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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES
AMSC 3 / CSEM 3

EXERCISE/EXERCICE

Powerlessness in the Face of Responsibility:
LtGen Romeo Dallaire's Military Leadership during UNAMIR

November 2000

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Abstract

In October 1993 United Nations Security Council passed a resolution to install UNAMIR - a Chapter VI peacekeeping mission under UN command in Rwanda. The mission failed and could not prevent the Rwandan people from becoming victims of one of the cruelest genocides in the second half of the 20th Century. Within the last couple of years a significant amount of literature has been published on the Rwanda operation. So this mission sets the frame for a discussion of operational level military leadership under the conditions of a peacekeeping operation under UN command.

Since international organizations like the United Nations are "coalitions of the willing", successful military leadership particular in peace support operations under UN command is strongly dependent on the political responsiveness, interest and unity of effort by the parties involved. It requires seriously trained and educated personnel, effective political analysis and intelligence of the conflict, robust command and control structures, and a stringent political guidance and interpretation of the missions mandate.

A brief outline of the historical events reasons of the failures of UNAMIR will be described, mainly following the conclusions and recommendations of the Independent Inquiry caused by the UN Secretary-General. The dilemma of military leadership during UNAMIR will be approached under a twofold perspective. The conclusions of the Independent UN Inquiry will set the framework for a predominantly administrative and organizational perspective. LtGen Dallaire's personal reflections will add the predominantly ethic and moral perspective of leadership and rise serious questions about the specific nature of missions under UN command like: problems of military loyalty in an international environment of responsibilities; the nature of "political control" and "political influence" as result of "political interests" (not necessarily identical with "national interests" of the political entities involved) in a multi- or international environment; "Order and obedience" in an operation under UN command.

Introduction

If one has never personally experienced war, one cannot understand in what the difficulties constantly mentioned really consist, nor why a commander should need any brilliance and exceptional ability.

Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Book I, Chapter VII, section 1

“... The world must deeply repent this failure. Rwanda’s tragedy was the world’s tragedy. All of us who cared about Rwanda, all of us who witnessed its suffering, fervently wish that we could have prevented the genocide. Looking back now, we see the signs which then were not recognized. Now we know that what we did was not nearly enough – not enough to save Rwanda from itself, not enough to honor the ideals for which the United Nations exists. We will not deny that, in their greatest hour of need, the world failed the people of Rwanda...¹”

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the Parliament of Rwanda, 7 May 1998

The Rwanda Genocide and in this context the UNAMIR performance in Rwanda 1993/94 touched public interest as well as it was subject to several inquiries² and law-suits in the past.

What happened in Rwanda 1993/94, what went wrong, what could have been prevented? What was the scenario set and driven by the responsible parties involved? What was the scenario in

¹ Full text of Annan’s speech see: "The Triumph of the Evil." How the West ignored warnings of the 1994 Rwanda genocide and turned its back on the victims. 100 days of slaughter. *PBS Online and WGBH/ Frontline* <<http://www.pbs.org/wbg...es/frontline/shows/evil/index.htm>>

² *Rapport d'information depose en appelation de l'article 145 du Reglement par la Mission d'Information de la Commission de la Defense nationale et des Forces armees et de la Commission des Affaires etrangeres sur les operations militaires menees par la France, d'autres pays et l'ONU au Rwanda entre 1990 et 1994.* France. Assemblée nationale, Paris , 15 Decembre 1998, Tome I, II, III(1), III(2). <<http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr>> (=Rapport d'information); *Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda.* United Nations Department of Public Information, New York, 15 December 1999, <<http://www.un.org>> (=Report of the Independent Inquiry). Besides this there were several serious publications on researches done by international governmental or non-governmental organizations: *The United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996.* United Nations Blue Book Series, Vol.X, Department of Public Information, United Nations, New York 1996; Des Forges, Alison: *Leave None To Tell The Story. Genocide in Rwanda.* New York, Washington,D.C., London, Brussels: Human Rights Watch, 1999 <<http://www.hrw.org>>; "The Triumph of the Evil." How the West ignored warnings of the 1994 Rwanda genocide and turned its back on the victims. Interviews. 100 days of slaughter. The Somalia debacle. Readings. The warning. *PBS Online and WGBH/ Frontline* <<http://www.pbs.org/wbg...es/frontline/shows/evil/index.htm>> (= "The Triumph of the Evil.") ;

which the Force Commander UNAMIR – the later Lieutenant-General Romeo Dallaire – had to assume military command – and leadership?

Due to LtGen Dallaire's particular personal situation³ including the fact that he obviously seems to be one of the few persons to feel guilty or publicly comment⁴ about what happened during the UNAMIR mission, the essay will not primarily discuss LtGen Dallaire's personal leadership performance. The research will focus on the overall political, military, organizational and structural general framework of the UNAMIR mission as a peace support operation run under UN command and discuss their implications on the military leadership issues.

Following Pigeau and McCann's approach to understand command as a composition of person and position⁵, a more abstract perspective might be possible. Leadership⁶ on the contrary is bound to the personal influence and confidence-building⁷ of a "leader" and is to a very high degree dependent on the real, in-time situation which is irreversible and which causes instant human – and not primarily organizational - action. LtGen Dallaire's leadership during UNAMIR is only understandable out of the close context of this mission. That fact requires a closer look to the historical context and on the circumstances in which LtGen Dallaire had to act. A study

³ Off, Carol: General Breakdown. In: *National Post*, 28 October 2000, *Saturday Night*, Don Mills pp.29-38

⁴ Dallaire, R.A.: "Command Experiences in Rwanda" In Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann, eds. *The Human in Command: Exploring the Modern Military Experience*. : Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2000, pp.29-50; Dallaire, R.A. and B.Poulin: "Rwanda: From Peace Agreement to Genocide." *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No.3 (Spring 1995), pp. 7 – 11 (= Dallaire/Poulin I); Dallaire, R.A. and B.Poulin: "UNAMIR: Mission to Rwanda" *Joint Forces Quarterly*, No.7, (Spring 1995), pp. 66 –71 (= Dallaire/Poulin II); Hobson, Sharon: Interview with Major General Romeo Dallaire. *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Vol. 23, No. 15, (15 April 1995), p. 32

⁵ Pigeau, Ross and McCann, Carol: "What is a Commander". Paper presented to the Human in Command Workshop & Symposium, Breda, The Netherlands, 5-8 June 2000, p.3.

On the issue of "command" see also: Creveld, Martin van: *Command in War*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1985

⁶ On the issue of "leadership" see also: Bass, Bernard M.: *Transformational Leadership: Industrial, Military, and Educational Impact*. Mahwah, NJ, Lawrence Erlbaum Ass., 1998; Yukl, Gary A.: *Leadership in Organizations*. Englewood Cliff, NJ, Prentice Hall, 1989.

⁷ Dallaire, R.A.: "Command Experiences in Rwanda", p.46.

purely on Pigeau & McCann's sociological and organizational oriented academic approach⁸ admits only limited expectations, to learn "lessons" out of LtGen Dallaire's experiences which are characterized by the fact, that he was driven by an exceptional understanding of institutional as well as moral and ethic responsibility as military leader.

On the background of a brief outline of the historical events reasons of the failures of UNAMIR will be described, mainly following the conclusions and recommendations of the Independent Inquiry caused by the UN Secretary-General⁹. The Inquiry's assignment of responsibilities to the parties and organizational elements involved set the picture for the complexity of the operational-level¹⁰ military leadership issues during UNAMIR.

The dilemma of military leadership during UNAMIR will be approached under a twofold perspective. The conclusions of the Independent UN Inquiry¹¹ will set the frame for a

⁸ The so-called CAR-model developed by Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann might be seen as an interesting approach to perceive a "military world" of "command" under the perspective of sociological and organizational science perspectives. Unfortunately it is based on several assumptions which indicate a restriction towards a typical American-Canadian military understanding. Due to this orientation – may be also due to language problems – experiences of other Armed Forces, like European ones, are out of sight. Two examples out of others may underline that opinion: In their discussion of the relationship between legal and personal authority it is stated "*This is why militaries have their own judicial system: they provide an explicit mechanism for judging obligations to help ensure that legal authority is not abused.*" Unfortunately they did not realize, that a unique judicial system might not be necessary for Armed Forces. There are several very efficiently functioning Armed Forces (for example the German Armed Forces) without military judicial system – simply based on their societies civil judicial systems. In their "Balanced Command Envelop" they assume that the levels of competency, responsibility and authority must be balanced according to every level of command. Unfortunately they did not perceive, that this assumption will not meet the reality of a mission-oriented military command structure, where the level of competency necessarily must be in the minimum one level above the level of responsibility (and authority) to ensure proper understanding of the missions as basis for action.

⁹ *Report of the Independent Inquiry*

¹⁰ Although there might be serious reservations, whether it is correct to address a mission like UNAMIR as "operational-level" by nature, this issue will not be discussed in detail. Reflecting peace support operations of an UNAMIR-like nature could lead to the conclusion of a very ambivalent nature of those missions: On the one hand the military commanders' tasks seem to be highly political and strategically by nature. Under a strictly military perspective on the other hand the commanders' function seem to be predominantly tactical by nature due to the fact that the number of troops under his command are rather mediocre by amount and design. This problem is of importance under the perspective, whether respective military leaders will be well prepared when sent to such "operational-level" missions.

¹¹ The recommendations of the Independent Inquiry is also to be seen in the light of an almost recent report worked out within the UN - *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*. A Far Reaching Report by an Independent Panel. 21 August 2000 <http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/docs/full_report.htm> (Bahimi-Report)

predominantly administrative and organizational perspective. LtGen Dallaire's personal reflections will add the predominantly ethic and moral perspective of leadership and rise serious questions about the specific nature of missions under UN command like: problems of military loyalty in an international environment of responsibilities; the nature of "political control" and "political influence" as result of "political interests" (not necessarily identical with "national interests" of the political entities involved) in a multi- or international environment; "Order and obedience" in an operation under UN command.

So this essay argues as follows:

Successful military leadership particular in peace support operations under UN command is strongly dependent on the political responsiveness, interest and unity of effort by the parties involved. It requires seriously trained and educated personnel, effective political analysis and intelligence of the conflict, robust command and control structures, and a stringent political guidance and interpretation of the missions mandate.

