

Archived Content

Information identified as archived on the Web is for reference, research or record-keeping purposes. It has not been altered or updated after the date of archiving. Web pages that are archived on the Web are not subject to the Government of Canada Web Standards.

As per the [Communications Policy of the Government of Canada](#), you can request alternate formats on the "[Contact Us](#)" page.

Information archivée dans le Web

Information archivée dans le Web à des fins de consultation, de recherche ou de tenue de documents. Cette dernière n'a aucunement été modifiée ni mise à jour depuis sa date de mise en archive. Les pages archivées dans le Web ne sont pas assujetties aux normes qui s'appliquent aux sites Web du gouvernement du Canada.

Conformément à la [Politique de communication du gouvernement du Canada](#), vous pouvez demander de recevoir cette information dans tout autre format de rechange à la page « [Contactez-nous](#) ».

The truth, the whole truth or nothing. Period.

The most effective media strategy for the
military in the information age.

By: Colonel R.M. Williams

This paper was written by a student attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfillment of one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.

La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale.

ABSTRACT

The military and the media engage in a complex relationship that is vital to the health of a modern democratic state. Deception and lies can spoil this relationship and harm the trinity of people, government and military as recent examples have shown. In the current information age, this relationship serves as a vital element of modern warfare and this demands effective strategies to deal with the speed and volume of the real-time media environment.

This paper examines the military doctrine related to the evolving military-media relationship and finds areas for needed improvement. It examines both direct military-media interactions through the public affairs function and those that occur indirectly through the emerging form of warfare known as information operations. It concludes that the most effective strategy for the military is one based on truthful disclosure based on a realistic framework that respects operational security but still allows the media to function effectively. It offers a series of recommendations that will improve the relationship from both the military and the media perspectives.

The truth, the whole truth or nothing. Period.

The most effective media strategy for the
military in the information age.

*There is a great deal of difference between not releasing information and telling the truth. We're telling the truth, we are just not releasing some information.*¹

Introduction

*Information is the currency of victory on the battlefield.*²

The media: it is all-pervasive, all-consuming and, to some, all-important. This is the information age and it is now more important than ever that the military develop the most effective strategies to deal with information and the systems that handle it. It is also vital that the military understand and respect the role of the media as the principal conduit of information to the people. As BBC reporter Nik Gowing noted:

*A failure to embrace constantly the new media realities of the "real-time tyranny" could yet leave the military struggling in a future conflict whether as war fighter or peace implementers in one of the new generation of "complex emergencies".*³

The military deals with the media in both a direct and indirect manner and there is an inherent tension between these two approaches. The activity known as public affairs (PA) manages the direct interface while the indirect approach forms part of an emerging class of warfare known as information operations (IO). Public affairs and information operations have significantly different and occasionally contradictory doctrine and policies concerning misinformation, disinformation, and deception. For example, U.S. PA doctrine is clear and explicit in directing that information must be disclosed to the media and public completely and in a "timely and accurate" manner unless the information threatens "national or operations security, or the safety or privacy of the men

¹ Gen. Maurice Baril quoted in – CBC Newsworld, "Canada on the Attack", at <http://cbc.ca/news/indepth/canadaattacke/military.htm>

² Gary Pounder, "Opportunity Lost.", *Aerospace Power Journal*, Maxwell Ab, Summer 2000, p. 3

³ Paul Edwards, "The military-media relationship – a time to redress the balance?" *RUSI Journal*, London, Oct 1998, p. 49

and women of the Armed Forces.”⁴ In contrast, U.S. and Canadian IO doctrine is far more ambiguous on this issue with an openness to operational deception or other measures designed to “influence the adversary decision makers” to cease actions that may harm our interests.⁵ However, from the point of view of the media, information released in either manner enters the public domain and can thereby influence decision-makers and the general public on both sides of a dispute. Any deception, therefore, represents a potential challenge to the operation of a free press that is critical to a free and open democratic society.

The thesis of this paper is that the most effective strategy for the military in managing the military-media relationship is to use a truthful but realistic approach for both direct (PA) and indirect (IO) interactions with the media. This will require improved doctrine and an education process to enlighten and improve the relationship between members of the military and media. To be effective, doctrine must address situations where the provision of complete and correct information could impair operational security or the safety of personnel in harm’s way. The most effective strategy in such cases is to provide no information at all rather than attempt any practices of deception or disinformation.

This strategy represents both an ethical and a practical solution. First, it avoids the slippery slope of deception and prevents the military from falling prey to a range of options driven by self-interest rather than national interests. It also responds to the evolution of technology, the media and the nature of warfare that is making the rapid exposure of deception more and more difficult to prevent. Once deception is exposed, the deception itself becomes the issue, and this is potentially far more damaging than the disclosure of the original information would have been. A culture that condones deception finds it very difficult to limit its application to only those circumstances where

⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-61, *Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations*, 14 May 1997, p. II-2. This document and the accompanying Appendix A, DOD Principles of Information, Appendix B, Guidelines for Coverage of DOD Combat Operations, and Appendix X, Media Ground Rules represents the explicit guidance for PA activities. It is far more extensive and explicit than the DND/CF doctrine.

the justification can stand scrutiny, and a pattern of deception, once established, is difficult to control. Finally, truth is a relative notion and in an increasingly complex world requires a more adaptable set of realistic and pragmatic principles. In summary, times have changed and the military-media relationship must adapt to face these new circumstances.

In support of this thesis, this paper will first establish a theoretical foundation for the discussion of the military-media relationship and the relative meaning of truth. Then it will examine the major factors that have transformed the military-media relationship: the advance of information technology, the democratization of information, and the changing nature of warfare. It will next examine the impacts that these factors have had on the media and the military and the issues that continue to shape their respective views of the relationship. Finally, it will examine the way ahead, exploring the means to address these factors and perceptions to establish the proposed strategy.

The trinity and the truth

George Washington understood that the war he fought was in part a public opinion war. He wanted victories on the battlefield but refused to achieve them at the expense of the people he hoped to influence.⁶

Writing in the mid-nineteenth century, Clausewitz postulated a key social relationship that underpinned the nation state's ability to effect national policies up to and including war. He claimed that the "the remarkable trinity"⁷ of the people, their government and their military need to exist in harmony, and therefore an alignment process was needed between the parties or it would weaken the nation state. Unresolved, the will of the nation is divided and the first CF principle of war – the selection and maintenance of the aim – is unfulfilled.

⁵ U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-13, *Doctrine for Information Operations*, 9 Oct 1998 p. I-1, and the CF Information Operations Doctrine (interim), para 101 (a) Policy.

