morale of those qualified. As noted by Abbott, an individual's self-esteem comes from recognition by his peers. Just as the awarding of the PID to a qualified Reserve diver improves their self-esteem, the reservation of the Clearance Diver pin for qualified Clearance Divers now accomplishes the same for their self-esteem. This philosophy, extended to the MARS community, can instill a greater sense of pride, morale and achievement than exists today and assist in the prevention the documented continual erosion of their identity since the post World War II years.

The trade of port inspection diver badge was always a requirement since the trade inception in 1991, but until a badge could be created they would wear the Clearance

[127]CPO1 Davis, 60-61.

Diver badge. Separation of the occupational identity occurred in 2008 when the Naval Reserve port inspection divers were awarded their own badge.

> The creation of a separate badge for PIDs now recognizes the fact that their diving duties are greater than those of a ship's team diver, combat diver or search and rescue technical diver…but a little less than those of a clearance diver."[128]

It took several years of effort to develop and have accepted a suitable badge, but the importance of recognizing the individuals that were successful in their attainment of inspection diver qualification warranted the effort. "The new PID badge is important because it recognizes the uniqueness of the trade."[129] While recognizing the uniqueness, the new badge will instill a sense of unique identity for the Reservist Inspection Diver but it will help maintain the identity of Clearance Divers, now the only individuals wearing their badge. Just as the PID occupation recognized their desire for an identification mark, members of ship's NBP teams sought similar identity.

The NBP badge was born from the acceptance of a requirement to recognize those particular individuals in a ship's company that have attained a significant level of professional expertise within their occupation. Though the National Defence Clothing and Dress Committee (NDCDC) has

Figure 4 – The NBP badge

Source: Official RCN badges, http://jfchalifoux.com/rcn.htm

[128]Darlene Blakeley, *The Maple leaf* newspaper, "Port inspection divers receive new badge," Vol. 11, No. 36 (29 October 2008) , 9.

[129]Blakeley, 9.

not accepted the original submission as a qualification badge to be worn on DEUs (so it may be worn on for the remainder of an individual's career), the Navy did subsequently advance a proposal for a NBP Badge that would be worn on the NCD jacket by qualified instructors and Naval Boarding Party personnel.[130] The badge, shown in figure 4, is traditional and recognizably naval. The blue background represents the naval environment while the crown is the naval crown and the swords are traditional cutlass's symbolizing the traditional weapons used by naval boarding parties of earliest days of sail. Only those sailors who currently serve on a naval boarding party and naval boarding party instructors can wear the team recognition badges, but only when they are serving on a NBP or in a specific instructor position. The incompatibility of this, when compared to those that wear the previously described badges throughout their careers, currently sits with the National Dress Committee.

This section has shown that the navy has recognized the importance of identifying some sailors for their professional accomplishments. The important lesson to learn with respect to the NBP badge is the realization of power of recognition of individual accomplishments has in establishing pride in self. Even in a relatively small environment of a ship, where most members of a ship's company know one another, their occupations, roles and responsibilities, the desire remains within an individual to have clearly defined identity within their environment. Being a member of the team instills pride, and it begins with the graduation from the boarding course and the award of the new badge. Being recognized by the naval institution with a visible method of separation and distinction within their peer group provides a lasting value to the individual. Wearing of

[130]Department of National Defence, Maritime Command Order (MARCORD) 17-3, Vol 1, June 2006, 2.

the NBP badge signifies the wearer as an individual who belongs to an elite group within the ship, similar to the sailor that is a member of the ship's diving team. Recognition of this accomplishment in a period of a sailor's career should be maintained throughout their career.

An additional consideration of the wearing of specialty badges for the remainder of a career is that they remain an identity symbol when away from the element. The suffering from a lack of naval identity through the Unification years was solved by returning to the traditional naval uniform. The wearing of specialty badges assists in refining the identity of the individual within the organization. The navy should not only retain these identifiers but broaden their use to ensure that these decent steps in the right direction continue. All taken in the effort to assist in either recognition of accomplishments or establishment of personal identity among peer groups, the repetition of this common goal; the desire for sense of self and identity, must expand to the naval officer corps, particularly to the MARS officer community. It has been a fierce battle in the past and the time has come to right the wrongs.