The road to the Rwanda Genocide

The background and the dimension of the 1993/94 Rwanda situation is not to be understood without a short look back into history ¹², showing the long lasting tensions between the two ethnic groups of Hutu and Tutsi population in that area. Under the 1918 Treaty of Versailles the

¹² Details on the historical and chronological events see: *Rapport d'information*, Tombe I, Tombe II, Annex 1.2.; *Report of the Independent*, Annex I: Chronology of Events; Castonguay, Francois: *Les Casques Bleus au Rwanda*. Paris and Montreal: L'Harmattan inc. 1998, pp. 253-275; Des Forges, Alison: *Leave None To Tell The Story*. pp. 31-64; "Valentina's Nightmare". A Journey into the Rwanda Genocide. *PBS Online and WGBH/Frontline*, Chronology, <<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/rwanda/>>; Dallaire / Poulin I, pp. 7 – 8; Dallaire / Poulin II, pp. 66 –67;

former German colony of Rwanda-Urundi was made a League of Nations protectorate. The two territories separately administered under two different Tutsi monarchs became governed by Belgium. The population consisted of two major ethnic entities – the Tutsi (14 %) and the Hutus (85 %) - whose traditional relationship under the German as well as under the Belgium domination was turned into a class system. A system of ethnic identity cards differentiating between Tutsis and Hutus was introduced by the Belgian administration in 1926. The Belgians favored the Tutsi minority to enforce their rule by giving them privileges and western-style education, whereas the Hutu population remained more agriculturally oriented. Under those auspices the de-colonialisation process of the 1960s from the very beginning was accompanied by ongoing severe acts of violence between the two ethnic groups.

In 1959 the Hutus started to rebel against the Belgian colonial power and their favorite Tutsi elite: 150,000 Tutsis fled to Burundi. In 1962 Belgium withdrew; Rwanda - under a Hutu-regime - and Burundi – where the Tutsi retained power - became two separate and independent states. Responding a military attack of exiled Tutsis from neighboring Burundi led to new Tutsi massacres in Rwanda in 1963, followed by further massacres in 1967. In 1973 General Juvenal Habyarimana seized power. Setting up a one-party (Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Development – MRND) state, a policy of ethnic quotas was entrenched in all public service employments. In the following years a pattern of exclusion restricted Tutsis to 9 % of available jobs, whereas Hutus from the president's home area in northern Rwanda got overwhelming preference in public services and in the military.

In 1986 Rwandan exiles formed the Tutsi dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in Uganda starting to invade their guerilla troops from Uganda into Rwanda in October 1990. Only with French and Zairean assistance did the Rwanda government reached a cease-fire in March 1991.

In this period the Rwandan army started to train and arm civilian militias – the Interahamwe (“Those who stand together”). Within the next three years president Habyarimana showed only slight interest to establish a genuine multi-party political system, which he had conceded in 1990 under the pressure of Western aid donors to that over-populated country, starving from famine and desolate public revenues. Tensions and massacres among the Tutsi population around the country went on, when in February 1993 RPF guerillas from Uganda launched a new offensive, which reached thereby the outskirts of the Rwandan capital of Kigali. Rwanda again had to ask for French military assistance and the fighting continued for several months.

This was the frame when the United Nations were involved for the first time on a request by Ugandan president Museveni to install a neutral observer force at the Uganda-Rwanda border to prove that there was no war support out of Uganda for the then RPF-rebels. On 22 June 1993 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 846 which installed the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda/Rwanda (UNOMUR), which was operational by mid-October under the command of then BrigGen. Romeo Dallaire from Canada with headquarters in Kabale, Uganda. On 4 August 1993 the belligerent parties in Rwanda signed the Arusha Peace Agreement¹³ and its six protocols, aiming at the installation of a Broad-Based Transitional Government (BBTG) to restore peace and stability in Rwanda by insuring political, military and constitutional reforms. The United Nations was provided a broad role in that agreement to install a so-called Neutral International Force (NIF). In preparation for this mission two weeks later the UN Secretary General dispatched a reconnaissance mission, headed by BigGen Dallaire, Force Commander UNOMUR, to the region. From 19 to 31 August 1993 the mission group studied possible

¹³ Mas, Monique: Paris-Kigali 1990-1994. Lunettes coloniales, politique du sabre et onction humanitaire. Paris, Montreal: L'Harmattan, 1999, pp.309; Castonguay, Francois: *Les Casques Bleus au Rwanda*. Paris and Montreal: L'Harmattan inc. 1998, p. 37

functions of the NIF and resources needed for such a peacekeeping operation ¹⁴. Unfortunately the key expert to that mission on the Rwanda region had to stay back at home due to a medical problem so that the fact-finding mission already from the outset lacked indispensable expertise. Unaware of key information on the real Rwanda situation in his analysis BrigGen Dallaire requested a force of about 5000 troops. From the very outset UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali made clear to Dallaire that the Security Council never would agree 5000 troops ¹⁵. To assist the Rwandan government in its efforts the United Nations Security Council Resolution 872 ¹⁶ from 5 October 1993 authorized the establishment of a 2,548 soldier contingent named United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) into which UNOMUR became administratively integrated.

On 22 October 1993 – one day after a coup d’etat in neighboring Burundi, which brought additional about 300,000 Hutu refugees to Rwanda – BrigGen Dallaire, the new UNAMIR force commander, arrived at Kingali, followed by an 24 person advance party. On 1 November the Organization of African Unity Military Observer Group of some hundred African observers and Tunesian soldiers, which had existed since mid-1992 was integrated into UNAMIR. From now on things got its own dynamic –and dramatic.

UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda)

Significantly limiting the mandate of UNAMIR against the Secretary-General’s proposals in his report to the Security Council from 24 September, Resolution 872 (1993) set the frame for the

¹⁴ Castonguay, Francois: *Les Casques Bleus au Rwanda*. Paris and Montreal: L’Harmattan inc. 1998, pp. 35-37.

¹⁵ UN-experts estimated 8000 troops – the US recommended 500. Off, Carol: *The Lion The Fox & The Eagle. A story of generals and justice in Rwanda and Yugoslavia*, Random House Canada 2000, pp.26-27

¹⁶ Details on the resolution see: Castonguay, Francois: *Les Casques Bleus au Rwanda*. Paris and Montreal: L’Harmattan inc. 1998, pp. 43-44

UNAMIR mission.¹⁷ Under strong political pressure immediate deployment of the forces into five sectors was provided¹⁸. The mission's operation was planned to consist of four phases¹⁹. At 23 November 1993 the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Rwanda, former Foreign Minister of Cameroon, Dr. Jacques-Roger Booh Booh²⁰, arrived in Kigali as political head of the mission. On the same day, BrigGen Dallaire had sent to UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Headquarters a draft set of Roles of Engagement (ROE) for UNAMIR²¹ with the request for approval – a request to which UN headquarters never responded formally.

¹⁷ *Report of the Independent Inquiry*; Annex I: Chronology of Events (October 1993 – July 1994); Castonguay, Francois: *Les Casques Bleus au Rwanda*. Paris and Montreal: L'Harmattan inc. 1998, pp. 33-35; Dallaire / Poulin I, p.8; Dallaire / Poulin II, pp.66 –67.

The mandate included the following elements

- to contribute to the security of the city of Kigali, i.e., within a weapons-secure area established by the parties in and around the city ;
- to monitor observance of the cease-fire agreement, which called for the establishment of cantonment and assembly zones and the demarcation of the new DMZ and other demilitarization procedures;
- to monitor security situation during the final period of the transitional government's mandate, leading up to the elections;
- to assist with mine clearance, primarily through training programs;
- to investigate, at the request of the parties, or on its own initiative, instances of non-compliance with the provisions of the Protocol of Agreement on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties, and to pursue any such instances with the parties responsible and report thereon as appropriate to the Secretary-General;
- to monitor the process of repatriation of Rwandese refugees and the resettlement of displaced persons to verify that it is carried out in a safe and orderly manner;
- to assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance in conjunction with relief operations, and
- to investigate and report on incidents regarding the activities of the gendarmerie and police.

¹⁸ Kigali, the De-militarized Zone (DMZ), the Government forces (RGF) and the RPF with UNOMUR as fifth sector, the Southern Sector was added on later. Castonguay, Francois: *Les Casques Bleus au Rwanda*. Paris and Montreal: L'Harmattan inc. 1998, pp. 45-46. Organization of UNAMIR forces see Enclosure I.

¹⁹ 5 October 1993 – 4 January 1994 preparation to establishment of the BBTG; 5 January – 4 April 1994 planning and preparation of disengagement, demobilization and integration of both forces; 5 April 1994 – 4 January 1995 actual disengagement and integration of the two forces; 5 January – 4 November 1995 security in the period leading to democratic elections.

²⁰ Booh-Booh was appointed 27 October 1993 by the UN Secretary-General. According to C.Off and other sources Booh-Booh was not only badly prepared but also not well qualified for that delicate mission, Off, Carol : *The Lion. The Fox & The Eagle*, pp.37, 62-65. The Independent Inquiry also carefully confirmed problems in the relationship between Dallaire and Booh-Booh, *Report of the Independent Inquiry*, III. Conclusions, 15. Organizational Problems.

²¹ Para 17 of these ROE stated: "There may also be ethnically or politically motivated criminal acts committed during this mandate which will morally and legally require UNAMIR to use all available means to halt them. Examples are executions, attacks on displaced persons or refugees, ethnic riots, attacks on demobilized soldiers, etc. During such occasions UNAMIR military personnel will follow the ROD (*error: i.e. ROE*) outlined in this directive, in support of UNCIVPOL and local authorities or in their absence, UNAMIR will take the necessary action to

During November and December 1993 violence steadily increased – the political situation faced a stalemate, while Special Representative Booh Booh unsuccessfully tried to bring the parties to a fulfillment of the political steps envisioned in the Arusha Agreement. Finally by the end of UNAMIR phase I in early January 1994 its troops numbered 1,428 military personnel from 19 different countries. It was not without irony – and made the tragedy even more profound - when Rwanda at 1 January 1994 became a non-permanent member of the Security Council.

The date of 11 January 1994 was a crucial milestone, when BrigGen Dallaire got a detailed note from a top level informant of the Interhamwe cadres activities, arms caches and the ongoing registration of Tutsis in Kigali with the planning of their extermination and the intent of killing some Belgian soldiers in order to guarantee Belgian withdrawal from Rwanda. In a cable Dallaire informed MajGen Maurice Baril, Military Advisor to the UN Secretary-General, in New York about his intentions to counter that threat with fast offensive action and asked for guidance²². At the end of an exchange of cables between Under-Secretary-General Annan (cables signed by Assistant Under-Secretary-General Iqbal Riza) and Booh Booh / Dallaire, DPKO denied UNAMIR permission to conduct any offensive UNAMIR actions, instructing UNAMIR to immediately inform president Habyarimana and meet the ambassadors of Belgium, France and the United States²³. President Habyarimana subsequently was informed and was

prevent any crime against humanity ”. Des Forges, Alison: *Leave None To Tell The Story*. p.133; *Report of the Independent Inquiry, The establishment of UNAMIR*.

Concerning the ROE and specifically its para 17 there is some dissonance in the literature insofar, as the Human Rights Watch Report states, that UN Headquarters had accepted the ROE. The crucial para 17 obviously was not known to all troops of UNAMIR in full length - Des Forges, Alison: *Leave None To Tell The Story*. pp.133-134, footnotes 113 – 115.

²² Text of the cable see Enclosure II

²³ Text of the last cable of 11 January 1993 from Annan to Booh Booh / Dallaire see Enclosure III. C.Off points out the absurdity ordering Dallaire to inform President Habyarimana about weapons being stored in the president's own party's headquarter as well to inform the ambassadors of Belgium, France and the United States – authorities with an own sophisticated intelligence gathering capability – who knew much more about the actual situation than Dallaire himself, Off, Carol: *The Lion. The Fox & The Eagle*, pp.42-43.

requested to inform UNAMIR within 48 hours about his steps to avoid further violence – an issue that the Rwandan president ignored consequently.