⁶ Felman, Lt Col Marc D., "The Military/Media Clash and the New Principle of War: Media Spin", Air University Press: Alabama, 1993 p. 3. Felman cites William M. Hammond, "The Army and Public Affairs: A Glance Back", *Newsmen and National Defense*, Brassey's: Washington, 1991, p. 3

⁷ Michael I. Handel, *Masters of War*, London: Cass, 1992, P. 11

Some argue that the media plays the key role in the resolution process. A few nations, such as the United States, have adopted this role within their constitutions, while others take a less formalized approach adopting accepted practices under their forms of democratic government. However, it is widely accepted that a free and open press is a vital element of an effective democratic process. While elements of the trinity may bridle at their relationship with the media from time to time, the debate and dialogue strengthens the democratic process. Some even suggest that the “perennial friction ... is not only unavoidable, it is probably desirable.”⁸

The relationship is often misunderstood, however, since each of the elements approach their role from different perspectives. The government assumes the leadership role granted by the people, with the associated right to make decisions, to create policy, to ensure the peace and security of the nation and its interests and, if necessary, to commit the nation to war to defend those interests. The military responds to the direction of government to wage war on behalf of the state, and looks to the people for support and encouragement. The people bear the weight of supplying the resources to sustain the state and the military, and in return expect that their voice will be heard, understood and acted upon. To all, the media can be at times an enemy or an ally, positive or negative. The focus of this paper, however, is the military-media relationship.

This dialectic between military and media is not new: it has raged for as long as recorded history. Yet as this paper will discuss, the information revolution, facilitated by the explosion of media and technology coupled with the globalized environment and the changing nature of warfare, demands that the military-media relationship be revised. Col Harry G. Summers (Ret), a U.S. Army doctrinal expert, notes that for the trinity to function properly when considering the defence of national interests, it must resolve the balance of the “cost” of the intervention with the resultant “value” achieved.⁹ His analysis of the US intervention in Vietnam leads him to conclude that the media’s most vital role in the maintenance of the trinity is to give voice to the debate in the public

⁸ Loren B. Thompson, ed., *Defense Beat: The Dilemmas of Defense Coverage*, Lexington Books: New York, 1991, p. 181

⁹ Summers, Col Harry G., “Western Media and Recent Wars.” *Military Review*, Kansas, May 1986, p. 12

domain so that the balance may be maintained. In his view, a truthful debate occurs when the government, military and people can consider and debate their perceptions of “cost” and “value” of an intervention based on the best information available at the time. Any distortion of these elements, for example by under-stating the cost in resources expended to achieve the aim (in people, arms, or national treasure) or by over-estimating the value achieved (in mission results, enemy casualty estimates or decrease in enemy spirit) undermines the balance of the trinity and the effectiveness of democracy.

He dismisses the argument that lies or distortions are universally justified to protect a nation’s resolve in the face of a challenge. He argues, citing examples in both Great Britain and Germany during World War II, that, armed with a truthful understanding of the cost/value relationship, a nation’s resolve may in fact be strengthened by hardship.¹⁰ Others agree: “people are far more resilient – far stronger – than many believe. Citizens in a free society will face the truth of things, however unpleasant, provided those who lead them deserve their trust and confidence.”¹¹

Journalists are quick to point out the important role they play to raise key issues that facilitate the cost/value debate:

A free press reveals when bad leadership exists, when bad equipment exists, when there is a violation of state and international rules (eg. many times during the Vietnam war), bad training, inadequacies of supply and materiel, troop safety and the status of troop morale. A free press can discover friendly fire casualties, safety issues, for example the attack on a nuclear reactor in Iraq and the attendant fallout from that, or the after effects of the oil well fires.¹²

History is replete with examples where deception of the media was used, not to prevent a loss of resolve but rather a loss of reputation. Leaders may not wish to deal with issues for personal or political reasons and may wish the problem would simply go away. For example, in Vietnam, the initial performance of the M-16 rifle was poor. This was clearly recognized by the soldiers who spoke frankly to the media while the

¹⁰ Summers, p. 14.

¹¹ Peter R. Young, ed., *Defence and the Media in time of limited war*, Cass: London, 1992, p. 13, key note address by the Governor-General of Australia, Hon. Bill Hayden.

¹² Ibid, p. 187, citing Col David Hackworth, US Army, (Retd).

official response from senior officers attempted to discount fully the issue. Tony Appel of the Washington Post recalls after writing a critical story:

Westmoreland [Commander of U.S. Forces in Vietnam] went crazy: "How can you say that?" I said, "Well General, go talk to the guys who have the goddamn things jam and [who] go and steal Vietcong weapons whenever they have a chance, off dead bodies."¹³

Thus, in Summers' view, the media in Vietnam played a positive and effective role in bringing forward the disharmony in cost and value recognized by the trinity. Rather than blame the media for its actions, he acknowledges their role and lays the philosophical foundation for their increasing value in the modern age. In other words, if you blame the media messenger and ignore the message, you risk significant peril. The concept of the trinity and its ability to assess the cost/value relationship should therefore form the basis for IO doctrine and should address the shared and adversarial components of the military-media relationship.

This concept helps us draw the line between those acceptable practices (those that protect operational security while still permitting a fact-based cost/value debate) from those which support a group's self-interest (by using lies and deception to distort a proper assessment thereby not allowing a valid cost/value debate).

Next, let us examine the concept of truth and its relative application in the complex reality of modern times. Truth, as a fundamental strategy, was cited in the heat of the Gulf War by the Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney when he noted: "It would be a big mistake to use [Press Secretary Pete Williams] to mislead the press, for deception purposes or whatever ... credibility counted for everything."¹⁴ It was echoed, sceptically, by the press itself:

Isn't the point that, after Vietnam, they aren't going to get caught cooking the books? I don't want to gainsay Schwarzkopf's integrity, but that's not the point. The main thing is that they know after Vietnam that they have to maintain

¹³ First Amendment Centre, Military and the Media, a collection of annotated comments, found at www.fac.org/publicat/military/14-views.htm, p. 3

¹⁴ First Amendment Centre, p. 17

*credibility, that the story will eventually get out. It's a pragmatic, not a moral, issue.*¹⁵

Truth is, in reality, a relative notion. Neither the media nor the military can claim to possess or comprehend it in its real-time context. Any piece of information - a news report, a picture or a television image – is “merely a slice of the action.”¹⁶ All participants are subject to the same “fog of war” that Clausewitz recognized when he noted: “the great part of the information obtained in war is contradictory, a still greater part is false, and by far the greatest part is of doubtful character.”¹⁷

Thus, it is not practical to pursue a utopian perspective of truth with philosophical constructs of idealism. Rather, we must look to the pragmatic and realistic since, in the real battle for “first impressions,”¹⁸ balance, perspective and accuracy are often sacrificed on the altar of deadlines, spin and sound-bite affecting both sides. The “flash-to-bang” time, from event to report, is becoming instantaneous. “The camera does not lie,” says Gowing, “You cannot fight against it, because inevitably the truth comes out. TV creates resonances and political sonic ripples that cannot be ignored.”¹⁹ We must have, therefore, an educated media to reflect properly the real-time nuances of the situation and a dynamic military-media relationship to deal with it.