Section Six – Perfecting the Naval Officer's Identity

The previous sections have detailed what it is to be a profession and why there exists an underlying responsibility to ensure the professional is able to find recognition within their profession, either through unique clothing, crests, colors or clothing accoutrements. Following sections then detailed the erosion of the MARS officer identity, a critical concern because it has been proven that "[t]he social and individual functions of socialization indicate that there is an underlying need for identity that is part of being human."[131] Specifically, self-esteem involves an internal process of self-evaluation between the "ideal self" and the "perceived self." Because of the association between mature identity status and internal locus of control, over time, individuals with a primarily internal locus of control are expected to initiate changes that lessen the discrepancy between the "ideal" and "perceived" self, therein holding higher levels of self-esteem and self-acceptance.

All naval officers' identity needs to be improved to close the gap between their ideal and perceived self. This requirement has been recognized through the history of the navy to this day. From the placement of 'Canada" flashes on shoulders of tunics following the Mainguy incidents to the uproar following Unification, the battle of identity has raged. Many might argue that the identity of the 'naval officer' has been returned to the navy through DEUs. While true to an extent, the recognition of professional accomplishment remains dismal at best. It is not a matter of vanity but an acceptance of the importance one places in identity and sustainment of morale.

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[131]Gerald R. Adams, *The Objective Measure of Ego Identity Status: A Reference Manual* (Utah: Utah State University), 1989, 5.

The naval officer identifies with being in the navy, more so than being in Maritime Command, but it is the normal function of socialization that sees the sense of belonging to the larger unit linked to the required sense to maintain uniqueness. An individual's well-being is manufactured through the psychological aspects of feeling significant and mattering to the social environment."[132] The sense of belonging to the navy is found in the naval uniform, but the sense of uniqueness, the attainment of being an individuated person, is at issue.

The process that one derives individuality is through differentiation. "Intrapersonally, this process centers on the differentiation of various aspects of the self. Interpersonal differentiation focuses on the emergence of an autonomous self from that of others."[133] Within the social surroundings an atmosphere that facilitates differentiation will foster a feeling of being significant and valued. The lack of such an atmosphere Unification created was inevitably its downfall because the individual dynamic of needing to be individuated, unique or special was lost with the loss of the sense of self.

This service element demand for differentiation from each other, and the low morale that the lack of differentiation produced, drove the re-establishment of the DEU and the restoration of the other dynamic of identity; the social dynamic. DEUs, the regimental system maintained by the army, the awarding of wings within the air force and the designation of speciality pins in the navy are all examples of methods of restoring the ability to feel connected and to have union and fellowship with other members of the

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[132]Adams, 4.

[133]*Ibid*., 5.

unique profession others. “Both dynamics serve psychological and social well-being through feelings and self-perceptions of mattering to oneself and to others.”[134] Within a military context, much of the perception of mattering to others is found within the common uniform that gives belonging as well as the uniqueness of recognition of qualification competence.

Of all the services, within the officer corps the army has been best able to maintain both dynamics of identification. The common uniform restored post-Unification gave identity belonging to the army, but the distinctiveness came from items such as cap-badges, regimental shoulder titles and occupational collar pins. An infantry officer is recognizable collar pins and then through shoulder titles to his regiment. If granted airborne qualifications a set of wings are awarded, and from those the distinction between the regimental jumper and one that has taken the jump course but not been posted to an airborne regiment is found in the color of the wings. Notwithstanding the potential danger of creating a degree of differentiation which could result in extreme uniqueness of an individual that likely would be met “with a lack of acceptance by, and communion with, others,” [135] the requirement to differentiate comes from the established perceptions of self.

The lack of differentiation can diminish the sense of acceptance through expertise as well as sense of pride through recognized achievement. The officer’s sense of pride is developed by their own sense of accomplishment as well as their institutions recognition

[134]Adams, 5.