The security situation worsened constantly in a way that on 14 February the Belgian Foreign Minister, Mr. Willy Claes in a letter to the Secretary-General argued in favour of a stronger mandate for UNAMIR. On 23 February 1994 BrigGen Dallaire cabled to New York information about weapons distributions²⁴, death squad target lists, planning of civil unrest etc²⁵. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Special Representative, Mr. Michel Moussali, called for action to restore stability in Rwanda, warning of possible “bloodbath of unparalleled proportions”²⁶. Although UNAMIRs strength grew up to 2,548²⁷, with troops from 24 different countries by March, poor equipment, extremely limited logistics and insufficiently trained personnel reduced its capacity significantly²⁸.

Just after Security Council Resolution 909 (1994) had extended the UNAMIR mission for slightly less than four other months at 5 April 1994, president Habyarimana was killed during a crash of his plane at the night of 6 April 1994²⁹. This marked the final start for the Rwandan genocide of the Tutsi and murder of the Hutu opposed to Habyarimana.

²⁴ Firearms, even traditional weapons like spears, bows and arrows were not even easily available at the world market. Another matter where machetes: Between January 1993 and March 1994 requests for import licenses into Rwanda indicate an import of 581,000 kilograms of machetes - about double the amount of previous years. With an assumed weight of one kilo per machete this quantity would equal to 581,000 machetes or one for every third male Hutu in Rwanda. Remarkable is in this context besides the extraordinary quantity the name of a main importer: Felicien Kabuga,, a friend of president Habyarimana and father-in-law of one of the president’s sons. Des Forges, Alison: *Leave None To Tell The Story*, pp.127-128.

²⁵ An extract of UNAMIR’s list of incidents from 31 December 1993 to 25 March 1994 see Castonguay, Francois: *Les Casques Bleus au Rwanda*. Paris and Montreal: L’Harmattan inc. 1998, pp. 78-80

²⁶ A detailed chronological prescription of the facts see: Des Forges, Alison: *Leave None To Tell The Story*. pp.141-179.

²⁷ see Enclosure I

²⁸ Dallaire for example received only half of the announced one Belgian battalion, whereas the Bengali troops proved to be almost completely unprepared, untrained, poorly lead and extremely bad equipped , , Off, Carol : *The Lion. The Fox & The Eagle*, pp.40-41.

²⁹ According to UNAMIR’s report president Habyariman’s plane was shot down as it was coming back from a subregional summit in Dar es Salaam on the further implementation of the Arusha process. Together with him the president of Burundi, Cyprien Ntaryamira was on board and killed as well. The circumstances of the accident never

The peacekeeping mission of UNAMIR had obviously failed – there was no peace to keep anymore. The mandate –and its interpretation, number and equipment of forces on the ground and not at least the political unwillingness of the world community to take responsibility did prevent UNAMIR from taking effective actions either to stop or limit the ongoing slaughter³⁰ or to protect the victims effectively. No one seemed to be really interested in any success or in any preventive action to stop the ongoing slaughter – not the UN whose primary intent seemed to be efforts towards a face saving cease-fire to resist on an ongoing Chapter VI mission, nor the Security Council. France played a shadowy role aside with the Hutu regime and the US did everything to prevent substantial assistance. Even Canada had refused to help its general, when he asked for a battalion in February 1994³¹. The brutal murder of ten Belgian soldiers at 7 April³² set the path to a complete withdrawal of the Belgian contingent within 12 days³³, leaving behind them some thousand Rwandan refugees under their protection, who were slaughtered just after the Belgian withdrawal, while at the same time France, Belgium and Italy had initiated an

were investigated closely. A detailed prescription of the facts see : Des Forges, Alison: *Leave None To Tell The Story.*, pp.181-185

³⁰ On 12 April 1994 Dallaire had submitted a proposal and request for a rapid reaction force of 5000 troops under Chapter VI to stop the violence by use of force on the basis of the ROE, para 17. This proposal was never responded by UN. ” Off, Carol: *The Lion. The Fox & The Eagle*, pp.57-59

³¹ Dallaire characterized the situation best by stating “Surely no single nation would have deserted its troops in a way, we were deserted by the world community in Rwanda”. Off, Carol: *The Lion. The Fox & The Eagle*, pp.44, 62,67, 93.

The dubious role of French policy beside others proofs the fact, that officially French troops had left Rwandan territory (*Report of the Independent Inquiry*; Annex I: Chronology of Events (October 1993 – July 1994), whereas the first and only external troops to reach the site, where President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down at 6 April 1994 were French troops which were not under the command of Force Commander UNAMIR. An interesting lapidary statement is covered in the findings of the Independent Inquiry: “The rapidity of the response, whereby the French operation was dispatched within hours of the shooting down of the aircraft, also shows a disconnect in the analysis of the situation between the key Member States of the United Nations and UNAMIR” - *Report of the Independent Inquiry*, III. Conclusions, 16. National evacuations: international troops in different roles. More on France’s support for the Hutu regime see Off, Carol: *The Lion. The Fox & The Eagle*, pp.73-74, 79-82. For the official French policy see *Rapport d'information*.

³² Details on the massacre see Castonguay, Francois: *Les Casques Bleus au Rwanda*. Paris and Montreal: L’Harmattan inc. 1998, pp. 111-119.

³³ Thanks to the Belgian commander, Colonel Luc Marchal, who delayed the withdrawal of his battalion for three days, the Ghanaian contingent, posted in northern Rwanda, could be called down to secure the Kigali airport area. Off, Carol: *The Lion. The Fox & The Eagle*, p.63; “The Triumph of the Evil”, Interview with Colonel Luc Marchal.

evacuation campaign to rescue 1,361 expatriates including 178 Rwandan officials. On 19 April 1994 UNAMIR's troop strength was reduced from 2,165 to 1,515 and the number of military observers from 321 to 190. Without success BrigGen Dallaire had argued to retain a reduced UNAMIR after the Belgian withdrawal. Based on three options submitted by the UN Secretary-General³⁴ the Security Council on 21 April adopted resolution 912, adjusting UNAMIR's mandate and reducing its strength from 2,539 to 270 troops. Getting note of this reduction of UNAMIR's force BrigGen Dallaire decided to disobey the UN order to pull out. He appealed to BrigGen Henry Anyidoho, Commander of the Ghanaian contingent to stay with his troops in Rwanda. BrigGen Anyidoho agreed and both resisted Special Representative Booh Booh's advice to comply with the order³⁵.

Reduced in force, badly equipped, restricted by mandate BrigGen Dallaire was urged to represent a UN mission amidst a civil war which within days mutated into genocide of unconceivable dimensions. By mid of May 1994 the International Red Cross estimated 500,000 Rwandans having been killed.

It took until 17 May 1994 when Security Council adopted resolution 918 (1994), expanding again UNAMIR to a maximum of 5,500 personnel by creating and mandating UNAMIR II to conduct a Chapter VI peacekeeping operation for humanitarian reasons³⁶. Despite that resolution

³⁴ Secretary-General report S/1994/470: i) Immediate and massive reinforcement of UNAMIR to stop the fighting and the massacres, requiring several thousand additional troops and enforcement powers under Chapter VII; ii) downsizing of UNAMIR to 270 troops, acting as an intermediary between the parties and seek a cease-fire; iii) complete withdrawal of UNAMIR.

³⁵ Off, Carol: *The Lion. The Fox & The Eagle*, p.64. Surprisingly UN never responded to Dallaire's and Anyidoho's disobedience. Even in the findings of the Report of the Independent Inquiry this serious fact is simply neglected - *Report of the Independent Inquiry*.

³⁶ The mission: Protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk, support of relief efforts in Rwanda, arms embargo on Rwanda.

UNAMIR's buildup did not meet these requirements³⁷. How desperate the UNAMIR situation really was at that time was proved by the fact, that MajGen Baril during his 22 – 27 May special mission to Kigali asked Dallaire's staff for their land-evacuation plan. Informed that UNAMIR had planned only on an air-evacuation – not at least the a result of the permanent serious lack of gasoline, which made a land-evacuation absolutely impossible – MajGen Baril explained that the Security Council would not agree to any airlift. Now the mission definitively became a matter on death or life for all UNAMIR troops³⁸. It took until July 1994 when the first UNAMIR II troops arrived – among them 350 Canadian communications troops³⁹.

On 22 June 1994 French and Senegalese forces unilaterally started Operation Turquoise⁴⁰ – a finally Security Council approved multinational operation for humanitarian purposes in Rwanda⁴¹.

In August 1994 the Tutsi RPF forces had gained control over most parts of Rwanda, after the Hutu government had flown to Zaire. After a unilaterally declared cease-fire RPF set up an interim government of national unity in Kigali. Within around 100 days an estimated 800,000 Rwandans of Tutsi as well as of Hutu ethnic origin had been killed as well in a civil war as well as in a giant genocide.

³⁷ On 18 June 1994 UNAMIR consisted of 354 troops, 25 military staff personnel and 124 military observers, totaling to 503 under BrigGen Dallaires' command. In May 1994 Canada had sent twelve officers to enforce the UNAMIR mission.

³⁸ Off, Carol: *The Lion. The Fox & The Eagle*, p.64. Informed about that crucial decision, BrigGen Dallaire decided, that UNAMIR under those conditions would evacuate by a foot-marsh.

³⁹ Off, Carol: *The Lion. The Fox & The Eagle*, p.82

⁴⁰ Operation Turquoise lasted until early August: 2,330 French and 32 Senegalese troops installed a Humanitarian Protection Zone in southwest Rwanda. The French forces later were replaced by Ethiopian UN troops.

⁴¹ Under Dallaire's perspective this operation was the more a cover-up for the Goma refugee camp.

UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda) – Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations of Boards of Inquiry ⁴²

In its conclusions the Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda (Independent Inquiry)⁴³ drew a surprisingly unvarnished picture of the causes and failures. Although these findings may be considered as a result of a broad spectrum of “post-factum” inquiries, based on all the knowledge of “what happened after ...”, the independent inquiry was not afraid to frankly identify responsibilities out of his understanding⁴⁴.

The Inquiry highlights milestones on the way to failure. Two main political circumstances of that current time are shortly addressed without broader discussion: the impact of the disastrous Somalia campaign on world community’s reluctance to engage again in internal violence in an African state and the fatal fact, that Rwanda on 1 January 1994 routinely became a non-permanent member of the Security Council, which gave the Hutu government a unilateral platform of influence to cover its real intentions and activities.⁴⁵

Above all it stated an insufficient political analysis in the planing phase, which led to an inadequate mandate for UNAMIR⁴⁶:

⁴² *Report of the Independent Inquiry*, III. Conclusions ; *Rapport d'information*, Tombe I, pp.345-359. Because of reasons of time and space the description follows mainly the broader course of the UN-board.