Do Secretary Cheney’s comments on the need for truth indicate a consistent change in the approach to military-media relations? Unfortunately not. Observing the military or government response to recent crises, we can see that the temptation to lie or to deceive remains powerful. Military staffs continue to “interpret” published doctrine and guidance, and claim sanction for deception in the name of a higher interest. Such justifications include the need to improve the chances of mission success, to preserve the

¹⁵ Ibid, p. 8 quoting James Reston of the New York Times

¹⁶ Philip M. Taylor, “War and the Media”, lecture delivered to conference on media-military relations at Royal Military Sandhurst in 1995 and found at www.leeds.ac.uk/ics/arts-pt2.htm, p. 3

¹⁷ Devereaux, Lt Christopher, “Combat Leadership and the Media.” *US Naval Proceedings*, Maryland, July 1995, pp. 65

¹⁸ Maj Raymond R. Hill, Jr., “The Future Military-Media Relationship: The Media as an actor in war execution,” Research Paper AU/ACSC/0307/97-03, Air University, Mar 1997, p. 19

¹⁹ Nik Gowing, “Real Time Television Coverage of Armed Conflicts and Diplomatic Crises: Does it pressure or distort foreign policy decisions?” Paper submitted to Harvard College, 1994, p. 27

morale and spirit of the nation, or to counter obvious attempts by the enemy to challenge the nation's resolve through propaganda or misinformation.

Research conducted into the cultural attitudes of the military and the media by Wiegand and Paletz suggest that the military is predisposed to accept deception while the media is not. Over 60% of surveyed military officers felt “they should be allowed to use the media to deceive the enemy (thereby deceiving the American public)” while only 8% of the media agreed.²⁰ This research also indicates the cause is both cultural and institutional. While fully three-quarters of the journalists believe the media should publish critical material showing “federal government officials and military leaders misled the public about a military operation,” less than one-third of the military agree.²¹ The military is culturally inclined to assume every criticism is a challenge to their institution.²²

Before looking at examples of self-serving uses of IO doctrine, let us first consider an example where IO was used in a manner consistent with the recommended approach. In the Gulf War, U.S. coalition leaders freely provided information about a possible course of action (an amphibious landing near Kuwait City) while the movement of troops to prepare for the actual strategy (a westward swinging “left hook” attack) was executed under media blackout. The media complained of deception but military commanders were quick to admit the initiative and claim that it was totally justified since it protected soldiers on the battlefield and forced Iraq to maintain additional forces near Kuwait to repel the possible attack.²³ Since the deception was clearly for operational security reasons and was fully disclosed after the battle had been joined, this is obviously a legitimate use of IO according to Summers' theory.

²⁰ Wiegand, Krista E. And Paletz, David L., “The Elite Media and the Military-Civilian Culture Gap.” *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol 27, No 2, Winter 2001, p. 183

²¹ Wiegand & Paletz, p. 183.

²² First Amendment Centre, p. 92 quoting Col David Purka, Director of Public Affairs at the U.S. Air Force Academy following some revelations of cadet cheating.

²³ Perry M. Smith, *How CNN Fought the War*, Birch Lane: New York, 1991, p. 70

Other examples of deception are far from legitimate use of IO (or PA) doctrine. The Iran-Contra affair, where senior national security officials lied to and deceived the U.S. Congress to cover illegal activity regarding the transfer of arms and money, was clearly illegitimate.²⁴ In Canada, the Post-Somalia Inquiry and the host of subsequent investigations that followed the torture and murder of a Somali youth (Arone) and the questionable deaths of two other Somali intruders also raised the spectre of deception. Whether the reactive strategy to these incidents was driven by media management, spin control, deliberate obfuscation, or simple negligence has never been fully resolved. However there were incidents (such as the handling of Access to Information requests) that were examined individually and found to be both deliberate and deceptive.²⁵ No argument can be made that operational security considerations could justify the withholding of information under these circumstances. In both cases, the negative impact resulting from the deception was significantly more far reaching than what would have resulted from the original story, had it been dealt with openly and honestly.

The evolution of the military-media relationship

*War, to put it quite bluntly, is good for the media business.
.. [but the question is now] whether the media are good for the business of waging war.*²⁶

CNN (the Cable News Network) joined the media world on 1 June, 1980 and has made a significant impact not only on the industry but on our perceptions of the media as well. The “CNN effect” is a shorthand way of stating that, in the process of reporting a story, the media forces government and the military to react, thereby influencing the outcome as a player in the process and not just as a reporter of the story itself.²⁷ However CNN and the CNN effect are simply indicators of the evolution of the military-media relationship. This evolution was driven by three fundamental themes: the advance of

²⁴ Amy B. Zegart, *Flawed by Design – The evolution of the CIA, JCS and NSC*, California: Stanford, 1999, p. 70.

²⁵ See *1995/96 Annual Report of the Office of the Information Commissioner* (available at www.infoweb.magi.com/~accessca/oic.html#1) regarding the case files (3100-7480/001 and 3100-7481/001) for the practise of renaming Responses to Questions (RTQ) as Media Response Lines (MRL) and the subsequent destruction of documents that was deemed to be deliberate and deceptive.

²⁶ Taylor, p. 1

²⁷ Strobel, p. 4.

communications technology, the globalization of the media, and the evolving nature of warfare.

The advance of communications technology is all encompassing. Media (an inclusive term both for the methods by which information can be passed from author to viewer, and for the merchants of information and influence who market the product) is converging. Voice communications by phone, cell phone, satellite phone, and radio have merged with digital messaging to provide instant, world-wide connectivity for the average citizen. Television has moved from regular programming to specialty programming to world-wide satellite based availability – any subject, any time, anywhere. Multimedia, the fusion of text, images, video and sound, now links communication and computer based environments in most modern homes. Coupled with the vast growth of the Internet and the convergence of personal computing into news and entertainment, we are seeing the “democratization of information”²⁸ and it is affecting the media itself. The globalization of media interests, manifested by hyper-competition across multiple media and across ideologies and borders, is not only changing what is “news” but how that news is being acquired, processed and redistributed. And that in turn has “changed the pace and rhythm of policy making be it foreign, defense, economic or military.”²⁹

And this new “pace and rhythm” can directly affect world events. For example, during the attempted coup in Russia in 1991, although the plotters shut down the television and satellite links, the radio and the press, they failed to cut telephone and fax links. The result: the dramatic image of Yeltsin aboard a tank was spread widely by fax: this resulted in increased opposition to the coup, which ended shortly thereafter.³⁰

International media are exploiting these technology improvements and are no longer comfortable being dependent upon the military for information. For example,

²⁸ Warren P. Strobel, *Late Breaking Foreign Policy*, US Inst of Peace Press: Wash, 1997, p. 225

²⁹ Young, p. 175. Perspectives of General Michael Dugan, relieved of his position as Chief of Staff U.S. Air Force by President Bush during the Gulf War for inappropriate comments to the press.

when an American maritime reconnaissance aircraft collided with a Chinese fighter and was forced to land on Hainan Island, all the satellite images displayed in the media came from commercial sources. To penetrate a strict military news blackout, NBC television hired a private plane to search for the American fleet in the Mediterranean Sea before the attack on Libya in April, 1986.³¹ And, in a show of independence, the major networks established a broadcasting infrastructure in Haiti in anticipation of the expected U.S. invasion.³² Multinational media can now muster more resources than many modern nation states.