[135]*Ibid.,* 5.

of unique abilities or expertise. The individual perceives their pride from the evaluation of worth of self through the comparative process of their ideal self and their perceived self. To be recognized for achievement, by the institution as well as peers, allows the gap between the two 'selfs' to narrow, enhancing the ability to attain self-pride.

The effective measure in the army includes the regiment and occupational distinctions. Within the air force the assortment of wings for pilots, navigators, weapons controllers, et al, provide the same. The navy indeed has measures, as the PID, Clearance Diver, NBP and ship's diver badges mentioned earlier would attest. The occupation badges for Petty Officer First Class (PO1) and below also support the advance of the notion of uniqueness in the establishment as a source of pride for those entitled to be identified by profession. The officer corps, and in particular the MARS officer, does not benefit from the same effort.

Rather than being an issue some may call vanity, to this point this paper has presented the evidence suggesting the normalcy of a desire for identity within peer groups of profession institutions and military elements. The history of Canadian sailors gaining and losing naval identity though the years has been illustrated and the present state of the naval officer sense of identity has been presented, along with the navy's efforts to recognize some through certain qualifications (PIDs, divers, etc.). The supporting evidence from the previous sections now allows the presentation of the way ahead for perfecting the MARS officer identity because the importance of identity and recognition can not be denied.

This search for identity, as noted in the Unification section, is based on the desire for a sense of pride and morale found through a recognizable uniform. Common identity in the CF was a "morale breaker."[136] Of the over 1 100 service personnel interviewed by the Unification Task Force in 1980, a common theme arose; not only should the title of Royal Canadian Navy be returned to navy, along with Royal to the RCAF, but that traditional uniforms be restored and identifying badges returned in order to allow individuals to have their professional and trade recognized by the uniform they wore.[137] This was not a goal to just "return to the good old days" but recognition of the negative impacts of commonality to the individual and the adverse effect continual erosion of indentifying symbols has on morale of personnel.

It is not the intention to imply that the personal accomplishments in attaining professional qualifications as PIDs, Clearance Divers or submariners pail in comparison to the qualifications a MARS officer. It is merely to state the obvious; there exists a disparity in recognition efforts as well as identity symbols that the navy has currently in practice. The lessons of the past must be hoisted aboard to be able to improve the naval officer's identity in the future or the navy is standing into danger where a MARS officer will have no perception of identity or sense that the institution recognizes their accomplishments. In the tough times that naval careers demand individuals to endure, enforcers that stress the importance of the individual to the greater whole, and that their

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[136]G.M. Pyffe – Chairman, Dr. H. Critchley – Member, Dr. A. Legault – Member, Mr. E.A. Olmstead – Member, Major-General P.A. Neatby – Member, W.M. Ritchie – Executive Secretary, Task Force on Review of Unification of The Canadian Armed Forces: Final Report, 15 March, 1980, (Ottawa, [Ontario]: Ministry of National Defence, 1980), 59.

[137]*Ibid.*,45.

profession recognizes their accomplishments, helps ensure successful passage through those difficult times.

Throughout a career, a MARS officer transits through many difficult venues of training. They complete MARS officer training, which currently stands at a nearly 50 percent success rate.[138] Following basic Certificate of Competency Part II completion they move on the a Director Level warfare specialty course, being and Above Water or Under Water Warfare Officer, a Shipborne Air Controller, a ship's Navigator or the newly created Information Management Director. Successful coursing and tours can lead to selection to the Operations Room Officer (ORO) course, a course seen by many as the pinnacle in a MARS officer's naval training syllabus. Throughout the 10 to 12 years it takes to reach that level a MARS officer completes a series of ten command exams in all areas of warfare, command and control as well as logistics. Through all these gates of accomplishment, there is not one distinguishing decoration. Postings as Directors, OROs, Executive Officers and Commanding Officers gives the non-visual reward of accomplishment, but the development of some sort of recognition the navy can place on the successful officer, much like the marine Anchor and Globe, would provide a level of identity, recognition, pride and esprit de corps not found in today's navy.