⁴³ C.Off argues about an inherent dubiousity of this inquiry due to the fact that the new UN Secretary-General, Mr. Kofi Annan, commissioned the inquiry, picked the panel and set the terms of reference - Off, Carol: *The Lion. The Fox & The Eagle*, pp.96, 112-113. In fact there are some points of question in the result of this inquiry: Dallaire’s disobedience towards the Security Council Resolution 912 of 21 April 1994 is as well neglected as it is the issue of a land-evacuation of UNAMIR in May 1994. Nevertheless the Report of the Independent Inquiry speaks a remarkable clear voice in a lot of other cases of responsibilities.

⁴⁴ Although the Reports conclusions may not be consistent in all cases, these identifications of responsibilities for failures are undertaken in a mostly frank and overt clearness, which forbids to be simply paraphrased. Out of those reason relatively long passages of the reports’ text is quoted in the original voice.

⁴⁵ *Report of the Independent Inquiry*, III. Conclusions, 7. The Shadow of Somalia; 18. Rwanda as a member of the Security Council; Off, Carol: *The Lion. The Fox & The Eagle*, pp.70-71.

⁴⁶ The same conclusion is to be found: *Rapport d'information*, Tombe I, pp.356-357:

The responsibility for the oversight in the planning of UNAMIR lies with the parts of the UN Secretariat concerned, in particular the Center for Human Rights and DPKO. (...) The responsibility for the limitations of the original mandate given to UNAMIR lies firstly with the United Nations Secretariat, the Secretary-General and responsible officials within the DPKO for the mistaken analysis which underpinned the recommendations to the Council, and for recommending that the mission be composed of fewer troops than the field mission had considered necessary. The Member States which exercised pressure upon the Secretariat to limit the proposed number of troops also bear part of the responsibility. Not at least, the Security Council itself bears the responsibility for the hesitance to support new peacekeeping operations in the aftermath of Somalia, and specifically in this instance for having decided to limit the mandate of the mission in respect to the weapons secure area.⁴⁷

Without any doubt there was no broad interest of the world community on Rwanda and its problems⁴⁸. Tensions between the two ethnic entities of Tutsi and Hutu were perceived as a dominating factor of the country's history during the last decades⁴⁹. Particularly the overall political situation has to be conceived under the traumatic experiences of the Somalia experience and the decisions taken by the international parties involved were dominated by the fear to avoid “another Somalia”⁵⁰.

Concerning the implementation of the mandate, the preservation of a neutral role under the traditional peacekeeping mandate was perceived crucial. The Inquiry underlined its perception, that the 11 January 1994 cable sent by BrigGen Dallaire to MajGen Baril⁵¹ showed central

⁴⁷ *Report of the Independent Inquiry*, III. Conclusions, 2. The Inadequacy of UNAMIR's mandate.

⁴⁸ "The Triumph of the Evil." Interview with Iqbal Riza, Assistant Under-General-General for Peacekeeping Operations; Interview with James Wood, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs at the Department of Defense 1986-1994; Interview with Tony Marley, political advisor for the U.S.State Department 1992-1995; *Rapport d'information*, Tome I, pp.354.

“It has been stated repeatedly during the course of the interviews conducted by the Inquiry that the fact that Rwanda was not of strategic interest to third countries and that the international community exercised double standards when faced with the risk of a catastrophe there compared to action taken elsewhere.” - *Report of the Independent Inquiry*, III. Conclusions, 10. The lack of political will of Member States.

⁴⁹ "The Triumph of the Evil." Interview with Iqbal Riza, Assistant Under-General-General for Peacekeeping Operations

⁵⁰ "The Triumph of the Evil." Interview with Iqbal Riza, Assistant Under-General-General for Peacekeeping Operations; Interview with James Wood, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs at the Department of Defense 1986-1994; Interview with Tony Marley, political advisor for the U.S.State Department 1992-1995;

⁵¹ see Enclosure II

aspects of UNAMIR's perception how to implement its mandate. The Inquiry here saw serious mistakes with the result that not sufficient attention was given to the informations contained:

Dallaire should not have addressed the cable only to Baril.⁵²

Although Annan's and Riza's reaction⁵³ proved the realization of the importance of the information

“they did not brief the Secretary-General about. And the Security Council – which a week before had conditioned its continued support for UNAMIR on progress in the peace process – was not informed. Given the Headquarters had determined that raiding the arms caches and conducting deterrent operations was not within the scope of the mandate, the Inquiry feels that this issue should have been raised with the Security Council as a fundamental weakness in the mandate of the mission, which the Council should consider rectifying because of the risks involved. The Inquiry has no evidence that the issue was raised in this way with the Council.”⁵⁴

Concerning the serious issue of Roles of Engagement and its dissonant understanding between UNAMIR and Headquarters the Inquiry summed up:

“It is disturbing, however, that there was such a lack of clarity in the communications between UNAMIR and Headquarters regarding which rules were in force.”⁵⁵

In an interview one of the then key-players, Assistant Under-Secretary-General Riza⁵⁶, discussed the deep going differences in the ROE concerning the use of force. It seems cynical to forbid any

⁵² This approach is quite understandable, keeping in mind that MajGen Baril was the Military Advisor to the Secretary-General. To forward the cable correctly was in the sole responsibility of MajGen Baril – and the Under-Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who obviously did not inform the Secretary-General nor the Security Council correctly and timely.

The role played by the then MajGen Maurice Baril in the whole Rwanda case as Military Advisor to the Secretary General seems to be not quite clear yet. Unfortunately Gen Baril refused to make any public statements (except one interview with Francois Castonguay) on his role; asked about the Rwanda case just after he had been appointed as new Chief of Defense, Gen Baril simply answered the reporters that he would not be standing there today, if there were doubts about him - Off, Carol: *The Lion. The Fox & The Eagle*, p.39-40, 42-43, 70, 90, 95-99,101.

⁵³ see Enclosure III

⁵⁴ *Report of the Independent Inquiry*, III. Conclusions, 3. The implementation of the mandate.

⁵⁵ *Report of the Independent Inquiry*, III. Conclusions, 4. Confusion over the roles of engagement.

⁵⁶ "The Triumph of the Evil." Interview with Iqbal Riza, Assistant Under-General-General for Peacekeeping Operations; Off, Carol: *The Lion. The Fox & The Eagle*, pp.90-91.

use of force in the pre-stage of foreseeable violence and directly after their outbreak⁵⁷, whereas, confronted with the results of that decision, the responsibility for not using force under worse conditions all of a sudden is switched almost to the level of the individual soldier on the ground. In the central problem of responding to the genocide the Inquiry identified massive deficiencies in the UNAMIR command and control structure, for example by the fact that due to the weak mandate the Force Commander UNAMIR lost practical command of parts of his troops and was sidelined in relation to the national evacuation operations.

“The responsibility for this situation must be shared between the leadership of UNAMIR, the Secretariat and the troop contributing countries. The Inquiry believes that it is essential to preserve the unity of United Nations command and control, and that the troops contributing countries, despite the domestic political pressure which may argue the reverse, should refrain from unilateral withdrawal to the detriment and even risk of ongoing peacekeeping operations.”⁵⁸

Basic deficiencies were identified by the Inquiry in respect to analytical capacity to really understand the political background and dimension of the Rwanda cause – neither by UNAMIR nor by the Headquarters. So UNAMIR was established without any fallback position or worst case scenario.

“At Headquarters there was no sufficient focus or institutional resources for early warning and risk analysis. Much could have been gained by more active preventive policy aimed at identifying the risks for conflict or tension, including through an institutional cooperation with academics, NGOs and better coordination within different parts of the United Nations system dealing with Rwanda. The failure to formulate a determined response to these warnings is due in part to the lack of correct analysis, both in UNAMIR and within the Secretariat, but also by key Member States. These are examples which, together with others cited in this report, such as the handling of the Dallaire cable, and the analysis of developments after the genocide began, show an institutional weakness in the analytical capacity of the United Nations. The responsibility

⁵⁷ UN did never respond to Dallaire's request / proposal of 12 April 1994 for a rapid reaction force of 5000 troops to stop the killings under a further Chapter VI mission, using his ROE's para 17 as a basis of use of force. Off, Carol: *The Lion. The Fox & The Eagle*, pp.58.

⁵⁸ *Report of the Independent Inquiry*, III. Conclusions, 5. Failure to respond to the genocide.

for this lack of analytical capacity falls primarily on the Secretariat under the leadership of the Secretary-General.”⁵⁹

Concerning the Security Council’s 21 April 1994 decision to reduce UNAMIR to a minimal force in the face of the evident killings

...”the Inquiry believes that the Secretary-General could have done more to argue the case for reinforcement in the Council. It is a decision, which the Inquiry finds difficult to justify. The Security Council bears the responsibility for its lack of political will to do more to stop the killing. The delay in decision-making by the Security Council was a distressing show of lack of unity in a situation where rapid action was necessary. The delay in identifying the events in Rwanda as a genocide was a failure by the Security Council.”⁶⁰

The reluctance by some states – in particular by the United States ⁶¹ - to use the term of “genocide” in the Rwandan case is not at least a result of political disinterest together with the lack of will to act instantly in an appropriate way as they would have been obliged to act as soon as a genocide was identified.

In this context the Inquiry identified a fundamental weakness in the course of action of UNAMIR as well as all levels within the UN to focus on the achievement of a cease-fire rather than to stop the ongoing genocide ⁶².

“The persistent attempts to view the situation in Kigali after the death of the President as one where the cease-fire had broken down and therefore needed to be restored through negotiations, rather than one of genocide in addition to the fighting between the RGF and RPF, was a costly error of judgement. It was an error committed by the Secretariat, the

⁵⁹ *Report of the Independent Inquiry*, III. Conclusions, 9. Lack of analytical capacity; see also: 14. Flow of information.

⁶⁰ *Report of the Independent Inquiry*, III. Conclusions, 5. Failure to respond to the genocide.

⁶¹ Interestingly particularly Tom Marley among other reasons underlined the importance of the special relationship between the United States and Belgium as a reason for United States, not to intervene against the Belgium withdrawal explained: "The Triumph of the Evil. Interview with James Wood, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs at the Department of Defense 1986-1994; Interview with Tony Marley, political advisor for the U.S.State Department 1992-1995.Particular “obstructions” by the United States and Belgium were seen as causes in *Rapport d'information*, Tome I, pp.359-360. Outstanding importance in this context is to be given to the 3 May 1994 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD 25), aimed to limit U.S. military involvement in international peacekeeping operations: "The Triumph of the Evil." 100 days of slaughter; Off, Carol: *The Lion. The Fox & The Eagle*, pp.58-59.