Information is now an equalizer enabling the weak to challenge the strong. As the former head of the U.N. Commission for Human Rights noted, “television is our lifeline to the politicians who want nothing to do with us or hope that the problems will go away from the public consciousness”.³³ The media can also use information (such as horrific images) to exploit emotion to heighten the debate despite official efforts to limit their coverage.³⁴ And, this raises significant questions about global coverage of “our wars” (affecting national interests) versus “others’ wars”, noted by Taylor. “In our wars the journalist walks a very thin tightrope attached to two cliff edges labeled ‘objectivity’ and ‘patriotism.’”³⁵ In a globalized environment with multi-national media conglomerates, and with many non-state actors such as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), there are many situations where players see the two cliff edges from vastly different perspectives. The resulting coverage is difficult to control and influence, making deception almost impossible.

The greatest force influencing the globalization of the media is the Internet, undeniably the most egalitarian form of communication ever devised. With a simple personal computer or laptop, one can become a member of the media with a major impact

³⁰ Devereaux, Lt Christopher, “Combat Leadership and the Media.” *US Naval Proceedings*, Maryland, July 1995, p. 64

³¹ *Defense Beat: The dilemmas of Defense Coverage*, ed. Loren B. Thompson, Lexington Books:New York, 1991, p. 90.

³² Devereaux, p. 64

³³ Gowing, p. 35

³⁴ Gowing, p. 79. Quoting Marlin Fitzwater, Press Advisor to Pres. Clinton, “The charge of hiding deaths [of the U.S. Marines dragged through the streets of Mogadishu] was almost worse than showing it.”

on perceptions around the world. This lesson was not lost on Matt Drudge,³⁶ the Zapatista rebels, the Burmese exiles, the United Nations, the Yugoslavian dissidents protesting Milosevic³⁷ nor the Chinese government who aggressively limit access by their own citizens.

Not only has the capability of the citizen to be aware of global events undergone a revolution, so has the military environment itself, as a result of the demise in the threat of total war, the increase of limited wars of choice (vice survival), the increased presence of media collection technology on the battlefield, and the increasing expectations of the people to see, hear and understand what is going on. Jamie Shea, the NATO press commentator during the Kosovo campaign, echoed Summers' cost/value balance when he said:

*...wars of conscience [demand that we] gain and maintain the high ground of moral or just war [by] using conflict only as a last resort, ensuring the means are proportionate to the ends pursued, taking care to discriminate between military and civilian targets, and demonstrating [to world opinion] that the ultimate good should outweigh the costs paid.*³⁸

And it must be done publicly: "the last thing the military wants, as an institution, is a secret war ... Particularly if you've got a volunteer force."³⁹

*But, it is the unique nature of the peace operations - their openness, the lack of a defined enemy, the multiplicity of institutions involved and the absence of vital security stakes - that ultimately permits the type of coverage that exists and determines its effects on the audience ... this includes NGOs, neutral countries and multi-national industries.*⁴⁰

³⁵ Taylor, p. 8

³⁶ Pounder, p. 7. "Drudge, an American gift shop manager with no previous journalism experience, created one of the web's most popular news sites .. by early 1999, more than a million people were accessing [his site]. He also was the first to release details of the Monica Lewinsky affair."

³⁷ Margarita S. Studemeister, "The Impact of information and communication technologies on international conflict management." *Bulletin of the American Society for Information Science*, Washington, Feb/Mar 1998, p. 1-4. She describes the sophisticated use of internet sites and broadcast capabilities to move data, voice or television images beyond the reach of local censorship to a world-wide audience.

³⁸ Jamie P. Shea, "The Kosovo Crisis and the Media", *NATO Nations and Partners for Peace*, Uithorn, 2000, p. 39

³⁹ First Amendment Centre, p. 36, citing Jerry Friedheim, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.

⁴⁰ Warren P. Strobel, *Late Breaking Foreign Policy*, US Inst of Peace Press: Wash, 1997, p. 212.

As Dugan notes, “limited war is an operative term for the military, it is only a descriptive term for the media.”⁴¹ That is to say for the military, this new form of warfare challenges existing military doctrine, while for the media it simply provides an increase in coverage opportunities.

The media – writing the “first rough draft of history”⁴²

*People blithely imagine that journalists are where the news is. Alas, not so; the news is where the journalists are.*⁴³

The media serves two vital purposes in the context of the Clausewitzian trinity: it informs the public on what policies its government is pursuing and how those policies are being executed; and it independently records for history what happened.⁴⁴ Coverage can aid the nation itself by providing the information for Summers’ cost/value balance debate, by countering enemy propaganda and misinformation, by acting as a conduit for signals and messages between the parties, and by serving as a source of intelligence.

In this iterative process, the CNN effect undeniably influences the evolution of events. While many may debate if mass media can force policy to change or simply raises the attention of decision makers who make more expeditious decisions, it is generally agreed that they ensure the story cannot be ignored – “it forces [governments] to act.”⁴⁵

While stronger today, media influence is not all that new and has been on the rise since the Crimean War. As Knightley notes in his historical analysis entitled “The First Casualty”, the expansion of media influence and independence has been resisted by the military and government every step of the way. As each wave of technology advanced, from telegraph to telephone to radio to satellite transmitter, the military has attempted to delay, limit, filter or censor the flow of news reporting. When that failed, they added

⁴¹ Peter R. Young, ed., *Defence and the Media in time of limited war*, Cass: London, 1992, p. 175

⁴² Taylor, p. 2.

⁴³ Paul Edwards, “The military-media relationship – a time to redress the balance?” *RUSI Journal*, London, Oct 1998, pp. 43

⁴⁴ Hill, p. 2

⁴⁵ Gowing, p. 47

means to control the physical movement of journalists, delay their access to theatres, or consolidate them into “pools.”⁴⁶

However, with growing media independence, the old style military response to censor and filter information is increasingly difficult. The Operation Desert Storm “managed war” model (“Desert Muzzle” coined by some⁴⁷) is nearing the end of its lifecycle and increased media presence is simply a fact of life. Even former Secretary of Defence Dick Cheney recognized this when he noted, “As an administration official, it’s gotten increasingly difficult to sort out what we know from intelligence and what we know from CNN.”⁴⁸ The military must now prepare for a more independent and ever present media, able to examine, analyze and criticize the operation from a variety of perspectives.