Decoration of the successful MARS officer provides professional differentiation recognized as key in Abbott's studies. This is the responsibility of the naval institution, not the individual. To date many officers pursue their own methods of identification. They wear belt buckles with distinct badges of affiliation. A common site is also tie-clip

[138]LCdr Michelaine Lahaie, Director of Maritime Training and Education 2 (DMTE2), e-mail 2nd February 2009.

designed to resemble the US Navy Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) pin. Though distinct tie-clips are not uncommon, the use of distinctive pins must bring to question the driving force behind their selection. In the MARS community it is often the search for identity.

During the 1990s a team was set up within the navy to run a programme entitled Project Pride, an effort to address issues for naval recognition. In 1991 the return to the DEU was still fairly new. As an effort to improve on recognition, it was almost viewed as enough to satisfy those people that "cared a hoot" about the state of naval identity.[139] The review of various submissions put forth seeking recognizable identity, including a request for a Surface Operations badge, was not supported based on reasoning that included a worry that the naval officer would resemble a third world officer resplendent with buttons and bows. Fear existed that any addition of qualification pins would be seen as an Americanization of the naval uniform and that there was no comparison practice in other navies.

The implication that the "awarding of numerous badges by the air force creates an atmosphere of elitism that impacts directly on increased morale and heightened esprit de corps"[140] suggests recognition of professional qualifications should be avoided to prevent a differentiation between sub-occupations. That a comparison to a pilot receiving their wings when attaining qualification was wild stab at justification implies the writer had no concept of the importance of receiving institutional recognition for attaining professional

[139]Cdr D.C. Beresford-Green, Senior Staff Officer Personnel Support, Memorandum MARC: 5250-1, 20 March 1991, 1.

[140]Beresford-Green 2.

expertise. Further, no documentation could be found supporting the statement that qualification wings in the air force diminishes morale.

Finally, it was proposed that awarding badges would somehow make non sea-going officers feel less a part of the navy for not having sea-going qualification or time badges.[141] It is interesting to note that an example provided was on naval doctors, and that they are the one naval occupation to maintain the distinct colour identity (red cloth) between rank stripes.

In contrast, what the aforementioned amalgamation of appearance does is to diminish the sense of pride within a sea-going officer by not allowing them the recognition so earned. The lesson of the failed Unification policy was evidently too soon forgotten. The memorandum does, however, provide supporting comment to the extent that monetary rewards, such as sea pay, do not motivate people and that the time had arrived when the individuals that had endured the hardship of duty at sea deserved recognition for their service. Feeling that the 'overwhelming response" in support of identity and recognition measures was solely due to peer pressure, and that the naval uniform does not lend itself to be covered in 'trinkets' or 'festooned with baubles', the memorandum recommended the idea of improving recognition and identity be shelved for 5 years. The recommendation, unfortunately, was supported.[142]

Efforts continued in the 1990s despite this failure to realize the impact identity has on pride, esprit de corps and morale. Once again Project Pride held meetings in

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[141]Beresford-Green, 2.

[142]*Ibid*,. 3.

Ottawa to discuss and then present recommendations for the creation of "recognition of sea time" and a "sea operations skill badge."[143] The meeting of the Chief of Maritime Staff (CMS) Honours and Awards officer, the Command CPO and both MARPAC and MARLANT CPOs resulted in approval in principle, with caveats, of the adoption of either a sea operations/sea time recognition badge or a similar pin. The conclusion reached found that recognition was of genuine importance to the troops and would follow the established requirements similar to submariners and ship's divers (once a career milestone was attained a career badge would be granted).[144] Non-supportive documentation could not be located, but suffice to say that no change in dress policies 11 years after the report suggest the recommendations were not supported outside the navy or never forwarded for proper review. History may some day reveal the truth.