⁶² C.Off quotes Iqbal Riza as recorded saying:”The United Nations cannot intervene in a civil conflict of an ethnic nature. With a cease-fire, it will be easier to control and supervise those villages.” - . Off, Carol: *The Lion. The Fox & The Eagle*, p.91. This quote – if correct – would raise and underline again a fundamental responsibility of UN Headquarters and DPKO for willingly neglecting a genocide.

leadership of UNAMIR and the Members of the Security Council. Several Council members have criticized the quality of the analysis provided to them by the Secretariat in this instance. For a number of the non-permanent members at the time, a key to realizing the genocidal perspective to the killings in Rwanda was information provided to them by the NGO community.”⁶³

The constant lacks and shortfalls of UNAMIR’s equipment, logistics, troops preparedness and funds were subject of a vast number of cables from BrigGen Dallaire and Special Representative Booh Booh to the UN Headquarters as well to the responsible individuals. In this important case the Inquiry unequivocally stated:

“The responsibility for the logistical problems faced by UNAMIR lies both with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, in particular its Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD), and with individual troop contributors. FALD should not have allowed UNAMIR to have the dire lack of sources described above. By April, six months after the establishment of the mission, these fundamental logistics problems should have been dealt with. However, the Inquiry also finds that troop contributors to UNAMIR did not provide their contingents with basic weaponry and other material for which they were responsible. The constant pressure by the Security Council on UNAMIR to save money and cut resources also created problems in a situation where the mission was too weak to start with.”⁶⁴

Although it was clear from the very beginning of the UNAMIR mission that the mandate as well as number and equipment of the troops would not allow any significant role to protect human life in a situation of overwhelming violence, considerable efforts were undertaken by UNAMIR personnel to protect civilian personnel during the massacres – sometimes at increasing risk to their own life. Besides examples of disastrous conduct of some troops⁶⁵ the unclear situation

⁶³ *Report of the Independent Inquiry*, III. Conclusions, 8. Focus on achieving a cease-fire.

⁶⁴ *Report of the Independent Inquiry*, III. Conclusions, 6. Peacekeeping overburdened: inadequate resources and logistics.

⁶⁵ The Bengali battalion set an example of utmost poor leadership, insufficient equipment and a lack of any mission-oriented training. On the other hand on his sudden withdrawal the Belgium battalion left behind some 2000 Rwandan civilians under their protection at the Kigali ETO college, who were cruelly slaughtered after the Belgian retreat – Dallaire, R.A.: “Command Experiences in Rwanda”, pp.37, 40-43; Off, Carol: *The Lion. The Fox & The Eagle*, pp.54, 63-64,

and confusing interpretations on the ROEs⁶⁶ as well as the whole mandate after the failure of the Arusha Accord⁶⁷ reduced UNAMIR's ability to protect political leaders as well as civil population's victims as well as the own UN national staff members effectively. Keeping in mind these above-mentioned circumstances the findings of the Independent Inquiry concerning these issues seem to overemphasize UNAMIR's responsibility:

“The failure in these instances (*i.e. the protection of political leaders*) seems to be attributable in some instances to a lack of direction from UNAMIR Headquarters, but also to the peacekeepers themselves, who by not resisting the threat to the persons they were protecting in some of the cases outlined above, as would have been covered by their Rules of Engagement, showed a lack of resolve to fulfil their mission.”⁶⁸

Concerning the withdrawal of the Belgium contingent – against the stated will of BrigGen Dallaire as well as Colonel Luc Marchal – the findings draw a confusing picture by addressing UNAMIR Headquarters as representatives of the originators of the command and control system in place (UN Headquarters, Security Council, Member States) when it is stated:

“If such a momentous decision as that to evacuate the ETO school (*i.e. the execution of the clear political will of Belgium to withdraw their contingent without any delay*) was taken without orders from the Force Commander, that shows grave problems of command and control within UNAMIR.”⁶⁹

The third group of people needing protection was the UN national staff members. The UN regulations at that time precluded the evacuation of national staff. So when the international

⁶⁶ The UN argumentation follows basically the line of para 17 of Dallaire's Rules of Engagement (although UN Headquarters never officially had approved these ROEs). On the other hand again and again Dallaire's requests to take actions actively had been refused by UN Headquarters. Under these confusing circumstances the argument to count the individual peacekeeper on ground responsible for things, which their political masters even refused to realize, seems somewhat strange.- "The Triumph of the Evil." Interview with Iqbal Riza, Assistant Under-General-General for Peacekeeping Operations; Off, Carol: *The Lion. The Fox & The Eagle*, pp.90-91.

⁶⁷ With the beginning of the open violence BrigGen Dallaire saw himself all at a sudden as a “Force Commander without mandate”. The Belgian and Bengali contingents got conflicting orders on a national chain of command, French, Belgian and Italian evacuation forces under respective national command entered the mission theatre without giving Dallaire any command & control influence. - Dallaire, R.A.: “Command Experiences in Rwanda”, pp.35-38; Off, Carol: *The Lion. The Fox & The Eagle*, pp.40-41, 61-64; *Report of the Independent Inquiry*, III. Conclusions, 16. National evacuation: international troops in different roles.

⁶⁸ *Report of the Independent Inquiry*, III. Conclusions, 11. Failure to protect political leaders. Off, Carol: *The Lion. The Fox & The Eagle*, pp.108-112.

⁶⁹ *Report of the Independent Inquiry*, III. Conclusions, 12. Failure to protect civilians.

civilian UN staff was evacuated, national staff members were left behind. In this case the Independent Inquiry's finding is not quite understandable insofar as they rely on a quite abstract "responsibility of information" rather than on a "responsibility of protection"

"The mistaken perception among national staff members in Rwanda that the United Nations would and could protect them shows that a serious failure on the part of those in charge of security – in particular the Special Representative and the designated security officials – to provide correct information to staff members."⁷⁰

The Independent Inquiry sums up its conclusion in almost disillusioning, but – concerning the leadership of UNAMIR diffuse - final observations:

"While the presence of United Nations peacekeepers in Rwanda may have begun as a traditional peacekeeping operation to monitor the implementation of an existing peace agreement, the onslaught of the genocide should have led decision-makers in the United Nations – from the Secretary-General and the Security Council to the Secretariat officials and the leadership of UNAMIR – to realize that the original mandate, and indeed the neutral mediating role of the United Nations, was no longer adequate and required a different, more assertive response, combined with the means necessary to take such action."⁷¹

Obviously it requires the somewhat blurring political terminology of international organizations to say in the same breath that all United Nations decision-makers - ..." from the Secretary-General and the Security Council to the Secretariat officials and **the leadership of UNAMIR**"... were in an equal way responsible for not realizing ..."that the original mandate was no longer adequate and required a different, more assertive response, combined with the means necessary to take such action." On the part of UNAMIR's leadership this conclusion only is comprehensive on behalf of the mission's overall leadership – the **political leadership of UNAMIR**.⁷² During its investigation the Independent Inquiry could identify without any doubt deficiencies also on

⁷⁰ *Report of the Independent Inquiry*, III. Conclusions, 13. Failure to protect national staff.

⁷¹ *Report of the Independent Inquiry*, III. Conclusions, 19. Final conclusions

⁷² *Report of the Independent Inquiry*, III. Conclusions, 2. The inadequacy of UNAMIR's mandate, 3. The implementation of the mandate, 5. The failure to respond to the genocide, 15. Organizational problems.

behalf of UNAMIR's military leadership – but to attribute the above mentioned responsibility to them is to argue upside down!

Consequently the Independent Inquiry formulated 14 recommendations⁷³ to ensure an overall improvement on behalf of the United Nations for the further conduct of Peacekeeping Operations. Out of the specific Rwandan experience the issue of genocide and human rights issues are on top. Improvements within the organizational levels of the UN administration as well as within the UN political bodies, an effective early warning system, better cooperation with NGOs in place, protection of national staff members in crisis areas and a clear formulation of binding ROEs for the different missions are covered. Towards the Member States the requirement of well trained, equipped and mission-oriented troops as well as a sufficient funding by the of United Nations to fulfill peacekeeping missions are requested.

Dallaire's Dilemma

Out of his UNAMIR experiences LtGen Dallaire even in early 1995 made recommendations for a more effective organizational and administrative approach towards peacekeeping operations by the UN⁷⁴. A team of senior crisis managers should be installed to monitor the crisis under military, political, humanitarian and logistical aspects ... “as an entity to implement measures to stop the crisis, gain control of it, and adjust the resources needed”... . Standby military forces and equipment available to the UN on short notice together with a contingency fund for the UN Secretary General to pay for emergency activities should provide efficient rapid response and more freedom of action. A rapid response support system should improve the field commander's authority to allocate and spend budgets in a proper and efficient way. Non-Governmental

⁷³ see Enclosure IV

Organizations' activities on the ground should be coordinated by an UN agency, missions should have their own media platform, including jamming capabilities against broadcast activities aimed at inciting things like crimes against humanity or the killing of peacekeepers. Not the least he argued for an integral intelligence-gathering capability for the UN.

In his most recent publication⁷⁵ LtGen Dallaire broadened his spectrum of “lessons learned” out his personal experience in coalition-type UN-Chapter VI-mission⁷⁶ and focuses besides the organizational elements as well on moral and ethical perspectives of leadership.

As a most crucial starting point in a complex coalition mission, like UNAMIR was, Dallaire identified the need for an intimate familiarity with the mission's complex rules of engagement, which are undoubtedly agreed and accepted by all participants – political, governmental, military as well as NGOs. The diffuse and diverging interpretations of the UNAMIR ROEs were reason for immense losses of personnel and credibility⁷⁷. All clarification at the same time will become somewhat diffuse, when the vocabulary changes: classic military terms like “attack, defend, or destroy” will mutate in a conflict resolution operation to terms like “monitor, assist, create, and investigate”. “Nuances of an agreement and the complex wording of mandates carry enormous political implications – implications that military organizations are not (*necessarily*) trained to handle, especially when they concern the delicate balance of power between rival factions in

⁷⁴ Hobson, Sharon: Interview with Major General Romeo Dallaire. *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Vol. 23, No. 15, (15 April 1995, p. 32; Dallaire / Poulin I, p. 11; Dallaire / Poulin II, p. 71

⁷⁵ Dallaire, R.A.: “Command Experiences in Rwanda”. The author summarizes his findings under topics: a) Classic warfare skills are insufficient, b) Sophisticated technology versus the simple radio, c) Cultural awareness, d) Risk assessment and decision making, e) Casualties, f) Uncertainty and ambiguity, g) Moral and ethical dilemmas, h) Accountability, i) Military cohesion, k) One mission for all participants, l) Communication and the media, m) Trust, n) Discipline, stress, and coping.

⁷⁶ LtGen Dallaire summarizes peacekeeping missions under a broad “conflict resolution” scenario, which he assumes as constituent for the majority of future military involvement particular for middle powers due to the increasing unwillingness of world power nations to involve in military actions out of their primary national interest. Dallaire, R.A.: “Command Experiences in Rwanda”, pp.32.

⁷⁷ Dallaire, R.A.: “Command Experiences in Rwanda”, p.31.

scenarios where the agreements between the factions have not been formalized.”⁷⁸ Under such circumstances all of a sudden the classic distinction between the political – strategic – operational levels loose their meaning.