In attempting to make these preparations, military planners believe they face these significant challenges:

- a. Perceived lack of media integrity – The competition to win the “battle of first impression,”⁴⁹ the pressure to scoop a story for personal reputation or material gain, and the perceived elevation of self-interest over national interest, raises military and government belief that the media regularly distorts a fragment of information into a misleading story. This belief prevents or damages trust between the parties and leads to a military perception that there is a “culture of incompetence”⁵⁰ in the media.
- b. Insufficient depth of media understanding – While the amount of information available to the media has increased, there has not been a corresponding increase in the level of experience, analysis, and understanding on the journalist’s part.

⁴⁶ Taylor, p. 9.

⁴⁷ Gowing, p. 16

⁴⁸ Baker, Rear Admiral Brent, “Decisions at the Speed of Satellite.” *US Naval Proceedings*, Maryland, Aug 1992, p. 69

⁴⁹ Hill, p. 19

This is distorting the complexity of modern warfare. To the military, the media is becoming at best “first with the obvious”⁵¹ or at worst “a random searchlight .. [or an] erratic source of raw information”⁵² that produces “more heat but less illumination.”⁵³ One example was the bombing of the Al Firdos bunker near Baghdad during the Gulf War. As General Perry Smith (Ret) notes, resultant coverage by Peter Arnett, censored by Iraqi authorities, claimed that the bombing campaign was failing and had now shifted to attack civilian targets. Smith points out, however, that someone familiar with bunker fundamentals would have noted that the facility had all the key features of a military bunker, including its construction, the overhead camouflage, and a secure fence surrounding it. As he points out, “a standard civilian bomb shelter does not have a perimeter fence” because people need to get in and out quickly.⁵⁴ Nevertheless, the bunker bombing became problematic for the coalition’s cohesiveness and led to changes in targeting.

- c. Perceived lack of media objectivity – It is correctly stated that when the military makes mistakes people can die – when the media makes mistakes it issues retractions⁵⁵ leading some to deny that the military should support the media at all.⁵⁶ The military also question the objectivity and balance of the media coverage, especially when the adversary can take advantage of the situation. Such was the complaint voiced by General Sir Michael Rose, former UNPROFOR commander. He believed some international media coverage was “mischievous at best and downright misleading much of the time”.

⁵⁰ *Defense Beat: The dilemmas of Defense Coverage*, ed. Loren B. Thompson, Lexington Books:New York, 1991, p. 124.

⁵¹ William V. Kennedy, *The Military and the Media*, Praeger: Conn., 1993, p. 39. Citing Ted Koppel of ABC news describing the competition amongst network news divisions.

⁵² Gowing, p. 36.

⁵³ Pounder, p. 62.

⁵⁴ Smith, pp. 32-37

⁵⁵ Felman, Lt Col Marc D., “The Military/Media Clash and the New Principle of War: Media Spin”, Air University Press: Alabama, 1993, p. 26. Quoting Maj Gen Sidle, head of a DOD task force study on military-media relations, he adds, “the military has learned through experience that some of the [media] do not always know what will impair operational security and endanger the troops”.

⁵⁶ Felman, p. 9. Admiral Boorda, then Chief of Naval Operations, “the operation cannot include a public affairs component. We’ve lost sight of what we’re all about if we do that.”

Too often, Rose felt the media took sides and doctored the truth on account of emotional involvement, usually with the Muslims. Often as a result of this unbalanced support from the media, the Muslims would break a cease fire or launch an attack confident that the blame would be ascribed to the other faction.⁵⁷

Let us now examine the military's evolving posture and how this is perceived by the media.

The military – fighting for the media high ground

This is a media war and we're going to win it.⁵⁸

The military understands and respects the value of information on the battlefield. In fact, the majority of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) that now drives the military force structure debates in all western countries is based upon the increased capability to gather, process and utilize information for effective command and control and employment of military forces. As a result, an overarching doctrine of “information operations” (IO) has emerged, defined as:

An integrating strategy which seeks to protect one's own information and influence an adversary's military and civilian decision makers through the use of information or by affecting their information base. ... [As it] encompasses political, economic and diplomatic efforts as well as defence and military measures, coordination among all government departments .. is crucial⁵⁹

IO doctrine broadens the previous military concepts of command and control warfare (C2W), electronic warfare (EW), psychological operations (PSYOP) and operations security (OPSEC) into a broader national security construct, along with supporting elements such as civil and public affairs, and national infrastructure protection. It recognizes the “vital ground” of information as the “fifth dimension of

⁵⁷ Edwards, p. 49.

⁵⁸ Felman, p. 5, quoting Ken Bacon, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs during the lead-in phase of the Gulf War.

⁵⁹ Policy Directive (draft), *DND Information Operations*, p.1. This document covers the CF doctrinal and guidance issued as B-GG-005-004/AF-010 *CF Information Operations* manual that is subordinate to B-GG-005-004/AF-000, *Canadian Forces Operations Manual*.

warfare ... critical to success in the future.”⁶⁰ By exercising the capability to monitor, intercept, selectively filter, replace, or supplant information within the news media, internet, and adversary information system networks, the military (acting on behalf of the entire government) has widened the battlefield dramatically into civilian domains well removed from the scenes of devastation.

The conduct of IO has both defensive and offensive components. Defensive IO is largely protective in nature, guarding networks and systems from interception, interference or intrusion. Offensive IO, on the other hand, covers a range of options that can include destruction of the data or the systems themselves, creation of network overloads, confusion of network topologies, and distortion of the data elements. It can be as obvious as a physical attack on a critical switching or power station, or as subtle as a cyberspace attack directed towards media, banking, commerce or transportation systems with few digital fingerprints to identify the sources. No matter the method used, the increasing scrutiny of the world-wide media means that the results of IO actions will be perceived, monitored, and reported as the conflict unfolds.

Offensive IO strives to “influence the decision maker” by affecting the information or information system used to make decisions. Publicly, IO (and public affairs (PA)) will demonstrate: resolve; the intention to prevail; and the capacity to succeed to deter an adversary. At the unofficial level, and after receipt of the appropriate approvals from national and coalition authorities, current IO doctrine permits offensive actions, deception and psychological operations undertaken to deny, degrade, destroy or deceive.

This doctrine thus places the official agents, including public affairs, in a difficult situation. Their role is primarily defensive and focuses on providing timely and accurate information to counter adversary misinformation, but they also form part of the IO coordination function on the staff of the commander and national authority. As an “official” function, PA are directed to attempt no deception (as is current Canadian

⁶⁰ Pounder, p. 4 quoting Gen. Fogleman, Chief of Staff U.S. Air Force.

policy⁶¹), yet they must remain fully included in the overall IO campaign plan and coordination effort which expressly supports deception. Since the media will be the observer of some IO events, the victim of others, and a knowing or unknowing agent in still others, the management of media impact (including anticipated reactions if the deception is uncovered) is expressly included as one phase in the IO planning process. The dilemma is that media spin (that some refer to as a new principle of war⁶²) becomes a critical part of the IO campaign, and PA implicitly becomes part of “spin warfare.”