Three years later (2001) the CF Naval Operations School (CFNOS) took up the fight on the direction of a Naval Personnel Working Group. The report to the Director of Naval Personnel Requirements highlighted the widespread desire captured throughout the fleet for the recognition of unique skills a MARS officer, and sailor, will acquire throughout a successful career. In this document a fundamental aspect of recognition is presented that was not identified in previous recommendations. In the navy of old there was little requirement to recognize professional accomplishments by badge or pin because promotion was a sufficient indicator and the support trades in naval uniform were far fewer. As the navy has gotten smaller over the years and the shore

[143]LCdr G Arbuckle, Project Manager – Project Pride, *Recognition of Sea Time*, memorandum MARC: 4500-1 (PM Project Pride) dated September 1998, 1.

[144]Arbuckle, PM Project Pride, 1-3.

establishments grown, the realization grew that promotion alone as an indicator no longer met the needs of the individual officer. As MARS officers spent longer time in each rank it was felt that recognition of more qualified and experienced officers within peer groups by the bestowment of outward recognition measures, similar to divers and aircrew, would foster instant and considerable professional pride.[145] In years past a MARS Commander in the navy was ORO and Command qualified because that was the only way to achieve that rank. This is no longer the case.

The widespread interest and support of the study CFNOS conducted in 2001 forced an actual limit of the number of recommendations for recognition improvements. Once assessed and focused, CFNOS presented a short list of the following recommendations of qualification badges based on the acceptance that the particular qualification level warranted recognition:

a. A Surface Warfare pin (similar to the US Navy SWO pin);

b. Director Qualification pins (SAC, Warfare Directors, Navigators, etc.);

c. Maritime Enginneers (MARE) and Sea Logistics officers on Head of Department (HOD) qualification; and

d. Operations Room Officer (ORO).[146]

CFNOS also identified the need for a separate recognition of Coxswain and Sea Command individuals. A caveat to the four awarded pins is that only the highest level of

[145]Canadian Forces Naval Operations School, CFNOS 1060-1, *Naval Specialty and Qualification Badges*, 22 January 2001, 1.

[146]CFNOS: 1060-1, 2.

qualification badge be worn, so that once an officer reached ORO status, previous qualification pins would be discarded. A supportable stance, one aspect of qualification should be added, that of the MARS officer attainment of the Command Part II qualification. Again, the smaller size of the navy will result in many command qualified officers not being awarded the opportunity to assume sea command and thus higher ranks. Such realities in the navy are dissatisfactions to many command officers not able to achieve command due to so few appointments. Official recognition of their attainment of the professional level of expertise can at least provide some solace in their lack of opportunity to command, assisting in previously recorded concern over the erosion of individual recognition levels.

Though the adoption of unique pins for each level does have merits in solving the identity issues, a method stated previously of recognition between different levels found in parachutist wings also bears consideration. The development and acceptance of one form of warfare qualification pin that may be adorned with colored maple leafs denoting level of achievements, from C of C II to ORO for example, would reduce the requirement for various pins while satisfying the need for a uniquely warfare operations design.

It must be stated that the aim of ORO pins, Command qualification badges or command pins is not to keep non-qualified officers outside an elite group of the higher qualified level of MARS officers, but merely as a reflection of Abbott's documented natural desire for professions and professionals to separate themselves from others as a statement of uniqueness and attainment of newer status. The effort required attaining the command qualification; the successful completion of a plethora of command exams and

the successful challenge of a command board warrant the loss of a past identity and the assumption of a new one, one of a command qualified MARS officer within the naval profession. The need of making this identity change, which should be initiated by the profession, is a prevention of the current limited status change perceived following the attainment of the command qualification.

The little things - Certificates

Canadian Forces Certificates of Achievement are the standard method used to recognize and award qualifications attained at CFNOS. Perhaps of equal importance to the actual development of a qualification pin would be creating the sense that the navy held of self identity of the MARS officer that achieves their qualification of Operations Room Officer comes from how the presentation of the qualification is conducted. Current practice has the ORO course officer giving the successful student their CF Certificate of Achievement during the end course report interview. This is an extremely anti-climatic and insufficient method of proper recognition of being successful on a senior Canadian tactical warfare course.