The different cultural biases often were reason for western cultural arrogance. Intimate knowledge of the historical, political, social, economic, ethnic and religious background of the country, its people and the groups involved proved as an important factor. General Paul Kagame for example, the leader of the Tutsi RPF, received military training as an Ugandan officer at the U.S.Army Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas in 1990.

Subsequently he operated very successfully against the French during “Operation Turquoise”. Because of his experience, he could argue “Kigali can handle more body bags than Paris can.”⁷⁹ Particularly under the severe Somalia experience the grave concern about suffering any military casualties proved to be an overriding factor for most Western countries: confronted with 10 killed paratroopers Belgium withdrew its whole contingent within days – an internal political decision despite deserting of thousands of refugees under Belgian protection. For months President Clinton's PDD 25 prevented any US military assistance and even in July 1994 the vast majority of US troops were deployed to neighboring countries of Uganda and Zaire. A US contingent even was forbidden to provide UNAMIR forces with water supply, which was urgently needed in the face of hundreds of displaced persons under UNAMIR protection, which were dying of thirst⁸⁰.

During the Rwandan genocide UNAMIR personnel were confronted with “ hundreds and thousands of belligerents (female as well as male), many of whom intoxicated on narcotics and alcohol “, driven into brutal ethnic, tribal or religiously originated violence by the most effective,

⁷⁸ Dallaire, R.A.: “Command Experiences in Rwanda”, pp.38-39

simple use of hateful, slaughter-inciting radio propaganda. Western technological superiority was marginalized by the fact, that the mandates and ROEs perspective classified the national (mis-) use of broadcast under the cover of national sovereignty.⁸¹

The outbreak of the violence marked an additional cornerstone for serious moral and ethnic questions: Within hours the Rwandan cease-fire was broken and the belligerent Rwandan parties went to war. Despite any discussion on the ROEs' interpretation, Dallaire legally stated the end of his mission's mandate.

As above mentioned the Independent Inquiry stated the failure to protect the political leaders⁸².

Dallaire questions whether his order – or request – to his troops to protect Rwandan politicians was morally correct under those conditions? What reasons should they have to risk their lives on order of a Canadian general, ...”when their own country was not at a risk, their government did not want casualties, and our chances of success were minimal?”...⁸³ Dallaire is convinced that his decision was absolutely correct. Personally he proved his serious conviction towards human rights and the protection of refugees and displaced persons during the Rwanda genocide manifold⁸⁴, although he might not be seen very successful in his achievement in the face of hundreds of thousands killed, by his refusal, to cut down his mission to 270 troops on the UN order, and his decision to evacuate as last resort by a foot-march together with the persons under UNAMIR protection, when the UN refused him an airlift. But his questions on a commander’s risk assessment nevertheless remain and prove the depth of his dilemma:

⁷⁹ Dallaire, R.A.: “Command Experiences in Rwanda”, p.35; Off, Carol: *The Lion The Fox & The Eagle*.pp.76, 82.

⁸⁰ Dallaire, R.A.: “Command Experiences in Rwanda”, p.38; Off, Carol: *The Lion The Fox & The Eagle*.pp.81.

⁸¹ Dallaire, R.A.: “Command Experiences in Rwanda”, p.34.

⁸² *Report of the Independent Inquiry*, III. Conclusions, 11. Failure to protect political leaders

⁸³ Dallaire, R.A.: “Command Experiences in Rwanda”, p.36

⁸⁴ Repeatedly he was the aim of serious attempts of discredit by the Rwandan media and particular target of various murder plots - Off, Carol: *The Lion The Fox & The Eagle*.pp.75-76, 84.

“How far should a commander go in negotiating with a belligerent leader (one who still has blood on his hands from the morning’s slaughter) to save a couple of thousand people, when the commander knows that this same belligerent is killing others by the tens of thousands? How far should a commander risk the lives of (...) own troops in order to save a few people when the belligerents are slaughtering others left and right? How can commanders in such a situation reasonably balance the risks in operation? Lacking a direct threat to their country’s national security, should their priorities change from the time-honored military ethos of “my mission, my personnel, myself” to “my personnel, my mission, myself”? Commanders therefore have to balance many paradoxical questions: How many casualties will the different national contingents in a multinational operation absorb before actually pulling out? What will inspire troops to commit themselves to enormous personal risks when they know that other nations will withdraw after (or even before) they take casualties? Should commanders spare lives of their troops and possibly sacrifice the mission, but then face their nation’s and possibly the world’s moral acrimony? Or should they commit their troops to achieving the mission using the classic casualty assessments techniques for success? Do commanders in conflict resolution situations need a whole new set of rules, equations, and doctrine to help them make such decisions?”⁸⁵

And above this, add the question: What happens, if the respective political leadership does not act corresponding to their political responsibility so that the military leader will lack the understanding of mutual loyalty? Military leaders are certainly accountable to their own government for their actions, but are they also accountable to international organizations – and vice versa – are international organizations accountable to national military leaders? Dallaire knows that feeling by stating: “Surely no single nation would have deserted its troops the way we were deserted by the world community in Rwanda”.⁸⁶

Dallaire presents horrific examples of moral and ethical dilemmas, in which there can be doubt on the relevance of Western beliefs and values:

“When a platoon commander is restricted to the Chapter VI rules of engagement, what should that commander say to his or her troops as they work their way into a village where the inhabitants have been slaughtered, where women and children have been literally hacked to pieces, but some are still alive and screaming for help? Does the platoon commander order the soldiers to help the survivors when 30 % of the population is known to have AIDS, and the platoon personnel lack of gloves and other safety

⁸⁵ Dallaire, R.A.: “Command Experiences in Rwanda”, p.37-38

⁸⁶ Off, Carol: The Lion The Fox & The Eagle.p.93.

equipment needed to protect them from infection? Moreover, what happens when soldiers see a woman carrying a child on her back, in the midst of a killing spree by extremist groups, hacking to death another woman carrying a child on her back? Do the soldier open fire? On whom? What are the moral implications if they do not try to stop the killing?⁸⁷

The issue of accountability for Dallaire is to be understood in a new dimensions. In his personal argumentation on accountability versus obedience he gets even close to the contemporary German members of the 20 July 1944 Resistance Group, when he refers to his own perception of accountability towards history:

“In Rwanda, if we too had withdrawn outright when ordered to, ...(...)... we would have had to live with having morally failed to try to avoid a catastrophe or at least try to save some of the moderate leaders on both sides in the process. History would have warranted in painting us as the force with no clear mandate that withdrew for fear of casualties just when hundreds of thousands of people were being slaughtered. The United Nations, the contributing nations, and I myself could justifiably have been held accountable for cowardliness and a complete lack of morale fibre.”⁸⁸

But he also raises really new and provoking issues, which certainly needs to be debated seriously:

“During the first three weeks of the genocide in Rwanda, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was the only international agency in the country, except for the media and UNAMIR. The ICRC lost 56 nationals who had been negotiating for the safe passage of casualties during assaults on hospitals. Yet when asked to testify at the ICTR (*International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda*), the ICRC refused, arguing that to do so would jeopardize the perception of its impartiality in future hot spots! Should military personnel similarly not testify before such bodies, since militaries must also be perceived as neutral and impartial participants for future conflict resolution operations?”⁸⁹

Dallaire without any doubt is right in his perception that the question of accountability is not restricted to the political or strategic level, but dominates more and more everyday military life in peacekeeping operations. His example of questions in the field of law in armed conflict – here

⁸⁷ Dallaire, R.A.: “Command Experiences in Rwanda”, p.39.

⁸⁸ Dallaire, R.A.: “Command Experiences in Rwanda”, p.40. The fact, that Dallaire obviously did not feel himself prepared towards this situation, indicates a certain lack in the senior officers military education system at least within the Canadian Forces. This must not be assumed generally for other military forces – in particular those who coped intensively with the European history of the WW II era.

⁸⁹ Dallaire, R.A.: “Command Experiences in Rwanda”, p.41.

questions of status of prisoners of war etc. – is coercive. The multinationality in coalition forces does not make that problems easier to be handled.

Dallaire was a victim of the fact, that conflict resolution under UN responsibility is completely dependent on the willingness of the member nations to furnish mission-appropriate trained and equipped forces and fund UN in an adequate and timely way to conduct a successful operation.

“The commander may appear to have an adequate number of troops, but if more than half of them do not meet minimum standards or do have the requisite mobility and sustainability, then the commander is seriously limited in employing them. Imagine building a headquarters using staff who don’t speak the same language and don’t even have the same operating procedures.”⁹⁰

Another serious cause of potential conflicts Dallaire identified in the cooperation – or coexistence – between military forces and NGOs as well as military forces and the media in the same theater. Although he had substantial assistance particular by NGO and the media in the horrific days of April/May 1994⁹¹, he points out that military and NGOs have different aims and missions which will be to some degree incompatible, but have to be integrated.

“I am adamant that conflict resolution must not be attempted unless we are willing to address all the dimensions of a problem (that is, its political, humanitarian, security, and economic factors) and to do so over the long term – for decades if necessary. Unless we are willing to make long-term commitments, we must not deploy troops under the pressure of media-driven hype.”⁹²

⁹⁰ Dallaire, R.A.: “Command Experiences in Rwanda”, p.42; *Report of the Independent Inquiry*, III. Conclusions, 6. Peacekeeping overburdened: inadequate resources and logistics; Off, Carol: *The Lion The Fox & The Eagle*.pp.112.

⁹¹ Off, Carol: *The Lion The Fox & The Eagle*.pp.67

⁹² Dallaire, R.A.: “Command Experiences in Rwanda”, p.44. This perception proofs right when compared to the political understanding of NATO’s involvement in former Yugoslavia, as underlined by the political responsible institutions involved.

Concerning the media, Dallaire underlines the positive effects of a deliberate use of this asset by a Force Commander to gain an influencing forum for his problems on the one side, but also to make best use to additionally address his forces.⁹³

Last but not least Dallaire stresses the importance of strong military discipline – an area which proved some remarkable deficiencies on the level of some troops deployed under his command in UNAMIR⁹⁴. In close conjunction with this he underlined the increasing urgent necessity to cope with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) on all levels of military personnel employed.⁹⁵

If this topic will not be further discussed in length it is out of mainly two reasons: the one is the fact of an increasing awareness of that problem⁹⁶, the other one is found in the personality of LtGen Romeo Dallaire himself, who personally has experienced PTSD and even now seems to be a serious victim of this problem.⁹⁷

Summing up LtGen Dallaire's conclusions can not be done better than in his own words, strongly arguing towards the development of a

“balance between providing (a) the training, equipment priorities, and force structures required for classic RMA-type warfighting, and (b) the much broader multidisciplinary

⁹³ Dallaire, R.A.: “Command Experiences in Rwanda”, pp.45.

⁹⁴ Dallaire, R.A.: “Command Experiences in Rwanda”, pp.46; Off, Carol: *The Lion The Fox & The Eagle*. pp.40-41, 61-64. At the same time these examples of poor discipline to a certain degree influenced the picture in the conclusions of the Independent Inquiry - *Report of the Independent Inquiry, The crash of the Presidential plane: genocide begins*. III. Conclusions, 11. Failure to protect political leaders.