In defence of this ambiguity, many in the military or government in general proclaim the “right to lie”⁶³ or more generally the right to censor, filter, or alter information that will diminish public support, espousing that the ends justify the means. They further note that the U.S. judiciary has been blunt in the dismissal of a universal public “right to know”⁶⁴ and has supported measures to limit access to military operations.

For the most part, the public is prepared to support restrictions on the withholding of information, for limited periods during a conflict, and the media often acquiesce reluctantly. As General Dugan notes, “Democratic societies, in whose name the ‘right to know’ is so frequently claimed, do not want information that will hazard its sons and daughters, friends and neighbours to be available to any and all. Societies inherently

⁶¹ *CF IO Operations Policy*, para 101.a.(9) (g) notes PA activities “are governed by existing statutes, laws, policies, and principles and shall not compromise nor be compromised by IO orders or directives.” Furthermore, at 302.1e.(2).(f) declare that PA will only serve by “disseminating factual information”. This is confirmed by the Defence Administrative Orders and Directives (DAODs) for Public Affairs, namely DAOD 2008-0, *Public Affairs Policy* and DAOD 2008-4, *Public Affairs, Military Doctrine and Canadian Forces Operations* (both effective March 1, 1998).

⁶² Felman, p. 1. In defining Media Spin as a new principle of war he assigns the following key objectives and recognizes the need to separate truth from fabrication – 1. Paying close attention to public relations and recognizing that public support is an essential ingredient of combat success. 2. Aggressively insuring that media portrayal of combat operations is neither distorted nor misrepresented through press omissions. And 3. above all, safeguarding the safety of troops and operational security but not lying to the media merely for sake of convenience.

⁶³ Kennedy, p. 131. Arthur Sylvester, then Asst Secretary of Defence for Public Affairs in the Kenned

understand there are boundaries.”⁶⁵ W

attitudes lead to suspicion and mistrust on the media's part.

b. The military frequently employs delay and censorship as an evasive strategy.

There is no question that the logistics necessary to support world-wide media coverage of operations is complex and demanding. However, the media perceives that many limits are merely fabrications since meeting the media deadline is not the top priority for the military.⁷⁰ These measures can include extensive accreditation processes for journalists, enforced pooling of media activities (shared coverage), centralized information bureaus imposing lengthy clearance processes for news items, and limitations imposed on real-time feeds of material sent out of theatre. The dependence upon the military is a critical weakness that media are working hard to minimize, though they recognize that complete independence will never be possible. Both sides agree that the problem is getting more difficult to manage, and that the final solution will be based more on trust than on technology.

c. The military are hyper-sensitive to criticism. To the media, history has shown that justified criticism can serve the interests of the nation by exposing ineffectiveness or grievous incapacity.⁷¹ However they perceive the military as culturally sensitized to criticism. "In the military, we tend to think that even the slightest criticism ... is a disaster. 95% of an article can be glowing and yet we torture ourselves over 5% of criticism. ... we have to get used to accepting a little bit of rough with the smooth."⁷² This hyper-sensitivity can set the stage for patterns of behaviour that threaten the integrity of the military profession itself. The attempt to deceive the Access to Information process following the Canadian deployment to Somalia (previously presented) and the attempts to lie or

⁷⁰ Taylor, p. 9

⁷¹ Knightley, pp 8-16. Critical coverage of the Crimean War by William Howard Russell in 1854 led to a parliamentary investigation that ultimately resulted in the sacking of the commander and his staff, and the replacement of the Prime Minister. Contemporary reporting by Thomas Chenery (see Knightley, page 18) on the deplorable state of field nursing was noted by a British woman who wrote to the Secretary of War, asking "why have we no sisters of charity?" She was offered the opportunity to create and lead a government nursing service that saved many lives. Her name: Florence Nightingale.

⁷² Edwards, p. 48.

manipulate data to promote the V-22 Osprey aircraft program⁷³ are but two recent examples. It is relevant to note, that the first example was exposed by staff members who refused to follow the questionable direction and complained to colleagues and to the media. In the second, allegations were exposed using surreptitious video-tapes of Squadron staff meetings subsequently sent to both the media and the Secretary of the Navy. In the current information age there is little chance of sustaining deception for very long.

- d. There is no independent oversight body. Noting the ease with which deception can be mounted, the media are quick to point out there are few processes to vet IO measures (with the notable exception of certain capabilities for which legal controls are mandated). As General Schwarzkopf noted when the Gulf IO plan was tabled for approval: “One of the principal proposals was that we would plant false stories in the newspapers [so] the enemy would believe them. We don’t do that in the United States of America. We don’t lie to the press. We’re not going to do that.”⁷⁴ Under current doctrine such activity would not be allowed, but the media has no way to validate that, especially when they can see dissension amongst the military itself. As Pounder notes, there was significant mistrust and limited mutual support amongst the IO and PA staffs planning the Gulf campaign.⁷⁵

⁷³ Mary Pat Flaherty and Thomas E. Ricks, “A Troubled Osprey Wounds the Corps.” *Washington Post*, Tuesday, May 1, 2001, p. 1-4. The report outlines the fabrication of false data, lies and cover-ups to improve the serviceability statistics of the aircraft to generate positive media and congressional support pending a critical program decision.

⁷⁴ First Amendment Centre, p. 97

⁷⁵ Pounder, p. 64. He notes the IO group felt the PA group was “disinterested” in using public information as a “deterrent factor” while the PA group felt that engaging in IO had the “potential” to put them on the “slippery slope”

Making “The Odd Couple”⁷⁶ relationship work

If it can help it, the military is done letting other people tell its’ story. Tactical events take on strategic significance because CNN makes them so.⁷⁷

Experienced commentators generally agree that the military-media relationship cannot be permanently resolved through a set of specific measures and that it will take constant attention and cooperation. An effective relationship requires a combination of principles, processes and cultural adjustments that will, from time to time, be tested by circumstances that defy simplistic solutions. The following themes are proposed to build the most effective relationship:

Plan for a more effective partnership.

The media and military will remain joint stakeholders in future conflicts and must plan “to put aside their common antagonisms in favour of their common interests.”⁷⁸ They must engage in joint planning to ensure that acceptable access and distribution mechanisms are prepared in advance of operations. This must also include discussion of technology requirements for timely movement of visual and audio products from the scene.

The military should take formal steps to acknowledge the respective roles of media and the military by establishing formalized accreditation and training processes to enable media to accompany Canadian Forces overseas as the U.S. military has done. This should also include increased funding for media representative support to maximize the opportunity for the Canadian perspective to be presented. As former DND public affairs director Col. Ralph Coleman points out, some support is provided routinely although there are some in the media who feel this challenges their objectivity. He

⁷⁶ Frank Aukofer, *America’s Team: The Odd Couple*, Freedom Forum – First Amendment Center: Nashville, 1995

⁷⁷ John Donnelly, “Spinning: the Military’s other war.” *American Journalism Review*, Adelphia, Apr 1998, p. 1, quoting Admiral “Snuffy” Smith, USN, first Commander of NATO Forces in Bosnia.