In comparison, successful completion of Occupational Specialty Qualification Able Seaman (OSQAB – but now referred to as NETP - Naval Environmental Training Programme) normally involves a ship's company fallen in on the flight deck with the young sailor receiving their framed OSQAB certificate from their ship's commanding officer, with the standard grip and grin. Newly graduated OROs in the ceremony cannot help but feel identification and achievement dissatisfaction. Passed to peers, this lack of sense achievement can have negative effects on others considering pursuit of similar

career paths. If the adoption of a qualification pin brings about a more formal award ceremony, similar to a Marine receiving their globe and anchor following the "Crucible" then the very nature of the pin is important in meeting the legitimacy requirement of the profession found within each individual.

The recognition of achievement by the institution in a formal setting is a fostering agent in developing morale and pride in service, and recognition is a keystone of good human resources (HR) management and a critical element in developing the well-being of the service member. "Recognition of achievement is essential as it highlights exemplary qualities that are vital to the organization's success." [147] The CF HR programme detailed in the Defence Administrative Order and Directive (DAOD) 5027-0 states that the DND and the CF recognizes that their strength is not constituted in military equipment but from the expertise of the personnel, both in uniform and civilian, which serve the department and the Forces. The professional expertise they attain and the exemplary manner in which they fulfill their duties reflects highly on how the Canadian Society sees their military. To reward those that serve in this manner, the DAOD directs that recognition methods must be developed and utilized through the Awards and Recognition Program (ARP). This DAOD was established to promote the institution's ARP. By doing such, the effectiveness of recognition programmes may be monitored and funds allocated to appropriate granting authorities so that respective leaders and

[147]Department of National Defence, ADM (Fin CS) Home, Defence Administrative Orders and Directives (DAODs) DAOD 5027-0, *Recognition*, http://www.admfincs.forces.gc.ca/dao-doa/5000/5027-0-eng.asp; Internet, accessed 23 February 2009.

supervisors.[148] The development of a proper ORO certificate would fall under this directive.

Of all certificates rewarded to a naval officer, however, the one in obvious absence is a certificate for attaining the Sea Command qualification, for currently no policy of awarding a Command Certificate exists. The creation of this certificate must fall under the responsibility of Maritime Command due to its distinct naval officer attribute. The initiative and responsibility for developing this certificate was put forth by the Director of Maritime Training and Education (DMTE) in 2007.[149]

The Naval Training System (NTS) utilizes Form CF 289 – Certificate of Military Achievement to recognize and reward sailors and officers on achieving training or qualification milestones. DAOD 5031-9 provides guidelines for awarding these certificates but also states that certificates may be locally produced in lieu of a CF 289.

Over the past several years, DMTE staff has entertained queries from Command qualified personnel as to whether or not an initiative was being staffed to ensure successful candidates would receive, at the very least, a CF 289. Unfortunately, ongoing staff limitations at DMTE and higher priority tasks precluded any such initiative.

DMTE 2 recently had an opportunity to investigate the level of magnitude required to issue locally produced certificates to Command qualified officers. As an

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[148]DAOD 5027-0.

[149]LCdr C.A. Bursey, Briefing Note for Director Maritime Training and Education (RDMIS #99417), "Surface/MWS Command Qualification Certificates," 26 February, 2007, 1.

alternative to the customary CF 289, a few options were explored through Director General Public Affairs (DGPA) Creative Services. These certificates, if approved, should rightly be signed by the Chief of Maritime Staff (CMS) as a suitable recognition from the navy for an officer's professional achievement.[150] The reward would be a simple approach to improving the underlying basis for this paper; with the MARS officer community the natural human requirement for recognition within their profession as experienced a nearly steady erosion since the end of the Second World War.

[150]Bursey, 2.

Section Seven

Conclusion

"Work on self and identity has a special place in the study of human nature, as self-concerns are arguably at the center of individuals' striving for well-being and for making sense of one's life."[151] The naval officer's goals develop and are influenced by the behaviour of the institution in which they thrive to achieve the highest levels of competence. Self-esteem and motivation come from the satisfaction of accomplishing goals which they strive to attain. For the institution not to recognize the achievement of such goals limits the development of the sense of self and identity to what they can muster themselves.