⁹⁵ Dallaire, R.A.: “Command Experiences in Rwanda”, pp.46.

⁹⁶ English, Allan D.: *Historical and Contemporary Interpretations of Combat Stress Reactions*. Prepared for the Board of Inquiry – Croatia. Board of Inquiry - Croatia, Canada 26.January 2000; Farley, K.M.: *Stress in Military Operations*. Canadian Forces Personnel Applied Research Unit, Willowdale, Ontario 1995; Hatton, Richard A.: *Stressors and Stresses on Peacekeeping Operations: Implications for Operational-Level Commanders*. Toronto, Ontario, CFC, AMSC 1, November 1998; Lamerson, G.D. Kelloway, E.K.: *Towards a Model of Peacekeeping Stress: Traumata and Contextual Influences*. Canadian Psychology. 37 no.4 (1996), pp.195-204; Pinch, Franklin C. - Dickenson, Ron A.: *Notes on the Sources of Stresses and Strains in the Military Operational Environment*. Gloucester, ON: FCP Human Resources Consulting, September 1998; Reproduction from AMSC 3 A/AS/GSP/LDR/LD-1 / A/PS/GSP/LDR/S-3, Annex C; Town, Richard R.: *The Effect on Sustainment of Stress in Operations*. Toronto, Ontario, CFC, AMSC 2, November 1999.

⁹⁷ It is frequently reported that Dallaire even as Force Commander UNAMIR several times went out to willingly suicidal missions and suffers immense personal problems since he came back from Rwanda. Due to the self-restriction mentioned at the beginning, this area will not be subject to further description. Off, Carol: *General Breakdown*. In: *National Post*, 28 October 2000, *Saturday Night*, Don Mills pp.29-38; Off, Carol: *The Lion The Fox & The Eagle*.pp.84.

competencies that leaders require to be able to develop innovative solutions and methods for conflict resolution. The officer corps needs a broader-based education, with increased emphasis on the social science in particular. Furthermore, conflict resolution operations will demand that military doctrine be modified, upgraded, or even created outright, and that changes be made in leadership training, stress management policies, and possibly even organizational structures.”⁹⁸

Conclusions and recommendation

It might be tempting and on the first glance almost easy to respond to the Rwanda experience with the formulation of an impressive “list of past deficiencies, shortfalls and demands” which will have to be changed. The problem of peacekeeping operations – or even better using Dallaire’s terminology “conflict resolution” – in a multinational UN-scenario is far too complex, to be solved with a simple “list of requirements”. Most of the issues are experienced and pointed out already many times, at different levels solutions are already on the way.⁹⁹

Given the fact - and there are strong indications - that conflict resolution missions will be a dominant part of future military missions, organization, structure, equipment, training and education of armed forces have to be restructured and adjusted towards the demands and requirements of modern conflict resolution. Whether this will be accomplished by the creation of specific conflict-resolution-forces or by classic “all-round-forces” will be predominantly a national decision. The vast amount of the recommendations above-mentioned show the path and most forces already passed the starting line.

⁹⁸ Dallaire, R.A.: “Command Experiences in Rwanda”, p.49.

⁹⁹ Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda. United Nations Department of Public Information, New York, 15 December 1999, IV. Recommendations (see Enclosure IV); *Rapport d'information*, Tome I, pp.345-359; Hobson, Sharon: Interview with Major General Romeo Dallaire. *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Vol. 23, No. 15, (15 April 1995, p. 32; Dallaire / Poulin I, p. 11; Dallaire / Poulin II, p. 71) Dallaire, R.A.: “Command Experiences in Rwanda”, p.49. For the UN the most recently forwarded “Bahimi”-Report is most interesting. Theoretically this reports leads a way into the future – hopefully it will be a basis for actions to follow - *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*. A Far Reaching Report by an Independent Panel. 21 August 2000 (Bahimi-Report)

Without any doubt it is of great importance to improve on organizational and administrative levels, because that is the comparatively easier way and may bring faster solutions. Concerning the United Nations, the Independent Inquiry has presented important recommendations.

Everybody will agree that it is of utmost importance to formulate a clear mandate with binding ROEs for any mission and ensure a clear and common understanding and interpretation between all parties involved. Hopefully the United Nations will improve their organizational capabilities, existing regulations and internal cooperation to ensure a more effective use of capacities and capabilities already in place. As a prerequisite, member states hopefully will provide appropriate funding for required logistics.

Since international organizations like the United Nations by nature are “coalitions of the willing” all their efforts unfortunately have the inherent tendency to be bound towards the restriction of a “lowest common denominator”. The willingness and determination of the Member States, the way in which they perceive their national interests, define the means they are willing to invest and by this way define the results of any effort. Accepting this fact, questions have to be answered: What are the interests of the United Nations? Are there really common interests of such gravity that they will be undoubtedly and universally accepted? Asked on an abstract basis, stopping or even better preventing genocide should be such a common interest. In the concrete constellation Rwanda proved, that this was not the case. What remains? Can it be more than the hope, that constant recommendations and appeals may shape the member states willingness to bear responsibility?

It was the former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, who formulated an “Agenda for Peace” and claimed for military contingents provided by Member States to the United Nations under UN command and control to fulfil such conflict resolutions. But it takes not only forces – to use

forces effectively an experienced military staff under an appropriate command and control structure has to be installed. Particularly the UNAMIR experience proved problems resulting from the lack or negligence of a responsible and responsive appropriate military UN command and control structure on the strategic level. The “Bahimi”-Report contains a lot of useful recommendations for organizational and structural improvement of the UN organization¹⁰⁰. But even then it requires a strong imagination to envision that member states could be willing to provide permanent national military forces under a UN authority. Nevertheless – would that solve problems like experienced during UNAMIR, when Member States unilaterally terminated their commitment?

States install armed forces out of their national will and interest. It is our understanding that soldiers are strictly bound to the political primacy – normally represented by national authorities. Loyalty towards the national political leadership corresponds with responsibility of the political institutions. Can this relationship be transformed towards international institutions? How can effective political control of armed forces and the mutual atmosphere of responsibility and loyalty be preserved in an international environment, where “political influence” as result of "political interests" (not necessarily identical with “national interests of the political entities involved) determine minimized “coalition interests”? There is reasonable doubt – Dallaire’s statement of having been “deserted by the world community” seems to be still valid!

Above mentioned prerequisites for a successful military operational-level leadership in peace support operations under UN command had been identified. To a high degree these facts were not given during the UNAMIR operation: political responsiveness, interest and unity of effort by the parties involved were underdeveloped if not existent. Dallaire's mission was poorly financed,

¹⁰⁰ *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. A Far Reaching Report by an Independent Panel.* 21

badly equipped with most personnel not seriously enough trained and educated for such a mission. There was no effective political analysis and intelligence to the conflict, the command and control structures were not adequate and UN's political guidance and interpretation of the missions mandate was nor stringent nor forceful. These factors set the frame in which Dallaire had to act as an operational level commander.

Without any doubt Dallaire's leadership was characterized by an outstanding degree of personal dedication - dedication towards the mission itself as well as dedication towards the peacekeeping function of the UN at all. It is questionable whether Dallaire did experience this dedicational duality - out of the retrospective there seems to be some indication that this duality might have been reason for some of his decisions - at least up to the moment when he decided not to follow orders from UN Headquarters. One might argue that his dedication was too high so that it strained the realistic assessment of certain factors. There are some indications for the mission-dedication's preponderance: His realistic request for 5000 troops, the formulation of the ROE - in particular its para 17, his 11 January 1994 request to swipe the arms caches or his 12 April 1994 proposal of a 5000 troops rapid reaction force with the aim to stop violence under a Chapter VI mission on the basis of para 17 of his ROE. On the other hand there is some lack of realistic perception of the political situation, the acceptance of UN decisions against his own conviction. Anyway - this would be an easy post-factum assessment.

Dallaire gave significant examples for his charismatic leadership and his crucial ability to motivate his troops, which stood with him under utmost severe and dangerous conditions - even under circumstances of extreme desertion by the military and political levels of responsibility. From an very early stage he was aware of the tactical as well as operational as well as strategic

role he had to cover up to top level political decisions. Very soon he also was aware of the moral implications of his leadership - as well towards his troops, as well as towards the Rwandan population.

The question to resign in face of the strategic and political desertion and the lack of will and responsibility by the involved parties obviously was not a realistic choice for him. Until the crucial events of 6 April 1994 proved the end of any peaceful solution Dallaire obviously did not lose confidence to fulfill his mission. The more the slaughters went on the more it was a convincing moral obligation for him to stay in theater. One might argue that this was wrong under military operational-level perspectives. But those who argue in that way have to reflect on their arguments in case if Dallaire really would have evacuated UNAMIR together with the withdrawing Belgian contingent.

As legitimate as the desire might be for a final and "handy" evaluation and judgement on Dallaire's leadership during UNAMIR - a proper evaluation or judgement requires stringent and complete information about the facts in detail. Unfortunately in the UNAMIR case this is not done yet. Even the Report of the UN Independent Inquiry did not cope with or answer important details. Some interrelations up till now stay in the dark. The more it is surprising to realize how some complacent "experts" come up with easygoing judgements without serious competence ¹⁰¹. It seems to be easy to blame Dallaire for asking for informing UN Headquarters about his intentions to raid the arms caches¹⁰² - he was correct and he was denied!

¹⁰¹ Particularly Carol Off's recent publication seems to be reason for journalistic "handy" judgements like - Worthington, Peter: *Even the best intentions can go wrong*. Toronto Star, 3 December 2000
<<http://www.canoe.com/Columnists/worthington.html>>

¹⁰² ... "Of course, he should have raided the arms caches he'd been tipped off about, and told New York afterwards. Asking permission was fatal. He could even have used the old journalist's technique of informing editors: "Unless hear otherwise, I intend ..." - Worthington, Peter: *Even the best intentions can go wrong*. Toronto Star, 3 December 2000. That makes the difference between journalists and responsible soldiers and may be it's the reason, why Force Commanders are needed. Thank God - Dallaire acted like a soldier and not like a journalist!

To give some further examples of lack of final research and knowledge:

The Independent Inquiry stated that deficiencies in the in-theater command and control structure:

Before doing so it must be researched, what foreign troops were in the Rwanda theater besides UNAMIR and not under Dallaire's command? There are indications about such units: for example the first foreign troops in place at the crash-zone of President Habyarimana's plane at 6 April 1994 were French troops (not under UNAMIR command and control), whereas UN troops were denied access. What was the role and mission of those troops, what was the knowledge of UN Headquarters about those military formations, their mission?

The Independent Inquiry as other authors stated, that Dallaire had sufficient military force and should have used this force offensively to stop violence just from the outbreak at 07 April 1994. Was UNAMIR's force really "sufficient" for such a task - keeping in mind that UN Headquarters itself had estimated a force-strength of 8000 troops as required in October 1993? Such a statement seriously contradicts to the Belgian foreign minister Willy Claes's perception to strengthen UNAMIR, pointed out in a letter to the UN Secretary-General at 14 February 1994. But troop strength is only one side of the coin - troop effectiveness primarily depends on troop equipment and in particular on the training and education status those troops have. Time and time again Dallaire requested for appropriate equipment of his troops - without success!