⁷⁸ Eberhard, p. 83, quoting Col Summers.

ironically notes that the reporter “who broke the Somalia story was on a DND-sponsored flight and he did not seem to feel that he was being compromised.”⁷⁹

It is generally agreed that an information vacuum is in neither party’s interest. To fill the vacuum, there must be a proactive PA effort to supply appropriate material that accurately depicts the real situation in its difficulty, nobility and horror, while exposing none of the operationally sensitive elements. As Washington Post reporter Bradley Green noted: “Overall, my feeling is that the military lost something important because of the Pentagon-NATO media strategy. By staying quiet, they denied those involved their due for their heroism and bravery.”⁸⁰ This is a challenging task since high paced and stealthy conflict may occur at night and well outside traditional media eyes and ears. But an absence of information opens the door to adversary information or an aggressive media pursuing information either in harm’s way or acquiring it on the open market. Neither is desirable.

Mechanisms to vet the material in the most efficient manner must be well established before the pace of activity reaches crisis stages. To maintain openness and transparency, the U.S. military has encouraged the concept of “security at source”⁸¹ to decentralize the process and make it as efficient as possible. Practical measures such as these need to be discussed and resolved at the earliest possible stage.

Incorporate the concept of the trinity into consistent PA/IO doctrines.

While there are valid reasons to retain separate IO and PA doctrines, since each encompasses many issues beyond the overlapping interests, they must be made more consistent, especially with regard to the fundamental role and objectives of the military-media relationship. The Gulf War example (previously described), selected to

⁷⁹ Michael Croft, Sharon Hobson, and Dean Oliver, *Information Warfare: Media-Military Relations in Canada*, Workshop Report, No. 20 – 1999, Norman Patterson School of International Affairs, Ottawa, p. 7

⁸⁰ Pounder, p. 69

⁸¹ Joint Publication 3-61, *Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations*, 14 May 1997, Appendix A, paragraph 2. Outlines the process and responsibilities for joint military-media accountability for the vetting

demonstrate acceptable deception in both U.S. and Canadian IO doctrine, adds little to the debate. In essence, it is far too simplistic and conveys little of the subtleties that face the IO/PA planner: it is a black and white example in what is clearly a grey world. Instead, more subtle examples are needed to give the reader a fundamental understanding of the dilemmas facing a commander on a realistic battlefield. More relevant examples should examine how to deal with situations such as media exposure of friendly fire incidents, tensions amongst coalition members, critical equipment that fails to perform properly, collateral damage causing civilian casualties, or ethnically inspired mass killing. The effectiveness of the relationship is tested more by subtlety than direct operational security interests.

In addition, there must be better guidance on the separation of the national interest from the self-interest, taking a longer-term view with less sensitivity. The understanding inherent in Summers' cost/value balance should be made apparent to both military and media so that coverage reinforces the trinity of people, military and government.

The current ambiguity of PA and IO doctrine should be addressed, establishing the strategy of truthful disclosure except for those situations where the justification for deception can be made conclusively. Consideration should be given to establishing a process to ultimately disclose necessary deceptions at an appropriate time, as soon as possible after the operational security rationale is no longer justified.

Build expertise in both the military and media

Both military and media agree that the modern battlefield environment requires increased media expertise and understanding if it is to deal credibly with Gowing's "real-time tyranny." Unfortunately the cadre of media with military experience is decreasing rapidly. Such capability can only be built through joint training and exposure to exercises and training sessions, preferably well before the crisis unfolds. This must

of material. It provides a list of models for prohibited information items and guidance on how to resolve disagreements.

emphasize open and frank discussion of goals and objectives to align expectations. To this end, it may be useful to encourage media representatives to attend professional military education courses (such as the National Security Studies Course) and to second military officers (not simply those employed in public affairs, but also future combat commanders) to work in regional or national media centres. Additionally, assistance, perhaps in the form of a battlefield primer, full of facts, terms, methods and background data that can be handed out for quick reference, is urgently needed. In essence, the military need to explain what they are doing and why it is necessary in terms and concepts that the public can understand easily. As one commentator noted:

*In most coverage of US forces in both Somalia and Haiti, for example, there was almost no reporting on the changing tactics, ground rules, locations, morale and performance of U.S. or allied forces, despite the fact that these peacekeeping efforts were the first such endeavors since the Cold War ended. We simply did not know how our forces did.*⁸²

Once the understanding begins to build, the processes themselves need to be fully developed so that the information flow between the military and media can meet the speed and volume that modern coverage demands.

And, most importantly, emphasize a strategy of truthful disclosure

IO, while needed in some instances, is too powerful a tool to be used indiscriminately. The strategy of truth must be addressed openly and with minimal ambiguity. While the establishment of process, understanding and expertise will lead to credibility, the inevitable disagreements will require resolution based on trust and accountability. This will be difficult to establish for, as we have seen, there remains cultural mistrust and misunderstanding amongst the military and media players. However, the military or government must resist the use of arbitrary solutions. “Turning off the news flow, as some suggest, only breeds skepticism and suspicion, no matter for what reason,” notes Paul Edwards.⁸³ And this leads to the second, and perhaps more

⁸² First Amendment Centre, p. 13, quoting Dr. Braestrup, Director of Communications at the Library of Congress.

⁸³ Eberhard, Col Wallace B., “A Familiar Refrain but Slightly Out of Tune.” *Military Review*, Kansas, Feb 1987, p. 83

difficult issue: to hold the military and media accountable to the people for the proper support of the trinity. Neither side seems ready to accept a measure of culpability but common ground must be found. As Dr. Heidi Studer, a political philosopher, points out, “it will only be the honourable who are bound by honour.”⁸⁴

Moving forward

Train as you fight, and fight as you train. Old Military proverb.

In an ideal world, a unified trinity built on a strategy of truthful disclosure, with demonstrated public support for the decision of government to commit military forces into conflict, with a capable and professional military force that projects resolve and determination, and with a diligent media providing professional and knowledgeable oversight, there would be little room for enemy propaganda and deception to mislead the nation.

Whether we prefer a justification based on an ethical position that integrity is fundamental to the modern profession of arms, or a pragmatic rationale reflecting the inevitability of disclosure, the strategy of truthful disclosure is the most effective strategy for the new age of mass media and the information revolution.