This paper has examined the significance of identity throughout the ages. It defined the study of a nation's history that normally reveals the nation it is today is based on its military achievements in the past. Many Canadians believe that Vimy Ridge was Canada's founding moment. Canada has a military tradition that is difficult to deny. This tradition is one of service and conduct that gives Canadians service personnel reason to believe they have chosen an honourable profession. Tradition by itself is not sufficient to maintain pride, morale and personal satisfaction in service, as attested to by the events that lead to naval incidents of the 1950s and the subsequent Mainguy report. There is the need for the individual to be recognized within his chosen profession as having achieved certain levels of professional achievement.

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[151]Carolyn C. Morf, *Self and Identity* (Bern Switzerland: Psychology Press, University of Bern), 2005, 97.

Personnel are concerned about two human identity aspects of service; identity within the Canadian society and identity within the military organization. The policy of Unification of the three services into one common force, based on fiscal restraints and the goal of establishing a loyalty to the organization similar to that of family, failed due to the inadequacy that it meets the individuals need for identity, both within society and within the military.[152]

Throughout the navy's history there have been many moments when it fought for its identity. These were difficult moments for until recently it seems that Canadian national interest has not been stirred by interest in the military. Following September 11th, 2001 the navy has been awarded numerous opportunities for positive press. Captured in Op Apollo, the Canadian Navy (or Maritime Command ships, more correctly) have deployed to the Persian Gulf for Operation APOLLO, integrated with US Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) for Operation ALTAIR, commanded CTF 150 in the Persian Gulf and off the Horn of Africa, and had HMCS VILLE DE QUEBEC participate in counter-piracy operations in the fall of 2008. All these events have given significant recognition to Canadian sailors, assisting in the establishment of an identity once again that can be based on pride of service on a global level. However, it has been shown that the professional naval officer, while enjoying this new found identity in Canadian society, is still stymied within their peer groups by a lack of a personal sense of identity.

Identification as a member of Maritime Command, or a member of the navy, has been attained through the distinctive naval uniform, but much remains to be perfected.

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[152]Yanow, 26.

Though focusing on the MARS officer in particular, all sea-going naval officers, such as engineers (both Combat Systems and Maritime Systems) suffer from a distinct lack of identifying measures within the naval element. While the naval officer uniform, for the Regular Force, Reserve Force and the Cadet Instructor Cadre, has returned to a proper naval appearance since the cancellation of the Unification policy, identification of the naval operations officers still requires the return to the distinctive identifying posture found with the executive curl. Even though the identity of a Regular Force, sea-going officer can be improved through the use of the executive curl, the importance of capturing their distinct identity and professional qualifications can be satisfied through giving the deserving sea-going officers the adoption of unique qualification pins, providing a visible sign of the recognition their profession has bestowed upon them.

It is hoped that the work presented here can be seen in the light of what can be done to improve the overall sense of achievement and self identity of a modern naval officer. This was not an assault on those who lead today's navy, but merely a celebration of the identity the navy has earned through its nearly 100 years of existence. Within that celebration can be found the realization that the naval officer who serves the navy can be proud to wear the naval uniform. However, their sense of identity is what makes the navy what it is; a service in which to be proud. By expending the merest of efforts, the identity of a naval officer can be increased substantially. And with that, the pride and esprit de corps that is the heart of the navy will beat stronger than ever before.

This effort to attain proper identity for the serving members of the navy reflects what an officer must always strive to accomplish in a career; the continuous and untiring

attempt to improve their vocation for the betterment of the naval profession of arms in which they serve. That is the only tribute sought. "The highest praise that can be paid an officer or an enlisted man at his retirement or death is that he lived and worked according to the best traditions of the service."[153]

[153]William P. Mack, Royal W. Connell, and Leland Pearson. *Naval customs, traditions & usage* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press), 1980, 17.

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