Statements on Dallaire's leadership like:

" One can't help feeling that had MacKenzie been in Rwanda, not only would 800,000 people not have been slaughtered, but UN troops would have had the weaponry and muscle to impose some sort of order."...¹⁰³

are fatal and ridiculous in the face of Dallaire's unsuccessful requests for additional troops, appropriate equipment and even the Canadian refusal to send additional troops!

¹⁰³ Worthington, Peter: *Even the best intentions can go wrong*. Toronto Star, 3 December 2000

There is significant contradiction in the present literature and documents on the crucial subject of the ROEs - its approval by UN Headquarters and the question, whether all UNAMIR troops operated under the same ROEs. The argumentation particular on the ROE's para 17 is inconsistent and has to be cleared.

Last but not least the Independent Inquiry's statement on Dallaire's 11 January 1994 cable:

"Dallaire should not have addressed the cable only to Baril" leads to unanswered questions about the role and function of the Military Advisor to the UN Secretary-General within the UN Headquarters structure, his functional relationship to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations and DPKO. On the bottomline it is the unclarified relationship between the operational, strategic and political levels within UN Headquarters with its consequence for any operational leadership.

There is a lot of contradiction in details – further in depth research of the documents in the archives of the UN in New York, in the archives of the United States, Belgium, France, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and Canada will be necessary, as well as at the ICRC and some NGOs. Researches and interviews with contemporaries will be required – and the one or the other would have to break his silence.

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
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Rapport d'information depose en appelation de l'article 145 du Reglement par la Mission d'Information de la Commission de la Defense nationale et des Forces armees et de la Commission des Affaires etrangeres sur les operations militaires menees par la France, d'autres pays et l'ONU au Rwanda entre 1990 et 1994. France. Assemblée nationale, Paris , 15 Decembre 1998, Tome I, II, III(1), III(2). <<http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr>>

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Enclosure I:**Organization of UNAMIR (Force numbers of March 1994)**¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁴ Willame, Jean-Claude: *Les Belges au Rwanda. Le Parcours de la Honte*. Bruxelles: Ed.Grip, 1997, p. 73

Enclosure II: Cable from BrigGen Romero Dallaire, Force Commander UNOMIR to MajGen Maurice Baril, Military Advisor to the Secretary General, United Nations, dated 11 January 1994¹⁰⁵

TO:
BARIL/DPKO/UNATIONS FROM:
DALLAIRE/UNOMIR/KIGALI
NEW YORK
FAX NO: MOST
IMMEDIATE-CODE
CABLE-212-xxx-xxxx FAX NO: 011-xxx-xxxx

INMARSAT:
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR
PROTECTION OF
INFORMANT

ATTN: MGEN BARIL ROOM NO: 2052
TOTAL NUMBER OF
TRANSMITTED PAGES
INCLUDING THIS ONE: 2

1. Force Commander put in contact with informant by very very important government politician. Informant is top level trainer in the cadre of interhamwe-armed militia MRND.
2. He informed us he was in charge of last Saturdays demonstrations which aims were to target deputies of opposition parties coming to ceremonies and Belgian soldiers. They hoped to provoke the RPF BN to engage (being fired upon) the demonstrators and provoke a civil war. Deputies were to be assassinated upon entry or exit from Parliament. Belgian troops were to be provoked and if Belgians soldiers restored to force a number of them were to be killed and thus guarantee Belgian withdrawal from Rwanda.
3. Informant confirmed 48 RGF PARA CDO and a few members of the gendarmerie participated in demonstrations in plain clothes. Also at least one Minister of the MRND and the sous-prefect of Kigali were in the demonstration. RGF and Interhamwe provided radio communication.
4. Informant is former security member of the president. He also stated he is paid 150,000 per month by the MRND party to train Interhamwe. Direct link is to chief of staff RGF and president of the MRND for financial and material support.

¹⁰⁵ "The Triumph of the Evil." How the West ignored warnings of the 1994 Rwanda genocide and turned its back on the victims. Interviews. 100 days of slaughter. The Somalia debacle. Readings. The warning. *PBS Online and WGBH/Frontline* <<http://www.pbs.org/wbg...es/frontline/shows/evil/index.html>>

5. Interhamwe has trained 1700 men in RGF military camps outside the capital. The 1700 are scattered in groups of 40 throughout Kigali. Since UNAMIR deployed he has trained 300 personnel in three weeks training sessions at RGF camps. Training focus was discipline, weapons, explosives, close combat and tactics.
6. Principal aim of Interhamwe in the past was to protect Kigali from RPF. Since UNAMIR mandate he has been ordered to register all Tutsi in Kigali. He suspects it is for their extermination. Example he gave was that in 20 minutes his personnel could kill up to 1000 Tutsis.
7. Informant states he disagrees with anti-Tutsi extermination. He supports opposition to RPF but cannot support killing of innocent persons. He also stated that he believes the president does not have full control over all elements of his old party/faction.
8. Informant is prepared to provide location of major weapons cache with at least 134 weapons. He already has distributed 110 weapons including 35 with ammunition and can give us details of their location. Type of weapons are G3 and AK47 provided by RGF. He was ready to go to the arms cache tonight – if we gave him the following guarantee. He requests that he and his family (his wife and four children) be placed under our protection.
9. It is our intention to take action within the next 36 hours with the possible H HR of Wednesday at dawn (local). Informant states that hostilities may commence again if political deadlock ends. Violence could take place day of the ceremonies or the day after. Therefore Wednesday will give greatest chance of success and also be most timely to provide significant input to on-going political negotiations.
10. It is recommended that informant be granted protection and evacuated out of Rwanda. This HQ does not have previous UN experience in such matters and urgently requests guidance. No contact has yet been made to any embassy in order to inquire if they are prepared to protect him for a period of time by granting diplomatic immunity in their embassy in Kigali before moving him and his family out of the country.
11. Force commander will be meeting with the very very important political person tomorrow morning in order to ensure that this individual is conscious of all parameters of his involvement. Force commander does have certain reservations on the suddenness of the change of heart of the informant to come clean with this information. Recce of armed cache and detailed planning of raid to go on late tomorrow. Possibility of a trap not fully excluded, as this may be a set-up against this very very important political person. Force commander to inform SRSG first thing in morning to ensure his support.
13. Peux Ce Que Veux. Allons-y.

Enclosure III: Cable of Kofi Annan, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations to Force Commander UNAMIR, BrigGen Romeo Dallaire (signed by Iqbal Riza, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations), dated 11 January 1994¹⁰⁶

TO: BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR ONLY
 NO DISTRIBUTION
 FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
 NUMBER: UNAMIR: 100
 SUBJECT: Contacts with Informant

1. We have carefully reviewed the situation in the light of your MIR-79. We cannot agree to the operation contemplated in paragraph 7 of your cable, as it clearly goes beyond the mandate entrusted to UNAMIR under resolution 872 (1003).
2. However, on the assumption that you are convinced that the information provided by the informant is absolutely reliable, we request you to undertake the initiative described in the following paragraphs.
3. SRSG and FC should request urgent meeting with the President. At that meeting you should inform the President that you have received apparently reliable information concerning the activities of the Interhamwe militia which represents a clear threat to the peace process. You should inform him that these activities include the training and deployment of subversive groups in Kigali as well as the storage and distribution of weapons to these groups.
4. You should inform him that these activities constitute a clear violation of the provisions of the Arusha peace agreement and of the Kigali weapons-secure area. You should assume that he is not aware of these activities, but insist that he must ensure that these subversive activities are immediately discontinued and inform you within 48 hours of the measures taken in this regard, including the recovery of the arms which have been distributed.
5. You should advise the President that, if any violence occurs in Kigali, you would have to immediately bring to the attention of the Security Council the information you have received on the activities of the militia, undertake investigations to determine who is responsible and make appropriate recommendations to the Security Council.
6. Before meeting with the President you should inform the Ambassadors of Belgium, France and the United Nations of your intentions and suggest to them that they may wish to consider making similar demarche.
7. For security considerations, we leave it to your discretion to decide whether to inform the PM(D) of you plans before or after the meeting with the President. When you meet with the PM(D), you should explain to him the limits of your mandate. You should also assure him that, while the mandate of UNAMIR does not allow you to extend protection to the informant, his identity and your contacts with him will not be repeated not be revealed.
8. If you have major problems with the guidance provided above, you may consult us further. We wish to stress, however, that the overriding consideration is the need to avoid entering into a course of action that might lead to the use of force and unanticipated repercussions. Regards.

¹⁰⁶ "The Triumph of the Evil." How the West ignored warnings of the 1994 Rwanda genocide and turned its back on the victims. Interviews. 100 days of slaughter. The Somalia debacle. Readings. The warning. *PBS Online and WGBH/Frontline* <http://www.pbs.org/wbg...es/frontline/shows/evil/index.html>

Enclosure IV: Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda. United Nations Department of Public Information, New York, 15 December 1999, IV. Recommendations¹⁰⁷

1. The Secretary-General should initiate an action plan to prevent genocide involving the whole UN system, and aiming to provide input to the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance in 2001
2. Renewed efforts should be made to improve the capacity of the UN in the field of peacekeeping, including the availability of resources: political momentum for action should be mobilized at the Millennium Summit and Assembly. In each peacekeeping operation it should be clear which Rules of Engagement apply.
3. The United Nations – and in particular the Security Council and troop contributing countries – must be prepared to act to prevent acts of genocide or gross violations of human rights wherever they may take place. The political will to act should not be subject to different standards.
4. The early warning capacity of the United Nations needs to be improved, through better cooperation with outside actors including Egos and academics, as well as within the Secretariat.
5. Efforts need to be made to improve the protection of civilians in conflict situations.
6. Further improvements in the security of UN and associated personnel, including local staff, are necessary. Consideration should be given to changing existing rules to enable the evacuation of national staff from crisis areas.
7. Cooperation between officials responsible for the security of different categories of staff in the field needs to be ensured.
8. An effective flow of information needs to be ensured within the UN system.
9. Further improvements should be made in the flow of information to the Security Council.
10. The flow of information on human rights issues should be improved.
11. National evacuation operations must be coordinated with UN missions on the ground.
12. Further study should be given to the possibility to suspend participation of the representative of a Member State on the Security Council in exceptional circumstances such as in the crisis in Rwanda.
13. The international community should support efforts in Rwanda to rebuild the society after the genocide, paying particular attention to the need for reconstruction, reconciliation and respect for human rights, and bearing in mind the different needs of survivors, returning refugees and other groups affected by the genocide.
14. The United Nations should acknowledge its part of the responsibility for not having done enough to prevent or stop the genocide in Rwanda. The Secretary-General should actively seek ways to launch a new beginning in the relationship between the United Nations and Rwanda.

¹⁰⁷ Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda. United Nations Department of Public Information, New York, 15 December 1999, IV. Recommendations
<<http://www.un.org>>