But the trust, support and understanding necessary to implement this strategy is not yet fully established within the military culture. If we return to the Marine Corps scandal involving the Osprey aircraft, we can still see evidence that deceptive wartime habits and resultant peacetime practices are hard to change. Flaherty and Ricks paint the picture for us (and all quotations are cited from their work⁸⁵):

General James Jones, Commandant of the Marine Corps travelled to the New River air base to “take the measure of his Marines” at the squadron implicated in the investigation. Standing on the stage at the base theatre, “he knew he had to give the speech of his life.” Addressing a group saddened by the loss of colleagues to aircraft

⁸⁴ Croft et al, p. 10.

crashes, angered by the political pressure placed on their disgraced commanding officer and senior staff, and disheartened by the lack of support by the system, the General spoke from the heart.

“This is about trust,” he said, “This is about the uniform.”

To demonstrate his point and relate to the troops, he spoke of his experiences in Vietnam. “In a different world, in a different time I’ve been where you have been, Jones said.” He recounted the story of the unreliable M-16 rifle and drew a parallel to the current peacetime crisis.

He enjoined them to look beyond the dispute and said the Marine Corps would do the right thing. If the V-22 couldn’t be made right through redesign, as was the M-16, the Marine Corps would “summon the moral courage to walk away from it.” After he took questions, he left the stage uncertain as to the effect of his work. Had he resolved the “skepticism, frustration, and discouragement” of his Marines over this dilemma? Had he ensured that trust and truth would replace the atmosphere of lies and deception? He turned to Alford McMichael, the Sergeant-Major of the Marine Corps, for his perspective. “So, how did it go? Jones asked. McMichael shook his head: You’ve got work to do.”

The comment applies to the military-media relationship as well.

⁸⁵ Flaherty, Ricks, pp. 3-4.

Bibliography

Annual Report of the Information Commissioner of Canada, 1995/96, concerning Files 3100-7480/001 and 3100-7481/001, at www.infoweb.magi.com/~accessca/oic.html#1

Baker, Rear Admiral Brent, "Decisions at the Speed of Satellite." *US Naval Proceedings*, Maryland, Aug 1992, pp. 69-72

Alastair Campbell, "Communications lessons for NATO, the military and media." *RUSI Journal*, London Aug 1999, pp. 31-36

Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, "Canada on the Attack." CBC Newsworld at cbc.ca/news/indepth/canadaattacke/military.htm

Clodfelter, Lt Col Mark, "To Tell the Truth: The Challenge of Military Leadership." Research Paper. National Defence University, 24 April 1998

Michael Croft, Sharon Hobson, and Dean Oliver. *Information Warfare: Media-Military Relations in Canada*, Workshop Report, No. 20 – 1999, Norman Patterson School of International Affairs, Ottawa,

Department of National Defence, DND Information Operations Policy (Draft), undated.

Department of National Defence, B-GG-005-004/AF-010 (interim), *CF Information Operations*, 15 Apr 1998

Devereaux, Lt Christopher, "Combat Leadership and the Media." *US Naval Proceedings*, Maryland, July 1995, pp. 62-65

John Donnelly, "Spinning: the Military's other war." *American Journalism Review*, Adelphia, Apr 1998, p. 11

Paul Edwards, "The military-media relationship – a time to redress the balance?" *RUSI Journal*, London, Oct 1998, pp. 43-49

Eberhard, Col Wallace B., "A Familiar Refrain but Slightly Out of Tune." *Military Review*, Kansas, Feb 1987, pp 71-84

Felman, Lt Col Marc D., "The Military/Media Clash and the New Principle of War: Media Spin." Research Paper. Air University Press: Alabama, June 1993

First Amendment Centre, "Military and the Media", a collection of annotated comments, found at www.fac.org/ppublicat/military/14-views.htm

Mary Pat Flaherty and Thomas E. Ricks, "A Troubled Osprey Wounds the Corps." *Washington Post*, Tuesday, May 1, 2001

Gowing, Nik, "Real Time Television Coverage of Armed Conflicts and Diplomatic Crises: Does it pressure or distort foreign policy decisions?" Research Paper submitted to Harvard College, 1994

Maj Raymond R. Hill, Jr., "The Future Military-Media Relationship: The Media as an actor in war execution." Research Paper AU/ACSC/0307/97-03, Air University, Mar 1997

Howell, Maj Cass D., "War Television, and Public Opinion." *Military Review*, Kansas, Feb 1987, pp 71-84

William M. Hammond, *Reporting Vietnam: Media and Military at War*. University Press: Kansas, 1998

Michael I. Handel, *Masters of War*, London: Cass, 1992

Henderson, Cdr Ronald H., "To Tell the Truth: The Challenge of Military Leadership." Research Paper. National Defence University: Washington, 24 Apr 1998

Jane Jacobs, *Systems of Survival*, Vintage Books: New York, 1999

Department of Defense, "Joint Doctrine for Information Operations", Joint Publication 3-13, 9 Oct. 1998

William V. Kennedy, *The Military and the Media*. Praeger: Conn., 1993

Philip Knightley, *The First Casualty*. Harcourt Brace: New York, 1975

Ingrid Lehmann, *Peacekeeping and Public Information*. Frank Cass: London, 1999

Gary Pounder, "Opportunity Lost." *Aerospace Power Journal*, Maxwell Ab, Summer 2000, pp. 56-78

Eric Schmitt, "US Media Policy: Justify Air Assault but Skimp on Details." *New York Times*, Mar 27, 1999, p. 1

Bob Shacochis, "Pens and Swords." *Harvard International Review*, Cambridge, Mass. Winter 2000, pp. 26-30

Jamie P. Shea, "The Kosovo Crisis and the Media." *NATO Nations and Partners for Peace*, Uithorn, 2000, pp. 39-46

Perry M. Smith, *How CNN Fought the War*, Birch Lane: New York, 1991

Warren P. Strobel, *Late Breaking Foreign Policy*, US Inst of Peace Press: Wash, 1997

Margarita S. Studemeister, "The Impact of information and communication technologies on international conflict management." *Bulletin of the American Society for Information Science*, Washington, Feb/Mar 1998, pp. 24-27

Summers, Col Harry G., "Western Media and Recent Wars." *Military Review*, Kansas, May 1986, pp. 4-17

Philip M. Taylor, "War and the Media", Lecture delivered to conference on media-military relations at Royal Military Sandhurst in 1995 and found at www.leeds.ac.uk/ics/arts-pt2.htm

Loren B. Thompson, ed. *Defense Beat: The dilemmas of Defense Coverage*, Lexington Books:New York, 1991

Wiegand, Krista E. And Paletz, David L., "The Elite Media and the Military-Civilian Culture Gap." *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol 27, No 2, Winter 2001, p. 183-204

Wright, Lt Col Richard H., "Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures." *Military Review*, Mar-Apr 2001, pp. 30-32

Peter R. Young, ed. *Defence and the Media in time of limited war*, Cass: London, 1992

Peter Young and Peter Jesser, *The Media and the Military*, St Martins Press:New York, 1997

Amy B. Zegart, *Flawed by Design – the evolution of the CIA, JCS and NSC*, California Press: Stanford, 1999.